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Democracy: A Very Short Introduction
 VERY SHORT INTRODUCTIONS are for anyone wanting a stimulating
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Very Short Introduction to everything from Psychology and Philosophy of
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Very Short Introductions available now:

ABOLITIONISM Richard S. Newman AMERICAN IMMIGRATION

THE ABRAHAMIC RELIGIONS
Charles L. Cohen
ACCOUNTING Christopher Nobes
ADDICTION Keith Humphreys
ADOLESCENCE Peter K. Smith
THEODOR W. ADORNO
Andrew Bowie
ADVERTISING Winston Fletcher
AERIAL WARFARE Frank Ledwidge
AESTHETICS Bence Nanay
AFRICAN AMERICAN HISTORY
Jonathan Scott Holloway
AFRICAN AMERICAN RELIGION
Eddie S. Glaude Jr
AFRICAN HISTORY John Parker and
Richard Rathbone
AFRICAN POLITICS Ian Taylor
AFRICAN RELIGIONS
Jacob K. Olupona
AGEING Nancy A. Pachana
AGNOSTICISM Robin Le Poidevin
AGRICULTURE Paul Brassley and
Richard Soffe
ALEXANDER THE GREAT
Hugh Bowden
ALGEBRA Peter M. Higgins
AMERICAN BUSINESS HISTORY
Walter A. Friedman
AMERICAN CULTURAL HISTORY
Eric Avila
AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS
Andrew Preston
AMERICAN HISTORY Paul S. Boyer
David A. Gerber
AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL
HISTORY
Jennifer Ratner-­Rosenhagen
THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM
Charles L. Zelden
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY
G. Edward White
AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY
Joseph T. Glatthaar
AMERICAN NAVAL HISTORY
Craig L. Symonds
AMERICAN POETRY David Caplan
AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY
Donald Critchlow
AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES
AND ELECTIONS L. Sandy Maisel
AMERICAN POLITICS
Richard M. Valelly
THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY
Charles O. Jones
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
Robert J. Allison
AMERICAN SLAVERY
Heather Andrea Williams
THE AMERICAN SOUTH
Charles Reagan Wilson
THE AMERICAN WEST
Stephen Aron
AMERICAN WOMEN’S HISTORY
Susan Ware
AMPHIBIANS T. S. Kemp
ANAESTHESIA Aidan O’Donnell
ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
Michael Beaney
ANARCHISM Alex Prichard
ANCIENT ASSYRIA Karen Radner
ANCIENT EGYPT Ian Shaw
ANCIENT EGYPTIAN ART AND
ARCHITECTURE Christina Riggs
ANCIENT GREECE Paul Cartledge
ANCIENT GREEK AND ROMAN
SCIENCE Liba Taub
THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST
Amanda H. Podany
ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY Julia Annas
ANCIENT WARFARE
Harry Sidebottom
ANGELS David Albert Jones
ANGLICANISM Mark Chapman
THE ANGLO-SAXON AGE John Blair
ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR
Tristram D. Wyatt
THE ANIMAL KINGDOM
Peter Holland
ANIMAL RIGHTS David DeGrazia
ANSELM Thomas Williams
THE ANTARCTIC Klaus Dodds
ANTHROPOCENE Erle C. Ellis
ANTISEMITISM Steven Beller
ANXIETY Daniel Freeman and
Jason Freeman
THE APOCRYPHAL GOSPELS
Paul Foster
APPLIED MATHEMATICS
Alain Goriely
THOMAS AQUINAS Fergus Kerr
ARBITRATION Thomas Schultz and
Thomas Grant
ARCHAEOLOGY Paul Bahn
ARCHITECTURE Andrew Ballantyne
THE ARCTIC Klaus Dodds and
Jamie Woodward
HANNAH ARENDT Dana Villa
ARISTOCRACY William Doyle
ARISTOTLE Jonathan Barnes
ART HISTORY Dana Arnold
ART THEORY Cynthia Freeland
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Margaret A. Boden
ASIAN AMERICAN HISTORY
Madeline Y. Hsu
ASTROBIOLOGY David C. Catling
ASTROPHYSICS James Binney
ATHEISM Julian Baggini
THE ATMOSPHERE Paul I. Palmer
AUGUSTINE Henry Chadwick
JANE AUSTEN Tom Keymer
AUSTRALIA Kenneth Morgan
AUTISM Uta Frith
AUTOBIOGRAPHY Laura Marcus
THE AVANT GARDE
David Cottington
THE AZTECS Davíd Carrasco
BABYLONIA Trevor Bryce
BACTERIA Sebastian G. B. Amyes
BANKING John Goddard and
John O. S. Wilson
BARTHES Jonathan Culler
THE BEATS David Sterritt
BEAUTY Roger Scruton
LUDWIG VAN BEETHOVEN
Mark Evan Bonds
BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS
Michelle Baddeley
BESTSELLERS John Sutherland
THE BIBLE John Riches
BIBLICAL ARCHAEOLOGY
Eric H. Cline
BIG DATA Dawn E. Holmes
BIOCHEMISTRY Mark Lorch
BIOGEOGRAPHY Mark V. Lomolino
BIOGRAPHY Hermione Lee
BIOMETRICS Michael Fairhurst
ELIZABETH BISHOP
Jonathan F. S. Post
BLACK HOLES Katherine Blundell
BLASPHEMY Yvonne Sherwood
BLOOD Chris Cooper
THE BLUES Elijah Wald
THE BODY Chris Shilling
THE BOHEMIANS David Weir
NIELS BOHR J. L. Heilbron
THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER
Brian Cummings
THE BOOK OF MORMON
Terryl Givens
BORDERS Alexander C. Diener and
Joshua Hagen
THE BRAIN Michael O’Shea
BRANDING Robert Jones
THE BRICS Andrew F. Cooper
BRITISH CINEMA Charles Barr
THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION
Martin Loughlin
THE BRITISH EMPIRE Ashley Jackson
BRITISH POLITICS Tony Wright
BUDDHA Michael Carrithers
BUDDHISM Damien Keown
BUDDHIST ETHICS Damien Keown
BYZANTIUM Peter Sarris
CALVINISM Jon Balserak
ALBERT CAMUS Oliver Gloag
CANADA Donald Wright
CANCER Nicholas James
CAPITALISM James Fulcher
CATHOLICISM Gerald O’Collins
CAUSATION Stephen Mumford and
Rani Lill Anjum
THE CELL Terence Allen and
Graham Cowling
THE CELTS Barry Cunliffe
CHAOS Leonard Smith
GEOFFREY CHAUCER David Wallace
CHEMISTRY Peter Atkins
CHILD PSYCHOLOGY Usha Goswami
CHILDREN’S LITERATURE
Kimberley Reynolds
CHINESE LITERATURE Sabina Knight
CHOICE THEORY Michael Allingham
CHRISTIAN ART Beth Williamson
CHRISTIAN ETHICS D. Stephen Long
CHRISTIANITY Linda Woodhead
CIRCADIAN RHYTHMS
Russell Foster and Leon Kreitzman
CITIZENSHIP Richard Bellamy
CITY PLANNING Carl Abbott
CIVIL ENGINEERING David Muir Wood
THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
Thomas C. Holt
CLASSICAL LITERATURE William Allan
CLASSICAL MYTHOLOGY
Helen Morales
CLASSICS Mary Beard and
John Henderson
CLAUSEWITZ Michael Howard
CLIMATE Mark Maslin
CLIMATE CHANGE Mark Maslin
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY
Susan Llewelyn and
Katie Aafjes-van Doorn
COGNITIVE BEHAVIOURAL
THERAPY Freda McManus
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE
Richard Passingham
THE COLD WAR Robert J. McMahon
COLONIAL AMERICA Alan Taylor
COLONIAL LATIN AMERICAN
LITERATURE Rolena Adorno
COMBINATORICS Robin Wilson
COMEDY Matthew Bevis
COMMUNISM Leslie Holmes
COMPARATIVE LITERATURE
Ben Hutchinson
COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST
LAW Ariel Ezrachi
COMPLEXITY John H. Holland
THE COMPUTER Darrel Ince
COMPUTER SCIENCE
Subrata Dasgupta
CONCENTRATION CAMPS
Dan Stone
CONDENSED MATTER PHYSICS
Ross H. McKenzie
CONFUCIANISM Daniel K. Gardner
THE CONQUISTADORS
Matthew Restall and
Felipe Fernández-Armesto
CONSCIENCE Paul Strohm
CONSCIOUSNESS Susan Blackmore
CONTEMPORARY ART
Julian Stallabrass
CONTEMPORARY FICTION
Robert Eaglestone
CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY
Simon Critchley
COPERNICUS Owen Gingerich
CORAL REEFS Charles Sheppard
CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY Jeremy Moon
CORRUPTION Leslie Holmes
COSMOLOGY Peter Coles
COUNTRY MUSIC Richard Carlin
CREATIVITY Vlad Glăveanu
CRIME FICTION Richard Bradford
CRIMINAL JUSTICE Julian V. Roberts
CRIMINOLOGY Tim Newburn
CRITICAL THEORY
Stephen Eric Bronner
THE CRUSADES Christopher Tyerman
CRYPTOGRAPHY Fred Piper and
Sean Murphy
CRYSTALLOGRAPHY A. M. Glazer
THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION
Richard Curt Kraus
DADA AND SURREALISM
David Hopkins
DANTE Peter Hainsworth and
David Robey
DARWIN Jonathan Howard
THE DEAD SEA SCROLLS
Timothy H. Lim
DECADENCE David Weir
DECOLONIZATION Dane Kennedy
DEMENTIA Kathleen Taylor
DEMOCRACY Naomi Zack
DEMOGRAPHY Sarah Harper
DEPRESSION Jan Scott and
Mary Jane Tacchi
DERRIDA Simon Glendinning
DESCARTES Tom Sorell
DESERTS Nick Middleton
DESIGN John Heskett
DEVELOPMENT Ian Goldin
DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY
Lewis Wolpert
THE DEVIL Darren Oldridge
DIASPORA Kevin Kenny
CHARLES DICKENS Jenny Hartley
DICTIONARIES Lynda Mugglestone
DINOSAURS David Norman
DIPLOMATIC HISTORY
Joseph M. Siracusa
DOCUMENTARY FILM
Patricia Aufderheide
DREAMING J. Allan Hobson
DRUGS Les Iversen
DRUIDS Barry Cunliffe
DYNASTY Jeroen Duindam
DYSLEXIA Margaret J. Snowling
EARLY MUSIC Thomas Forrest Kelly
THE EARTH Martin Redfern
EARTH SYSTEM SCIENCE Tim Lenton
ECOLOGY Jaboury Ghazoul
ECONOMICS Partha Dasgupta
EDUCATION Gary Thomas
EGYPTIAN MYTH Geraldine Pinch
EIGHTEENTH‑CENTURY BRITAIN
Paul Langford
THE ELEMENTS Philip Ball
EMOTION Dylan Evans
EMPIRE Stephen Howe
EMPLOYMENT LAW David Cabrelli
ENERGY SYSTEMS Nick Jenkins
ENGELS Terrell Carver
ENGINEERING David Blockley
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
Simon Horobin
ENGLISH LITERATURE Jonathan Bate
THE ENLIGHTENMENT
John Robertson
ENTREPRENEURSHIP Paul Westhead
and Mike Wright
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS
Stephen Smith
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
Robin Attfield
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Elizabeth Fisher
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS
Andrew Dobson
ENZYMES Paul Engel
EPICUREANISM Catherine Wilson
EPIDEMIOLOGY Rodolfo Saracci
ETHICS Simon Blackburn
ETHNOMUSICOLOGY Timothy Rice
THE ETRUSCANS Christopher Smith
EUGENICS Philippa Levine
THE EUROPEAN UNION
Simon Usherwood and John Pinder
EUROPEAN UNION LAW
Anthony Arnull
EVANGELICALISM
John G. Stackhouse Jr.
EVIL Luke Russell
EVOLUTION Brian and
Deborah Charlesworth
EXISTENTIALISM Thomas Flynn
EXPLORATION Stewart A. Weaver
EXTINCTION Paul B. Wignall
THE EYE Michael Land
FAIRY TALE Marina Warner
FAMILY LAW Jonathan Herring
MICHAEL FARADAY
Frank A. J. L. James
FASCISM Kevin Passmore
FASHION Rebecca Arnold
FEDERALISM Mark J. Rozell and
Clyde Wilcox
FEMINISM Margaret Walters
FILM Michael Wood
FILM MUSIC Kathryn Kalinak
FILM NOIR James Naremore
FIRE Andrew C. Scott
THE FIRST WORLD WAR
Michael Howard
FLUID MECHANICS Eric Lauga
FOLK MUSIC Mark Slobin
FOOD John Krebs
FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY
David Canter
FORENSIC SCIENCE Jim Fraser
FORESTS Jaboury Ghazoul
FOSSILS Keith Thomson
FOUCAULT Gary Gutting
THE FOUNDING FATHERS
R. B. Bernstein
FRACTALS Kenneth Falconer
FREE SPEECH Nigel Warburton
FREE WILL Thomas Pink
FREEMASONRY Andreas Önnerfors
FRENCH LITERATURE John D. Lyons
FRENCH PHILOSOPHY
Stephen Gaukroger and Knox Peden
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION
William Doyle
FREUD Anthony Storr
FUNDAMENTALISM Malise Ruthven
FUNGI Nicholas P. Money
THE FUTURE Jennifer M. Gidley
GALAXIES John Gribbin
GALILEO Stillman Drake
GAME THEORY Ken Binmore
GANDHI Bhikhu Parekh
GARDEN HISTORY Gordon Campbell
GENES Jonathan Slack
GENIUS Andrew Robinson
GENOMICS John Archibald
GEOGRAPHY John Matthews and
David Herbert
GEOLOGY Jan Zalasiewicz
GEOMETRY Maciej Dunajski
GEOPHYSICS William Lowrie
GEOPOLITICS Klaus Dodds
GERMAN LITERATURE Nicholas Boyle
GERMAN PHILOSOPHY
Andrew Bowie
THE GHETTO Bryan Cheyette
GLACIATION David J. A. Evans
GLOBAL CATASTROPHES Bill McGuire
GLOBAL ECONOMIC HISTORY
Robert C. Allen
GLOBAL ISLAM Nile Green
GLOBALIZATION Manfred B. Steger
GOD John Bowker
GÖDEL’S THEOREM A. W. Moore
GOETHE Ritchie Robertson
THE GOTHIC Nick Groom
GOVERNANCE Mark Bevir
GRAVITY Timothy Clifton
THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND
THE NEW DEAL Eric Rauchway
HABEAS CORPUS Amanda L. Tyler
HABERMAS James Gordon Finlayson
THE HABSBURG EMPIRE
Martyn Rady
HAPPINESS Daniel M. Haybron
THE HARLEM RENAISSANCE
Cheryl A. Wall
THE HEBREW BIBLE AS LITERATURE
Tod Linafelt
HEGEL Peter Singer
HEIDEGGER Michael Inwood
THE HELLENISTIC AGE
Peter Thonemann
HEREDITY John Waller
HERMENEUTICS Jens Zimmermann
HERODOTUS Jennifer T. Roberts
HIEROGLYPHS Penelope Wilson
HINDUISM Kim Knott
HISTORY John H. Arnold
THE HISTORY OF ASTRONOMY
Michael Hoskin
THE HISTORY OF CHEMISTRY
William H. Brock
THE HISTORY OF CHILDHOOD
James Marten
THE HISTORY OF CINEMA
Geoffrey Nowell-Smith
THE HISTORY OF COMPUTING
Doron Swade
THE HISTORY OF EMOTIONS
Thomas Dixon
THE HISTORY OF LIFE
Michael Benton
THE HISTORY OF MATHEMATICS
Jacqueline Stedall
THE HISTORY OF MEDICINE
William Bynum
THE HISTORY OF PHYSICS
J. L. Heilbron
THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL
THOUGHT Richard Whatmore
THE HISTORY OF TIME
Leofranc Holford‑Strevens
HIV AND AIDS Alan Whiteside
HOBBES Richard Tuck
HOLLYWOOD Peter Decherney
THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE
Joachim Whaley
HOME Michael Allen Fox
HOMER Barbara Graziosi
HORMONES Martin Luck
HORROR Darryl Jones
HUMAN ANATOMY
Leslie Klenerman
HUMAN EVOLUTION Bernard Wood
HUMAN PHYSIOLOGY
Jamie A. Davies
HUMAN RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT Adrian Wilkinson
HUMAN RIGHTS Andrew Clapham
HUMANISM Stephen Law
HUME James A. Harris
