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“Searching for a timely and comprehensive book on cyber law? If so, Cyber Law
& Ethics should be for you. For this book is for anyone interested in all the major
legal and ethical cyber issues, including freedom of online speech, privacy, IP and
gaming. Also covered are a number of evolving and emerging topics such as AI,
cyborgs and drones. Although it centers on U.S. law, the book is refreshingly global.
Mark Grabowski and Eric Robinson pay discerning attention to international and
comparative law. What a remarkable contribution to understanding cyber law.”
Kyu Ho Youm, Jonathan Marshall First
Amendment Chair, University of Oregon, USA
Cyber Law and Ethics
A primer on legal issues relating to cyberspace, this textbook introduces business,

policy and ethical considerations raised by our use of information technology.
With a focus on the most significant issues impacting Internet users and
businesses in the United States of America, the book provides coverage of key
topics such as social media, online privacy, artificial intelligence and cybercrime
as well as emerging themes such as doxing, ransomware, revenge porn, data-
mining, e-sports and fake news. The authors, experienced in journalism,
technology and legal practice, provide readers with expert insights into the
nuts and bolts of cyber law.
Cyber Law and Ethics: Regulation of the Connected World provides a practical
presentation of legal principles, and is essential reading for non-specialist
students dealing with the intersection of the Internet and the law.
Mark Grabowski is Associate Professor of Communications at Adelphi

University, USA.
Eric P. Robinson is Assistant Professor at the University of South Carolina,

USA and is “of counsel” to Fenno Law, LLC.
Cyber Law and Ethics
Regulation of the Connected World
Mark Grabowski and Eric P. Robinson

First published 2022
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2022 Mark Grabowski and Eric P. Robinson
The right of Mark Grabowski and Eric P. Robinson to be identified as
authors of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with sections
77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in
any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing
from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation
without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A catalog record has been requested for this book
ISBN: 978-1-032-02309-0 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-0-367-46260-4 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-02778-2 (ebk)
Typeset in Bembo
by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India
Contents
Preface viii
About the Authors x
Acknowledgments xii
1 Origins of the Internet 1
2 Who Controls the Internet? 20
3 How Are Internet Regulations Made? 33
4 Freedom of Speech in an Online World 53
5 Limitations on Online Speech 67
6 Digital Privacy 92
7 Intellectual Property 114
8 Online Business and the Law 142
9 Network Neutrality 156
10 Cyberthreats 166
11 Online Gaming 193
12 Emerging Issues in Cyber Law 208
Case Index 223

Index 226
Preface
For most of us, the Internet simply exists and we take it for granted. Every day,
we do things like send text messages, post comments on Facebook, upload
photos to Instagram, find dates on Tinder, stream music on Spotify, shop on
Amazon, bank online, publish blog posts, play video games or get around town
using Uber.
Without even knowing it, we are licensing content, exercising free speech
rights, utilizing artificial intelligence technology, sharing personal information
and, sometimes, perhaps being victimized by cybercriminals or even breaking
laws ourselves. Legal issues relating to cyberspace are becoming more and more
important to everyday people as the world becomes more connected. With
technology rapidly upgrading and changing, the issues are in constant flux and
impact everything from what we buy to what we know about governments
and elections.
Therefore, in modern society, understanding the nuts and bolts of cyber
law is useful for anyone and everyone, but especially people who work in
fields such as the media and tech, or aspire to. But there’s seemingly no good
textbook suited for such a necessary subject. The existing books are narrowly
focused, written for law students or out of date. But this textbook is different.
Co-written by two journalists-turned-lawyers-turned-professors, this book’s
appeal lies in its succinct, informative and easy-to-understand style. Its goal is
to engage modern college students who want a practical, “bottom line” pres-
entation of legal principles, rather than a complex, legalistic approach more
suited to law students and attorneys. Having taught courses such as media law,
cyber law and blockchain to undergraduates, the authors know how to explain
complicated terms in a way that laypersons can understand.
This book examines many of the legal, policy and ethical issues raised by
our use of cyberspace and information technology. It is not meant to be inter-
preted as legal advice, nor is it an exhaustive listing of every cyber law in the
world. Rather, it provides a primer on the most common and important legal
and ethical issues impacting cyberspace, particularly Internet users and busi-
nesses in the United States. Some of the topics include: social media, online
privacy, artificial intelligence, cybercrime, intellectual property, online gam-
ing, network neutrality and Internet governance. This book also covers novel
Preface ix
and emerging issues that other books do not, such as catfishing, doxing, ran-
somware, sexting, revenge porn, data-mining, drones, cybernetics, Bitcoin,
WikiLeaks, e-sports and fake news.
Each chapter ends with a “Closing Arguments” section that includes a ques-
tion to provoke further thought and discussion.
Turn the page and start upgrading your legal knowledge!
About the Authors
Mark Grabowski is an associate pro-

fessor of communications at Adelphi
University on Long Island, where he
teaches courses on web journalism,
cyber law, digital ethics and cryptocur-
rency. He is also a columnist for the
Washington Examiner and frequently
writes about tech policy. Grabowski’s
previous book, Cryptocurrencies: A
Primer on Digital Money, was published
by Routledge in 2019. He has also pub-
lished in top law journals such as Yale
Journal on Regulation, Stanford Law &
Policy Review, Harvard Journal of Sports
and Entertainment Law, Communication Law Review and the Journal of Law,
Technology & the Internet. His work has been cited by many major media out-
lets, several top law journals, the National Constitution Center and renowned
federal Judge Richard Posner. It has also been translated and republished in
Korean and Romanian. Grabowski is frequently invited to give talks around
the world, which includes a 2014 TEDx talk on “The Battle for Control of the
Internet” in Shanghai. He won the 2015 James Madison Prize for Outstanding
Research in First Amendment Studies and a 2020–21 Fulbright award to study
cryptocurrency regulations in the Philippines. The former newspaper reporter
holds a J.D. from Georgetown Law. His website is markgrabowski.com.
About the Authors xi
Eric P. Robinson is an assistant profes-
sor in the School of Journalism and Mass
Communications at the University of South
Carolina, where he teaches media law and
ethics. He is also “of counsel” to Fenno
Law, LLC in Charleston/Mount Pleasant,
South Carolina, which focuses on media and
Internet law. He was previously co-director
of the Press Law and Democracy Project at
Louisiana State University, and deputy direc-
tor of the National Center for Courts and
Media at the University of Nevada, Reno.
He was also an affiliate scholar with the
Credit: Stan Foxworthy.
Digital Media Law Project at Harvard Law
School’s Berkman Klein Center for Internet
& Society, a staff attorney at the Media Law Resource Center and a legal fellow
at the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press. He recently published
Reckless Disregard: St. Amant v. Thompson and the Transformation of Libel Law,
and oversaw a complete revision of Internet Law: The Complete Guide. He is also
the monthly media law columnist for the South Carolina Press Association. He
earned his J.D. from Syracuse University, and his Ph.D. from Louisiana State
University. His website is ericrobinson.org.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank the following individuals for their assistance:
University of South Carolina student Anna Bennett, who served as a research
assistant and proofreader; Parsons School of Design associate professor William
Bevington, who designed the book’s cover; and artist Debjani Bhattacharya,
who created the illustrations inside the book.
1 Origins of the Internet
When we look at the Internet, and where it came from, and where it’s arrived
today, and where it’s headed, I think it’s quite clear that the engineers didn’t really
realize just how much this was going to change things.
— Edward Snowden
Things were so different before the Internet that it’s inconceivable for today’s
university students to appreciate how much the Internet transformed our
existence.
Before we had things like social media and dating apps, meeting a new
person happened organically: through our family, neighborhood, school or
events. There were also clubs for everything: garden clubs, game clubs, clubs
for collectors. They were a way for people to connect with others with similar
interests. Communications occurred through letters, phone calls and in-person
meetings, not e-mails, text messages or Zoom meetings.
If you wanted to meet up with a friend, there was no Skype or FaceTime:
you had to make plans over landline telephones to rendezvous at a specific
time and a precise location. If the person was outside your local calling area,
it was a “toll call,” which could be expensive. Phones were strictly for talking
and didn’t have contact lists, cameras or any other capabilities. Phone numbers
needed to be memorized or looked up in a “phone book” which was often
thick enough to double as a child’s booster seat. There was no GPS: either
a paper map or handwritten directions were necessary to get to the meeting
place. And you better not run late or get lost because there was no way to
inform your friend to wait for you.
If you needed to buy something, you’d go to a store or the mall — there
was no Amazon. If you couldn’t find what you were looking for, you ordered
it from a catalog and would wait six to eight weeks for delivery. Payment was
made with checks, not PayPal or online banking. Looking for a good place
to eat? You’d ask someone for a recommendation and hope they were right,
since there was no crowdsourcing via review sites like Yelp. Reservations were
made over the phone, not online. And having your own car or taking a taxi or
other public transportation was the only way to get from place to place as there
was no Uber or Lyft. If you needed to fly somewhere, you visited a travel agent
or called the airline to make your reservations and mail you your plane ticket.
If you wanted entertainment, you’d religiously watch your favorite TV
shows at a set day and time each week, or else you were likely never be able
to see them. There was no such thing as “On Demand” or DVRs. At a certain
time at night, many TV channels would play the national anthem or disco
music and then just go off the air, showing a blank screen. Before Netflix
and streaming, you had to rent a VHS tape or DVD from Blockbuster Video.
People bought music in the form of records, cassette tapes and CDs from a
store or listened to their AM / FM radios. One of the first commercial video
games, Atari’s Pong, was a far cry from today’s visually stunning, role-playing,
online video games. Later, Super Mario Bros. on Nintendo was a huge break-
through, as were the first affordable home computers like the Commodore 64.
But until the release of user-friendly software such as Microsoft’s Windows
operating system, only geeks with programming knowledge knew how to
operate a computer.
There was no Google. If you forgot a fact like the name of a film or who
starred in it, you would head to the local library building, during the hours
it was open, and hope that the book you needed wasn’t already checked out.
For more general knowledge, you’d look things up in a big book or series of
books known as an encyclopedia, which was the analogue of Wikipedia, or
perhaps ask a wise elder. Want the news? The New York Times and other physi-
cally printed newspapers could be delivered to your doorstep each morning
and provide coverage of the previous day’s happenings. TV news was generally
limited to local news shows at 6 and 11 p.m., plus the networks’ national news
broadcasts. CNN began in 1980, but its 24/7 coverage of the Persian Gulf War
in 1991 was a game-changer.
Origins of the Internet 3
The Internet changed all of that, along with virtually every aspect of mod-
ern American life, whether it’s ordering a pizza, buying a TV, sharing a photo
with a friend, going to school and even finding a romantic partner. It has revo-
lutionized communications, expanding our access to information, people and
ideas from around the corner and around the world.
The Internet itself has also been transformed. It’s not your father’s Internet
anymore. Heck, it’s not even your older sister’s Internet anymore. In its early
days — which from a historical perspective are still relatively recent — it was
a static network designed to shuttle a small amount of data or a short mes-
sage between two terminals and store information published and maintained
only by expert coders. Today, however, immense quantities of information are
uploaded and downloaded over this electronic leviathan every moment. And
the content is both created and accessed by everyone, for now we are all com-
mentators, publishers and creators online.
A few visionaries had some insight into how the Internet would change
our lives forever. But most people, including many scholars, had no idea how
far-reaching this technology and its impact would become. For example, in a
1998 article about the pitfalls of making predictions about technological pro-
gress, Paul Krugman, later a New York Times Pulitzer Prize-winning columnist
and Nobel Laureate of Economics, wrote, “By 2005 or so, it will become clear
that the Internet’s impact on the economy has been no greater than the fax
machine’s.”1
The Internet has become necessary for survival, a trend which reached
new importance during the COVID-19 pandemic. With most businesses
and schools closed due to government-imposed lockdowns, many important
aspects of everyday life shifted online. Governments also used it to controver-
sially monitor and track citizens for the stated purpose of preventing further
virus outbreaks.
The technological advancements offered by our modern, connected world
haven’t necessarily always translated into progress. The rapid and unexpected
rise of the Internet has outpaced social norms and has sparked a debate about
how it should be used, and how it should not be used. It has also outpaced the
law, and has left courts, legislators and regulators playing catch-up. This book,
which describes the laws and regulations applicable online right now, should
thus be considered a work in progress, just like the law itself is.
But before covering the legal and ethical implications raised by the
Internet, it is important to first understand how it developed, how it works
and how it’s used. Knowing the history, architecture and uses of the Internet
will help inform us about the creation and appropriateness of laws and social
norms for it.
Krugman, Paul, Why Most Economists’ Predictions Are Wrong, Red Herring, June 1998, archived at
1
https://web.archive.org/web/19980610100009/http://www.redherring.com/mag/issue55/eco-
nomics.html.
How the Internet Works
The Internet is a world-wide network of computers linked together by tel-
ephone and fiber optic wires, satellite links and other telecommunications infra-
structure. The essential components of the Internet can be divided into two
categories: servers (computer hardware) and software applications. Servers house
most of the information on the Internet: they are specialized computers which
store information, share information with other servers and make this informa-
tion available online. Software applications, such as browsers and mobile appli-
cations (“apps”), are what people use to access the information available on the
Internet, using a computer or mobile device. Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox,
Apple Safari and Microsoft Edge are the most commonly used browsers. Popular
apps include Uber, Tinder, Spotify, Instagram and various mobile video games.
When you connect your computer or mobile device to the Internet, you
are connecting to a special type of server which is provided and operated by
your Internet service provider (ISP). The ISP is the entity that provides your
connection to the Internet; examples include Verizon, AT&T, a library or
your university. The job of this “ISP server” is to provide the link between
your device and the Internet. A single ISP server can handle the Internet con-
nections of many individual devices. When you use a browser or app, there
may be thousands of other people connected to the same server that you are
connected to.
ISP servers receive requests from devices to view webpages, check e-mail,
utilize apps and use every other Internet function. Since each individual server
can’t store all the information from the entire Internet, in order to provide
users’ devices with the pages and files they request, ISP servers must connect to
other Internet servers known as “host servers.”
But first they must determine which host server contains the relevant infor-
mation. It does this by accessing a database that is stored in various copies at
several servers, known as name servers. The database is known as “WhoIs,”
which is short for the question “Who is responsible for this domain name?” It
translates web addresses into numerical codes that indicate where online the
information can be found.
The numerical codes correlate with host servers, which are the computers
where websites and apps “live.” The host server’s job is to store information
and make it available to other servers. Every website and application in the
world is located on a host server somewhere. For example, harvard.edu is
hosted on a server on Harvard’s campus. The textbook authors’ personal web-
sites, markgrabowski.com and ericrobinson.org, are both hosted on servers in
California.
To view a web page from your browser, the following sequence happens:
1. You either type a website address, also known as a uniform resource loca-
tor (URL), into your “address bar” or click on a hyperlink that includes a
URL for the website.
2. Your browser sends a request to your ISP server asking for the page.
3. Your ISP server looks in the WhoIs database to find the exact host server
which houses the website you requested, then sends that host server a
request for the page contents.
4. The host server sends the requested page to your ISP server.
5. Your ISP sends the page to your browser and you see it displayed on your
screen.
This entire process takes mere seconds, so that most websites can be easily
and quickly accessed. And the Internet includes built-in redundancy, so that
the system may use various routes through servers and connections in order to
supply the data.
This underlying architecture serves as the first level of what is effectively a
sort of “regulation” of online behavior. Much like how humans must operate
within the confines of the laws of physics in the real world, Internet users are
restricted to the code the Internet and its applications are built on and can only
work within its limits.
History of the Internet

