The Unorthodox Liberalism of Joseph Raz

Author(s): Robert P. George

Source: The Review of Politics , Autumn, 1991, Vol. 53, No. 4 (Autumn, 1991), pp. 652-
671
Published by: Cambridge University Press for the University of Notre Dame du lac on
behalf of Review of Politics

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1407310

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 The Unorthodox Liberalism of
Joseph Raz
Robert P. George

In The Morality of Freedom, Joseph Raz has challenged the anti-perfection

of orthodox liberal political theory and proposed an alternative form of liber
based on perfectionist moral premises. Raz maintain that his theory of po
morality qualifies as a "liberal" theory in view of the pride of place it give
tonomy" considered as an intrinsic human good. Nevertheless, autonom
cording to Raz, is valuable only when exercised in the pursuit of morally upr
ends. The principal point of contact between Raz's theory and leading
perfectionist versions of liberalism is his endorsement of a qualified version o
Mill's "harm principle." Raz argues that, though the law can and should
courage "victimless immortalities" by noncoercive means, it should not cr
nalize victimless wrongdoing. The article argues that Raz's claims are stro
where his substantive position is weakest. Perfectionist conservatives and
perfectionist liberals are correct to maintain that Razian perfectionism c
supply a ground for rejecting coercive legislation to uphold public moralit
matter of principle.

INTRODUCTION

[I]t is the goal of all political action to enable individuals to purs

valid conceptions of the good and to discourage evil or empty on

Where, in contemporary writing, would one expect to find s

a claim? Perhaps the last place one would be tempted to look i
a book described by its author as "both an introduction a
contribution to the political theory of liberalism."2 After all,
not the distinctive claim of (at least some) modern liberals
against ancient and medieval political thinkers, that political a
thorities ought, to the extent possible, to remain neutral as bet

Thanks are due to Amy Gutmann, Walter Murphy, Joseph Boyle, Germ
Grisez, and Mark Brandon who read drafts of this article and offered, from
different perspectives, valuable criticisms and suggestions. Thanks are als
to members of the departments of philosophy, religion, and sociology of St.
College who made the article the subject of a lively interdisciplinary fa
seminar. Finally, the author gratefully acknowledges the sponsorship of the A
ican Public Philosophy Institute at whose 1990 Annual Meeting the article
first presented.
1. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 198
133.
2. Ibid., p. 1.

652

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 THE LIBERALISM OF JOSEPH RAZ 653

citizens' competing conceptions of what makes for a valuable

morally worthy way of life?3
No less orthodox a liberal moralist than retired Justice Wi
J. Brennan has captured the spirit of mainstream liberalism
in his notion that the political order established by the Constit
of the United States is "facilitative."4 According to a facilitat
conception of politics, government - whether federal, sta
local-has no authority to judge matters of "personal" mor
The question of whether a conception of the good is "valid" or
is for individuals to decide for themselves free of governme
intrusion. The proper concern of government is to preser
freedom of individuals to pursue whatever conceptions of the
they happen to favor (so long as they do not violate the righ
others).
The quotation with which I began this article leaves no doubt
that the "liberalism" ofJoseph Raz departs radically from the Bren-
nanite orthodoxy. In Raz's view, a morally sound political order
cannot be neutral about which ways of life are good and which are
evil: the very point of political action is to encourage pursuit of
what is truly worthwhile and discourage pursuit of what is morally
unworthy.
Just asJohn Rawls's A Theory ofJustice5 helped to reorient political
philosophy by challenging the utilitarian premises of prominent
pre-Rawlsian versions of liberalism, Raz's Morality of Freedom is
helping to reorient the debate by challenging the prevailing as-
sumptions of post-Rawlsian liberalism. What Raz proposes, how-
ever, is not to return to utilitarianism, but to develop a political
morality of freedom that is not only non-utilitarian and nonneu-
tralist but also, at least in some ways, pre-liberal.
If the modern approach to political theory is distinguished from
the ancient and medieval approaches above all by the modern
commitment to a neutralist or "facilitative" politics, the position
Raz adopts in The Morality of Freedom places him in the company
of Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas rather than in the camp of Locke,
Rawls, and Brennan. In what sense, then, can Raz's political
theory qualify as liberal?

3. See Ronald Dworkin, "Liberalism," in A Matter of Principle (Cambridge,

MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 191.
4. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2351 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
5. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1971).