HUMOUR Noël Carroll
THE ICE AGE Jamie Woodward
IDENTITY Florian Coulmas
IDEOLOGY Michael Freeden
THE IMMUNE SYSTEM
Paul Klenerman
INDIAN CINEMA
Ashish Rajadhyaksha
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Sue Hamilton
THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
Robert C. Allen
INFECTIOUS DISEASE Marta L. Wayne
and Benjamin M. Bolker
INFINITY Ian Stewart
INFORMATION Luciano Floridi
INNOVATION Mark Dodgson and
David Gann
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Siva Vaidhyanathan
INTELLIGENCE Ian J. Deary
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Vaughan Lowe
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION
Khalid Koser
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Christian Reus-Smit
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
Christopher S. Browning
INSECTS Simon Leather
IRAN Ali M. Ansari
ISLAM Malise Ruthven
ISLAMIC HISTORY Adam Silverstein
ISLAMIC LAW Mashood A. Baderin
ISOTOPES Rob Ellam
ITALIAN LITERATURE
Peter Hainsworth and David Robey
HENRY JAMES Susan L. Mizruchi
JAPANESE LITERATURE Alan Tansman
JESUS Richard Bauckham
JEWISH HISTORY David N. Myers
JEWISH LITERATURE Ilan Stavans
JOURNALISM Ian Hargreaves
JAMES JOYCE Colin MacCabe
JUDAISM Norman Solomon
JUNG Anthony Stevens
THE JURY Renée Lettow Lerner
KABBALAH Joseph Dan
KAFKA Ritchie Robertson
KANT Roger Scruton
KEYNES Robert Skidelsky
KIERKEGAARD Patrick Gardiner
KNOWLEDGE Jennifer Nagel
THE KORAN Michael Cook
KOREA Michael J. Seth
LAKES Warwick F. Vincent
LANDSCAPE ARCHITECTURE
Ian H. Thompson
LANDSCAPES AND
GEOMORPHOLOGY
Andrew Goudie and Heather Viles
LANGUAGES Stephen R. Anderson
LATE ANTIQUITY Gillian Clark
LAW Raymond Wacks
THE LAWS OF THERMODYNAMICS
Peter Atkins
LEADERSHIP Keith Grint
LEARNING Mark Haselgrove
LEIBNIZ Maria Rosa Antognazza
C. S. LEWIS James Como
LIBERALISM Michael Freeden
LIGHT Ian Walmsley
LINCOLN Allen C. Guelzo
LINGUISTICS Peter Matthews
LITERARY THEORY Jonathan Culler
LOCKE John Dunn
LOGIC Graham Priest
LOVE Ronald de Sousa
MARTIN LUTHER Scott H. Hendrix
MACHIAVELLI Quentin Skinner
MADNESS Andrew Scull
MAGIC Owen Davies
MAGNA CARTA Nicholas Vincent
MAGNETISM Stephen Blundell
MALTHUS Donald Winch
MAMMALS T. S. Kemp
MANAGEMENT John Hendry
NELSON MANDELA Elleke Boehmer
MAO Delia Davin
MARINE BIOLOGY Philip V. Mladenov
MARKETING
Kenneth Le Meunier-FitzHugh
THE MARQUIS DE SADE John Phillips
MARTYRDOM Jolyon Mitchell
MARX Peter Singer
MATERIALS Christopher Hall
MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS
Richard Earl
MATHEMATICAL FINANCE
Mark H. A. Davis
MATHEMATICS Timothy Gowers
MATTER Geoff Cottrell
THE MAYA Matthew Restall and
Amara Solari
THE MEANING OF LIFE
Terry Eagleton
MEASUREMENT David Hand
MEDICAL ETHICS Michael Dunn and
Tony Hope
MEDICAL LAW Charles Foster
MEDIEVAL BRITAIN John Gillingham
and Ralph A. Griffiths
MEDIEVAL LITERATURE
Elaine Treharne
MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY
John Marenbon
MEMORY Jonathan K. Foster
METAPHYSICS Stephen Mumford
METHODISM William J. Abraham
THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION
Alan Knight
MICROBIOLOGY Nicholas P. Money
MICROBIOMES Angela E. Douglas
MICROECONOMICS Avinash Dixit
MICROSCOPY Terence Allen
THE MIDDLE AGES Miri Rubin
MILITARY JUSTICE Eugene R. Fidell
MILITARY STRATEGY
Antulio J. Echevarria II
JOHN STUART MILL Gregory Claeys
MINERALS David Vaughan
MIRACLES Yujin Nagasawa
MODERN ARCHITECTURE
Adam Sharr
MODERN ART David Cottington
MODERN BRAZIL Anthony W. Pereira
MODERN CHINA Rana Mitter
MODERN DRAMA
Kirsten E. Shepherd-Barr
MODERN FRANCE
Vanessa R. Schwartz
MODERN INDIA Craig Jeffrey
MODERN IRELAND Senia Pašeta
MODERN ITALY Anna Cento Bull
MODERN JAPAN
Christopher Goto-Jones
MODERN LATIN AMERICAN
LITERATURE
Roberto González Echevarría
MODERN WAR Richard English
MODERNISM Christopher Butler
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY Aysha Divan
and Janice A. Royds
MOLECULES Philip Ball
MONASTICISM Stephen J. Davis
THE MONGOLS Morris Rossabi
MONTAIGNE William M. Hamlin
MOONS David A. Rothery
MORMONISM
Richard Lyman Bushman
MOUNTAINS Martin F. Price
MUHAMMAD Jonathan A. C. Brown
MULTICULTURALISM Ali Rattansi
MULTILINGUALISM John C. Maher
MUSIC Nicholas Cook
MUSIC AND TECHNOLOGY
Mark Katz
MYTH Robert A. Segal
NANOTECHNOLOGY Philip Moriarty
NAPOLEON David A. Bell
THE NAPOLEONIC WARS
Mike Rapport
NATIONALISM Steven Grosby
NATIVE AMERICAN LITERATURE
Sean Teuton
NAVIGATION Jim Bennett
NAZI GERMANY Jane Caplan
NEGOTIATION Carrie Menkel-Meadow
NEOLIBERALISM Manfred B. Steger
and Ravi K. Roy
NETWORKS Guido Caldarelli and
Michele Catanzaro
THE NEW TESTAMENT
Luke Timothy Johnson
THE NEW TESTAMENT AS
LITERATURE Kyle Keefer
NEWTON Robert Iliffe
NIETZSCHE Michael Tanner
NINETEENTH‑CENTURY BRITAIN
Christopher Harvie and
H. C. G. Matthew
THE NORMAN CONQUEST
George Garnett
NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS
Theda Perdue and Michael D. Green
NORTHERN IRELAND
Marc Mulholland
NOTHING Frank Close
NUCLEAR PHYSICS Frank Close
NUCLEAR POWER Maxwell Irvine
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Joseph M. Siracusa
NUMBER THEORY Robin Wilson
NUMBERS Peter M. Higgins
NUTRITION David A. Bender
OBJECTIVITY Stephen Gaukroger
OBSERVATIONAL ASTRONOMY
Geoff Cottrell
OCEANS Dorrik Stow
THE OLD TESTAMENT
Michael D. Coogan
THE ORCHESTRA D. Kern Holoman
ORGANIC CHEMISTRY
Graham Patrick
ORGANIZATIONS Mary Jo Hatch
ORGANIZED CRIME
Georgios A. Antonopoulos and
Georgios Papanicolaou
ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY
A. Edward Siecienski
OVID Llewelyn Morgan
PAGANISM Owen Davies
PAKISTAN Pippa Virdee
THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI
CONFLICT Martin Bunton
PANDEMICS Christian W. McMillen
PARTICLE PHYSICS Frank Close
PAUL E. P. Sanders
IVAN PAVLOV Daniel P. Todes
PEACE Oliver P. Richmond
PENTECOSTALISM William K. Kay
PERCEPTION Brian Rogers
THE PERIODIC TABLE Eric R. Scerri
PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD
Timothy Williamson
PHILOSOPHY Edward Craig
PHILOSOPHY IN THE ISLAMIC
WORLD Peter Adamson
PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY
Samir Okasha
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
Raymond Wacks
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
Barbara Gail Montero
PHILOSOPHY OF PHYSICS
David Wallace
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Samir Okasha
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
Tim Bayne
PHOTOGRAPHY Steve Edwards
PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY Peter Atkins
PHYSICS Sidney Perkowitz
PILGRIMAGE Ian Reader
PLAGUE Paul Slack
PLANETARY SYSTEMS
Raymond T. Pierrehumbert
PLANETS David A. Rothery
PLANTS Timothy Walker
PLATE TECTONICS Peter Molnar
PLATO Julia Annas
POETRY Bernard O’Donoghue
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY David Miller
POLITICS Kenneth Minogue
POLYGAMY Sarah M. S. Pearsall
POPULISM Cas Mudde and
Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser
POSTCOLONIALISM
Robert J. C. Young
POSTMODERNISM Christopher Butler
POSTSTRUCTURALISM
Catherine Belsey
POVERTY Philip N. Jefferson
PREHISTORY Chris Gosden
PRESOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY
Catherine Osborne
PRIVACY Raymond Wacks
PROBABILITY John Haigh
PROGRESSIVISM Walter Nugent
PROHIBITION W. J. Rorabaugh
PROJECTS Andrew Davies
PROTESTANTISM Mark A. Noll
PSEUDOSCIENCE Michael D. Gordin.
PSYCHIATRY Tom Burns
PSYCHOANALYSIS Daniel Pick
PSYCHOLOGY Gillian Butler and
Freda McManus
PSYCHOLOGY OF MUSIC
Elizabeth Hellmuth Margulis
PSYCHOPATHY Essi Viding
PSYCHOTHERAPY Tom Burns and
Eva Burns-Lundgren
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Stella Z. Theodoulou and Ravi K. Roy
PUBLIC HEALTH Virginia Berridge
PURITANISM Francis J. Bremer
THE QUAKERS Pink Dandelion
QUANTUM THEORY
John Polkinghorne
RACISM Ali Rattansi
RADIOACTIVITY Claudio Tuniz
RASTAFARI Ennis B. Edmonds
READING Belinda Jack
THE REAGAN REVOLUTION Gil Troy
REALITY Jan Westerhoff
RECONSTRUCTION Allen C. Guelzo
THE REFORMATION Peter Marshall
REFUGEES Gil Loescher
RELATIVITY Russell Stannard
RELIGION Thomas A. Tweed
RELIGION IN AMERICA Timothy Beal
THE RENAISSANCE Jerry Brotton
RENAISSANCE ART
Geraldine A. Johnson
RENEWABLE ENERGY Nick Jelley
REPTILES T. S. Kemp
REVOLUTIONS Jack A. Goldstone
RHETORIC Richard Toye
RISK Baruch Fischhoff and John Kadvany
RITUAL Barry Stephenson
RIVERS Nick Middleton
ROBOTICS Alan Winfield
ROCKS Jan Zalasiewicz
ROMAN BRITAIN Peter Salway
THE ROMAN EMPIRE
Christopher Kelly
THE ROMAN REPUBLIC
David M. Gwynn
ROMANTICISM Michael Ferber
ROUSSEAU Robert Wokler
RUSSELL A. C. Grayling
THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY
Richard Connolly
RUSSIAN HISTORY Geoffrey Hosking
RUSSIAN LITERATURE Catriona Kelly
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
S. A. Smith
SAINTS Simon Yarrow
SAMURAI Michael Wert
SAVANNAS Peter A. Furley
SCEPTICISM Duncan Pritchard
SCHIZOPHRENIA Chris Frith and
Eve Johnstone
SCHOPENHAUER
Christopher Janaway
SCIENCE AND RELIGION
Thomas Dixon and Adam R. Shapiro
SCIENCE FICTION David Seed
THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION
Lawrence M. Principe
SCOTLAND Rab Houston
SECULARISM Andrew Copson
SEXUAL SELECTION Marlene Zuk and
Leigh W. Simmons
SEXUALITY Véronique Mottier
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE
Stanley Wells
SHAKESPEARE’S COMEDIES
Bart van Es
SHAKESPEARE’S SONNETS AND
POEMS Jonathan F. S. Post
SHAKESPEARE’S TRAGEDIES
Stanley Wells
GEORGE BERNARD SHAW
Christopher Wixson
MARY SHELLEY Charlotte Gordon
THE SHORT STORY Andrew Kahn
SIKHISM Eleanor Nesbitt
SILENT FILM Donna Kornhaber
THE SILK ROAD James A. Millward
SLANG Jonathon Green
SLEEP Steven W. Lockley and
Russell G. Foster
SMELL Matthew Cobb
ADAM SMITH Christopher J. Berry
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
ANTHROPOLOGY
John Monaghan and Peter Just
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
Richard J. Crisp
SOCIAL WORK Sally Holland and
Jonathan Scourfield
SOCIALISM Michael Newman
SOCIOLINGUISTICS John Edwards
SOCIOLOGY Steve Bruce
SOCRATES C. C. W. Taylor
SOFT MATTER Tom McLeish
SOUND Mike Goldsmith
SOUTHEAST ASIA James R. Rush
THE SOVIET UNION Stephen Lovell
THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR
Helen Graham
SPANISH LITERATURE Jo Labanyi
THE SPARTANS Andrew J. Bayliss
SPINOZA Roger Scruton
SPIRITUALITY Philip Sheldrake
SPORT Mike Cronin
STARS Andrew King
STATISTICS David J. Hand
STEM CELLS Jonathan Slack
STOICISM Brad Inwood
STRUCTURAL ENGINEERING
David Blockley
STUART BRITAIN John Morrill
SUBURBS Carl Abbott
THE SUN Philip Judge
SUPERCONDUCTIVITY
Stephen Blundell
SUPERSTITION Stuart Vyse
SYMMETRY Ian Stewart
SYNAESTHESIA Julia Simner
SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY Jamie A. Davies
SYSTEMS BIOLOGY Eberhard O. Voit
TAXATION Stephen Smith
TEETH Peter S. Ungar
TERRORISM Charles Townshend
THEATRE Marvin Carlson
THEOLOGY David F. Ford
THINKING AND REASONING
Jonathan St B. T. Evans
THOUGHT Tim Bayne
TIBETAN BUDDHISM
Matthew T. Kapstein
TIDES David George Bowers and
Emyr Martyn Roberts
TIME Jenann Ismael
TOCQUEVILLE Harvey C. Mansfield
LEO TOLSTOY Liza Knapp
TOPOLOGY Richard Earl
TRAGEDY Adrian Poole
TRANSLATION Matthew Reynolds
THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES
Michael S. Neiberg
TRIGONOMETRY
Glen Van Brummelen
THE TROJAN WAR Eric H. Cline
TRUST Katherine Hawley
THE TUDORS John Guy
TWENTIETH‑CENTURY BRITAIN
Kenneth O. Morgan
TYPOGRAPHY Paul Luna
THE UNITED NATIONS
Jussi M. Hanhimäki
UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES
David Palfreyman and Paul Temple
THE U.S. CIVIL WAR Louis P. Masur
THE U.S. CONGRESS Donald A. Ritchie
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
David J. Bodenhamer
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
Linda Greenhouse
UTILITARIANISM
Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and
Peter Singer
UTOPIANISM Lyman Tower Sargent
VATICAN II Shaun Blanchard and
Stephen Bullivant
VETERINARY SCIENCE James Yeates
THE VIKINGS Julian D. Richards
VIOLENCE Philip Dwyer
THE VIRGIN MARY
Mary Joan Winn Leith
THE VIRTUES Craig A. Boyd and
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VIRUSES Dorothy H. Crawford
VOLCANOES Michael J. Branney and
Jan Zalasiewicz
VOLTAIRE Nicholas Cronk
WAR AND RELIGION Jolyon Mitchell
and Joshua Rey
WAR AND TECHNOLOGY
Alex Roland
WATER John Finney
WAVES Mike Goldsmith
WEATHER Storm Dunlop
THE WELFARE STATE David Garland
WITCHCRAFT Malcolm Gaskill
WITTGENSTEIN A. C. Grayling
WORK Stephen Fineman
WORLD MUSIC Philip Bohlman
WORLD MYTHOLOGY David Leeming WRITING AND SCRIPT
THE WORLD TRADE Andrew Robinson
ORGANIZATION Amrita Narlikar ZIONISM Michael Stanislawski
WORLD WAR II Gerhard L. Weinberg ÉMILE ZOLA Brian Nelson

