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To Dr. Anthony Brown: Thank you for keeping me alive and healthy, despite
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 ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Michael Meyers is the industry’s leading authority on CompTIA Network+

certification. He is the president and founder of Total Seminars, LLC, a
member of CompTIA, and a major provider of IT fundamentals, PC and
network repair, and computer security training and training materials for
thousands of organizations throughout the world.
Mike has written numerous popular textbooks, including the best-selling
CompTIA A+® Certification All-in-One Exam Guide, Mike Meyers’
CompTIA Network+® Guide to Managing and Troubleshooting Networks,
and Mike Meyers’ CompTIA Security+® Certification Guide.
Mike has attained numerous industry certifications, including CompTIA
A+, CompTIA Network+, CompTIA Security+, CompTIA Cybersecurity
Analyst (CySA+), and Microsoft Certified Professional.

About the Contributor

Scott Jernigan wields a mighty red pen as Editor in Chief for Total
Seminars. With a Master of Arts degree in Medieval History, Scott feels as
much at home in the musty archives of London as he does in the crisp IPS
glow of Total Seminars’ Houston HQ. After fleeing a purely academic life,
he dove headfirst into IT, working as an instructor, editor, and writer.
Scott has written, edited, and contributed to dozens of books on computer
literacy, hardware, operating systems, networking, security, and certification,
including Computer Literacy—Your Ticket to IC3 Certification, and co-
authoring with Mike Meyers the CompTIA IT Fundamentals® All-in-One
Exam Guide and Mike Meyers’ CompTIA Security+® Certification Guide.
Scott has taught computer classes all over the United States, including
stints at the United Nations in New York and the FBI Academy in Quantico.
Practicing what he preaches, Scott is a CompTIA A+, CompTIA Network+,
and CompTIA Security+ certified technician, a Microsoft Certified
Professional, a Microsoft Office User Specialist, and Certiport Internet and
Computing Core Certified.

About the Technical Editor

Jonathan S. Weissman is an associate professor and IT program coordinator
(Department of Computing Sciences) at Finger Lakes Community College.
He is also a senior lecturer (Department of Computing Security) at Rochester
Institute of Technology and teaches part-time at Syracuse University
(Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science) and Nazareth
College (School of Management).
Jonathan is the co-author of Mike Meyers’ CompTIA Network+®
Certification Passport, Sixth Edition and Mike Meyers’ CompTIA Network+®
Guide to Managing and Troubleshooting Networks Lab Manual, Fifth
Edition, and also serves as technical editor for many industry textbooks.
Jonathan also developed three courses for the edX RITx Cybersecurity
MicroMasters program, which he has taught to more than 50,000 students
worldwide. In addition to teaching, Jonathan is a networking and
cybersecurity consultant for local businesses and individuals.
Jonathan has a master’s degree in Computer Science from Brooklyn
College and holds 34 industry certifications, including CCNP® Routing and
Switching, CCNA® Security, CompTIA Security+, CompTIA Network+,
CompTIA A+, Certified Ethical Hacker, Computer Hacking Forensic
Investigator, and IPv6 Certified Network Engineer (Gold), among others.

LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/jonathan-s-weissman-058b649b

Twitter: https://twitter.com/cscprof
Becoming a CompTIA Certified IT
Professional Is Easy
It’s also the best way to reach greater professional opportunities and rewards.

Why Get CompTIA Certified?

Growing Demand
Labor estimates predict some technology fields will experience growth of
more than 20% by the year 2020. (Source: CompTIA 9th Annual Information
Security Trends study: 500 U.S. IT and Business Executives Responsible for
Security.) CompTIA certification qualifies the skills required to join this
workforce.

Higher Salaries
IT professionals with certifications on their resume command better jobs,
earn higher salaries, and have more doors open to new multi-industry
opportunities.
Verified Strengths
Ninety-one percent of hiring managers indicate CompTIA certifications are
valuable in validating IT expertise, making certification the best way to
demonstrate your competency and knowledge to employers. (Source:
CompTIA Employer Perceptions of IT Training and Certification.)

Universal Skills
CompTIA certifications are vendor neutral—which means that certified
professionals can proficiently work with an extensive variety of hardware and
software found in most organizations.

Learn More: Certification.CompTIA.org

CompTIA Disclaimer
© 2018 CompTIA Properties, LLC, used under license by CompTIA
Certifications, LLC. All rights reserved. All certification programs and
education related to such programs are operated exclusively by CompTIA
Certifications, LLC. CompTIA is a registered trademark of CompTIA
Properties, LLC in the U.S. and internationally. Other brands and company
names mentioned herein may be trademarks or service marks of CompTIA
Properties, LLC or of their respective owners. Reproduction or dissemination
of this courseware sheet is prohibited without written consent of CompTIA
Properties, LLC. Printed in the U.S. 04711-Jan2018.
 CONTENTS AT A GLANCE

Chapter 1 Network Models

Chapter 2 Cabling and Topology
Chapter 3 Ethernet Basics
Chapter 4 Modern Ethernet
Chapter 5 Installing a Physical Network
Chapter 6 TCP/IP Basics
Chapter 7 Routing
Chapter 8 TCP/IP Applications
Chapter 9 Network Naming
Chapter 10 Securing TCP/IP
Chapter 11 Advanced Networking Devices
Chapter 12 IPv6
Chapter 13 Remote Connectivity
Chapter 14 Wireless Networking
Chapter 15 Virtualization and Cloud Computing
Chapter 16 Mobile Networking
Chapter 17 Building a Real-World Network
Chapter 18 Managing Risk
Chapter 19 Protecting Your Network
Chapter 20 Network Monitoring
Chapter 21 Network Troubleshooting
Appendix A Objective Map: CompTIA Network+
Appendix B Create Your Study Plan
Appendix C About the Online Content
Glossary
Index
 CONTENTS