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654 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

PLURALISTIC PERFECTIONISM AND THE VALUE OF AUTONOMY

Mainstream liberal political theory is anti-perfectionist. Anti-

perfectionism is the view that government is either (i) required to
remain neutral on controversial questions of what makes for, or
detracts from, a morally good life, or (ii) forbidden to act on the
basis of controversial ideals of moral goodness. Rawls's adoption
of anti-perfectionism in A Theory of Justice has been followed by
many of the most influential contemporary liberal political theo-
rists, including Robert Nozick, Ronald Dworkin, Bruce Ack-
erman, and David Richards.
Raz, however, breaks sharply with these theorists by utterly
rejecting anti-perfectionism. He devotes two chapters of The Mo-
rality of Freedom to criticizing the various arguments that these au-
thors and others have put forward in support of governmental
neutrality and the exclusion of ideals. His conclusion is that anti-
perfectionist principles of political morality are neither warranted
nor, strictly speaking, even possible.
He proposes, therefore, to construct a theory of political morality
on perfectionist premises.6 He denies, however, that perfectionist
political theories must be illiberal. If there are, as Raz believes,
good grounds for supposing that liberty is humanly and morally
valuable, then a sound perfectionist theory will not leave the good
of liberty out of account.' A perfectionist liberal political theory
will give liberty a certain pride of place among the human goods.
In concluding his critique of anti-perfectionist liberalism, Raz
makes two points that foreshadow his adumbration of a perfec-
tionist alternative. First, he observes that "not all perfectionist ac-
tion is a coercive imposition of a style of life. Much of it could be
encouraging and facilitating' action of the desired [i.e., morally

6. For another noteworthy effort to develop a perfectionist liberal political

theory, see the writings of William A. Galston, especially "Defending Liberalism,"
American Political &ience Review 76 (1982): 621-29; and "Liberalism and Public
Morality" in Liberals on Liberalism, ed. AlfonsoJ. Damico (Totawa, NJ: Rowman
and Littlefield, 1986), pp. 129-47.
7. John Finnis makes the same point: "liberty and authenticity are goods, too.
They will find their place in any accurate (i.e., 'full', non-emaciated .. .) theory
of human good" (Fundamentals of Ethics [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983],
p. 50).
8. Obviously, Raz's use of the term "facilitating" here does not imply the
Brennanite notion of a "facilitative" political order that abstains from treating
people's personal moral welfare as a reason for political action. Raz is simply
proposing that there are sometimes noncoercive means of encouraging and en-
abling people to do what is morally good and avoid what is morally evil.

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 THE LIBERALISM OF JOSEPH RAZ 655

upright] kind, or discouraging undesired [i.e., immoral] mode

behaviour."9 Second, he notes that "[p]erfectionism is ... comp
ible with moral pluralism, which allows that there are many
ally valuable forms of life which are incompatible with
other."10
The second point is critical to Raz's project. From the perspec-
tive of anti-perfectionist critics, his perfectionism renders his claim
to be presenting an authentically liberal theory of political morality
dubious. In reply to these critics, Raz would maintain that what
qualifies his theory of political morality as "liberal" is the pride of
place it gives to individual liberty. He must, therefore, give some
account of why liberty should enjoy this pride of place. Any such
account will, in turn, depend upon an understanding of the value
of liberty.
According to Raz, something is valuable insofar as it contributes
to human well-being. And things can contribute to human well-
being in two ways. Some things are instrumentally valuable. They
are worth having as means to other valuable things. Other things
are intrinsically valuable. They are worth having for their own
sakes. Instrumental values have their value as means ultimately to
things that are intrinsically valuable.
In Raz's theory of practical reasoning, values, including intrinsic
values, are reasons for action. They are not reducible to desires.
On the contrary, desires are, he claims, "reason-dependent."11 It
is the reason-dependent character of desires that grounds a person's

9. Morality of Freedom, p. 161.

10. Ibid. Raz's notion of "moral pluralism" has nothing to do with moral
relativism. In speaking of "many morally valuable forms of life which are incom-
patible with each other" he is not supposing that there are actions which are
"morally wrong" for people who happen to think that they are morally wrong but
"morally right" for people who happen to think otherwise. Nor is he supposing
that there are actions which are "morally right" for people who wish to perform
them but "morally wrong" for others. He has in mind, rather, the idea that
there are certain morally valuable possibilities (e.g., actions and ways of life) the
choosing of which is incompatible with the choosing of certain other morally
valuable possibilities. For example, the choosing of a life of consecrated celibacy,
while morally valuable, is incompatible with the choosing of marriage despite the
fact that marriage is morally valuable. Or again, the choice to devote an evening
to conversation with friends, while morally valuable, is incompatible with the
choice of spending that evening reading Shakespeare, reflecting on human fini-
tude, or praying for wisdom despite the fact that these activities are morally
valuable.
11. Morality of Freedom, pp. 140-44.

