Part I: The Proper Understanding of a Valid Psychology

Chapter 1: The Nature of the Science of Psychology

If a science is defined as an organized body of knowledge of things through

their causes,1 then the goal of any science of psychology must, hy its very nature, be to
arrive at the causes of mental health and illness. But this presupposes knowledge of the
intellect itself as well as those faculties which may have some influence on the intellect.
Moreover, it is apparent that modern psychology has not fully grasped the nature of the
intellect itself since it has not been able to provide an accurate or complete definition of
mental illness. Before any science engages in an investigation of its proper object, it is
necessary to know those things which constitute each science in general in order to he
certain that one's science is engaging its object properly. In other words, one must know
those things which arc required for each science to he certain that the particular science
under question fulfills the requirements necessary to comprise any valid science. Given
the aforesaid, this chapter will consider the following: 1) what comprises each science;
2) what principles must be accepted in any valid science of psychology and finally 3)
what things comprise a valid science of psychology and some subsequent distinctions
in order to limit the scope of this book.

I. The Constituents of Every Science

The intellect of man is fundamentally designed to know the truth and

knowledge of the truth either pertains to his practical intellect or his speculative
intellect.2 "The speculative has for an end the truth which it considers, while the
practical directs the truth considered to an activity as to an end."' The practical intellect
seeks knowledge for the sake of action whereas the speculative intellect considers truth
for its own sake. Thus, the science of metaphysics studies the existences of things for
the sake of the knowledge itself. Ethics or morals, on the other hand, seeks knowledge
for the sake of acting in accordance with the knowledge it grasps.
When considering the objects of the practical and speculative intellects, we see
that every valid science has three constituents, viz. the material object, the formal object
and the method. The material object of a science is the subject matter or the thing the
science studies. Hence, one science is different from another insofar as its object of
study differs from the other scicnces,4 e.g. biology studies living things and chemistry
studies chemical reactions. Since the sciences are divided according to their objects,

1
See SCG I, c. 94, n. 3 and Aristotle, Posterior Analytics (as found in The Basic
Works ofAristutle, ed. by Richard McKeon, Random House, New York, 1941), I, 2 (7 lb10).
2
These are not two different faculties in man, but the same intellect considered
from the point of view of its different objects of consideration.
3
De trinitate, p. 3, q. 5, a. l: "speculativus habet pro fine veritatem quam
considerat, practicus vero veritatem consideratam ordinal in operationem tamquam in
finem."
4
Ibid.: "et ideo oportet scientias speculativas dividi per differcntias speculabilium,
in quantum speculabilia sunt."

2
 11-IE NATURE OFTIIE SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY

there are practical sciences, such as ethics, ergonomics, etc., and there arc speculative'
sciences, such as philosophy and astrophysics. The various speculative sciences are
therefore based on their different objects or subject matters.
lt may happen that one science studies something from another science and
regarding this SL. Thomas makes the following observation:

One science is contained under another in two ways, in one way, as

its part, because its subject is part of the subject of that other science,
as plant is a certain part of natural body. Hence the science of plants
is also contained under the natural science as a part. In another way,
one science is contained under another as subalternated lo it, when,
namely, in a higher science there is given the reason for what a lower
science only knows as fact, as music is contained under arithmetic.6

Here St. Thomas is noting that a science is under another in two ways. The first is when
one science is a branch of another broader science, since it only studies a part of the
other science, e.g. inorganic chemistry is a branch of the broader science of chemistry.
The second way is when one science is subalternated to another science and by this St.
Thomas means that the one science receives its principles from another science, e.g., the
science of epistemology receives its principles from philosophical anthropology, logic
and metaphysics. Therefore, in the consideration of the subject matter of the science,
one must also consider if it is a branch of a broader science, i.e. if a science studies a
subject matter which is covered al least in part by another science which considers the
object of study more absolutely. In this case, the higher science7 will supply the lower