Acknowledgments
Introduction
Chapter 1 Network Models
Historical/Conceptual
Working with Models
Biography of a Model
Network Models
The OSI Seven-Layer Model in Action
Welcome to MHTechEd!
Test Specific
Let’s Get Physical—Network Hardware and Layers 1–2
Beyond the Single Wire—Network Software and Layers
3–7
The TCP/IP Model
The Link Layer
The Internet Layer
The Transport Layer
The Application Layer
Frames, Packets, and Segments/Datagrams, Oh My!
The Tech’s Troubleshooting Tools
Chapter Review
Questions
Answers
Chapter 2 Cabling and Topology
Test Specific
 Network Topologies
Bus and Ring
Star
Hybrid
Mesh
Parameters of a Topology
Cabling and Connectors
Copper Cabling and Connectors
Fiber-Optic Cabling and Connectors
Other Cables
Fire Ratings
Networking Industry Standards—IEEE
Chapter Review
Questions
Answers
Chapter 3 Ethernet Basics
Historical/Conceptual
Ethernet
802.3 Standards
Test Specific
Ethernet Frames
Early Ethernet Standards
Bus Ethernet
10BaseT
10BaseFL
CSMA/CD
Enhancing and Extending Ethernet Networks
The Trouble with Hubs
Switches to the Rescue
Connecting Ethernet Segments
Troubleshooting Switches
 Chapter Review
Questions
Answers
Chapter 4 Modern Ethernet
Test Specific
100-Megabit Ethernet
100BaseT
100BaseFX
Gigabit Ethernet
1000BaseSX
1000BaseLX
SFF Fiber Connectors
Mechanical Connection Variations
Implementing Multiple Types of Gigabit Ethernet
Ethernet Evolutions
10 Gigabit Ethernet
Beyond Network+
IEEE 802.3ba
Chapter Review
Questions
Answers
Chapter 5 Installing a Physical Network
Historical/Conceptual
Understanding Structured Cabling
Cable Basics—A Star Is Born
Test Specific
Structured Cable—Network Components
Structured Cable—Beyond the Star
Installing Structured Cabling
Getting a Floor Plan
Mapping the Runs
 Determining the Location of the Telecommunications
Room
Pulling Cable
Making Connections
Testing the Cable Runs
NICs
Buying NICs
Link Lights
Diagnostics and Repair of Physical Cabling
Diagnosing Physical Problems
Check Your Lights
Check the NIC
Cable Testing
Problems in the Telecommunications Room
Toners
Chapter Review
Questions
Answers
Chapter 6 TCP/IP Basics
Historical/Conceptual
Test Specific
The TCP/IP Protocol Suite
Internet Layer Protocols
Transport Layer Protocols
Application Layer Protocols
IP and Ethernet
IP Addresses
IP Addresses in Action
Class IDs
CIDR and Subnetting
Subnetting
 CIDR: Subnetting in the Real World
IP Address Assignment
Static IP Addressing
Dynamic IP Addressing
Special IP Addresses
Chapter Review
Questions
Answers
Chapter 7 Routing
Historical/Conceptual
How Routers Work
Test Specific
Routing Tables
Freedom from Layer 2
Network Address Translation
Dynamic Routing
Routing Metrics
Distance Vector and Path Vector
Link State
EIGRP
Dynamic Routing Makes the Internet
Route Redistribution
Working with Routers
Connecting to Routers
Basic Router Configuration
Router Problems
Chapter Review
Questions
Answers
Chapter 8 TCP/IP Applications
Historical/Conceptual
 Transport Layer and Network Layer Protocols
How People Communicate
Test Specific
TCP
UDP
ICMP
IGMP
The Power of Port Numbers
Registered Ports
Connection Status
Rules for Determining Good vs. Bad Communications
Common TCP/IP Applications
The World Wide Web
Telnet and SSH
E-mail
FTP
Internet Applications
Chapter Review
Questions
Answers
Chapter 9 Network Naming
Test Specific
Before DNS
NetBIOS
hosts
DNS
How DNS Works
DNS Servers
Troubleshooting DNS
Diagnosing TCP/IP Networks
Chapter Review
 Questions
Answers
Chapter 10 Securing TCP/IP
Test Specific
Making TCP/IP Secure
Encryption
Integrity
Nonrepudiation
Authentication
Authorization
TCP/IP Security Standards
User Authentication Standards
Encryption Standards
Combining Authentication and Encryption
Secure TCP/IP Applications
HTTPS
SCP
SFTP
SNMP
LDAP
NTP
Chapter Review
Questions
Answers
Chapter 11 Advanced Networking Devices
Test Specific
Virtual Private Networks
PPTP VPNs
L2TP VPNs
SSL VPNs
DTLS VPNs
 DMVPN
Alternative VPNs
Switch Management
Virtual LANs
Trunking
Configuring a VLAN-Capable Switch
Tagging
VLAN Trunking Protocol
InterVLAN Routing
DHCP and VLANs
Troubleshooting VLANs
Multilayer Switches
Load Balancing
QoS and Traffic Shaping
Port Bonding
Network Protection
Chapter Review
Questions
Answers
Chapter 12 IPv6
Test Specific
IPv6 Basics
IPv6 Address Notation
Link-Local Address
IPv6 Prefix Lengths
The End of Broadcast
Global Unicast Address
Aggregation
Using IPv6
It Just Works
DHCPv6
 DNS in IPv6
Moving to IPv6
IPv4 and IPv6
Transition Mechanisms
Chapter Review
Questions
Answers
Chapter 13 Remote Connectivity
Historical/Conceptual
Telephony and Beyond
The Dawn of Long Distance
Test Specific
Digital Telephony
Copper Carriers: T1 and T3
Fiber Carriers: SONET/SDH and OC
Packet Switching
Real-World WAN
Alternative to Telephony WAN
The Last Mile
Dial-Up
DSL
Broadband Cable
Satellite
Fiber
Which Connection?
Using Remote Access
Dial-Up to the Internet
Private Dial-Up
Dedicated Connection
Remote Terminal
WAN Troubleshooting Scenarios
 Loss of Internet Connectivity
Interface Errors
DNS Issues
Interference
Chapter Review
Questions
Answers
Chapter 14 Wireless Networking
Historical/Conceptual
Test Specific
Wi-Fi Standards
802.11
802.11b
802.11a
802.11g
802.11n
802.11ac
WPS
Wi-Fi Security
Enterprise Wireless
Implementing Wi-Fi
Performing a Site Survey
Installing the Client
Setting Up an Ad Hoc Network
Setting Up an Infrastructure Network
Extending the Network
Verifying the Installation
Troubleshooting Wi-Fi
No Connection
Slow Connection
Weird Connection
 Chapter Review
Questions
Answers
Chapter 15 Virtualization and Cloud Computing
Historical/Conceptual
Concepts of Virtualization
Meet the Hypervisor
Emulation vs. Virtualization
Desktop Virtualization
Test Specific
Virtualization Benefits
Power Saving
Hardware Consolidation
System Recovery
System Duplication
Research
Virtualization in Modern Networks
Hypervisors
Scaling Virtualization
To the Cloud
The Service-Layer Cake
Cloud Delivery Models
Chapter Review
Questions
Answers
Chapter 16 Mobile Networking
Mobile Network Technologies
Test Specific
Cellular WAN
802.11
Bluetooth
 Less Common Mobile Network Technologies
Deployment Models
BYOD
COBO
COPE
CYOD
On-Boarding and Off-Boarding
Scenarios
Geofencing
Locating and Disabling Lost Mobile Devices
Hardening IoT Devices
Chapter Review
Questions
Answers
Chapter 17 Building a Real-World Network
Test Specific
Designing a Basic Network
Define the Network Needs
Documentation
Network Design
Compatibility Issues
Internal Connections
External Connections
Unified Communication
It Started with VoIP
Unified Communication Features
VTC and Medianets
ICS
DCS
PLC
SCADA
 Chapter Review
Questions
Answers
Chapter 18 Managing Risk
Test Specific
Risk Management
Security Policies
Change Management
Patching and Updates
Training
Points of Failure
Standard Business Documents
Security Preparedness
Contingency Planning
Incident Response
Disaster Recovery
Business Continuity
Forensics
Safety
Electrical Safety
Physical/Installation Safety
Rack Installation and Maintenance
Emergency Procedures
Chapter Review
Questions
Answers
Chapter 19 Protecting Your Network
Test Specific
Network Threats
Spoofing
Packet/Protocol Abuse
 Zero-Day Attacks
ARP Cache Poisoning
Denial of Service
Man-in-the-Middle
Session Hijacking
Brute Force
Physical/Local Access
Malware
Social Engineering
Common Vulnerabilities
Unnecessary Running Services
Unpatched/Legacy Systems
Unencrypted Channels
Cleartext Credentials
RF Emanation
Hardening Your Network
Physical Security
Network Security
Device Hardening
Host Security
Firewalls
Types of Firewalls
Implementing and Configuring Firewalls
Troubleshooting Firewalls
Chapter Review
Questions
Answers
Chapter 20 Network Monitoring
Test Specific
SNMP
Monitoring Tools
 Packet Sniffers
Protocol Analyzers
Interface Monitors
Performance Monitors
Putting It All Together
Scenario: Monitoring and Managing
SIEM
Chapter Review
Questions
Answers
Chapter 21 Network Troubleshooting
Test Specific
Troubleshooting Tools
Hardware Tools
Software Tools
The Troubleshooting Process
Identify the Problem
Establish a Theory of Probable Cause
Test the Theory to Determine Cause
Establish a Plan of Action and Identify Potential Effects
Implement the Solution or Escalate as Necessary
Verify Full System Functionality and Implement
Preventative Measures
Document Findings, Actions, and Outcomes
Resolving Common Network Service Issues
“We Can’t Access Our Web Server in Istanbul!”
Hands-On Problems
LAN Problems
WAN Problems
Beyond Local—Escalate
End-to-End Connectivity
 Troubleshooting Is Fun!
Chapter Review
Questions
Answers
Appendix A Objective Map: CompTIA Network+
Appendix B Create Your Study Plan
Review Your Overall Score
Review Your Score by CompTIA Network+ Exam Domain
Appendix C About the Online Content
System Requirements
Your Total Seminars Training Hub Account
Single User License Terms and Conditions
TotalTester Online
Assessment Test
TotalSims for Network+
Mike’s Video Training
Playing the Mike Meyers Introduction Video
Mike’s Cool Tools
Technical Support
Glossary
Index
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I’d like to acknowledge the many people who contributed their talents to
make this book possible:
To Tim Green, my sponsoring editor at McGraw-Hill: I love what you
bring to the table with every book—the encouragement, the joy, the witty
banter, and the grammar hammer. Always a pleasure to work with you!
To my in-house Editor-in-Chief, Scott Jernigan: I couldn’t have done it
without you, amigo. Truthfully, has there ever been a better combo than a
wizard and a paladin?
To Jonathan S. Weissman, technical editor: Wait, how many more
certifications did you get since the last edition? No wonder you keep me
honest (and accurate)! Still, tossing in smiley faces after telling me, in perfect
New Yorker, “you’re totally wrong here!” doesn’t actually stop the sting
much. Ha!
To Bill McManus, copy editor: So wonderful to work with you again.
You are the best!
To Michael Smyer, Total Seminars’ resident tech guru and
photographer: Your contributions continue to shine, from superb
photographs to excellent illustrations and, in this edition, some nicely styled
writing. Well done!
To Dave Rush, crack technologist and ridiculously talented person:
How can I list the many contributions you’ve made to make this book—and
all the crazy products that go with it—so awesome? Researching, writing,
arguing, filming, arguing, researching some more … and the final product.
All fun!
To Travis Everett, Internet guru and writer: You bring the “A” game
every time and your contributions to this book in writing and as a
technologist were both lasting and timely. Thank you!
To Dudley Lehmer, my partner at Total Seminars: As always, thanks
for keeping the ship afloat while I got to play on this book!
 To Claire Yee, acquisitions coordinator at McGraw-Hill: Another
stellar effort from you keeping us on task, on yet another book that is better
by far because of your participation. Thank you!
To LeeAnn Pickrell, project editor: So fun working with you again. Not
a rollercoaster this time, but just smooth sailing!
To Claire Splan, proofreader: You did a super job, thank you!
To Cenveo Publishing Services, compositors: The layout was excellent,
thanks!
 INTRODUCTION