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656 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

reasonable wish not to have his false desires satisfied. "Want-

satisfaction qua want-satisfaction," Raz concludes, "is not intrin
cally valuable."a We do not necessarily do people a favor, th
by helping them to get whatever they happen to want. If th
happen to want what is evil or empty, they have reason not to h
their desires fulfilled and others may have reason to frustrate,
even help to alter, the desires they happen to have.
Now, how does Raz conceive of the value of liberty? Is liberty
intrinsically valuable? Or is it merely instrumentally valuable?
it is intrinsically valuable, is the value of liberty realized in every
in which liberty is exercised? Or is it realized only when someo
exercising liberty chooses what is morally good?
Raz takes the position that liberty, or what he prefers to cal
"autonomy,"a3 is intrinsically valuable. It is an aspect of hum
well-being. A rich and full human life is made even richer and fu
when the values realized in that life are realized in and through
in which the agent freely chooses what to do. Raz explains t

[t]he ruling idea behind the ideal of personal autonomy is that peop
should make their own lives. The autonomous person is (part) auth
of his own life. The ideal of personal autonomy is the vision of peo
controlling, to some degree, their own destiny, fashioning it throu
successive decisions throughout their lives.'4

"Autonomy," he says, "is opposed to a life of coerced choices.

contrasts with a life of no choices, or of drifting through life witho
ever exercising one's capacity to choose"'5 Autonomous perso
according to Raz, are "agents who can ... adopt personal projects
develop relationships, and accept commitments to causes, throu
which their personal integrity and sense of dignity and self-resp
are made concrete."'6
Raz says that "all coercion invades autonomy by subjecting the

12. Ibid., p. 143.

13. Raz distinguishes autonomy in his sense, namely, "personal autonomy"
from "the only very indirectly related notion of moral autonomy" (Morality
Freedom, p. 370, n. 2). Cf. David Richards's reduction of moral autonomy t
personal autonomy in various of his writings, e.g., Sex, Drugs, Death and the Law
(Totawa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1982). For a critique of Richards see
John Finnis, "Legal Enforcement of Duties to Oneself: Kant v. Neo-Kantians,"
Columbia Law Review 87 (1987): 433, sec. 3.
14. Morality of Freedom, p. 369.
15. Ibid., p. 371.
16. Ibid., p. 154.

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 THE LIBERALISM OF JOSEPH RAZ 657

will of the coerced."" Nevertheless, he does not regard all

straints on freedom as unjustified invasions of autonomy. On
contrary, he argues that "autonomy is possible only within a f
work of constraints."a Thus, according to Raz:

the completely autonomous person is an impossibility. The ideal

the perfect existentialist with no fixed biological and social nat
who creates himself as he goes along is an incoherent dream.19

In Raz's more modest understanding of the value of autono

"significant autonomy is a matter of degree."20
Moreover, Raz recognizes that an autonomous agent doe
ordinarily choose for the sake of autonomy. Rather, his auto
mous choice is ordinarily motivated by some other value.
"the value of freedom depends on the other values whic
freedom to perform such actions serves."2' Autonomy or free
in Raz's philosophy, is not the only intrinsic value. There are m
other things that are intrinsically good; and inasmuch as auton
is ordinarily exercised in choosing for reasons other tha
tonomy, it would not be valuable unless there were other int
goods.
It is clear, then, that Raz's perfectionism is pluralistic. There
are many human perfections. Thus, frequently, there are many
possible morally valuable possibilities among which people must
choose. In choosing, one realizes not only the values that motivate
one's choice; one realizes the value of autonomy as well.
Is it not the case, however, that one may autonomously choose
possibilities that are morally bad? Are such choices somehow re-
deemed by the freedom one exercises in making them? Raz faces
these questions squarely. His position is that though one may au-
tonomously choose what is morally bad, "[a]utonomy is valuable
only if exercised in pursuit of the good."22 "Indeed," he says, "auton-
omously choosing the bad makes one's life worse than a comparable
non-autonomous life is." Raz himself takes note of some of the
political implications of this view: "Since autonomy is valuable on

17. Ibid., p. 155.

18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., p. 154.
21. Ibid., p. 16.
22. Ibid., p. 381.

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658 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

if it is directed at the good it supplies no rea

reason to protect, worthless let alone bad op
Raz argues that the good of autonomy req
available to them for choice a range of mor
perfectionist political order will, therefore,
provision of such options. On the basis of
rejects familiar notions of liberalism as a the
ment. "While not denying that governments
a threat to individual liberty," he says "ther
which regards them also as a possible source
latter conception that he embraces.
In rejecting the former conception, Raz als
alism so characteristic of anti-perfectionist
ophy. Near the beginning of The Morality of
"[i]f there is one common thread to the arg
is its critique of individualism and its end
liberal morality on non-individualistic grou
square his antipathy to individualism with h
individual freedom?
Raz argues that the existence of certain social institutions, prac-
tices, and conventions (what he generally refers to as "social forms")
are often critical to making available to people morally valuable
opportunities for choice. The opportunity to marry, for example,
is only available in circumstances where the institution of marriage
exists. Marriage simply is not a realistic option for people in a
society that lacks that social institution. And while the institution
of marriage differs in certain respects from society to society, there
are limits to the pluralism that any society can bear with respect
to that institution. The concrete legal and symbolic significance of
the institution of marriage as it exists (where it exists) is not an
individual matter.26 Raz illustrates the point with the example of
monogamous marriage:

Monogamy, assuming that it is the only morally valuable form of

marriage, cannot be practised by an individual. It requires a culture

23. Ibid., p. 411.

24. Ibid., p. 18.
25. Ibid.
26. According to Raz, "the very relationship between spouses depends
on the existence of social conventions. These conventions are constitutive of the
relationship. They determine its typical contours. They do this partly by assigning
symbolic meaning to certain modes of behavior" (Morality of Freedom, p. 350).