5
The term speculative is not to he understood as it is in modem parlance, viz.
something of opinion or which is not based on fact or systematic investigation. Speculation
is a philosophical term which refers to the process of reasoning hy which we arrive at the
knowledge of the truth about something. It is based on experience of reality and employs
rules of reasoning (logic) in order to arrive at certain knowledge of its object. Outside the
philosophical sciences, this term usually refers to formulating a theory or opinion based on
uncertain facts or lacking all of the facts and therefore reaches a conclusion which is
uncertain. Thi1. is not the ca<;e in scholastic philosophy.
''Ibid., ad 5:"aliqua scientia continetur sub alia dupliciter, uno modo ut pars ipsius,
quia scilicet subiectum eius est pars aliqua subiecti illius, sicut planta est quaedam pars
corporis natural is; undc et scientia de plantis continetur sub scienlia naturali ut pars. Alio
modo continetur una scientia sub alia ut ei subaltcmata, quando scilicet in superiori scientia
assignalur propter quid eorum, de quihus scilur in scicnlia infcriori sol um quia, sicut musica
ponilur sub arithmetica."
7A science is a higher science the more abstractly or lhe more completely it

considers its subject matter in comparison lo another. So, for instance, philosophy of man
is a higher science than epistemology since it studies man in a more complete and abstract
manner than epistemology, which only studies a part of man, viz. how his intellect comes
to true knowledge.

3
 INlRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF MENTAL HEALTH

science with conclusions about the ohject of study and that science assumes those
conclusions as principles in its reasoning. 8 The subject matter in philosophy is called
the material object.
The second of the three constituents of every science is the formal object. The
question of the formal object arose because some sciences study the same thing and so
the question is what makes them different. St. Thomas makes the following observation:

Although the subjects of the other sciences are parts of being, which
is the subject of metaphysics, nevertheless, it is not necessary that the
other sciences are its parts. For each of the sciences treats one part of
being according to a special mode of consideration other than the way
in which it is considered in metaphysics. Hence, properly speaking,
its subject is not part of the subject of metaphysics; for it is not part
of being according to that point of view from which being is the
subject of metaphysics, but considered from this point of view, it i
a special science distinct from the othcrs.9

St. Thomas is noting two things of importance: the first is that one science can differ
from another science by the point of view (ratio) the respective sciences take. Hence,
the philosophical science of nature differs from the empirical sciences of natural things
by virtue of the fact that they look at the same things from different points of view. The
philosophical science of nature considers physical things from the point of view of their

8
St. Thomas observes that the division of sciences is threefold. The first division
treats what is in matter and in motion and this pertains to physics. Here, physics is to be
understood according to its Greek derivation, i.e. it studies those things which are pan of
nature. Hence, in a modern context, this would include all of the empirical sciences and the
philosophy of nature. The second division of the sciences is that which treats of what is
without matter or motion of that which is in matter, i.e. mathematics. For Aquinas,
mathematics would be what is called today geometry insofar as geometry considers things
which exist in reality but is not concerned with the actually existing thing as such, e.g. it
considers how one can calculate angles based on knowledge of the length of the sides of a
triangle, even though it is not looking at a specific triangular thing, like a child's building
block. Modem mathematics actually employs both geometry and aspects of the empirical
science of physics. The last division of the sciences is that which considers those things that
are neither in matter nor in motion and this pertains to the science of metaphysics which
considers the nature of being as such. These three divisions are seen in De trinitate.
9
Ibid., ad 6: "quamvis subiecta aliarum scientiarum sint partes entis, quod est
subiectum metaphysicae, non tamen oportet quod aliae scientiae sint partes ipsius. Accipit
enim unaquae4ue scientiarum unam partementis secundum specialem modum considcrandi
alium a modo, quo consideraturens in metaphysica. Unde proprie loquendo subiectum illius
non est pars subiecli metaphysicae; non enim est pars entis secundum illam rationern, qua
cns est subiecturn metaphysicac, sed hac ratione considerata ipsa est special is scientia aliis
condivisa."

