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 yANamialaceleleledieance)

Contemporary
Islamic Philosophy
Translated by ©
Mostafa Hoda’‘i
An Introduction to Contemporary Islamic Philosophy
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 AN
INTRODUCTION TO
CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC
PEO OP THY

Mohammad Fana’i Eshkevari

Translated by
Mostafa Hoda’i
 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British
Library.

ISBN: 978-1-907905-02-5 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-907905-03-2 (pbk)

© MIU PRESS, 2012

This edition first published in 2012

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored

in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
without the prior permission in writing of MIU Press, or as expressly
permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate
reprographics rights organisation. Enquiries concerning reproduction
outside the scope of the foregoing should be addressed to MIU Press.

MIU Press
Premier House, Unit 8, 11‘ Floor, 112 Station Road, Edgware,
London HA8 7B]
CONTENTS

Acknowledgement
Preface
Transliteration
Introduction
Imam Khomeini
“Allamah Tabataba’i
Ayatollah Murtada Mutahhari
Mahdi Ha’iri
Sayyid Jalal al-Din Ashtiyani 103
Sayyid Muhammad Bagir al-Sadr 122
Muhammad Tagi Ja‘fari 143
Ayatollah Hasanzadeh Amuli ’ 157
wON
oO
DS
®
DO
W Ayatollah Javadi Amuli 174
Ayatollah Muhammad Tagi Misbah Yazdi 201
Sayyid Ahmad Fardid and the Unsi Wisdom 218
eeNo
eS
EeSO
RF Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Perennial Philosophy 231
Conclusion: The Situation of Philosophy in Contemporary Iran
and Recent Developments 246

Glossary 261
Bibliography 263
Index 269
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This work would not have been possible without the support of the Islam
and West Research Centre, affiliated to Al-Mustafa International Research
Institute, Qum, Iran.
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PREFACE

The present work is an introduction to Islamic philosophical thought

in contemporary Iran and some of the most significant philosophers
of this era. It must be noted that not all philosophers discussed here
have initiated an innovative philosophical system; rather, most of
them are regarded as interpreters and expounders of Mulla Sadra’s
philosophy. Furthermore, the present writing does not intend to
enumerate the inventions of the philosophers in question. Its purpose,
however, is to introduce current, prevailing philosophical discussions
and to expand and enrich the philosophical scope of those who
engage in philosophical study and research. There has_ been,
therefore, an emphasis upon diversity of subjects chosen as well as
analysis and criticism of discussions.
I deem it necessary here to express my appreciation and gratitude
to the respected scholars hujjat al-Islam Dr Ahmad Ahmadi and hujjat
al-Islam Ghulam Rida Fayyazi who kindly studied this work and
embellished it with their genuine and elegant points. It must be
mentioned, however, that positions taken in these discussions are
those of the author and not necessarily of these respected scholars,
and the author alone is responsible for any errors or shortcomings in
the work. I would also like to thank the text compilation section of
the Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute for their efforts
in publishing the Persian text of the book. I would like to thank
Mostafa Huda’i for translation of the book and Dr Muhsin Miri, Head
of Institute of Islam and West in the al-Mustafa University for
selecting this book for translation and facilitating its translation and
publication. Finally, I would like to acknowledge the efforts of David
Burrell, Professor of Comparative Theology at Tangaza College in
Nairobi and Hesburgh Professor Emeritus of Philosophy and
Theology at the University of Notre Dame, in editing the final work.

Mohammad Fana’i Eshkevari, Qom

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TRANSLITERATION

In general, the following transliteration system has been employed.

However, in deference to common conventions, throughout the text,
‘e’ and ‘o’ have been used in lieu of ‘i’ and ‘u’ in proper names of
Persian (non-Arabic) origin (such as the suffix ‘-zadeh’), although ‘i’
and ‘u’ have been retained in transliteration of all titles and non-
English words as well as Iranian names of etymologically Arabic
origin (such as ‘Murtada’) and proper names in bibliographic
references.

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INTRODUCTION

Islamic Philosophy and its History

Etymologically, philosophy means ‘love of wisdom’ and ‘search for
knowledge’, but technically it encompasses a multitude of
applications with different extensions.
In its broadest sense, philosophy includes all sciences. Philosophy
in this sense is not one science, so Avicenna referred to it as
‘philosophical sciences’ - in the plural. It is divided into theoretical
and practical branches. Theoretical philosophical sciences, including
logic, theology, mathematics, and natural philosophy, seek the
perfection of the theoretical faculty of the human soul through
acquiring knowledge and belief, while the practical philosophical
sciences seek the perfection of the theoretical faculty of the human
soul through acquiring knowledge of practical affairs, so that the
practical faculty of the soul can be perfected through ethics in the
next phase.’
In its second sense, philosophy is a particular science which
discusses properties common to all existents or, in other words, the
existent as such,’ so it is called philosophia prima or metaphysics.
In the third sense, which is prevalent nowadays, philosophy
includes all sciences which intellectually, critically, and more or less
systematically investigate fundamental questions touching
everything.’ Philosophia prima, epistemology, philosophy of mind,
philosophy of religion, ethics, and philosophy of science are among
the various philosophical sciences in the third sense. By ‘philosophy’
in this work, we mean this third sense.
Wherever man and civilized society have existed, they have
exhibited a kind of philosophy. Different philosophies have existed in
civilizations as varied as Persia, India, China, and Greece. Greek
 PN oR OD Wey I oun

philosophy is one of the most recognized among ancient

philosophical traditions; its beginning goes back to about the sixth
century BCE. A great number of Greek philosophical works have
been preserved and have entered into other communities. Many
Greek works in the sciences, including philosophy, were translated
into Arabic and introduced to Muslims beginning in the second and
third centuries hijri.
Muslims were hardly strangers to philosophical thought prior to
acquiring knowledge of Greek philosophy; rather, intellectual and
philosophical thought in various fields had been prevalent amidst this
community. Due to the encouragement of the Qur’an and the Sunnah
to elaborate its intellectual teachings on various subjects as God,
creation, and man, critical thinking entered Muslims’ lives from the
beginning of Islam. Discussion of various doctrinal issues gradually
intensified leading to the emergence of different theological schools
as well as diverse views in Qur’anic commentary and figh. The
Muslims’ acquaintance with Greek philosophy opened new doors in
this field, and Islamic philosophical thought entered a new phase.
Following the translation of many works of Greek philosophy,
Muslims began to learn and teach Greek philosophy as well as
produce works to explain and interpret it. Chief among Muslim
philosophers’ concerns after encountering Greek philosophy was
determining its relationship with Islamic beliefs. Hence, they always
studied Greek philosophy from a critical and comparative standpoint.
In those cases where they encountered elements incompatible
with Islamic belief, they amended them to bring the appropriate
Islamic perspectives into various philosophical topics. This act of
negation and affirmation, as well as elimination and absorption,
brought philosophy out of its original Greek form to give it a new
shape as Islamic philosophy.
Doubtless there are many common elements and similar aspects
between Islamic and Greek philosophies; but their fundamental
differences in various philosophical fields, especially in theology and
anthropology, suffice to grant Islamic philosophy a new identity.
Although Greek philosophy was no stranger to the concept of God,
the Islamic interpretation of God was sufficiently different from that
of Greek philosophy to distinguish the Muslim philosophers’ view on
man and existence as well. The Islamic interpretation of God
introduced three fresh concepts into Islamic philosophical thought -
 CO NTE MiPLOIR
A RY TSE AMI EC APH ILOS
OP HY

namely, creation, revelation, and resurrection. These notions

substantially differentiated it from its Greek background. This new
philosophy or new phase of philosophy, created by Islamic thinkers
by integrating Greek philosophy with Islamic sciences, is what we
call ‘Islamic philosophy’.
Islamic philosophy has taken various forms throughout its history.
The three main schools of thought in Islamic philosophy are the
peripatetic, illuminationist, and transcendental. Aristotle’s intellectual
and logical method is dominant in the peripatetic movement, though
suffused with Platonic and neo-Platonic elements. Farabi (836-918)
and Avicenna (949-1007) are among the pioneers of Islamic peripatetic
philosophy. The illuminationist movement, founded by Shahab al-Din
Suhrawardi (1128-1166), combines theoretical thought and intuition,
though the illuminational element is of greater significance. Using
various sources of cognition including the intellect, intuition, and
revealed teachings as well as experiences of philosophers, mystics,
and theologians, Mulla Sadra (1558-1629) endeavoured in the ii
century to establish a new system which he called ‘transcendent
philosophy’. It is noteworthy that all forms of Islamic philosophy
have been influenced in one way or another by Islamic teachings.
Philosophical thought in the Islamic world has been present in
fields beyond what we call philosophy. One of those fields is
theology, reflected in well-known schools.of theology. Shi‘a theology
acquired a philosophical tone especially by Khwajah Nasir al-Tusi
(1176-1251).
Another domain connected to philosophy and_ philosophical
thought is Sufism, or mysticism. Ibn ‘Arabi (1139-1217), in particular,
gave Islamic mysticism a systematic theoretical shape, also
profoundly influencing the formation of Mulla Sadra’s transcendent
philosophy.
Indeed, one cannot come to a full recognition of philosophical
thought in the Islamic world without studying all these trends of
thought. All of them have influenced one another as each has played
some role in forming philosophical thought. Yet while Islamic
teachings have been the common source and inspiration for all of
these movements, traces of Greek philosophy can also be found in
most of them.
From a geographical standpoint, Persia became the centre of
philosophical, theological, and mystical activities. Generally,
 INTRODUCTION

however, works on the Islamic sciences were written in Arabic,

although some were written in Farsi. The western part of the Islamic
world, particularly Andalusia, wa’ also a significant region for
philosophical and mystical thought. Among the most notable
philosophers of that area were Averroes (1099-1174) and Ibn ‘Arabi.
Philosophy has had its ups and downs in the Islamic world. Just as
many Muslims welcomed philosophy and played a significant role in
its advancement, many others regarded it from the very beginning as
incompatible with Islamic teachings and resisted it. So philosophy
came to be regarded as a marginal trend in many Islamic countries, so
for much of Islamic history, controversy regarding philosophy as well
as rejection and repudiation of philosophers has prevailed. The
dominance of Ash‘arite thought over many Sunni scholars was
always a major obstacle to welcoming philosophy. At the forefront of
all those who were against philosophy stands Imam Muhammad
Ghazzali (1029-1048) who, by writing the book Tahafut al-Falasifah
(The Incoherence of the Philosophers) and excommunicating all
philosophers, launched an all-out attack on philosophy in such a way
that philosophy failed to emerge among the majority of Sunnis of the
Islamic world. Another opponent of philosophy was Ibn Taymiyyah
(d. 1139) whose negative influence can be observed till this very time
in the emergence of phenomena of Salafism and Wahhabism, which
have boycotted’ philosophy and __ intellectual thought by
excommunicating philosophers. Also, in the Shi‘a world, extreme
Akhbarism has always been in conflict with philosophy.

