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Critical Infrastructure
Critical Infrastructure: Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, Fifth Edition

represents a continuation of research and recommendations from the past editions
that spans nearly 20 years of focusing on critical infrastructure (CI) protection.
Over that time, the operating, threat, and technical environments have changed
drastically. The doctrines that have guided practitioners across various domains
have also evolved due to changing demands. This is a natural result when doctrines
collide and gradually evolve toward, and coalesce into, a singular understanding of
an issue. Those who have practiced in this domain have seen these collisions in the
past—an example being the convergence of physical security and cyber information
and operational) technologies security.
It is with this backdrop and understanding of the domain that the authors not
only describe the current state of affairs, but also provide a means through which
researchers and participants—such as practitioners, students, industry stakeholders,
owners, and operators in various government and private CI sectors—can look at
trends and changes the in the domain that may not be apparent elsewhere.
The authors identify shifts in today’s environment that move the thinking away
from simply the robustness of systems to their adaptability and resilience. They
outline design processes that, likewise, are evolving away from the simple adoption
of best practices to risk-based management and even towards structures based on
engineering-driven principles. These changes are not occurring at a unified pace,
and the differences can result in tensions between certain communities. However,
the debate itself is indicative of the critical thinking that is beginning to take hold
within each infrastructure domain.
Critical Infrastructure, Fifth Edition continues to critically examine the evolving
importance of our critical infrastructure to our society—recognizing the under
pinning value of cyber technology and how physical infrastructures and delivery
models impact and affect people and society.
Robert Radvanovsky is an active professional in the United States with over 40

years’ knowledge in security, risk management, business continuity, disaster recovery
planning, and cyber. He has a vast background in engineering, business, and cyber,
specifically on the topics of critical infrastructure protection and assurance. He has
a special interest and tremendous knowledge in matters of critical infrastructure,
along with industrial control systems (ICS) cybersecurity, and has published a
number of articles and research papers regarding this topic. His activities include
working for several professional accreditation and educational institutions on the
topics of homeland security, critical infrastructure protection and assurance, and
cybersecurity.
Allan McDougall is a seasoned asset protection and security practitioner; he has

over 25 years’ experience between the military, public sector, and private sector, in
addition to being highly active within the research community. A former combat
engineer, his approach to problem solving can be described as pragmatic. His public
sector experience has included service in the National Coordinator Security Policy
and Projects at the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, senior positions within the
Fleet Security organization of the Canadian Coast Guard, the senior inspector for
ports and marine facilities, and as the manager and technical authority for physical
security at the Canada Border Services Agency. He is currently actively involved
in international efforts associated with the future of cybersecurity in the maritime
domain and the evolving need for certification and accreditation.
Critical Infrastructure
Homeland Security and Emergency
Preparedness
Fifth Edition
Robert Radvanovsky and Allan McDougall
Boca Raton London New York
CRC Press is an imprint of the

Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
Designed cover image: © Shutterstock
Fifth edition published 2024
by CRC Press
2385 NW Executive Center Drive, Suite 320, Boca Raton FL 33431
and by CRC Press
4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN
CRC Press is an imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
© 2024 Robert Radvanovsky and Allan McDougall
First edition published by CRC Press 2006
Fourth edition published by CRC Press 2018
Reasonable efforts have been made to publish reliable data and information, but the author and
publisher cannot assume responsibility for the validity of all materials or the consequences of
their use. The authors and publishers have attempted to trace the copyright holders of all material
reproduced in this publication and apologize to copyright holders if permission to publish in this
form has not been obtained. If any copyright material has not been acknowledged please write and
let us know so we may rectify in any future reprint.
Except as permitted under U.S. Copyright Law, no part of this book may be reprinted, reproduced,
transmitted, or utilized in any form by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or
hereafter invented, including photocopying, microfilming, and recording, or in any information
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Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks and are
used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.
ISBN: 978-1-032-38757-4 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-032-38508-2 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-34663-0 (ebk)
DOI: 10.4324/9781003346630
Typeset in Garamond
by Apex CoVantage, LLC
From Bob
This book is dedicated to my loving wife, Tammy, who has always
supported and been patient with me, especially while this book was
being written. She has encouraged me to continue
my research on this topic. She is my rock.
From Allan
This work is dedicated to my wife, Angela, and those who make great
efforts to continuously improve the overall critical infrastructure
protection domain. My particular thanks to Martin and those who
work across the academic, professional, and practitioner communities
to keep our communities and societies safe and secure.
Contents
Additional Information .................................................................................xii

Preface ..........................................................................................................xiii
Introduction .................................................................................................. xv
Authors’ Notes .............................................................................................. xix
Acknowledgments ........................................................................................ xxi
1 Introduction to Critical Infrastructure Assurance

and Protection 1
1.1 Introduction ...................................................................................... 1
1.2 What Is Critical Infrastructure? ........................................................ 3
1.3 What Is the Private Sector? ................................................................ 4
1.4 What Is the Public Sector? ................................................................. 6
1.5 What Is CIP? ..................................................................................... 8
1.6 What Is CIA? .................................................................................... 9
1.7 What Are Public-Private Partnerships? ............................................ 11
1.8 Critical Infrastructure Functions ..................................................... 11
1.9 Evolution of Critical Infrastructure ................................................. 12
2 Demand, Capacity, Fragility, and the Emergence of Networks 17
2.1 Introduction .................................................................................... 17
2.2 What Are We Trying to Protect? The Concept of Capacity ............. 17
2.3 Demand: The Reason for Capacity ................................................. 18
2.3.1 The Concept of Performance .............................................. 19
2.3.2 Local Impact and the Influence on Capacity ...................... 19
2.3.3 Results of a Local Impact in the Immediate Sense .............. 20
2.3.4 Relevance to CIP ................................................................ 22
2.3.5 Push, Pull, Lag, and Delay in the Network
Environment ....................................................................... 23
2.4 At the Regional (Small System) Level .............................................. 23
2.4.1 Influence at the Small System Level .................................... 23
2.4.2 Current Efforts and Research.............................................. 26
2.4.3 The Interdependency Hydra ............................................... 27
vii
viii ◾ Contents
2.4.4 Network Fragmentation and Dissolution ............................ 28

2.5 Cyber as a New Domain in Conflict ............................................... 29
2.5.1 The Pendulum of Convergence ........................................... 30
2.5.2 Convergence and the Understanding of Threat................... 31
2.5.3 Fragility .............................................................................. 33
2.5.4 Fragility and Destabilization of Systems ............................. 35
2.5.5 Fragmentation and Dissolution of Networks....................... 36
2.6 Dissolution and Convergence: An Emerging Risk ........................... 37
2.6.1 Convergence, Network Expansion, Open Architecture,
and Common Criteria ......................................................... 38
2.7 Marking the Journey ....................................................................... 38
2.7.1 Overview ............................................................................ 39
2.7.2 Legislation: 107th Congress (2001–2002) ........................... 39
2.7.3 Legislation: 108th Congress to 109th Congress .................. 40
2.7.4 The State Today: A Recap ................................................... 40
2.7.5 Government as a Driver of Change ..................................... 41
2.7.6 Research and Understanding .............................................. 42
2.8 Authors’ Notes................................................................................. 42
3 Consolidation of Power on Core Critical Infrastructure
Sectors 45
3.1 Introduction .................................................................................... 45
3.2 Meeting the Dragons on the Map ................................................... 45
3.3 Who Owns the Treasure? ................................................................ 49
3.4 What Value?.................................................................................... 51
3.5 Target Audiences ............................................................................. 54
3.6 Expanding beyond the Traditional Response................................... 56
3.7 Areas of Potential Risk or Concern ..................................................64
4 Te New Role of Government 69
4.1 Introduction .................................................................................... 69
4.2 What Is a Public-Private Partnership (P3)? ...................................... 69
4.3 The P3 Spectrum ............................................................................ 70
4.4 Establishment of New Capacity....................................................... 73
4.5 Maintenance of Existing Capacity ................................................... 73
4.6 The Coming Financial Crisis .......................................................... 75
4.7 Other Forms of Public-Private Cooperation and the Erosion
of Governance ................................................................................. 77
4.8 Balancing Points .............................................................................. 78
4.9 Authors’ Notes................................................................................. 80
5 Te Reinvention of Information Sharing and Intelligence 84
5.1 Introduction .................................................................................... 84
5.2 Data vs. Information vs. Intelligence ............................................... 85
Contents ◾ ix
5.3 The Importance of Background to Context ..................................... 87

5.4 Context Affecting Sensitivity........................................................... 91
5.5 Enter the Cloud ............................................................................... 99
5.6 The Cloud as an Amplifier ............................................................ 101
5.7 Clouds and Concealed Conduits ................................................... 102
5.8 Linking the Trusted Computing Base and User
Communities................................................................................. 105
5.9 Barriers to Information Sharing..................................................... 108
5.10 The Continuing Rise of Open Sources .......................................... 109
5.11 Open-Source Information and Intelligence ................................... 110
5.12 An Approach to Information Sharing—The Consequence-
Benefit Ratio ..................................................................................111
6 Challenges Facing Vital Services 113
6.1 Defining Vital Services .................................................................. 113
6.2 Trends Creating Vital Services ........................................................114
6.3 The Role of Regulatory Oversight ................................................. 116
6.4 Balancing Public Safety and Business Operations...........................118
6.5 Consultation, Cooperation, or Coercion........................................ 121
6.6 Balancing Resilience and Financial Responsibility ........................ 125
6.7 The Emerging Role of Private Associations and
Membership .................................................................................. 127
6.8 Membership Versus Competition? ................................................. 128
6.9 Authors’ Note ................................................................................ 128
7 Management of Critical Infrastructure Resiliency 131
7.1 Introduction .................................................................................. 131
7.2 What Is Resilience?........................................................................ 131
7.3 Alignment with the Mission .......................................................... 133
7.4 Communities, Operations, and Infrastructure .............................. 135
7.5 The Core Elements ........................................................................ 142
7.6 The Supply Chain and Third-Party Risks ..................................... 145
7.7 Aligning Standards and Baselines .................................................. 148
7.8 The Core Challenges ..................................................................... 149
7.9 Why Over the Walls When Through the Gates? ........................... 150
7.10 The Rise in Counterfeits and Substandard Parts ........................... 153
7.11 The Rise of Unknown Vulnerability in the Home
Office ............................................................................................ 154
7.12 The Movement towards Clouds ..................................................... 156
7.13 Authors’ Note ................................................................................ 157
8 Te Coming Resurgence of Interdependencies 160
8.1 Looking at the World—A Community ......................................... 160
8.2 Current Trends in Business............................................................ 161
x ◾ Contents
8.3 The Shift and Change Government and Regulation ..................... 163
8.4 The Blurred Line between Government and Business ................... 164
8.5 The Rise of the Networked Machines—The Internet
of Things (IoT).............................................................................. 164
8.6 Trends in the Alignment of Interdependencies .............................. 165
8.7 The Emergence of the Key Sectors—Energy, Transportation,
Telecommunications, and Financial .............................................. 168
8.8 Comparing the Topography of Interdependencies with Flat/
Hierarchical Networks .................................................................. 170
8.9 Conditions for the Perfect Storm ................................................... 173
8.10 Authors’ Note .................................................................................174
9 Te Evolution of Physical Security 176
9.1 Introduction .................................................................................. 176
9.2 Core Offices Tested ....................................................................... 179
9.3 Resetting the Role of Physical Security .......................................... 180
9.4 The Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Perspective ............... 181
9.5 Picking an Appropriate Approach .................................................. 184
9.6 The Security Goal in Critical Infrastructure Protection ................ 188
9.7 Establishing the Overall Context and Organization ...................... 191
9.8 Establishing the Infrastructure Underpinning the
Organization ................................................................................. 192
9.9 Robustness and Assurance ............................................................. 195
9.10 Applying Architecture to Physical Security.................................... 198
9.11 Some Technical Specifications and Performance Measurement
to Continue ................................................................................... 203
9.12 Impact Shifts with Strategic Level Architecture .............................204
9.13 Conclusion .................................................................................... 205
10 Paradigm Shift of Nationally Sensitive Information,
and Networks 208
10.1 Introduction ............................................................................... 208
10.2 How COVID Impacted Organizations....................................... 209
10.3 The Impact on Critical Infrastructure Workforces ..................... 211
10.4 Challenges in Administering the Critical Infrastructure
Workforce ................................................................................... 212
10.5 Challenges Due to Changes in Available Infrastructure
for the Critical Infrastructure Workforce .................................... 214
10.6 Securing the Mobile Workforce .................................................. 216
10.7 The Challenge of Enabling Information ..................................... 218
10.8 Challenges Faced with Critical Infrastructure Information ........ 219
10.9 Why Does Critical Infrastructure Information Require a
Clearance?................................................................................... 221
10.10 Individual Certifications vs. Industry Certifications ................... 222
Contents ◾ xi
10.11 Why Are There So Many Different Levels of Clearances?........... 224

10.12 Should There Be a CII Certification That Covers
All Sectors? ................................................................................. 225
10.13 Authors’ Note ............................................................................. 226
11 Considerations to Be Maintained in Paradigm Shifts 232
11.1 Introduction ............................................................................... 232
11.2 What Are Considered Paradigm Shifts? ...................................... 232
11.3 The Need for Diligence and Care ............................................... 237
11.4 The Need to See the Whole Picture ............................................ 238
11.5 Building an Understanding Through Models ............................. 239
11.6 The System+1 Approach ............................................................. 243
11.7 The Use of System Thinking to Map Dependencies ................... 245
11.8 Not All Change Is Equal ............................................................ 246
11.9 Managing the Complex Adaptive Critical Infrastructure ............ 247
11.10 Alternative or Interim Approaches .............................................. 248
11.11 The Clouds and Critical Infrastructure ...................................... 249
11.12 Authors’ Note ............................................................................. 250
12 Climate Change 252
12.1 Introduction ............................................................................... 252
12.2 Climate versus Weather? ............................................................. 252
12.3 The First Impact—Uncertainty .................................................. 254
12.4 Adjusting Emergency Management ............................................ 256
12.5 The Ability to Withstand............................................................ 257
12.6 The Ability to Respond............................................................... 258
12.7 The Ability to Recover ................................................................ 259
12.8 The Role of the OODA Loop ..................................................... 261
12.9 Factors to Improve Observation .................................................. 261
12.10 Improving Orientation................................................................ 262
12.11 Improving Decision-Making....................................................... 262
12.12 Improving Actions ...................................................................... 263
12.13 Authors’ Note ............................................................................ 264
Index ........................................................................................................... 265
Additional Information
Due to the ongoing and rapidly changing Internet resources, the authors have pro-
vided a secondary source of reference material should the primary web page URL
no longer exist. The entire purpose of this is to maintain a sense of consistency
throughout the publication, as well as to provide information as a “snapshot in
time,” providing useful resources at the time while writing this book.
We hope that you will find these alternative resources useful and informative.
An example of the alternate reference material may be as follows:
http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book5/chapter_number/reference_number
For example, the URL http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book5/chapter12/ch12ref1.

pdf is the first publicly accessible reference for Chapter 12. As this is the fifth edi-
tion of our book, “book5” is the first subdirectory representing the beginning of
the documentation tree. Please refer to the specific referential text, as there is no
viewable website, just website copies documentation in Adobe PDF format.
xii
Preface
By failing to prepare, you are preparing to fail.