4
 THE NATURE OF THE SCIENCE OF PSYCI IOLOGY

essences whereas the empirical sciences arc not interested in the essences of things as
such. but some part of the things, e.g. chemistry studies the various elements and how
they react, biology considers cellular structures and their interrelations, etc. The
perspective or point of view (ratio) taken within each science is called the formal
object.'"
The second thing of importance is regarding the method. St. Thomas notes that
each science treats a thing in a special way which means that each science has a different
method of proceeding which is proper to that science.11 Moreover, it also means that the
way we look at the subject matter, i.e. formal object, determines the method of
proceeding, e.g. philosophy docs not proceed in the same manner as empirical sciences
which use physical tests to arrive at its conclusions. Rather, its method is proportionate
!o its object, e.g. the objects of metaphysics do not admit of an empirical method and
therefore demand a different method.12 Therefore, we must be clear that the method
must be proportionate to the perspective or subject matter and this is likewise dependent
upon the point of view taken. We must also clearly understand that the formal object,

10
Here an observation must he made regarding the prejudice of the empirical
sciences in reference to the philosophical sciences. Since a science is defined as an
organized body of knowledge of things through their causes, then philosophy which studies
the essences and causes of things is just as much a science as the empirical sciences. In fact,
it is more of a science because it studies the essence and nature of causality as such which
is completely beyond the scope of the empirical sciences. Moreover, since philosophy
studies the nature of causes, the empirical sciences are dependent upon philosophy to tell
them the nature of causality. Without a working presupposition ahout what causality is, the
empirical sciences are incapable or engaging their proper method. Therefore, just because
philosophy uses a different method and takes a different point of view to the objects which
empirical sciences study does not make it any less of a science.
11
Ergo, it must not be assumed that the empirical method is the only valid scientific
method. Whik it may be used in all of the empirical sciences adjusted to each subject
matter, nevertheless, philosophy is a science which proceeds in a different manner than the
empirical sciences, but that does not make it any less accurate or inferior. In fact, it is the
opposite since the more ahstract and therefore universal one considers an object, the more
noble that consideration will be and therefore the method of philosophy is more noble than
the method of the empirical sciences.
12
Empirical scientists should also avoid assuming that the empirical method is the
only valid method of proceeding for any science whatsoever. While the empirical method
is proper to its own material object, it is not proper to philosophy which is also a valid
science. Very often, empirical sciences try to reformulate the definition of a science in order
to exclude philosophy (and theology) from being considered sciences. However, such a
motion on their part is inherently contratlictory, for the formulation of the definition of a
science is not open lo the empirical method and therefore to give a true formal definition
requires one to engage in philosophy. So either empirical scientists accept that philosophy
is a science or they are left with the unseemly prospect of not having a "scientific" definition
of science itself.

5
 IN1RODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF MENTAL HEALTI-I

the point of view, must be proportionate to the subject matter which ultimately
determines the proportionality of the method to the object.
Considering the aforesaid, we can now move to the third constituent of a
science and that is the method. The method is defined as the mode of proceeding within
a given science; it answers the question "how" (quomodo in Latin) the science
investigates the object under consideration. Since the method is governed or determined
by the object, both formal and material, there will be different methods of proceeding
based upon the different objects of consideration. The empirical sciences begin with an
induction13 (formulation of a hypothesis), deduce certain things from the hypothesis,
confirm or deny the hypothesis based on experimentation and then reformulate the
hypothesis, if need be, based on data received from the confirmation stage of the
method. The philosophical method varies with the material object but it does not
contain the confirmation stage even though its knowledge of the object is drawn from
things as they exist in reality and its conclusions can be judged to be true or not by
looking at the object in reality.14 Therefore, each science will have a method proper lo
its object.

II. The Principles of a Valid Psychology

A. Material Object, Formal Object and Method

One of the fundamental misunderstandings of modem psychology relates to its

material object. Since the Thomistic/realist understanding of man is that man is a
composite of body and soul,15 we have reached our first fundamental difference with the
way modern psychology views man. Modern psychology views man as nothing more