Contemporary Islamic Philosophy

With the efforts of such figures as Sayyid Jamal al-Din Asadabadi
(1833-1893), who graduated from the Iranian hawzah and was
a
follower of Mulla Sadra’s philosophy, philosophy, and intellec
tual
thought was gradually revived in some Islamic countries in
recent
centuries. Sayyid Jamal engaged in reviving philosophy in Egypt
in
such a way that this country became a centre for intellectual
and
philosophical activities, as several Egyptian researchers sought
to
revive the Islamic philosophical legacy. Among them, one
may
mention Muhammad ‘Abduh (1845-1902), Mustafa ‘Abd al-Razzaq,
and more recently ‘Abd al-Rahman Badawi. Nevertheless, Islamic
philosophy failed to find its proper position in the Arab world. Many
 CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY

of those engaged with philosophy in Arab countries today are

influenced by Western rather than Islamic philosophy.
Philosophy has also been alive for several centuries in the Indian
subcontinent, with many enthusiasts of philosophy throughout the
subcontinent in recent centuries. * The philosophy of Mulla Sadra was
spread in India from the 17" century, and the philosophers of that
country wrote some commentaries on it. Works of Mulla Sadra like
Sharh al-Hidayah became textbooks in some Indian Islamic
seminaries. Among the influential thinkers of that country were Shah
Waliullah Dehlavi (1693-1755) and Sayyid Ahmad Khan Bahaduri
(1811-1894). Influenced by Western modernist trends, Sayyid Ahmad
Khan reviewed the Islamic legacy as well. Doubtless, the most
influential philosopher of the region was Muhammad Iqbal Lahuri
(1868-1936) who is still the centre of philosophical attention and study
in the Indian subcontinent. Through his familiarity with Western
philosophy and thought on the one hand and Islamic philosophy and
sciences, especially that of Mawlawi on the other, he managed to
present his thoughts in a modern form focusing on the return to the
self and revival of the Islamic thought on the basis of harmony among
intellect, religion, and spiritual experience. Iqbal’s skills in composing
Farsi and Urdu poetry and presenting his ideas in versified language
have contributed to his legacy as a genuine thinker.
Nevertheless, Islamic philosophy has’ begun to capture the
attention of Muslims in the contemporary age. Many Muslim thinkers
in the Islamic world are engaged in philosophical thought, and the
various philosophical activities taking place in some Islamic countries
are worthy of separate study and research.
It is noteworthy that contemporary philosophical research in the
Islamic world, whether in the Indian subcontinent, east Asia, or the
Arab world, is for the most part influenced by Western modernism, so
the presence of the Islamic philosophical tradition in such research is
quite minimal. In order to determine the modern relationship
between Islamic and Western philosophy, one has to consider the
influence of Western thought on Muslim countries during the
colonial era. Most of those engaged in philosophy in these countries
were either been educated in Western countries or in universities in
the Islamic world which based their programs on the Western model.
In Iran, however, the case has been different. Compared to other
Islamic countries, Islamic philosophy in Iran has enjoyed a privileged
 EN EeRI@ DP wicet FOr

position, due perhaps to a vigorous philosophical tradition prior to

Islam, as well as its more than thousand-year-old history of
continuous philosophical tradition in the Islamic era; a focus on the
intellect in Shi‘a thought; and the fact that Iran was not colonized by
the Western powers. Although the wave of modernism and
Westernization reached Iran as well and had some influence, due to
the Iranian historical and cultural background, it failed to overshadow
Islamic philosophical thought.
So a long-lasting Islamic philosophical tradition must be sought in
Iran; which, as in the past, remains the heart of philosophical activity
in the Islamic world - and hence the centre of discussion in this work.
Iran has enjoyed a continuous master-disciple chain for centuries, as
the Islamic-Iranian philosophical legacy has been transferred from
one generation to another while continuing its evolutionary course.
Although the torch of philosophy has been kept alive amongst
Iranians, and figures such as Farabi, Avicenna, Suhrawardi, Khwajah
Nasir al-Tusi, and Mulla Sadra have emerged within this culture,
philosophy has never enjoyed the privilege and popularity it does
today.
In addition to global transformations which have been sources of
fundamental changes in all sciences and branches of knowledge,
including philosophy, this novel transformation in Iran is indebted,
more than anything else, to two great figures: Imam Khomeini and
‘Allamah Tabataba’i, who were the inheritors and bearers of the
Islamic intellectual and spiritual tradition, its teachers and the
mediums for transferring it to the next generation. They were two
significant philosophical, mystical poles whose wisdom stimulated,
directly or indirectly, most philosophers and students of philosophy
in contemporary Iran. Almost all of the figures discussed here have
been their students, directly or indirectly, or have been influenced by
their thoughts and works.
The present research deals with the status of Islamic philosophy in
contemporary Iran, with a brief glance at the works and ideas of the
most influential philosophers of the age. Clearly it is not possible to
demarcate between different periods. Nevertheless, all figures
discussed here are thinkers whose personalities and thoughts took
shape, and part of whose activities took place, before the Islamic
Revolution of Iran; yet they continued to flourish after it. Some have
since passed away, while others continue to benefit Iran. In the
 CON
a MORO URAL RY SSL
A Mile MRA. L OS:O PHY

interest of economy, philosophers who passed away before the

Islamic Revolution, as well as the younger generation of scholars who
flourished and bloomed after it will not come under our scrutiny.
The philosophers we will discuss are Imam Khomeini, “Allamah
Tabataba’i, Murtada Mutahhari, Mahdi Ha’iri Yazdi, Sayyid
Muhammad Bagir al-Sadr,’ Muhammad Taqi Ja‘fari, Sayyid Jalal al-
Din Ashtiyani, Hasanzadeh Amuli, Javadi Amuli, and Misbah Yazdi.
The figures mentioned are all religious scholars who have studied at
the hawzahs of Qom and Najaf, while the first seven have passed
away though the last three are still teaching at the hawzah of Qom. In
addition to these figures, the present work will also address two other
influential philosophers with different backgrounds and intellectual
tendencies: Sayyid Ahmad Fardid and Seyyed Hossein Nasr.
While I have tried not to neglect the more prominent figures, the
sheer number of philosophers in this era demands we select among
them. In some cases names have only been mentioned, and some
figures may have been neglected. I apologize for this beforehand and
hope, God willing, to compensate for this shortcoming in a more
detailed work. We shall have to discuss twelve philosophers in a
limited space, requiring the present discussion to be very brief, so will
not be able to present a detailed analysis of all the works and
thoughts of those philosophers. Most contemporary philosophers
have been prolific authors - some having produced over a hundred
works — making it impossible to summarize their thought in a brief
book. Moreover, most of these philosophers have not been presented
together in one book, and this alone makes it difficult to speak about
them. So this discussion can at best be provide a brief acquaintance
with contemporary Islamic philosophy, an indication of their thought,
and an introduction to more comprehensive research in this field.
The main purpose of this discussion is to reflect the present
condition of philosophy in contemporary Iran and to introduce the
most significant figures engaged in it. Due to the limitations
mentioned above, the present discussion will not proceed via the
usual method in the history of philosophy by presenting a brief report
of the specific and innovative views of each philosopher. In most
cases, a general outline of each figure’s philosophical background,
role, and method will first be briefly presented, and then one or more
samples of discussions presented by that philosopher will be
surveyed, so that the reader will become acquainted with the
 INTRODUCTION

favourite subjects of that philosopher as well as his outlook and

approach. Our approach will differ in the case of some figures, due to
characteristics specific to them. In ‘this way, the reader will become
aware, to some extent, of the kinds of discussion presented by each
figure as well as their philosophical trend and method of
presentation, and hence will obtain a reasonably accurate image of
contemporary Islamic philosophy.
As will be seen, the present work does not intend merely to
present a report of philosophers’ views, for its main purpose is to
pave the way for developing philosophical thought by becoming
acquainted with their ideas.
Presenting contemporary Islamic philosophy is necessary and
beneficial for various reasons. Contemporary Islamic philosophy is a
part of the history of Islamic philosophy and its presentation would
be of special benefit in addition to benefits of presenting the general
history of Islamic philosophy. The present discussion indicates that
philosophical thought continues in the Islamic world and that the age
of Islamic philosophy has not come to an end; rather, this tradition
advances with greater vivacity towards unfolding new horizons in the
realm of philosophical thought.
The present research indicates the diversity of subjects and
outlooks in Islamic philosophy, expands the perspectives of
philosophical students and researchers, and prevents them from
remaining within restricted frames and neglecting the diversity of
philosophical thought.
By presenting contemporary philosophy, the latest findings of
Muslim philosophers as well as current philosophical issues will
become available to a new generation of thinkers. Through the
perusal of such discussions, the caravan of thought should move on at
a rapid pace.

Notes
Avicenna writes, ‘Philosophical sciences...are divided into the theoretical
and the practical...The theoretical is the one in which perfection of theoretical
faculty of the soul through actualization of Actual Intellect is sought, and this
happens through conceptual and assertive knowledge of those affairs which are
not our deeds and [mental or spiritual] states. Its end, therefore, is actualization
of an opinion or a belief which is not concerning the mode of an act or that of
 CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY

the source of an act as such...And the practical is the one in which perfection of
theoretical faculties through actualization of conceptual and assertive knowledge
of those affairs which are our deeds is sought first in order for the practical
faculty of the soul to be perfected secondly.’ (al-Shifa’, p. 3)
Avicenna, al-Shifa’, p. 13 (the second chapter (fas!) of the first treatise
(magqalah)).
* The following definition cited in The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy is
closest to the third application of philosophy: ‘The study of the most general and
abstract features of the world and categories with which we think: mind, matter,
reason, proof, truth, etc.’ S. Blackburn, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 286.
- Unfortunately the colonial dominance of Britain over the ancient, rich land
of India with its multilateral and long-lasting cultural invasion, caused the Farsi
language and Islamic culture to be replaced by the English language and culture
in that region. One of the unfortunate consequences of that cultural invasion is
that Western philosophy is currently more popular in the scholarly centres and
universities of India and Pakistan than Islamic philosophy. The same situation
can be seen in the Arab world.
° Sadr is the only non-Iranian philosopher discussed in this work. Though
not an Iranian himself, he is of Iranian origin and belongs to the Iranian, Shi‘ite
philosophical realm.
IMAM KHOMEINI

Life and Works

Sayyid Ruhullah Musawi Khomeini (1902-1989) was a jurist, a mystic,
and a prominent philosopher in the contemporary age. Due to his
grand position as a political and religious leader as well as his juristic
authority, his philosophical aspects have not been properly
recognized, even though he was a prominent master of Islamic
philosophy before attaining those other positions. In fact, Imam
Khomeini’s mystical position has met with more recognition than his
philosophical aspect, for he left many written works on mysticism,
while in the realm of philosophy not many written works by him are
available; this is one reason that his philosophical side is not always
recognized.
Imam Khomeini was eminent in four major fields of the hawzah in
his time: figh, usul, mysticism, and. philosophy. He spent years
teaching high level figh and usul in Qom and Najaf, and trained many
mujtahids. There are many written works of Khomeini and transcripts
of his lessons on figh and usul. Ayatollah Ja‘far Subhani has
transcribed and published a course of Khomeini’s usul lessons under
the title Tahdhib al-Usul which serves as a reference for researchers
in this field. Khomeini’s prominent master in figh and usul was
Ayatollah Shaykh “Abd al-Karim Ha’iri Yazdi (1855-1934).
Imam Khomeini learned mysticism from Ayatollah Mirza Jawad
Maliki Tabrizi (d.1925) and Ayatollah Muhammad ‘Ali Shah Abadi
(1871-1948). Between 1928 and 1935, he studied Sharh Fusus al-Hikam,
Misbah al-Uns, al-Futuhat al-Makkiyyah, and Manazil al-Sa’irin at
Shah Abadi. Khomeini wrote many works on mysticism, including
Ta ligat ‘ala Sharh Fusus al-Hikam Qaisari va Misbah al-Uns, Asrar al-
Salat, Sharh Du‘a al-Sahar, and Misbah al-Hidayah. Khomeini’s
 CONTEMPORARY ASTAMIC PHILOSOPHY