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www.oup.com/vsi/
 Naomi Zack

DEMOCRACY
A Very Short Introduction
 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
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© Naomi Zack 2023
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To my granddaughters, Cloe and Winona, may
democracy continue to get better in your time
Contents

Acknowledgments xix

List of illustrations xxi

1 Thinking about democracy: tools for understanding 1

2 Democracy in the ancient world: Greece, Rome,

and beyond 18

3 Democracy in the medieval and Renaissance world 33

4 The social contract: consent of those governed 46

5 Rights and revolutions: (exclusive) political equality 62

6 Social progressivism: toward democracy in society 77

7 New democracies and new conceptions of democracy 97

8 The future of democracy: threats and resilience 112

Appendix: US Bill of Rights, 1789; The Declaration of

the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 1789; UN Universal
Declaration of Human Rights 129

References 145

Further reading 151

Index 157
Acknowledgments

The text for this VSI was written and revised over a two-­year
period. I am very grateful to my students at Lehman College,
CUNY, for their feedback on early versions of the manuscript as
I taught different iterations of a course called “Democracy:
Intellectual and Historical Developments.” Imogene Haslam,
as Project Editor, has provided expert coordination through
production. Thanks also to Production Management Executive
Ethiraju Saraswathi of Straive.com, for overseeing production.
My greatest debt for the coherence and readability of the book
is to Dr. Latha Menon, Senior Commissioning Editor for the
VSI Series. Latha provideded invaluable support through
revisions of both the initial proposal and the completed
manuscript. Her advice and editing were extraordinarily
conscientious and incisive, and I thank her for the existence of
the book.

Naomi Zack
Bronx, NY
March 3, 2023
List of illustrations
1 “Trump Supporters Hold ‘Stop
The Steal’ Rally In DC Amid
Ratification Of Presidential
Election” 2
Samuel Corum/Stringer
2 Cleisthenes of Sicyon at the
Olympic Games 19
Photo by The Print
Collector/Hulton
Archive/Getty
3 “Joan at the walls of Paris,”
c.1860 34
© iStock/Andrew Howe
4 Leviathan of Hobbes after
stamp from the 17th
century 52
© iStock/Grafissimo
5 The inauguration of George
Washington as the first
President of the United
States 66
Original Artwork: Printed by Currier
& Ives. Photo by MPI/Getty Images
6 Vintage engraving of sketches
from the Women’s Suffrage
meeting at St James’s Hall,
London, 1884 93
© iStock/duncan 1890
7 Flying military airplanes
and machine guns 98
© iStock/narvikk
8 Greta Thunberg speaks at the
United Nations, September
23, 2019 113
Spencer Platt/Getty Images
Chapter 1
Thinking about democracy:
tools for understanding

People who live in democracies, especially rich democracies, are

generally safe and comfortable. They have opportunities for
self-­advancement and are optimistic about the future. More
people attempt to immigrate than are admitted. That is the ideal,
and the benefits of democracy are easily taken for granted by those
who have them. Others, who are poor, non-­white, non-­male,
disabled, non-­heterosexual, or non-­binary cannot take the ideal as
reality. They aspire to or demand the benefits of democracy and,
what is very important, believe that democracy itself allows for
them to attain its benefits.