13
By virtue of the fact that empirical sciences begin with an induction, they can
never have absolute certitude in their conclusions. This follows from the fact that the
conclusions are drawn from the premises, and one of the premises, which is the hypothesis,
is not absolutely certain. Therefore, since one cannot assert in a conclusion what is denied
or lacking in the premises, one cannot make absolutely certain assertions or conclusions
when the premises do not provide it.
1
4The various philosophical methods are explicated by St. Thomas in De trinitate,
p. 3, q. 6, a. I.
15
Aquinas discusses this in ST I, q. 76; SCG Il, c. 56; De anima a. 1 and 2. Also,
the Council of Vienne formally condemns the position that: "substantia ani mae rationalis seu
intellectivac vere ac per se humani corporis non sit forma" ("the substance of the rational or
intclleetive soul truly and per se is not the form of the human body" -- Henricus Denzingcr
and Adulfus Schonmetzer, Enchridion SymbolorumDefinitionum et Declarationum de rebus
Fidei et Morum, fHerder, Friburgus, J 976, henceforth, Denz.] 902 [481]). Essentially
speaking a Catholic must hold that the soul is the substantial form of the body and that man
is a composite of body and soul. See also Ludwig Ott, Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma
(TAN Books and Publishers, Inc., Rockford, Illinois, 1974), p. 97.

6
 THE NATURE OF THE SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY

than a physical or material thing.16 However, since the faculties of man reside in the
body and soul composite or in the soul alone, and since the intdlect is one of these
faculties. any valid psychology must n:cognize that its object of study is not merely
material. Rather, man's intellect has three parts, two of which are immaterial and
perform their funclions independently of the body. Psychology has for its primary
material object the intellect of man, for the science of mental health essentially studies
the human intellect. But since the human intellect depends on other faculties for its
knowledge and since other faculties can have a direct and indirect effect on the intellect,
psychology studies secondarily those things and faculties of man which affect the human
intellect. Some of those faculties are likewise immaterial (e.g. the will) and this must
also be kept in mind regarding the material object of psychology. It is because modern
psychology has departed from a proper understanding of man's ontological constitution
that it has not had much success in curing modern man's psychological illnesses.
The formal object is the point of view taken toward the material object and
since psychology has as its primary concern mental health, then its point of view or ratio
will be from the perspective of health. Therefore, in a secondary fashion, psychology
will look at those faculties and things which affect the health of the intellect. This is
what essentially separates it from epistemology, for epistemology studies the human
intellect from the point of view of how it knows rather than from the point of view of its
health. Moreover, psychology also differs from the philosophy of man insofar as it
considers only a part of man, i.e. the intellect and those things which affect the intellect,
as well as things outside of man which affect the intellcct. 17
The method will essentially be philosophical. For since the method must be
proportionate to the material object as governed by the formal object, then psychology
must be a philosophical science. This follows from the fact that only a philosophical
science is capable of addressing immaterial entities. The empirical sciences by their

16
Consider the following passage of John Watson (Psychology as the Behaviorist
Views It as found in Classics in Psychology, ed. By '[borne Shiply, Philosophical Library,
Inc., New York, 1961, p. 798): "Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a purely objective
experimental branch of natural science. Its theoretical goal is the prediction and control of
bchavior. Introspection forms no essential part of its methods, nor is the scientific value of
its data dependent upon the readiness with which they lend themselves to interpretation in
terms of consciousness. The behaviorist, in his efforts to get a unitary scheme of animal
response, recognizes no dividing line between man and hrute. The hehavior of man, with
all of its refinement and complexity, fonns only a part of the behaviorist's total scheme of
investigation." Modem psychology which had its beginnings with Franz Brentano did not
begin with this conception of man. It originally began with the conception that man was a
composite of hody and soul and later psychologists began the move away from this notion
until recently man is viewed as a purely material being no different from an animal.
17This qualification helps to avoid the prohlem in many modem empiricalsciences

which seek to make their own science the explanation for all things. Since psychology only
covers a part of man, it does not discuss the whole of man and therefore is not as noble a
science as the philosophy of man, nor docs it explain everything aboul man.