By picking up this book, you’ve shown an interest in learning about

networking. But be forewarned. The term networking describes a vast field of
study, far too large for any single certification, book, or training course to
cover. Do you want to configure routers and switches for a living? Do you
want to administer a large Windows network at a company? Do you want to
install wide area network connections? Do you want to set up Web servers?
Do you want to secure networks against attacks?
If you’re considering a CompTIA Network+ certification, you probably
don’t yet know exactly what aspect of networking you want to pursue, and
that’s okay! You’re going to love preparing for the CompTIA Network+
certification.
Attaining CompTIA Network+ certification provides you with four
fantastic benefits. First, you get a superb overview of networking that helps
you decide what part of the industry you’d like to pursue. Second, it acts as a
prerequisite toward other, more advanced certifications. Third, the amount of
eye-opening information you’ll gain just makes getting CompTIA Network+
certified plain old fun. Finally, you’ll significantly enhance your opportunity
to get a job. Everything seems to be networked today, putting network techs
in demand.
Nothing comes close to providing a better overview of networking than
CompTIA Network+. The certification covers local area networks (LANs),
wide area networks (WANs), the Internet (the world’s largest WAN),
security, cabling, and applications in a wide-but-not-too-deep fashion that
showcases the many different parts of a network and hopefully tempts you to
investigate the aspects that intrigue you by looking into follow-up
certifications.
The process of attaining CompTIA Network+ certification will give you a
solid foundation in the whole field of networking. Mastering the
competencies will help fill in gaps in your knowledge and provide an
ongoing series of “a-ha!” moments of grasping the big picture that make
being a tech so much fun.
Ready to learn a lot, grab a great certification, and have fun doing it? Then
welcome to CompTIA Network+ certification!

Who Needs CompTIA Network+? I Just

Want to Learn about Networks!
Whoa up there, amigo! Are you one of those folks who either has never heard
of the CompTIA Network+ exam or just doesn’t have any real interest in
certification? Is your goal only to get a solid handle on networks and a jump
start on the basics? Are you looking for that “magic bullet” book that you can
read from beginning to end and then start installing and troubleshooting a
network? Do you want to know what’s involved with running network
cabling in your walls or getting your new wireless network working? Are you
tired of not knowing enough about TCP/IP and how it works? If these types
of questions are running through your mind, then rest easy—you have the
right book. Like every book with my name, you’ll get solid concepts without
pedantic details or broad, meaningless overviews. You’ll look at real-world
networking as performed by real techs. This is a book that understands your
needs and goes well beyond the scope of a single certification.
If the CompTIA Network+ exam isn’t for you, you can skip the rest of this
Introduction, shift your brain into learn mode, and dive into Chapter 1. But
then, if you’re going to have the knowledge, why not get the certification?

What Is CompTIA Network+ Certification?

CompTIA Network+ certification is an industry-wide, vendor-neutral
certification program developed and sponsored by the Computing
Technology Industry Association (CompTIA). The CompTIA Network+
certification shows that you have a basic competency in the physical support
of networking systems and knowledge of the conceptual aspects of
networking. To date, many hundreds of thousands of technicians have
become CompTIA Network+ certified.
CompTIA Network+ certification enjoys wide recognition throughout the
IT industry. At first, it rode in on the coattails of the successful CompTIA A+
certification program, but it now stands on its own in the networking industry
and is considered the obvious next step after CompTIA A+ certification.
(CompTIA A+ is the certification for PC technicians.)

What Is CompTIA?
CompTIA is a nonprofit, industry trade association based in Oakbrook
Terrace, Illinois, on the outskirts of Chicago. Tens of thousands of computer
resellers, value-added resellers, distributors, manufacturers, and training
companies from all over the world are members of CompTIA.
CompTIA was founded in 1982. The following year, CompTIA began
offering the CompTIA A+ certification exam. CompTIA A+ certification is
now widely recognized as the de facto requirement for entrance into the PC
industry. Because the CompTIA A+ exam initially covered networking only
lightly, CompTIA decided to establish a vendor-neutral test covering basic
networking skills. So, in April 1999, CompTIA unveiled the CompTIA
Network+ certification exam.
CompTIA provides certifications for a variety of areas in the computer
industry, offers opportunities for its members to interact, and represents its
members’ interests to government bodies. CompTIA certifications include
CompTIA A+, CompTIA Network+, and CompTIA Security+, to name a
few. Check out the CompTIA Web site at www.comptia.org for details on
other certifications.
CompTIA is huge. Virtually every company of consequence in the IT
industry is a member of CompTIA: Microsoft, Dell, Cisco … Name an IT
company and it’s probably a member of CompTIA.

The Current CompTIA Network+ Certification

Exam Release
CompTIA constantly works to provide exams that cover the latest
technologies and, as part of that effort, periodically updates its certification
objectives, domains, and exam questions. This book covers all you need to
know to pass the N10-007 CompTIA Network+ exam released in 2018.

How Do I Become CompTIA Network+ Certified?

To become CompTIA Network+ certified, you simply pass one computer-
based exam. There are no prerequisites for taking the CompTIA Network+
exam, and no networking experience is needed. You’re not required to take a
training course or buy any training materials. The only requirements are that
you pay a testing fee to an authorized testing facility and then sit for the
exam. Upon completion of the exam, you will immediately know whether
you passed or failed.
Once you pass, you become CompTIA Network+ certified for three years.
After three years, you’ll need to renew your certification by taking the current
exam or completing approved Continuing Education activities. By
completing these activities, you earn credits that (along with an annual fee)
allow you to keep your CompTIA Network+ certification. For a full list of
approved activities, check out CompTIA’s Web site (www.comptia.org) and
search for CompTIA Continuing Education Program.

NOTE The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) has

accredited the CompTIA Network+ certification as compliant with
the ISO 17024 Standard. That makes it special.

Now for the details: CompTIA recommends that you have at least nine to
twelve months of networking experience and CompTIA A+ knowledge, but
this is not a requirement. Note the word “recommends.” You may not need
experience or CompTIA A+ knowledge, but each helps! The CompTIA A+
certification competencies have a degree of overlap with the CompTIA
Network+ competencies, such as types of connectors and how networks
work.
As for experience, keep in mind that CompTIA Network+ is mostly a
practical exam. Those who have been out there supporting real networks will
find many of the questions reminiscent of the types of problems they have
seen on LANs. The bottom line is that you’ll probably have a much easier
time on the CompTIA Network+ exam if you have some CompTIA A+
experience under your belt.
What Is the Exam Like?
The CompTIA Network+ exam contains 100 questions, and you have 90
minutes to complete the exam. To pass, you must score at least 720 on a scale
of 100–900.
CompTIA uses two types of questions: multiple-choice and performance-
based. Multiple-choice questions offer four or five answer options; you select
the correct answer and proceed to the next question. The majority of the
questions follow this format.
Performance-based questions require you to do something. You might
need to arrange a wireless access point in an office for maximum coverage,
for example, or properly align the colored wires on a network connector. You
need to have appropriate command-line skills to respond at a command
prompt. These are all things that good network techs should be able to do
without blinking. I’ll cover all the topics in the book, and you’ll get practical
experience as well in the various extra design elements and labs.
The exam questions are divided into five areas that CompTIA calls
domains. This table lists the CompTIA Network+ domains and the
percentage of the exam that each represents.

The CompTIA Network+ exam is extremely practical. Questions often

present real-life scenarios and ask you to determine the best solution. The
CompTIA Network+ exam loves troubleshooting. Let me repeat: many of the
test objectives deal with direct, real-world troubleshooting. Be prepared to
troubleshoot both hardware and software failures and to answer both “What
do you do next?” and “What is most likely the problem?” types of questions.
 A qualified CompTIA Network+ certification candidate can install and
configure a PC to connect to a network. This includes installing and testing a
network card, configuring drivers, and loading all network software. The
exam will test you on the different topologies, standards, and cabling.
Expect conceptual questions about the Open Systems Interconnection
(OSI) seven-layer model. You need to know the functions and protocols for
each layer to pass the CompTIA Network+ exam. You can also expect
questions on most of the protocol suites, with heavy emphasis on the TCP/IP
suite. If you’ve never heard of the OSI seven-layer model, don’t worry! This
book will teach you all you need to know.

NOTE CompTIA occasionally makes changes to the content of

the exam, as well as the score necessary to pass it. Always check
the Web site of my company, Total Seminars
(www.totalsem.com), before scheduling your exam.