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 THE LIBERALISM OF JOSEPH RAZ 659

which recognizes it, and which supports it through the public's

tude and through its formal institutions."

Thus, according to Raz, in promoting and protecting s

forms such as marriage public authorities - far from violating
vidual liberty and autonomy- enhance these goods. By con
a political order that neglects to provide such support fails to
available to its members the morally valuable opportunity aff
by, for example, the institution of monogamous marriage.
Moreover, Raz notices that certain social forms that ar
portant for human well being and fulfillment need not thems
even provide opportunities for choice. In remarking on this
Raz draws out further implications of his conception of indi
liberty that run contrary to liberal orthodoxy.

The relations between parents and their children are an exampl

a relationship which is not based upon choice of partners. It sh
that an environment can be supportive of autonomy and yet in
forms not based on choice.... It has to be admitted though that
here choice has tended to creep more and more into the relatio
Parents have greater control over whether and when to have chil
and to a certain extent over which children to have. The widesp
use of contraception, abortion, adoption, in vitro fertilization
similar measures has increased choice but also affected the relations
between parents and their children. The impact of the increased
choice on the character of the family is just beginning to be felt.
It would be a mistake to think that those who believe, as I do, in
the value of personal autonomy necessarily desire the extension of
personal choice in all relationships and pursuits. They may consis-
tently with their belief in personal autonomy wish to see an end to
this process, or even its reversal.28

I have quoted Raz at length here to highlight both his thorough-

going anti-individualism and, relatedly, his rejection of the com-
mon liberal belief that the expansion of individual choice, or its
extension into new areas of human activity, is inevitably desirable.
For Raz, everything depends on the moral evaluation of the options
being made available for choice. Where a choice is between morally
worthy but incompatible possibilities, one realizes (in addition,
perhaps, to other goods) the intrinsic good of autonomy simply by

27. Ibid., p. 160.

28. Ibid., pp. 393-94.

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660 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

choosing for oneself. The opportunity to

fore one which it is in principle valuable
trast, it may not be valuable for one to h
possibilities. Raz insists that the choice
despite its autonomous nature, is value
make such choices is valuable only to the
and overcoming the temptation to choose
for one to build a good moral character.
no particular immoral possibility need
function."9 Life is filled with ineradicable
one may form one's moral backbone an
Let us take stock: Raz's pluralistic per
range of choices between morally valuabl
bilities. In making these choices, indiv
particular intrinsic good (or human perf
autonomy. This good provides the mor
political commitment to individual libert
its perfectionist concern for the moral w
ernment ought to support those social
make morally valuable opportunities avai
eschew neutrality with respect to marr
example. In promoting and protecting th
government does not violate people's auto
autonomy by enriching the morally v
choice. As between morally valuable but
however, government must, for the sa
individual liberty. Autonomy requires
from dictating to people in morally ne
governments, insofar as they deprive p
options, harm them by violating their
hand, government need not, and indeed
tral as between morally upright and im
play an active role in encouraging morall
discouraging activities that are morally e

LIBERAL TOLERATION AND THE HARM PRINCIPLE

None of what I have said thus far is likely to provide muc

reassurance to orthodox liberals. By the same token, more tradi-

29. Ibid., p. 410.

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 THE LIBERALISM OF JOSEPH RAZ 661

tionally minded philosophers may be wondering just what, if

thing, separates their positions from Razian liberalism. To be
Raz's political theory is not illiberal; it places a great emphasi
the importance of individual liberty. Contemporary natur
theorists and other traditionally oriented conservative critics
liberalism, however, typically defend alternatives to liberalism
are in no way illiberal. They too are pluralistic perfectioni
They too believe that people ought to shape their own liv
choosing for themselves whether, or whom, to marry, for exa
They agree that government ought to support social instituti
that make morally valuable opportunities available to peop
abstain from dictating to people in matters that are morally
different. Their perfectionism is no more sympathetic to ty
than is Raz's perfectionist liberalism. So, the question ling
What is distinctively liberal about Raz's political philosoph
The answer may lie in Raz's endorsement of a modified ver
of J. S. Mill's "harm principle."31 In Raz's hands, this prin
forbids the government from employing coercive means t
courage people from committing "harmless" or, better, "victim
immoralities.32 While his perfectionism authorizes the govern