Complacency about democracy, for both those who have its

benefits and those who strive for them, was jolted during
President Trump’s administration in the United States. On
January 6, 2021, after Trump had lost the 2020 election and
called it “stolen,” his supporters stormed the US capitol, with some
chanting “Hang Mike Pence,” the Vice-­President, whose job it was
to preside over the Senate certification of the 2020 election
(Figure 1). This violent uprising was quelled, hundreds were
criminally charged and sentenced, and congressional investigation
followed. But many conservatives, progressives, activists, and legal
scholars believe that American democracy is “in peril.” They are
reacting to both the eruption of violence and disorder on January 6,

1
 1. “Trump Supporters Hold ‘Stop The Steal’ Rally In DC Amid
Ratification Of Presidential Election.”
Democracy

and its intent to disrupt normal democratic procedures for the

peaceful transition of government after a democratic election.

Such dangers to democratic procedures are not limited to

American politics. Internationally, threats to democracy can be
existential. Russian military aggression against Ukraine in early
2022 breached the security of a democratic sovereign nation. If a
democratic sovereign nation is taken over by an undemocratic
one, internal democracy will collapse. Internal democracy may
also be threatened by elected officials with authoritarian ties and
leanings. When French President Emmanuel Macron handily won
re-­election against right-­wing populist candidate Marine LePen in
April 2022 (58.5 percent to 41.5 percent), the democratic world of
NATO and the US heartily congratulated him and breathed a sigh
of relief.

Both internal and external threats to democracy make it urgent to

think systematically about what democracy is and how it came

2
about, so that it can be protected. From a philosophical-­historical
perspective, that is the purpose of this book. What is democracy?
What it means now is different from what it meant in the ancient
world or the 18th century. Even today, not all that is called
“democracy” resembles what people who live in real democracies
mean by the word. Still, some past meanings of “democracy” that
would not qualify as “democracy” now contributed to our present
ideals and realities of democracy. We can start with several general
definitions: Democracies are nations containing both
governments and their societies that are democratic; Democracy
is an ideal for the best form of government and its related society;
Democracies are democratic practices and institutions in both
government and society. The word “democracy” thus refers to
actual nations and societies, forms of government, and political
practices. But what makes them democratic?

Thinking about democracy

The Pew Research Center refers to 2017 sources that ranked the
195 countries in the world according to how democratic they are,
based on: electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, the
functioning of government, political participation, and political
culture. Specific factors are considered to be very important:
freeness and fairness of national elections, security of voters,
protection against foreign-­power influence, and the capability of
civil servants to implement policies. The quality of political life is
also important. According to all these measures, although about
half of all the world’s countries can be considered democracies,
only 22 are “full” democracies. Pew ranked them in order: Norway,
Iceland, Sweden, New Zealand, Finland, Ireland, Denmark,
Canada, Australia, Switzerland, Netherlands, Luxembourg,
Germany, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Austria, Spain, Mauritius,
Costa Rica, France, Chile, Portugal. Another 46 countries,
including the United States, were assessed as “flawed”
democracies. Of course, any such ranking is subject to criticism of
the standards used and how they have been applied and
computed. But the overall project tells us how expert observers
now view democracies.
3
 In this Very Short Introduction to democracy, I will begin by
providing a descriptive philosophical distinction considering
different instances of democracy and uses of the word. This is the
distinction between the concept of democracy and conceptions of
democracy. It is like the distinction between fruit and apples or
pears, or between dogs and poodles and basset hounds. Not
everyone will welcome this distinction, so I will also discuss
normative ideals of democracy that claim to express what
democracy really is. Statements of such ideals are normative,
because they imply that actors in the real world should strive for
them. The second section is about actual democracies and forms
of democratic government, and the third section is a consideration
of traditional and alternative historical approaches to democracy.
Finally, I offer a brief discussion of my methodology in the book,
together with an overview of Chapters 2–8.

Conceptual and normative approaches

Democracy

As a philosopher, I prefer to view democracy as a concept that

almost everyone can grasp. A concept is an idea that is the shared
meaning of a word. Because it can be widely shared, the concept
of democracy is abstract and general. As abstract, the concept
does not refer to anything in reality—it is a thought. As general,
the concept of democracy is also vague, but it can refer to all of its
concrete instances that specify it in ways that are meant to
describe conditions in the world, and it also refers to all of its
conceptions. A conception of democracy is a description of a
particular meaning of the abstract concept. A conception of
democracy is more particular than the abstract general concept.
For instance, we can say of the concept of democracy that it
vaguely and generally means that those who are governed have a
say in that government. A conception of democracy might specify
universal suffrage so that all adult citizens can vote. A competing
conception of democracy may specify that only those adults who
are educated or own property can vote. Conceptions of democracy
change over time and place. Our present best conception of
4
democracy may include universal recognition of human rights.
That is a relatively new conception, dating from the 1948 United
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (see Appendix).
Older conceptions of democracy excluded certain humans from
rights recognition. And future conceptions of democracy may
extend the recognition of rights to non-­human life forms.

However, there is no guarantee that future conceptions of

democracy will continue to be more inclusive, or “better.” And
there may also be arguably (contested or competing) best
conceptions of democracy in the present. Whether reasoning over
past, present, and future, or considering competing or contested
conceptions of democracy in the present, it is important to
emphasize that there is nothing relative about such competing
conceptions, because arguments need to be made for which is the

Thinking about democracy

best conception at any given time.

The word “democracy” refers to a mental “something” that is its

concept—a concept is the meaning of a word—and this concept
need not refer to any actual thing outside of people’s minds. The
concept of democracy is, again, vaguely, a kind of government in
which those governed have influence over that government.
Governments have been called “democratic” if they have a division
of powers, elections are free, the majority can make decisions for
everyone, the rights of individuals are respected by the
government, those governed are treated equally, there is a free
press and free dissent, and those governed generally consent to
their existing government but retain a right to change it. None of
these traits of democratic government define “democracy,” because
not everyone who uses the word means all or most of them, or
even perhaps any of them. But as a general, shared concept,
democracy vaguely refers to a form of government in which those
governed consent to their government and are able and allowed to
participate in it. But this is still not a fully adequate definition
because a vague concept cannot be defined. However, a concept
can be specified through its conceptions.
5
 The democratic traits already mentioned and others that are
associated with the concept of democracy have been and can
continue to be combined, fleshed out, and applied, according to
different conceptions of democracy. Conceptions of democracy
specify it in a particular time and place—conceptions of
democracy depend on their contexts. Past conceptions of
democracy may include or leave out factors important to our
modern conceptions of democracy. For example, from the ancient
world until well into the 19th century, the leading conception of
democracy permitted slavery, but no one today would include
slavery in their conception of democracy.

The word “democracy” thus refers to both an abstract concept and

its more concrete conceptions. Real nations with democratic
governments are also called “democracies.” Democracies usually
include, in founding documents or traditional practices (or both),
rule by law and practices that uphold political freedoms. The
Democracy

leading conception of democracy in the early 21st century is an

ideal of morally good government. Past conceptions of democracy
have varied from (negative) descriptions of mob rule in the
ancient world, to advocacy of rights for middle-­class white men in
the modern period, to Marxist ideas of the ascendancy of the
working class. Through both affirmation and criticism, these past
conceptions have led to present progressive conceptions that
center justice and equality for all, including racial and ethnic
minorities, women, LGBTQ+(?) people, the poor, indigenous
people, disabled people, and other disadvantaged human groups.

Conceptions of democracy need not be explicit, because a group

may suddenly arise to demand democratic treatment that was
previously denied, without naming the conception of democracy
that it is invoking. Still, a theorist may be able to infer implicit or
inchoate conceptions. For instance, demands for greater
government protection against gun violence rely on a conception
of democratic government as a central authority that keeps the
peace. Gun owners and manufacturers may lobby against
6
government regulation of gun ownership and sales, based on a
conception of democracy that holds individual liberty sacrosanct.

The concept of democracy thus supports multiple conceptions.

This variety in conception does not mean that differences are
merely semantic. Rather, different conceptions of democracy are
associated with different concrete past and present circumstances.
And they may describe existing democratic governments. For
example, after the Civil War, US conceptions of democracy
excluded slavery, whereas before the Civil War, slavery was
included. Approaching specific ideas about democracy as
conceptions of the general concept allows us to recognize ideas
about democracy that we may not accept now. This is not
relativism, because it can be shown that some conceptions of
democracy are more democratic than others. For instance, a

Thinking about democracy

conception of democracy that excludes slavery is more democratic
than one which includes it.

Conceptions of democracy are not “just ideas,” because they are

related to real governments and institutions. If a conception of
democracy is aspirational—and not only descriptive—it should
be possible to explain how it can come about, that is, what existing
government structures or social institutions it builds on or
could innovate. For example, women’s suffrage was included in
19th-­century conceptions of democracy, before women were
allowed to vote; the absence of legal slavery was part of a
conception of democracy before slavery was outlawed. In both
cases, it was possible and ultimately practical to describe
democracy without exclusively male suffrage or slavery. A
conception of democracy in which animals have rights or stronger
environmental preservation is legally protected would require
recognition of animal-­rights human advocacy or the need to
expand existing environmental protection legislation.

Aspirational conceptions of democracy have histories in political

movements, as well as changes toward greater inclusion within
7
 governments that are already democratic. Political aspiration can
inspire individuals and move multitudes to demand government
change, through rhetoric, scholarly treatises, and popular
demonstration and protest. For instance, the 2011 Occupy
Movement in the United States raised international awareness of
unprecedented inequalities in wealth and income, as support and
protests spread to 951 cities in 82 countries. But this awareness
did not quickly result in legal changes to economic inequalities.

Leading conceptions of democracy change over time. During the

second half of the 20th century until the present, both progressive
activist movements and scholarly work have been motivated by a
democratic conception of social equality. Activists and academics
in the humanities and social sciences have often been the
avant-­garde of new, egalitarian conceptions of democracy.
Activists have protested undemocratic or unjust treatment of
members of disadvantaged groups in society, such as women,
Democracy

LGBTQ+(?) groups, people of color, and disabled people.

Academics have sought to analyze, ameliorate, and improve the
conditions of these groups by forging new subfields across existing
disciplines, such as feminism, critical race theory, philosophy of
race, and post-­colonial studies. There have also been innovations
in scholarly methods: standpoint theory aims to give voice to
those excluded or powerless, by speaking from their
circumstances; intersectionality focuses on those who experience
multiple oppressions. Both new subfields in existing disciplines
and methodological innovations, together with activism based on
them, may ultimately motivate new conceptions of democracy.

Not everyone would be receptive to the philosophical concept–­

conception distinction of meanings of “democracy” that I am
proposing. One reason is that it sounds relative, as though all
conceptions are equally good. Some begin with what they think
democracy really is, as an ideal that does or does not exist in
reality. A contrast between that ideal can be made with what is

8
called “democracy” that falls short of the ideal, with the
implication that what falls short of the ideal should be brought up
to it. The “should” makes this comparison a normative approach.
Defining democracy in this normative way allows for the
identification of democratic failure at a given time (as in the
rankings described earlier) or misnomer. For instance, when a
nation with an authoritarian government calls itself a democracy,
those with a contemporary normative ideal of democracy can say
that nation is not a democracy. But, as noted, arguments can also
be provided in favor of a particular conception of democracy.
(In this case, comparison of what is called “democracy” between
authoritarian and non-­authoritarian conceptions.) So the
difference between a concept–­conception approach and a
contextualized normative approach may not amount to much.

Thinking about democracy

However, direct normative approaches to democracy do seek
moral justification, with a number of plausible reasons that point
to benefits for those democratically governed: Democracy allows
for the interests of those governed to be furthered through their
political participation; Democratic government functions better;
Democratic decision making draws on broad intellectual
resources; Democracy supports individual liberty and autonomy,
which are intrinsic human goods, and at the same time, there is
public (transparent) decision making that treats people as equals,
in the parts of their lives shared under government. These are
moral issues because they pertain to human well-­being. But,
moral reasons can also be given in favor of or against different
conceptions of democracy. Sometimes, the morally bad nature of a
conception of democracy, for instance one that approves slavery, is
self-­evident. But other times, moral value may be debatable, for
instance in discussion about the compatibility of capitalism with
democracy. Throughout this book, I will find the concept–­
conception distinction for ideas of democracy useful, together
with the implied understanding that not all conceptions of
democracy are morally or ethically equal.