Choosing a “birthday” for the Internet is a rather arbitrary task since some-
one didn’t just flip a switch and send the whole thing into existence. Unlike
technologies such as the light bulb or the microwave, which resulted from an
inventor’s “eureka” moment, the Internet has no single “inventor.” Instead,
dozens of pioneering scientists, engineers and programmers each devel-
oped new technologies and features that eventually merged to become the
“Information Superhighway” we use today.
The origins of the Internet can be traced back more than 60 years ago
in the United States, where it began as a government weapon in the Cold
War rivalry with the Soviet Union. Initially, government and academic scien-
tists and researchers used it to communicate and share data with one another.
Today, the general public uses the Internet for almost everything, and for many
people it would be impossible to imagine life without it.
The Sputnik Scare

A key catalyst in the development of the Internet occurred on October 4,
1957, when the Soviet Union launched the world’s first human-made satellite
into orbit. The satellite, known as Sputnik, did not do much. It simply orbited
around the Earth for about three months, sending blips and bleeps from its
radio transmitters until its batteries died. Still, the beach-ball-sized Sputnik
provided an alarming wake-up call: while the brightest minds in the U.S. had
been designing bigger cars and better TV sets, it appeared the Soviets had
been busy focusing on less frivolous things. And, Americans feared, they were
going to win the Cold War because of it. “The Soviets had caught us with our
pants down,” said Leonard Kleinrock, a UCLA professor who helped build the
Internet. “We were behind in technology.”2
Sputnik’s launch galvanized Americans to think more seriously about sci-
ence and technology so that the nation could regain ground it appeared to have
lost to its feared rival. Schools added courses on subjects like physics, calculus
and chemistry. Corporations received government grants to conduct scientific
research and development. And the federal government itself created agencies,
such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the
2
National Geographic, The Internet Revolution and Digital Future Technology Documentary, 2018,
https://youtu.be/V9xZFZ07UbA.
Department of Defense’s Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), to
develop space-age technologies such as rockets and computers.
The Birth of the ARPAnet

Scientists and military experts were especially concerned about what might
happen in the event of a Soviet attack on the nation’s telephone system. They
feared that just one accurately targeted missile could destroy the whole system
of physical lines and wires that made efficient long-distance communication
possible. In 1962, a scientist from Massachusetts Institute of Technology and
ARPA named J.C.R. Licklider proposed a solution to this scenario: an “inter-
galactic network” of computers that could talk with one another.3 Such a
network would enable government leaders to communicate if the telephone
network was destroyed. Thus, Licklider developed the first practical schematics
for the Internet.
In 1965, researchers developed a way of sending information from one
computer to another known as “packet switching,” a process which breaks
data down into message blocks, or packets, before sending it to its desti-
nation. Each packet takes its own route in cyberspace and is then recon-
structed into the message at its destination. Without packet switching, this
ingenious computer network — known as the ARPAnet — would have
been just as vulnerable to Soviet attacks as the phone system, which can’t
reroute data transmission when a line is down because it relies on circuit
switching.
“LOGIN”
In 1969, ARPAnet delivered its first message: a “node-to-node” commu-
nication from a computer at UCLA research lab to a computer at Stanford
University. (Each of these computers was the size of a small house.) Though
short and simple, the message — “LOGIN” — crashed the fledgling ARPA
network. Stanford’s computer only received the first two letters. Two years
later, ARPA computer programmer Ray Tomlinson perfected the messaging
system into what we know today as e-mail. He also made the decision to use
the “@” symbol to separate the user name from the computer name (which
later on became the domain name).
3 Whitall, Susan, How Michigan Man Helped Map Path to the Internet, Detroit News, Oct. 14, 2015,
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/opinion/2015/10/14/internet-michigan-nsfnet-douglas-van
-houweling-university-michigan-merit/73959878/.
UCLA professor Leonard Kleinrock helped develop “packet switching” and sent the first
message over ARPAnet using the device he’s pictured with. Credit: UCLA.
The Network Grows

The virtual world grew steadily during the 1970s, expanding beyond the
four computers in the continental U.S. to include the University of Hawaii’s
ALOHAnet, London’s University College and the Norwegian Seismic Array
near Oslo, Norway. The network was then expanded beyond military and
academic use. In 1975, the first commercial ISP was born with the introduc-
tion of a private-sector version of ARPAnet known as Telenet. It enabled tech
companies and computer hobbyists to connect to cyberspace and would later
be acquired by later-day telecom giant Sprint.
Michael Hart, a data processor at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, published the first e-books and founded the first digital library,
known as Project Gutenberg, by manually typing the U.S. Declaration of
Independence, the Bible and other texts into a computer to transmit to other
users on the network. Just as quickly, the new technology started to be abused,
as Gary Thuerk, a marketing executive for a computer company, sent the first
spam e-mail to 400 ARPAnet users in 1978. While the e-mail campaign did
result in over $12 million in sales, Thuerk received many complaints from
those he contacted, and a strict rebuke from the government.4 Little did he
know that his stunt would set a bad precedent for decades to come.
Bonazzo, John, This Week in Tech History: First Spam E-mail, Hindenburg Explosion, Observer, May 2, 2016,
4
https://observer.com/2016/05/this-week-in-tech-history-first-spam-e-mail-hindenburg-explosion/.
Traveling throughout the cyberverse still wasn’t easy. It wasn’t like it is today,
when users can just enter a web address in their browser and get taken there
automatically. To access one of those early networks, users had to either be
logged into a device hardwired directly into the network or gain access remotely
through a modem, which sends computer data over a phone line. If they wanted
to go to a different network, the process would have to be repeated each time. As
these separate, packet-switched computer networks multiplied, it became more
difficult for them to integrate into a single worldwide network.
By the end of the 1970s, Stanford University computer science professor
Vinton Cerf and government scientist Robert Kahn remedied this problem by
developing a way for all of the computers on all of the world’s mini-networks
to communicate with one another. They called their invention “Transmission
Control Protocol,” or TCP. Later, they added an additional protocol, known as
“Internet Protocol,” or IP. Today these protocols are better known by the acro-
nym TCP / IP. The term “Internet” also began to be used for the entire network.
The World Wide Web

Cerf and Kahn’s combined protocol, as one writer put it, is “the ‘handshake’
that introduces distant and different computers to each other in a virtual
space.”5 And it transformed the Internet into a worldwide network. To this
day, TCP / IP remains the standard protocol for the Internet.
By the 1980s, there were more ordinary citizens accessing the Internet than
government officials and academic researchers, due to the introduction of IBM’s
personal computer and telephone modems. Cyberspace exploration also became
much easier thanks to Jon Postel and Elizabeth Feinler, who developed the
Domain Name System (DNS), which established the familiar .edu, .gov, .com,
.mil, .org and .net systems for naming websites. This was easier to remember
than the previous numeric designations for websites, such as 216.58.213.78 (the
IP address for google.com). Users formed virtual communities by using “Usenet
groups,” which allowed them to post messages to an electronic bulletin board.
Although few people participated (interactions were limited to text and response
times could take weeks or longer), these groups were a primitive form of social
media. The Internet was now thought of as being its own place, albeit a virtual
one, and novelist William Gibson coined the term “cyberspace” in Neuromancer,
a 1984 book that added the cyberpunk genre to science fiction.
At the same time, government officials began to worry that connecting
computers could lead to harm. The 1983 techno-thriller film WarGames — in
which a young teenager breaks into a U.S. military supercomputer and unwit-
tingly almost starts World War III — prompted Congress to enact the first
cybercrime law. Under the 1986 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, hacking
became a federal felony. The law was used to prosecute an offender just two
5 Wenkart, Michael, 50 Scientific Discoveries That Changed the World, 2014, 160.
years later when a Cornell University student unleashed an Internet virus that
caused millions of dollars in damage, rendering 10% of all computers world-
wide useless.6 Using the Internet now posed serious risks. So, a year later,
John McAfee formed the first antivirus company, which later became part of
Intel. Still, the Internet remained an obscure technology, as less than 1% of the
world’s population had Internet access at that point.7
That changed in the 1990s, when the Internet transformed into the online envi-
ronment we inhabit today. In 1991, Tim Berners-Lee, a British computer pro-
grammer working at the European Organization for Nuclear Research (known
as CERN for its French acronym) on the France–Switzerland border, introduced
the World Wide Web: an Internet that was not simply a way to send files from
one place to another but was itself a “web” of information that anyone on the
Internet could retrieve. Unsurprisingly, CERN is credited with having the first
website. A search tool called “Gopher,” developed by University of Minnesota
computer programmer Mark McCahill, helped users find and retrieve informa-
tion they were seeking. These developments served as a crucial step in developing
the vast trove of information that most of us now access on a daily basis.
In 1992, a group of students and researchers at the University of Illinois devel-
oped a browser they called Mosaic (which later became Netscape) that offered a
user-friendly way to search the web. For the first time, users could see words and
images on the same page and navigate using scrollbars and clickable links.
6 Vaughan-Nichols, Steven J., The Day Computer Security Turned Real: The Morris Worm Turns 30, ZD
Net, Nov. 2, 2018, https://www.zdnet.com/article/the-day-computer-security-turned-real-the-morris-
worm-turns-30/.
7 Roser, Max et al., Internet, Our World in Data, 2015, https://ourworldindata.org/internet.
The Internet Goes Mainstream
In 1995, the Internet became commercialized. After Congress decided that the
web could be used for commercial purposes, companies of all kinds hurried
to set up websites, and e-commerce entrepreneurs began to use the Internet
to sell goods directly to customers. Giant ISPs such as CompuServe, Prodigy
and America Online (AOL) provided e-mail, instant messaging and web
browser features to millions of Americans nationwide. Netscape’s development
of Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) encryption made it safer to conduct financial
transactions, such as credit card payments, online. Banks began to offer online
banking to customers. Amazon and eBay commenced business. Users could
shop online for books, food, wine, travel deals and real estate. Craigslist offered
online classified ads for jobs, apartments, personals and more. And Match.com
enabled people to find romantic partners online. Bill Gates decided to redefine
Microsoft as an Internet company, beginning a browser war against Netscape
with his unveiling of Internet Explorer.
The Internet also changed traditional media in many ways. RealAudio
Player’s creation in 1995 made it possible to stream audio and video over the
Internet. Newspapers — including The New York Times in 1996 — created
websites and began breaking news online. Eventually journalists started get-
ting scooped by upstart bloggers. In 1998, Matt Drudge broke arguably the
story of the decade when he revealed that President Bill Clinton had an affair
with a 22-year-old White House intern, which led to his impeachment. 1998
also gave birth to Google, which today is the second-largest Internet com-
pany, behind only Amazon, thanks largely to its search engine and advertising
platform. As the decade approached its end, Napster opened up the gates to
mainstream peer-to-peer file-sharing of media over the Internet.
Suddenly, the Internet looked like it could be as revolutionary as the print-
ing press; maybe even more so. No longer was it just for computer geeks. The
new digital frontier spawned a “dot-com” boom that reinvigorated America’s
lagging economy and revolutionized the way people communicated. By the
end of the 1990s, almost half of the U.S. population was online.8
But this new communication and convenience caused casualties.
E-commerce and online banking caught the attention of criminals who saw
a new frontier. Facing increased competition from blogs for audiences and
from Google and Craigslist for advertising dollars, newspapers struggled to sur-
vive. Movie and music revenues also suffered as Napster made it easy to pirate
entertainment. Companies such as Microsoft were able to establish monopolies
by using anti-competitive business practices to crush competitors. And pedo-
philes utilized the web to spread child pornography and prey on unsuspecting
children.
Real Time Statistics Project, Internet Live Stats, accessed Oct. 5, 2020, https://www.internetlivestats
8
.com.
The Internet was quickly devolving into an “Old Wild West” environ-
ment. Lawmakers tried to play catch-up but had mixed results. An attempt
by Congress to censor “indecent” and “offensive” speech online was struck
down by the Supreme Court, which declared in the 1997 landmark case Reno
v. American Civil Liberties Union that the First Amendment’s freedom of speech
clause protected content on the Internet.9 The U.S. Department of Justice was
successful, however, in reining in Microsoft. The tech giant avoided being split
up by agreeing to pay an enormous settlement to Netscape’s parent company
and curb its anti-competitive practices. Meanwhile, a federal court ordered
Napster to shutter.
Many other Internet companies didn’t survive either, but for different rea-
sons. The dot-com bubble collapsed in 2000 as hundreds of Internet-based
companies failed to make profits and closed. The NASDAQ Composite, a
stock market index which includes a large number of tech companies, lost 10%
of its value in a single day, and finally hit bottom in October 2002.10
But the industry quickly rebounded, thanks to the emergence of “Web
2.0,” a term coined by web designer Darcy DiNucci to describe websites that
enabled users to share content and socialize. While this wasn’t a new technol-
ogy, it hadn’t been popular to use the Internet in such a collaborative way until
then. The amount of data created on, with or by the Internet in 2003 alone
was more than all the data created in human history up to that point.11
Between 2003 and 2006, MySpace, Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, LinkedIn,
Reddit, WordPress, Flickr and Skype were all born, spurring massive growth
and adoption. Video games became both a social affair and a spectator sport.
Nintendo, Sega and Microsoft released Internet-ready gaming consoles that
allowed online multiplayer modes. E-sports grew tremendously, both in view-
ership and prize money, and the number of tournaments grew from about
10 in 2000 to 260 by the end of the decade.12 Meanwhile, smartphones, such
as the BlackBerry and Apple iPhone, became ubiquitous, creating a culture of
constantly being online.
But this expansion of online activities came with many caveats and qualifi-
ers. Psychologists such as Kimberly S. Young broached the concept of Internet
addiction.13 Unsolicited commercial e-mail, known as “spam,” was another
9 Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).