mastery of theoretical and practical mysticism can be observed in his

writings. His mystical writings are equivalent to those of first-rate
mystics.
For some time, Imam Khomeini studied philosophy, mathematics,
and astronomy under Ayatollah Mirza ‘Ali Akbar Hikami Yazdi (d.
1926). His principal master in philosophy, however, was Ayatollah
Sayyid Abu al-Hasan Rafi‘i Qazvini (1889-1974). He studied Mulla
Hadi Sabzivari’s Sharh Manzumah for four years under this sage’s
tutorship. He also took part in Rafi‘i’s Asfar lessons for a short period
of time, but due to his astute mind and his grounding in philosophy,
he realized that it was not necessary to continue that course; hence,
he deemed it sufficient to study and discuss Asfar with Ayatollah
Mirza Khalil Kamare’i to become a skilful master of the subject
himself.’
Khomeini taught many courses of Sharh Manzumah and for ten
years taught the main parts of Asfar. Transcriptions of his lessons of
Sabzivari’s Sharh Manzumah and parts of Mulla Sadra’s Asfar have
been published by one of his students named Ayatollah Sayyid ‘Abd
al-Ghani Ardabili (1920-1990). Those lessons were held in Qom from
1944 to 1949."
Imam Khomeini wrote annotations on the Asfar which have been
lost. Apart from his philosophical works, Imam Khomeini’s
philosophical ideas can also be found in other fields such as
philosophy, mysticism, theology, ethics, politics, and Qur’anic
exegesis. He also presented many philosophical and intellectual
discussions in usul which can be studied in the works he has left.
Imam Khomeini’s students included Sayyid Jalal al-Din Ashtiyani,
Murtada Mutahhari, Sayyid ‘Abd al-Ghani Ardabili, Mahdi Ha’iri
Yazdi, Sayyid Mustafa Khomeini, Sayyid Rida Sadr, Sayyid
Muhammad ‘Ali Qadi Tabataba’i, Husayn ‘Ali Montazeri, and Sayyid
‘Izz al-Din Zanjani.”
Beginning in 1926, Imam Khomeini began teaching philosophy and
mysticism and continued for at least three decades. Many of these
lessons were held in private and sometimes in secret. The outlook
dominating hawzahs of that time was quite contrary to philosophy
and mysticism, to the extent that some accused philosophers and
mystics of heresy. In such an atmosphere, Khomeini nurtured
philosophical thought in Qom by teaching philosophy and training
prominent students in this field. Through his position in figh and
 CHAPTER 1

religious authority (and later leadership), he managed to withstand

this anti-philosophical outlook and pave the way for creating a
proper atmosphere in society towards philosophy. Were it not for
Khomeini’s peerless role in this field, the influence of ‘Allamah
Tabataba’i and his students could not have gone beyond a limited
horizon.
The role of Imam Khomeini in the growth and development of
Islamic philosophy is unique. After the triumph of the Islamic
Revolution under Imam Khomeini’s leadership, his positive approval
of philosophical thought, including his support of the ideas and works
of Mutahhari, started a golden age in the public attitudes towards
Islamic philosophy in Iran, especially at hawzahs and universities,
hitherto unprecedented in Iranian history. One can witness the effects
of this wave beyond Iran’s borders through drawing the attention of
Muslim as well as non-Muslim students and researchers to Islamic
philosophy.
The comprehensiveness of Imam Khomeini’s knowledge is hardly
rivalled. Few people may be found who could stand at the highest
rank in philosophy, mysticism, figh, and usul all at once. Ashtiyani
asserts:
Misbah al-Hidayah and Sharh Du‘a al-Sahar, Khomeini’s mystical
works, are peerless in their respective fields...These two works
are everlasting with regard to the inclusion of secrets and exact
details of mysticism. Imam [Khomeini] produced them in his
early youth. Misbah al-Hidayah can be likened to works of the
seventh and eighth hijri centuries, the era of the ripeness of
mysticism and Sufism...Imam Khomeini has taught all of the three
fields of knowledge’ free from shortcomings in any of those
sciences.
From Ashtiyani’s viewpoint, such a person is unique; so he refers
to him using titles like ‘the unique man of the age in intellectual and
narrative sciences as well as intuition, the seal of philosophers and
mystics’.” Imam Khomeini was also a poet whose collection of
mystical poetry has been published.
According to Mahdi Ha’iri, Imam Khomeini was not very
interested in peripatetic thought, but was drawn considerably to the
illuminationist philosophy of Suhrawardi. He also interpreted
transcendent philosophy with mystical tendencies. Khomeini. paid
attention to the natural sciences and modern astronomy while

12
 CONTEMPORARY AUSLAMIAC PHILOSOPHY

rejecting older forms of astrology.’ Yet Khomeini praised Avicenna,

despite the fact that he did not accept peripatetic tendencies.
Regarding this matter Ashtiyani writes,
The prominent and unique master of our time in intellectual and
narrative sciences as well as intuitional and direct knowledge, the
mystic Imam, Ayatollah al-Uzma Khomeini, asserts: “Various
faults can be found in Avicenna with regard to philosophical
theology; nevertheless, he is peerless amongst masters of opinion
and research.”
Regarding Imam Khomeini’s views of the originality of Mulla
Sadra’s philosophy and its differences with Greek philosophy,
Ashtiyani asserts,
The seal of philosophers and mystics, Imam Khomeini, asserts
that equating Mulla Sadra’s transcendent philosophy, and the
views of his students and followers, with Greek philosophy
would be utter ignorance. He has also stated several times that
the philosophy of Greece should be regarded as significant in
itself.
With this conviction Khomeini spent many years teaching Mulla
Sadra’s transcendent philosophy, explaining his thoughts and
opinions. As is mentioned in the book Tagrirat Falsafah, he
commented upon of the way this philosophy treated ontology, the
self, and Resurrection.
Another aspect of Imam Khomeini’s thought regards his politics.
From his viewpoint, politics and governing society are inseparable
parts of Islamic teachings. According to him, religion without politics
and politics without religion are both unacceptable. Imam Khomeini's
theories of Islamic government and wilayat al-faqih have been
considered and discussed by scholarly and political circles in Iran and
the world for nearly half a century. It was on the basis of these
considerations that Imam Khomeini fought and overthrew the Pahlavi
dynasty. The Islamic Republic of Iran was designed and formed on
the basis of Imam Khomeini’s political thought, and the Iranian
Constitution was codified based on his theories. With regard to
political thought, Imam Khomeini regularly praises Ayatollah Sayyid
Hasan Modarris (d. 1937). Although Imam Khomeini’s political ideas
have engaged much discussion, no comprehensive analysis of his
political philosophy has yet been presented.

13
 C HPAP
IF EAR 4

In Imam Khomeini’s thought, figh, philosophy, mysticism, and

politics are not separate fields to which he attended individually but
are each parts and essential eleménts of a single connected world-
view, a philosophy of individual and collective life on the basis of
Islamic teachings —- to the actualization of which Imam Khomeini
dedicated his entire life.

A Glance at Talab va Iradih (The Treatise on

Wishing and Willing)
Among Imam Khomeini’s works related to philosophical discussions
is Talab va Iradih (The Treatise on Wishing and Willing).”° In usul al-
figh, when the question of wishing or willing is discussed, a series of
questions are raised concerning the origins of wishing and willing, as
well as determinism and free will, as can be seen in Kifayat al-Usul by
Khurasani, its commentaries, and most books written after it. The
Treatise on Wishing and Willing presents Imam Khomeini’s kharij
lectures on the same issue, written separately in Arabic in Hamadan
during the month of Ramadan 1371 AH (1950), exhibiting the
significance of that topic with due precision. Although the discussion
is basically philosophical, the treatise includes philosophical,
theological, and mystical perspectives, given the relation of the topic
with other intellectual disciplines, while displaying the complete
proficiency of the author in such realms. Here, we shall present a
summary report of that treatise, to show a sample of Imam
Khomeini’s philosophical thought. Since exploring the two concepts
of wishing and willing will involve fundamental philosophical
discussion, Imam Khomeini briefly refers to principles of
transcendent philosophy and mysticism.

God’s Attributes Being Identical with His

Essence or Additional to It
The discussion commences with the question of whether willing is
wishing, or something else. The dispute is rooted in the question of
whether God’s command, such as ‘perform the prayer’, implies
willing in addition to wishing. To answer that question, one needs to
explore the reality of speech in the Truth. Yet before that, one should

14
 CPOUNST
EMP OORAALSY PIES TAUMEL CE = Pelt IL: OrS'O
PH Y

deal with the relation of [God’s] attributes to God’s essence.

Are God’s attributes the same as His essence or something added
to it? To escape attributing composition to God’s essence, the
Mu‘ tazilites denied attributes, but, in order to preserve belief in God’s
attributes, the Ash‘arites believed that God’s attributes are added to
His essence. However, both beliefs are far from the truth and carry us
to extremes. The truth is that God’s attributes are the same as His
essence, without necessitating any composition. Since the Truth is
pure being and sheer existence, He is the same as any perfection and
beauty; and any perfection or beauty returns to the reality of
existence, for should perfection resolve to existence or anything else,
it would require at least two principles. If some aspects of perfections
resolve to existence and others to quiddity, one must assert the
principality of both existence and quiddity. For if any perfection
derives from a separate origin and principle, various principles will be
required; yet according to the principality of existence, existence is
the genuine principle, with all perfections resolving to it.
Furthermore, should we hold that God’s attributes are not the same as
His essence, the essence of the Necessary Being would be composed.
Yet God’s essence - which is pure being - would lack purity, while
the essence of the Necessary Being would become contingent. The
only way to escape such problems is to believe in the unity of God’s
essence and attributes. ’
As for the reality of God’s speech, the Mu'tazilites hold that it is
the creation of speech in something like a tree, the soul of a prophet,
or an angel. In other words, since God’s speech is that of a subsistent
utterance, He is called the Speaker, as with human speech. The
difference, however, is that man uses an instrument to create speech
while God needs no instrument with which to speak.
To this point, the Ash‘arites maintain that God’s speech is neither
one of voice nor of letter, but rather is a meaning subsisting in God’s
essence, called ‘soul speech’ (al-kalam al-nafsi): the object denoted by
literal speech. According to them, wishing, which is the object of
denotation of command, pertains to ‘soul speech’ so is other than
willing.
Imam Khomeini asserts that truth is neither one nor the other. The
Mu‘tazilites are not right since immediate creation of speech, which is
a transient, renewing affair, would require renewal and change in
God’s attributes and essence - a view which is erroneous.

15
 “CHAPTER 11

The Will of the Almighty, as an existential attribute of perfection,

is neither accidental nor variable, but rather an attribute in the
Almighty’s essence. Should the Almighty lack the ability to will, as
natural existents do, His essence would be composite and thus
incomplete.
But it may also be said that God’s will is not identical with His
essence, for we know that His will is not identical with His
knowledge. His knowledge encompasses everything, while His will is
limited, and does not cover evil affairs. Knowledge, therefore, is other
than will. On the other hand, God’s knowledge is identical with His
essence; so will, which is different than knowledge, cannot be
identical with His essence.
The answer is that limitation in the realm of will, by comparison
to knowledge, does not stand in the way of will’s being an essential
attribute, since hearing and sight are also more limited in comparison
with knowledge while they are essential. His essence involves
knowledge of any known, hearing of any heard, and sight of any
seen; and in the same way willing the good is identical with the
Almighty’s essence.
Furthermore, it can be said that there can be no difference
between knowledge and will in term of inclusion and nbh-inclusion.
God’s essential knowledge is identical with existence, and pertains to
nothing but existence. In other words, God’s knowledge principally
pertains to existential truths rather than to non-existents and evil
affairs — unless accidentally. For will principally pertains to good
affairs, yet only accidentally to incomplete and evil affairs. It can be
said, therefore, that whatever is an object of knowledge is an object of
will as well. Thus, it must be said that will is among God’s essential
attributes.
The Ash‘arites’ opinion is invalid too; for to believe that God’s
attributes, including the attribute of speech, subsist in God’s Essence
in the manner of subsistence of inherence would necessitate potency,
imperfection, and composition in God’s essence. Just as believing that
God’s essence is void of attributes of perfection would necessitate
many false consequences, such as God’s having a quiddity, and
transforming His essential necessity into contingency.
Indeed, God is Speaker even in the state of essence — in a way
which only those firmly rooted in wisdom would realize, so quite
beyond the understanding of Ash‘arites or other theologians."