7
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF MENTAL HEALTH

very nature require that their objects be physical or material since they must, during the
confirmation stage, perform some sort of test or experiment which can only be done on
material things. Since the intellect of man is both material and immaterial, psychology
can only legitimately employ a philosophical method, for only a philosophical method
is proportionate to the material and formal objects of psychology. The method,
therefore, proceeds essentially by induction 18 and deduction19 which are the proper
methods of philosophy. It is inductive because, in order to discuss mental health, one
must first understand the nature of man and his faculties, which are apprehended through
induction. Moreover, certain aspects of man are understood or reasoned out hy
deduction as well. Therefore, psychology will essentially employ a philosophical
method by which it reasons to the nature of mental health, mental illness, the proper
relationships of the faculties of man to the intellect, those things which affect mental
health and illness outside of man, as well a<; how mental health will be gained or lost.

B. Additional Principles of the Science of Psychology

To fill out our understanding of how psychology proceeds, we must remember

what goes into each science. Since a science is an organized body of knowledge of a
thing through its causes, psychology will have as its primary task the understanding of
the intellect of man from the point of view of its health and illness and the causes of that
health or illness. However, before one can adequately discuss the proper subject matter
of this science, he must have the prerequisite knowledge of those things which can affect
the intellect. Psychology is a subalternated science since it receives its first principles
as conclusions (facts) from other sciences. Psychology is subalternated first and
foremost to the philosophy of man since it recci ves its understanding about man's nature
and the nature of man's faculties from this science. This is perhaps modern
psychology's most notable failing, for it has proceeded in its science by rejecting those
principles which are proper to a Thomistic/realist philosophy of man.20 Since it did not

18
lnduction is defined as a form of philosophical reasoning in which the conclusion
docs not necessarily follow from the premises and the certainty of the conclusion is based
upon the amount of support provided by the premises; it is a form of argumentation in which
one proceeds from the particular to the general.
1
'>Deduction is defined as a form of logical reasoning in which the conclusion
necessarily follows from the premises; it is a form of argumentation in which one proceeds
from the general to the particular.
20
The Church has repeatedly pointed philosophers in the direction of Thomism, e.g.
see: Leo XIII, Aeterni Patris, passim, but especially paras. 21, 25 and 33; Pope St. Pius X,
Puscendi Dominici Gregis, para. 45; CIC/83 can. 252, §3 and Sacred Congregation For
Catholic Education, Ratio Fundamentalis, paras. 79 and 86. One can safely assume that by
basing a psychology on the principles and teachings of St. Thomas one is not going to go too
far afield. In considering the various philosophers, Aquinas seems to provide the best
understanding and penetration into the nature of man, his faculties and their actions and
objects.

8
 THE NATURE OF THE SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY

hegin with a clear philosophical understanding of the nature of man and his faculties, it
was bound to err. Sim:e psychology is a subalternated science, it must assume its first
principles from other sciences and modern psychologists assumed the wrong principles.
For that reason, the method of modern psychology was not proportionate to its object
because it did not understand the object of its inquiry. Moreover, it assumed an
empiricist conception of man without giving suflicient reason for doing so and these
presumptions led to its errors.21
Moreover, while modem psychology erroneously thought that, by aligning itself
with the empirical method, it would have a respectability in the scientific community
since it was an empirical science, newrtheless, it constantly made philosophical
statements about the nature of man and his faculties. For example, Freud and Jung's
theories of the unconscious or subconscious are incapable of being proven empirically
and yet to discuss the nature of the subconscious or unconscious rnquired inductions and
deductions without a confirmatory stage and that is nothing other than the philosophical
method. To make the statements many psychologists did about man requires
philosophical training and knowledge of the method which they neither had nor
employed properly.
In addition to being subalternated to the philosophy of man, psychology is also
subalternated to metaphysics, for it is proper to metaphysics to discuss what is nut in
malkr nor in motion.22 Since the intellect, will and other faculties in man are spiritual,
at least in radice if not entirely, then only metaphysics can adequately discuss their
nature. Moreover, concepts and volitional movements are immaterial entities which can
only be addressed by the science of metaphysics. Since God and angels can have an
effect on the operations of the intellect and other faculties which can be known through
the natural light of reason, 23 then only metaphysics can draw the proper conclusions
which are used as principles in psychology.
Psychology is subaltcrnate to logic insofar as logic is the art and science of
right reasoning and in order for the intellect to be healthy, it will have to comply with
the principles of logic. Moreover, psychology will be subalternated to epistemology
since that science tells us the nature of man's knowledge, his intellect and how he knows.