10 McCullough, Brian, A Revealing Look at the Dot-com Bubble of 2000 — And How it Shapes Our Lives
Today, TED, Dec. 4, 2018, https://ideas.ted.com/an-eye-opening-look-at-the-dot-com-bubble-of
-2000-and-how-it-shapes-our-lives-today/.
11 Siegler, MG, Eric Schmidt: Every 2 Days We Create As Much Information As We Did Up To 2003, Tech-
Crunch, Aug. 4, 2010, https://techcrunch.com/2010/08/04/schmidt-data/.
12 Popper, Ben, Field of Streams: How Twitch Made Video Games a Spectator Sport, The Verge, Sept. 30,
2013, https://www.theverge.com/2013/9/30/4719766/twitch-raises-20-million-esports-market
-booming.
13 Young, Kimberly S. Internet Addiction: A New Clinical Phenomenon and Its Consequences, American
Behavioral Scientist, Dec. 1, 2004, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0002764204270278.
growing problem, accounting for nearly 90% of e-mail traffic by the beginning
of the 21st century.14 In 2003, 25 years after the first spam e-mail, Congress
finally took action, making it a crime to send spam. But the government failed
to address the other major problem that developed with all of this online activ-
ity: less privacy. As the Internet became more entrenched in society, businesses
began to harvest users’ data, which created a trade-off. Data-mining allowed
websites to create a better user experience, but also required users to sacrifice
potentially sensitive private information for the sake of convenience.
Other nations worried that connecting to cyberspace was also requiring
them to sacrifice their culture and values. The Internet was no longer an
American phenomenon, but it was still very Americentric. By the end of the
decade, nearly one-third of the world’s population — 2 billion people — had
Internet access, and China had twice as many Internet users as the U.S.15 Yet,
American companies dominated the Internet business. They dominated web
browsing, search, e-mail and social networking on computers, smartphones
and tablets. Chinese officials worried their society might become infected by
decadent American culture. So, they banned some platforms, placed onerous
restrictions on others and developed their own homegrown competitors that
could reap the economic benefits for China — and keep the Chinese govern-
ment in control.
By 2010, even more things or objects were connected to the Internet than
people, giving birth to the term “Internet of Things” (IoT).16 Besides comput-
ers and phones, TVs, appliances, door locks, baby monitors and many other
everyday objects were now “smart gadgets.” Refrigerators, for example, could
be programmed to stream music, share notes with household members and
order food online when supplies are running low. The Internet also began
to play a major role in politics. Presidential candidates started doing much of
their fundraising, advertising and campaigning via the Internet and much of
the public’s political discourse happened on social media apps instead of in the
town square. Social media also began shaping Hollywood. Kim Kardashian,
Justin Bieber, Kate Upton and countless others went from obscurity to celeb-
rity thanks to the Internet.
At the same time, the Internet became a more perilous place. A handful
of tech companies, including Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon essen-
tially established monopolies in their industries, making serious competition
from startups nearly impossible. Critics grew especially concerned about the
implications for free speech, as Silicon Valley giants began heavily censoring
Clement, J., Spam: Share of Global E-mail Traffic 2007-2019, Statista, May 14, 2020, https://www
14
.statista.com/statistics/420400/spam-e-mail-traffic-share-annual/.
Real Time Statistics Project, supra note 8.
15
Evans, Dave, The Internet of Things: How the Next Evolution of the Internet Is Changing Everything,
16
Cisco White Paper, Apr. 2011, https://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en_us/about/ac79/docs/innov/IoT
_IBSG_0411FINAL.pdf.
their platforms to curtail what they considered hate speech and disinformation.
Even a sitting U.S. president, Donald Trump, was censored and permanently
banned by some platforms. But some politicians insisted more censorship was
needed to prevent social media platforms from being weaponized to spread
disinformation and incite violence. Social media also came under attack from
educators and psychologists, who blamed it for a rapid rise in cyberbullying,
depression and school shootings. Cybercrime rates skyrocketed, as miscre-
ants weaponized the Internet in new and cruel ways to harass others, such as
revenge porn and “swatting” (harassing someone by reporting false emergen-
cies at their home, provoking a response from first responders). Criminals
managed to weaponize the IoT to temporarily shut down popular websites
in 2016.
The Internet, particularly social media, has also been utilized against
governments. Twitter and Facebook played a large role in the Middle East
revolts of the early 2000s, eventually leading to the overthrow of dictators in
Egypt and Libya in 2011. Meanwhile, Russia attempted to interfere with the
2016 U.S. election by spreading disinformation online. The U.S. government
also found itself embroiled in controversy when Edward Snowden, a National
Security Agency contractor, revealed that officials were using the Internet to
secretly spy on its citizens and other countries. That scandal led to the U.S.
agreeing to abdicate its long-standing control of key Internet infrastructure
to an international multi-stakeholder group. In response to these crises, many
governments began heavily censoring the Internet to avoid being the next to
lose control.
In 2010, a group of scientists working as part of the Pentagon’s JASON
project concluded that the Internet is complex far beyond modern understand-
ing. In their report they stated that many of the Internet’s behaviors cannot be
explained well and that a better understanding of the science behind cyberse-
curity was needed. “When we look at the Internet, and where it came from,
and where it’s arrived today, and where it’s headed, I think it’s quite clear that
the engineers didn’t really realize just how much this was going to change
things,” Snowden said.17
THE INTERNET BY THE NUMBERS

The Internet has become almost a full-time job for the average American,
who now spends more than six hours online per day using it for almost
any activity imaginable. Consider the numbers:
• Worldwide, about 59%, or 4.5 billion of the 8 billion people in the
world, have access to the Internet. A majority (51%) of all Internet
17 The Internet Revolution and Digital Future Technology Documentary, supra note 2.
users worldwide are in Asia; only about 7% of Internet users reside

in North America.18
• Of those worldwide users, 96% access it daily and about half actively
use social media.19
• More and more Americans are accessing the Internet through smart-
phones instead of computers. 81% own a smartphone and 37% of all
Internet users go online mostly using their phones, and not using
another device such as a desktop or laptop computer.20
• 89% of Americans get at least some of their news online — more than
any other medium, including traditional TV, radio and newspapers —
and 37% prefer to get their news online than via analog media.21
• There are more than 1.5 billion websites worldwide.22
• Every day, 169 billion e-mails are sent, 4 billion Google searches
are made, 4.6 billion YouTube videos are viewed, 500 million tweets
are posted, 4 billion blog posts are written, 82 million photos are
uploaded on Instagram, 3 million smartphones are sold, and 90,000
websites hacked per day.23
• More than 80% of the U.S. population has used the Internet to
purchase something. Domestically, online sales are growing by 15%
annually and account for nearly $517 billion per year. Amazon is the
most popular online retailer.24
• Approximately 40% of American heterosexual couples and 60%
of same-sex couples now first meet online.25 About 40% of single
adults have used online dating. Nearly half of online relationships end
through an e-mail.26
18 Miniwatts Marketing Group, Internet World Stats, accessed Oct. 5, 2020, https://www.Internetworld-
stats.com/stats.htm.
19 Kemp, Simon, Digital 2019: Global Internet Use Accelerates, We Are Social Inc., Jan. 30, 2019, https://
wearesocial.com/blog/2019/01/digital-2019-global-Internet-use-accelerates.
20 Anderson, Monica, Mobile Technology and Home Broadband 2019, Pew Research Center, June 13,
2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/06/13/mobile-technology-and-home-broad-
band-2019/.
21 Mitchell, Amy et al., For Local News, Americans Embrace Digital but Still Want Strong Community Con-
nection, Pew Research Center, Mar. 26, 2019, https://www.journalism.org/2019/03/26/nearly-as
-many-americans-prefer-to-get-their-local-news-online-as-prefer-the-tv-set/.
22 Id.
23 Real Time Statistics Project, supra note 8.
24 Young, Jessica, US Ecommerce Sales Grow 14.9% in 2019, Digital Commerce 360, Feb. 19, 2020,
https://www.digitalcommerce360.com/article/us-ecommerce-sales/
25 Kopf, Dan, Around 40% of American Couples Now First Meet Online, Quartz, Feb. 12, 2019,
https://qz.com/1546677/around-40-of-us-couples-now-first-meet-online/.
26 Thottam, Isabel, 10 Online Dating Statistics You Should Know, 2018, https://www.eharmony.com/
online-dating-statistics/.
What Comes Next?
With the arrival of the 2020s, and with them a global pandemic, Internet
access has practically become a necessity for survival in the U.S. and much
of the developed world. Those who didn’t lose their jobs due to the pan-
demic started working from home. Schools went entirely online. And due
to social distancing, dialog and expression occurred almost entirely through
digital communication. The average U.S. adult spent a whopping 16 hours a
day with digital media during “shelter in place” orders, according to an analysis
by Activate Consulting.27 Governments worldwide rolled out intrusive surveil-
lance systems to ensure citizens were obeying lockdown orders and to trace
transmission of the virus. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the digital divide
like never before as those without Internet access, particularly in Africa (where
70% lack a connection), became more vulnerable.28 It also widened an exist-
ing rift between the U.S. and China, which now find themselves engaged in a
digital “Cold War,” with both sides banning each other’s top tech companies
and popular apps.
The start of an artificial intelligence (AI) revolution presents equal uncer-

tainty and upheaval. Self-driving cars and medical advances should improve
our lives, but experts fear that as AI advances it could eliminate many jobs or
eventually eliminate humanity altogether. At the moment, it’s largely unreg-
ulated. All of this tech has also taken a tremendous toll on the environment.
27 Wolf, Michael J., How Covid-19 Has Transformed the Amount of Time We Spend Online, Wall Street
Journal, Aug. 7, 2020, https://blogs.wsj.com/experts/2020/08/07/how-covid-19-has-transformed
-the-amount-of-time-we-spend-online/.
28 Miniwatts Marketing Group, supra note 18.
Though the Internet can significantly cut down on carbon emissions by
allowing workers to telecommute, most activities we do online are not
productive. The Internet’s use of electricity now accounts for 10% of the
world’s carbon emissions, and it’s expected to double through the 2020s as
our technology takes on more advanced forms like AI and the developing
5G Network.29
As we reflect on the 50 years since the first computer message was sent,
it’s evident the Internet has completely changed the world. But more of the
big changes that it will bring still lie ahead and its history has just begun.30
“The way to think about where the Internet is going is not what’s the
future of the Internet, but what does the Internet mutate into and what are
all the reaction products that go spinning off into different directions,” said
Paul Saffo, future studies chair at Stanford University. “And it’s only just
started.”31
Whether these future developments make our lives easier and better or add
complications and create new problems will depend largely on the regulations
and norms we create to govern them. This book explores the law as it applies
to the Internet now, and how these and new laws are likely to apply in the
future.
CLOSING ARGUMENTS
The Internet was developed, in large part, as a result of the “Cold War”
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, which fostered technological
innovation and led to the development of a resilient computer infra-
structure that serves as the Internet’s backbone. On the other hand, the
Cold War also resulted in trillions of dollars of perhaps excessive military
spending, and to American involvement in Korea,Vietnam and other for-
eign conflicts.Were the technological benefits of the Cold War worth the
fear and uncertainty of those years?
29 Lozano, Kevin, Can the Internet Survive Climate Change?, New Republic, Dec. 18, 2019, https://
newrepublic.com/article/155993/can-internet-survive-climate-change.
30 Blitz, Matt, What Will the Internet Be Like in the Next 50 Years?, Popular Mechanics, Nov. 1, 2019,
https://www. popularmechanics . com / technology / infrastructure / a29666802 / future - of - the
-internet/.
31 The Internet Revolution and Digital Future Technology Documentary, supra note 2.
Additional Sources
Andrews, Evan, Who Invented the Internet?, History.com, Oct. 28, 2019, https://www.
history.com/news/who-invented-the-internet.
Broom, Douglas, Coronavirus Has Exposed the Digital Divide Like Never Before, World
Economic Forum, Apr. 22, 2020, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/04/
coronavirus-covid-19-pandemic-digital-divide-internet-data-broadband-mobbile/.
Buckley, Sean, Vint Cerf and Bob Kahn, Co-Inventors of TCP/IP Protocol, Fierce Telecom,
Oct. 4, 2011, https://www.fiercetelecom.com/special-report/vint-cerf-and-bob-kahn
-co-inventors-tcp-ip-protocol.
Chikhani, Riad, The History of Gaming: An Evolving Community, TechCrunch, Oct. 31, 2015,
https://techcrunch.com/2015/10/31/the-history-of-gaming-an-evolving-community.
Computer History Museum, Internet History of 1980s, https://www.computerhistory.org/
internethistory/1980s/.
Computer Innovations, Mar. 1, 2013, http://computinnovative.blogspot.com/2013/03/
internet-and-its-works.html.
Craig, William, The History of the Internet in a Nutshell, WebFX, Nov. 14, 2019, https://
www.webfx.com/blog/web-design/the-history-of-the-internet-in-a-nutshell/.
Dentzel, Zaryn, How the Internet Has Changed Everyday Life, Open Mind BBVA, 2014,
https://www.bbvaopenmind.com/en/articles/internet-changed-everyday-life/.
Dewey, Caitlin, 36 Ways the Web has Changed Us, Washington Post, Mar. 12, 2014,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/arts-and-entertainment/wp/2014/03/12/36
-ways-the-web-has-changed-us/.
FBI, Operation Innocent Images, https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/operation
-innocent-images.
Giordano, Simon, American Big Tech Will Not Protect You, Brown Political Review, Nov. 20,
2019, https://brownpoliticalreview.org/2019/11/american-big-tech-will-not-protect
-you/.
Graff, Garrett M., Could Trump Win the War on Huawei — And Is TikTok Next?, Wired, July
14, 2020, https://www.wired.com/story/could-trump-win-the-war-on-huawei-and-is
-tiktok-next/.
History.com Editors, The Invention of the Internet, History.com, Oct. 28, 2019, https://www
.history.com/topics/inventions/invention-of-the-internet.
Leigh, Peter, The Nostalgia Nerd’s Retro Tech: Computer, Consoles & Games (2018).
Lester, Simon, The End of American Internet Dominance, Cato Institute, June 4, 2013, https://
www.cato.org/publications/commentary/end-american-internet-dominance.
Marple, Liz, Remember What Life Was Like Before the Internet, It’s Rosy, July 9, 2019, https://
www.itsrosy.com/Life+Before+The+Internet.
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Nov. 20, 2018, https://www.le-vpn.com/internet-privacy-cyber-security/.
NORSAR, NORSAR Becomes the First Non-US Node on ARPANET, the Predecessor to
Today’s Internet, https://www.norsar.no/about-us/history/arpanet.
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Reclaim The Net, Aug. 5, 2020, https://reclaimthenet.org/twitter-locks-president
-trumps-campaign-account-prevents-tweeting/.
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Apr. 17, 2015, https://wjbq.com/what-it-looked-like-when-tv-stations-would-go-off
-the-air-overnight-video/.
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Conversation, Apr. 21, 2015, https://theconversation.com/doxxing-swatting-and-the
-new-trends-in-online-harassment-40234.
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/20727-internet-history.html.
2 Who Controls the Internet?
The great risk is that digital nationalism will balkanize the Internet, breaking it up
into a patchwork of incompatible and irreconcilable fiefs.
— Akash Kapur
Who controls the Internet? It’s complicated. In a sense, everyone does, and
no one does. There are a variety of non-profit and for-profit entities working
behind the scenes that control the basic operating procedures of the Internet
— how information gets sent and received. But governments also have a role,
through laws and regulations. If you’re transmitting or downloading child por-
nography in the United States, the FBI will prosecute you. If you’re a dissident
living in Beijing and criticize the Chinese government on your blog, you
could face legal troubles — or worse — there. However, there is no single reg-
ulatory unit that oversees the Internet globally and makes rules that everyone
must abide by. After all, the Internet is a cross-border, international medium.
Some people want to change that.
With so many entities and governments vying for control of the Internet,
it can sometimes be confusing whose rules apply. For example, hate speech
is protected by the First Amendment in the U.S., but it is illegal in many
European countries. On the other hand, some countries have fewer restrictions
on sexual content than the U.S., while others have more.
If we had one governing body that set rules for the entire Internet, we
may be able to avoid such legal dilemmas and conflicts. In recent years,
there has been a push to give the United Nations blanket authority over
the Internet. But such a development is unlikely to occur given that there
are nearly 200 countries that all have their own, often conflicting ideas of
how to run the Internet. So, establishing global governance would require
settling on shared standards and values, which may be impossible because
of differing histories, social sensitivities and political realities. Think about
it: would you want the U.N. or some other country to be in charge of
the Internet if that meant you had to give up some of your rights as an
American?
Who Controls the Internet? 21
Internet Governance
The Internet has been referred to as the “Information Superhighway.” Such a
metaphor is useful in understanding how it’s controlled. Just as governments
establish driving laws on physical roads in the real world that prohibit activities
such as speeding or drunk driving, so too can they create laws that regulate
behavior in the virtual world.
Of course, before such laws can be made and enforced, actual roads need
to be built. Civil engineers are responsible for deciding how to make these
roads: things like where roads should be built, what type of material is used
and where exits and on-ramps will be located. In the virtual world, sev-
eral non-profit organizations — including the Internet Society, the Internet
Architecture Board, the Internet Engineering Task Force and the World Wide
Web Consortium — are tasked with developing the underlying architecture
and protocols for the online world. They write the code that determines how
people access the Internet, and how data and information is transmitted and
shared.
Once a user is online, national governments may regulate how users in their
country move about the Internet. Likewise, governments can also regulate
content providers and telecommunications companies that do business with
their citizens.
But no one country owns the Internet. Although the Internet was born
in the U.S., it has now become a cross-border, international space. Content
providers may have their physical offices in one country, conduct their busi-
ness in another country, and store their content on servers in a third country.
Whichever setup providers use for these purposes, their content can be readily
accessible from anywhere in the world. Similarly, content may be transmit-
ted through several nations on its way from a sender to a recipient. An e-mail
sent from New York to New Zealand may pass through servers and networks
in several countries before it reaches its destination. Content contained in
that e-mail may be legal in one country but illegal in another. If a legal issue
arises from the sending of that e-mail, which country should have jurisdiction?
Invariably, disputes arise between countries over which country’s laws should
apply.
Internet Protocols
While each country makes rules for Internet use within its borders (and
sometimes beyond, as you’ll learn), the protocols — things like the code and
architecture — for the Internet are essentially in no government’s hands. As
discussed in Chapter 1, the Internet grew out of the communications network
survivability concerns of the U.S. Department of Defense during the Cold
War era. As the Internet began its transition from a government defense tool
to commercial resource, the U.S. government contracted the running of the
Internet first to the non-profit Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA),
and eventually to the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN), a nonprofit corporation formed by stakeholders of the Internet
community that includes advisors from more than 100 countries.
ICANN currently handles various Internet protocols, including managing
the system of domain names (web addresses) and maintaining the “root server”
directory of domains. In simple terms: to reach another person on the Internet
you have to give your computer a destination, usually entered as a name or
number. That destination has to be unique, so computers know where to
find each other. ICANN coordinates these unique identifiers across the world.
Without that coordination we would not have one global Internet. Humans
prefer to find desired web addresses and e-mail addresses by name (such as
“whitehouse.gov” or “routledge.com”) but computers know each other by
numbers, or Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. ICANN manages the Domain
Name System (DNS), often referred to as “the phone book of the Internet”
because it matches domain names with appropriate IP address numbers. In
short, ICANN is similar to a traffic cop directing traffic, but for the Internet.
Until recently, the U.S. government had always controlled ICANN, because
it essentially invented the Internet. But that changed in October 2016, when
the U.S. agreed to relinquish sole oversight of Internet traffic. Now, the U.S.
government equally shares governance of ICANN with foreign governments,
tech companies and advocacy organizations.
The ICANN handover was controversial. For example, Senator Ted Cruz
and then-presidential candidate Donald Trump preferred that the U.S. govern-
ment maintain oversight of ICANN and took an “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix
it” viewpoint. Some lawmakers even attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to block
the transfer through a lawsuit. Others supported ICANN’s independence, but
were concerned the transition plan was hasty and needed more fine-tuning.
On the other hand, proponents insisted this power shift was necessary for vari-
ous reasons. They argued that the Internet had become too American-centric.
Since countries such as China and India have many more Internet users than
the U.S., proponents reasoned it was no longer fair for one nation to control
the world’s communication tool. Moreover, the world no longer trusted the
U.S. to oversee the Internet after the Edward Snowden surveillance scandal.
There were also fears that some countries could form an alternate Internet
rather than participate in our existing global and interconnected cyberspace.
There was more controversy in 2020 when ICANN proposed selling the abil-
ity to assign and control .org domain names to a private, for-profit entity, includ-
ing fears of rising fees for .org domains and that a for-profit organization would
have no commitment to the public interest. The sale was eventually rejected.
Governmental Regulation
While ICANN oversees the Internet’s backbone — the domain-name system,
IP address allocation and network protocol number assignments — individual
governments still have a great deal of control over how the Internet operates
in their individual countries. This means that each country can regulate which
content its citizens can see and determine which content is illegal or censored
in that nation.
Since the Internet became a global multi-communication medium in the
1990s, countries all over the world, including the U.S., have enacted laws
aimed at regulating the segments of the Internet within their jurisdictions, or
at least bringing those parts of the network within the ambit of their systems
and legal jurisdictions. The result is a range of Internet regulatory models at the
international and national levels that govern everything from Internet infra-
structure to social networking sites like Facebook, Instagram and Twitter.
This multiplicity of regulatory approaches to the Internet essentially trans-
forms cyberspace into a series of interconnected jurisdictions where each coun-
try attempts to apply its rules, regulations and culture to the networks and
network traffic within its territorial jurisdiction. Internet law and regulation
is further complicated because it arose at the same time that other media —
information technology, telecommunications, print media, sound, still images
and motion pictures — were converging, even though countries have tradi-
tionally regulated these media differently. This presented new questions about
which media regulatory model should apply online.
Consequently, conflicts of laws invariably emerge. But, before we discuss
those conflicts and how they’re resolved, let’s look at what regulations the
international community agrees on.
International Regulations
Nations around the world have come to agreement on some elements of
Internet regulation through a combination of international conventions, U.N.
resolutions, declarations and plans of action. Areas of Internet content that are
covered by international law include child pornography, data protection and
intellectual property. Specifically:
Electronic Commerce: To help facilitate the global information economy we now live
in, in which the flow of data is an essential component, a number of interna-
tional agreements by members of the World Trade Organization have been
made on issues including: the development and interconnection of satellites
to facilitate such transfers; the elimination of tariffs on information technol-
ogy products; the liberalization of telecommunications markets worldwide;
and allowing the use of electronic signatures to facilitate e-commerce.
Child Pornography: Most countries have agreed to suppress child pornography on
the Internet. As child pornography became prevalent on the Internet, the
U.N. General Assembly adopted the Optional Protocol to the Convention
on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and
Child Pornography. The U.N. called for worldwide criminalization of
the production, distribution, exportation, transmission, importation, and
intentional possession and advertising of child pornography. But it is up
to individual countries to enact and enforce such laws, since there is no
international body with the authority to prosecute such cases.
Intellectual Property: One of the most significant multilateral Internet agree-
ments was carried out within the framework of the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO), an organization with a membership of
193 countries. When international disputes over issues such as whether
copyright infringement has occurred, WIPO makes a determination based
on internationally agreed standards of intellectual property protection on
the Internet. The WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances
and Phonograms Treaty of 1996 made international copyright law applica-
ble to the Internet and laid the groundwork for a multilateral approach to
the resolution of intellectual property disputes. One of the most important
provisions of the treaty makes it a crime for hackers and cyber thieves
to make illegal copies by circumventing digital anti-piracy measures that
copyright holders embed in software programs, DVDs and other media
that contains or is used to present copyrighted work.
Conflicts of Laws
Although international regulation has been established for a few elements of
the Internet, there are no international agreements for many other areas. For
example, in 2012, the U.N. organized a World Conference on International
Telecommunications that sought to form consensus on how to regulate inter-
national phone calls made via the Internet. Eighty-nine nations agreed to a
treaty, but the U.S. and 54 other countries refused.
There are many and varied reasons for these policy disagreements, including
that different countries have differing ideas on Internet regulation; and that our
existing remedies for resolving international conflicts of law, which are based
primarily on physical locations, are inadequate for the Internet. With approxi-
mately 200 countries, there’s no one-size-fits-all solution to these situations.
Models of Internet Regulation