9
 Factors of democracy
Governments are ruling institutions in society that perform
functions, such as taxation and defense, which less powerful parts
of society cannot do on their own. Governments also have
ultimate physical power or force, within their societies.
Historically, democracies have been actual national governments
that express their norms of government in founding documents,
laws, and/or traditional practices. Democratic governments are
distinguished by their histories and the cultures within societies
associated with them. After the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the
traditional unit of democracy has been the nation state, as a
geographically bounded sovereign entity. Democracies are nations
with democratic governments.

Many accounts of the founding and origins of democratic nation

states feature relief from cruel and unjust tyranny and exploitive
Democracy

oppression. Democratic governmental structures were also

designed to restrain human greed for wealth and power, although
only among elites until the 20th century. With free speech,
democracies allow for ongoing criticism and disagreement about
these restraints. For example, objection to inequalities of wealth
and income by those who have less may be countered by the
inertia of such inequality or even efforts to increase it. This
process of disagreement has no natural equilibrium and
democracies are not set up to achieve that. Still, in general, several
conceptual tools are useful for understanding how democracy and
democracies work: inclusion; participatory or direct versus
representative government; divisions of government powers;
federalism.

Inclusion and participation. Two major questions have structured

both actual democratic governments and conceptions of them:
Who are the people who will have a say in governing? This is the
question of inclusion. Should democratic government be direct or

10
representative? This is the question of participation. The question
of inclusion involves the voting and participation rights of citizens,
which were first restricted to adult male property owners. It can
be answered historically through descriptions of the expansion of
suffrage to include poor men, women, and members of racial and
ethnic minority groups. The second question is related to the first
in terms of the formal structure of government, and in the modern
period it has largely been answered in favor of representative over
direct democracy: The people—however they are designated at a
given time—democratically elect their representatives, who will
carry out the functions of government.

Direct or participatory democracy allows for those governed to

directly make government decisions. In otherwise representative
governments, popular referenda may sometimes be held and that

Thinking about democracy

is another instance of direct democracy. Examples of recent
referenda include the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the
European Union in 2016 and the US State of California’s rejection
of Affirmative Action in 2020. Direct democracy sounds as though
it is more democratic than representative democracy and it is if
the electorate is small enough so that all members can participate.
But there can be direct democracy with only an elite part of the
population allowed to participate, as in ancient Greece, and there
can be representative government with universal adult suffrage, as
in modern democracies.

Broad universal adult suffrage can also be restricted by

gerrymandering or politically drawing the boundaries of electoral
districts so that members of specific groups do not have sufficient
majorities to carry a district. Voter suppression may outright bar
racial or ethnic minorities from polling places or create obstacles
to voting that mainly apply to them. Gerrymandering and voter
suppression involve both inclusion and participation.

Over the modern period, disputes about changes within what are
considered the most democratic governments have been about
11
 who should be permitted to have a say in government, that is, who
should be included within participants. After the American
Revolutionary period, there was ardent disagreement about
whether the new country should be set up as a democracy or a
republic, which roughly meant direct versus representative
democracy. It was then assumed and approved that representative
government would filter out uninformed voters. By the 19th
century, fears of universal suffrage were expressed as fear of how
working-­class people could be manipulated by the rich and well
educated. In The English Constitution (1867), Walter Bagehot
called this a change of vox populi into vox diaboli. Such concern
about an under-­educated electorate carries into present worries
about the circulation of conspiracy theories and the spread of
conservative white-­supremacist and xenophobic populism.

The distinction between democracies and republics has further

importance if democracies are simply governed by majority rule,
Democracy

in contrast to governments in republics that can safeguard the

rights of [numerical] minorities when the majority votes to
infringe them. Benjamin Franklin’s remark, “It’s a republic, if you
can keep it,” referred to apprehensions among US founders of the
winner-­takes-­all dangers of party politics. Democracy was suspect,
because the majority was believed to be uninformed or biased
against elite minorities—the majority might be unjust after
gaining power.

Divisions within government. Conceptions of democratic

governments have emphasized rule by law that provides for both
divisions within central government powers and sub-­national
government structures. Constitutions specifying basic citizen
rights, general principles of government, and the structure of
government may be written out, as in the United States, or based
on well-­established legal traditions, as in the United Kingdom.
Democratic division of government is in accord with the doctrine
attributed to Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu’s The
Spirit of Law published in 1748. Montesquieu’s main idea was that
12
those who make the laws, the legislature, have power and
authority distinct from the executive, who heads the government
and applies the laws; an independent judiciary is a third power
capable of checking both the executive and legislature.

Federalism. Not all democracies consist of simply one government

with authority over those governed. Federalism is a government
structure that divides power between a national, central
government, and smaller, usually geographical units, such as
states. Some federal systems, as in Canada, assign more power to
the national government; others to states, as in the United States,
although central and state powers and authority frequently
overlap. Overall, the authority of the national government and its
constitution usually pre-­empt the authority of state governments
and their constitutions. The division of government power can be

Thinking about democracy

quite complicated, so that government power is shared beyond the
broad divisions in federal systems. State governments within the
United States may share their powers with more local government
units such as counties, cities, boroughs, and townships. Many
different arrangements are possible and different interests require
open negotiations and a general sense of commonality and
cooperation in order to avoid constitutional crises, civil war,
gridlock, or towns where neighbors hate one another.

Power divisions in federal systems can have real teeth. In the

United States, during the COVID-­19 pandemic, politically
Democratic states imposed stricter mitigation measures than
Republican states. This difference was possible because US states
have jurisdiction over public health. Before the 2022 mid-­term
election, Republican state legislatures passed voter restriction
rules that are believed to be obstacles to minority voting. Such
political party differences can become ad hoc government
structures that further or undermine ideals of democracy. Both
federalism and partisan politics show that we should not assume
that democratic nation states are thoroughly unified by a national
government. Rather, the differences and disagreements among
13
 and within state and local governments amount to a democratic
structure among more local governments—excluding civil war.

Democracy is not limited to forms of government within nation

states. There are also relations among nations, and institutions
within societies connected to respective governments. Global
democratic relations among nations remain aspirational in the
early 21st century. Superpowers dominate throughout the world,
sometimes in unstable détente, and there are extreme gaps in
rights and human well-­being among nations. Diplomatic
processes have resulted in international agreements such as trade
treaties, cooperative regulative projects, and military alliances.
Diplomatic negotiations are also constant. In addition, democratic
nations may newly emerge.

Overall, sovereignty is the most important characteristic of

democratic nations or divisions within them. Sovereignty
Democracy

entails a freedom to act among other political units. The

individual’s counterpart to sovereignty is autonomy, a liberty to
do anything that the law does not forbid. (The double negative
is necessary here, because usually only what is unlawful is
explicitly defined.)

Historical approaches to democracy

World Western dominance has been reflected in dominant
Western conceptions of democracy. Since the 17th century,
Westerners have assumed that democracy was reinvented in the
Euro-­American tradition, in direct descent from democracy in
ancient Greece and Rome. Thus, leading historical accounts often
begin with ancient Greece and Rome and then go straight to the
Magna Carta, the American Revolution, and the French
Revolution. As a result, non-­Western democratic practices in Asia,
Africa, the Middle East, and among indigenous groups—albeit
some of them in institutions and regions within nations—have not
received robust scholarly attention. Also, historical accounts often
14
omit consideration of democratic institutions and practices in
medieval Europe.

Nobel laureate Amartya Sen has attributed part of this neglect to a

Western emphasis on voting, compared to free public discourse.
Sen believes that Eurocentric racism also contributes to such
omissions. Many of the overlooked historical democratic practices
emphasized free public discussion and criticism or public reason,
without broad electoral practices.

In considering intellectual and historical conceptions of

democracy, it is vital to recognize the inherently disruptive effects
of new conceptions of democracy and changes into democratic
government. New democratic arrangements instituted by
government are likely to contradict existing status rankings and

Thinking about democracy

well-­established hierarchies of privilege in society. Philosopher
Jacques Rancière argues in his 2007 Hatred of Democracy that the
spontaneity of democratic demands means that democracy is
“government of anybody and everybody.” Rancière claims that as a
result, those with rank and status who are already in power in
both society and government hate democracy.

Those seeking to expand democracy within a nation state or make

it more inclusive are usually motivated by conceptions of justice.
The concept of justice, like the concept of democracy, is vaguely,
but universally grasped. The concept of justice is more abstract
and general than the concept of democracy and some conceptions
of democracy may seem unjust in comparison to others. Many
could not say what their conception of justice is. Instead, injustice
is more easily and likely to be identified. Protests and
demonstrations may suddenly erupt against an immediate
outrage, to be accompanied with chants of “No Justice, No Peace.”
The concept of justice, which includes people getting what they
morally deserve, according to decisions made by government
officials, only vaguely connotes a kind of order or the restoration
of order in society under government.
15
 In this VSI, I aim to combine historical contexts with key ideas or
themes that are relevant to present democratic realities and ideals.
The themes of what we—people of good will, humanitarians,
progressives, political scholars—now consider to be democracy or
democratic can be related to past ideas in their historical contexts.
Sometimes thinkers have directly influenced political events and
other times they have been influenced by them. Overall, influence
may be a slow process, with insights of one century not coming to
fruition in reality until the next century, or even later. The
relationship between history and ideas is complicated and even
mysterious. But it seems natural to study them together, ideas in
their historical contexts and political periods with their
accompanying ideas. Ideas and realities in their times go together.
However, I am not providing historical narratives to connect
historical events, but rather to contextualize historical thought
about democracy. The result should be a historically
contextualized story of conceptions of democracy from the ancient
Democracy

world to the present—from a philosophical perspective. In

retrospect, this story suggests connections between ideas and
events, or at least our ability to say, “If not for X, Y would have
been very different.” For instance, without social contract theory,
the American and French revolutions would have had different
justifications. And without the moral reform perspectives of
Rousseau, Bentham, Mill, and Marx, ideas and movements
toward democracy in society, outside of government, might not
have occurred when they did. By the same token, it does not
require a philosopher to point out the cumulative effects of
democratic institutions over time. For instance, democratic
deliberative bodies throughout the world supported the
development of democratic structures in modern nation states.

Over the following chapters, democracy in the ancient world

(Chapter 2) is followed by democratic structures in the medieval
and Renaissance period (Chapter 3). The social contract is then
explored as the theme of early modern statecraft (Chapter 4).
Rights became important goals during the American and French
16
revolutions (Chapter 5). Nineteenth-­century moral progressivism
was an important shift in focus from democratic government to
democratic society (Chapter 6). The period of World War II
influenced much of 20th-­century thought about democracy, as
well as new forms of activism (Chapter 7). Finally, although we
can consider only history and current events, we do know the
shape of current threats to democracy. Problems such as climate
change, pandemics, and undemocratic populism will likely need
to be addressed in the future (Chapter 8).

The general subject of democracy is more complicated from a

philosophical perspective than a first approach might reveal. As a
result, analysis might seem too dry for the spirit of democracy and
its almost universal appeal. But it is my hope that the trajectory of
the book will kindle political optimism in readers. Democracy,

Thinking about democracy

even when people falsely believe that something is democratic
when it is not, has a distinctive spirit. The descendants of people
who are passionate about preserving what they consider
democracy now may look back and shake their heads. But they
will do so because they think that what they consider democracy
to be much better, much more democratic. And we hope they will
be right.

17
Chapter 2
Democracy in the ancient
world: Greece, Rome,
and beyond

Some historians have speculated that before recorded history and

the institution of government, hunter-­gatherer groups were
democratic, because they shared work and property. Survival of all
would have required cooperation and even altruism. Decisions
may have been made by vote or acclaim. There is no path from
unrecorded to recorded history, but such speculation gets us
thinking about democracy in units smaller than nations. Indeed,
recorded history provides evidence of democracy in much smaller
political units than nations, which have supported democracy in
larger units that encompass them or learn from them. We also
know that democracy can spread.