16
 ConnEMPORARY SCAM Cc PHILOSOPHY

Ash‘arite Proofs for Distinguishing between

Wishing and Willing, and Their Refutation
The Ash‘arites have presented some arguments in order to prove a
distinction between wishing and willing. Sometimes, they argue,
there is an expressed wish not raised by will, like commands issued
for testing someone. Such commands do not originate in the will, nor
could we find, by referring to depths of ourselves, anything other
than a wish in the mind that could originate them. So if a mental wish
can be the origin of command and speech, it can be the same with all
cases, so will need not interfere.
In response, Imam Khomeini asserts that when we issue such
commands, they originate from our will, so there is no difference
between ‘testing’ and ‘non-testing’ commands in this respect. Such
commands ground voluntary acts, as with all voluntary human acts.
The only difference lies in their motivations and results: in real
commands, the commander intends to effect the result, the object of
the command; while ‘testing’ commands examine the person
commanded.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that commands and prohibitions
issuing from God are not influenced by motivations and intentions
like those of humans, for motivations and desires influence the agent
while it is absurd that God should be influenced by something. One
reason for this is that being influenced necessitates potency and
disposition and as a result composition and imperfection, which are
characteristics of contingent existents, and the Necessary Being is
above them. Some would say that God does what He does in order to
benefit His creatures — this is also untrue, for it would make God’s act
caused by desire.
It should not be thought that this assertion implies that God’s
action is purposeless and in vain. God’s act has an end - that end
being the most perfect cosmic order which is in turn subject to the
most beautiful Lordly order. That end is not something separate from
God’s essence, but is rather identical with it. God’s will pertains to
the cosmic order in a subordinate and not in an independent manner.
His end being identical with His essence does not mean that He is
influenced by His essence; rather, it means that His love of His
essence necessitates secondarily His love of His effects; as His
essential knowledge is identical with His knowledge of others in the

17
 CHAP TIER V1

plane of essence. Also, it should be known that His will over things is
not a variable affair; rather, it is His very being loved essentially —
and not things being loved independently. The hadith of the ‘hidden
treasure’ also denotes that, for He said, ‘I was a hidden treasure, then
I loved to be known, and thus I created the creatures to become
known.’ Love of essence emergent and becoming known is the very
love of the essence and not that of creatures; so ‘one who loves’, ‘one
who is loved’, and ‘love’ are identical here, and that is the very
essence of the Truth.
So the Ash‘arites’ opinion, which differentiates between wish and
will by appealing to testing commands, is refuted. The refutation of
Khurasani’s” opinion - that is, the negation of real will in testing
commands and belief in configurative willing and wishing - also
becomes clear. Furthermore, configurative wiling* is basically
nonsense. It is not plausible to assume subjective, configurative
existence for real affairs such as wishing and willing.
Another argument presented by Ash‘arites for the otherness of
wishing from willing is that should wishing and willing be treated as
identical, it would be necessary either that unbelievers and
disobedient people cannot really be held responsible, which is not
true; or that God’s objective violates His will so that Gdd’s will is not
actualized, which is worse than the former. Since God’s will is the
complete cause of the objective being actualized, and actualization of
the will necessitates actualization of the objective, when we see that
the objective is not actualized we must say that there is has been no
willing. Willing cannot be the origin of that burden, so there is
nothing other than wishing to be the origin of that burden. So there is
no choice but to say that the origin of that burden is wishing and not
wiling. Since this is the case here, it would be the same in other
things.
Imam Khomeini does not accept Khurasani’s answer to that
assertion. Khurasani delineates the conflict between determination
(al-jabr) and absolute free will (al-tafwid) and prepares some
preliminaries in his attempt to solve the problem of determination
and absolute free will. The conflict between determination’ and
absolute free will is presented here because, should what man
does be
necessary according to the Divine Will, determination would become
necessary; yet should he do it by his free will, Divine Will would
be
sundered from His objective. So how one can bring Divine Will
and

18
 CONTEMPORARY ASLAMM CG PHILOSOPHY

human free will together? Imam Khomeini presents the discussion in

a more general manner - that is, how can one bring the causality and
agency of God and causality and mutual influence of creatures
together? If the agency belongs absolutely to God, what then can
causal order be? And if there is causality among creatures, how
should one understand divine agency?
The people who believe in absolute free will hold that causation is
an independent affair in which God has no role — whether the cause
be abstract or material, having free will or not; and whether the effect
be caused by natural agents such as the sun causing light or fire
burning things; or be dependent upon something else, such as the
sweetness of honey and bitterness of colocynth — and generally
speaking, God’s role is merely to bring principles of things into being.
He is like a mason who has built a building and gone away. The
building is independent of the builder, the existence and non-
existence of the builder being ineffectual in the subsistence of the
building. Hence, the affairs of the universe are left with itself and
man’s affairs are delegated to his intellect.
The people who believe in determination hold that as God is the
agent of principles, He is the immediate agent of the effects of things.
Things themselves, however, have no efficacy and causality, and
generally speaking, there is no principle of causality among things.
Properties and effects seen in the universe are results of the
circulation of divine practice which produces something after
something else; e.g., following the existence of the sun, it creates
light; and following the existence of fire, it creates burning. In the
same way, it is God who creates an act following man’s will. Even
logical effects are directly attributed to divine agency; it is God who
creates knowledge of the conclusion following man’s knowledge of
the premises of a syllogism, and not the very knowledge of the
premises causing knowledge of the conclusion. It is because of our
ignorance of divine agency that we attribute effects to things.
Thus, those who believe in absolute free will discharge God from
having efficacy in the universe limiting His role to the creation of
principles, while determinists discharge creatures from having
efficacy, attributing all affairs immediately to God.”

Refutation of Absolute Free Will

How can an existent be considered independent in originating? Only

1g
 ? CHARTER V1

if it can remove all possible ways of non-existence from its effect;

otherwise, it could not originate its effect independently. It should be
clear that if the existence of an effect is dependent upon a thousand
conditions and the agent can originate nine hundred and ninety nine
of them but is unable to actualize one, such an agent cannot be the
complete cause or independent in originating the effect. One possible
reason for the non-existence of an effect is the non-existence of its
cause. Can a contingent cause remove that non-existence from its
effect? In other words, can a contingent existent negate its non-
existence? If so, the contingent per essentiam would become a
necessary being per essentiam, and this is impossible. Since the
necessary being per essentiam is an existent from whom all ways of
non-existence are removed, and a contingent is not so, if the latter
wants to originate an effect, it will be in need of its cause in order to
remove non-existence from itself.
Another answer is that in the universe demonstrated in
transcendent philosophy, the effect per essentiam is in need of and
dependent upon the cause in its whole essence and identity, since its
very essence is indigence, dependence, and connection. Should the
effect be such that this need is additional and accidental to it, the
effect would then be necessary in its essence — effecthood being
additional to it — and this is impossible. According to the principality
of existence, by ‘effect per essentiam’ we mean a contingent existent
effected by the action of the Maker, so quiddities are mere subjective
considerations abstracted from limits of existence; with the existence
of the effect displaying that very indigence. Whereas, were we to
assume that a contingent existence is not in need of the Necessary
Being, the contingent would be transformed into the necessary and
the indigent transformed into self-sufficient, which is utterly
impossible.
Another argument in refutation of the theory of absolute free will
is that a thing which is independent in originating is independent in
existence as well, since originating is secondary to existence and it is
impossible that something which is not independent in existence be
independent in originating. All contingent beings are needy and
dependent in their existence. Therefore, contingent beings cannot
be
independent in originating. Since this is true for all contingent beings,
there is no difference between abstract and material, or free and
compelled, in this regard A Qur’anic verse alludes to that reality: “

20
 Cen biMVPO RARY SSL AyMire PHL
L-O S:O PH Y

‘Indeed those whom you invoke besides God will never create [even]
a fly even if they all rallied to do so! And if a fly should take away
something from them, they cannot recover that from it. Feeble is the
seeker and the sought!’ (22:73)

Refutation of Determinism
First, Imam Khomeini reminds us that a critical response to such
ideas, and a solution to the problem of determinism and absolute free
will, are dependent upon preliminaries discussed in metaphysics; so
even a brief discussion of the issue must recall some ontological
principles:

a) Since existence is the principle of actualization, it is a simplex

reality having no genus and differentia; and is graded in a
particular gradation having degrees and levels. Any incomplete
level of it is essentially dependent upon a prior higher level
(without there being any interval between them) in such a way
that its attachment to any other level is equivalent to essential
transformation — which is impossible. This means that any level of
existence has an ontological status and level it cannot transgress,
so the hierarchy of existence as well as the gradation of its levels
demands that displacing existents and gradations is impossible.
b) Since the Almighty Truth is absolutely pure where all attributes as
well as essential aspects refer to pure existence, change and
variation are not conceivable in His essence and attributes; for
such variation would necessitate transforming His pure essence
into a composite, His sheer actuality into potency, and His
necessity into contingence. The purity of His essence and
attributes necessitates that what emanates from Him must
emanate from the very reality of His essence and the whole of His
reality. Now, if we assume that variable, renewing affairs emanate
from Him immediately, that would necessitate that change and
variation occur in His essence and in attributes identical with His
essence. Therefore, issuance of a variable affair from Him
necessitates the contingency of something which is eternal per
essentiam, or the eternity of something contingent per essentiam,
or the constancy of something which is variable per essentiam —
and these are all impossible.

21
 COHWARP T4ESR FI

c) The immediate issuance of a multiple from an utterly simple one

necessitates composition and multiplicity of the one, which is
impossible. There is no difference in this regard between a free
agent and compelled one; for in free will as well as the will of a
simple one, a free agent is identical with his essence, and what
emanates from his will and free will emanates from his essence; so
multiplicity and renewal of will and free will is the very
multiplicity and renewal of the essence. But it should not be
thought that God’s will and act is like human will and act. Man is
an incomplete, multiple, and variable being while such things do
not exist in the Necessary Being. Also, as will be noted below, it
should not be thought that the impossibility of the immediate
issuance of the multiple from the Necessary Being necessitates any
failure in His power. '
d) The essence and reality of existence are identical with the
origination of efficacy in such a way that the negation of the
efficacy of existence is equivalent to negation of its essence; hence,
it is impossible to assume an existence without any efficacy.
Negation of the efficacy of an existence necessitates the negation
of the efficacy of all existences, including the Necessary Being
since the reality of existence is one, simplex, and univocal.

Based on those preliminaries, it becomes clear that the determinist

theory which treats God as being the immediate source of all acts and
effects is invalid and that the role of contingent intermediaries is
undeniable in actualizing acts and realizing effects.”

‘Something Between the Two’

Now that it has become clear that the theories of determinism and
absolute free will are equally invalid; that, both the independent
agency of existents and God’s immediate agency in the world of
multiplicity can be refuted, we must prove that there is ‘something
between the two’.’” According to that theory, causality and agency
are actualized in the world of contingency and contingent existents
are effective, but they are not independent in their causality and
efficacy. The only independent agent in the universe is the Almighty
Truth, and other existents are indigent, depending on the First in
their existence as well as their attributes, acts, and effects. If we

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 GON TIE MIP OR A RY BISILAIMAMTE (Pet 1 LOS
OP HY

understood the meaning of contingent existence as being the

connection itself, we would know that any act of a contingent
existent is both its act and God’s act. Thus, the universe — as sheer
connection and attachment to God - is the manifestation of God’s
power, will, knowledge, and act; and this is the meaning of
‘something between the two’.
Based on that explanation, Qur’anic verses like: “And you did not
throw when you threw, rather it was God who threw’ (8:17) may be
understood; that is, it can be equally said that the Prophet threw and
he did not throw, since he was not independent in that act. Or
another verse: ‘But you do not wish unless it is wished by God’
(76:30) in which the creature’s will is attributed to God since the
creature’s will is the manifestation of God’s will.
It becomes clear, therefore, that determinism and absolute free will
are both far from the truth, since absolute free will exalts the
contingent to the level of necessity, and determinism degrades the
Necessary Being to the level of the contingent. They do injustice to
both the Necessary Being and the contingent being, so ‘something
between the two’ becomes the middle way which grants both creator
and creature their due rights.
However, there is a problem here. If the effect of anything which
causes an effect and the act of any agent can be attributed to God,
then evil and bad affairs should also be attributed to God. The answer
is that whereas all acts and effects are attributed to God, good,
beauteous, and perfect affairs are from Him, but evil, bad, and
incomplete affairs take their character from immediate agents. For
God is Pure Being, the purity of any perfection and beauty, and
nothing but perfection and beauty; otherwise composition and
contingency would be found in Him. Since He is pure being and sheer
perfection and beauty, nothing could emanate from Him but
existence, perfection, and beauty. Evil and incomplete affairs belong
to effects without reference to any making, for making pertains only
to existence which is sheer perfection and good. Thus, it can be said
that all good affairs are made and all made affairs are good. However,
the evil affairs seen in nature are the result of accidents, the
interference of the material world, and restrictions of nature; so all of
them refer in one way or another to non-existence or lack of
perfection, and non-existential affairs are not objects of making.
Relative non-existence belongs to made, contingent beings, rooted

23
 CMAP TER V1

in their limitations and contingency. Hence the revealed word is the

truth where it says, “Whatever good befalls you is from God, and
whatever ill befalls you is from yourself’ (4:79). However, since non-
existents and relative affairs are among the features of contingent
existents and such existents are from God, one can accidentally
attribute them to God and say, ‘All are from God’ (3:78). The final
conclusion is that good affairs are per essentiam from God and
accidentally from contingent beings, while evil affairs are per
essentiam from contingent beings and accidentally from God, just as
one can say that light is from the sun but limitations and
determinations seen in mirrors are per essentiam from mirrors and
not from the sun. Based on that explanation, one can be guided to the
meanings and secrets of Qur’anic verses and hadiths f addressing
these issues.® .
One point to consider is that Imam Khomeini comes to conclusions
that present the most plausible interpretation of Qur’anic verses and
hadiths through philosophical analysis, thereby illustrating the
harmony between intellect and religion. Through an utterly rational
course, he attains the same truths taught by revelation.