Approaches to Internet regulation vary widely and include:
Self-Governance Model: The self-governance or self-regulation model insists that

the Internet community is capable of regulating itself and that promulga-
tion of domestic or international laws is both unnecessary and undesirable.
In the early days of the Internet, this model initially flourished because the
law invariably lags behind technology. Governments initially lacked an
understanding of the workings of and an appreciation for the importance
of the Internet, leaving Internet entrepreneurs and users to come up with
their own norms and standards.
But this model is quickly becoming extinct worldwide. Lawmakers are
starting to catch up with the times and most countries now regulate the
Internet in some way, within the framework of their particular political,
legal, moral and cultural values.
The Neo-Mercantilist Model: This model is based on the premise that the Internet
is essentially a vehicle of commerce. The role of government, therefore,
is to ensure the free flow of commerce online and to remove any impedi-
ments to such commerce. The American approach to Internet regulation
generally falls in this category, based on the notion of a marketplace: of
not only products and services, but also ideas. As such, except in the nar-
rowest of circumstances, the government may not regulate speech on the
basis of its content. These principles are the foundation of the U.S.’s neo-
mercantilist Internet law regime.
This does not mean that the government has no involvement in the
online world. The U.S. government has funded supercomputers and
domestic networks and connectivity based on the premise that computer
infrastructures were similar to the American interstate highway system,
which provided the infrastructure for transportation and communication
but allowed the free market to determine the flows of traffic on these
systems.
In 1997, the Clinton Administration offered the world a framework
for the expansion and regulation of electronic commerce that concep-
tualized the Internet as a global capitalist marketplace and appealed
to governments to assume a minimalist regulatory posture toward
e-commerce. The framework favored self-government, decentraliza-
tion, public–private sector partnerships and the creation of interna-
tional agreements as the values that should guide Internet regulation.
It was aimed at creating a seamless global market economy with a
fluid exchange of finance, goods, services and information. The plan
essentially globalized America’s libertarian principles: the marketplace
of ideas, laissez-faire economics, free trade, and the free flow of infor-
mation, goods and services.
The international Internet law regime promoted by the Clinton
Administration led to the development of U.N. and WTO protocols that
generally adhere to these principles.
The Culturalist Model: Many countries have the impression that their cul-
tures are besieged by the globalization of American popular culture.
Transformation of the Internet into an American-dominated commer-
cial and multi-communication space, whose architecture closely mirrors
America’s socio-cultural and political logic, has prompted some coun-
tries to enact Internet laws that are designed to protect their national
cultures.
France is an example of such a culturalist state. The French government
has always defended what communication scholar Armand Mattelart calls
“cultural sovereignty.”1 Under its ideology of exception culturelle (cultural
exception), France does not want its culture subsumed within an undif-
ferentiated “Western” culture. Since the 1970s, French law has classified
the French language and the French media and telecommunications infra-
structure as part of its cultural heritage that should be protected against
Anglo-American domination.
This culturalist perspective has also been applied to the Internet. France
views the Internet as a cultural rather than a commercial platform, and
regulates it within its protectionist framework. In France, laws mandate
that websites located in the country be in French and that Internet content
accessible to French citizens on French territory abide by the country’s laws
on free speech. American companies such as Yahoo! have encountered
legal problems for violating French Internet content laws. For example, in
2000 a French court held that sales of Nazi memorabilia on Yahoo!’s auc-
tion site violated French law, which bans such items.
In order to protect French national identity, language and culture on the
Internet, new terminology spawned by technology is systematically replaced
with French neologisms. For example, in 2003, the General Commission on
Terminology and Neology officially approved replacement of the English
word “e-mail” with the French equivalent, courier éléctronique.
Restricted: Some countries severely restrict Internet activities within their borders,
either by having only a few data connections to the worldwide Internet, as
in North Korea, or by blocking and censoring content that the government
does not favor, as in China. In these nations, all Internet use, including e-mail,
is monitored for subversive content. But there is often an elite of government
officials and scholars who have broader access than most citizens.
Maintaining severe limitations on domestic Internet content and com-
munications is increasingly difficult for nations such as China that are or
seek to be involved in the system of global commerce. These governments
face increasingly difficult challenges in maintaining internal restrictions
while also fostering economic, academic and other international relation-
ships. Another problem for these restrictive governments is the increasing
availability and effectiveness of technologies that allow their citizens to
bypass government controls.
Globalism: This model is based on multinational political, economic, techno-
logical and cultural cooperation in regulating the Internet, and it relies on
treaties and international conventions to achieve that goal. There has been
some progress in this direction, with the adoption of international rules
regarding protection of intellectual property and prohibition of child por-
nography online. But there are still no international agreements resolving
the multiple issues of Internet jurisdiction.
1
Mattelart, Armand, La Mondialisation de la Communication [Globalization of Communication] (3rd
ed., 2002), 93.
While this is not an exhaustive list of the different models of Internet regula-
tion, it illustrates a range of possible approaches. Given these differing models,
conflicts between these philosophies and the countries that follow them invari-
ably emerge.
Examples of Conflicting Laws

Ultimately, the disparate approaches towards Internet governance can be
grouped into two camps: (1) a top-down approach where the government
controls the Internet versus (2) a multi-stakeholder approach in which the
private sector, civil society, academics, engineers and the government all have
seats at the policymaking table.
Both approaches have advantages and drawbacks. China and the U.S. pro-
vide a good contrast and comparison of these two approaches in practice.
Both nations have a booming technology culture. Chinese companies such
as Alibaba, Baidu and Tencent rival their American counterparts Amazon,
Google and Facebook in terms of heft. But China has stringent limits on online
content, while the U.S. favors giving its Internet users freedom of speech.
China’s approach provides more security. China has been able to avoid
controversies such as allegations regarding foreign interference in U.S. elec-
tions because its heavy-handed approach is effective in protecting against
news of which the government does not approve, hacking and foreign med-
dling. Where Russia and other nations may have turned the Internet into a
political weapon to use against rival countries, China has used it as a shield
to guard against technology advancing quicker than the government can
control it.
However, China’s approach is incompatible with Western democratic ide-
als. China squelches online dissent and imprisons many of those who dare
criticize the government. It blocks foreign news and information, including
the websites of generally respected news sources such as The New York Times,
and promotes homegrown technology companies that it can control while
banning global services like Facebook and Twitter. Human rights observers
frequently condemn China’s Internet crackdown because it inhibits freedom
of speech and thought.
Given these differences, it’s easy to see how conflicts arise between the laws
of various countries. Such conflicts are not uncommon in international law
on a wide variety of subjects. But the Internet presents novel challenges for
resolving them.
Why Existing Remedies are Inadequate