We imagine democracy coming from the people who want a say in

government. Ironically, though, democracy in ancient Athens
grew out of conflicts within the nobility. Cleisthenes of Athens
(c.570 bc –­c.508 bc ) was a scion of the Alcmaeonid family,
prominent in politics since the 8th century bc . Cleisthenes
(Figure 2) was named after his maternal grandfather Cleisthenes,
Tyrant of Sicyon. Cleisthenes of Sicyon and Alcmaeon, who was
the paternal grandfather of Cleisthenes of Athens, had been allies
in a holy war to protect the Delphic Oracle. Victory was celebrated
with the revival of the Pythian Games, at which Cleisthenes of
Sicyon won the first chariot race in 582 bc . However, the

18
2. Cleisthenes of Sicyon at the Olympic Games.

Democracy in the ancient world

Alcmaeonids had earlier been cursed on the advice of the Delphic
Oracle and were twice exiled from Athens. Cleisthenes of Athens
was able to return to Athens when he was about 45 and he was
recorded as chief archon (magistrate) in 525–524 bc .

In 508 bc, there was conflict within the Athenian nobility about
reforms that had been instituted by statesman and poet Solon
(630–560 bc). Solon had replaced rule by the wealthy only with
participation by farmers and smaller landowners. Cleisthenes
gathered the support of the common people to institute further-­
reaching reforms by abolishing the principle of inherited privilege,
which favored the conservative nobles. Instead, geographic
localities became requirements for citizenship. Because more
people could participate in political life, isonomia, equality of
rights for all, was proclaimed. This change from family to locality
as the basis of political representation earned Cleisthenes of
Athens the enduring title of “founder of democracy”—in the West.
However, the history of the origins of democracy reaches beyond
the West.

19
 The word demokratia (δημοκρατία), or rule by the demos or the
people, first referred to the direct, participatory democracy of the
city state of Athens, as instituted by Cleisthenes, and it later came
to include the quasi-­representative government of the Roman
Republic. When democracy was successful in Greece and Rome, it
was accompanied by political rhetoric that validated and glorified
it, often as motivation for military action. The Greek people were
proud of their elefthería (ελευθερία) or freedom, and Romans had
their res publica, or “people’s thing.” However, ancient democratic
practices were not restricted to Athens and Rome but extended
throughout Greece and other parts of the world. Still, despite the
popularity of early democracy and its expanse, philosophers such
as Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero were skeptical of rule by the people.
Regardless, these critics also contributed to ideas about
government and ethics that later became part of modern
conceptions of democracy.
Democracy

Democracy outside of Athens and Rome

Non-­Eurocentric identifications of democracy in the ancient
world have sometimes been part of political projects to claim
democratic antecedents for places not previously considered
democratic. Examples include democratic movements during the
struggle for independence in India and more recent democratic
movements in China. Resistance to Euro-­centric views of the
progress of Western civilization has also been part of multicultural
efforts in the West, itself. For instance, Martin Bernal’s 1991 Black
Athena: Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization attributed key
cultural achievements of classical Greece to Egyptian influences in
ways that supported African American and African diasporic
reclamation of black history.

Historical research has identified democracy in Mesopotamia,

including Assyria, Babylonia, Anatolia, Persia, and Sumeria
(Anatolia is now Turkey and Persia is Iran; Assyria, Babylonia,
and Sumeria are in Iraq). This form of governance consisted of
20
deliberation in people’s assemblies that influenced kings and
sometimes had ultimate authority. Democratic influences from
Phoenicia (now Lebanon and Syria) are believed to have inspired
democratic innovations in parts of Greece, before Athenian
democracy. All of the democratic structures in these areas
probably spread through the mechanisms and requirements of
trade, rather than explicit political ideology. Political structures in
ancient Israel, northern India, and China also had democratic
elements, as did the government of Sparta. These strains of
democracy merit more detailed focus, to show that ancient
democracy was not restricted to Athens and Rome.

The Amarna Letters, preserved on Egyptian clay tablets, recorded

diplomatic reports of difficulties in dealing with Phoenician cities
in the 1300s bc . Although, like Egypt, these cities were

Democracy in the ancient world

monarchies, they also had councils of elders and assemblies who
sought to bypass their rulers and negotiate directly with the
Egyptian pharaoh. These influential councils represented broader
populations and persisted at least until the 10th century bc . The
elders of Gebal/Byblos and other cities, such as Tyre, eventually
became more powerful than the monarch. Carthage, originally a
colony of Tyre, had a constitution requiring that the two suffetes,
who were elected annually, govern on the advice of a council of
elders. Carthage also had elections, town meetings, and
trade guilds.

Greek historian Polybius (264–146 bc ) suggested that Rome was

able to conquer Carthage because Carthage’s “measures were
deliberated upon by the many.” When Alexander the Great
conquered Sidon, in 333 bc , the king surrendered because his
citizens willed it; in Tyre, it was the people who refused entry to
Alexander, and he vanquished the city. Phoenicians were
influential when Homer produced the Iliad and probably during
the Trojan War period in the 12th century bc . Homer referred to
assemblies of elders, as well as kings. There is archaeological and
textual evidence that before Athens became democratic, the city
21
 states of Chios, Erythrae, Chalcis, Naxos, Argos, Elis, Syracuse,
and Acragas both traded with Phoenicians and had democratic
practices themselves. Athens was surrounded by these other city
states and interacted with them, so it is not a big leap to surmise
that Athenian leaders were inspired by these nearby democratic
practices.

Sparta was admired by Plato and Aristotle, among others, for its
collective standards of self-­discipline, military prowess, and
egalitarianism in its elite classes, which included the education of
women. Sparta’s ruling and social system has been claimed
throughout the centuries, by democrats, militarists, and in the
1930s, on account of its abolition of private property, by
communists. Sparta had a mixed government that has confounded
political theorists, but it is known that early on, about 750–600 bc ,
its constitution was democratic in specifying regular meetings
for a popular assembly. At the same time, through reforms by
Democracy

Lycurgus (born c.800 bc ), the power of Sparta’s dual kingship was

checked by popular election from within an expanding assembly
to the gerousia, or council of elders. Over the following century,
the assembly came to overrule the gerousia and appoint ephors
who functioned first as judges over civil cases and then as
executives within Sparta, who also conducted foreign relations.
(Aristotle suggested that Sparta had been influenced by Carthage
toward democracy, but Stephen Stockwell, co-­editor of the 2011
The Secret History of Democracy, reasons that, more likely,
Phoenicians influenced both Carthaginians and Spartans in
this regard.)

There were also democratic assemblies outside of Greece and

Phoenicia. Reports of democratic practices in both Israel and
India were embedded in religious texts, which obscured their
political content. The idea of a covenant between the people and
God in ancient Israel, in addition to biblical reports of assemblies,
looks like an early version of modern social contract theory,

22
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
 — Teidän korkeutenne suokoon armollisesti anteeksi, —
vastasivat molemmat naiset pian ohimenevällä nolostumisella.

Tässä silmänräpäyksessä astui Södermanlannin herttuatar

huoneesen, hän joka kiivastuneena Liljehorn'in kehnosta
käyttäymisestä Ölannin tappelussa väliin oli nimittänyt häntä
petturiksi ja väliin antanut viittauksia, että Kustaa-kuningas, joka
kentiesi kadehti puolisonsa, herttuan, sotaonnea merellä oli suuri syy
siihen, että laivasto ei totellut herttuan käskyjä.

— Ei, ei, — keskeytti Sofia Albertina mielenliikutuksella, — ei

koskaan Kustaa-kuninkaalla, ei koskaan! Eipä hänen
vihamiehensäkään voisi esiintyä semmoisella epäluulolla, enkä
käsitä, miten sinä… Ei, ei mistään syistä olisi Kustaa-kuningas voinut
toimia niin halventavaisesti itseänsä sekä kantamaansa nimeä!

— Niin, sinä voit kyllä olla oikeassa, ja minustakin näyttää hän tätä
nykyä olevan liian hyvä ystävä Kaarlolle, voidaksensa tällä tavoin…

— Noh, kun tämän huomaat itsekin, Charlotta, kummastuttaa

minua vieläkin enemmän, että olet voinut antaa viittauksia
semmoisesta kelvottomuudesta Kustaa-kuninkaan puolelta, —
vastasi Sofia Albertina jalolla mielikarvaudella vilkkaissa
kasvoissansa; — ensiksi sinä esiinnyt mitä kauheimmilla uutisilla ja
sitte mitä hirveimmillä epäluuloilla.

— Niin, ystäväiseni, eihän aina tarkoiteta mitä sanotaan, ja olkoon

mitä tahansa, niin voihan tällaisilla ajoilla…

— Sillä yhteiskunnan asteella, jossa sinä olet, on todellakin

anteeksiantamatointa esiintyä sellaisilla ajattelemattomilla lauseilla.
 Herttuatar otti nöyryydellä vastaan tuon ankaran nuhteen, ja
läsnäolevat naiset riensivät vakuuttamaan, että he puolestansa, ja
mitä heillä muutoin olikin kuningasta vastaan, kuitenkin pitivät häntä
liian hyvänä ruotsalaisena, omatakseen edes pienintä aijettakaan
ruotsalaisten sotakunnian ehkäisemiseksi.

Yksinään jäätyänsä seisoi Sofia Albertina kauan avonaisessa

akkunassa vajonneena syviin ajatuksiin, jotka koskivat hänen
kolmea veljeänsä: — Heittäytyä vehkeilemisiin ja heti säikähtää,
kunnianhimoisia, velttoja ja voimattomia, sellaisia he ovat, Kaarlo ja
Fredrik, — hän ajatteli, — ei kumpaisellakaan heistä olisi rohkeutta
jos tarvittaisiin. Heissä oi ole äitini ylevää henkeä, Kustaa-kuningas
on ainoa… Kustaa-parka, tämäkö siis on ainoa tulos hallituksesta,
joka alkoi niin loistavasti ja onnellisesti… sinä olet joutunut asemaan,
jossa sinua väärin arvostellaan… miksi et tyytynyt tuohon
vähäpätöisempään, vaan kuitenkin kunniakkaampaan toimeen, että
olisit; ollut rauhan ylläpitäjänä ja harrastanut alamaistesi edistystä
siveellisessä ja taloudellisessa vaurastumisessa… miksi, niin, miksi
et sitä tehnyt! Sofia Albertina peitti kasvonsa käsillään, ja
alakuloisuuden sekä levottomuuden huokaus kuului hänen
huuliltansa.
NELJÄSKYMMENES LUKU.

Nuot kolme sotaretkeä Venäjätä vastaan olivat päättyneet.

Kumpaisenkin sotivan valtakunnan hallitsija oli puolestansa ikävöinyt
rauhaa. Kustaa-kuningas oli väsynyt sisällisistä ja ulkonaisista
riidoista; hänen aikeensa koota kaikki puolueet isänmaan lipun
ympärille eivät olleet onnistuneet, vaan siitä huolimatta oli hän
saavuttanut etuja ja voittoja sekä onnistunut tehdä vastarintaa
vihollisille. Katharina, joka kentiesi pelkäsi sitä yksimielisyyttä ja
innostusta, joka ehkä voisi herätä oloon saavutetuista voitoista, oli
ollut yhtä halukas kuin Kustaa-kuningaskin saamaan lopun tästä
sodasta, ja Verälän rauhan sopimuksen allekirjoitettua, elokuun 14 p.
1790, piti Kustaa kuningas juhlallisen tuloretkensä Tukholmaan,
elokuun 30 p. 1790.

Kuninkaan väsymätöin sielu työskenteli kotimaisten olojen

järjestämisessä, urhollisten soturein sekä kaikkein, jotka tässä
sodassa olivat itsensä kunnostaneet, palkitsemisessa ja teki yhä
jättiläissuunnitelmia tulevaisuuden varalta sekä otti samalla innolla
kuin ennenkin osaa toisten valtakuntain asioihin etenkin tuon nyt niin
onnettoman Ranskan, ja Moniteurin, Journal de Paris'in ja muiden
sanomalehtien vuoksi laiminlyötiin milt'ei kaiken muun lukeminen.
 Aina Ranskan vallankumouksen alusta oli hän seurannut sen
kehittymistä mitä suurimmalla hartaudella ja hän oli se hallitsija, joka
muita selvemmin käsitti sen merkityksen ja surulliset seuraukset.