Benjamin Franklin
This fifth edition represents a culmination of research activity that has gone on over
the past several years and builds upon previous editions. The intent of presenting
the materials in this book is to represent the significant strides and changes made
in understanding the fundamentals behind securing, protecting, and safekeeping
the operations of our world’s infrastructures—their relevant industries, their land-
marks, as well as their national assets—that are considered critically vital to the
continued economic success and operation of our society.
From the time that the first edition of this book was conceived to the present
day, the importance of identifying what is critical to our society—worldwide—has
evolved into new perspectives to many countries throughout the world. As nations
explore their response to the critical infrastructure protection challenge, we have
seen a shift from the hard postures of robustness and force protection to more
fluid postures associated with resiliency and the establishment of redundant infra-
structure. While this effort continues, the domain is also seeing increased attention
being paid to the interaction between the physical, cyber, and various forms of con-
trol and automation systems that are integrated into this infrastructure. While most
will recognize the strides being made in communications technology, communities
may well want to be prepared for a paradigm shift, as quantum computing and pro-
cessing is now visible on the horizon. Similarly, the boundaries between physical,
cyber, and procedural controls is becoming increasingly blurred, as new technology
enables both those protecting infrastructure and those attacking it. What is becom-
ing more apparent is that if certain nations want to retain their competitive advan-
tage or position in the world’s international hierarchy, they need to become far more
resilient and creative in their thinking so that they can identify new opportunities
for efficiency. Otherwise, their current efforts to protect their infrastructure will
have the unintended consequence of stifling their industries and economic engines,
causing the nation to ultimately fail in its overall goal to protect its international
position, citizens, economies, and sovereignty.
xiii
xiv ◾ Preface
Facing this challenge will require the full security domain (not just govern-
ment, industries, or individuals) to break the silos that continue to permeate the
security industry. This will require updates in the doctrines of all security domains
(including physical security and information technology) as well as a significant
effort in modernizing the training materials and approaches used to develop those
communities.
Since the initial inception of this book, there have been significant strides in
efforts of safeguarding the operations of our world’s infrastructures. This edition
represents further developments since the fourth edition of this book appeared.
Introduction
This book is divided into 12 chapters, each of which deals with a specific evolu-
tion within the critical infrastructure domain. These chapters are intended to stand
alone but present information and build on the fifth edition.
Chapter 1: Introduction to Critical

Infrastructure Assurance and Protection
This chapter provides the base for the entire book and provides the historical back-
grounds of critical infrastructure, and why it is important to society. There are some
terms and definitions covering a brief synopsis of the intent of this book and what
is to be expected from critical infrastructure assurance and protection specialists
and professionals.
Chapter 2: Demand, Capacity, Fragility,

and the Emergence of Networks
This chapter is more theoretical in that it identifies an emerging trend in thinking
rather than describing some of the changes in the strategic infrastructure that have
taken place since the first edition appeared. At the time of the first edition, much of
the focus on critical infrastructure protection efforts was at the very local level—how
to protect key facilities. Recent infrastructure issues have highlighted the fact that this
infrastructure is subject to impacts that can flow along interdependencies and also dis-
ruptions within its networked environment. This chapter reflects that current trend.
Chapter 3: Consolidation of Power on

Core Critical Infrastructure Sector
Moving beyond National Frameworks (prior edition), the chapter focuses on core
areas of energy, telecom, and transportation—logistics backbones to communications
xv
xvi ◾ Introduction
and mobility (and capability to respond to a large-scale crisis) in a modern environ-

ment. This chapter reviews the consolidation of power in terms of energy, telecom-
munications, banking, and transportation, and the potential for these to become
“The Big Four” and how their interactions with other sectors play an important
factor.
Chapter 4: The New Role of Government

This chapter discusses a paradigm shift of the role of governments from regula-
tors to catalysts for change (e.g., setting firm targets for “green energy” and other
benefits, such as electric vehicles). The reader should understand that relationships
between governments and private sector entities is more dynamic now when look-
ing at management of infrastructure, and its impacts at social and economic levels.
Chapter 5: The Reinvention of Information

Sharing and Intelligence
This chapter outlines the paradigm shifts in how information and intelligence are
viewed and treated. This chapter has been updated to address the current handling
of information. Additionally, it introduces the emerging role of clouds and our
increasing importance to information, and how intelligence is gathered.
Chapter 6: Challenges Faced with Vital Services

This chapter looks at the current challenges associated with managing key-critical
services, such as frontline workers during periods of adversity (e.g., pandemics), as
well as the need to adopt a more system-focused, performance-based approach to
how we look at the value of work. It raises the issue of how we view challenges faced
by frontline workers, such as stockers and delivery drivers in the food sector (not
restaurants), supply chain, and medical (e.g., lack of experienced doctors in some
places.
Chapter 7: Management of Critical

Infrastructure Resiliency
This chapter discusses systems under pressure during periods of crisis, such as
floods, failed electric grids, pandemics, etc. It delves further into how resilient an
infrastructure is when faced with an increased number of rapid changes, their speed
Introduction ◾ xvii
and frequency, and diversity of the issues. Additionally, this chapter identifies an
even greater holistic approach in encompassing multiple disasters occurring at the
same time (e.g., pandemic and flood).
Chapter 8: The Coming Resurgence

of Interdependencies
With the demand of increased connectivity comes increased interdependencies.
This can produce much-needed redundancy, but it can also include dependence
and, as such, the potential for increased risk. This chapter reviews how current
projects tend to focus on one aspect, and are likely to see either newer or increasing
number of vulnerabilities associated with interdependencies associated with other
infrastructures.
Chapter 9: The Evolution of Physical Security

This chapter assimilates and integrates the Emergency Management chapter from
the previous edition into this new chapter. It includes physical and asset security,
management, and focus on continuity of operations.
Chapter 10: Paradigm Shift of Nationally

Sensitive Information and Networks
This chapter introduces challenges faced by public service workers/contractors from
home who require nationally secured information that would otherwise be accessed
only from a centralized location. This now includes private sector employees who
require security clearances to discuss and share information with each other, as well
as public service workers.
Chapter 11: Considerations to Be

Made in Paradigm Shifts
This chapter outlines the concerns at the social and economic levels as to whether
governments and private sector entities are ready for these shifts based on several
emerging factors. Additionally, can the interdependent sectors pivot accordingly
to adapt to these new paradigm shifts? The chapter also introduces the emerging
role of the interim operating capability versus the cataclysmic shift of key-critical
infrastructures.
xviii ◾ Introduction
Chapter 12: Climate Change

While there is still debate within certain circles regarding the specifics of climate
change, certain facts can be recognized. Urbanization along coastal and littoral
areas needs to consider the changes in the world’s oceans. Building architects
and engineers face increasing challenges to a rapidly changing environment and
how this will directly and profoundly impact—and, in extreme cases, disrupt—
infrastructure. This chapter reviews the ways to protect capacity within the sectors,
and it re-examines base requirements dealing with environmental factors (such as
building codes, standards of design, etc.) in order to accommodate an environment
that could become more extreme or change more rapidly in the years to come.
Authors’ Notes
This publication offers an aid in maintaining professional competence, with the

understanding that the authors, editor, and publisher are not rendering any legal,
financial, or any other professional advice.
Due to the rapidly changing nature of the infrastructure security industry, the
information contained within this publication will become outdated, and therefore
the reader should consider researching alternative or other professional or more cur-
rent sources of authoritative information. The significant portion of this publication
was based on research conducted over several years from a plethora of government
and public domain resources, publications, and Internet-accessible websites, some
of which may no longer be publicly available or may have been restricted due to laws
enacted by a particular country’s government.
The views and positions taken in this book represent the considered judgment
of the authors and editor. They acknowledge with gratitude any input provided and
resources offered that contributed to this book. To those who have contributed to
the book’s strengths and characteristics, we thank you for your contributions and
efforts. For any inconsistencies that may be found, we alone share and accept the
responsibility for them and will gladly make corrections as needed.
One additional note concerns the evolutionary process that we are witnessing
within this industry. We are seeing a shift from the force-protection doctrine that
concentrates on the protection of vital nodes and infrastructure, to a doctrine that
relies more heavily on the assurance of critical services and establishing and then
maintaining resilient networks. Realistically, private citizens, corporations, and
governments alike all see the flow of services and goods, such as electricity, drink-
able water, etc., as a service; we turn on a light switch or a faucet, and it just works,
and we do not concern ourselves much with the route that the service or product
takes to get to its final destination. This paradigm shift is being driven by the con-
tinuously evolving threats and the realization of increasing costs associated with
the force-protection doctrine’s relatively reactive approach to risk management.
In an effort to keep the references available for the readers, we have provided a
set of “snapshot of the website” links for all government and public domain web-
site references. As these website references change, become deleted, and so on, it is
important that readers know what the references were at the time of the writing of
xix
xx ◾ Authors’ Notes
this book. This will ensure that those references are “frozen in time” and will not
be changed or altered in any fashion whatsoever. We consider this a value-added
feature to this book, and invite you to review those website references now in case
they become unavailable over time. You may access this information via a dedicated
website at http://cipbook.infracritical.com.
Acknowledgments
Some materials used in this book were taken in part or in their entirety from several
very reliable and useful sources. Any information that may appear to be repetitive in
its content from those sources was taken to provide a more introspective perception
of what defines critical infrastructure assurance.
The authors, editor, and publisher thank the following organizations for their
contributions of references and materials:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (www.dhs.gov)

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which is part of the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security’s National Preparedness Directorate
(www.fema.gov)
U.S. Department of Homeland Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency (cisa.gov)
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), which is part of the
U.S. Department of Commerce (www.nist.gov)
Public Safety Canada (www.publicsafety.gc.ca)
Parks Canada (www.parks.canada.ca)
xxi
Chapter 1
Introduction to Critical
Infrastructure Assurance
and Protection
1.1 Introduction
Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) is a topic that is now beginning to span
generations. The basic concept of critical infrastructure protection finds its roots
in concepts such as vital point protection that can cast back several thousand years
with the protection of key shelter points, food stores, and other features such as
water sources. Those involved in the planning of conflicts extended this to such
infrastructure as food, water, ammunition, fuel, and equipment. Civil infrastruc-
ture followed the same course, with the need for protecting vital points gradually
expanding from vital points to the protection of distributed infrastructure (such as
transportation, telecommunications, water, and other networks) to a more holistic
protection of critical services described in previous editions. Some will remember
the Year 2000 (Y2K) issue as an emerging crisis that was one of the first clear
examples of this expansion, involving the surveys of several critical infrastructures
(such as the electrical grid) in preparation for the possible disruption of services
that included power, communications, financial services, and transportation. For
others, the issue began shortly after the attacks on September 11, 2001. Over the
past two decades, the paradigm of how we address issues associated with our criti-
cal infrastructures has changed from an effort of protecting assets (robustness) to a
focus on the promotion of resilience and the capacity to meet demand. This book
will focus primarily on changing networks from an asset-based approach to an even
more capacity-based approach. Changes made within the food industry (the rise of
DOI: 10.4324/9781003346630-1 1
2 ◾ Critical Infrastructure
door delivery services) illustrated some of the adjustments that needed to be made
to sustain the capacity during the recent pandemic, with mixed results.
This journey began with the mad dashes on Y2K changes, when the situation
became dire enough that airline executives had to board aircraft to fly across zero-
hour in order to demonstrate that their planes were still safe. While Y2K caused
concerns at a technical level, it represented a narrow band on the overall threat
spectrum. The attacks of 9/11 broadened the focus to include terrorist attacks,
while natural disasters around the world, including Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy
at home, broadened it even further. Populations have become less confident that
critical services can be protected and delivered at all times.
Since the last edition, the threat spectrum continues to evolve. The various
categories of events continue to broaden. We see “lone wolf attacks”1 and similar
attacks continue to occur at many venues. Of note, mental health issues, which
may be at the root of some of these attacks, have gained new status as a result of
some of these tragic events. We continue to witness increasing numbers of small
groups driven by political and other ideologies, forcing conflicts both at home
and abroad. These conflicts are often exacerbated by the nature of the dialog
permeating through social and news media. We have also observed an increase in
both the overt and surreptitious involvement of state actors who engaged in intel-
lectual property theft, economic espionage, information operations, and other
activities even to the point of laying the groundwork for attempts to disrupt our
infrastructure via cyber and similar means. While outside of the scope of this
work, one might even argue that we are now seeing a version of the conflict in
which state actors focus their combined political, economic, and military might
in both the physical and logical domains.
While human factors have expanded, so have the challenges associated with climate
change. Changes in the environment have strained the infrastructure’s ability to meet
demand. Catastrophic events, ranging from severe drought to severe inundation, that
have challenged communities as “century-level events” are occurring more frequently.
Populations are now guided to maintain reserves of key resources (food, water, medi-
cine) to sustain them as traditional emergency responders may be delayed, or unable to
provide, immediate support. Combined with increasingly severe events, our ability to
reliably predict these events has been strained by decisions that reduced the amount of
available data to the instability of weather events.
The breadth and depth of the challenge continues to increase, drawing in more
communities as we attempt to address complex issues. While the issue of critical
infrastructure protection has involved significant resources, originally these focused
on narrower groups of technical and government teams. However, this has now
broadened to include other security domains, such as traditional and social sciences
examining sources of conflict and the sources of changes within complex systems.
As these groups have expanded and evolved, so have the methods used to examine
this domain and its associated challenges.
Critical Infrastructure Assurance and Protection ◾ 3
An examination of the community now engaging this challenge shows that not all
the changes have been positive. While governments, academic institutions, and private
sector entities have continued to take up the challenge, an increasing politicization of
issues continues, notably through those that have tainted scientific and critical issues
in order to promote political and other interests. The security community has not been
immune to this. In short, the issue of critical infrastructure protection, which once
resided in the public domain, has expanded to become its own business line. And, like
any other business line, there are those who continue to attempt to serve the public
interest, while others have identified the issue as a potentially lucrative source of funds.
As a result, the data, information, and intelligence associated with climate change have
become tainted through communications and spin-doctoring, meaning all conclusions
must be put under a far more critical eye.
1.2 What Is Critical Infrastructure?