There’s no disputing that a sovereign state may create and enforce laws con-
cerning activities within its borders. In the physical world, it is relatively easy
for courts to determine the geographical locations of the persons, objects and
activities relevant to a particular case. Even international sea law, such as the
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, is based on territory. But the Internet
is a cross-border space, and online activities often involve actors and intermedi-
aries in multiple physical locations. Thus, diverse sets of potentially incompat-
ible laws and rules overlap and are frequently in conflict.
Virtual frontiers do not map neatly into boundaries of national territories.
Content providers may physically reside in one place, conduct their business in
another place, and locate their servers in a third location, with their content read-
ily accessible from anywhere in the world. As the French Yahoo! case illustrates,
cross-border platforms can host user-generated content that might be deemed
illegal in certain jurisdictions, but not in others. Furthermore, attempts to identify
the physical location of a particular user over the Internet have proven extremely
difficult, and many Internet users compound this problem by intentionally hiding
their location. Traditional principles of international jurisdiction, particularly ter-
ritoriality, are poorly suited for this sort of environment of geographic anonymity.
Courts around the world have struggled to develop a satisfactory solution,
and no progress has been made toward a uniform global standard of Internet
jurisdiction. This legal limbo has serious consequences. The economy suf-
fers as businesses are less likely to invest and innovate due to legal uncertain-
ties. Internet companies also waste valuable resources handling international
legal disputes. And some users may find themselves facing legal claims abroad
for activities that are legal in the users’ country, while others must surf the
web without any certainty that redress is available for harms they might suffer
online. While U.S. courts routinely honor foreign court judgments as a matter
of mutual respect among courts, a concept known as comity, there is an excep-
tion for defamation. Under the 2010 federal SPEECH Act, federal and state
courts in the U.S. do not enforce foreign defamation judgments unless the U.S.
court determines that the foreign court acted with due process and protects
free speech similarly to the First Amendment.2
Barbour, Emily C., The SPEECH Act:The Federal Response to “Libel Tourism,” Congressional Research
2
Service, Sept. 16, 2010, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41417.pdf.
How to Resolve Conflicts of Law
Here are some common proposals for fixing the problem:
A Universal Regulatory Scheme: An international convention could lead to a treaty

establishing substantive “universal standards” for what’s legal and illegal.
The treaty could also create an international body that would promulgate
civil and criminal Internet regulations and jurisdictional rules. However,
getting every nation around the world to agree on standards and then
adopt them into their domestic legal codes seems daunting, if not impos-
sible. Attempts to do this with outer space and the Moon haven’t worked
well: either few countries adopt the law or it’s so vague as to be tooth-
less. The creation of a global Internet law could also create new conflicts,
between the common Internet law and individual nations’ domestic laws.
A Global Standard for Determining Jurisdiction: A treaty could be signed by all
nations that creates a single test for determining Internet jurisdiction. It
could, for example, be an “effects” test. Under this principle, a nation may
assert jurisdiction over conduct that has an effect in that nation, even if the
conduct does not actually occur within its borders. For example, in 2001,
Thailand prosecuted blog posts criticizing its king, even though the posts
were written in the U.S., on the grounds that the impact — the “effect”
— of the posts was in Thailand. As with the process of creating a global
standard, reaching a consensus would be daunting.
Filtering and E-borders: Governments could regain control of their borders by
placing blocking and tracking technologies at international access points
or at the Internet service provider’s (ISP’s) servers to act as centuri-
ons. Many governments have already implemented such technologies
to monitor and regulate Internet activities of their citizens. However,
such filters can easily be circumvented and won’t resolve issues such
as determining which law applies in cases of defamation and copyright
infringement. In addition, this could undermine the Internet’s infra-
structure and is antithetical to its founding purpose of being a tool to
share information.
Choice of Law Provisions: Content providers and users could agree to resolve dis-
putes in a particular forum by including choice of law provisions in Terms
of Service contracts. But there would need to be an international consen-
sus regarding the validity of such agreements. This seems unlikely given
that it would limit governments’ power and the European Union has been
reluctant to allow such forum selection clauses. Also, there is the persistent
issue of whether users are aware of such provisions, since most do not read
the Terms of Service documents of the sites and services that they use.
Do Nothing: Not all of the issues of Internet regulation require solutions. We
can allow the Internet community to regulate itself, as it originally did.
But, of course, conflict will persist, and will often require litigation to be
resolved.
Given that all of these proposals seem to have drawbacks, what is the solu-
tion? The best model for global Internet governance may be a hybrid that
incorporates some elements from various models. Internet governance is a
complex task requiring a complex set of regulatory mechanisms. As a result, the
optimal system of governance may be a combination of regulation, with vari-
ous stakeholders — government officials, tech companies and Internet users —
involved in setting rules and making decisions. Admittedly, this solution may
seem like a bit of a cop-out. But keep in mind, the reason for the deadlock
concerning Internet jurisdiction is because each of the most common solutions
has significant drawbacks. There is no silver bullet solution to this issue.
“Splinternet”
Clearly, it looks like the world won’t reach any consensus on how to govern
the Internet any time soon. Despite some goodwill gestures such as America’s
recent move to share oversight of ICANN with other nations, world powers
have never been more divided over Internet governance.
Since the U.S. ceded control in 2016, ICANN has struggled to maintain its
authority over the Internet. The EU has “started rejecting the organization’s
authority,”3 while Brazilian officials told ICANN that only governments con-
trol the Internet. “ICANN lost 99% of its spine when the U.S. relinquished
control over it. It now lost the remaining 1%,” observed one industry analyst.4
The EU is also asserting its power to force changes on how the Internet func-
tions. Due to its perceived weakness, many critics now mockingly refer to
ICANN as “ICANN’T.”
ICANN could soon face a much greater existential threat. China, Russia
and other nations remain concerned about possible external influence from
the U.S. and Western nations. Consequently, the BRICS nations (Brazil,
Russia, India, China and South Africa) announced in 2018 they plan to
develop their own separate Internet. “We all know who the chief admin-
istrator of the global Internet is, and due to its volatility, we have to think
about how to ensure our national security,” stated the press secretary to
Russian leader Vladimir Putin.5
Consequently, smaller nations could face a choice: join the BRICS Internet,
which will be highly censored, or participate in the West’s Internet, which
enjoys great freedom of expression, but its content is primarily in English and
caters to users located thousands of miles away. “The great risk is that digital
McCarthy, Kieren, As GDPR Draws Close, ICANN Suggests 12 Conflicting Ways to Cure Domain Privacy
3
Pains, The Register, Feb. 9, 2018, https://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/02/09/icann_whois_gdpr.
4
Develegas, Theo, Comment to Andrew Allemann, I Just Fixed Whois and GDPR, Domain Name
Wire, Apr. 13, 2018, 2:03 p.m., https://domainnamewire.com/2018/04/13/i-just-fixed-whois-and
-gdpr/#comment-2249232.
Staedter, Tracy, Why Russia Is Building its Own Internet, IEEE Spectrum, Jan. 17, 2018, https://spectrum.
5
ieee.org/tech-talk/telecom/internet/could-russia-really-build-its-own-alternate-internet
nationalism will balkanize the Internet, breaking it up into a patchwork of
incompatible and irreconcilable fiefs,” warns Akash Kapur, a senior fellow at
the GovLab at New York University. “The prospect of a technical ‘Splinternet’
is no longer as inconceivable as it once was. In the decades ahead, we may look
back wistfully to a time when data could move freely across the globe, without
virtual customs or immigration checkpoints.”6
CLOSING ARGUMENTS
At its best, the Internet is a global communication tool that allows people
from around the world to share ideas, learn new things and crowdsource
that knowledge to innovate. But the Internet is increasingly becoming
balkanized. Is it possible to have a truly global Internet where everyone
plays by the same rules? Or are we destined for a divided Information
Superhighway? Who’s at fault? Is the movement away from universal
access online a good or bad thing?
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Administrative Oversight Since the 2016 Handover, Neb. L. Rev. Bull., Aug. 6, 2018,
https://lawreview.unl.edu/Should-the-U.S.-Reclaim-Control-of-the-Internet%3F.
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2014, https://abcnews.go.com/International/internet-north-korea/story?id=27789459.
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Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
16. RAW MATERIALS FOR ALKYD RESINS
The alkyd resins are made chiefly from phthalic anhydride and glycerin. Phthalic anhydride in turn is
made from naphthalene. Polybasic acids such as maleic, succinic, etc., may also be used with glycerin
to form alkyd resins. Naphthalene, phthalic anhydride, maleic and other polybasic acids, and glycerin
are discussed in the order named.
NAPHTHALENE
The discovery of naphthalene in coal tar was made simultaneously by Garden and Brande in 1819,
and its composition was determined by Faraday in 1826 and later by Laurent in 1832. Naphthalene is
almost invariably a constituent of the products obtained when organic matter is heated to comparatively
high temperatures. For example, it is formed in small quantities when acetylene, alcohol, acetic acid,
benzene, or toluene are heated to high temperatures. Together with certain aromatic hydrocarbons it is
formed in the cracking of petroleum and in the hydrogenation of petroleum fractions. Naphthalene is a
constituent of the principal varieties of tar produced from coal in the manufacture of gas and coke under
ordinary conditions, but not of low-temperature tar. It is present in coal gas although its presence must
be kept as low as possible to avoid blocking service pipes in cold weather. The proportion in gas tar
varies with the kinds of coal used and is greater the higher the temperature used during carbonization; it
usually amounts to 4 to 6 percent but is sometimes as much as 10 percent. In tars obtained from
byproduct coke ovens the proportion of naphthalene and other aromatic hydrocarbons depends on the
type of oven used. Byproduct coke-oven tar averages 10 to 11 percent naphthalene; blast-furnace tar
contains only very small amounts.
Processes to synthesize naphthalene were described as early as 1873 by Aronheim, in 1876 by
Wroden and Znatowicz, and in 1884 by Baeyer and Perkin. English Patent No. 26,061 of 1898 claims
that it may be obtained by heating barium carbide with barium hydroxide to a high temperature. None of
these processes has become of commercial importance.
Recovery of naphthalene.
Naphthalene is recovered in the distillation of coal tar, in the fraction boiling at 180° to 250° C., in the
creosote oil fraction boiling at 240° to 270° C. and most abundantly in the carbolate or middle oil fraction
boiling at 200° to 250° C. When these fractions are allowed to cool most of the naphthalene crystallizes
out and is separated by draining and hot-pressing. This crude material is partially purified by washing
with hot caustic soda solution to remove tar acids and then with mineral acid to remove basic
substances. Refined naphthalene is obtained by subliming, or preferably by distilling the crude product.
Description and uses.
The Tariff Act of 1930 defines crude naphthalene as naphthalene solidifying under 79° C. after the
removal of all water present; and refined naphthalene as that having a solidifying point at or above 79°
C. after the removal of all water present.
Crude grades, melting between 70° and 78.5° C., are found in commerce as yellow, red, or brown
crystalline solids. These grades are used in the manufacture of phthalic anhydride and other coal-tar
intermediates; in the manufacture of lampblack; to enrich illuminating gas and sometimes motor fuel; in
synthetic tanning materials; and in certain insecticides. Probably its most important outlets are as a raw
material for phthalic anhydride (see p. 98) and refined naphthalene.
Refined grades, melting above 79° C., are marketed as white, crystalline lumps or flakes. Their
principal uses are in the manufacture of intermediates, dyes, medicinals, solvents, and textile assistants;
as moth repellants; as a lubricant when mixed with rapeseed oil; to remove the “bloom” from lubricating
oils; as a preservative for rubber goods and animal skins; and in explosives (trinitro naphthalene). In
1936 more than 75 coal-tar intermediates made from naphthalene were commercially produced in the
United States. Of the 75 million pounds of these intermediates produced in that year, 31 million pounds
were phthalic anhydride, an important component of synthetic resins of the alkyd type.
United States production.
Crude naphthalene is produced in the United States by byproduct coke-oven operators, gas works
that produce their own coal tar, and also by firms that purchase coal tar and distill it. Statistics of
production by groups are shown in table 33.
Table 33.—Crude naphthalene: United States production, 1918-37
By producers of tar By purchasers of tar Total production

Year Unit Unit Un
Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value
value value val
1,000 pounds Per pound 1,000 pounds Per pound 1,000 pounds Per p
1918 40,138 $1,281,440 $0.032 40,138 $1,281,440 $0
1919 12,612 327,201 .030 12,612 327,201
1923 11,872 $201,824 $0,017 41,453 652,148 .016 53,325 853,972
1925 9,239 92,389 .010 34,135 519,773 .015 43,374 612,162
1926 7,747 100,709 .013 45,166 494,986 .011 52,913 595,695
1927 8,303 91,331 .011 45,298 470,806 .010 53,601 562,137
1928 112,182 146,186 .012 35,180 395,059 .011 47,362 541,245
1929 119,761 316,182 .016 19,502 366,491 .020 39,263 682,673
1930 112,640 151,681 .012 18,617 304,574 .020 31,257 456,255
1931 17,623 76,229 .010 13,311 199,665 .015 20,934 275,894
1932 14,632 41,690 .09 8,961 125,453 .014 13,593 167,143
1933 16,618 66,181 .010 24,003 360,040 .015 30,621 426,221
1934 110,743 139,665 .013 27,179 489,222 .018 37,922 628,887
1935 112,937 168,185 .013 34,716 624,890 .018 47,653 793,075
1936 137,552 600,836 .016 51,984 1,195,632 .023 89,536 1,796,468
1937 160,797 1,215,942 .020 55,182 1,545,100 .028 115,979 2,667,522
1 Crude and refined. Refined naphthalene included here is probably small so that the figures here
and those for total production are substantially accurate.
Source: Bureau of Mines and U.S. Tariff Commission.
Refined naphthalene is obtained from domestic crude, imported crude, and recently from petroleum
cracking and hydrogenation. Table 34 shows the annual production and sales of refined naphthalene
since 1916. The difference between the figures for the quantity produced and that sold represents the
amount used by refiners in the manufacture of other products.
Table 34.—Refined naphthalene: United States production and sales, 1917-37
Production Sales
Year
Quantity Value Value Quantity Value Value
1,000 pounds 1,000 dollars Per pound 1,000 pounds 1,000 dollars Per pound
1917 35,343 2,334 $0.07
1918 28,112 2,163 .08
1919 17,625 1,161 .07
1920 30,231 2,309 .08
1921 13,554 13,183 741 $0.056
1922 17,420 14,060 794 .057
1923 28,184 21,871 1,271 .058
1924 15,324 11,961 603 .050
1925 17,581 12,508 610 .049
1926 18,072 12,456 576 .046
1927 21,233 (1)
1928 24,992 (1)
1929 31,144 21,120 1,027 .049
1930 31,956 20,171 949 .047
1931 34,959 21,260 829 .039
1932 25,825 18,877 783 .041
1933 42,708 28,658 1,065 .037
1934 38,730 21,257 1,100 .052
1935 46,564 28,761 1,212 .042
1936 52,694 30,499 1,841 .060
1937 52,194 29,657 1,893 .060
1 Not publishable.
Source: Compiled from annual reports of the Tariff Commission on dyes and other synthetic organic
chemicals in the United States.
Organization of the industry.—There are 10 domestic producers of crude naphthalene, operating 52

tar-distilling plants in the following States: Ohio (7), Pennsylvania (6), Illinois and New York (5 each),
Alabama, Minnesota, and New Jersey (3 each), Missouri, Rhode Island, Wisconsin, Utah, West Virginia
(2 each), and Michigan, Massachusetts, Maryland, Kentucky, Oregon, Connecticut, Tennessee, Indiana,
Virginia, and Washington (1 each). Although these plants do not all recover naphthalene as such, they
are equipped to recover a crude mixture of naphthalene and tar acids for shipment to a central
extracting and refining plant. The principal producing plants are located in Pennsylvania (2), New Jersey
(2), Illinois (1), Indiana (1), and West Virginia (1).
The purchasers of tar produced 77 percent of the total output of crude naphthalene in 1935 and 58
percent in 1936.
There are 8 producers of refined naphthalene located in the following States: New Jersey (3),
Pennsylvania (2), California, Indiana, and Ohio (1 each).
Trend of production.—Although the United States is the largest producer of coal tar, the limited
demand for the main products of tar distillation (creosote oil and pitch) has tended to restrict the amount
distilled, thereby reducing the output of naphthalene and the tar acids to a point where the domestic
output was not sufficient to meet our requirements. As a result, large quantities of these products have
been imported. In 1936 we produced 560 million gallons of coal tar, containing from 400 million to 500
million pounds of naphthalene.[17] In the same year we distilled about 300 million gallons of tar,
containing 230 million to 270 million pounds of naphthalene,[17] and our actual recovery of crude
naphthalene was 89,536,000 pounds.
Early in 1935 the price of crude naphthalene was about 1.5 cents per pound or 15 cents per gallon, at
which level there was little incentive to isolate it from the various fractions of tar distillation. Late in 1935
and in 1936 a serious shortage in naphthalene prevailed, largely because of increased demand by
synthetic resin makers but also because of restrictions on exports from certain European countries. The
price of the crude then advanced in domestic markets to from 2.5 to 3 cents per pound, with the demand
greatly exceeding the supply. Between 1930 and 1936 the apparent consumption of crude naphthalene
(production plus imports) increased from 59 million to 129 million pounds, or more than 100 percent.
During the same period production increased from 31 million to 89 million pounds; and imports
increased from 27 million pounds in 1930 to 48 million pounds in 1935 but declined to 40 million pounds
in 1936.
Domestic producers of naphthalene are increasing their output, and they state that continued prices of
2.5 to 3 cents per pound for naphthalene solidifying at about 75° C. or slightly higher will stimulate
production sufficiently to meet all present and near-future requirements. Estimates obtained in the
summer of 1936 from the large tar distillers and a petroleum refiner indicate that production was
appreciably greater in 1937 than in 1935. These estimates included the potential output of two new tar
distillation plants under construction, the topping of large quantities of tar (hitherto used as fuel without
removing any of the products), the recovery of appreciable quantities of naphthalene by several
petroleum refiners, and increased output by other producers.
Imports of crude naphthalene in 1937 amounted to 52,664,277 pounds valued at $1,133,157, or 2.2
cents per pound.
World production.
The output of naphthalene in the principal producing countries, in 1933 and 1935, is shown in table
35. Most of these statistics were estimated from the output of tar or of other distillation products given in
official reports of the countries or in consular reports.
The figures in table 35 indicate that the output in 1935 was an increase of about 100 million pounds
over 1933 or 41 percent. Notwithstanding this sharp increase in world production, consumers had
difficulty in obtaining their requirements. It is believed that the world output in 1937 substantially
exceeded that in 1935.
Table 35.—Naphthalene (all grades): World production, by countries, 1933 and 1935
[In thousands of pounds]