30. Raz usefully distinguishes between "weak" and "strong" forms of plur
(ibid., pp. 395-99). "Strong" pluralism, which he endorses, is marked b
recognition of incompatible virtues that (1) "are not completely ranked r
to each individual," and/or (2) "are not completely ranked by some impe
criteria of moral worth," and/or (3) "exemplify diverse fundamental con
He explains that the incommensurability of values supports (1) and (2
renders (3) highly plausible. It is noteworthy that the natural law theory
brated by John Finnis in Natural Law and Natural Rights (Clarendon:
University Press, 1980), for example, is fully compatible with Raz's "s
pluralistic perfectionism. This compatibility is undoubtedly to be account
in large part by Finnis's own belief in the incommensurability of the basic
of human good that provide ultimate reasons for choice and action. R
Finnis both reject utilitarianism--even the "two level" and "indirect" for
utilitarianism that may be morally pluralistic in a weaker sense and, as Raz
out, "may also accept the first two strong forms of moral pluralism [bu
incompatible with the third" (Morality of Freedom, p. 397).
31. According to Wojciech Sadurski, who criticizes Raz's political philo
from an anti-perfectionist point of view, "[t]he major point of converge
tween Raz's book and the 'conventional' liberal theory is the acceptance o
harm principle as a basis for restraining the exercise of coercive powers
state." "Joseph Raz on Liberal Neutrality and the Harm Principle," OxfordJo
of Legal Studies 10 (1990): 122-33, 130.
32. Raz's references to "harmless" immoralities in Morality of Freedom cr
some uncertainty as to the scope of his critique of morals legislation. Recen
has clarified the matter by making clear that he objects to the criminalizati
"victimless" immoralities generally. See "Liberalism, Skepticism, and D
racy," Iowa Law Review 74 (1989): 761-86, 785.

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662 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

to use noncoercive methods of combatting imm

he argues that a due regard for the value of
government as a matter of principle from cr
acts unless those acts are harmful, or at least
to others.
It is worth emphasizing that Raz opposes th
of victimless immoralities as a matter of mor
merely making a prudential or pragmatic arg
legislation. Thus, his position can be distingu
tion of Aquinas, for example. In his famous
of whether the criminal law ought to repress
that human law should concern itself mainly
cause harm to others." He did not, however,
the use of the criminal law to protect the com
ronment against the corrupting influences o
matter as one for prudent legislative judgme
Raz, by contrast, wishes to show that the u
to combat victimless immoralities is itself m
adopts, I submit, a distinctively liberal posit
position with an argument meant to show th
are ruled out by a proper concern for auto
however, that this claim is problematic in view
Noting that his general argument is "that it i
ernments to promote morality," he says:

that means that governments should promote

the life of those whose lives and actions they
this concession amount to a rejection of the ha
according to the common conception which
function of the principle as being to curtail th
ments to enforce morality. I wish to propose a d
of it, according to which it is a principle abou
enforce morality.34

He then sets about the task of "deriv[ing

from the principle of autonomy."35

33. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 96, a. 2, reply. Joel Fein

that Aquinas' position qualifies him as a "liberal" on t
limits of the criminal law. Inasmuch as Aquinas clearl
legislation as a matter of moral principle, however, Fe
See Robert P. George, "Moralistic Liberalism and L
Law Review 88 (1990): 1415-29, 1421-22.
34. Morality of Freedom, p. 415.
35. Ibid.

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 THE LIBERALISM OF JOSEPH RAZ 663

Raz's proposed derivation begins with yet another reminde

a concession entailed by his perfectionism. He then make
distinct claims by which he purports to establish that this conc
does not undercut the principle of his liberal opposition to m
laws.

Pursuit of the morally repugnant cannot be defended from coercive

interference on the ground that being an autonomous choice endows
it with any value. It does not (except in special circumstances where
it is therapeutic or educational). And yet the harm principle is defen-
sible in light of the principle of autonomy for one simple reason.
The means used, coercive interference, violates the autonomy of its
victim. First, it ... expresses a relation of domination and an attitude
of disrespect for the coerced individual. Second, coercion by criminal
penalties is a global and indiscriminate invasion of autonomy. Im-
prisoning a person prevents him from almost all autonomous pur-
suits. Other forms of coercion may be less severe, but they all invade
autonomy, and they all, at least in this world, do it in a fairly indis-
criminate way. That is, there is no practical way of ensuring that the
coercion will restrict the victim's choice of repugnant options but will
not interfere with other choices.36

Liberal critics of legal moralism, no less than its nonliberal de-

fenders, have found Raz's argument in defense of the harm prin-
ciple to be fragile."7 His claim that coercion necessarily "expresses
a relation of domination and disrespect" seems gratuitous. He offers
no evidence for the claim and many people, including the present
author, see no reason to credit it. As the anti-perfectionist liberal
theorist Wojciech Sadurski has observed, "more radical perfection-
ists than Raz have argued that it is precisely the respect for a
person which should trigger our coercive interference with morally
repugnant actions.""3 Sadurski goes on to argue that, in light of
Raz's perfectionist conception of autonomy (i.e., the conception of
autonomy as valuable only when exercised in the pursuit of what
is morally valuable), it is hard to perceive any violation of the value