— Niin, Elis-hyväni, — lausui kuningas, joka jutellen näistä

vaiherikkaista ajoista astuskeli edestakasin Schröderheim'in rinnalla,
— Ranskan kuningaskunnan vaarallinen asema on epäkohta, joka
voi kojua kaikkiin kuningaskuntiin. Muutamat viestit ovat vaikuttaneet
minussa sellaisen hirmun, että niitä ajatellessani kauhistun. Ei tullut
unta silmiini sinä yönä, kun sain kuulla tuon riehuvan roistojoukon
antaneen Feneloun pään hänen vävynsä Berthierin suudeltavaksi;
koko yön oli tuo kauhea näky silmissäni enkä voinut nukkua
vähääkään. Kuitenkin nukuin minä makeasti yöllä ennen elokuun 19
päivää. Ei, minä kammoksun tätä vallankumousta, minä vihaan
sitä!… Maasta paenneille Bourboneille tahdon tarjota suojapaikkaa
valtakunnassani ja minä tahdon tehdä kaikki, ollakseni muiden
hallitsijani luona hyödyksi Ludvig XVI:sta asialle.

— Teidän majesteettinne hyvä ja jalo sydän on aina sama!

— Se ei kannata mainitsemista, Elis. Enhän olisi ihminenkään, jos

en nyt ponnistaisi kaikkia voimiani. Axel Fersen on tätä nykyä
Parisissa ja ystävällisessä yhteydessä kuninkaallisen perheen
kanssa; hän auttaa Maria Antoinettea, ja tunnen itseni levolliseksi,
tietäessäni heillä hänessä olevan luotettavan ystävän, jolla on pää ja
sydän paikallansa. Ja itsekin lähden kentiesi sinne vast'edes, niin
saammehan nähdä…

— Teidän majesteettinne innolla ja nerolla saatane kentiesi jotakin

toimeen tässä onnettomassa asiassa, jos vaan nuot muut vallat…
 — Pitäisihän kaikkein olla halukkaat tukahuttamaan… niin,
kaikissa tapauksissa luulen herättäneeni Katharina-keisarinnan
halun ja toivon saavani pysymään sen vireillä, sillä hän käsittää
selvään esimerkin tuottaman vaaran, innostuksen voiman ja
kansassa heränneiden liikkeiden tarttuvaisuuden, joka on levinnyt
Amerikan aarniometsistä Ranskaan saakka ja joka vallattomuuden
viehätyksen ja petollisen kaunopuheisuuden houkuttelemisien
kannattamana on erittäin sovelias viettelemään roskaväkeä, joka
aina pitää vallattomuutta vapautena. — Minä itse suosin
kansanvaltaisuutta ja olen riidellyt tuota vanhaa neuvostoa vastaan
sekä ollut ainoa puolustamaan kansan oikeutta näiden
yksivaltaisuus-ehdoituksilta. Olenpa itse pannut toimeen
vallankumouksenkin isänmaani vapauden ja turvallisuuden edestä;
mutta, foi de gentilhomme, olisinpa valmis uhraamaan henkeni,
kukistaakseni tuon ranskalaisen… heidän "vapauttansa" minä
kammoksun sekä halveksin heidän "tasa-arvoisuuttansa" ja
"yhdenvertaisuuttansa" ja inholla mainitsen minä näitä sanoja, vaikka
ajatukseni ikäänkuin lumottuina niissä riippuvat.

Kuningas vaikeni muutamaksi sekunniksi, hänen hienot kasvonsa

leimusivat mielikarvaudesta ja hän jatkoi äkkiä: — Olen jo koettanut
estää ja tulen tästälähtein nimenomaan kovasti kieltämään
sanomalehden-kirjoittajia ja kirjailijoita sanallakaan mainitsemasta
Ranskassa ilmautuneita levottomuuksia sekä kansalliskokouksen
keskusteluja ja päätöksiä.

— Valistunut ja sivistynyt kansa, joka on tottunut mielihalulla

seuraamaan asiain menoa, pitää tätä kieltoa liian ankarana
kovuutena. Sire, olen rohjennut ilmaista tämän vilpittömän
mielipiteeni. Ei yksikään hallitsija, paitsi Augustoa, olo niin laajan
vallan ohessa, kuin teidän majesteetillanne on, voimallisemmin
suojellut ja hartaammin kunnioittanut sanan vapautta ja tieto…

— Elis-hyväni, seuraukset voisivat tosin olla sellaiset kuin sanot;

mutta minun syyni ovat pakoittavia, — vastasi Kustaa-kuningas
lempeästi ja näyttämättä panneen pahaksensa Scröderheimin
rohkeata muistutusta. Astuttuaan vielä kerran vaitonaisena laattian
poikki, jatkoi hän enevällä alakuloisuudella: — Minä olen
hallituksessani ollut liiaksi lempeä, liiaksi myöntyisä… olen antanut
sydämeni ja tunteeni puhua liian paljo, ja silloin kun olisin pitänyt
panna toimeen varoittavia esimerkkejä, olen antanut armon astua
rangaistuksen sijaan. Jo kapinan ja uppiniskaisuuden ensimäisten
oireidenkin ilmestyessä olisin… mutta saadaanhan nähdä, mitä
meille tästä lähtein on odotettavissa, jos he ottavat esimerkkiä
Anjalan liitosta… yhden verisen pään täytyy pudota…

— Sire, suvaitkaatte…

— Ei, ei sanaakaan Hästesko'sta eikä niistä muista!… Minä olen

karkaissut itseni kaikkia esirukouksia vastaan, vieläpä omaa
itseänikin vastaan. Ajan henki vaatii ankaruutta, jott'ei sen
mielettömyys tempaisi meitä turmion pyörteisiin… Minun päätökseni
on luja kuin kallio.

Kuningas pysähtyi erääsen linnan akkunaan, kääntäen

mielenliikutusta osoittavat kasvonsa pois Schröderheimistä. Se
ankaruus, jota Kustaa-kuningas piti tarpeellisena, täytti hänen
sielunsa kauhistuksella, ja hän tunsi todellista riemua päästessään
niistä synkistä ajatuksista, jotka häntä rasittivat, kun hän nyt lausui:

— Tule tänne, Elis, niin saat nähdä, — kuninkaan huulille ilmautui

iloinen hymyily, samalla kuin hänen hienosta ivasta loistava silmänsä
katseli ales linnan pihaan, jossa Armfelt istui eräässä kantotuolissa
suuren kunniavahtinsa ympäröimänä, jolla hän oli kannattanut
itsensä linnaan. Osoittaen tuota loistavaa seuruetta, lausui kuningas:
— Minkälainen narri Armfelt onkaan. Hän käyttäikse, ikäänkuin olisi
hän turkkilainen pasha! Minä pelkään sananparren toteutuvan, jossa
sanotaan, että ylpeys käy lankeemuksen edellä.

— Minuun koskee todellakin kipeästi, nähdessäni hänet noin

mieletöinnä, — jatkoi kuningas vakavammin, — mikä hän on, miksi
hän itseänsä luulee? Suoraan sanoen ei ole mitään, jota hänen
kunnianhimonsa ei luule saavuttavansa! — Niin, me tapaamme
toisemme jälleen, Elis-hyväni; minä menen tekemään suunnitelmaa
uuteen näytelmäkappaleesen, enkä suvaitse kenenkään itseäni
häiritä, ei kenenkään, ja, — mennessänsä kääntyi hän äkkiä ympäri,
lausuen: — Minä olen antanut Armfelt'ille ystävyyteni, ja hän on
tehnyt minulle monta palvelusta, joiden takia pidän häntä arvossa ja
joita olen myöskin osannut palkita; mutta eikö hän luule jo
saaneensa kyllältä? Hän menee liian pitkälle vaatimuksinensa. Jos
hän haluaa kreiviksi, tulee hän siksi pääsemään, mutta ei miksikään
muuksi, — ja sen täytyy sinun hänelle sanoa.

Schröderheim, joka oli Armfelt'in todellinen ystävä, joutui

hämillensä ja koetti etsiä joitakuita sanoja ystävänsä puolustukseksi,
mutta Kustaa-kuningas keskeytti häntä hymyillen: — Niin niin, eihän
se ole kovin vaarallista, — lausui hän; — Armfelt on hemmoiteltu
onnen poika, ja hänen on vaikea kestää myötäkäymistä. Vielähän
asia on autettavissa, kun hän vaan ymmärtää pysyä aloillansa…

Ja kuningas sulki nyt itsensä työhuoneesensa, kentiesi

antaaksensa tällä tavoin suosikillensa pienen muistutuksen ja
pidättääksensä häntä etäämpänä sekä saattaaksensa hänet jälleen
järkeensä.
NELJÄSKYMMENESENSIMÄINEN
LUKU.

— Älkäätte panko pahaksenne, että olen rohjennut tunkea tänne

saakka; mutta en ole voinut hillitä sydämeni halua saada itse kiittää
teitä, armollinen neiti!

Se oli Maria Holm, tätä nykyä rouva Eneroth, neiti Rudenschöldin

entinen ompelijatar, joka tällä tavoin ilmaisi sydämensä kiitollisuutta.

— Oletteko nyt todellakin onnellinen?

— Minun mieheni on niin hyvä, äitini ja sisareni ovat luonani, ja me

tulemme kaikki hyvin toimeen. Niin, minä olen niin onnellinen, ja
teidän kauttanne, armollinen neiti, ovat kaikki: nämät levolliset päivät
tulleet! — Marian tavallisesti kalpeilla kasvoilla oli rusottava hohto,
jonka riemu ja kiitollisuus oli synnyttänyt: — Että te, neiti ajattelitte
kaikkea tuota, jota minä koetin kuvailla itselleni pelkäksi
mielettömyydeksi, mahdottomuudeksi ja hulluudeksi… ja että minä
kerta satuin teille mainitsemaan lapsellisesta lemmestäni, kuinka
kummalliselta minusta kaikki tämä tuntuu! Niin, mikä harvinainen
onni minulla oli ensi kerran sattuessani teidän läheisyyteenne, se oli
Daschka-kreivittären luona. Ah, te, armollinen neiti, olette
unohtaneet kaiken tämän, vaan en minä, en koskaan!

Tuo umpimielinen ja kaino tyttö oli tullut aviovaimoksi, ja tuon

nuoren aviovaimon onnellisuus pani sanat vierimään hänen
autuudesta hymyileviltä huuliltansa.

— Niin, niin, Daschka-kreivittären, — kertoi Magdalena, ja hänen

ajatuksensa riensivät taasen tuohon ensimäiseen viehättävään
nuoruuden aikaan, jolloin lapsuus riehakkaana leikintekona oli hänen
takanansa ja tulevaisuus ikäänkuin tämän vaiherikkaana jatkona
hänen edessänsä: entisyys muserretuista nukenpäistä ja tulevaisuus
muserretuista sydämistä…

Hiljainen huokaus nousi Magdalenan povesta. Nyt ja silloin, kuinka

erinkaltaista! Vihlovalla levottomuuden tunteella silmäili hän Marian,
— tuon huolettoman ja viattoman — tyyniä, levollisia kasvoja; ah,
sellainen olisi hän itsekin voinut olla! — Daschka-kreivittären, niin, se
oli silloin! — kertoi Magdalena: — Mihinkähän tuo iloinen,
veikistelevä venakko oli joutunut? Mihin olivat joutuneet hänen kaikki
senaikuiset ihailijansa? Ja minkähän tuloksen hänen oma haaveileva
käsityksensä elämästä oli saavuttanut?

— Ja sitte… jatkoi Maria, — oletteko, armollinen neiti unohtanut

sen päivän, jolloin kohtasimme metsäpolulla?

— Juuri tämän suvipäivän, tämän elämäni suvipäivän ja kaikkein

niiden viattomain lapsellisten muistojen johdosta, jotka olivat tämän
päivän kanssa yhteydessä, tulinkin teitä ajatelleeksi! Kaikki nämät
sydämelleni niin rakkaat muistot haluaisin vielä kerran saada elää
uudestansa ja pysähtyä niihin!
 Alakuloisuuden vivahdus himmensi Magdalenan silmissä olevaa
tulta, auringon säteet valuivat hänen kultaisille kutrillensa, ja hänen
paisuville huulillensa ilmautui murheellisen kaipuun hymyily.