Country 1933 1935
Germany 109,148 145,530
Great Britain 45,750 155,000
UNITED STATES 30,620 47,653

France 30,000 133,000
Netherlands 115,000 115,000
Belgium 11,025 125,000
Czechoslovakia 6,835 10,805

U. S. S. R. 110,000 115,000
Poland 15,000 18,000
Spain 11,250 12,000
Italy 12,500 13,000
Canada 12,000 13,000
Total 269,128 362,988
1 Estimated.
Source: Official statistics of the several countries and consular reports.
Germany.—Germany is the largest producer of naphthalene and the third largest producer of coal tar.
With increased production of coal tar and intensive efforts to recover the maximum of naphthalene there
has been a larger output of naphthalene in recent years, but increased consumption has created a
scarcity in Germany as in all other important producing countries. As a result, greatly reduced quantities
are available for export, a situation that is in marked contrast to earlier periods when superabundant
production created a marketing problem. The manufacture of phthalic anhydride for alkyd resins is
requiring increased quantities of naphthalene.
The demand for alkyd resins has been given a marked impetus by the development of a new
standardized linseed oil varnish substitute known as El Varnish, the use of which is required by the
Control Board for Industrial Fats in Germany for certain interior and exterior painting (see p. 77).
Increased requirements for other important purposes such as intermediates, dyes, black pigments, and
explosives have also contributed to the scarcity of naphthalene. In order to conserve domestic supplies,
the Reich Government, from December 1935 until late in 1937 prohibited its export without special
permit. The prospect of continued strong domestic demand apparently will curtail for an indefinite period
the quantities available for export.
The international scarcity of naphthalene resulted in a sharp increase in its price in Germany as
elsewhere. The export embargo augmented the domestic German supply, although a shortage still
existed and large consumers found it difficult to secure adequate amounts. The shortage of foreign
exchange greatly curtailed imports of naphthalene from nearby countries.
The German Government issued a decree requiring that beginning July 1, 1936, the entire national
output of coal tar should be delivered to plants equipped for the recovery of tar products distilling up to
240° C. (naphthalene boils at 218° C.). This measure assured maximum recovery of benzol, toluol,
xylol, solvent naphtha, phenol, cresol, xylenol, other tar acids, and naphthalene. The decree
contemplated an official list of distillation units, and all tar producers were required to report to the official
trade control board for mineral oil their monthly output, quantities distilled, and quantities delivered to
other distillation plants.
German production, imports, exports, and apparent consumption of naphthalene are shown in table
36. Production increased from 108 million pounds in 1928 to 146 million pounds in 1935; imports
decreased from 9 to 4 million pounds; exports decreased from 48 to 22 million pounds; and apparent
consumption increased from 69 to 128 million pounds in the same years.
Table 36.—Naphthalene: German production, imports, exports, and apparent consumption, 1928-37

Apparent
Year Production Imports Exports
consumption1
1928 108,173 9,471 48,332 69,312
1929 124,362 8,032 39,739 92,655
1930 103,194 3,892 34,614 72,472
1931 92,169 2,403 39,077 55,495
1932 90,626 952 29,720 61,852
1933 109,148 7,483 31,842 84,783
1934 132,300 8,641 35,044 105,891
1935 145,530 4,246 22,169 127,603
1936 (2) 493 8,153 (2)
1937 (2) 33 24,966 (2)
1 Production plus imports, minus exports.
2 Not available.
Sources: Consular reports (production); Der auswartige Handel (imports and exports).
Imports of naphthalene into Germany in past years have been supplied by nearby countries, notably
the Saar (which became an integral part of Germany in February 1935), Belgium, Czechoslovakia,
Poland, the Soviet Union, and others. The United States has been the most important foreign market for
German naphthalene, taking from 50 to 75 percent of the total quantity exported. Other important buyers
were Belgium, Italy, Japan, and France. Table 92 (see p. 144) shows the quantity and value of imports
and exports by countries in recent years.
Great Britain.—The recovery and distillation of coal tar in Great Britain is highly developed. The
annual output of tar, principally gas-works tar, is somewhat smaller than in the United States, although
the quantities distilled for the recovery of separate components exceed the quantities distilled in the
United States. In 1935 the tar distilled in England and Wales totaled 330 million gallons and in Scotland,
31 million gallons, or a combined total of 361 million gallons as compared with about 280 million distilled
in this country.
Production of naphthalene in Great Britain is shown in table 37.
Table 37.—Naphthalene: Production in Great Britain, in specified years
Year Production
1,000 pounds
1924 13,730
1930 41,400
1933 45,750
19351 55,000
19361 70,000
1 Estimated.
Source: Consular reports.
Table 38 shows exports of naphthalene from Great Britain in recent years. The United States has
been the best customer, in most recent years taking 50 percent or more of the total exported. Our
imports from Great Britain have been entirely crude naphthalene, duty-free.
Imports of naphthalene into Great Britain are not shown separately in official statistics. It is known that
the Netherlands exported small quantities to Great Britain in 1929 and 1933.
Table 38.—Naphthalene: Exports from the United Kingdom
Quantity Value
Year To all countries To United States
To all countries To United States
Pounds sterling Dollars1 Pounds sterling Dollars1
1,000 pounds 1,000 pounds
1928 5,132 (2) 20,607 100,278 (2) (2)
1929 9,185 4,312 32,348 157,110 12,558 60,993
1932 11,132 7,514 26,869 94,205 14,274 50,046
1933 14,718 10,480 38,172 161,728 19,604 83,059
1934 11,955 6,492 35,226 177,514 13,025 65,637
1935 14,490 7,999 49,939 244,789 18,413 90,256
1936 26,332 13,412 120,372 598,357 46,158 229,447
1 Conversion to dollars at annual average quotations of the Federal Reserve Board.
2 Not available.
Source: The Trade of the United Kingdom, 1929 and 1936.
Belgium.—The distillation of coal tar is one of the oldest and most important branches of the Belgian
chemical industry. Approximately 90 batteries of byproduct-coke ovens, with a total of 3,000 ovens are
in operation. Practically all of the coal tar produced in these operations is distilled for the recovery of the
several products. The output of naphthalene is shown in table 39.
Table 39.—Naphthalene: Belgian production, 1928-35
Year Quantity
1,000 pounds
1928 26,000
1929 26,500
1930 24,200
1931 22,000
1933 12,000
19351 25,000
1 Estimated.
Belgian imports and exports of naphthalene, by countries, are shown in tables 93 and 94 (see pp.
146, 147). Belgium is a net importer of crude naphthalene and a net exporter of refined naphthalene. In
1937, it imported 9 million pounds and exported 6.7 million of crude; it imported only 19 thousand
pounds and exported 14 million pounds of refined.
Czechoslovakia.—The annual output of naphthalene in Czechoslovakia is shown in table 40.
Table 40.—Naphthalene: Czechoslovak production, in specified years, 1928-35
Year Quantity
1,000 pounds
1928 5,733
1930 6,174
1931 2,205
1932 1,543
1933 6,835
1934 9,040
1935 10,805
France.—Naphthalene is produced in France by a number of manufacturers, most of whom consume

their production in their own factories. The French output is said to be insufficient to meet domestic
requirements. Estimated production is given as approximately 30 million pounds annually. Appreciable
quantities are imported from nearby countries. Imports from Belgium in recent years average between 1
million and 3 million pounds.
Poland.—Production of crude naphthalene in Poland is shown in table 41.
Table 41.—Crude naphthalene: Polish production, 1928-36
Year Quantity
1,000 pounds
1928 4,708
1929 5,257
1930 3,925
1931 3,486
1932 3,704
1933 4,795
1934 7,705
1935 5,021
1936 2,836
The Netherlands.—Statistics of production are not available. Exports in recent years, however, have
averaged about 10 million pounds annually. It is believed that the production of crude naphthalene
exceeds 15 million pounds a year.
Table 95 (see p. 148) shows Netherland imports and exports of naphthalene by countries in recent
years. Imports in 1937 amounted to 2 million pounds and exports to 15 million pounds.
Canada.—Statistics of production are not available. The annual output of crude naphthalene is
estimated at 2 to 3 million pounds.
Imports of refined naphthalene are usually about 1 million pounds (see table 96, p. 150). Exports are
probably small, although in 1929 and 1934 those to the United States alone were over 1 million pounds.
The Soviet Union.—Statistics of production of naphthalene in the Soviet Union are not available. The
annual output has been estimated at 10 million pounds in 1933 and 15 million pounds in 1935. Exports
have increased substantially in recent years, those to the United States from 1 million pounds in 1934 to
6 million pounds in 1935. Exports to Germany were 361 thousand pounds in 1933; 1 million pounds in
1934; and 531 thousand pounds in 1935.
Japan.—Japanese production of naphthalene has been small compared with the output of other tar
products. The output of crude naphthalene in 1934 was reported to have been 381 thousand pounds.
Expansion of the byproduct coking industry in Japan and Manchuria has increased the production of
coal tar, byproduct ammonia, and benzol. Japan has imported large quantities of naphthalene in recent
years, principally from Germany and Belgium. The increased consumption in Europe may so reduce
supplies from these sources as to cause Japan to increase the recovery at home.
Japanese imports of naphthalene from principal sources, are shown in table 97 (see p. 150). In 1936,
12.6 million pounds were imported.
United States imports.
Rates of duty.—Prior to September 8, 1916, all grades of naphthalene were imported free of duty.
Since that time crude naphthalene has remained free but refined naphthalene has been subject to the
tariff treatment shown in table 42.
Table 42.—Naphthalene: Rates of duty upon imports into the United States, 1916-38
Rate of duty
Period Authority
Crude Refined
To Sept. 8, 1916 Free Free Free under par. 452 of the act of 1913 and under previous
acts.
Sept. 9, 1916, do. 15 percent ad Revenue Act of 1916.
to Sept. 8, valorem
1921. and 2½
cents per
pound.
Sept. 9, 1921, do. 15 percent ad Emergency Tariff Act of 1921. (Title V, prohibited imports
to Sept. 21, valorem for 3 months except when not obtainable in sufficient
1922. and 2 quantities or on reasonable terms as to quality, price,
cents per and terms of delivery).
pound.
Sept. 22, 1922, do. 55 percent ad Crude, free under par. 1549 and refined dutiable under par.
to Sept. 21, valorem 27 of the Tariff Act of 1922.
1924. and 7
cents per
pound.1
Sept. 22, 1924, do. 40 percent ad Ad valorem rate on refined reduced as provided for in Tariff
to June 17, valorem Act of 1922.
1930. and 7
cents per
pound.1
June 18, 1930, do. do. Crude, free under par. 1651 and refined dutiable under par.
to Apr. 30, 27 of Tariff Act of 1930.
1935.
May 1, 1935, to do. 20 percent ad Refined reduced under trade agreement with Belgium.2
— valorem
and 3½
cents per
pound.1
1 Ad valorem based on American selling price or United States value.
2 Generalized to all countries which do not discriminate against United States products.
Under the Tariff Act of 1930, crude naphthalene is on the free list[18] and refined naphthalene is
dutiable at 7 cents per pound and 40 percent ad valorem on the basis of American selling price, since it
is competitive with refined naphthalene produced in this country.[19] Under the trade agreement with
Belgium, effective May 1, 1935, the duty on refined naphthalene was reduced to 20 percent[20] ad
valorem and 3½ cents per pound on imports from that country. Under the Trade Agreements Act this
reduction applies also to imports from all other countries which do not discriminate against commerce of
the United States. In July 1938 Germany was the only one not receiving the reduced rate, exports from
that country being subject to the rates specified under the Tariff Act of 1930.
Import statistics.—Table 43 shows imports of crude naphthalene (solidifying at less than 79° C.) and
table 44 of refined naphthalene (solidifying at or above 79° C.) The unit invoice values of imports of
refined naphthalene in 1924, 1926, 1927, 1928, and 1935 indicate that the imported product was
probably not naphthalene as recorded but one of its derivatives provided for elsewhere in paragraph 27.
Table 43.—Crude naphthalene (solidifying at less than 79° C.): United States imports for consumption,
in specified years, 1919-37
Value per
Calendar year Rate of duty Quantity Value
pound
1,000 pounds
1919 Free 3,239 $92,265 $0.028
1920 do. 15,012 530,219 .035
1923 do. 20,992 575,702 .027
1924 do. 5,267 96,491 .018
1925 do. 1,980 26,593 .013
1926 do. 6,963 126,088 .018
1927 do. 6,576 131,436 .020
1928 do. 19,926 357,679 .018
1929 do. 35,007 598,718 .017
1930 do. 27,667 397,292 .014
1931 do. 30,971 318,578 .013
1932 do. 27,002 234,557 .009
1933 do. 42,786 451,019 .010
1934 do. 47,995 669,383 .014
1935 do. 48,455 643,249 .013
1936 do. 39,806 785,396 .020
19371 do. 52,664 1,133,157 .022
1 Preliminary.
Source: Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States.
Table 44.—Refined naphthalene (solidifying at or above 79° C): United States imports for consumption,
in specified years, 1919-37
Computed
Unit
Calendar year Rate of duty Quantity Value ad
value
valorem rate
Pounds Percent
1919 15 percent + 2½ cents per pound. 7,650 $384 $0.050 64.8
1920 do. 3,697,562 416,172 .112 37.2
1923 55 percent + 7 cents per pound 9,605 194 .020 401.6
1924 do. 4,549 1,147 .252 82.8
1925 do.
1926 40 percent + 7 cents per pound 424 125 .295 63.7
1927 do. 18,668 3,077 .165 82.5
1928 do. 27 6 .222 71.5
1929 do. ⎫
1930 do. ⎪
Jan. 1-June 17 ⎪
do.
June 18-Dec. 31 ⎬ None
1931 do. ⎪
1932 do. ⎪
1933 do. ⎭
1934 do. 66 6 .091 116.7
1935 do.1 99 31 .313 62.4
1936 20 percent + 3½ cents per pound2 30 20 .667 50.5
19373 do.2 5,055 1,085 .215 36.3
1 From Germany. No imports under trade agreement rate.
2 Belgo-Luxemburg trade agreement rate.
3 Preliminary.
Table 45 shows the principal sources of our imports of crude naphthalene in recent years. Germany
was the principal source until 1936; the United Kingdom, previously the next most important source, was
first in 1936 and 1937. In the last three years appreciable quantities have been received from Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union, hitherto unimportant sources.
Table 45.—Crude naphthalene (solidifying under 79° C.): United States imports for consumption from
principal sources, in specified years
Source 1929 1931 1933 1934 1935 1936 19371