How Do I Take the Test?

To take the test, you must go to an authorized testing center. You cannot take
the test over the Internet. Pearson VUE administers the actual CompTIA
Network+ exam. You’ll find thousands of Pearson VUE testing centers
scattered across the United States and Canada, as well as in over 75 other
countries around the world. You may take the exam at any testing center. To
locate a testing center and schedule an exam, call Pearson VUE at 877-551-
7587. You can also visit their Web site at https://home.pearsonvue.com/.

NOTE Although you can’t take the exam over the Internet,
Pearson VUE provides easy online registration. Go to
 https://home.pearsonvue.com/ to register online.

How Much Does the Test Cost?

CompTIA fixes the price, no matter what testing center you use. The cost of
the exam depends on whether you work for a CompTIA member. At press
time, the cost for non-CompTIA members is $302 (U.S.).
If your employer is a CompTIA member, you can save money by obtaining
an exam voucher. In fact, even if you don’t work for a CompTIA member,
you can purchase a voucher from member companies (like mine) and take
advantage of significant member savings. You simply buy the voucher and
then use the voucher to pay for the exam. Vouchers are delivered to you on
paper and electronically via e-mail. The voucher number is the important
thing. That number is your exam payment, so protect it from fellow students
until you’re ready to schedule your exam.
If you’re in the United States or Canada, you can visit www.totalsem.com
or call 800-446-6004 to purchase vouchers. As I always say, “You don’t have
to buy your voucher from us, but for goodness’ sake, get one from
somebody!” Why pay full price when you have a discount alternative?
You must pay for the exam when you schedule, whether online or by
phone. If you’re scheduling by phone, be prepared to hold for a while. Have
your Social Security number (or the international equivalent) ready and either
a credit card or a voucher number when you call or begin the online
scheduling process. If you require any special accommodations, Pearson
VUE will be able to assist you, although your selection of testing locations
may be a bit more limited.
International prices vary; see the CompTIA Web site for international
pricing. Of course, prices are subject to change without notice, so always
check the CompTIA Web site for current pricing!

How to Pass the CompTIA Network+ Exam

The single most important thing to remember about the CompTIA Network+
certification exam is that CompTIA designed it to test the knowledge of a
technician with as little as nine months of experience—so keep it simple!
Think in terms of practical knowledge. Read this book, answer the questions
at the end of each chapter, take the practice exams on the media
accompanying this book, review any topics you missed, and you’ll pass with
flying colors.
Is it safe to assume that it’s probably been a while since you’ve taken an
exam? Consequently, has it been a while since you’ve had to study for an
exam? If you’re nodding your head yes, you’ll probably want to read the next
sections. They lay out a proven strategy to help you study for the CompTIA
Network+ exam and pass it. Try it. It works.

Obligate Yourself
The first step you should take is to schedule the exam. Ever heard the old
adage that heat and pressure make diamonds? Well, if you don’t give yourself
a little “heat,” you might procrastinate and unnecessarily delay taking the
exam. Even worse, you may end up not taking the exam at all. Do yourself a
favor. Determine how much time you need to study (see the next section),
and then call Pearson VUE and schedule the exam, giving yourself the time
you need to study—and adding a few extra days for safety. Afterward, sit
back and let your anxieties wash over you. Suddenly, turning off the
television and cracking open the book will become a lot easier!

Set Aside the Right Amount of Study Time

After helping thousands of techs get their CompTIA Network+ certification,
we at Total Seminars have developed a pretty good feel for the amount of
study time needed to pass the CompTIA Network+ exam. Table 1 will help
you plan how much study time you must devote to the exam. Keep in mind
that these are averages. If you’re not a great student or if you’re a little on the
nervous side, add another 10 percent. Equally, if you’re the type who can
learn an entire semester of geometry in one night, reduce the numbers by 10
percent. To use this table, just circle the values that are most accurate for you
and add them up to get the number of study hours.
Table 1 Determining How Much Study Time You Need

A complete neophyte may need 120 hours or more of study time. An

experienced network technician already CompTIA A+ certified should only
need about 24 hours.
Study habits also come into play here. A person with solid study habits
(you know who you are) can reduce the number by 15 percent. People with
poor study habits should increase that number by 20 percent.
The total hours of study time you need is __________________.

Study for the Test

Now that you have a feel for how long it’s going to take to study for the
exam, you need a strategy for studying. The following has proven to be an
excellent game plan for cramming the knowledge from the study materials
into your head.
This strategy has two alternate paths. The first path is designed for highly
experienced technicians who have a strong knowledge of PCs and
networking and want to concentrate on just what’s on the exam. Let’s call
this group the Fast Track group. The second path, and the one I’d strongly
recommend, is geared toward people like me: the ones who want to know
why things work, those who want to wrap their arms completely around a
concept, as opposed to regurgitating answers just to pass the CompTIA
Network+ exam. Let’s call this group the Brainiacs.
To provide for both types of learners, I have broken down most of the
chapters into two parts:

• Historical/Conceptual Although not on the CompTIA Network+ exam,

this knowledge will help you understand more clearly what is on the
CompTIA Network+ exam.
• Test Specific These topics clearly fit under the CompTIA Network+
certification domains.

The beginning of each of these areas is clearly marked with a large banner
that looks like the following.

Historical/Conceptual
If you consider yourself a Fast Tracker, skip everything but the Test Specific
section in each chapter. After reading the Test Specific sections, jump
immediately to the Chapter Review questions, which concentrate on
information in the Test Specific sections. If you run into problems, review the
Historical/Conceptual sections in that chapter. After going through every
chapter as described, take the free online practice exams on the media that
accompanies the book. First, take them in practice mode, and then switch to
final mode. Once you start scoring in the 80–85 percent range, go take the
test!
Brainiacs should first read the book—the whole book. Read it as though
you’re reading a novel, starting on page 1 and going all the way through.
Don’t skip around on the first read-through, even if you are a highly
experienced tech. Because there are terms and concepts that build on each
other, skipping around might confuse you, and you’ll just end up closing the
book and firing up your favorite PC game. Your goal on this first read is to
understand concepts—to understand the whys, not just the hows.
Having a network available while you read through the book helps a lot.
This gives you a chance to see various concepts, hardware, and configuration
screens in action as you read about them in the book. Plus, you’ll need some
gear to do all the hands-on exercises sprinkled throughout the book. Nothing
beats doing it yourself to reinforce a concept or piece of knowledge!
You will notice a lot of historical information—the Historical/Conceptual
sections—that you may be tempted to skip. Don’t! Understanding how some
of the older stuff worked or how something works conceptually will help you
appreciate the reason behind current networking features and equipment, as
well as how they function.
After you have completed the first read-through, cozy up for a second.
This time, try to knock out one chapter per sitting. Concentrate on the Test
Specific sections. Get a highlighter and mark the phrases and sentences that
make major points. Look at the pictures and tables, noting how they illustrate
the concepts. Then, answer the end of chapter questions. Repeat this process
until you not only get all the questions right, but also understand why they are
correct!
Once you have read and studied the material in the book, check your
knowledge by taking the online practice exams included on the media
accompanying the book. The exams can be taken in practice mode or final
mode. In practice mode, you are allowed to check references in the book (if
you want) before you answer each question, and each question is graded
immediately. In final mode, you must answer all the questions before you are
given a test score. In each case, you can review a results summary that tells
you which questions you missed, what the right answer is to each, and where
to study further.
 Use the results of the exams to see where you need to bone up, and then
study some more and try them again. Continue retaking the exams and
reviewing the topics you missed until you are consistently scoring in the 80–
85 percent range. When you’ve reached that point, you are ready to pass the
CompTIA Network+ exam!
If you have any problems or questions, or if you just want to argue about
something, feel free to send an e-mail to me at michaelm@totalsem.com or to
my editor, Scott Jernigan, at scottj@totalsem.com.
For additional information about the CompTIA Network+ exam, contact
CompTIA directly at its Web site: www.comptia.org.
Good luck!

—Mike Meyers
 CHAPTER 1
Network Models
The CompTIA Network+ certification exam expects you to know how to
• 1.2 Explain devices, applications, protocols and services at their
appropriate OSI layers
• 1.3 Explain the concepts and characteristics of routing and switching
To achieve these goals, you must be able to
• Describe how models such as the OSI seven-layer model and the
TCP/IP model help technicians understand and troubleshoot networks
• Explain the major functions of networks with the OSI seven-layer
model
• Describe the major functions of networks with the TCP/IP model

The CompTIA Network+ certification challenges you to understand virtually

every aspect of networking—not a small task. Networking professionals use
one of two methods to conceptualize the many parts of a network: the Open
Systems Interconnection (OSI) seven-layer model and the Transmission
Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) model.