The Problem of the Infinite Regression of Wills,

and Its Solution
Imam Khomeini also presents a well-known enigma in the discussion
of determinism, and solves it. Man’s will is either an effect of external
factors, or of another will in him. Should man’s will be an effect of
external factors which go back to God’s will, actualization of such a
will would be necessary and man would have no role in it. That is,
man would be compelled and coerced in his will in that case and
hence his acts, which are caused by such a will, would be coerced; for
something whose complete cause is coerced, is itself coerced. Should
man’s will be an effect of another will in him — that is, should will
also be a voluntary effect - we would ask of the previous will
whether it is an effect of external factors or of another will. Thus,
what would be necessitated is either determinism or infinite regress.
After a precise analysis, he rejects solutions presented by
renowned thinkers such as Mir Damad, Akhund Khurasani, Shaykh
‘Abd al-Karim Ha’iri Yazdi, and others. Then he presents another
solution which can be summarized as follows.

24
 G ORN Tee: M-PLOrR
AREY) Missy AU-MiEe). PLO
S: O.P ALY

Voluntary acts emanating from the human soul are of two kinds.
One kind is actualized through the mediation of bodily organs, such
as writing and building, in which man’s hand intermediates. In such
cases, the human soul is the agent of motion of his bodily organs per
essentiam and that of the produced effect accidentally. For instance,
what a mason originates directly is the motion of his bodily organs.
As for displacing materials, placing them in a specific order, and the
formation of the building, they are effects of the mason’s soul, though
mediated by conceptions, intentions, and moving muscles.
Other kinds of acts are actualized immediately or through non-
material mediators, as in conceptions originated by the soul through
its creativity: the plan of a building which an engineer draws in his
mind. Whereas the origination of such a plan is voluntary and
through knowledge and will, the principles of origination of such an
idea are not present in detail in the engineer’s mind — contrary to the
first kind in which detailed presence of such principles is necessary.
To create a plan, an engineer does not need to imagine the act, judge
the benefit of the act, or bring it to resolution by moving muscles.
Indeed, such thing is impossible, for conception cannot be the
principle of conception. In such cases, the soul originates all that
through its creativity; for the soul is spiritual, and a spiritual being
has in its essence all actual perfections of its effect, without needing
any conception, will, or intention additional-to its essence to exercise
its creativity.
Once we have appreciated these two kinds of human acts, we
should know how human resolution and will take shape. First, we
should know that resolution and will are not among the passive
affairs of the soul, like avidity and passion; rather, they are among
acts of the soul originated without any bodily instruments. Yet the
soul is not in need of an additional will in order to originate them, but
rather originates them through its essential knowledge and
awareness; since the soul, like other originating agents, possesses its
effects in a higher, superior manner. As the soul is not in need of
imagined ideas in order to originate them, it is not in need of another
will to originate will. Hence the problem of infinite regression does
not occur.
So when we intend to do an external act, like build a building,
what is independently considered by us is the building itself, not its
intentional principles like conception, intention, and will - which

25
 CyAkASP
I EsR: WI

only function as instruments, and are not per essentiam objects of

perception, avidity, or will. Therefore, even if it could be possible that
will should pertain to will, such a thing would not happen here; for
willis not per essentiam an object of conception and avidity. So we
need not intend to originate the will, but rather to originate the
building.

Solving the Problem of Incompatibility of

Necessity and Free Will
As Avicenna shows in his metaphysics, a thing is not brought into
being unless it is necessitated, that is, its existence must be
necessitated so its non-existence becomes impossible. That
philosophical rule is universal, including acts of free agents as well, so
implies that issuing an act from any agent is necessary; so that it can
be said that any agent is coerced and compelled in his act. To escape
from such a problem, some theologians denied inclusion of a free
agent in that rule. And so that the free will of the Necessary Being
should not be blemished, they treated it as valid for compelled agents
in order to use it for proving the existence of the Necessary Being.
Imam Khomeini holds that such a view is irrational, since the scope of
inclusion of a rational rule is determined by demonstration and not
by our preference or desire.
Here, Imam Khomeini offers a purely philosophical approach,
indicating the difference between his own philosophical treatment
and that of some theologians. According to Imam Khomeini, it is
demonstration that determines which belief is correct and which one
is incorrect for a philosopher, so it is not acceptable to come up with
reasoning for something one already believes.’
According to Imam Khomeini, that rule is valid, from self-evident
and universal premises, so it does not contradict the free will of free
agents. To demonstrate this, one should take the following points into
consideration:
a) Whatever we conceptualize, either its actualization or its non-
actualization is necessary, or neither its actualization nor its non-
actualization is necessary. The first is the Necessary Being, the
second is an impossible being, and the third is a contingent being;
no other assumption is plausible. That division is merely

26
 GONTEMPORARY UWSLAMIC PHILTOSOPH Y

conceptual; otherwise, in reality and actuality, any contingent

being would either be necessary or impossible; for should its
complete cause be existent, its actualization would be necessary —
and should its complete cause not be existent, its actualization
would be impossible. Therefore, everything which is not necessary
is impossible and everything which is not impossible is necessary.
b) Considering the essence and quiddity of every contingent being,
its proportion of existence and non-existence is equal, so neither
existence nor non-existence has priority regarding it. For should
such a priority attain the level of necessity, the contingent per
essentiam would be transformed into the necessary per essentiam,
and this is impossible; yet should that priority be insufficient, to
speak of it would be idle, since the contingent is nothing before its
actualization, so that one can speak of its priority only in terms of
existence. The contingent (as such) is sheer subjective
consideration and is non-existential before its actualization, so no
property and prerequisite can be attributed to it.
Since the contingent has no prerequisite and its proportion to
existence and non-existence is equal, it is necessarily in need of a
cause in its origination. That originating cause either closes all
possible ways of non-existence to it, or it does not. In the case of
the latter, the existence of the contingent is impossible; for its
existence in this case is either because of its essential priority,
which was refuted, or due to the actualization of an effect without
a cause and preferring without any preference, which is the very
coincidence of two contradictory affairs. In other words, should
the realization of the contingent be conditional upon one thousand
conditions and all those conditions be actualized but one, the
existence of the contingent would be impossible — and it could
have no priority in terms of existence - for one condition of its
existence would not be actualized and it would still be in the state
of parity between existence and non-existence. But should all
conditions of its existence be actualized, its non-existence would
be impossible; since that necessitates self-contradiction and
negation of a thing of itself, for one may ask why it has not
become existent while all conditions of its existence are realized.
Should its exit from possibility be dependent upon something else,
self-contradiction would result; for it was assumed that all
conditions were actualized, and this would mean that what is the

27
 CHAP TER +1

complete cause is not the complete cause. Should it exit from

possibility while the complete cause exists, it would be necessary;
for there would be no intermediary between those two in reality.
Should the contingent remain in its previous state after the
efficacy of cause, this would be impossible; and should it exit from
the previous state, this would be necessary. Here, by ‘necessity’ is
meant ‘necessity-by-something else originated by the cause’.
Therefore, cause necessitates and originates effect, and effect
becomes necessary and existent.
Thus, it becomes clear that the rule in question is universal and
covers all contingent quiddities, including the act of a free agent.
However, the rule does not contradict the free will of the free agent,
for the rule asserts that the contingent cannot exist unless it is
necessitated, and the complete cause of any effect necessitates and
originates that effect. Moreover, in voluntary acts, the agent
necessitates and originates the act through his will and free will, and
far from contradicting the free will of the agent, this fact emphasizes
it. Voluntary necessitation never causes coercion of the agent. It is
not plausible that necessity coming from the agent affects the agent.
Even if someone treats preferring without any preference as possible,
he cannot deny the necessity coming from the agent, for in such a
case it is the agent who voluntary necessitates one side without any
preference. A point that must be noted, however, is that there is no
independent complete cause in the universe but the N ecessary Being;
it is only He who can negate all possible non-existences of an effect
by necessitating and originating it.”

Pre-Eternal Knowledge and Free Will

Another problem emerges from the conviction that the order of
universe is subject to the divine will and decree, and the chain of
existence in the unseen as well as visible world is embraced in God’s
pre-eternal will, so it is impossible for an act of will to escape His
will; therefore what emanates from human beings must
be
necessitated by God’s decree and His pre-eternal will. This leads to
the conclusion that men are coerced and compelled in their acts,
though they appear free.
In other words, God’s knowledge of the most perfect order

28
 CONTEMPORARY ASL AMAG PHILOSOPHY

originates that order, and God is an agent by providence and by

manifestation in such a way that the sheer presence of His
Knowledge originates all known objects, which are subject to His
Knowledge and not vice versa. Hence knowledge, will, and power
exist in God by a single simple existence. Since He is sheer existence,
He possesses all perfections in a necessary manner. His power and
will are His very knowledge; hence, the order of the universe is
subject to His providential knowledge. So no room for free will
remains for anyone.
Some have replied that since knowledge is subject to the known
object, it cannot be the cause of the known object; hence, God’s
knowledge cannot affect human acts, but rather it is subject to them.
From what we said, refutation of that answer should be simple; for
while that is true for passive knowledge, God’s Knowledge is active
and so not subject to the known object, but rather the known object is
subject to His creating knowledge.
Deliberating on what we said on ‘something between the two’
would clarify this answer. God’s knowledge and will regarding the
order of the universe operates as the principle of causality; that is, the
order of the universe as such, and in its arrangement is an object of
knowledge. For instance, God’s Knowledge has the status of cause
before effect, not at the level of effect; and effect is always preceded
by cause and is never without cause. Therefore, God’s order of
knowledge preserves the causal order, so there is no room for
coercion. The first emanation possesses all perfection of the created
world in a simple manner, effecting its connection and attachment in
relation to God. Thus, whatever emanates from it emanates from the
Almighty, so there can be no separation or distance between it and
God. Also, any effect emanating from any cause in later levels will
follow the same rule. God is open-handed everywhere and His agency
flows over all, bestowing upon every existent its own specific effect
and property. Thus, whereas man is a free agent, his agency and free
will are as shadows of God’s agency and free will, and not
independent of Him. Hence God’s will and knowledge pertains to the
complete existential order without contradicting man’s free will;
rather, since God’s knowledge envisages the free agent as such, it
reinforces his free will.”