Quantity in thousands of pounds
Germany 21,931 17,444 20,797 22,219 15,742 2,712 12,129
Belgium 2,531 253 4,970 7,314 2,388 2,025 1,995
United Kingdom 8,096 11,339 15,704 6,968 10,689 16,301 17,594
Poland and Danzig 5,766 5,075 1,969 2,312
Canada 1,488 331 223 1,073 76 255 734
Netherlands 44 937 1,092 621 1,344 3,794 3,359
Czechoslovakia 2,984 6,960 6,595 6,414
U. S. S. R. 1,050 6,158 5,145 7,091
All other countries 918 667 22 1,010 1,038
Total 35,007 30,971 42,786 47,995 48,455 39,806 52,664
Value
Germany $382,078 $170,463 $242,501 $326,607 $230,820 $75,314 $287,901
Belgium 48,508 2,506 57,243 90,424 31,375 55,503 51,227
United Kingdom 124,427 123,890 135,853 78,968 123,545 273,964 340,760
Poland and Danzig 89,002 63,992 35,439 55,184
Canada 23,344 3,808 2,729 18,703 1,169 4,093 7,941
Netherlands 614 11,837 12,693 8,739 19,724 105,404 93,045
Czechoslovakia 44,371 98,099 120,529 128,197
U. S. S. R. 12,569 74,354 97,815 146,331
All other countries 19,747 6,074 171 17,335 22,571
Total 598,718 318,578 451,019 669,383 643,249 785,396 1,133,157
Value per pound
Germany $0.017 $0.010 $0.012 $0.015 $0.015 $0.028 $0.024
Belgium .019 .010 .012 .012 .013 .027 .026
United Kingdom .015 .011 .009 .011 .012 .017 .019
Poland and Danzig .015 .013 .018 .024
Canada .016 .011 .012 .017 .015 .016 .011
Netherlands .014 .013 .012 .014 .015 .028 .028
Czechoslovakia .015 .014 .018 .020
U. S. S. R. .012 .012 .019 .021
All other countries .022 .009 .008 .017 .022
Average .017 .010 .011 .014 .013 .020 .022
Percent of total quantity
Germany 62.7 56.3 48.6 46.3 32.5 6.8 23.0
Belgium 7.2 .8 11.6 15.3 14.9 5.1 3.8
United Kingdom 23.1 36.6 36.7 14.5 22.0 41.0 33.4
Poland and Danzig 12.0 10.5 5.0 4.4
Canada 4.3 1.1 .5 2.2 .2 .6 1.4
Netherlands .1 3.0 2.6 1.3 2.8 9.5 6.4
Czechoslovakia 6.2 14.4 16.6 12.2
U. S. S. R. 2.2 12.7 12.9 13.4
All other countries 2.6 2.2 2.5 2.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1 Preliminary.
Source: Compiled from official statistics of the United States Department of Commerce.
United States exports.
Exports are not shown separately; it is doubtful if any naphthalene is exported. Demand in the United
States has exceeded domestic production.
Competitive conditions.
The commercial development and widespread application of surface coatings and finishes made from
alkyd resins, in which phthalic anhydride and glycerin are the principal components, has resulted in a
world-wide shortage of naphthalene, which is a raw material used in making phthalic anhydride. In
recent years about one-half of domestic requirements of crude naphthalene have been imported (see
table 46) from Europe, principally Germany and the United Kingdom. Increased demand for the same
purposes, in these countries, has so reduced the quantities available for export as to create a serious
shortage in the United States. Germany placed an embargo on exports late in 1935 and continued it
until late in 1937.
Table 46.—Crude naphthalene: United States production, imports, and apparent consumption in
specified years
Apparent Percent
Year Production1 Imports2 3 supplied by
consumption imports
1,000 pounds 1,000 pounds 1,000 pounds
1923 53,325 20,992 74,317 28
1927 53,601 6,577 60,178 11
1929 39,263 35,007 74,270 47
1931 20,934 30,971 51,905 60
1932 13,593 27,002 40,595 66
1933 30,621 42,786 73,407 58
1934 37,922 47,995 85,917 56
1935 47,653 48,455 96,108 50
1936 89,536 39,806 129,342 31
19374 115,979 52,664 168,643 31
1 From table 33.
2 From table 43.
3 Production plus imports.
4 Preliminary.
Vast quantities of naphthalene potentially available in this country were not recovered because of the
low prices prevailing until 1936. Since then an increase in the price of crude naphthalene from 1.55
cents to 2.5 cents and 3 cents per pound has stimulated production and has led to additional recovery.
PHTHALIC ANHYDRIDE
Phthalic anhydride is an aromatic polybasic organic acid anhydride made from naphthalene by vapor
phase catalytic oxidation. It is marketed as white needle-shaped crystals or flakes having a melting point
of 130° to 131° C. and boiling at 284° to 285° C. It is the cheapest and most widely used aromatic
organic acid. Its most important use is in the manufacture of synthetic resins of the alkyd type. Other
important uses are in dye intermediates; in phenolphthalein; in benzoic acid; in dyes such as indigo,
phloxines, rhodamines, erythrosines; and in esters such as dibutyl phthalate (widely used as a
plasticizer in nitrocellulose lacquers and films and of interest as a greaseless lubricant), diethyl phthalate
(used as a perfume fixative and denaturant of alcohol), dimethyl phthalate (used as a plasticizer in
cellulose acetate films), and diamyl phthalate (used as a plasticizer). Important new processes using
phthalic anhydride as a raw material include the syntheses of anthraquinone, substituted
anthraquinones, and benzoyl benzoic acid.
Before the World War phthalic anhydride was made by heating naphthalene with sulphuric acid in the
presence of mercury; the sulphuric acid acted as an oxidizer, and sulphur dioxide and carbon dioxide
were liberated. This process was used in Europe and in the United States to produce the small
quantities of phthalic anhydride needed for the manufacture of certain dyes and intermediates. It proved
highly unsatisfactory as to operation; the yield varying widely from batch to batch. The sales price of the
phthalic anhydride produced at that time was as high as $4.25 per pound, whereas it is 12 to 14 cents
per pound today.
In September 1916, Gibbs and Conover, working in the Color Laboratory of the Bureau of Chemistry
and Soils, United States Department of Agriculture, developed a process for the synthesis of phthalic
anhydride by the direct vapor phase catalytic oxidation of naphthalene. This work was done under the
United States Government’s wartime investigation of the manufacture of intermediates and dyes. Gibbs
and Conover were granted United States Patent No. 1,285,117 covering the basic process, and the
invention was assigned to the people of the United States. This process revolutionized the manufacture
of phthalic anhydride, causing the market price to drop to $2.85 per pound in 1918, to 46 cents per
pound in 1920, and to 13 cents in 1930. With each decline in price new outlets were found, and
domestic production increased practically every year, rising from 227,000 pounds in 1918 to 23,500,000
pounds in 1935.
By a remarkable coincidence the same basic process was developed in Germany, by Alfred Wohl, in
the laboratories of the Interessen Gemeinschaft Industrie A. G. (German I. G.), at almost the same time
that Gibbs and Conover made their discovery. In 1920 Wohl applied for a United States patent covering
this process, claiming invention in the summer of 1916. There was some doubt whether his discovery
had been made 2 months earlier or 3 days later than that of Gibbs and Conover, but in July 1934 the
United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the German
inventor, allowing Wohl’s claim filed with the German patent office on June 28, 1916. Therefore, Wohl’s
claim covering the air oxidization process was upheld and he was granted United States Patent No.
1,971,888, issued August 28, 1934 and assigned to the German I. G.
Several domestic firms began commercial production of phthalic anhydride about 1918 under the
patent of Gibbs and Conover and have since operated the process continuously. Such manufacturers
are presumably protected from possible patent litigation and the payment of royalties under the Wohl
patent by section 3 of the so-called Nolan Act of 1921, which states: “No patent granted or validated ...
shall affect the right of any citizen of the United States or his successor in business to continue the
manufacture, use, or sale commenced before the passage of this Act, nor shall the continued
manufacture, use, or sale by such citizen ... constitute an infringement.”
Table 47 shows the production and sales of phthalic anhydride from 1917 through 1937.
Table 47.—Phthalic anhydride: United States production and sales, 1917-37
Sales
Year Production Unit value
Quantity Value
Pounds Pounds
1917 138,857 138,857 $587,240 $4.23
1918 227,414 227,414 648,650 2.85
1919 290,677 290,677 290,037 .99
1920 796,210 796,210 362,431 .46
1921 202,471 202,471 79,162 .39
1922 1,629,182 1,317,625 461,944 .35
1923 2,343,802 2,091,100 596,508 .29
1924 2,787,308 2,277,073 556,265 .24
1925 3,900,332 3,560,429 701,840 .20
1926 4,379,108 3,446,175 604,949 .18
1927 4,549,820 4,064,476 686,946 .17
1928 6,030,854 5,445,432 888,156 .16
1929 9,168,946 7,450,037 1,147,953 .15
1930 6,693,001 5,614,012 724,909 .13
1931 (1)
1932 6,259,000 5,695,000 663,000 .12
1933 14,075,844 11,593,716 1,271,887 .11
1934 20,680,379 13,511,253 1,575,787 .12
1935 23,421,558 17,931,662 2,105,134 .12
1936 31,244,378 22,905,873 2,824,471 .12
1937 45,210,784 17,565,905 2,492,473 .14
1 Not available.
Source: Compiled from annual reports of the Tariff Commission on dyes and other synthetic organic
chemicals in the United States.
There are six domestic makers of phthalic anhydride, with producing units at Bridgeville, Pa., Buffalo,
N. Y., Philadelphia, Pa., Deepwater Point, N. J., Saint Louis, Mo., and Detroit, Mich. Five of these firms
have been producing in commercial quantities continuously for a number of years and it is therefore
believed that these companies may continue to produce without the payment of royalties. New
producers using this process, however, might be at a disadvantage unless licensed to operate without
the payment of royalties by the owner of the patent.
The production of phthalic anhydride has increased remarkably since the discovery of the vapor
phase catalytic process of manufacture. Until 1922 the only large outlet was the coal-tar dye industry.
The development of new uses for phthalic esters, principally dibutyl phthalate, increased the demand
during the period 1922-28. With the drop in price of phthalic anhydride, resins made from it and glycerin
became of commercial interest and about 1929 their production began to increase sharply. Most of the
increased output since that year is accounted for by its use in alkyd resins. As previously stated, surface
coatings made from these resins are now applied to practically all “indoor” surfaces, both wood and
metal, and to “outdoor” use on metal. Largely as a result of the growing popularity of surface coatings of
the alkyd type the domestic production of phthalic anhydride exceeded 45 million pounds in 1937 and
may reach 50 million pounds in 1938. This estimate is based on the present trend of consumption of
alkyd resins and current use therein of phthalic anhydride. Should other polybasic acids be used in
greater proportion the estimate would have to be revised. Considerable research work is being done on
certain polybasic acids, with very promising results in some instances. Maleic anhydride is being used
commercially, as are adipic acid, malic acid, and succinic acid. Other possibilities include such acids as
citric, tartaric, sebacic, fumaric, and oxalic.
Production in other countries.
Phthalic anhydride is manufactured in Germany, England, France, Italy, and Japan, but no statistics of
foreign production or of international trade are available. The output in Germany is known to be
increasing rapidly and is believed to be the principal reason for the German embargo on exports of
naphthalene.
In England there are two makers: Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., and Monsanto Chemicals, Ltd.
The latter is a branch of the American firm of the same name.
In Italy, production was started in 1928 by the A. C. N. A. at Cengio. Capacity is given as 600,000
pounds annually, and the process is essentially the same as in this country.
Japanese production is estimated at 6 million pounds a year. Nihon Seuryo’s plant is the principal
one, and the Nishijima mill, at Osaka, the next in importance.
United States foreign trade.
Imports of phthalic anhydride are dutiable under paragraph 27 at 7 cents per pound and 40 percent
ad valorem based on American selling price. There were practically no imports since the World War until
1937, when 223,431 pounds were imported from England to relieve a temporary shortage.
Exports, if any, are not shown separately in official statistics.
Competitive conditions.
Phthalic anhydride is the cheapest polybasic organic acid and therefore the most widely used in the
production of alkyd resins. The rapid rise in consumption of surface coatings and finishes made from
these resins presages greater demand for phthalic anhydride (and glycerin) in the future, particularly if
this type of outdoor finish for wood is successful.
The world-wide shortage of naphthalene, with attendant sharp increases in price, raises the question
of whether there may not be partial or complete replacement of phthalic anhydride by other polybasic
acids in certain types of alkyd resins. The probability of such replacement seems remote unless the use
of other polybasic acids, at present much higher priced, so improves the properties of the resins as to
give a superior product. Approximately 100 pounds of naphthalene are required to produce 109 pounds
of phthalic anhydride. Naphthalene at 3 cents per pound gives phthalic anhydride a raw material cost of
2.75 cents per pound as compared with 1.45 cents per pound when naphthalene was 1.55 cents per
pound. In other words, the increase of 1.5 cents per pound in naphthalene, meant an increase of only
about 1⅓ cents per pound in the raw material cost of phthalic anhydride, and only approximately ¼ cent
per pound in the raw material cost of an alkyd resin surface coating containing about 20-percent phthalic
anhydride.
POLYBASIC ACIDS OTHER THAN PHTHALIC ANHYDRIDE
Maleic acid and anhydride.
Maleic anhydride is obtained as a byproduct in the manufacture of phthalic anhydride and as a major
product by the vapor phase catalytic oxidation of benzene. Domestic production, still small compared
with phthalic anhydride, has increased many fold during the past two or three years. In 1937 there were
three producers of maleic anhydride, with an output totaling 2,114,176 pounds. The uses of maleic acid
derivatives other than in making resins are minor.
Malic acid and malomalic acid.
Malic acid is widely distributed in the vegetable kingdom, occurring especially in unripe apples.
Commercially it is obtained by synthesis. Domestic production was reported for the first time in 1935.
Malomalic acid is formed by heating malic acid. United States Patent No. 1,091,627 covers a resin
made from malic acid and glycerin which will increase the toughness of phthalate resins. United States
Patent No. 1,667,198 suggests the use of malomalic acid to form resins of glass-like appearance.
Adipic acid.
Adipic acid is made by oxidation of cyclohexanol. When condensed with glycerin it yields an alkyd
resin which is soft and rubbery and which does not harden when heated. Numerous patents have been
granted on the preparation of adipic acid and its resins. Commercial production of adipic acid was first
reported in 1935, and the output increased in 1936 and in 1937.
Succinic acid and anhydride.
Succinic acid is a white crystalline powder melting at 185° C. and boiling at 234° C., with
decomposition to succinic anhydride. It may be obtained by the reduction of maleic acid. Condensation
with glycerin gives a resin tougher and more flexible than is obtained with phthalic anhydride.
In 1937 there were two commercial producers of succinic acid. It is believed that small quantities are
used in combination with phthalic anhydride in alkyd resins.
Fumaric acid.
Fumaric acid is a white crystalline powder obtained by the prolonged heating of or by the action of
mineral acids on maleic acid. Fumaric acid and maleic acid are structurally identical and the former
decomposes at about 280° C., forming the latter. In 1937 there was one domestic maker of fumaric acid.
GLYCERIN
Glycerin (glycerol) is a clear, colorless or almost colorless, odorless, syrupy, hygroscopic liquid. It is
obtained as a byproduct of the soap and fatty acid (oleic acid or red oil and stearic acid) industries.
Other sources are insignificant; glycerin can be produced by the fermentation of carbohydrates such as
molasses, but when glycerin prices are low this process is not profitable. The chief commercial grades
of crude glycerin are “soap lye” glycerin, a byproduct of the soap industry, containing about 80 percent
glycerin, and “saponification” grade, a byproduct of the fatty acid industry, containing about 88 percent
glycerin. Chemically pure grades contain about 95 percent and dynamite grades about 98.5 percent
glycerin. Other grades include “30° yellow distilled” containing about 96 percent glycerin.
The uses of glycerin are extremely varied, the most important being in the manufacture of alkyd resins
and ester gums; in the manufacture of nitroglycerin and dynamite; as a moistening, antiseptic, and
sweetening agent in tobacco; in pharmaceutical and medicinal preparations; and in certain soft drinks,
soaps, and inks.
The output of both the crude and the refined has increased in recent years, reaching new highs in
1937. Chemically pure glycerin constitutes about 60 percent of the total refined output and dynamite and
other grades about 40 percent. In the production statistics shown in table 48, grades such as yellow
distilled are included with the dynamite grade. Since large soap makers refine their own crude glycerin,
the sale of crude is only a small part of the total output.
Table 48 shows domestic production of glycerin by grades and table 49 production for sale.
Table 48.—Glycerin: United States production by grades, in specified years, 1919-37