21
Modern psychology is proof of the Aristotelian dictum: "A small en-or in the
beginning becomes great in the end" (De caelo l, 5 [271h8-13I). Since they assumeJ the
wrong principles which were their premises, they could only draw the wrong conclusions.
22
See De trinitate, p. 3, q. 5, a. 4.
2The fact that man can arrive at knowledge of God by the natural light of reason
is formally defined at Vatican I (Filiu,1· Deus, chap. 2 [Denz. 3004 (1785)]): "Eadem sancta
Ecclesia tenet eldocet, Deum, rerum omnium principium cl finem, naturali humanae rationis
lumine e rebus creatis certo cognosci possi" and (Ibid. canons 2. Oe revelatione, n. I (DcnL.
3026 ft 806])): "Si quis dixeril, Deum unum et vcrum, crealorcm et Dominum nostrum, per
ea, quae facta sunt, naturali rationis humanae lumine certo cognosci no posse: anathema sit."
Aquinas argues to the existence of God, His attributes and His being a Creator through the
natural light of reason in SCG I & IJ.

9
 INTRODUCTION TO TIIE SCIENCE OF MENTAL HEALTH

It will be subaltcrnated to ethics insofar as ethics treats of the appetites and their right
ordering and how they affect morally right or wrong behavior.
Finally, a full understanding of how man can gain and lose mental health cannot
be understood without a serious consideration of how spiritual realities affect the
operation of the faculties. While these can be considered in general in metaphysics, the
actual operations of things like grace, the sacraments, the demonic, etc. can only be
understood in light of revealed theology. We come to an important point in
understanding, therefore, what a full psychology will entail. A complete science of
psychology will include both what is known through the natural light of reason as well
as what is known through the light of faith. While the natural24 science of psychology
can define mental illness and health and their causes, a full understanding of those
causes can only be grasped when theological principles are likewise accepted. While
there is not and cannot be a theological science of mental health,25 nevertheless the
material object of the natural science of psychology will not be fully grasped without an
understanding of theological principles. While psychology is essentially a natural
science and as a natural science is a science in its own right, the full understanding of
psychology will not be achieved without theology playing a part.

C. Modern Psychiatry

Modern psychiatry has a valid basis for its method. While modern psychology
is akin to alchemy in that it is not a valid science because it does not understand its
object properly, modern psychiatry does have a sound basis as a science. As a
suhalternatcd science to psychology, it must accept the valid conclusions of psychology
regarding what the faculties arc, what their proper actions are and how they are
composed. But part of psychology is a clear recognition that there is a material part of
man's intellect and, as material, it can be affected by the various physical agents, such
as chemicals, physical damage caused by pathological and non-pathological causes, etc.
Since the study of these things is proper to an empirical science, it is not proper to
psychology as such to investigate them. Therefore, there must be a science which docs
investigate the material operations of the brain as such.
This means that what is natural and proper to the material intellect will come
generically from psychology, whereas how that works itself out chemically or
biologically comes from psychiatry. For example, what the emotions are is proper!y and
universally grasped by psychology (or more properly the philosophy of man), yet
psychiatry can help us a great deal in understanding the chem.ical processes which
accompany and affect the emotions. Moreover, while philosophy may discuss the acts
of the passive intellect, since the faculty is partly material, it pertains to psychiatry to
localize the parts of the passive intellect. Once psychology determines which activities

2
4Thc term natural here does not refer to an empirical science hut a natural science
as counter distinguished from a supernatural science.
2
'Why this is the case will be discussed at the beginning of Volume ll.