36. Ibid., p. 418-19.

37. Compare Sadurski's criticisms of Raz's argument in "Joseph Raz on Lib-
eral Neutrality," pp. 130-33, with mine in "Justice and Public Morality," The
World and 1 5 (1990): 517-45, 537-43.
38. "Joseph Raz on Liberal Neutrality," p. 132. For examples of "more radical
perfectionists" making precisely the argument mentioned by Sadurski, see Finnis,
"Legal Enforcement of'Duties to Oneself," p. 437, and Robert P. George, "Indi-
vidual Rights, Collective Interests, Public Law, and American Politics," Law and
Philosophy 8 (1989): 245-61, 256-58.

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664 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

of autonomy in legal prohibitions of victim

raises the suspicion that Raz smuggles into h
fectionist notion of autonomy."39
As for Raz's claim that "coercion by crimin
and indiscriminate invasion of autonomy
with Sadurski's judgment that "[t]his argume
equate to the burden it is supposed to carry
of the harm principle."" Criminal prohibiti
the case of morals laws is certainly no more
nate" than prohibition and punishment in ot
inal law. If preventing self-corruption is as
ical action as preventing theft, as Raz con
seems to be no moral principle that forbids
law to combat vice. Prudential consideration
against legal prohibition in many or even m
such considerations, however, will vary wit
any event, as Sadurski observes, "Raz's ar
autonomy-based argument against the penalt
morally repugnant actions, but is not sufficien
all coercive prohibitions of immoral [tho
iour."41

THE VALUE OF AUTONOMY

Even apart from the difficulties it creates for his argument

against morals legislation, there is something peculiar in Raz's
claim that autonomy is intrinsically valuable, yet devoid of value
in the case of morally evil choices. Indeed, Donald Regan main-
tains that Raz's position on the matter is internally inconsistent.

[T]here is no inconsistency in saying that autonomy is autonomy

even when it chooses the bad, and saying also that autonomy is
valuable only when it chooses the good. But there is an inconsistency
in asserting both of these propositions and in supposing also (as Raz
does) that autonomy, tout court, is valuable. These three propositions
taken together entail that autonomy which chooses the bad both is
and is not valuable.42

39. "Joseph Raz on Liberal Neutrality," p. 132.

40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., p. 133.
42. "Authority and Value: Reflections on Raz's The Morality of Freedom
Southern California Law Review 62 (1989): 995-1085, 1084.

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 THE LIBERALISM OF JOSEPH RAZ 665

Regan's advice to Raz is that, "strange as it may sound

should abandon the claim that autonomy is autonomy even w
it chooses the bad. The less desirable alternative, accordi
Regan, is to give up the claim that autonomy is per se val
I think that Regan is on to something here, but that he gi
Raz the wrong advice. If something is intrinsically valuab
realization in immoral acts does not negate its value. By the
token, its value does not redeem the (immoral) choices by wh
it is realized, at least if consequentialism is false (as Raz agree
is).4S Therefore, if autonomy is conceived to be intrinsically
able, we must recognize its value even when exercised immor
And we can do so without jeopardizing the belief that some au
mous acts really are immoral.
Nevertheless, I think that Raz is correct in his view that no
of value is realized in wicked choices by virtue of their having
autonomously made. I shall argue that he is mistaken, how
in his understanding of personal autonomy as an intrinsic va
Autonomy appears to be intrinsically valuable because somet
really is more perfect about the realization of goods whe
realization is the fruit of one's own practical deliberatio
choice. The additional perfection is provided not by auton
however, but by the exercise of reason in self-determina
Among the intrinsic values that one realizes in practically re
able (i.e., morally upright) choosing is the value of practical re
ableness itself. Indeed, where a moral norm (i.e., a princi
practical reasonableness) dictates a choice one way rather
another as between competing possibilities each of which pro
a reason for action, one's reason for choosing the morally up
possibility over its competitor may be precisely the good of pr
reasonableness. Practical reasonableness is not merely the for
standard of rectitude in action; it is itself a reason for action
Practical reasonableness is a complex good whose central asp
include personal integrity and authenticity. As a reflexive go
that is, a good into whose very definition deliberation and ch

43. Raz rejects consequentialism on the ground that consequentialist m

of moral judgment rely on the mistaken assumption that basic values are co
surable in a way that would make aggregation and comparison of values p
See Morality of Freedom, chap. 13. For a more radical critique of consequent
based on the "incommensurability thesis," see John Finnis, Joseph M. Boyle
and Germain Grisez, Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism (Oxford: Clar
Press, 1987), pp. 254-60.