Census year Crude 80 Refined
percent basis
Chemically Dynamite Total
pure grade grade
1919 61,793 36,693 25,655 62,348
1920 54,688 32,860 31,571 64,431
1923 99,579 47,992 52,369 100,361
1924 95,154 53,243 37,368 90,611
1925 103,407 55,448 52,658 108,106
1926 116,369 64,460 49,579 114,039
1927 128,209 59,126 49,266 108,392
1928 130,499 66,419 46,622 113,041
1929 140,080 66,791 58,981 125,772
1930 138,675 69,654 50,974 120,628
1931 140,002 70,528 43,366 113,894
1932 133,919 63,624 41,539 105,163
1933 119,812 58,585 45,534 104,119
1934 153,115 80,359 48,553 128,912
1935 141,185 74,705 48,685 123,390
1936 154,096 85,386 47,535 132,921
1937 167,882 92,889 51,794 144,683
Source: Bureau of the Census, U. S. Department of Commerce.
Table 49.—Glycerin: United States production for sale, in specified years, 1919-35
Crude1 Refined
Year Value per Value per
Quantity Value Quantity Value
pound pound
1,000 pounds Cents 1,000 pounds Cents
1919 18,228 $2,482,779 13.6 47,377 $11,461,213 24.2
1923 27,444 3,124,470 11.4 74,105 12,214,012 16.5
1925 30,735 4,258,351 13.9 94,303 16,991,213 18.0
1927 27,000 3,942,991 14.6 89,585 19,184,806 21.4
1929 28,790 2,358,031 8.2 113,140 12,715,641 11.2
1931 27,530 1,673,733 6.1 102,510 10,316,347 10.1
19312 25,964 1,551,573 6.0 101,615 10,222,850 10.1
1933 22,161 1,191,000 5.4 107,853 7,915,000 7.3
1935 24,042 2,366,481 9.8 121,262 12,984,684 10.7
1 By chemical and soap manufacturing plants only.
2 Adjusted for comparison with 1933.
Source: Bureau of the Census, U. S. Department of Commerce.
Crude glycerin is produced by about 200 soap makers and by about 12 producers of fatty acids. Soap
factories are located in more than half the States, the principal ones being in Ohio, New York,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Illinois, California, and Pennsylvania; the fatty acid plants are located in
five or six States, Ohio being of chief importance. Most of the smaller producers sell their output of crude
glycerin. Refiners of glycerin are few in number compared to the producers of crude. The larger soap
plants refine their own crude glycerin and in addition purchase crude from other plants for refining.
The process of recovering glycerin consists of chemically treating weak glycerin solutions separated
from the soap or fatty acids, and then concentrating and distilling under reduced pressures. The
average yield is less than 10 percent but varies from about 9 to 12 percent, depending upon the kinds of
oils and fats used. When prices are high every effort is made to recover the maximum yield of glycerin;
when prices are low, cost of chemical treatment and distillation makes it advisable to allow more glycerin
to remain in the soap or to discard the weak solutions.
Production in other countries.
As in the United States, glycerin is produced in foreign countries, as a byproduct of the soap and fatty
acid industries. The United Kingdom, Germany, and France, and recently the Soviet Union, are the
leading producers. The output in each of these countries is estimated to be less than a third of the
output in the United States. The British Census of 1930 reports the production of crude glycerin in the
United Kingdom at 44 million pounds. Authentic statistics on production in other leading countries are
not available, but most estimates show lower figures than for the United Kingdom. In some European
countries the normal production of soap results in more glycerin than can be utilized.
International trade.
France is the principal net exporter of crude glycerin and the United Kingdom of refined glycerin. The
Netherlands, Germany, and France are also net exporters of refined glycerin. The international trade of
certain of the more important producing countries in crude and refined glycerin is shown in table 50.
Table 50.—Glycerin: Imports and exports of principal countries, 1931 and 1933-37

1931 1933 1934 1935 1936
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Ex
Crude:
UNITED STATES1 8,782 (2) 4,988 (3) 13,722 (3) 4,092 (2) 8,686
United Kingdom 1,702 2,662 4,778 2,951 472 2,825 1,119 2,365 2,322 3
Germany 4,120 2,313 5,232 2,939 4,746 1,599 4,091 326 8,247
France 1,269 7,962 426 3,488 (2) 862 (2) 1,176
Netherlands 5,133 859 3,027 2,300 2,605 3,796 5,441 4,912 7,185 5
Refined:
UNITED STATES 1,966 328 2,776 (3) 2,214 (3) 69 3,354 3,448 1
United Kingdom 2,519 9,926 822 19,834 230 19,134 2 15,032 12
Germany 102 10,092 57 3,562 224 3,818 108 1,571 30 1
France 178 3,989 109 1,246 51 12,249 4 12,118 10 9
Netherlands 618 8,337 1,144 6,620 1,008 5,955 694 5,516 739 8
Belgium 534 758 1,193 429 1,206 2,360 998 1,945 188 1
1 Imports from Cuba and the Philippines not included in the United States statistics. These imports,
consisting of crude glycerin, averaged about 2,200,000 pounds annually for the period 1931-37.
2 Included, if any, with refined.
3 Not separately reported.
4 Preliminary.
Source: Official statistics of each country.
United States imports.
Under the Tariff Act of 1922, paragraph 43, imports of crude glycerin were dutiable at 1 cent per
pound and refined glycerin at 2 cents per pound. The Tariff Act of 1930, paragraph 42, carries the same
rates. Imports of crude glycerin from Cuba enjoy a preferential rate; they were dutiable at 0.8 cent per
pound up to September 3, 1934, and at 0.4 cent per pound thereafter. Under the trade agreement with
the Netherlands, effective February 1, 1936, the rate on refined glycerin was reduced from 2 cents to 1⅔
cents per pound (⅔ cent plus regular rate on crude, but not more than 1⅔ cents). Under the trade
agreement with France, effective June 15, 1936, the rate on crude glycerin was reduced from 1 cent to
0.8 cent, which automatically further reduced the rate on refined glycerin to 1¹⁴⁄₃₀ (approximately 1.47)
cents per pound. The rates under these last two trade agreements are generalized to all countries which
do not discriminate against our commerce.
The amount of glycerin supplied by imports has greatly declined. Prior to the World War, imports of
crude glycerin ranged from 30 million to 40 million pounds annually. After the war imports were less and
after 1929 declined to comparatively small quantities, except in 1934. Imports of refined glycerin were
relatively unimportant until 1924, except in 1920. They amounted to almost 11 million pounds in 1926,
but declined thereafter. Some of the imports are reexported with benefit of drawback. In 1930, 1,006,164
pounds of imported crude glycerin and 396,792 pounds of imported refined were thus reexported,
chiefly in the refined grades. Corresponding figures in 1932 and 1933 were 197,331 and 111,753
pounds of crude, and 40,011 and 10,056 pounds of refined.
Statistics of imports other than from Cuba and the Philippines are given in table 51. Table 52 shows
imports of crude from Cuba and table 53 imports of crude from the Philippines.
Table 51.—Glycerin: United States imports1 for consumption 1919-20 and 1923-37
Computed
Quantity,
Calendar year Rate of duty Value Unit value ad valorem
1,000 pounds
rate, percent
Crude
1919 1 cent per pound 3,564 $417,774 $0.117 8.5
1920 do 22,272 2,912,430 .131 7.7
1923 do 14,120 1,382,249 .098 10.2
1924 do 13,659 1,413,593 .103 9.7
1925 do 18,624 2,161,413 .116 8.6
1926 do 26,729 3,849,222 .144 6.9
1927 do 13,666 2,026,175 .148 6.7
1928 do 3,889 282,615 .073 13.8
1929 do 13,681 786,598 .058 17.4
1930 do 10,022 577,406 .058 17.4
1931 do 8,782 446,897 .051 19.7
1932 do 3,952 145,329 .037 27.2
1933 do 4,988 176,080 .035 28.3
1934 do 13,722 932,389 .068 14.7
1935 do 4,092 353,925 .086 11.4
1936 Various2 8,686 936,312 .108 7.7
19373 do 10,171 1,716,351 .169 4.8
Refined
1919 2 cents per pound 39 4,471 .114 17.5
1920 do 5,382 1,170,030 .217 9.2
1923 do 586 76,994 .131 15.2
1924 do 1,501 229,897 .153 13.1
1925 do 2,044 305,796 .150 13.4
1926 do 10,839 2,328,936 .215 9.3
1927 do 8,289 1,697,330 .205 9.8
1928 do 4,218 450,247 .107 18.7
1929 do 5,358 489,575 .091 21.9
1930 do 3,137 265,093 .085 23.7
1931 do 1,966 140,975 .072 27.9
1932 do 2,348 142,359 .061 33.0
1933 do 2,776 166,991 .060 33.2
1934 do 2,214 208,989 .094 21.2
1935 do 69 8,277 .121 16.6
1936 Various2 3,447 594,036 .172 8.5
19373 do 7,535 1,827,189 .242 6.2
1 Does not include products of Cuba (duty less 20 percent) and the Philippine Islands (free).
2 For changes in rates, see p. 105.
3 Preliminary.
Table 52.—Crude glycerin: United States imports (for consumption) from Cuba, in specified years,
1919-37
Computed ad
Calendar year Rate of duty Quantity Value Unit value
valorem rate
1,000 pounds Percent
1919 ⁸⁄₁₀ cent per pound 249 $27,023 $0.108 7.4
1920 do 139 21,941 .158 5.1
1923 do 429 47,438 .111 7.2
1924 do 768 85,971 .112 7.2
1925 do 624 73,538 .118 6.8
1926 do 835 134,893 .162 5.0
1927 do 1,119 170,723 .153 5.2
1928 do 690 48,963 .071 11.3
1929 do 921 60,158 .065 12.2
1930 do 843 53,905 .064
1931 do 1,171 67,709 .058 13.8
1932 do 1,232 50,147 .041 19.7
1933 do 1,216 56,737 .047 17.2
1934 Various1 1,178 92,692 .079
1935 ⁴⁄₁₀ cent per pound 2,551 228,011 .089 4.5
1936 do 2,160 230,340 .107 3.8
19372 do 2,477 381,683 .154
1 Trade agreement of ⁴⁄₁₀ cent per pound, effective Sept. 3, 1934.
2 Preliminary.
Table 53.—Crude glycerin: United States imports (for consumption) from Philippine Islands 1925-37
Calendar year Rate of duty Quantity Value Unit value

1,000 pounds
1925 Free 16 $1,418 $0.089

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Cyber Law and Ethics: Regulation of

the Connected World 1st Edition Mark

Law and the Regulation of Scientific Research: Trusting

The Regulation of Product Standards in World Trade Law

Law and Economics of Regulation 1st Edition Klaus

The Ethics of Architecture 1st Edition Mark Kingwell

Primary Mathematics 3A Hoerst

Cyber Law in Israel 1st Edition Gabriel Hallevy

The Handbook of Communication Rights Law and Ethics 1st

Competition Law of the EC and UK 6th Edition Mark Furse

A primer on legal issues relating to cyberspace, this textbook introduces business,

Mark Grabowski is Associate Professor of Communications at Adelphi

Eric P. Robinson is Assistant Professor at the University of South Carolina,

Mark Grabowski and Eric P. Robinson

1 Origins of the Internet 1

2 Who Controls the Internet? 20

3 How Are Internet Regulations Made? 33

4 Freedom of Speech in an Online World 53

5 Limitations on Online Speech 67

7 Intellectual Property 114

8 Online Business and the Law 142

9 Network Neutrality 156

11 Online Gaming 193

12 Emerging Issues in Cyber Law 208

Case Index 223

Mark Grabowski is an associate pro-

History of the Internet

The Sputnik Scare

The Birth of the ARPAnet

The Network Grows

The World Wide Web

9 Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).

THE INTERNET BY THE NUMBERS

users worldwide are in Asia; only about 7% of Internet users reside

The start of an artificial intelligence (AI) revolution presents equal uncer-

Models of Internet Regulation

Self-Governance Model: The self-governance or self-regulation model insists that

Examples of Conflicting Laws

Why Existing Remedies are Inadequate

A Universal Regulatory Scheme: An international convention could lead to a treaty

Description and uses.

United States production.

Table 33.—Crude naphthalene: United States production, 1918-37

By producers of tar By purchasers of tar Total production

Table 34.—Refined naphthalene: United States production and sales, 1917-37

Organization of the industry.—There are 10 domestic producers of crude naphthalene, operating 52

[In thousands of pounds]

UNITED STATES 30,620 47,653

Netherlands 115,000 115,000

Belgium 11,025 125,000

Czechoslovakia 6,835 10,805

Poland 15,000 18,000

Spain 11,250 12,000

Italy 12,500 13,000

Canada 12,000 13,000

Total 269,128 362,988

Source: Official statistics of the several countries and consular reports.

[In thousands of pounds]

1 Production plus imports, minus exports.

Table 37.—Naphthalene: Production in Great Britain, in specified years

Source: Consular reports.

Table 38.—Naphthalene: Exports from the United Kingdom

1 Conversion to dollars at annual average quotations of the Federal Reserve Board.

Case Index 223

9 Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).