These models provide two tools that make them essential for networking
techs. First, the OSI and TCP/IP models provide powerful mental tools for
diagnosing problems. Understanding the models enables a tech to determine
quickly at what layer a problem can occur and helps him or her zero in on a
solution without wasting a lot of time on false leads. Second, these models
provide a common language techs use to describe specific network functions.
Figure 1-1 shows product information for a Cisco-branded advanced
networking device. Note the use of the terms “L3” and “layer 7.” These terms
directly reference the OSI seven-layer model. Techs who understand the OSI
model understand what those numbers mean, giving them a quick
understanding of what the device provides to a network.

Figure 1-1 Using OSI terminology in device documentation

This chapter looks first at models in general and how models help
conceptualize and troubleshoot networks. The chapter then explores both the
OSI seven-layer model and the TCP/IP model to see how they help clarify
network architecture for techs.

Cisco and Certifications

Cisco Systems, Inc. is famous for making many of the “boxes” that
interconnect networks all over the world. It’s not too far of a stretch to say
that Cisco helps power a huge portion of the Internet. These boxes are
complicated to configure, requiring a high degree of technical knowledge.
To address this need, Cisco offers a series of certifications. The entry-level
certification, for example, is the Cisco Certified Entry Networking
Technician (CCENT). The next step is the Cisco Certified Network Associate
(CCNA) Routing and Switching.
Go to Cisco’s certification Web site and compare the objectives for the two
certifications with what you learned about CompTIA Network+ in the
“Introduction” of this book. Ask yourself this question: could you study for
CCENT or CCNA R&S and CompTIA Network+ simultaneously?
Historical/Conceptual
Working with Models
Networking is hard. It takes a lot of pieces, both hardware and software, all
working incredibly quickly and in perfect harmony, to get anything done. Just
making Google appear in your Web browser requires millions of hours in
research, development, and manufacturing to create the many pieces to
successfully connect your system to a server somewhere in Googleland and
to enable them to communicate. Whenever we encounter highly complex
technologies, we need to simplify the overall process by breaking it into
discrete, simple, individual processes. We do this using a network model.

Biography of a Model
What does the word “model” mean to you? Does the word make you think of
a beautiful woman walking down a catwalk at a fashion show or some hunky
guy showing off the latest style of blue jeans on a huge billboard? Maybe it
makes you think of a plastic model airplane? What about those computer
models that try to predict weather? We use the term “model” in a number of
ways, but each use shares certain common themes.
All models are a simplified representation of the real thing. The human
model ignores the many different types of body shapes, using only a single
“optimal” figure. The model airplane lacks functional engines or the internal
framework, and the computerized weather model might disregard subtle
differences in wind temperatures or geology (Figure 1-2).
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
even locally. An observer on the spot says: “In the disposition of their
destroyers, the authorities did not seem disposed to give them a free
hand, or to allow them to take any chances.” And again, “The torpedo
boats were never sent out with the aim of attacking Japanese ships,
or transports. If out, and attacked, they fought, but they did not go
out for the purpose of attacking, although they would to cover an
army flank.” These two actions define the rôle indicated by the
expression, “Fortress Fleet.” The Japanese expressed surprise that no
attempt by scouting was made to ascertain their naval base, which
was also the landing place of their army; and, although the sinking of
the two battleships on May 15 was seen from Port Arthur, no effort
was made to improve such a moment of success, and of
demoralization to the enemy, although there were twenty-one
destroyers at Port Arthur; sixteen of which were under steam and
outside. So, at the very last moment, the fleet held on to its defensive
rôle; going out only when already damaged by enemy’s shells, and
then not to fight but to fly.
It is a curious commentary upon this course of action, that, as far
as any accounts that have come under my eye show, the fleet
contributed nothing to the defense of the fortress beyond landing
guns, and, as the final death struggle approached, using their
batteries in support of those of the fortress; but the most extreme
theorist would scarcely advocate such an end as the object of
maintaining a fleet. The same guns would be better emplaced on
shore. As far as defense went, the Russian Port Arthur fleet might as
well have been at Cronstadt throughout. Indeed, better; for then it
would have accompanied Rozhestvensky in concentrated numbers,
and the whole Russian navy there assembled, in force far superior,
would have been a threat to the Japanese command of the sea much
more effective, as a defense to Port Arthur, than was the presence of
part of that fleet in the port itself.
The Russian fleet in the Far East, assembled as to the main body in
Port Arthur, by its mere presence under the conditions announced
that it was there to serve the fortress, to which it was subsidiary.
Concentrated at Vladivostok, to one side of the theater of war, and
flanking the enemy’s line of communications to that which must be
the chief scene of operations, it would have been a clear evident
declaration that the fortress was subsidiary to the ships; that its chief
value in the national military scheme was to shelter, and to afford
repairs, in short, to maintain in efficiency, a body which meant to go
out to fight, and with a definite object. The hapless Rozhestvensky
gave voice to this fact in an expression which I have found attributed
to him before the fatal battle at Tsushima: that; if twenty only of the
numbers under his command reached Vladivostok, the Japanese
communications would be seriously endangered. This is clear “Fleet
in Being” theory, and quite undiluted; for it expresses the extreme
view that the presence of a strong force, even though inferior, near
the scene of operations, will produce a momentous effect upon the
enemy’s action. The extreme school has gone so far as to argue that it
will stop an expedition; or should do so, if the enemy be wise. I have
for years contended against this view as unsound; as shown to be so
historically. Such a “fleet in being,” inferior, should not be accepted
by an enemy as a sufficient deterrent under ordinary circumstances.
It has not been in the past, and the Japanese did not so accept it. The
Russian “fleet in being,” in Port Arthur, did not stop their
transportation; although they recognized danger from it, and
consistently took every step in their power to neutralize it. Their
operations throughout were directed consistently to this end. The
first partially successful torpedo attack; the attempts to block the
harbor by sinking vessels; the distant bombardments; the mines laid
outside; and the early institution and persistence in the siege
operations,—all had but one end, the destruction of the fleet, in
being, within; but, for all that, that fleet did not arrest the transport
of the Japanese army.
These two simultaneous operations, the transport of troops despite
the fleet in being, and the persevering effort at the same time to
destroy it—or neutralize it—illustrate what I have called adjustment
between opposite considerations. The danger from the fleet in being
is recognized, but so also is the danger in delaying the initiation of
the land campaign. The Fleet in Being School would condemn the
transportation, so long as the Port Arthur fleet existed. It actually did
so condemn it. The London Times, which is, or then was, under the
influence of this school, published six weeks before the war began a
summary of the situation, by naval and military correspondents, in
which appears this statement: “With a hostile fleet behind the guns
at Port Arthur, the Japanese could hardly venture to send troops into
the Yellow Sea.” And again, four weeks later: “It is obvious that, until
the Russian ships are sunk, captured, or shut up in their ports with
their wings effectually clipped, there can be no security for the sea
communications of an expeditionary force.” These are just as clear
illustrations of the exaggeration inherent in the Fleet in Being theory,
which assumes the deterrent influence of an offensive threatened by
inferior force, as the conduct of the Russian naval operations was of
the inefficiency latent in their theory of Fortress Fleet.
If security meant the security of peace, these Fleet in Being
statements could be accepted; but military security is an entirely
different thing; and we know that, coincidently with the first torpedo
attack, before its result could be known, an expeditionary Japanese
force was sent into the Yellow Sea to Chemulpo, and that it rapidly
received reinforcements to the estimated number of fifty or sixty
thousand. The enterprise in Manchuria, the landing of troops west of
the mouth of the Yalu, was delayed for some time—two months,
more or less. What the reason of that delay, and what determined the
moment of beginning, I do not know; but we do know, not only that
it was made in face of four Russian battleships within Port Arthur,
but that it continued in face of the increase of their number to six by
the repair of those damaged in the first torpedo attack. As early as
May 31, it was known in Tokyo that the damaged ships were nearly
ready for the sortie, which they actually made on June 23.
It is doubtless open to say that, though the Japanese did thus
venture, they ought not to have done so. Note therefore that the
Japanese were perfectly alive to the risks run. From the first they
were exceedingly careful of their battleships, knowing that on them
depended the communications of their army. The fact was noted
early in the war by observers on the spot. This shows that they
recognized the full menace of all the conditions of the Russian fleet
in Port Arthur, also of the one in the Baltic, and of the danger to their
communications. Nevertheless, though realizing these various
dangers from the hostile “fleets in being,” they ventured.
About the middle of March, that is, six weeks after the war began,
a report, partly believed by the Japanese authorities, came in that the
Port Arthur ships had escaped in a snow storm, on March 11. It is
reported that all transportation of troops stopped for some ten days.
It may be remembered that in our war with Spain, a very similar
report, from two different and competent witnesses, arrested the
movement of Shafter’s army from Key West until it could be verified.
In the case of the Japanese, as in our own, the incident illustrates the
possible dangers from a “fleet in being.” In neither report was there
an evident impossibility. Had either proved true the momentary
danger to communications is evident; but the danger is one the
chance of which has to be taken. As Napoleon said, “War cannot be
made without running risks.” The condition that an enemy’s fleet
watched in port may get out, and may do damage, is entirely
different from the fact that it has gotten out. The possibility is not a
sufficient reason for stopping transportation; the actual fact is
sufficient for taking particular precautions, adjusting dispositions to
the new conditions, as was done by ourselves and by the Japanese in
the circumstances. The case is wholly different if the enemy has a
fleet equal or superior; for then he is entirely master of his
movement, does not depend upon evasion for keeping the sea, and
communications in such case are in danger, not merely of temporary
disarrangement but of permanent destruction. No special warning is
needed to know this; the note of the “Fleet in Being” School is
insistence on the paralyzing effect of an inferior fleet.