29
 CHAPTER a

Human Happiness and Affliction and their

Relation with Free Will .
After that thorough discussion on will and free will, Imam Khomeini
presents a brief discussion of happiness and affliction as it pertains to
this topic. For by free will man plays some role in his happiness or
affliction; while according to determinism he has no role in
determining his happiness or affliction. Hence, a discussion of
determinism and free will is incomplete without a discussion of the
reality and operation of human happiness and affliction in this
regard. Employing some philosophical preliminaries, Imam Khomeini
asserts his own opinion about happiness and affliction:
a) As is proven in the chapter on ‘demonstration’ (burhan) in logic,
the essential parts of reality are not caused by (external cause) In
other words, a quality or predicate which is essential to something
needs no external cause; for only contingent occurrences need a
cause; what is necessary does not. Should the relation of a subject
with a predicate be contingent (i-e., the subject has equal relation
with the predicate and its negation), its being qualified by that
predicate would need a cause; otherwise, preferring without any
preference would have to be necessary. For instance, when we
consider man in relation to existence, the relation is of
contingency [for existence] and is not essential to man; hence man
is in need of cause in his existence. But when we consider man in
relation to animality, the relation is of necessity, for animal is
essential to man. In the same way, the emergence of the number
four is contingent and in need of cause, but its being even is of
necessity, so it needs no causal explanation. It should be noted,
however, that necessary judgments regarding contingent beings
do not exclude them from being contingent, for both contingent
beings and judgments regarding them refer to their quiddities,
which is an intentional consideration prescinding from existence.
b) Existence, its accidents, and its requisites are not essential for any
contingent quiddity; otherwise, the contingent per essentiam
would be transformed into the necessary per essentiam. Therefore,
contingent quiddities are in need of a cause to be qualified by
existence, though, as said earlier, they are not dependent upon a
cause in their essence and essentials. As for existential levels, the
only self-subsistent existent is the Almighty Truth who needs no

30
 EON
EMP OTRO ACRAY SSP ACMaG. PHL O'S'0)'P HY

cause, but other levels of existence are in need of the Necessary

Being in their very existence. Thus, all existents in the universe
are in need of cause except the Necessary Being whose essence is
necessity and existence, so no cause can be conceived for Him. The
essence of contingent existents is indigence and dependence;
hence, the need for a cause is underlying their very being. The
effects and requisites of existence are dependent upon cause in
their actualization. Thus, the existence of an effect requires the
existence of a complete cause, and such a requirement is identical
with its being an effect, without reference to any further cause.
Since contingent quiddities are intentional considerations, by
themselves they have no way of effecting other things. The
essential requisites which they have are not actualized because
quiddities are presumed to such requisites; rather, such requisites
are only actual in the sense that they cannot be separated from
quiddities, though there can be no mutual efficacy. Something
which is non-existent has no essence and is not essential, so one
cannot speak of prerequisite and mutual efficacy. Mutual efficacy
exists among existential aspects - matters such as perfection,
beauty, good, and happiness being among existential properties,
while quiddities are void of such aspects.
Thus, quiddity does not manifest reality and is not considered a
perfection. The case is the same with the quiddity of power, life, and
other attributes. What is perfection and origin of effect is the
existence of knowledge, power, and life. It is existence that is the
source of any good, perfection, and excellence. Contingent existents
possess perfection to the extent they are endowed with existence, but
their quiddities are qualified by some effects and properties
accidentally and secondarily to these existents. All principles
mentioned above are based on established demonstrations which we
have not mentioned for the sake of brevity.

a) Now we can see what happiness and affliction are, and how they
are actualized. For common people happiness is the availability of
all means of pleasure, comfort, and [the fulfilment of] carnal
desires most of the time or all the time; its contrary being called
affliction. So, one who enjoys all kinds of pleasure and comfort is
absolutely happy, one who lacks all of them is absolutely afflicted,
and those in between are relatively happy or afflicted.

31
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
 Le 20, nous montons dans l’Atakor, en suivant un chemin très bien établi ; le
réseau hydrographique est dense et compliqué. Nous trouvons des truffes
blanches (terfes [A]), en particulière abondance. Ces terfes, avec le Dahnoun (A)
et le Berdi (A) sont des ressources en cas d’absence de vivres. Nous campons
dans l’oued Tikeneouin.
Et le temps qui était menaçant depuis quelques jours devient mauvais et nous
subissons un orage.
Les nuages sont très fréquents autour du massif du Tahat et des massifs
montagneux les plus élevés du Massif cristallin qu’ils entretiennent ainsi dans
une certaine humidité.
Le 21, nous campons dans l’oued Echchil près d’un abankor avec lauriers-
roses, au pied du Tahat. L’altimètre marque 1.730 mètres.
Le 22, nous gagnons par le Nord du Tahat, par un épaulement du Tahat à
plus de 2.000 mètres, l’oued Ti-n-Iferan situé beaucoup plus bas ; campons dans
cet oued près de son confluent avec l’oued Tellet-Mellel, et près d’une source
située dans le voisinage de beaux figuiers ; l’altimètre marque alors 1.720
mètres. Aperçu un tombeau et une roche gravée de tifinars.
Le 23, même camp.
Le 24, retour à l’oued Echchil.
Le 25, je gagne l’oued In-Fergan en remontant l’oued Abedassen d’abord,
puis en appuyant à l’Est dans des plateaux semés de majestueuses aiguilles
volcaniques.
Le 26, je descends vers l’oued Terroummout par de vastes coulées étagées
d’où émerge à ma gauche le pittoresque Akrakar ; à droite l’Isekram.
Je trouve un Calosome. Les Coléoptères au Sahara sont surtout représentés
par des Ténébrionidés (Pimelia, Blaps, etc.), des Curculionidés (Cleones,
Apions, etc.) et des Carabidés (en particulier le Tamanrasat).
Puis sous les coulées, vers le bas, réapparaît le Cristallin avec un point d’eau
important agrémenté de palmiers et dans lequel je trouve de nombreux papillons
noyés — parmi lesquels de très beaux Sphynx.
L’oued devient très humide dans les Schistes cristallins, profondément gravé,
et sa végétation assez belle ; en particulier, il y a de fort beaux lauriers-roses. Il
prend plus loin le nom d’oued Tamanrasat.
Je campe au pied d’une aiguille de lave prismée au milieu des tentes du caïd
Oini.
Le 27, le 28 et le 29, Tamanrasat.
 Le 30, le 31 et le 1er avril, retour par la même voie jusqu’à l’oued Echchil. Je
rencontre en particulier les campements d’Anaba et ceux de la Tamenoukalt, que
j’avais déjà rencontrés à l’aller.
Je gagne, de l’oued Echchil, l’oued Tikeneouin, où je passe, le 2, non loin
d’un abankor.
Le 3, retour à l’oued Echchil.
Le 4, le 5 et le 6, repos et étude de l’oued Echchil et de ses environs.
Le 7, je gagne l’oued Tamzizek par l’oued Tiniferan et l’oued Arrou, ce dernier
d’abord encaissé très pittoresquement dans les roches grenues, ensuite dans les
Schistes cristallins ; beaucoup d’eau partout.
Le 8, je gagne In-Amdjel par l’oued Arrou, puis l’oued Tessert à l’Est de l’oued
Arrou, puis l’oued In-Tayet, à l’Est de l’oued Tessert. Beau développement de
terrasses d’alluvions ; quelques abankors à fleur de terre.
A signaler de beaux Cipolins dans la région de l’oued Tessert.
Belle végétation arborescente, en particulier dans les oueds Arrou et Tessert.
Le 9 et le 10, In-Amdjel.
Je visite le centre de culture d’In-Amdjel.
Un jeune Targui, Retaman-ag-Baba Ahmed me rappelle étonnamment un
buste de Toutankamon. Il est de race targui pure. L’on attribue souvent une
origine lybique et peut-être égyptienne aux Touareg. Leurs cheveux tressés, les
croix abondamment répandues comme ornements sur tout ce qui est targui, leur
type n’est pas pour faire rejeter cette origine orientale des Touareg[96].
A In-Amdjel passe la piste automobile qui traverse le Sahara et mène au
Niger ; une équipe travaille à la réparer pour le passage du raid Citroën qui ne
sera pas la première traversée du Sahara en auto car le lieutenant Fenouil l’a
déjà traversé avec plusieurs autos à roues. De la première traversée du Sahara
en auto l’honneur revient à nos officiers.
Le 11, je gagne Teneleft près du Touferert (Toufrik). C’est une curieuse
aiguille de roche grenue. Je campe dans les campements d’Abadoroul des Kel-
Terourirt.
Le 12, pays de granits. Je passe par l’Anou (puits) oua-n-Tinifouk. A gauche
les monts In-Tafargui, et à droite et en arrière les monts Igematen.
On aperçoit encore au Sud le Tahat.
Je gagne le bas du massif de Briri où je campe près de l’oued Amelak.
Beaucoup d’Acheb, Lehema et Rabiè.
 Le 13, je longe le massif du Briri et je campe près de l’oued Teneleft, dans le
voisinage des tentes de Mohamed-ag-Iknane des Kelindrar.
Les granits ont là des formes extraordinaires dues à une corrasion intense
superposée à l’insolation.
Je vais voir dans la montagne une petite source permanente : Naher,
accessible aux ânes seulement.
Le 14, repos.
Le 15, je gagne l’oued Adenek et le Anou (puits) Adenek, en laissant à droite
les monts Isk, Iskaouen, Ahellakan, les oueds Tin-Sebra et Tinian.
Je rencontre un superbe cercle, dans le genre de celui rencontré entre Idelès
et Hirafock, mais de diamètre beaucoup plus grand. Au milieu se trouve un petit
carré dessiné par des pierres. Peut-être l’emplacement du feu sacré, car
d’aucuns prétendent que ces cercles sont des restes du culte persan du feu[97]
que les Touareg auraient eu avant d’être musulmans, ce qui est possible.
Je remonte l’oued Adenek jusqu’à un beau Tarfa près duquel j’établis mon
camp.
Le 16, je suis l’oued Adenek un moment, puis le quitte et suis un mechbed en
direction du mont Iskarneier. Je passe dans l’oued Tintamahé (qui se jette dans
l’oued Abezzou), puis dans l’oued Entenecha où se trouve un bon abankor, puis
dans l’oued Martoutic.
Je remonte l’oued Martoutic ; sur sa rive droite, dans la montagne, je vais
visiter l’abankor Tahara (avec palmiers, lauriers-roses et joncs [Juncus
maritimus]) et je campe au confluent des oueds Aor et Tintahouin, qui forment
l’oued Martoutic.
L’Iskarneier et l’Intakoulmont sont, à l’Est de l’oued Martoutic, deux cimes
élevées très importantes du Tifedest, remarquables en particulier comme type de
desquamation des granits, car ce sont d’étonnantes coupoles polies émergeant
d’un amoncellement de boules.
Le 17, je vais voir l’abankor de l’oued Aor, puis je gagne la source d’In-
Ebeggi, par l’oued Ehan-nebra, le mont Babaia étant à l’Est.
Nous laissons à droite l’Adrar Hellelè et gagnons l’oued In-Takoufi (qui
continue l’oued Ehan-nebra, après In-Ebeggi) par l’oued Goulgoul, affluent de sa
rive droite.
A gauche, la montagne Hogeda et Adrar Dinaleouin ; à droite, Adrar
Oscindida, Adrar Agenora, Agelaga, Amerê.
 Planche XVI.

Le Pays cristallin. L’aguelmam Tahara, près de l’oued Martoutic (Tifedest).

Végétation avec Juncus maritimus, palmier et laurier-rose en fleurs. — Un
Targui et son méhari.