The term critical infrastructure refers to assets of physical and logical systems that are
essential to the minimum operations of the economy and government. This much,
at least, has not changed. They include, but are not limited to, telecommunica-
tions, energy, banking and finance, transportation, water systems, and emergency
services, both governmental and private. As these systems become further intercon-
nected, we see two major trends becoming apparent. The first trend involves the
pace at which technology evolves. This is not a constant around the world, and as
time progresses, we continue to see examples of certain societies and communi-
ties progressing at different rates and the emerging challenges associated with the
replacement of aging infrastructure. The second trend involves understanding that
the specific elements that make up a critical infrastructure are not constant across all
communities and may be subject to physical, sociological, and cultural factors. As a
result, CIP practitioners need to understand the contexts (economic, environmental,
cultural, and political) within which critical infrastructures can be found. Thus, due
to advances in information technology and efforts to improve efficiencies in these
systems, infrastructures have become increasingly automated and interlinked. These
improvements have created new vulnerabilities relating to equipment failure, human
error, and weather and other natural causes, as well as physical and computer-related
attacks.
One contentious statement is that the term critical infrastructure refers to (logi-
cal) network architectures that support operations, not the operations themselves.
This fails a key test. While the logical infrastructure (including networks) has
become increasingly important, it does not feed people, generate electricity, purify
water, or ship goods. It is certainly incontestable that the networks supporting criti-
cal infrastructure play a significant and vital role, but it needs to be clearly under-
stood that it is one function of many.
Over the past decade, various levels of government have been held responsible
for the protection of their own infrastructure. As the world moves inexorably toward
a global-centric network, we are seeing levels of government, along with the private
sector and even individual citizens, having responsibilities that take a more global
approach. It is not unusual for individuals to call service centers halfway around
the world to assist them with their networking difficulties. At the same time, global
supply chains require that private entities become much more aware of events
around the world that can affect the resilience of their supply chains. This means
that local efforts that were seen as manageable, if somewhat uncomfortable, have
grown exponentially into international “monsters.” As a result, the previous process
associated with critical infrastructure assurance has grown in scope from consistent
testing and evaluation of local infrastructures to one that is at its beginning of
understanding the vast influences that operate at a much more global level. This has
changed the playing field—significantly—from one where the edicts coming from
national capitals are now the second step in a much grander process that involves
balancing of international interests and priorities with national responsibilities.
1.3 What Is the Private Sector?

The private sector of a nation’s economy consists of those entities not controlled by
the state, such as private firms and companies, corporations, private banks, nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs), etc.2 Many nations have entities that are established
to deal with the private sector. Often these are linked to applying requirements or
to the contracting arrangements that can be made between the government and the
private sector. What needs to be understood here is how controls differ between the
two. The private sector entity may influence laws or government policy, but does not
have the authority to set that policy. The policy controls which are often referred to
in today’s asset protection community are management decisions that remain largely
constrained to its own persons, assets, and operations. Even in arrangements where
the government delegates work, it is always done under the oversight of some legal
mechanism. The private sector may also have to respond to authorities that are out-
side of the nation—such as those imposed on it by parent companies, partners, or
even financial institutions. This can lead to a level of complexity when attempting
to determine what the requirements being placed on the private sector actually are.
The second aspect to remember about the private sector is the nature of its
finances. Regardless of good intentions and public messaging, the private sector
entity seeks to generate wealth. In return for some consideration, companies that
operate for-profit business models tend to seek to increase that wealth, while those
that operate not-for-profit business models attempt to balance their cash flows with
their operations. In short, decisions are made with a very clear understanding that
there are financial risks involved.
This financial risk is also different from that of the government. The govern-
ment operates on a fiscal year that allows for budgets to be reset to a starting point
and also has a significant ability to determine its level of debt, although the past few
years have seen pressure on government financial controls to reduce waste and limit
spending, resulting in a similar decline in resources in, or even elimination of, some
activities. The private sector does not have this. Budgets are linear in that if money
out is greater than money in, then eventually the company will first go into debt,
then insolvency, and then finally cease to exist. This has a profound effect on how
organizations look at their budgets and new requirements—the government may
see issues in terms of “costs of doing business,” while the private sector may interpret
those new measures as another step on the road toward “going out of business.”
With the continuing threat to supply chains, and servicing critical infrastruc-
ture, we are currently witnessing the implementation of national requirements in
both Canada and the United States.3 The executive order, presented by President
Biden, is a clearly stated message for those operating critical infrastructure and
certain government services, to ensure their operations are in order. Canada’s C-26
bill (an Act respecting cybersecurity, amending the Telecommunications Act, and
making consequential amendments to other Acts), was presented for first reading
on June 14, 2022, and focuses on what appears to be a regulatory structure focusing
on cybersecurity, including supply chains.
Several factors are pressuring global supply chains back onshore. Economic
losses due to China’s restrictive policy on “zero COVID”4 has had a severe ripple
effect on many countries, not just Canada and the United States. Conflicts, particu-
larly between Russia and Ukraine, have resulted in movements (nearly nationalistic)
supporting one side of the conflict or the other. Fuel costs have placed exceptional
pressure on the maritime, rail, and trucking industries. Similarly, companies that
handle LTL (less-than-truck loads) for courier companies also have had to change
their operations in response to increasing fuel costs.
Over the past two years, notably during the COVID-19 pandemic, another
aspect of critical infrastructure protection became apparent. While traditional
doctrine tended to accentuate the importance of key personnel (those with special
knowledge or delegations), the pandemic soon illustrated that certain groups of
employees needed similar consideration. For example, the stock person may not
hold the same level of delegated authority, or certain kinds of advanced skills; how-
ever, the loss of all stock persons (or enough to affect operations) had a similar nega-
tive effect on corporations or the ability of those corporations to deliver services.
The fact that certain managers needed to step in to perform those roles only illus-
trates the importance of those roles in the overall ability to maintain operations.
We have also learned that these impacts do not necessarily have to part to be
of the actual event. Anyone who has gone to a restaurant in a major city would
likely have noted that there is a key shortage of wait staff and cooks that resulted
either from change in priorities (in terms of quality of life for the staff), or through
individuals taking the time during the government-mandated shutdowns to take

steps that broadened their employment opportunities (new education, new trades,
new skills, etc.). This illustrates that what is believed to be a necessary response can
have impacts that also warrant consideration.
1.4 What Is the Public Sector?

The public sector consists of government-owned or government-controlled corpora-
tions, as well as government monetary institutions.5 This includes the various entities
(often organized into departments, agencies, commissions, authorities, and so forth)
that receive funding through the legislation that enables government organization of
funds and that derive their authority from enabling legislation. These can be orga-
nized at various levels in both the United States (federal, district, state, municipal,
and tribal) and Canada (federal, provincial/territorial, tribal nations, and municipal)
with, it is important to note, each wielding its own influence on the population.
In these structures, there are three significant trends. First, the balancing of
budgets has often been at the expense of lower levels of government through a
process called downloading, in which the higher level of government forces costs
onto the lower level of government, and ultimately, onto the taxpayer. While this
practice helps balance the budget of the higher level of government, it places a strain
on government levels beneath it and should be viewed in terms of the rebalancing
of accounts as opposed to the fixing of issues. The second involves the concept
of divestment. This practice involves the government restricting both its internal
and outsourced operations that it considers undesirable due to costs or complexity.
This, however, can have consequences, such as recently illustrated by the divest-
ment of the Port of Churchill in Canada that ultimately led to its closure a short
time after—costing Canada one of the shortest routes into Europe and the local
community its major employer.6 Third, there is also a rise in the apparent impor-
tance of First Nations government organizations, particularly when dealing with
major infrastructure projects and in partnership with the federal and provincial
governments.
Public sector entities may be involved in two major functions. The first func-
tion is regulating the behavior of those persons or entities that fall within their
jurisdiction. This is accomplished through legal tools that may include laws, regu-
lations, rules, measures, or a direction of current trends that would side more so
towards an increased reliance on regulation as opposed to legislation. Compliance
with any of these is considered mandatory in the eyes of the state, and breaches of
compliance may result in penalties ranging from financial penalties to something
significantly more severe. The increasing use of regulation and other structures
that fall under administrative law has a significant impact on how the government
enforces its requirements on the population. While criminal code infractions in
Canada and the United States are governed through the Bill of Rights (United
States) and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Canada), regulatory enforcement
is conducted through tribunals that differ significantly. Within the domain of criti-
cal infrastructure protection, it is far more likely that an organization would face
an administrative action (such as an Administrative Monetary Penalty, or AMP)
imposed through an inspector under regulation, rather than a criminal charge;
although the latter may still remain available, this option would be used only under
the severest of conditions.7
The concept of jurisdiction is also important, particularly when looking at
issues that involve international operations—such as shipping. In these cases, the
mechanism by which the state generates its requirements often involves participa-
tion in groups of various sizes and whose decision-making processes are guided by
consensus that is taken back to the various national governments. Depending on
the nature of the international group within which the nation-state is participating,
the laws and regulations that it passes may be constrained in terms of operating
within the constraints of the consensus of the international group or body.
This leads to the second function, which is the protection of people, property,
and operations under its care. This often operates hand-in-hand with the first func-
tion, as many regulations are intended to provide a level of protection for society
against activities that would appear to run afoul of public safety concerns or societal
norms. Generally, public safety will look more toward people and property, with
operations being included as part of the suite of business risks. The nation-state
will operate bodies that are designed to protect those persons that are abiding by
its requirements in most legitimate forms of government, and against significant
events such as natural disasters, fire, etc.
This level of constraint may also have an involuntary aspect. Over the past
decade, the world has seen an increase in international bodies becoming involved
in settling national disputes. Organizations such as the United Nations, Gulf
Cooperation Council, and other similar bodies have taken on an increasing role in
determining what constitutes acceptable national behavior. We see this in interna-
tional bodies sanctioning actions that range from trade restrictions to enforcement
through military intervention. As we move toward more international operations,
these international bodies are taking on increasing roles in overseeing the deci-
sions of their individual members. This has been particularly evident in situations
associated with the financial sector in Europe, where the European Union (EU)
essentially dictated what financial controls the Greek government was to put in
place in order to receive bailout funds. Similarly, the United Nations and other
international bodies have taken a significant interest in the state’s response to the
migration of persons, making comments on the states’ response and, one might
argue, leading a two-front campaign—one being legal and the other being in the
court of public opinion. This can be further complicated as certain issues which
are being addressed at global levels (such as migration due to climate) are at or
near the root of many national issues, such as migration, disease, the movement of
invasive species, and even, for some nations, the potential for resettlement. While
this dynamic is still evolving with respect to critical infrastructure assurance and
protection doctrine, the fact that international bodies appear to be becoming more
active should at least be in the back of the researcher’s mind when looking at
potentially evolving challenges.
1.5 What Is CIP?