Divided Forces[103]

But among the most important lessons of this war—perhaps the

most important, as also one easily understood and which exemplifies
a principle of warfare of ageless application—is the inexpediency, the
terrible danger, of dividing the battle fleet, even in times of peace,
into fractions individually smaller than those of a possible enemy.
The Russian divisions at Port Arthur, at Vladivostok, and in the
European ports of Russia, if united, would in 1904 have outweighed
decisively the navy of Japan, which moreover could receive no
increase during hostilities. It would have been comparatively
immaterial, as regards effect upon the local field of operations,
whether the ships were assembled in the Baltic, in Vladivostok, or in
Port Arthur. Present together, the fleet thus constituted could not
have been disregarded by Japan without a risk transcending beyond
comparison that caused by the Port Arthur division alone, which the
Japanese deliberately put out of court. For, while they undertook,
and successfully carried out, measures which during a period of four
months disabled it as a body menacing their sea communications,
they none the less before the torpedo attack of February 8 had begun
the movement of their army to the continent. It is most improbable
that they would have dared the same had the available Russian navy
been united. It would have mattered nothing that it was frozen in in
Vladivostok. The case of Japan would not have been better, but
worse, for having utilized the winter to cross her troops to the
mainland, if, when summer came, the enemy appeared in
overwhelming naval force. If Togo, in face of Rozhestvensky’s
division alone, could signal his fleet, “The salvation or the fall of the
Empire depends upon the result of this engagement,” how much
more serious the situation had there been with it the Port Arthur
ships, which had handled his vessels somewhat roughly the
preceding August.
To an instructed, thoughtful, naval mind in the United States,
there is no contingency affecting the country, as interested in the
navy, so menacing as the fear of popular clamor influencing an
irresolute, or militarily ignorant, administration to divide the
battleship force into two divisions, the Atlantic and the Pacific. A
determined President, instructed in military matters, doubtless will
not yield, but will endeavor by explanation to appease apprehension
and quiet outcry. Nevertheless, the danger exists; and always will
exist in proportion as the people do not understand the simple
principle that an efficient military body depends for its effect in war
—and in peace—less upon its position than upon its concentrated
force. This does not ignore position, and its value. On the contrary, it
is written with a clear immediate recollection of Napoleon’s pregnant
saying, “War is a business of positions.” But the great captain, in the
letter in which the phrase occurs, goes on directly to instruct the
marshal to whom he is writing so to station the divisions of his corps,
for purposes of supply, around a common center, that they can unite
rapidly; and can meet the enemy in mass before he can attack any
one of them, or move far from his present position against another
important French interest.
Concentration indeed, in last analysis, may be correctly defined as
being itself a choice of position; viz.: that the various corps, or ships,
shall not be some in one place, and some in others, but all in one
place. We Americans have luckily had an object lesson, not at our
own expense, but at that of an old friend. There is commonly
believed to have been little effective public opinion in Russia at the
time the war with Japan was at hand; such as did manifest itself, in
the use of dynamite against officials, seems not to have taken into
consideration international relations, military or other. But in the
councils of the Empire, however constituted, and whatever the
weight of the military element, there was shown in act an absolute
disregard of principles so simple, so obvious, and so continually
enforced by precept and experience, that the fact would be
incomprehensible, had not we all seen, in civil as in military life, that
the soundest principles, perfectly well known, fail, more frequently
than not, to sustain conduct against prepossession or inclination.
That communications dominate strategy, and that the
communications of Japan in a continental war would be by sea, were
clear as daylight. That the whole navy of Russia, united on the scene,
would be sufficient, and half of it probably insufficient, certainly
hazardous, was equally plain. Yet, ship by ship, half was assembled
in the Far East, until Japan saw that this process of division had been
carried as far as suited her interests and declared war; after which of
course no Russian battleship could go forward alone.
From the military point of view the absurdity of the procedure is
clear; but for national safety it has to be equally clear to statesmen
and to people. An outside observer, with some little acquired
knowledge of the workings of men’s minds, needs small imagination
to hear the arguments at the Russian council board. “Things are
looking squally in the East,” says one; “the fleet ought to be
increased.” “Increased,” says another, “you may say so. All the ships
we have ought to be sent, and together, the instant they can be got
ready.” “Oh but,” rejoins a third, “consider how exposed our Baltic
shores would be, in case war against us should be declared by Great
Britain, which already has an understanding with Japan.” The
obvious reply, that, in case Great Britain did declare war, the only
thing to be done with the Baltic fleet would be to snuggle it close
inside of the guns of Cronstadt, would probably be made; if it was, it
was not heeded. In a representative government would doubtless
have been heard the further remark, “The feeling in our coast towns,
at seeing no ship left for their protection, would be so strong, that I
doubt if the party could carry the next election.” Against this there is
no provision, except popular understanding; operative perhaps in
the interior, where there is no occasion for fright.
The most instructive feature of this Russian mistake, inexcusable
in a government not browbeaten by political turmoil, is that it was
made in time of peace, in the face of conditions threatening war. In
fact, as is often the case, when war came it was already too late to
remedy adequately the blunders or neglects of peace. More than
twenty years ago the present writer had occasion to quote
emphatically the words of a French author, “Naval Strategy”—naval
strategic considerations—“is as necessary in peace as in war.” In
1904, nearly a decade had elapsed since Japan had been despoiled of
much of her gains in her war with China. Since then Russia had been
pursuing a course of steady aggression, in furtherance of her own
aims, and contrary to what Japan considered her “vital interests and
national honor.” It is not necessary to pronounce between the views
of the two parties to see that the action of Russia was militarily
preposterous, unless her fleet grew in proportion to that of Japan,
and of her own purposes, and was kept in hand; that is, kept
concentrated. It would have mattered little whether, being united,
the outbreak of war found it in the Baltic, or in Vladivostok. That it
could come, as did Rozhestvensky, but in double his force, would
have been a fact no less emphatic when in the Baltic than in the
farther East.
It is precisely the same, in application as well as in principle, with
the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States. Both are exposed.
Neither need be more exposed than the other; for, in virtue of our
geographical position relatively to the other great Powers of the
world, it is not the momentary location of the fleet, but its simple
existence, adequate in numbers and efficiency, and concentrated in
force, which protects both coasts. Any invader from the one side or
the other must depend upon sea communications to support his
army throughout the war; not merely for the three months needed to
bring the United States fleet from one side to the other. But, if the
war begin with the fleet divided between the two oceans, one half
may be overmatched and destroyed, as was that of Port Arthur; and
the second on coming prove unequal to restore the situation, as
befell Rozhestvensky. That is to say, Concentration protects both
coasts, Division exposes both. It is of vital consequence to the
nation of the United States, that its people, contemplating the
Russo-Japanese naval war, substitute therein, in their
apprehension, Atlantic for Baltic, and Pacific for Port Arthur.
So they will comprehend as well as apprehend.
 30. Rozhestvensky at Tsushima[104]

[The Russian fleet under Rozhestvensky left Libau October 15,

1904; reached Madagascar January 1, 1905, the day of the surrender
of Port Arthur; and entered the Korea or Tsushima Straits on the
morning of May 26. A part of the auxiliaries had been left in the
mouth of the Yang-tse River, but the hospital and repair ships and
those laden with naval stores were with the fleet. According to
testimony at the court martial of Admiral Rozhestvensky, the
battleships entered the straits with coal for three thousand miles,
though the distance from the Saddle Islands to Vladivostok was but
nine hundred.—Editor.]
Criticism here is another case of inferring intentions from actions;
but, when the various parts of Rozhestvensky’s conduct are taken
together, the inference is nearly irresistible that the exaggerated
estimate of the influence of an inferior fleet in being possessed his
imagination. Besides the excessive coal stowage, he took with him a
train of transports, a notorious source of tactical embarrassment in
battle, though doubtless equally a source of refitment, if he got them
to Vladivostok; and there is no evidence of any attempt at advanced
scouting on his own part, or of driving off, as he might have done, the
Japanese scouts which showed up; the result being that Togo knew
all about his dispositions, and he knew nothing about Togo’s until he
saw the enemy’s main body.
Now I say, that, while all this was bad management in the face of
the enemy, and in so far bad tactics, the bad tactics issued from an
error of strategy; and the error in strategy was due to the lack of
unity of conception, of that exclusiveness of purpose, which is the
essence of strategy, and which subordinates, adjusts, all other factors
and considerations to the one exclusive aim. While writing these
pages, I came across a few lines by one of the first of German
philosophical historians, Ranke, in one of his greatest works,
“England in the Seventeenth Century.” They apply to policy, but
policy is twin brother to strategy. Permit me to quote them:
“Why did William III get the better of James II in Ireland? Because
he always kept his one great idea before his eyes, amid the many
perplexing circumstances, which surrounded him. The decision
which he displayed at every moment rested upon the fact that he had
only one end, and that the one imposed by the course of things.”