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666 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

enter, it is related to autonomy (in a way

a moment); yet it remains distinguisha
choices may or may not be consistent with
and authenticity; autonomous persons ma
of integrity and authenticity.
The value of autonomy is, as Raz sup
whether or not one uses one's autonom
to account for the conditional nature of t
at the same time to obviate the proble
whose value is conditional as if it were so
to notice the respects in which autonomy
reasonableness. Someone who lacks auto
effective freedom (from internal compuls
ments as well as from external constraint
in making self-constituting choices, simp
reasonable. The acquisition of autonomy
him better off precisely to the extent th
the sorts of choices in which he can real
goods, the goods of integrity and auth
that morally upright (i.e., practically reas
sically perfective of human beings, whil
unreasonable) choices realize no value in r
exercised in making them, is entirely so
tion is located in the exercise of reason t
sible, however; it is not located in autono
Of course, if we substitute a Kantian id
for Raz's notion of personal autonomy, th
autonomy and what I have called pract
(In effect, Regan invites Raz to make som
tion.) Such a substitution would, howev
albeit conditional and, in a sense, inst
basic), value of personal autonomy. In
is interested in grounding liberal polit
autonomy that can be exercised immoral
fully distinguishes from moral autonomy
Someone who wants something may hav
it or he may have a sheer (i.e., nonrea
Not all actions are rationally motivate

44. It is also worth pointing out that even ration

(in addition to reasons) emotions, feelings, ima
ourselves as sentient, bodily beings.

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 THE LIBERALISM OF JOSEPH RAZ 667

something can motivate one to act (and to bring reason to be

instrumentally to find and execute the means to satisfy one's desi
even where one lacks a reason for desiring what one desires. And
as Raz recognizes, it is simply a mistake to treat sheer desires as
if they were reasons for action.45 One may have and be aware o
reasons - even conclusive reasons - to do what one does not want
to do; and one may have no reason whatsoever to do what one
happens to want to do. If one acts on a sheer desire for something
that one has no reason to want, one's motive for action is subra-
tional. If, however, one's motive is rational, one's reason for action
may or may not be sufficient. It is sufficient if the intelligible value
of what one wants need not depend on the value of anything else.
If one's reason is not sufficient, the value of what one wants will
depend on the value of that to which it is a means or for the
realization of which it is a condition.
Something is intrinsically valuable if it provides an ultimate (or
"basic") reason for action, that is, a reason whose intelligibility doe
not depend on anything beyond itself. Purely instrumental goods
provide reasons for action, but these reasons depend for their intel
ligibility on more fundamental reasons (or subrational motives) for
action whose realization they help to make possible. There ar
many ultimate reasons for action; and these reasons often compet
with one another. Frequently, people have, and are aware of,
competing reasons for action, none of which defeat all the others."
Someone may have an ultimate rational- and not merely emo-
tional-motive for performing a certain act even if he has a com-
peting reason (which may also be an ultimate reason) not to per-
form it, or a competing reason to do something incompatible wit
performing it here and now.
Practical reasonableness - like other basic goods, (including
other reflexive goods, such as friendship and religion, and nonre-
flexive or "substantive" goods, such as knowledge and play) - i
intrinsically valuable because it is capable of providing an ultimat
reason for action. Someone's desire to be fair, for example, need

45. See Morality of Freedom, pp. 140-43, 316, 389.

46. The sense in which intrinsic human goods provide ultimate reasons for
choice and action has nothing whatsoever to do with the so-called "principle o
sufficient reason" which, as formulated by Leibniz, holds that "no fact can be rea
or existent, no statement true, unless there be a sufficient reason why it is so an
not otherwise, although most often these reasons cannot be known to us" (G. W
Leibniz, Monadology [1714], sec. 32).

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668 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

not (and probably cannot) be purely emot

need it be purely instrumental. Someone's
where he has a motive (indeed, even wher
albeit defeated, rational motive) to do somet
reflect his practical grasp of the intelligi
something worthwhile for its own sake. A
considered as one among a range of normat
tical reasonableness, provides an ultimate
sive) reason for performing a certain act
competing reasons for not performing it o
have a strong emotional aversion to perform
The same cannot be said, however, for
One may desire autonomy for a reason
for autonomy may be rationally grounde
autonomy may be grounded in some non
merely emotional desire to do as one pleases
however, provide an ultimate reason for ac
provide an ultimate reason for performi
one has competing reasons not to perform
autonomy to choose between practical possi
a certain possibility over its competitor(s) b
is the practically reasonable one. One can
certain possibility over its competitors beca
the autonomous one.47
Of course, the sheer desire to do as one pleases is understandable
as a (subrational) motive for action. But, as Raz observes, wanting
to do something is not a reason for doing it. A sheer desire to do
as one pleased is not a reason for doing something that one has n
other reason to do. Unlike practical reasonableness, autonom
does not provide an ultimate rational motive for doing X when one
has a competing motive not to do X. If one's desire for autonomy
is rationally grounded, its ground must be some good other than
autonomy itself whose (fuller) realization is made possible or,
least, facilitated, by the possession of a requisite degree of au
tonomy.48
While autonomy has a special value as a condition of practical

47. In a situation of morally significant choice, a choice either way is autono-

mous; autonomy is on both sides of the equation.
48. I share with Raz the view that "[s]ignificant autonomy is a matter of
degree" (Morality of Freedom, p. 154).