The term CIP pertains to activities for protecting critical infrastructures. This
includes people, physical assets, information, and communication cyber systems
that are indispensable for national, state, and urban security, economic stability,
and public safety. CIP methods and resources deter or mitigate attacks against
critical infrastructures caused by people (terrorists, other criminals, hackers,
etc.), natural calamities (hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, floods, etc.), and
accidents which may be as innocuous as a vehicle crash or may involve hazardous
material exposure to nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical substances.
Essentially, CIP is about protecting those assets considered invaluable to soci-
ety and that promote social well-being.8 CIP is often considered a reactionary
response to threats, risks, vulnerabilities, or hazardous conditions. It does entail
some preventative measures and countermeasures, but usually it is reactive by
nature.
CIP has two goals. The first goal can be related back to an alternative way
of thinking. By definition, a critical infrastructure involves physical and logical
systems necessary to support the safety, security, and economic well-being of com-
munities (to paraphrase the growing list of definitions). The second goal should be
more concerned with the protection of the infrastructure (in its physical and con-
structional contexts), and whether it is capable of delivering its anticipated services
to the community.
At this point, the reader needs to be cautious about how he or she looks at the
term CIP. Certain organizations, such as the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC), have promoted the approach in their communications using
the term CIP only to describe a narrow aspect of infrastructure protection. In the
case of the NERC, the term has been cast to identify only critical resources (physi-
cal and cyber) that are specific to the North American power grid. Failing to under-
stand these contextual issues can lead to discussions or debates where the scope of
the discussions is not understood by all involved.
Critical infrastructure assurance goes beyond the concept of CIP in that it seeks
to assure the viability of the services provided by that infrastructure. This implies
a strong focus on proactive and preventive controls. In this context, the concepts of
robustness, resiliency, and redundancy factor much more significantly because the
activities balance the need for protection and the potential impacts associated with
failure. This kind of approach to the issue of CIP was much closer to the intent
of the original goals of assuring the population that critical services would not be
disrupted and, in the off chance that they were disrupted, that the infrastructure
was designed and managed to restore the necessary level of services as quickly and
effectively as possible.
1.6 What Is CIA?

Most asset protection programs and their efforts often begin with determining why
something needs to be protected. The first part of this involves understanding the
mission or purpose of the organization and what service it provides or what good
it produces. The second element of this involves working backwards from the suc-
cessful achievement of these goals and looking at how various managed systems
come together. As one reduces from systems to sub-systems and ultimately to pro-
cesses, one sees the most granular level—that of the asset. These various inputs are
identified and assigned value based on their contribution to the given system and
its desired outputs or results. For example, the value of a facility may be that it
provides a clean and sterile environment for research. Something that breaches the
controls that protect that sterility would fall into the threat category, as the organi-
zation has lost a valuable part of its activities through the loss of the space. The sec-
ond part focuses on threats and assets (things) that can or might disrupt processes
and cause the organization not to be able to realize the full value or potential of
those assets. These steps become the foundation for such statements as risk being a
possibility of loss or injury; more specifically, it is an estimated impact that a hazard
would have on people, services, facilities, and structures in a community.9
The value associated with a critical infrastructure can be divided into several
parts. The first part involves circumstances in which the critical infrastructure provides
a unique service within and to a community. This is often the case where infrastruc-
ture costs are relatively (or even prohibitively) high, such that the community can
afford only one of the installation types. An example that supports this premise might
be that it is unlikely that you will see a town of 7,500 inhabitants with a water puri-
fication plant able to handle a population of 15,000 suddenly decide that it is time
to put in place a second similar installation. In this example, the concept of physical
security or force protection10 becomes vital, given any potential impacts associated
with the interruption, loss, or destruction of that particular infrastructure—in this
case, the loss of fresh drinking water to the local community. The second part is that
critical infrastructure may have a strategic value. Even if the demand is not immedi-
ate, the critical infrastructure may offer the ability to respond to a sudden change or
condition. Canada, for example, recently faced challenges associated with whether
it could support Europe’s impending fuel crisis (as of 2022), due to Canada’s lack of
sufficient pipelines and refining infrastructure to respond effectively.
In a networked environment, an additional layer of protection is possible
when leaving the local level as one begins to look at state/provincial, regional, or
even national levels. Depending on the nature of the service being provided, the
networked environment allows for an application of robustness, resilience, and

redundancy to be designed. When one infrastructure suffers a negative impact, the
loss of its performance in one area is offset by the remaining elements within the
network by either increasing or reallocating their own contributions so as to either
reach the desired level of overall performance or, in more extreme cases, reduce the
amount of impact associated with the disruption.
The question becomes whether to protect an individual infrastructure or the
ability of the networked environment to perform at a level that meets the demands.
The truth is that both are needed. Individual nodes and conduits associated
with an infrastructure network are intrinsic to that network’s ability to function.
Simultaneously, individual nodes operating in isolation must be looked at closely
in terms of residual risks allowed into a system that is essentially a single point of
failure. Another harsh reality of the critical infrastructure domain is that there are
people (i.e., families) who rely on those who operate in that field ensuring that
services are there when needed.
A range of events illustrates this reality. During the 1998 ice storm in Canada11
as well as the August 2003 blackout12 that affected13 much of the northeastern por-
tion of the United States and Canada, the challenge was that electrical power was
not available to maintain either heating and sumps (ice storm) or refrigeration and
heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning systems (2003 blackout). This lack of
availability prompted the declared states of emergency and resulted in organizations
putting their business continuity plans in motion and practicing other extraordinary
measures. The use of Canadian National Railway locomotives and generators to
supply electricity (in response to the ice storm) tends to point toward a lack of elec-
tricity being the problem and not simply a specific electrical transmission line being
disrupted.
Consider another example involving the U.S. postal system. Does it really
matter what street the mail comes from before it gets to your home? The
response would be “of course not.” What does matter is that your mail arrives
at your home on time and in unbroken condition. The concern sets in when we
wonder whether the mail or post is actually being delivered at all—something
that affects our paying of bills, receipt of ordered goods, and other forms of
communication.
Finally, consider the U.S. water supply systems. Again, we are less concerned
with whether the water is coming through a central pipe or some peripheral parts of
the system. We tend to become significantly concerned if the water supply fails to
provide water to our homes. For example, the prolonged drought in Lake Mead has
significantly impacted several states, particularly agriculture in those states. This is
resurrecting discussions about the viability of creating pipelines to carry water from
the Great Lakes. In turn, this is raising concerns internationally, given the agree-
ments between Canada and the United States over water rights and the preservation
of the Great Lakes watershed.14,15
Other examples will tend to follow the same suit, because it is the lack of criti-
cal services that poses the risk to society. Some might argue that the population is
concerned only about protecting critical infrastructure insofar as that protection
ensures the availability of the service to the public.
This leads to the concept and definition of CIA. The definition of CIP focuses
on protecting the nodes and conduits of any given infrastructure that delivers ser-
vices to its community through force protection. Although CIP tends to focus on
an all-hazards approach, it tends to operate at a very basic or local level—say, one
facility, one road, etc. CIA, on the other hand, tends to focus on a layer higher than
CIP, which includes the necessary arrangements to shift production around within
the network or surrounding networks so that demand is met, even if a local node
or conduit is disrupted.
If we were to take our two power-based examples, we would see the difference in
the approach. CIP would tend to focus on a very granular level—power production
facilities would be protected against various types of physical attacks or hazards.
CIA looks at the entire power grid, ensuring that the system can detect disruption,
shift capacity to meet demand, and ensure that services are being met—often trans-
parently to the consumer. In this context, it might be argued that CIA is the holistic
view that is actually sought by most CIP professionals.
1.7 What Are Public-Private Partnerships?

The divide between the public and private sectors is becoming more gray and flexi-
ble through the concept of public-private partnerships. A public-private partnership
is an agreement between a public agency and a private sector entity that combines
skills and resources to develop a technology, product, or service that improves the
quality of life for the general public. The private sector has been called upon numer-
ous times to use its resources, skills, and expertise to perform specific tasks for the
public sector.16 Historically, the public sector has frequently taken an active role in
spurring technological advances by directly funding the private sector to fulfill a
specialized need that cannot be completed by the public sector. What this arrange-
ment seeks to accomplish is a stable relationship between the two that allows a more
efficient and effective delivery of services. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
1.8 Critical Infrastructure Functions

Defining, using, and maintaining critical infrastructure is a combination of pro-
cesses. When looking at what should be defined as a critical infrastructure, we
need to move beyond the convenient definition and shopping lists promulgated by
governments and associations and ask three fundamental questions:
◾ Is the infrastructure necessary for the preservation of life or the continuation

of a society?
◾ Is the infrastructure operating in a very limited context or across a much
broader context? Put another way, is that infrastructure only specifc to a local
community, or does it interconnect with other communities to make a much
larger, more fragile community? Tis may infuence whether the infrastruc-
ture is considered to be a critical infrastructure in the national context or a
vital asset at the local level.
◾ Is the infrastructure operating as a singly or uniquely organized entity, or
is it a community of coordinated eforts put forth by several parties? Tis is
important to understand because the infrastructure, and its capacity, needs to
be understood in terms of assurance to its operations.
The answers to each of these three questions will have a profound impact on the
methods needed to protect the infrastructure and ensure delivery of its services.
This in turn will have an impact on the various methodologies and measures that
are available to those seeking to accomplish the same. It should not be looked upon
as a purely administrative process guided by checklists and prescriptive formulas.
1.9 Evolution of Critical Infrastructure

What many policy makers consider to be critical infrastructure has been evolving
and is often ambiguous. In the early 1990s, the word infrastructure was defined
primarily with respect to the adequacy of the community’s public works. In the
mid-1990s, however, the growing threat of international terrorism led policy mak-
ers to reconsider the definition of infrastructure in the context of security at national
levels. Successive government policies and laws have become refined and better
understood based on the expanded number of infrastructure sectors and the types
of assets considered critical for purposes of an economy’s security.17
This definition was adopted, by reference, in the Homeland Security Act of 2002
(P.L. 107-296, Sec. 2.4),18 and it established the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). The national strategy adopted the definition of critical infrastruc-
ture in P.L. 107-56, providing the following list of specific infrastructure sectors
and its assets falling under that definition.
SECTORS INCLUDE:
Agriculture and food production
Banking and finance
Chemical production
Critical manufacturing
Communications
Emergency services
Energy
Government facilities
Information technology
Nuclear energy and facilities
Postal shipping
Public health and healthcare
Transportation and logistics services
Water and wastewater treatment
K EY R ESOURCES INCLUDE:
Defense industrial base
Commercial facilities
Dams
National monuments and icons
The critical infrastructure sectors within the national strategy contain many
physical assets, but only a fraction of these could be viewed as critical according
to the DHS and Public Safety Canada definitions. For example, out of 33,000
individual assets cataloged in the DHS national asset database, the agency consid-
ers only 1,700, or 5%, to be nationally critical.19 Of the 33,000 assets listed in the
DHS database, only a small subset is defined as critical infrastructure sectors.20
Because federal, state, and local governments, as well as the private sector, often
have different views of what constitutes criticality, compiling a consensus list of
nationally critical assets has been an ongoing challenge for both DHS and Public
Safety Canada.
The critical infrastructure sectors are now being reviewed in the context of both
critical infrastructure protection (protection of assets) and critical infrastructure
assurance (protection of capacity). We see this evolution very clearly within the
Information Technology Sector as we look at the application of NIST Cybersecurity
Framework (CSF)21 that began its implementation with the security and privacy
controls described in NIST SP 800-53, Revision 4.22,23,24 NIST then published
NIST SP 800-160, Volume 1,25 specific to systems security engineering. The former
NIST SP 800-53, Revision 4,26 was then brought in-line through Revision 5 to
align more closely with NIST SP-800-160, Volume 1.27 As this shift was happen-
ing, NIST SP 800-160, Volume 2,28 has refined that systems security engineering
approach but focuses on developing cyber-resilient systems.
While CIP has been the focus, the concept of CIA has been approached largely
through the concept of resilience, which aligns much more closely with the concept
of CIA at the networked level and which has a profound impact at the local level
by allowing a greater degree of flexibility than the former CIP models.29 This shift
may afford greater flexibility for business, but it also opens up the need for improved
oversight by those authorities as it allows for better or expanded use of administrative
and procedural controls.
Notes
1. “[A]cts of terrorism carried out by radicalized individuals who prepare and commit
violent attacks on behalf of foreign terrorist organizations without first traveling
abroad to meet with and receive training from other members of the terrorist organi-
zation” (p. 5; URL: www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1221386/download).
2. FEMA Emergency Management Institute. (2007). U.S. Department of Homeland
Security Federal Emergency Management Agency, Principles of Emergency Management
Supplement, p. 5, released September 11, 2007. http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/
edu/08conf/Emergency%20Management%20Principles%20Monograph%20Final.
doc (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter1/ch1ref10.doc).
3. www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/02/24/executive-
order-on-americas-supply-chains/ (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book5/
chapter1/ch1ref1.pdf ).
4. The term “zero COVID” is actually a strategy to control and suppress the contagion as
much as possible to achieve a zero-contamination rate. Although it may be extremely
difficult to achieve, the objective of this strategy is to minimize contagion by reaching as
close to zero as possible. Many countries, such as China, have implemented such a strat-
egy. URL: www.isglobal.org/documents/10179/7943094/26_ISGlobal+COVID19+y+
COVIDCero+o+Maxima+Supresion+EN/0a4e83bb-6257-4f5d-8960-16c323b464b2
(alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book5/chapter1/ch1ref2.pdf).
5. National Archives (United Kingdom), Cabinet Papers 1915–1978, the International
Monetary Fund and Bretton Woods Conference. www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabi-
netpapers/themes/bretton-woods-conference.htm (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracriti-
cal.com/book3/chapter1/ch1ref4.pdf ).
6. The Port of Churchill sat on a great circle that was one of the shortest to the European
market. The port had been identified as being strategically important in the opening
of the Arctic to economic activity but had continued in decline. The divestment and
ultimate closure of the port, including some commentary on the impact, can be found
at www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/port-churchill-layoffs-1.3694830 and www.
cbc.ca/news/canada/thunder-bay/churchill-port-closure-thunder-bay-1.3697342.
7. Criminal courts involve the police laying specific charges with the state (used generically),
then laying a charge and introducing evidence to support that charge in the court. This
evidence must provide beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual is, in fact, guilty
within administrative law, the Administrative Monetary Penalty is laid through the
inspector’s department or agency, and the onus is on the individual to contest it through
an administrative tribunal which bases its decision on a balance of probabilities. While
administratively less burdensome, one might also have concerns regarding the shift in
the presumption of innocence that would shift between the two systems—the criminal
system requires the state to prove guilt, while the organization must defeat a penalty in
administrative court or continue to face the impacts of the enforcement action.
8. www.usfa.fema.gov/a-z/critical-infrastructure-protection.html (alt URL: http://cip-
book.infracritical.com/book3/chapter1/ch1ref1.pdf [old] and http://cipbook.infrac-
ritical.com/book5/chapter1/ch1ref3.pdf ).
9. U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) defines risk as “a function of
the nature and magnitude of a threat, the vulnerabilities to that threat, and the con-
sequences that could result.” https://emilms.fema.gov/is_0870a/groups/22.html (alt
URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book5/chapter1/ch1ref4.pdf ). Alternatively,