Apply this to Rozhestvensky. The one end imposed on him by the

course of things was the destruction of the Japanese fleet, which
comprised every armored vessel Japan could possibly muster for that
war. Togo’s signal[105] before the battle recognized this one end, and
there was no reason why his opponent should not have recognized it
equally. To reach Vladivostok was only a means to that end; an object
most important, because, if attained, it would put the Russians in the
best possible condition for battle. But this by no means superseded
the one necessary aim,—battle. More, it did not even postpone that
aim, as a matter of immediate consideration and preparation; for,
though escape through to Vladivostok might be possible, it was not
certain. It was not even probable, under all the conditions. Therefore,
while every forethought and care should have been to effect escape, if
possible, they should have been accompanied with the clear decision
that, should battle be forced, the fighting should have been qualified
by no thought of escape, and the fleet, like a ship cleared for action,
should have been stripped of all fleet encumbrances from the
moment of leaving the Saddles. A fleet is half beaten already when it
goes into battle with one eye upon something else than fighting.
 If Rozhestvensky had recognized these facts, in their due
importance and proportion, and had been convinced that battle was
his one aim, and that there was at least a very real possibility that he
could not postpone it till after Vladivostok, it seems to me he must
have reasoned thus: I must have coal enough to reach Vladivostok,
on a reasonable calculation of the distance, and of the expenditures
of the ships; both which were known. To this amount add a fair
margin of safety. This total should be carried for the purpose of
escape, if feasible; with perhaps an addition sufficient to last during
battle, with funnels pierced, which was a likely accident. Again, there
is for each ship a draft of water which best meets her maneuvering
needs. The chances are that the enemy will await us either in the
narrower part of the sea, or near his navy yards. As there is one
position, that in the Straits of Korea, which favors both these objects,
it is there I will probably have to fight, if at all. Therefore, as far as
possible, the coal carried by the fleet on starting should be such that
consumption up to the moment of reaching the straits will put them
in their best tactical trim. The coal supply needed to reach
Vladivostok is thus adjusted to the exigencies of battle.
Then as regards the transports. For the moment, on this last
fateful stretch, they are absolutely of no consequence as affecting
results. The adjustment of them, to the end of the battle, is to dismiss
them out of mind and presence. If beaten, the loss of them will not be
of the slightest consequence to Russia; if successful, they can be
summoned from an appointed rendezvous, and escorted to a
destination under such protection as may then seem expedient. An
Austrian officer has suggested that if the whole body had weighed
together, and at night had separated, the supply vessels proceeding
under convoy by the east of Japan might have escaped notice; or, if
seen, this report might have perplexed Togo, rather than enlightened
him. Upon the suggestion I make no comment, other than that it
would have been one way of counting out the supply ships.
The imminency of the occasion should have drawn, and did draw,
all Japan’s fighting force to the Straits of Korea, an element for
Rozhestvensky’s consideration. According to Semenoff the auxiliary
steamers Terek and Kuban were sent off the east coast expressly to
draw attention, but met no one, and their presence was unknown to
the Japanese.
 I am not disposed to question, or to doubt, that if the Russian
squadron had escaped Togo, and if the separated supply train had
been intercepted, it would have been very embarrassing to the ships
of war refitting at Vladivostok. Nor do I question that, in case of such
escape, the coal remaining in consequence of the deck loads taken
would have been of much value for future operations. The more real
and the greater those distracting considerations, like those of
William III in Ireland, the more do they throw into relief the
greatness, as well as the necessity, of subordinating them to the one
thing needful, namely, to be ready to the utmost on the day of battle.
They illustrate, too, how misleading is the disposition to
compromise, to concede something all around; to straddle the two
horses, escape and battle.
Rozhestvensky’s course was a compromise, a mix-up of escape and
fighting; a strategic blunder to begin with, in not concentrating
attention on the one needful thing clearly indicated by the course of
events, and hence resulting necessarily in a series of blunders, which
comprehensively may be called tactical. They all hang together, as
the results of a frame of mind; the overloading with coal, the
increased danger of fire therefrom, the submersion of the armor
belts, the loss of speed and tactical capacity, the neglect of scouting,
the company of the transports,—each of which is a tactical error,—all
proceed from the failure to observe that the one governing
consideration of strategy, in this war, was a naval battle under the
most favorable conditions. It is the repetition of the mistakes of the
Port Arthur division. When it becomes clearly imminent that one
may have to fight under conditions less favorable than one would
desire, conditions are changed; but there is no change of the
principles involved. Vladivostok reached, the principle would have
required the utmost preparation the yard offered, in the least
possible time, so as to be the most fit possible to fight. At the
Saddles, the same fitness required the dismissal from influence upon
conduct of all thought of Vladivostok, and of supplies there, so far as
such thought might modify the preparation for probable battle. It
seems very probable that the defective conceptions deducible from
Rozhestvensky’s conduct were emphasized and reinforced by the
heavy preoccupations about supplies, necessarily incidental to his
anxious outward voyage. His mind and morale had got a twist, a
permanent set, from which they could not recover.
 PART III
NAVAL AND NATIONAL POLICIES
 31. Expansion and Over-Sea Bases[106]

The Annexation of Hawaii

[As the date indicates, the essay was written at the time of the
Revolution in Hawaii, six years before its annexation. The part of the
essay preceding points out the predominant interest of the United
States in the Islands owing to their control of our trade routes and
naval approaches, and refers to the benefit to the world from British
colonial expansion.—Editor.]
But if a plea of the world’s welfare seem suspiciously like a cloak
for national self-interest, let the latter be accepted frankly as the
adequate motive which it assuredly is. Let us not shrink from pitting
a broad self-interest against the narrow self-interest to which some
would restrict us. The demands of our three great seaboards, the
Atlantic, the Gulf, and the Pacific,—each for itself, and all for the
strength that comes from drawing closer the ties between them,—are
calling for the extension, through the Isthmian Canal, of that broad
sea common along which, and along which alone, in all the ages
prosperity has moved. Land carriage, always restricted and therefore
always slow, toils enviously but hopelessly behind, vainly seeking to
replace and supplant the royal highway of nature’s own making.
Corporate interests, vigorous in that power of concentration which is
the strength of armies and of minorities, may here withstand for a
while the ill-organized strivings of the multitude, only dimly
conscious of its wants; yet the latter, however temporarily opposed
and baffled, is sure at last, like the blind forces of nature, to
overwhelm all that stand in the way of its necessary progress. So the
Isthmian Canal is an inevitable part in the future of the United
States; yet one that cannot be separated from other necessary
incidents of a policy dependent upon it, whose details cannot be
foreseen exactly. But because the precise steps that hereafter may be
opportune or necessary cannot yet be foretold certainly, is not a
reason the less, but a reason the more, for establishing a principle of
action which may serve to guide as opportunities arise. Let us start
from the fundamental truth, warranted by history, that the control of
the seas, and especially along the great lines drawn by national
interest or national commerce, is the chief among the merely
material elements in the power and prosperity of nations. It is so
because the sea is the world’s great medium of circulation. From this
necessarily follows the principle that, as subsidiary to such control, it
is imperative to take possession, when it can be done righteously, of
such maritime positions as contribute to secure command. If this
principle be adopted, there will be no hesitation about taking the
positions—and they are many—upon the approaches to the Isthmus,
whose interests incline them to seek us. It has its application also to
the present case of Hawaii.
There is, however, one caution to be given from the military point
of view, beyond the need of which the world has not yet passed.
Military positions, fortified posts, by land or by sea, however strong
or admirably situated, do not confer control by themselves alone.
People often say that such an island or harbor will give control of
such a body of water. It is an utter, deplorable, ruinous mistake. The
phrase indeed may be used by some only loosely, without forgetting
other implied conditions of adequate protection and adequate
navies; but the confidence of our own nation in its native strength,
and its indifference to the defense of its ports and the sufficiency of
its fleet, give reason to fear that the full consequences of a forward
step may not be weighed soberly. Napoleon, who knew better, once
talked this way. “The islands of San Pietro, Corfu, and Malta,” he
wrote, “will make us masters of the whole Mediterranean.” Vain
boast! Within one year Corfu, in two years Malta, were rent away
from the state that could not support them by its ships. Nay, more:
had Bonaparte not taken the latter stronghold out of the hands of its
degenerate but innocuous government, that citadel of the
Mediterranean would perhaps—would probably—never have passed
into those of his chief enemy. There is here also a lesson for us.
 32. Application of the Monroe Doctrine[107]