De l’oued In-Takoufi, traversant son affluent de droite, l’oued Timaratin, dont

la vallée amont abrite des points d’eau importants et doit être très intéressante, je
gagne le passage de l’Henderiqui où nous campons. Pâturage d’Arta.
Nombreuses antilopes mohor.
Le 18, traversons l’oued Intounin, dont l’amont est important par ses puits,
l’oued Ouhet, également riche en eau à l’amont, laissons à droite l’oued
Agellagan, contournons le mont Tileouin-Hanker et campons près de l’oued Ens-
Iguelmamen, au pied de la gara Ti-Djenoun, de l’Oudan, après avoir abreuvé les
chameaux à l’aguelmam d’Ens-Iguelmamen.
L’impression générale qui se dégage des régions du Tifedest que nous avons
parcourues est qu’il est très avantagé à divers points de vue, et en particulier que
les centres de culture y pourraient être nombreux (il y en a plusieurs
abandonnés) sans l’absence de main-d’œuvre agricole que la suppression
théorique de l’esclavage a créée dans ces pays.
Le Tifedest possède au plus haut degré l’avantage d’avoir des vallées
humides ; il joue un rôle important dans la richesse des Issekemaren, les riches
plébéiens des Kel-Ahaggar, et ses produits d’élevage camelin sont parmi les
meilleurs de l’Ahaggar.
C’est certainement une des régions les plus richement dotées du pays des
Kel-Ahaggar en même temps que vraiment des plus pittoresques et originales.
Le 19, je gagne directement le confluent de l’oued Taremert-n-Akh avec
l’Igharghar, près d’Egeleh. C’est maintenant un tanesrouft, le pays plat de
l’Avant-pays cristallin, pays absolument nu.
J’aperçois une grande antilope près d’Egeleh.
A signaler des tombeaux (?) nombreux, en gâteaux ronds bien bâtis, avec
des sortes de branches radiées, généralement deux. Sont-ce des tombeaux ou
des signaux ?
Je campe dans l’oued Taremert-n-Akh, près d’un peu d’Arta sec.
Le 20, je gagne Amguid, où je retrouve de la végétation (de l’acheb) et des
montagnes : l’Enceinte tassilienne.
Le 21 et le 22, repos à Amguid.
Le 22 et le 23, raid à Iraouen.
Du 24 au 1er mai, repos forcé à cause de mon état de santé.
Certains de mes Touareg également sont malades ou blessés ; et j’ai ainsi
l’occasion de voir des femmes touareg dans le rôle de médecin ; car ce sont, en
pays targui, les femmes qui connaissent les vertus des simples et l’art de guérir.
Pour les blessures elles font usage en particulier d’applications de plantes,
principalement de cédrat ; en médecine générale elles font grand usage de la
saignée et de sortes de cornets avec lesquels elles tirent du sang en des
endroits choisis, particulièrement à la nuque ; ces cornets jouent un peu le rôle
de ventouses scarifiées ; elles mettent aussi des applications de crottin sur les
tempes ; elles connaissent les propriétés laxatives du senné (qui pousse en terre
d’Ahaggar), etc., etc.
Les 2, 3, 4 et 5, raid au Tahihaout, par Tounourt Tin-Tedjert, l’oued Arami,
Tihoubar (source avec vrais roseaux [Phragmites communis]), l’oued Ti-
Gamahen et l’oued In-Tmanahen (point d’eau permanent et aguelmam).
Tuons des mouflons.
 C’est la chasse préférée des Touareg que celle du mouflon (ils méprisent la
chasse à la gazelle, dans laquelle excellent par contre les Arabes).
Quand le Targui part pour chasser, il cherche à ne pas être vu ; cela porte
malheur ainsi que les souhaits ; et à son retour il vous fait les honneurs de la
bête en vous apportant sa tête avec la queue coupée mise entre les dents.
Le mouflon séché, boucané, est un des éléments constitutifs de leurs
réserves de vivres ; ils en font également le commerce ; du poil des manchettes,
ils font des cordes très résistantes, ainsi que des chasse-mouches de nobles
seigneurs ; des cornes, quand elles sont grandes, des récipients pittoresques.
Le mouflon est considéré, semble-t-il, comme un des produits des terrains de
parcours et, comme tel, la chasse n’en semble admise pour les tribus que sur
leurs propres terrains de parcours.
Nous rencontrons de nombreuses mosquées à la manière targuia et un
tombeau de marabout.
Dans le Tahihaout, j’essaie de m’emparer à la course d’ânes redevenus
sauvages que l’on m’avait signalés. Ce n’est pas facile.
Du 6 au 19, je suis retenu à Tounourt et Amguid par une violente crise
d’appendicite qui préludait depuis quelques jours.
Les Touareg me soignent et je garde un souvenir reconnaissant en particulier
aux Forassi de la descendance d’El-Hadj-el-Foki qui m’entourent d’affection.
C’est une section raffinée des Touareg ; leurs femmes sont très recherchées
pour leur beauté, leur finesse et leur bonne éducation, et la dot que doit donner
leur mari est particulièrement élevée.
Et je vérifie encore combien est nuancé le code de la civilité touareg et
combien ils ont de formes de respect pour les femmes de haut lignage, pour les
vieillards, etc., etc.
J’y apprends également combien ils craignent la déesse Némésis. Il convient
par exemple de ne jamais les féliciter sur le nombre de leurs chameaux ou de
leurs jeunes bébés chameaux quand ils vous font l’honneur de leurs troupeaux,
car cela porte malheur, disent-ils, un rezzou est si vite arrivé qui change la face
des choses ! Il convient de ne même pas dire avec admiration : « Qu’il y en a ! »,
il convient tout juste de dire : « Il y en a quelques-uns », quand il y en a
beaucoup.
Les Touareg cachent leur fortune ; s’ils sont voilés quant à leur figure, ils le
sont aussi quant à leurs biens et d’ailleurs quant à tout. Nous ne savons pas en
particulier ce qu’ils cachent dans leurs grottes secrètes, ce qu’ils y entassent.
Ces cachettes, placées en général dans le terrain de parcours de leur tribu, où ils
mettent leurs biens, leurs provisions, ont souvent fait trotter mon imagination
quand ils allaient y chercher des vivres (dattes, blé, mouflon séché, etc.). Depuis
des siècles des objets curieux s’y sont peut-être entassés !... Les deux fusils que
j’ai trouvés près de Tin-Edness appartenaient, paraît-il, au père d’un Eitlohen
(Oinkara) ; ils lui venaient de son père, etc., etc., et ils étaient depuis longtemps
cachés dans la grotte que lui seul connaissait, où je les découvris. Dans ces
cachettes peuvent donc dormir des armes anciennes des Touareg (celles en tous
les cas qu’on leur voit arborer dans les grandes cérémonies et qui sortent alors
comme par enchantement) et beaucoup de vieilles choses. Peut-être là
trouverait-on quelques éléments pour l’histoire des Touareg, si informe encore.
Que de voiles encore à déchirer couvrent les mystérieux Touareg[98].
Pendant ces quelques jours je subis de nombreux vents de sable.
C’est d’ailleurs habituel en avril-mai. Aussi est-ce une période peu sûre dans
ces régions, car les Touareg, sachant que leurs traces seront ainsi effacées,
profitent souvent des vents de sables pour faire leurs raids de pillages.
Le 19, je vais à la Source du Figuier pour m’assurer de mon rétablissement.
A signaler contre la montagne un groupe de tombeaux (?) orientés, à
guirlandes, allées, tumuli, etc., près de Tin-Tarabin, à mi-chemin entre Tin-
Eselmaken et Tit-Tahart.
Le 20, gagnons l’oued Raris en traversant l’erg d’Amguid.
Le 21, je passe au pied de la pointe des Grès inférieurs d’In-Touareren ; là, un
tombeau (?) ancien, orienté, à guirlandes de pierres, tumuli, etc., en vague
croissant, est à signaler.
Traversons l’oued Tidilekerer ; remontons sur les Tassilis internes de
l’Emmidir par l’oued Tin-Tarahit (au Nord, l’oued Asaouen mène à l’oued Tilia ou
Henin). Tombes islamiques[99].
Descendons dans la cuvette de Tiounkenin, poussons une pointe au Sud,
jusqu’à l’aguelmam Afelanfela (ou Deïtman), dans le voisinage duquel je dois
signaler également un monument lithique du type à allées, guirlandes de pierres
et tumuli.
Le 22, passons à l’abankor de Tiounkenin.
Gisement de Graptolithes.
Après la traversée des Tassilis externes par l’oued Khanget-el-Hadid, où se
trouve l’aguelmam Hindebera, arrivons dans le mader Amserha, d’où nous
remontons vers le Nord, vers les puits de l’oued Tilia.
 Le 23, 24 et 25, oued Tilia. Beau pâturage de Had et de Drinn.
Le 26, le 27 et le 28, traversons les Pays pré-tassiliens par l’oued Abadra
(abreuvage à un puits), pour aboutir à Aïn-Redjem.
Le 29, Aïn-Ksob.
C’est la fin du Ramadan, et pour marquer ce jour mes Touareg édifient une
mosquée à leur manière dans laquelle ils se livrent à de nombreuses prières.
Le 30, Aïn-El-Hadj-el-Bekri (Tihoubar).
Tombeaux d’El-Hadj-el-Bekri et autres membres de sa famille.
Des dattes sont déposées sous la protection du marabout, ainsi que d’autres
objets.
Je crois qu’une partie est destinée à la famille d’El Hadj-el-Foki, sinon tout.
On ne doit pas toucher à ces provisions, paraît-il, que si l’on est près de mourir
de faim, en danger de mort, et les remplacer ensuite dès qu’on le peut.
Ce qu’il y a de curieux, c’est que les Touareg, pourtant pillards dans l’âme,
respectent cette règle ; ils n’aiment d’ailleurs que le vol à main armée, qui seul
est noble, et qui d’ailleurs n’est pas toujours un vol, puisque c’est souvent un
vieux compte que l’on règle.
Le 31, je fais d’une traite le parcours Tihoubar, Foggaret-el-Arab. La région
est désolée ; il y a absence complète de pâturage : c’est bien le Tidikelt.
Le 1er juin, repos à Foggaret-el-Arab.
Le 2, Foggaret-el-Arab-In-Salah.
J’apprends, à mon arrivé, que l’on m’avait cru assassiné ou grièvement
blessé et que non seulement des patrouilles avaient été à la recherche de
renseignements sur mon sort, mais encore qu’on s’était préparé à monter une
mission pour aller à mon secours ou me venger si cela avait été nécessaire.

[80] Ou Hoggar.
[81] Ces « impressions de route », tirées de mon journal de route, sont extraites du
texte d’une conférence que j’ai prononcée le 24 avril 1923 à Grenoble devant le
Club Alpin (Section de l’Isère) de même qu’un article « Seul au Hoggar » que j’ai
livré à la revue La Vie Tunisienne Illustrée en mai 1923 et qui y a paru en
décembre de la même année.
[82] C’est ainsi que l’on peut appeler d’un nom descriptif et point trop inexact
puisque le mimosa de France est un Acacia, les Tamat, Teleh et Ahtés (Acacia
Seyal, Acacia albida et Acacia tortilis).
[83] Tagoulmoust (T).
[84] Dans le sens héraldique du mot.
[85] Le sol de la Crau rappelle assez certains sols de reg. Il y aurait peut-être lieu
de se demander si ce sol de la Crau ne s’est pas constitué lors d’un climat plus ou
moins désertique.
De nombreuses raisons géologiques me font soupçonner que cette hypothèse
n’est pas loin de la vérité.
[86] Porphyre est ici employé dans le sens vulgaire.
[87] Edelés en Tamahak veut dire « lieu cultivé ». Idelès est un des plus beaux
Edelés de l’Ahaggar.
[88] Arrem en Tamahak veut dire « village », « centre de sédentaires », Kel arrem
(sédentaires) est opposé à nomades.
[89] Dans le Massif Central Saharien on distingue de l’Ouest à l’Est trois groupes
de Touareg : le groupe des Kel-Ahaggar de l’Ettebel des Taïtok, avec l’Ahnet
comme centre ; celui des Kel-Ahaggar du Grand Ettebel, avec l’Atakor de
l’Ahaggar et, enfin, celui des Kel-Ajjer, avec l’Ajjer.
[90] Sortes de toges blanches ornées de bandes écarlates ou pourpres et de points
bleus.
[91] Sinon celles des explorations de Duveyrier.
[92] Tirées de mon journal de route.
[93] D’après les Touareg il ne faudrait pas approcher son visage des belles fleurs
roses des Kerenka ; cela donnerait mal aux yeux.
[94] La grande piste saharienne qui passe par l’Oued Tedjert, Tisemt et l’Amadror
est certainement une des ces vieilles pistes sahariennes essentielles comme la
piste d’In Size dont nous trouvons déjà l’indication dans les cartes espagnoles du
xve siècle.
[95] Artemisia.
[96] Les Touareg ont souvent des clochettes pendues au cou de leur mehari ; tout
ce qui est Arabe ne se sert pas de clochettes ; les cloches et clochettes ont
quelque chose de chrétien ; les Touareg ont-ils passé dans les premiers siècles de
notre ère par une phase chrétienne à laquelle des relations avec la Lybie et
l’Egypte n’auraient pas été étrangères ? C’est là une question encore sans
réponse sûre.
[97] Le culte du feu existerait chez certaines tribus du Soudan Egyptien, ce qui est
déjà plus près de l’Ahaggar que la Perse et par suite pourrait nous éclairer peut-
être davantage sur beaucoup de questions encore très mystérieuses qui se posent
en terre d’Ahaggar.
[98] Je ne me suis guère étendu dans cet ouvrage sur les Touareg (caractère,
mœurs, droit, organisation sociale, etc.). Duveyrier en a admirablement traité à
 propos de sa pénétration des Touareg de l’Ajjer, et on ne saurait en écrire après
lui.
Plus on connaît les Touareg plus on s’aperçoit de l’exactitude de Duveyrier à
leur sujet. Je suis fier de rappeler ici que ce premier explorateur du pays targui
était un jeune géologue de 23 ans. C’est un bel exemple entre d’autres du rôle
glorieux qu’ont joué les scientifiques, dans la conquête et la pénétration du Sahara
Central.
[99] On doit remarquer que les tombes nettement islamiques, c’est-à-dire avec
pierres-témoin plutôt rares en pays targui, quand on compare leur nombre à celui
des monuments lithiques divers qu’on y rencontre.
 CONCLUSIONS

Dans ce travail l’étude géologique et morphologique du pays nous a permis

de distinguer, dégager et définir un certain nombre de régions et sous-régions,
un certain nombre « d’unités structurales ».