risk is “the likelihood that a threat will harm an asset with some severity of conse-
quences—and deciding on and implementing actions to reduce it.” www.fema.gov/
pdf/plan/prevent/rms/155/e155_unit_v.pdf, p. 3 (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracriti-
cal.com/book5/chapter1/ch1ref5.pdf ).
10. A term used by the military establishment of the United States and other countries to
define the following: “preventative measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against
the U.S. Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources,
facilities, and critical information.” Joint Publication 1–02, Department of Defense
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, November 2010 (as amended through
February 15, 2016), p. 90. URL: https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp1_02.pdf (alt URL:
http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book5/chapter1/ch1ref6.pdf ).
11. The 1998 ice storm hit several Canadian provinces of Ontario, Quebec, and New
Brunswick. Thousands of Canadians were without power and heat for several weeks as
power lines fell due to heavy ice and snow. Alongside public utilities and law enforce-
ment, over 15,000 members of the Canadian Armed Forces were there to help. URL:
https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/lbrr/archives/qc%20926.45.c22%20e78%202003-
eng.pdf (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book5/chapter1/ch1ref17.pdf).
12. The northeastern U.S. and portions of southern Canada had suffered the worst
recorded power blackout in history. Areas affected included New York, Massachusetts,
as well as New Jersey, along with Michigan, and from Ohio north to Toronto and
Ottawa, Ontario in Canada. Approximately, 50 million customers were impacted
without power for several days. The main cause of the power loss was due to poor
redundant operational controls. URL: https://www.energy.gov/oe/articles/blackout-
2003-final-report-august-14-2003-blackout-united-states-and-canada-causes-and
13. U.S. Department of Energy, August 2003 Blackout, dedicated web page with useful
links to information about the worst recorded blackout in U.S. and Canadian history.
URL: https://www.energy.gov/oe/august-2003-blackout (alt URL: http://cipbook.
infracritical.com/book5/chapter1/ch1ref19.pdf).
14. www.epa.gov/glwqa/what-glwqa (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracrfitical.com/book5/
chapter1/ch1ref7.pdf ).
15. https://binationa l.net/w p-content/uploads/2014/05/1094 _Ca nada-USA-
GLWQA-_e.pdf (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book5/chapter1/ch1ref8.
pdf ).
16. www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/st_innovative_public_private_partnerships_0710_ver-
sion_2.pdf (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chapter1/ch1ref12.pdf).
17. Library of Congress, CRS Report for Congress. (2004). Guarding America: Security
Guards and US Critical Infrastructure Protection, CRS-RL32670, November. https://
fas.org/sgp/crs/RL32670.pdf (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book3/chap-
ter1/ch1ref5.pdf ).
18. www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ296/PLAW-107publ296.pdf (alt URL: http://cip-
book.infracritical.com/book5/chapter1/ch1ref9.pdf ).
19. Liscouski, Robert, Asst. Sec. Infrastructure Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, testimony before the House Select Committee on Homeland Security,
Infrastructure and Border Security Subcommittee, April 21, 2004. Note that DHS’s
list of 1,700 critical assets may not include the 430 US commercial airports with
passenger screeners, whose security is primarily administered by the Transportation

Security Administration; https://fas.org/sgp/crs/RL32670.pdf (alt URL: http://cip-
book.infracritical.com/book3/chapter1/ch1ref5.pdf ).
20. For example, in the chemicals sector, DHS has identified 4,000 facilities as poten-
tially critical out of 66,000 total U.S. chemical sites. See Liscouski, Robert, Asst. Sec.
Infrastructure Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, testimony before
the House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats and International Relations, Combating Terrorism: Chemical Plant
Security, serial no. 108–156, February 23, 2004, p. 13. www.govinfo.gov/content/
pkg/CHRG-108hhrg94257/pdf/CHRG-108hhrg94257.pdf or www.govinfo.gov/con-
tent/pkg/CHRG-108hhrg94257/html/CHRG-108hhrg94257.htm (alt URL: http://
cipbook.infracritical.com/book5/chapter1/ch1ref10.pdf and http://cipbook.infracriti-
cal.com/book5/chapter1/ch1ref10a.htm).
21. NIST CSF v1.1—https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/CSWP/NIST.CSWP.04162018.
pdf (alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book5/chapter1/ch1ref11.pdf and
http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book5/chapter1/ch1ref11a.pptx).
22. https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf (alt
URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book5/chapter1/ch1ref12.pdf ).
23. It should be noted that NIST SP 800-53, Revision 4, has been superseded with
Revision 5 as of September 23, 2021. The difference between the two versions is
considerable. Revision 5 adds 66 new base controls, 202 new control enhancements,
and 131 new parameters to existing controls. The reason for referring to Revision 4
instead of Revision 5 is for sake of clarity pertinent to the discussion.
24. https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r5.pdf (alt
25. https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-160v1r1.pdf
(alt URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book5/chapter1/ch1ref14.pdf ).
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-160v2r1.pdf (alt
29. The resilience model has an increased emphasis on the restoration of operations.
While robustness or preventive controls continue to factor significantly, the concept
of detection, response, and recovery (using Canadian physical security doctrine as
per G1-025), or the response and recovery phase in the emergency management cycle
figure more prominently; www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/physec-secmat/pubs/g1-025-eng.htm
Chapter 2
Demand, Capacity,
Fragility, and the
Emergence of Networks
2.1 Introduction
The concepts described in this chapter have evolved significantly since the first
edition and continue to evolve as new and emerging factors continue to impact
infrastructure. These factors include well-debated issues such as climate change,
migration of populations, integration of new technology, increasing regulatory bur-
dens, and economic factors. What has been apparent is that an increasing number
and frequency of infrastructure issues are highlighting the fact that infrastructure,
and even whole communities, can be impacted through interdependencies and dis-
ruptions within the networked environment.
2.2 What Are We Trying to Protect?

The Concept of Capacity
If critical infrastructure is really about the infrastructure necessary to preserve the
safety, security, and economic well-being of citizens, then shouldn’t the focus nec-
essarily be on protecting infrastructure or assuring that a given service continues
to be delivered as required? Although the former is certainly important, the latter
aligns much more closely with the stated goals of critical infrastructure protection
(CIP).
DOI: 10.4324/9781003346630-2 17
The fact is that a given infrastructure at the local level is there to provide some
level of contribution into the system. The sum of these contributions, the ability to
coordinate how those services are delivered, and the means of delivering them to
their intended recipients may be best described as the capacity of the system.
These three elements (safety, security, and economic well-being) are important
because they operate similarly to the fire triad (heat, oxygen, and chemical reac-
tion). If the infrastructure can generate a significant amount of the service but
cannot identify where it is useful or deliver it to those points, then the system has
essentially failed. At the same time, a well-coordinated and well-maintained grid
that does not have anything sent through it is still failing to meet the final goal.
The ability of the system to produce, distribute, and deliver can be described as the
system’s capacity.
The symbiosis that exists between the ability to generate capacity and the abil-
ity to distribute that capacity has become much more evident, particularly when
looking at the fringes and expanding edges of society’s networked infrastructure.
Communities (which may range from settlement to economic bases of operation)
are expanding into environments such as the north. Similarly, the demand for tech-
nology is spreading outwards into increasingly remote locations. For those seeking
a clear example of the challenges that can arise, one only needs to look at the 2017
events that damaged the transportation network to communities such as Churchill,
Manitoba. In this specific example, the main ground transportation route (a rail
line) suffered catastrophic damage to the point where economic interests and even
the community’s survival has been called into question.1
The concept of capacity is now also being linked to the concept of assurance.
Assurance, generally speaking, is the trustworthiness that something is going to
perform as expected given a set of competitive or adversarial conditions. Those
assets or services that operate only in very stable and tranquil environments may
need only a lower level of assurance. Those intended to operate under difficult or
even contested environments, like conflict, need to offer a higher level of assurance.
As a result, those that are offering the capacity to meet demand are now being
increasingly challenged about the level of assurance that their capacity will be able
to meet that demand in what appears to be an increasingly competitive environ-
ment. Acceptance, in an engineering context, is not only about meeting accepted
requirements from one set of conditions, but about meeting the same accepted
requirements under more difficult or stringent conditions.
2.3 Demand: The Reason for Capacity

Demand and capacity exist in a constant balancing act. This is not to say that they
are always in equilibrium—they rarely are. It simply means that where there is a
demand, capacity will attempt to fill that demand. Where there is surplus capacity,
there is likely going to be a demand attempting to exploit that capacity. Those with
Demand, Capacity, Fragility, and the Emergence of Networks ◾ 19
a background in a supply-and-demand economics will find this concept very famil-

iar. The concept of assurance simply broadens the application of this balancing act
into differing threat conditions. The main question here is, can you still meet your
demands under an even more hostile environment?
2.3.1 The Concept of Performance

The concept of performance basically describes whether the system works with
sufficient capacity to meet its demand. For example, if there is a demand for 500
units of something, then the system would be considered in balance when it delivers
those 500 units, and otherwise out of balance.
Because of the nature of critical infrastructure, it can be reasonably argued that
three imbalances have to be considered. The most serious of these involves a situ-
ation where the capacity does not meet the demand. This may be represented by
a situation in which some portion of the population does not receive an expected
level of the critical service—such as occurs during a power failure. The second
most serious condition occurs when the capacity exceeds the demand but leads to a
response where the capacity is reduced, leaving the system vulnerable to a spike in
demand. This might be exhibited in situations where the private sector is primar-
ily involved in the delivery of the service, but due to a surplus of supply, businesses
leave the market because they become intolerably unprofitable. The final imbalance
is a sustained surplus of capacity.
The example of Churchill, Manitoba, illustrates an important factor in look-
ing at the demand and capacity balance. The local community has a vested inter-
est in the performance of regional infrastructure, particularly since that regional
infrastructure is essentially a single point of failure. With no viable replacement of
the rail system (i.e., no road) and the only alternative being air transportation, the
movement of critical supplies and stores (such as food) are impacted in terms of cost
and availability to the point where the impacts cascade through the community.
Concerns regarding Canada’s ability to sustain sovereignty operations in the area
are impacted due to the challenges. The example here is showing how the impacts
in terms of the performance of infrastructure need to be examined in a more coor-
dinated fashion between local (including business), regional, and national (includ-
ing strategic) perspectives.
2.3.2 Local Impact and the Inﬂuence on Capacity

When infrastructure is disrupted at the local level, that disruption loses its abil-
ity to provide the expected level of capacity into the overall system. At the local
level, the clearest understanding regarding the loss of capacity will flow from activi-
ties associated less with physical security than with business continuity planning
(BCP). Within BCP, thresholds are communicated that are used to determine the
severity of impacts or losses of key resources, etc. Although BCP generally ends at
the edge of the organization’s responsibility or mandate, the concept of CIP urges
this approach to be carried on throughout the organization and into progressively
larger systems.
One of the more evolving issues of late has been the concept of supply chain
risk management. In this context, the local impact now must now be looked at not
only in terms of its impact on operations and simple performance, but also in terms
of how people interpret the trustworthiness of the assurance case. An example of
this concern would be the recent introduction of Executive Order (EO) 14017,2,3,4
which focuses on supply chain security; EO 14028,5 for improving the nation’s
cybersecurity and utilizing standards such as the NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-
161;6 and NIST IR 8762, which reinforces the Executive Orders’ implementations.
These are being reviewed more closely in the context of both suitability of services
and acceptance in design.7,8
Some care has to be taken here to ensure that the quality of service is maintained
at a manageable level. What if the final product (e.g., a fuel) fails to reach that level
of quality for it to be usable in the system? This aspect of integrity is somewhat dif-
ferent from the traditional “nothing added, nothing deleted, and only authorized
changes made through well-formed or defined processes” and is more closely in line
with the traditional views of quality assurance and quality management.
2.3.3 Results of a Local Impact in the Immediate Sense