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 THE LIBERALISM OF JOSEPH RAZ 669

reasonableness, there are, I think, many intrinsic goods f

sake of which we rightly value autonomy. Someone who wish
do things worth doing (or that he thinks are worth doing
naturally wish to have the real possibility of doing those thi
well as the effective freedom to do them and to do them at his choi
To the extent that one's morally valuable options are limit
to the extent that one is strongly discouraged from choosing c
morally valuable options, one's opportunities for participatin
and realizing human goods are diminished. Thus, there ar
reasons to respect autonomy (in Raz's sense) and, indeed, t
hance it. These reasons are, however, provided by the many in
sically valuable things that can be done and realized by h
choice and action, not by autonomy itself. These intrinsically
able things are the "basic goods" that provide ultimate reason
choice and action. Practical reasonableness is one of these basic
goods, but there are many others.
Ultimate reasons for action are conditions of free choice."4 Free
choice is the principle of self-constitution. And, in an importan
sense, self-constitution is what the moral life is about. When on
makes morally significant choices, that is, choices in which one h
ultimate reasons for action (together, of course, with emotional a
other subrational motives), one exercises autonomy and constitu
oneself as one sort of person rather than another. One (re)shape
one's character and (re)creates one's moral self by (so to spea
integrating the relevant reasons into one's character. One become
in Raz's apt phrase, "(part) author of one's life." We should no
however, treat either the autonomy one exercises in choice i
volving ultimate reasons for action, or the self-constitution that
an inevitable side effect of morally significant choosing, as them
selves reasons for action. For the self-shaping (or "intransitive")
effect and significance of morally significant choice is ordinaril
accomplished without that self-shaping being the object of, that
the reason for, one's choice.
In certain situations of morally significant choice, that is, thos
in which one's reasons for doing X are moral norms which compe
with other (nonmoral) reasons or subrational motives for not doin

49. Free choice is paradigmatically between options each shaped by ration

deliberation, i.e., options for each of which one is aware of reasons to choose
For a full defense of free choice thus understood, see Joseph M. Boyle, J
Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, Free Choice: A Self-ReferentialArgument (No
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976).

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670 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

X, one exercises one's autonomy well and co

upright and virtuous person precisely by
one's autonomy (and thus one's capacity to
choices) were destroyed (say, by brainwashi
a result of a stroke), one could not be pra
practical reasonableness is reasonablenes
choosing. The significance of autonomy, we
clude, is not in providing a reason for actio
plying a condition for the possibility of pr
choice (as well as other basic human goods)
ates well and chooses uprightly (thus acti
realizing the good of practical reasonablene
or not.

In suggesting that it is practical reasonableness, and no

autonomy, that provides additional perfection to morall
choices, I do not mean to imply that personal autonomy
nificant. On the contrary, I think that personal auton
profound significance precisely insofar as it is a necessar
for being practically reasonable and often a condition f
other basic goods. The nonautonomous person - the p
due to internal compulsion or neurotic impediment o
constraint, cannot be part author of his own life - lacks the
freedom necessary for rational deliberation and choice w
to possible projects, relationships, and commitments. Th
tonomous person cannot be practically reasonable becaus
either the capacity to bring reason to bear in deciding w
(and thus, in a sense, who to be) or the opportunity to ex
capacity. Still, autonomy as a condition of practical reas
(and other goods) ought not to be identified with the intr
(e.g., practical reasonableness) whose realization it makes
to make) possible: someone who is utterly nonautonomo
be practically reasonable; nevertheless, someone who i
tonomous may be practically unreasonable.

CONCLUSION

Raz's claim to be operating within the tradition of liberalism

seems strongest where his arguments on the merits are weakest.
Whatever else is to be said for and against anti-perfectionism (and
I think that Raz is correct to think that there is much to be said

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 THE LIBERALISM OF JOSEPH RAZ 671

against it), its premises clearly provide more solid support fo

principled rejection of morals legislation than Raz is able to m
Of course, Raz could abandon his strong claims against
moralism and repair to prudential objections to most (or even
morals laws. In response to critics who might then accuse him
abandoning liberalism, he could say that the coincidence o
political theory with the theories of philosophers who think of th
selves as outside the liberal tradition simply reveals the exten
which liberal pluralism has influenced virtually all contempo
political thinkers. In the world of ideas, he might argue, the l
view of the importance of individual liberty has triumphed."

50. I have said nothing in this essay about Raz's very interesting treat
of the problem of political authority. His analysis of authority connects his
work in legal theory with his more recent writings in political theory. R
who are interested in the matter should consult Part One of Morality of Fr

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