Anglo-American Community of Interests

The writer has too often already discussed, directly or incidentally,

the strategic situation which finds its center in Panama to repeat the
same here; but one or two remarks about the Monroe doctrine may
be not out of place. Accepting as probably durable the new
conditions, which have so largely modified the nation’s external
policy in the direction of expansion, there is in them nothing to
diminish, but rather to intensify, the purpose that there shall be no
intrusion of the European political system upon territory whence
military effect upon the Isthmus of Panama can be readily exerted.
For instance, should a change anticipated by some occur, and
Holland enter the German Empire, it will be advantageous that it
should even now be understood, as it then would be necessary for us
to say, that our consent could not be given to Curaçao forming part of
that incorporation. The Isthmus of Panama—in addition to its special
importance to us as a link between our Pacific and Atlantic coasts—
sums up in itself that one of the two great lines of communication
between the Atlantic and the farther East which especially concerns
us, and we can no more consent to such a transfer of a fortress in the
Caribbean, than we would ourselves have thought of acquiring Port
Mahon, in the Mediterranean, as a result of our successful war with
Spain.
Consideration of interests such as these must be dispassionate
upon the one side and upon the other; and a perfectly candid
reception must be accorded to the views and the necessities of those
with whom we thus deal. During the process of deliberation not
merely must preconceptions be discarded, but sentiment itself
should be laid aside, to resume its sway only after unbiassed
judgment has done its work. The present question of Asia, the
evolution of which has taken days rather than years, may entail
among its results no change in old maxims, but it nevertheless calls
for a review of them in the light of present facts. If from this no
difference of attitude results, the confirmed resolve of sober second
thought will in itself alone be a national gain. This new Eastern
question has greatly affected the importance of communications,
enhancing that of the shorter routes, reversing political and military,
—as distinguished from mercantile—conditions, and bringing again
into the foreground of interest the Mediterranean, thus reinvested
with its ancient pre-eminence. For the same reason the Caribbean
Sea, because of its effect upon the Isthmus of Panama, attains a
position it has never before held, emphasizing the application to it of
the Monroe doctrine. The Pacific has advanced manifold in
consequence to the United States, not only as an opening market, but
as a means of transit, and also because our new possessions there, by
giving increased opportunities, entail correspondingly heavier
burdens of national responsibility. The isthmian canals, present and
to come,—Suez and Panama,—summarize and locally accentuate the
essential character of these changes, of which they are at once an
exponent and a factor. It will be no light matter that man shall have
shifted the Strait of Magellan to the Isthmus of Panama, and the
Cape of Good Hope to the head of the Mediterranean.
The correlative of these new conditions is the comparative
isolation, and the dwindled consequence, of the southern extremes of
Africa and America, which now lie far apart from the changed
direction imposed upon the world’s policies. The regions there
situated will have small effect upon the great lines of travel, and must
derive such importance as may remain to them from their intrinsic
productive value. Does there, then, remain sound reason of national
interest for pressing the Monroe doctrine to the extent of
guaranteeing our support to American states which love us not, and
whose geographical position, south of the valley of the Amazon, lies
outside of effective influence upon the American isthmus? Does the
disposition to do so arise from sound policy, or from sentiment, or
from mere habit? And, if from either, do the facts justify retaining a
burden of responsibility which may embarrass our effective action in
fields of greater national consequence—just as South Africa may
prove a drain upon Great Britain’s necessary force about Suez? In
short, while the principles upon which the Monroe doctrine reposes
are not only unimpaired, but fortified, by recent changes, is it not
possible that the application of them may require modification,
intensifying their force in one quarter, diminishing it in another?
 Not the least striking and important of the conditions brought
about by the two contemporary events—the downfall of the Spanish
colonial empire and the precipitation of the crisis in eastern Asia—
has been the drawing closer together of the two great English-
speaking nationalities. Despite recalcitrant objections here and there
by unwilling elements on both sides, the fact remains concrete and
apparent, endued with essential life, and consequent inevitable
growth, by virtue of a clearly recognized community of interest,
present and future. It is no mere sentimental phase, though
sentiment, long quietly growing, had sufficiently matured to
contribute its powerful influence at the opportune moment; but here,
as ever, there was first the material,—identity of interest,—and not
till afterwards the spiritual,—reciprocity of feeling,—aroused to
mutual recognition by the causes and motives of the Spanish war.
That war, and the occurrences attendant, proclaimed emphatically
that the two countries, in their ideals of duty to the suffering and
oppressed, stood together, indeed, but in comparative isolation from
the sympathies of the rest of the world.[108]
The significance of this fact has been accentuated by the precision
with which in the United States the preponderance of intelligence
has discerned, and amid many superficially confusing details has
kept in mind, as the reasonable guide to its sympathies, that the war
in the Transvaal is simply a belated revival of the issue on which our
own Revolution was fought, viz., that when representation is denied,
taxation is violent oppression. The principle is common to Great
Britain and to us, woven into the web of all her history, despite the
momentary aberration which led to our revolt. The twofold incident
—the two wars and the sympathies aroused, because in both each
nation recognized community of principle and of ideals—indicates
another great approximation to the unity of mankind; which will
arrive in good time, but which is not to be hurried by force or by the
impatience of dreamers. The outcome of the civil war in the United
States, the unification of Italy, the new German Empire, the growing
strength of the idea of Imperial Federation in Great Britain, all
illustrate the tendency of humanity to aggregate into greater groups,
which in the instances cited have resulted in political combination
more or less formal and clearly defined. To the impulse and
establishment of each of these steps in advance, war has played a
principal part. War it was which preserved our Union. War it was
which completed the political unity of Italy, and brought the
Germans into that accord of sentiment and of recognized interest
upon which rest the foundations and the continuance of their
empire. War it is which has but now quickened the spirit of sympathy
between Great Britain and her colonies, and given to Imperial
Federation an acceleration into concrete action which could not
otherwise have been imparted; and it needed the stress of war, the
threat of outside interference with a sister nation in its mission of
benevolence, to quicken into positive action the sympathy of Great
Britain with the United States, and to dispose the latter to welcome
gladly and to return cordially the invaluable support thus offered.
War is assuredly a very great evil; not the greatest, but among the
greatest which afflict humanity. Yet let it be recognized at this
moment, when the word “Arbitration” has hold of popular
imagination, more perhaps by the melody of its associations,—like
the “Mesopotamia” of the preacher,—than by virtue of a reasonable
consideration of both sides of the question, of which it represents
only one, that within two years two wars have arisen, the righteous
object of either of which has been unattainable by milder methods.
When the United States went to war with Spain, four hundred
thousand of the latter’s colonial subjects had lost their lives by the
slow misery of starvation, inflicted by a measure—Reconcentration—
which was intended, but had proved inadequate, to suppress an
insurrection incited by centuries of oppression and by repeated
broken pledges. The justification of that war rests upon our right to
interfere on grounds of simple humanity, and upon the
demonstrated inability of Spain to rule her distant colonies by
methods unharmful to the governed. It was impossible to accept
renewed promises, not necessarily through distrust of their honesty,
but because political incapacity to give just and good administration
had been proved by repeated failures.
The justification of Great Britain’s war with the Transvaal rests
upon a like right of interference—to relieve oppression—and upon
the broad general principle for which our colonial ancestors fought
the mother-country over a century ago, that “taxation without
representation is tyranny.” Great Britain, indeed, did not demand the
franchise for her misgoverned subjects, domiciled abroad; she only
suggested it as a means whereby they might, in return for producing
nine tenths of the revenue, obtain fair treatment from the state which
was denying it to them. But be it remembered, not only that a
cardinal principle upon which English and American liberty rests
was being violated, but that at the time when the foreigners were
encouraged to enter the Transvaal franchise was attainable by law in
five years, while before the five years had expired the law was
changed, and the privilege withdrawn by ex post facto act.
In each of these wars one of the two nations which speak the
English tongue has taken a part, and in each the one engaged has
had outspoken sympathy from the other, and from the other alone.
The fact has been less evident in the Transvaal war, partly because
the issue has been less clear, or less clearly put, chiefly because many
foreign-born citizens of the United States still carry with them the
prepossessions of their birthplace, rather than those which should
arise from perception of their country’s interest.
Nevertheless, the foundations stand sure. We have begun to know
each other, in community of interest and of traditions, in ideals of
equality and of law. As the realization of this spreads, the two states,
in their various communities, will more and more closely draw
together in the unity of spirit, and all the surer that they eschew the
bondage of the letter of alliance.