When something is disrupted, we return to the concept that the availability of the
critical service has been reduced. This leads to three important events that are wor-
thy of study. The first event involves what the loss or reduction of that service means
to the overall system. This revolves around the concept of what consequences arise
should the organization fail to meet its goals—again, a power failure, loss of trans-
portation, etc. The second event involves what the loss or reduction of that service
means to the internal use or management of inputs that would normally be used
to maintain that level of service delivery. How do the unused inputs survive the
impact? Are they perishable—must they be used within a certain time frame before
they are no longer of value? Are they persistent in that they can be stored nearly
indefinitely without a loss of value? These factors should generally be included in
the basic impact analysis—often in consultation with operations or material man-
agement personnel. The third event involves how the organization manages the fact
that it is no longer consuming those inputs at the same rate. Does this mean that
it will stop purchases of future inputs or that it will simply delay the delivery of
some? These upstream impacts are also important factors to be considered both in
the local impact analysis and later in the understanding of the impact on the overall
system. For those seeking parallels, concepts defined in supply chain management
and logistics provide some input.
Here we are seeing what may be described as an increase in how fast the impacts
can move through fragile and interdependent systems. When one considers the
Demand, Capacity, Fragility, and the Emergence of Networks ◾ 21
1987 disruption in Canada on the movement of grain and the loss of exports of coal
from certain areas of the western United States, the impacts moved through the
system quickly, but in a matter of days and weeks. These can be described largely
in terms of their root being economic in nature (one being a labor dispute and the
other being a collapse of an economy). The example of Churchill, Manitoba, illus-
trates two factors that have almost immediate impacts. The cessations of operations
by the private sector interest had an impact on the supply chain, and the economy
within the surrounding area. It cascaded quickly to other events, such as the closure
of the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) office in the town due to a lack of
need for operational support. The damage to the rail line also has an immediate
impact that will last some time (before repairs can be affected), but which is also
related to the first impact. The question will be whether there is adequate economic
demand for a restoration of full services without the seaport. Consequently, it is
not enough to simply look at these impacts as being completely isolated from each
other. One might propose looking at the impacts more in terms of the same prin-
ciples as supportive and destructive waves—where two impacts collide and create a
far more significant or difficult situation.
We are also witnessing two levels of impact, particularly within life safety envi-
ronments. The first of these is the impact that we all see—the fallen bridges, dam-
aged roads, and so on. These are not new and are well worn. The next level of
impact; however, is associated with the level of trust that the infrastructure will per-
form as expected. For example, people used to be able to count on being able to at
least go to an emergency room if they needed medical attention and there were no
other options. In Canada, conditions now exist where hospitals have actually closed
their emergency rooms for certain periods of time (or even weekends) because of
staff shortages.9 The demand for emergency services hasn’t changed; however, where
the system is offering capacity to meet that demand, it is now finding that the added
demand being placed on it is overwhelming what locations remain open.10
Impacts based upon trustworthiness may not be within the span of control of
the companies actually providing the capacity to meet demand. A recent outage
in Canada involving a major telecommunications community impacted a number
of services, including 911 emergency services and certain financial organizations.
These companies were not in a position to directly address the impacts, however,
there is an argument that the public confidence in their services has been eroded
as a result of the event. People had trust in the 911 service because that service was
supposed to be always available by law. As the service wasn’t available, additional
pressure has been placed upon the industry for increased assurance that similar situ-
ations will not arise in the future.
Generally, at the local level, four classes of impacts are observed. The first are
delaying impacts that essentially slow the inward flow of something into the system.
This concept is seen when warehouses are filled—at some point, the warehouse is
full, but we still need to store the material. The second involves the concept of lag.
This category of disruption describes the condition where something else is slowed
down because the necessary amount of inputs is not being received. Finally, at the
other end of the spectrum, the system will attempt to balance itself through either
the third class, push (seeking to find new demand), or the fourth class, pull (seeking
to find surplus capacity that can be aligned against unmet demand).
While the concept of push, pull, lag, and delay may operate independently at a
conceptual level, greater care needs to be taken to identify conditions where a single
event can lead to multiple impacts. Currently, many networked environments have
been making significant efforts to “fit more capacity into the same space,” so as to
be getting the best return on investment with respect to the use of infrastructure.
This is clearly evident when looking at issues in the transportation system (more
efficient switching systems, intermodal systems, freight forwarding), electronic
networks (increasing bandwidth, compression technology, and multiplexing), and
centralization.11 The impact here is that the current model (push-pull-lag-delay)
now operates at multiple levels. The disruption of a node or conduit may not just
impact something coming into the system, but it is becoming increasingly likely to
impact movement in the opposite direction. This is not new but is becoming far
more apparent. The other aspect comes from the fragility that is inherent in fringe
communities or communities that have not matured to the point where they have
robust, resilient, and redundant infrastructures. This can come in the form of new
communities but also in terms of new activities within communities that place
additional demands on that community. One might postulate that we will see sev-
eral working examples of this in the expansion into the North.
An impact that is becoming far more prevalent across a number of sectors might
be referred to as “load shedding,” a term often coined in the electrical power genera-
tion community. In the electrical generating capacity, this involves distributing pro-
duction capacity so that a loss of production capacity is reduced in severity at one
level. At the same time, however, it introduces several new layers of “moving parts”
that can, if not balanced and managed appropriately, lead to its own issues in terms
of cascading impacts. While the electric grid has seen this in terms of solar farms,
personal generating capability and similar forms or programs, it is evident in other
sectors as well. We are now seeing increases in the number of community gardens,
water supply and purification, outsourced services, and small service providers in
telecommunications. As these distribute capacity while reducing the probability of
a catastrophic failure at one level, they also can come at the price of increased insta-
bility or even vulnerability unless carefully coordinated at levels including techni-
cal, scientific, and regulatory oversight.12
2.3.4 Relevance to CIP

The concepts of push, pull, lag, and delay are becoming increasingly understood
at the local level. This was initially established through bodies of knowledge asso-
ciated with supply chains and logistics; it then moved into the realm of BCP
and has now become more understood in the realm of CIP. Where the divide
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„Vooruit maar, Koetschoek, het is in het geheel niet gevaarlijk! Wij
hebben de kurkengordels bij de hand en naderen den oever. Misschien
bereiken wij dien voordat de boot zinkt.”
„Ja wij k u n n e n de naaste landtong nog bereiken.—O, Allah!”
De boot was reeds half vol water, toen een hooge golf langs
stuurboordzijde veegde en ons onder water dreigde te drukken. Met
roeiriem en arm beproefde ik haar kracht te breken. Wij zaten reeds als
in een badkuip en het water klotste heen en weer in de boot. Wij
werkten, dat onze polsen geheel wit waren. „Forscher indompelen,
Koetschoek!” Het gelukte ons werkelijk de boot in de luwte te brengen,
voordat de noodlottige golf kwam, die haar gevuld zou hebben en ten
onder gebracht! In het duister van den avond bereikten wij gelukkig den
oever, zetten de boot schuin, en spanden de wollen dekens als dak er
overheen. Daarna staken wij een vuur aan om onze kleeren te drogen,
en nadat wij onze laatste korst brood hadden gegeten, sliepen wij, dood
vermoeid, ondanks den stroomenden regen spoedig in; het verheugde
ons geen gevangenen meer te zijn op het kleine rotseiland in het meer
Tschargoet-tjo.
Toen wij eindelijk weer in het hoofdkampement kwamen waren de

Tibetanen verheugd en verrast ons te zien. Hun hoofdmannen waren
bang geweest, dat de boottocht maar een voorwendsel was, en dat mijn
werkelijk plan was geweest, aan den zuidelijken oever van het meer te
landen, twee paarden van de nomaden te koopen en dan met
Koetschoek over het gebergte naar Lhasa te rijden. Nu hadden zij mij
echter terug en bewaakten mij nauwkeurig tot we drie maanden later de
grens van Ladak hadden bereikt.
[Inhoud]
36. De Taschi-Lama.
Zoo kwamen wij weer in het kleine Leh, de hoofdstad van Ladak terug, en zagen weer
de winterkaravanen, die uit Oost-Turkestan over het hooge gebergte waren gekomen, en
met hun waren naar Kaschmir trokken. Daarna verliepen verscheiden jaren, maar in
Augustus 1906 kwam ik weer naar Leh, om nog eens met een karavaan, dezen keer van
honderd paarden en muilezels en zeven en twintig mannen Tibet binnen te dringen.
Dezen keer ging de weg over de hooge bergen in noordelijk Tibet en een en tachtig
dagen zagen wij geen vreemde menschen. Maar toen wij daarna rechts af sloegen en
zuidelijker [153]streken naderden, kwamen wij Tibetaansche jagers en nomaden tegen,
van wie ik schapen en tamme yaks kocht, want het grootste deel van mijn lastdieren was
onderweg omgekomen. De ijle lucht en de schaarsche, slechte weidegrond, daarbij
koude en wind hadden hen gedood. De temperatuur was tot op 40 graden vorst gedaald.
Na een zwerftocht van een half jaar kwamen wij aan de boven-Brahmapoetra, op welker
troebele golven de Tibetanen, die anders nooit aan scheepvaart doen, met booten
varen, welke men nooit zou aanzien dat het booten zijn. Over een toestel, uit dunne,
buigzame latten vervaardigd, worden vier aan elkaar genaaide huiden van yaks
gespannen, en daarmede is de boot gereed. Maar ze kan een heel gewicht dragen en
glijdt licht over het water.
Toen wij nog een dagreis van Schigatze, de tweede hoofdstad van Tibet, verwijderd
waren, liet ik de karavaan langs den oever verder gaan; ik zelf nam met twee bedienden
plaats in een boot, welke door een Tibetaan handig werd bestuurd, en dreef in snelle
vaart de reusachtige Brahmapoetra af. Een menigte andere booten maakten de schoone
waterweg levendig. Zij waren bezet met pelgrims, die den grooten tempel in Schigatze
wilden bezoeken. Over twee dagen vierden de Lamaïsten hun grootste feest, het
Nieuwjaar. Dan stroomen van nabij en van verre pelgrims naar de heilige stad. Rondom
den hals dragen zij kleine afgodsbeeldjes, of op papier geschreven en in kleine
foudralen bewaarde wonderdoende spreuken, en veel pelgrims draaien kleine
gebedmolentjes, die met lange papierstroken zijn gevuld. Door het draaien der molens
dringen de gebeden, die op de papieren staan, door tot de ooren der goden—zoo
gemakkelijk is in Tibet het bidden! Ondertusschen kan men kalm met zijn reiskameraad
babbelen; als de molen maar in beweging blijft, behoeft men zich niet bezorgd te maken
over zijn tijdelijk en eeuwig heil!
Veel pelgrims prevelen, evenals alle Tibetanen, op gepaste en niet-gepaste

oogenblikken, de heilige woorden: „O m m a n i p a d m e h u m ! ” Deze vier woorden
zijn de sleutel van alle geloof en alle zaligheid. Zij beteekenen: „O, het juweel is in de
lotusbloem, amen!” Het juweel is Boeddha, en op al zijn beelden ziet men hem als het
ware uit de bladerkroon van een lotusbloem opwassen. Hoe vaker men de vier woorden
herhaalt, des te grooter kans heeft men op een gelukkig bestaan, als na den dood de
ziel in een nieuw omhulsel overgaat.
Wij bereikten Schigatze en sloegen in een tuin aan den rand [154]der stad onze tenten
op. Misschien vraagt een mijner lezers, waarom ik dezen keer nog niet eens beproefde
tot Lhasa door te dringen en waarom de Tibetanen, die mij den laatsten keer een leger
van vijfhonderd man tegemoet zonden, het verder reizen naar Schigatze niet
verhinderden? Nu, in het jaar 1904 hadden de Engelschen van uit Indië een veldtocht
naar Lhasa ondernomen, om den Dalai-Lama ontzag in te boezemen. Zij hadden toen
de stad zoo nauwkeurig beschreven, dat ik er verder niets meer had te zoeken en mij
daarom liever naar het onbekende Schigatze begaf. En deze reis van mij volgde zoo
spoedig op den tocht der Engelschen, dat de Tibetanen het niet waagden, mij, den
Europeaan, hinderpalen in den weg te leggen.
Klooster Taschi-lunpo in Schigatze.
Buiten de stad Schigatze ligt het groote klooster Taschiloenpo, waarin 3800 monniken
van verschillenden rang wonen, van piepjonge novieten tot grijze ordepriesters. Zij
loopen allen blootshoofds en met naakte armen en hun kleeren bestaan uit lange roode
stukken stof, die zij om hun lijf binden. De opperpriester heet Taschi-Lama; hij bekleedt
denzelfden hoogen rang en dezelfde hooge waardigheid als de Dalai-Lama in Lhasa. Hij
is allerwege beroemd om zijn heiligheid en zijn geleerdheid, en duizenden pelgrims
wachten uren lang om met een enkel woord door hem te worden gezegend.
Deze Taschi-Lama was toen een zeven en twintigjarige man, die reeds als heel kleine
jongen tot deze waardigheid was verheven. Ik kreeg van hem een uitnoodiging voor het
groote tempelfeest met nieuwjaar. Midden in de kloosterstad is een langwerpige, met
veranda’s, balkonnen en galerijen omgeven hof. In het rond ziet men de vergulde
koperen daken der heiligdommen en grafkapellen, waarin gestorven hoogepriesters
rusten. Overal wemelt het van dicht op elkaar gepakte menschenmassa’s, en al deze
gasten, die van nabij en van verre zijn gekomen, dragen stralende, bonte feestgewaden,
die met zilveren kettingen, koralen en turkooizen zijn versierd. In het midden van een
balkon is de plaats van den Taschi-Lama. Het is met geel-zijden draperieën en gouden
kwasten behangen, maar door een kleine vierhoekige spleet kon ik het gelaat van den
heiligen man zien.
De plechtigheid begon met het binnentrekken der kerkmuzikanten in den hof. Zij
droegen drie meter lange, koperen bazuinen, die zoo zwaar zijn, dat de klankopening op
den schouder van een koorknaap rust. Met dof, langgerekt bazuingeschal blazen de
monniken het nieuwe jaar in, evenals de priesters van Israël het begin van het jubeljaar
aankondigden. Daarop volgden [155]cymbalen, die in langzame, trillende maat klinken en
een getrommel voortbrengen, dat tegen de tempelmuren terugkaatst. Het geraas is
oorverdoovend, maar na de groote stilte in de dalen van Tibet klonk het dubbel feestelijk
en verheffend.
Zoodra het muziekkorps in het midden van den hof heeft plaats genomen, treden
dansende monniken naar voren. Zij dragen kostbare gewaden uit Chineesche zijde en in
de plooien glinsteren geborduurde gouden draken in den zonneschijn. Hun gelaat wordt
verborgen achter maskers, die wilde dieren met geopenden muil en geweldige horens
voorstellen. En nu dansen deze monniken een langzamen rondedans, om—zoo meenen
de vromen—booze geesten te bannen.
Den volgenden dag werd ik zelfs bij den Taschi-Lama ontboden. Door geplaveide,
nauwe straten, tusschen hooge kloostermuren omhoog gaande, komt men door nauwe,
donkere gangen, langs houten ladders, eindelijk in de hoogste verdiepingen van de
tempelstad, waar de hoogepriester zijn particuliere kamers heeft. Ik vond hem in een
eenvoudige kamer, waar hij met gekruiste beenen in een vensternis zat en door een
spleet in den muur op de tempeldaken, de hooge bergen en de zonnige stad in het dal
neerkeek. Hij is baardeloos en heeft kortgeknipt, bruin haar. De uitdrukking van zijn
gelaat is betooverend en zacht, bijna verlegen. Hij stak mij de hand toe en verzocht mij
plaats te nemen; daarna spraken wij geruimen tijd over Tibet, Zweden en de groote,
heerlijke aarde.
De Taschi-Lama is een van die zeldzame menschen, die men nooit meer vergeet, als
men eens tegenover hen heeft gestaan.
[Inhoud]
37. De wilde ezel en de yak.
Indien ik gedurende mijn reizen door Tibet al de wilde ezels had geteld, die
ik heb ontmoet, dan zouden het er vele, vele [156]duizenden zijn. Ginds in
het Noorden of in het hartje van het hoogland of in het Zuiden, gaat bijna
geen dag voorbij waarop men deze prachtige, trotsche dieren niet nu eens
afzonderlijk, dan in paren, of in kudden van verscheidene honderden
ontmoet. De Latijnsche naam van den wilden ezel is Equus Kiang. Deze
naam verraadt zijn nauwe verwantschap met het paard, en de Tibetanen
noemen hem Kiang. De wilde ezel is zoo groot als een middelmatige
muilezel, heeft goed ontwikkelde ooren en een scherp gehoor, aan den
staart een pluim en een rood-bruin vel, maar aan de buik en de pooten is
hij wit. Speurt hij gevaar dan snuift hij luid, heft den kop in de hoogte, spitst
de ooren en blaast de neusvleugels op; hij gelijkt meer op een fraaien ezel
dan op een paard. Maar als men hem op de zoutvlakten van Tibet ziet
rondgaloppeeren, dan schijnt het onderscheid tusschen den tammen en
den wilden ezel grooter dan tusschen ezel en paard en de paarden en
ezels van mijn karavaan zagen er naast de kiangs der woestijnen als
landloopers uit.
De wilde ezels zijn een sieraad van het stille, eenzame Tibet en sedert vele
jaren mijn vrienden. De karavaan trekt over de effen vlakte aan den oever
van een zoutmeer. Daar komt een kudde wilde ezels in een stofwolk
aangaloppeeren. Zij volgen allen het bevel van een leidenden ezel, de
veulens blijven in de nabijheid der moeder. De waakzame, maar
onvoorzichtige dieren hebben wel de karavaan gespeurd maar nog nooit
zulk een verschijning gezien en weten niet hoe gevaarlijk het kan zijn als
men zijn nieuwsgierigheid volstrekt wil bevredigen! Zij beschrijven een
fraaien halven cirkel om ons heen en houden halt naast onzen weg. Nu en
dan snuiven zij en hun pooten trillen van spierkracht en elasticiteit. Als de
karavaan nadert, maakt de kudde rechtsomkeert, loopt achter om ons
heen, en verschijnt weer aan onze andere zijde. En deze manoeuvre
herhaalt zich in zulk een orde, dat het den indruk maakt alsof de wilde
ezels door onzichtbare ruiters bestuurd worden. Zij schijnen onze
vermoeide paarden, die nauwelijks meer voort kunnen, te willen bespotten.
Of wij kampeeren op de vlakte naast een bevroren bron. In de nabijheid