10
 THE NATURE OF THE SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY

of the passive intellect are appropriate, modern psychiatry can set about determining
what chemical and biological dispositions are necessary for those functions to occur on
a physical level. It pertains, however, to psychology to determine what is proper to the
various physical faculties in general, although not chemically or hiologically, since the
faculties of man which are physical are part of a faculty which is both material and
immaterial. Therefore, only psychology can grasp the whole nature of the faculty and
that understanding is to be passed on to psychiatry which can then set about determining
what is normal on a purely physical level.
Finally, psychology is much like ethics in that ethics, for Aquinas, is essentially
a practical science. Nevertheless, there are certain speculative aspects to ethics, and this
is true of psychology as well. Psychology is also analogous to the science and art of
medicine. One must first study one's object scientifically hefore one practices medicine.
Psychology, therefore, is both speculative and practical. It is speculative insofar as it
strives for the knowledge of what mental health and illness and their causes are. While
possessing this knowledge is a perfection in itself, nevertheless, psychology also has a
practical role since the conclusions in the speculative part are applied in the practical
part in order to achieve three things: I) to provide the knowledge necessary to help those
who have mental health maintain it; 2) to understand mental illness and its causes so as
to be able to diagnose mental illness in those who have it and to determine what are the
causes of those mental illnesses; 3) to provide the knowledge and other forms of help to
aid those who are mentally ill, once properly diagnosed, to achieve mental health.

D. Modern Psychology

What then of all the work of modern psychology? Is it all to be considered for
nought? The answer is obviously in the negative; even St. Thomas observed that no man
is completely devoid of the truth and so the question shifts to what good things has
modern psychology accomplished? Clearly, one of the achievements of modern
psychology has been the cla<;sification of symptoms as demonstrated in the current text
DSM JV.2" Moreover, modern psychology has told us a great deal about what most
people think and do by means of statistical analysis and this has its place in psychology.
However, before we can fully grasp the symptoms which are the effects of
mental illness, we must first grasp what mental illness is, but that has been completely
wanting in modern psychology. Because modern psychology does nut understand its
material object, psychology has not made much sense in its classification of all the
psychological disordcrs. Moreovcr, it has failed to arrive at what mental health actually
is and this makes it impossible really to know if the average man is doing what is right.
Just because cveryonc in a society is engaging in certain types of behavior docs not
make those behaviors psychologically good. Here. psychology, assuming that man was
purely physical and therefore was just a product of physical laws, failed to recognize

6The asse11ion here is that modem psychology has had some success in the area
2

of diagnosis. It should not be assumed, however, that every form of classification of

symptoms and causes is accurate.

11
than man can act contrary to his nature. And even if an entire society is engaging in a
behavior which is not in congruity with man's nature, that behavior is not normal. While
statistics can tell me what the average or majority of people are doing, it does not
provide the norm.
It is only within the context of understanding the nature of Original Sin grasped
through revealed theology, and the nature of man as such grasped by philosophy, that
we arrive at the explanation of the difference between what the average man does and
what constitutes the norm. Since man is affected by Original Sin, most men commit sins,
but that does not mean that sins are natural. If they are not natural, how can they be the
norm for psychologically good behavior? How can they be a sign of mental health?
While these questions will be discussed, nevertheless, modern psychology has not been
successful because it did not understand its object and therefore what is proper to it. We
should not conclude, however, that everything modern psychology did was wrong or of
no benefit. However, we must judge the conclusions and work of modern psychology
only after we have grasped the conclusions of a valid psychology and are thereby able
to use those conclusions as principles to judge modern psychology

III. 'The Scope of the Current Volume

Considering the aforesaid, this volume will have as its scope the following. It
will first discuss in detail the subalternate principles accepted from other philosophical
sciences. It will then discuss the relationship of the various faculties and how they affect
one another. It will discuss the nature of mental health and mental illness in themselves.
Finally, it will draw some conclusions about how one loses and gains mental health in
light of the discussion on how the various faculties affect one another as well as a
threefold division of causes of mental health and illness. Since psychiatry is a
subalternated science to psychology and therefore operates on its own and since the
author is not competent in that field, psychiatry wi II not be a formal part of this study.27
Given the scope of this volume, a subsequent volume will cover the theological
principles which affect psychology. Moreover, since psychology also has a practical
aspect to it, a final volume will consider certain applications of the principles in the
previous two volumes as well as other questions not addressed in the first two volumes,
therehy completing an introductory look into psychology.

27
Since it is nut the competence of the author lo discuss in detail psychiatric aspects
of mental health, it will not be the proper scope of this text. Nevertheless, examples will be
employed throughout the book from psychiatry when they properly apply.

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