I. Les pays crétacico-tertiaires sud-constantinois avec leur bord relevé à la

périphérie constituant au Sud la Hamada de Tinghert et le Tademaït.

II. Le Massif Central Saharien comprenant :

1. Les Pays pré-tassiliens ;

2. L’Enceinte tassilienne avec :

a) Les Tassilis externes ;

b) Les Tassilis internes ;

3. Le Pays cristallin avec :

a) L’Avant-pays cristallin ;
b) Le Massif cristallin.

La distinction de ces unités de structure homogène nous paraît importante au

point de vue géologique et géographique.

*
* *

Nous avons indiqué par une rapide mise au point botanique et zoologique
combien la distinction inspirée par les considérations géologiques et
morphologiques entre les pays crétacico-tertiaires sud-constantinois et le Massif
Central Saharien était légitimée aussi par les caractères de la végétation et de la
faune.
 On constate un grand changement dans la flore quand l’on passe du Sahara
arabe dans le pays targui.
On remarque en outre :

la concentration de la végétation persistante sur le réseau hydrographique

auquel elle est étroitement limitée (sauf cas de sable, cas plutôt rare), alors qu’en
pays crétacico-tertiaires (particulièrement atteints par la « maladie des sables »)
la végétation persistante est largement diffuse ;
les caractères de cette flore persistante beaucoup moins adaptée à la
sécheresse, donc beaucoup moins désertique que celle des pays crétacico-
tertiaires ;
la conservation d’une flore persistante de pays humides et d’une faune
dulcaquicole complète composées d’espèces survivantes, à représentants
dispersés de temps beaucoup plus humides.

(Les autres massifs sahariens géologiquement et morphologiquement

comparables, les autres massifs cristallins du « Faîte saharien », avec leurs
enveloppes primaires, sont peut-être ainsi de même au point de vue zoologique
et botanique en opposition avec les pays de calcaires secondaires ou tertiaires et
de sables qui les entourent plus ou moins au Nord et au Sud).

*
* *

C’est ainsi que la flore et la faune du Massif Central Saharien semblent

témoigner de l’existence d’un passé humide au Sahara.
On peut croire que le réseau hydrographique du Sahara en disproportion
avec l’activité actuelle des oueds est également un héritage de ce passé humide.
Et ainsi la flore, la faune du pays targui et le réseau hydrographique saharien
fournissent un faisceau de raisons de croire qu’un passé humide a régné sur le
Sahara.
Nous ne sommes pas le premier à émettre cette hypothèse, mais la question
nous a paru ne pouvoir que gagner à une mise au point, appuyée souvent de
précisions nouvelles.
 Pour l’explication de ce passé humide, qui reste encore un point à éclaircir,
nous avons cru devoir faire un exposé de la question de la mer saharienne car,
au cas où des golfes méditerranéens et de l’Océan Atlantique auraient pénétré
profondément le Sahara on s’expliquerait des précipitations atmosphériques plus
considérables desquelles l’influence de volcans en activité et une plus grande
élévation du Massif Central Saharien ne semblent des explications ni suffisantes,
ni bonnes.
Et nous avons conclu que contrairement à l’opinion généralement admise
actuellement la question n’est pas réglée définitivement et qu’on ne peut rejeter
encore, sans éléments nouveaux, l’hypothèse des golfes sahariens.

*
* *

Au cours de cet exposé par unités structurales, nous avons mis en lumière le
rôle joué par les sédiments siluriens dans les formations de l’Enceinte
tassilienne.
Nous avons montré que les Grès inférieurs des Tassilis internes sont plus
anciens que les Schistes à Graptolithes (siluriens) et qu’ainsi toute une partie des
Tassilis est plus ancienne qu’on ne le croyait.
Nous avons esquissé la carte générale d’affleurement de ces Schistes
siluriens à Graptolithes et des Grès qui leur sont inférieurs.
Ces résultats ont une notable répercussion sur la géologie des vastes
domaines de grès de l’Afrique Centrale et Occidentale française dont ils peuvent
contribuer à démêler les traits par analogie.
Ces résultats permettent ainsi de croire que les sédiments siluriens jouent un
rôle important dans ces immenses pays[100].
Nous avons également indiqué que l’on peut maintenant considérer les
Schistes cristallins de l’Ahaggar comme plissés à l’époque algonkienne et
comme eux-mêmes anté-cambriens.
On peut admettre également cet âge anté-cambrien pour les Schistes
cristallins d’immenses régions du Sahara, ainsi que leur plissement à l’époque
algonkienne, entre autres les régions de l’Adrar des Iforas, de l’Aïr, du Tibesti (la
partie qui est en Schistes cristallins), de l’Eglab et d’Amseiga (au nord d’Atar, en
Mauritanie).
 Et c’est tout un « bouclier algonkien », un « faîte ancien » qui est révélé, le
« Faîte saharien »[101].

Dans ces conclusions, nous n’irons pas plus avant dans la mise en relief des
résultats scientifiques de notre exploration exposés au cours de ce travail.
Ceux-là, rappelés dans ces dernières lignes, suffisent déjà, croyons-nous, à
légitimer la mission[102] scientifique en Sahara central au point de vue
géologique, géographique et biologique dont nous avait chargé, en 1921, M. le
Ministre de l’Instruction Publique.

Grenoble, le 15 mars 1924.

 MASSIF CENTRAL SAHARIEN
DE L’AHAGGAR
Croquis Schématique de l’“ Enceinte Tassilienne ” par
Conrad Kilian 1922

(Agrandissement)

[100] Cette hypothèse paraît particulièrement vraisemblable quand on rapproche ces

observations de celle de M. Sainclair.
[101] Nous nous proposons dans des missions ultérieures d’étudier ces différentes
régions du « Faîte saharien » avec leurs enveloppes primaires en particulier par
une mission d’exploration d’Est en Ouest du Sahara d’Atar en Mauritanie à Bardaï
dans le Tibesti en passant par ses régions médianes et en coupant les pistes
transahariennes par leur milieu, l’aller, passant par le Djouf et Tamanrasat ; le
retour par Tummo Tamanrasat, In Size, Ouallen, le Sud d’Ouallen, l’Eglab et le
Hank.
Les régions inconnues du coude du Tafassasset, où certains prétendent
qu’existent les ruines d’une ville antique, et de l’Ouest de l’Acedjerad rentrent en
particulier dans ce programme d’exploration.
 Nous espérons qu’on nous donnera les moyens de la réaliser.
[102] Mission gratuite, c’est-à-dire non aux frais du gouvernement.
 TABLE DES PLANCHES

Pays crétacico-tertiaires sud-constantinois.

Pages
I. — Plaine au Sud d’Ouargla 40
II. — Dans les dunes près de Hassi et Khollal 46
III. — Dans le Gassi Touil 52
IV. — Dans la Hamada de Tinghert 54
V. — Modelé désertique dans le Djoua 62

Massif Central Saharien.

ENCEINTE TASSILIENNE

VI. — Le bord des Tassilis externes qui domine le Tahihaout 64

VII. — Le bord des Tassilis internes, près d’In Ebeggi 68
VIII. — La gorge de l’oued Iskaouen dans les Tassilis internes 78

PAYS CRISTALLINS

IX. — Les Basaltes de Tin ed’ness (Egéré) 90

X. — « Monad nock » à l’Est de Tin ed’ness (Egéré) 96
XI. — Dans l’oued Telouhet, près d’Idelès (Ahaggar) 120
XII. — La haute-plaine de l’Amadror et le Tellerteba 146
XIII. — Le Tellerteba vu de l’oued In Sakan (Anahef) 148
XIV. — Idelès, dans l’Ahaggar. — La Tamenoukalt. — Une aiguille volcanique 150
XV. — La Gara-ti-Djenoun (Oudan) 154
XVI. — Tahara, près de l’oued Martoutic (Tifedest) 176

CARTES

1. Carte d’itinéraire général 10

2. Coupe géologique de l’Enceinte tassilienne 66
3. Carte du Massif Central Saharien avec le figuré de l’Enceinte tassilienne en
rouge 186
 TABLE DES MATIÈRES

Pages
Introduction 7

PREMIÈRE PARTIE

DES PAYS CRÉTACICO-TERTIAIRES SUD-CONSTANTINOIS OU DU SAHARA

ARABE SUD-CONSTANTINOIS

I. — Études géologiques.
De la mer saharienne plio-pléistocène 11
De l’origine de la dépression Sud-Tinghert 17
Des troncs d’arbres silicifiés 22
Du Crétacé du Tinghert et du Djoua 23
Du projet de Transsaharien Souleyre. (Région du Gassi Touil et du Tinghert.)
Aptitude du sol à recevoir une voie ferrée 27
Ressources en eau 31
II. — Etudes botaniques.
De la flore des pays crétacico-tertiaires sud-constantinois 39
Du pâturage et du pâturage en Sahara arabe 43
III. — De mon itinéraire.
De Touggourt à Temassinin. — Impressions de route. 49
Notes de route 55

SECONDE PARTIE

DU MASSIF CENTRAL SAHARIEN OU DU PAYS TARGUI (AHAGGAR ET AJJER)

I. — Etudes géologiques.
Des Pays pré-tassiliens 64
De l’Enceinte tassilienne 65
Du Pays cristallin 79
Du projet de Transsaharien Souleyre. (Région d’Amguid).
Aptitude du sol à recevoir une voie ferrée 103
Ressources en eau 104
II. — Etudes botaniques.
 De la flore du Massif Central Saharien 113
Du pâturage dans le Massif Central Saharien et de l’élevage
targui 131
III. — Etudes zoologiques.
De la faune dulcaquicole du pays targui 139
IV. — De mon itinéraire.
De Temassinin à In-Salah par l’Ahaggar. — Impressions de route 143
De Temassinin à In-Salah, par l’Ahaggar. — Notes de route 156
Conclusions 183

Soc. An. M. Weissenbru

IMPRIMEUR DU ROI. BRUX
 Note du transcripteur:

Page 74, " direction sud-méridienne " a été remplacé par " sub-méridienne ".
Page 75, la phrase " monts de Tisekfa, d’Adrar-n’Taserest (Djebel Tanelak), " qui est dupliquée a été
supprimée.
Page 110, note 57, " Calatropis procera " a été remplacé par " Calotropis ".
Page 120, la référence à la note 61 était absente. Il a été placé juste après " a) L’Etel ".
Page 122, " plutôt mériterranéen " a été remplacé par " méditerranéen ".
Page 131, note 66, " Colligonum comosum " a été remplacé par " Calligonum ".
Page 171, " Typha augustifolia " a été remplacé par " angustifolia ".
La ponctuation n'a pas été modifiée hormis quelques corrections mineures.
La page de couverture, créée expressément pour cette version électronique, a été placée dans le
domaine public.