weidt een kudde Kiangs. Totdat de zon daalt loopen de dieren spelend
rond. Maar zoodra het donker wordt, verzamelen zij zich midden op de
vlakte tot een groote, op elkaar gedrongen troep; merries en veulens in het
midden, hengsten om hen heen. Zij zetten nachtwachten uit, die voor
wolven waarschuwen. Onze honden blaffen, als de wilde ezels in de stilte
van den nacht snuiven, of met hun hoeven op den grond stampen. [157]
Mijn Kozakken vingen eens twee kleine veulens, die nog niets van gevaren
afwisten. Zij stonden vastgebonden tusschen de tenten en beproefden in
het geheel niet te ontvluchten. Zij slurpten ijverig met water verdunde melk
en wij hoopten dat zij in het leven zouden blijven en ons nog jaren zouden
vergezellen: Toen ik echter zag hoezeer zij de vrijheid misten, wilde ik ze
liever teruggeven aan de wildernis en aan de verzorging hunner moeder.
Maar het was reeds te laat; de moeders wilden ze niet meer aannemen,
nadat ze in handen der menschen waren geweest. Wij moesten hen
slachten om ze voor de wolven te beveiligen. Zoo streng is de wet der
wildernis: een menschelijke aanraking is reeds voldoende om de
betoovering hunner vrijheid te breken. „Wie liet den wilden ezel vrij en
maakte de banden los van den wilden muilezel, aan wien Ik de woestijn tot
woning heb gegeven en zijn woonstede op de zoutachtige vlakte?” luidt het
in het Oude Testament.
Maar wij mogen niet van Tibet afscheid nemen en naar Indië terugkeeren,
zonder nog vluchtig kennis te hebben gemaakt met het geweldig rund, dat
in Tibet’s hoogste bergen leeft. In het Tibetaansch heet het yak en deze
naam is ook in de meeste Europeesche talen overgegaan. Zijn kleur is
steeds ravenzwart, slechts als hij oud is wordt hij grijsachtig. De tamme yak
is echter vaak lichtbruin of gevlekt. Zoowel de wilde als de tamme yak
hebben den eigenaardigen vorm van kop en de weelderige beharing. Van
terzijde gezien, ziet de yak er uit alsof hij een bult heeft; vlak boven de
voorpooten is het hoogste deel van den rug, en vandaar gaat hij schuin
omlaag naar den wortel der staart; hals en nek dalen nog wat dieper. Het
dier is ontzaglijk zwaar, sterk en plomp, dikwijls zijn de punten der grove
horens gesprongen, of door een heftigen strijd met een mededinger
afgestompt.
Daar de yak soms in een koude tot 40 graden onder het vriespunt moet
leven, heeft hij een dichte haarbedekking en een beschuttende vetlaag
onder de huid noodig, en daarvan is hij zoo goed voorzien, dat geen koude
op de wereld hem iets kan hinderen. Als zijn adem als twee wolken damp
uit zijn neusvleugels stroomt, dan voelt hij zich het beste. Merkwaardig is
de krans van een voetlange wollen franje die het onderste deel zijner zijden
en het bovenste gedeelte zijner voorpooten dikwijls zoo welig omgeeft, dat
de haarvlokken tot den grond reiken. Als de yak op steenharden, bevroren
of met puin bedekten ligt, dan dient deze dikke franje hem tot kussen, en
hij ligt er zacht en warm op. [158]
Waar leven deze vleezige reuzen van, daar hier toch eigenlijk niets groeit,
en een karavaan bij gebrek aan weide kan omkomen? Vaak ziet men
dagen lang geen grashalm, pas op 4500 meter hoogte vindt men en ook
heel zelden, kleine armzalige struiken, en om boomen te zien, moet men
nog 1000 meter dieper in het Brahmapoetradal afdalen. En toch zwerven
deze groote dieren daarboven rond en gedijen uitnemend. Zij leven van
mossen en korstmossen die zij met de tong oplikken. Die tong is zoo ruw
als een kartets en van harde scherpe hoornen weerhaken voorzien. Daar
scheren zij ook het slechts een centimeter hooge fluweelzachte gras mee
af, dat langs de oevers van de hoogste bergbeken groeit en zoo kort is, dat
een paard het niet zou kunnen afgrazen.
Eens maakte ik uit mijn hoofdkwartier een uitstapje van verscheidene

dagen en nam slechts twee mijner bedienden mede. Een der twee was een
Afghaan en heette Aldat. Hij was een geweldige yakjager, en placht de
buitgemaakte huiden aan Oost-Turkestansche kooplieden te verhandelen,
die ze tot zadels en laarzen verwerkten. Wij hadden ons nachtkwartier 200
meter hooger dan de top van den Mont Blanc opgeslagen, zoodat men, als
men slechts een paar schreden liep dadelijk buiten adem was en
hartkloppingen kreeg. Toen het kamp gereed was verzocht Aldat mij of ik
een grooten yakstier toch eens ging zien, die op een helling boven mijn
tent weidde, en daar ik Aldat beloofd had, dat hij onderweg mocht jagen,
en wij ook vleesch en vet noodig hadden, ging ik mede. De stier had ons
nog niet bespeurd. Hij ging met den wind mede, en dacht slechts aan het
sappige gras zijner weide; het water der gesmolten sneeuw siepelde
tusschen de steenen, het weer was koud, winderig en bewolkt—een echt
yakweder! Met het geweer op den rug kroop Aldat in een gleuf omhoog op
ellebogen en teenen voorwaarts sluipend als een op roof uitgaande kat. Op
dertig schreden afstand bleef hij achter een ternauwernood merkbaren
steenen wal liggen. In spanning sloeg ik elk zijner bewegingen gade.
Voorzichtig legde hij het geweer goed, ondersteunde het en legde aan. De
yak keek niet op, hij vermoedde niets kwaads. Vijftien jaren had hij in deze
vreedzame bergen, in de nabijheid van de sneeuwgrens rondgezworven,
en gedurende dezen langen tijd zal hij wel geen mensch hebben ontmoet.
Daar knalde het schot, zoodat de echo tusschen de rotswanden
weergalmde. De yak sprong in de hoogte; aarde en steen vlogen rondom
hem omhoog. Daarna deed hij eenige onzekere schreden vooruit, bleef
staan, tuimelde, beproefde [159]zich in evenwicht te houden, viel, stond met
moeite weer op stortte daarna zwaar en hulpeloos op den grond en bleef
onbeweeglijk liggen. Zonder een hand te bewegen lag Aldat onbeweeglijk
achter zijn geweer, om de wraakzucht van den stervenden stier niet op te
wekken. Maar de yak was dood en een uur later reeds gestroopt en in
stukken gedeeld.
Wilde yak.
Dat gebeurde den 9den September. Den 23sten konden de verwanten van
den yakstier van uit de verte een eigenaardigen stoet gadeslaan. Eenige
mannen droegen een langwerpig voorwerp naar den rand van een graf, dat
zij juist hadden gegraven, lieten het er in neer, bedekten het met een pels
en vulden het graf met steenen en aarde. In den eenvoudigen graf heuvel
werd de lat van een tent rechtop gezet, en aan de spits bonden zij den
behaarden staart van een wilden yak. Die onder dezen grafheuvel
sluimerde was Aldat zelf, de dappere yakjager!
[Inhoud]
38. Nuttige planten van Indië.
Hoog in Tibet heeft de grootste zijrivier van Indië de Satledsch, haar

bronnen. Met onweerstaanbare kracht breekt hij zich baan door den
Himalaja om naar de zee te komen, en zijn dal is ook voor ons de
beste weg om uit het hoogland van Tibet in het gloeiend heete
laagland van Indië af te dalen. Daarbij [160]doorsnijden wij een reeks
verschillende hoogtegordels, die alle hun eigenaardige dieren en
planten hebben. De tijger gaat niet bijzonder hoog langs de
zuidelijke hellingen van den Himalaja, maar het sneeuwluipaard
vreest de koude niet. De yak zou sterven indien men hem in dichtere
luchtlagen omlaag voerde; maar de wolf, de vos en de haas komen
zoo wel in Indië als in Tibet voor.
Nog scherper zijn de grenzen van het plantenrijk. Beneden de grens

der eeuwige sneeuw, (3900 meter) bloeien ranonkels en anemonen,
luiskruit en sleutelbloemen, precies zooals op onze hoogere
breedtegraden onder gelijke temperatuurverhoudingen. Op eene
hoogte van 3600 meter beginnen de wouden; de berk overschrijdt
deze grens niet, slechts eenige dennen en sparren gedijen nog
hooger. Tusschen 3000 en 1800 meter hoogte omgeven ons
geweldige bosschen van den betooverend schoonen naaldboom, die
Himalaja-ceder heet, en op den Libanon beroemde verwanten heeft;
van ceders van den Libanon waren de schepen gebouwd met welke
de Phoeniciërs, voor 4000 jaren den handel der Middellandsche zee
beheerschten. Op 2100 meter hoogte groet ons de eik, en verblijdt
ons de geur der klimrozen. Onder 1000 meter hoogte echter
ontplooit zich een andere wereld, want hier is de grens van het
tropische woud en spoedig zijn wij omringd door acacia’s en palmen,
bamboesriet en de geheele rijkdom van het Indische oerwoud.
De plantenwereld van Indië is het naast verwant aan die van tropisch
Afrika. Bevrucht door den regen van den moesson, of kunstmatig
bevloeid, geeft de grond voedsel aan wilde en verbouwde planten.
Wel is waar liggen er ook, vooral in het Noord-Westen over groote
uitgestrektheden, droge woestijnen. Maar in de andere streken is de
plantenwereld daarentegen des te weelderiger en dichter, zoodat de
lucht van bedwelmende geuren is vervuld, alsof het een reusachtige
broeikas was.
Hier groeit de komkommervormige vrucht der bananen, het voedsel

van verscheidene millioenen menschen. Van uit Indië en de
Soendaeilanden heeft de weldadige plant zich naar Afrika en de
kusten van de Middellandsche zee verbreid, ja, tot aan Mexico en
Midden-Amerika. Suikerhoudend en sappig, smakelijk en geurig is
haar wit meelachtig vleesch een heerlijke kost, en de groote
bladeren der bananen worden tot het bedekken van daken, voor
zomerschermen en andere nuttige doeleinden gebruikt.
Wat is het heerlijk rusten in het warme jaargetijde in de schaduw van

den mangoboom! Hij is 15 meter hoog en onder [161]zijn blauw-
groene lederachtige bladeren heerscht wonderbare koelte. Het
vleesch van de mangovruchten is goudgeel en sappig, rijk aan
suiker en citroenzuur. Maar als gij mij vraagt hoe zij smaken, dan
moet ik het antwoord schuldig blijven, want hun smaak herinnert niet
aan die van eenige andere vrucht; maar zooveel is zeker, dat zij zeer
goed smaken.
Uit zijn geboorteland Cochinchina heeft zich de sinaasappelboom

(appel van Sina, China) en zijn kleinere broer de mandarijnenboom
over geheel Indië en van daar verder verbreid; ’t zijn vruchten die
ieder bekend zijn, evenals de druiven, meloenen, appelen, peren,
walnoten en vijgen van welke, behalve nog vele andere, Indië een
overvloed bezit. De vijg is groen, voordat ze rijp is, dan wordt ze
geel, en de vijgeboom is overal te vinden, waar hij voldoende
warmte heeft. Reeds in het Oude en ook in het Nieuwe Testament
speelt hij een rol, en onder een vijgeboom bracht Boeddha klaarheid
in de raadselen van zijn godsdienst. Daarom heet deze boom
F i c u s r e l i g i o s a . In het Boeddhisme is de lotusbloem
(N y m p h a c a s t e l l a r i s ) die evenals de waterlelie op het water
drijft, niet minder beroemd. Zij is het zinnebeeld van den
Boeddhistischen godsdienst evenals het kruis dat van het
christendom. Op aanzienlijke hoogte staat in Indië de verbouwing
van rijst, vooral in den Noord-Oosthoek van den Voor-Indischen
driehoek, in Bengalen en Assam, eveneens op het Zuidelijk uiteinde
van Dekan, en in Birma op het Achter-Indische schiereiland. Tarwe
wordt in het Noord-Westen verbouwd en katoen in de binnenlanden.
De katoenstruik heeft groote, gele bloesems, en als het zaadhulsel,
dat zoo groot is als een walnoot, openspringt, vertoonen zich een
menigte zaden, die met zacht wollig haar zijn bekleed; dit haar is de
katoen. Als de afgeplukte zaadhulsels in de zon zijn gedroogd,
worden de haren door machines van de zaden losgemaakt,
gezuiverd, in balen verpakt en dan naar fabriekssteden over de
gehele wereld, maar bovenal naar Manchester verzonden. In Indië
en Arabië verbouwde men de katoenstruik reeds voor tweeduizend
jaren. Alexander de Groote bracht hem naar Griekenland, en nu zijn
bijna over de geheele wereld katoenplantages; de katoenverbouwing
staat het hoogst in Noord-Amerika.
Een ontzaglijke ontwikkeling is in de laatste tientallen jaren waar te

nemen in het verkrijgen van kaoetsjoek en gutta pertja. In het Jaar
1830 werden 230 tonnen kaoetsjoek naar Europa vervoerd, in 1896
steeg de uitvoer tot 31.500 tonnen, hetgeen door de uitbreiding van
de rijwiel- en automobiel-industrie werd veroorzaakt. Toen de
navraag op eens zoo groot werd, begon [162]een zinneloos vellen
van boomen, waarvan het ingedampte melksap kaoetsjoek levert;
maar nu is men tot verstandiger methoden gekomen. In Indië is de
gummiboom de gewichtigste van alle kaoetsjoek leverende
boomsoorten. Zijn bast wordt met dwarssneden voorzien, en het er
uitstroomende melksap wordt opgevangen, daarna gekookt,
geroerd, geperst, op blikken platen uitgespreid, samengerold, en in
stukken in den handel gebracht.
Verder krijgen wij uit Indië een geheele reeks van specerijen, kaneel,
de bast van de takken van den kaneelboom, peper, die Alexander de
Groote het eerst in Europa heeft binnen gevoerd, gember,
kardamome en sesam uit welker vruchten fijne tafelolie wordt
geperst. Bovendien groeien hier thee, koffie, tabak en nog een kruid,
dat een zegen en een vloek tegelijkertijd is, de papaver. Snijdt men
met een mes zijn onrijp zaadhulsel open dan siepelt er een zacht
melkachtig sap uit, dat bruin wordt en in de lucht verstijft. Dat is
opium. De opbrengst van de opiumplantages in Perzië en Indië gaat
voor het grootste deel naar China. De Chinees is een hartstochtelijk
opiumschuiver. Een kleine opiumbal wordt in den nauwen kop van
de bijzonder samengestelde pijp vastgekleefd en boven de vlam
eener lamp gehouden. De rook wordt in twee diepe teugen
ingeademd, en reeds na het tweede balletje valt de opiumrooker in
een op den dood gelijkenden slaap, vol liefelijke droomen en
heerlijke visioenen. Hij vergeet zijn zorgen en zijn omgeving en
verheugt zich in een korte zaligheid. Als hij ontwaakt is de
werkelijkheid zwaarder en somberder dan ooit voor hem en een
afschuwelijke hoofdpijn is het gevolg. Wie eenmaal tot deze zonde is
vervallen kan slechts in sanatoria worden genezen. In Perzië wordt
het opiumrooken als een schande beschouwd en men geeft er zich
slechts aan over in spelonken. Maar in China rooken mannen en
vrouwen in het openbaar.
Een Duitsch apotheker, Sertürner, trok in 1805 uit het opium de

morphine; inspuitingen hiermede stilden plaatselijke pijnen. Ook
daaruit is een hartstocht ontstaan en de ongelukkige menschen, die
het morphinespuitje niet meer kunnen ontberen zijn even zeker
verloren als drinkers. De doodkist en het lijkkleed wachten hen veel
eerder dan anderen.
Op eindeloos lange akkers verbouwt men in Indië het suikerriet, het

sap er van bevat 20% suiker. In de oude Indische taal, in het
Sanskrit heet het sakkara, en de Arabieren die het naar de kusten
van de Middellandsche zee brachten, noemden het sukkar. Zoo heet
het ook met kleine afwijkingen in alle [163]talen in Europa en in vele
van Azië. Ook de palm groeit in vele soorten in Indië, vooral de
dadelpalm, de kokospalm en de sagopalm. Uit het merg van den
laatsten wordt de sago bereid; ze is een merkwaardige plant, want
ze bloeit slechts eenmaal in den ouderdom van hoogstens twintig
jaar, dan sterft zij. En naast de palmen geeft de grond van Indië nog
aan een aantal nuttige boomsoorten voedsel, zooals den
sandelboom, welks hout tot fijne meubelen wordt verwerkt, den
ebbenhoutboom, en den teakhoutboom, die 40 meter hoog wordt en
in geheel Oost-Indië en op de Soendaeilanden groote wouden
vormt. Zijn hout is hard en sterk, evenals dat van den eik: spijkers
roesten er niet in. Daarom gebruikt men het veel om schepen te
bouwen; slaap- en restauratiewagens der spoorwegen zijn ook
meestal van teakhout vervaardigd. Dikwijls wordt de ter dood
veroordeelde boom drie jaar voordat hij geveld zal worden van zijn
schors ontdaan; hij sterft dan op zijn wortels en wordt lichter in
gewicht, zoodat hij door de werk-olifanten zonder moeite wordt
gedragen, en op het water der rivieren, langs welker loop hij naar
omlaag wordt gevoerd, kan drijven.
En dit rijke land, dat over de vijf millioen kilometer in het quadraat
omvat, dus tienmaal zoo groot is als Duitschland, behoort aan
Engeland; twee vijfden er van zijn vazalstaten, al het overige met
Birma vormt het Indische Keizerrijk. Ceylon is ook een Engelsche
kroonkolonie. Sedert Vasco di Gama in 1498 den zeeweg naar Indië
heeft ontdekt, trad Europa met het verre land in nadere verbinding.
Honderd jaar later werd de groote Engelsche handelsmaatschappij,

„de Oost-Indische compagnie” gesticht; deze kreeg vasten voet in
Indië en onderwierp steeds een grooter deel van het land. Nu zijn de
Engelschen honderd vijftig jaar lang daar volkomen overheerscher,
en het merkwaardigste er van is, dat dit, na China, het grootste rijk
der aarde met 300 millioen inwoners, slechts door een handvol
Engelschen wordt geregeerd. Behalve het Engelsche deel van het
leger leven er daar slechts 76000! Het wonder is slechts daardoor te
verklaren, dat de Indische vorsten en stammen elkaar wederzijds
oneindig meer haten dan hun gemeenschappelijke meesters, de
Engelsche indringers.
[Inhoud]
39. Naar de Ganges.
Dit, door zijn natuurschatten, overrijke laagland van Indië, naderen wij nu door
het dal van de Satledsch, die, hoe verder [164]wij omlaag komen, steeds breeder
wordt. Op kleine, wankele bruggen rijden wij over ontelbare zijrivieren, die in
vroolijke watervallen over de steenblokken dansen, zoodat het ver in het rond
dreunt en het borrelende water tot motregen verstuift. Zij snellen alle naar de
hoofdrivier, die eindelijk ontzaglijk zwelt en in zijn wilde kracht, eerbied
afdwingend, verder stroomt.
Simla.
De lucht wordt minder ijl en het ademhalen gemakkelijker. Het tuiten der ooren
en de hoofdpijn houdt op; de koude is ook voorbij. Reeds in het vroege
ochtenduur omgeeft ons milde lucht, en spoedig komen dagen, waarin men met
eenig verlangen de koelte in het hoogland van Tibet gedenkt. Toen ik vele jaren
geleden dezen weg ging, maakte een mijner honden, een groote, harige
Tibetaansche hond, die zeer onder de toenemende warmte leed, eenvoudig
rechtsomkeert en liep naar Tibet terug! Zijn longen en al zijn organen waren
aangepast aan de ijle lucht en ik moest, of ik wilde of niet, hem laten loopen.

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Critical Infrastructure Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness 5Th Edition Robert Radvanovsky Online Ebook Texxtbook Full Chapter PDF

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Critical Infrastructure: Homeland

Security and Emergency Preparedness,

Homeland Security and Intelligence Keith Gregory Logan

Introduction to Homeland Security 3rd Edition David H.

The Distributed Functions of Emergency Management and

Herbal Medic A Green Beret s Guide to Emergency Medical

Primary Mathematics 3A Hoerst

Homeland Security An Introduction to Principles and

Introduction to Homeland Security Policy Organization

An Introduction to Emergency Exercise Design and

Critical Infrastructure: Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, Fifth Edition

Robert Radvanovsky is an active professional in the United States with over 40

Allan McDougall is a seasoned asset protection and security practitioner; he has

Robert Radvanovsky and Allan McDougall

Boca Raton London New York

CRC Press is an imprint of the

ISBN: 978-1-032-38757-4 (hbk)

Additional Information .................................................................................xii

1 Introduction to Critical Infrastructure Assurance

2.4.4 Network Fragmentation and Dissolution ............................ 28

5.3 The Importance of Background to Context ..................................... 87

10.11 Why Are There So Many Different Levels of Clearances?........... 224

For example, the URL http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book5/chapter12/ch12ref1.

By failing to prepare, you are preparing to fail.

Chapter 1: Introduction to Critical

Chapter 2: Demand, Capacity, Fragility,

Chapter 3: Consolidation of Power on

and mobility (and capability to respond to a large-scale crisis) in a modern environ-

Chapter 4: The New Role of Government

Chapter 5: The Reinvention of Information

Chapter 6: Challenges Faced with Vital Services

Chapter 7: Management of Critical

Chapter 8: The Coming Resurgence

Chapter 9: The Evolution of Physical Security

Chapter 10: Paradigm Shift of Nationally

Chapter 11: Considerations to Be

Chapter 12: Climate Change

This publication offers an aid in maintaining professional competence, with the

U.S. Department of Homeland Security (www.dhs.gov)

1.2 What Is Critical Infrastructure?

1.3 What Is the Private Sector?

individuals taking the time during the government-mandated shutdowns to take

1.4 What Is the Public Sector?

1.5 What Is CIP?

1.6 What Is CIA?

networked environment allows for an application of robustness, resilience, and

1.7 What Are Public-Private Partnerships?

1.8 Critical Infrastructure Functions

◾ Is the infrastructure necessary for the preservation of life or the continuation

1.9 Evolution of Critical Infrastructure

URL: http://cipbook.infracritical.com/book5/chapter1/ch1ref4.pdf ). Alternatively,

passenger screeners, whose security is primarily administered by the Transportation

2.2 What Are We Trying to Protect?

2.3 Demand: The Reason for Capacity

a background in a supply-and-demand economics will find this concept very famil-

2.3.1 The Concept of Performance

2.3.2 Local Impact and the Inﬂuence on Capacity

2.3.3 Results of a Local Impact in the Immediate Sense

2.3.4 Relevance to CIP

„Ja wij k u n n e n de naaste landtong nog bereiken.—O, Allah!”

Toen wij eindelijk weer in het hoofdkampement kwamen waren de

Veel pelgrims prevelen, evenals alle Tibetanen, op gepaste en niet-gepaste

Klooster Taschi-lunpo in Schigatze.