Maria huomasi koskettaneensa joitakuita Magdalenalle surullisia

muistoja, — tällä jalosukuisella neidillä, joka näytti hänestä kuuluvan
ylhäisempään maailmaan, — voiko hänelläkin todella olla
jonkinlaista surua? — Hämmästyksellä kysyi Maria tätä itseltänsä, ja
kyyneleet kostuttivat hänen silmänsä, kun hän, kädet ristissä, hiljaa
lausui: — Ah, jospa voisin jollakin tavalla osoittaa kiitollisuuttani!

— Teidän pitää silloin tällöin tulla tänne sanomaan minulle, että

olette onnellinen, — vastasi Magdalena tuolla sievällä, iloisen
avosydämisyyden sekaisella kohteliaisuudella, jota hän, vaikka
sydämensä pohjassa olisikin ollut mitä tahansa, kuitenkin aina osasi
käyttää, ja jossa olikin hänen suurin viehätysvoimansa, — teidän
pitää välistä tulla tänne, se tulee todellakin tekemään minut
iloiseksi…

Näillä jäähyväisillä meni Maria pois, ja jäätyänsä yksin, meni

Magdalena suorastaan ruhtinattaren luokse, joka esihuoneessa hän
tapasi Södermanlannin herttuan.

— Mikä onnellinen kohtaus! — lausui Kaarlo-ruhtinas hymyillen.

— Siihen tarvitaan teidän korkeutenne suuri suosio, että pidätte

tämän onnenanne, — vastasi Magdalena, aikoen nöyrästi tervehtien
mennä hänen ohitsensa.

— Ei sellaista kiirettä, neiti Rudenschöld-hyväni, se

auringonpaiste, jonka teidän läsnäolonne luo, on yhä vaan ohikiitäviä
säteitä. Suvaitkaatte viipyä muutama minuutti, että saan ilmaista
teille sitä harrasta ihantelemista, jota omannan kauneudellenne ja
nerollenne.

— Olen todellakin hämilläni, kun en voi löytää kyllin soveliaita

sanoja vastatakseni teidän korkeutenne korulauseista.

— Ei korulauseisin, neiti Rudenschöld; nämät ovat sydämeni

todellisia ajatuksia.

— Se on liian suuri armo, teidän korkeutenne!

— Te tahdotte taaskin minut jättää? Mitä teillä oikeastansa on

minua vastaan?

— En tiedä, onko minulla mitään teitä vastaan… minä tiedän vaan,

ett'eivät ajatukseni milloinkaan ole harhailleet niin kauas… niin
korkealle, kuin teidän kuninkaalliseen korkeuteenne.

— Kovaa puhetta, neiti-hyväni, josta minä voisin tuntea itseni

loukatuksi!

— Pyydän anteeksi, teidän korkeutenne, mutta minä arvelin teidän

kysymyksenne vaativan totuutta sisältävän vastauksen.

— Noh, olkoon niinkin! Te olette kuitenkin aina yhtä viehättävä, ja

minä rukoilen siis, että te joskus suvaitsisitte ajatuksissanne
muistella minuakin! Niin, Magdalena, ihana viehättävä Magdalena,
minä lemmin teitä, ja minä pitäisin itseni onnellisimpana ihmisenä,
jos te tahtoisitte… jos te voisitte vastata minun tunteisiini! — Kaarlo-
ruhtinas oli puolittain polvistuneena tarttunut Magdalenan käteen,
jolle hän painoi suutelolta.
 — Kaikki vaihettelee tässä maailmassa, nyt on minun vuoroni
tuntea itseni loukatuksi, — ja puolittain iloisen ja puolittain
vihastuneen näköisenä veti hän pois kätensä, jatkaen: — ja
kerrassansa pyydän, että teidän korkeutenne nyt viimeisen kerran
pitäisi minulle tällaista loukkaavaa puhetta!

Ennenkuin herttua ennätti sitä estää, oli Magdalena jo pois

huoneesta.

Suljetun oven ollessa itsensä ja Kaarlo-ruhtinaan välillä, hengähti

Magdalena helpommin; hänen poskensa hehkuivat, ja hänen
sydämensä tykytti ankarasti. — Kuinka voi hän rohjeta? — Hän
painoi kättään kovasti rintaansa. — Hänkin, kuinka rohkeni hänkin!
— nämät puoliääneen lausutut sanat kuuluivat milt'ei huokaukselta.
Tuo ihana Magdalena Rudenschöld huokasi kasvojensa juonteiden
vienouden, suloisuuden ja viehättävän ihanuuden vuoksi…
Ainoastansa yhdellä oli oikeus riemuita niiden suloudesta,
ainoastansa yhdellä oli hänen sydämensä ja tulisi muuttumatta
olemaan. Tuolla pikaisella vaihettelevaisuudella, joka oli hänen
luonteessansa, pudisteli hän nyt keveitä, kullanhohtavia kutriansa.

— Hyi sentään! — lausahti hän pienellä ivallisella naurulla.

NELJÄSKYMMENESTOINEN LUKU.

Magdalena istui äitinsä rinnalla. Tuota hyvää sopua ja rakkautta,

joka näiden välillä aina oli vallinnut, verhosi nyt ikäänkuin peittävä
huntu. Ei niin, kuin olisi äiti ja tytär rakastaneet toisiansa vähemmin
kuin ennenkään; mutta äidin oli valloittanut värisyttävä levottomuus
lapsestansa; ja voiko tämäkään suoraan katsella äitinsä silmiin?

Tämä ei ollut Magdalenalle helppo asia, ja heidän liikkeissänsä oli

jäykkyys sekä heidän sanoissansa laimeus, jota ei kumpikaan
rohjennut ehkäistä, pelosta että joko toinen lausuisi tahi toinen saisi
kuulla liian paljo.

Heidän pakinoimisensa ei siis koskenut heitä itsiänsä, vaan he

pysyivät kumpikin puoluettomalla alalla ja koettivat sanoa toisillensa
totuuden keskustelematta suorastansa niin arkaluontoisesta asiasta,
kuin tuo häviämätöin pilkku nuoren tytön nimessä ja hyvässä
maineessa on.

He juttelivat nyt sangen ystävällisesti. Pentistä, Magdalenan

rakkaimmasta veljestä sekä iloisesta ja reippaasta leikkitoverista.

— Lapset pienet, surut pienet, lapset isot, surut suuret, — lausui

kreivitär Rudenschöld, luoden äkisti silmäyksen Magdalenaan. Pentti
saattaa minulle paljo huolta, hän on liian rohkea liian varomatoin…
ah, niin, varomatoin! — Hän huokasi, ja hänen silmäyksensä
kiinnittyivät taasen tyttäreensä.

— Oh, hän tulee kait järkevämmäksi, hänen täytyy kait tulla siksi,
— vastasi Magdalena, koettaen näyttää hämmästymättömältä; —
hänellä on niin hellä ja hyvä sydän.

— Ja luuletko siis tämän tulevan puhumaan minun puolestani… ja

että hän tulee säälimään minun tuskaani?

— Varmaan, varmaan?

— Niin, kentiesi. Lapsen rakkaus voi tosin olla suuri, mutta

äidinrakkaus… sitä et sinä voi käsittää… et voi käsittää minun
levottomuuttani ja pelkoani.

Magdalena hento vartalo värisi, mutta voittaen

mielenliikutuksensa, silmäili hän suloisesti hymyillen äitiänsä; ei
millään tavalla voinut hän nyt puhua. Pelko, että hän saattaisi
äidillensä menehtymättömän surun, valtasi hänet ahdistuksella, ja
äitinsä rauhoittaminen ja kaiken pelon poistaminen häneltä oli kaikki,
mitä Magdalena tällä hetkellä halusi.

— Niin, kentiesi ei se olekaan mitään, — lausui kreivitär

Rudenschöld, joka Magdalenan hymyilystä sai uutta toivoa ja uutta
voimaa — kentiesi on se vaan juorupuhetta… panettelemista…

— Mitä hänestä sitte jutellaan? — kysyi Magdalena, koettaen

hämmentää asiata.

— Hänestäkö? Ah, niin!… Kevytmielisten toverien seura, jossa

saadut esimerkit ovat vaaralliset sellaiselle luonteelle, kuin hänellä
on… siinä on kaikki, mutta siinä on kylläksi herättämään minussa
pelkoa. Toivoisin sydämestäni hänen tulevan varovaisemmaksi…
häneltä kuluu paljo rahaa, ja sinä tiedät minun varallisuuteni. Vaiti,
luulenpa kuulevani hänen askeleensa.

— Minä tulen puhumaan tästä hänelle.

— Ei nyt. Joskus toiste, kun joudutte kahdenkesken, on parempi.

— Kuten haluatte, äitini, — lausui Magdalena, suudellen hellästi

äitinsä kättä. Mikä anteeksi rukoileminen tässä suudelmassa olikaan!
Mikä pelko, ett'ei hän voisi lykätä kauaksi selityksen antamista eikä
ajan pitkään estää äitiänsä kuulemasta niitä huhuja, joita Magdalena
tiesi itsestänsä olevan kulkemassa. Siis näki hän helpoituksen
tunteella yksissä olon äitinsä kanssa keskeytetyksi ja hymyillen
tarjosi hän kättä Pentille:

— Noh, mitä uutta, veliseni? — kysyi hän iloisesti.

— Uuttako? Sen kait pitäisi koskea uusia kuoseja? — lausui tuo

uljas ja pulska kaartin upseeri, joka veitikkamaisella silmäyksellä
katseli tuota karvanahka ranteista päähinettä, joka Magdalenalla oli
ollut päässänsä ja jonka hän oli laskenut marmoripöydälle. Näenpä
sinunkin käyttäväsi puolalaista päähinettä! Potocki seurueneensa on
tehnyt kuoseissa perinpohjaisen mullistuksen, ja aina siitä ajasta
asti, kuin kuningas on esiintynyt Taratalka-nutussa (49), on…

— Se puku on soma ja soveltuu hänelle erinomaisen hyvin.

— Puolan kruunu soveltuisi myöskin hänelle, luullakseni.

— Hyvänen aika, mitä puhetta se on, Pentti, — keskeytti häntä

äitinsä.
 — Mitä vaan on joka ihmisen kielellä… Kustaa-kuningas pyrkii
Puolan kuninkaaksi. Se on tietty asia, että hän pitää sen maan
kruunua vanhana Vasa-suvun perintönä. Tuleepa hauska nähdä,
miten hän aikoo suoriutua uskonnon kysymyksestä!… Kentiesi
saamme jonakin kauniina päivänä kuninkaan, joka tunnustaa
katholilaista…

— Pyydän sinua, Pentti, itsesi ja meidän tähdemme, ajattele hyvin,

ennenkuin puhut tuollaista! Ne ovat liian vaarallisia asioita…

— En minä, äitikultani, mitään pahaa tarkoita! Magdalenahan

tiedustelee uutisia, ja minä… mutta ryhtykäämme johonkin muuhun,
joka kentiesi enemmän miellyttää sisartani: sinun entinen vihapitosi,
paroni Reuterholm, tulee taas pian matkustamaan.

— Kernaasti minun puolestani…

— Joku aika sitte oli hänen ja kuninkaan välillä ollut kiivas

kohtaus, joka viimeksimainittu oli nuhdellut häntä valtiollisista
mielipiteistänsä sekä hänen kapinallisesta mielenlaadustansa ja
yhteydestänsä Ranskassa olevien, vallankumouksellisten seurain
kanssa, ja kuninkaan sanotaan kiivaudessansa menneen niin
pitkälle, että hän riisti Reuterholm'ilta sen eläkkeenkin, jota hän sitte
viime valtiopäiväin on nauttinut.

— Syyttä ei kuningas suinkaan ole vihastunut! Minä puolestani on

tiedä ketään vastenmielisempää ihmistä, kuin Reuterholm, joka on
tullut ikävämmäksi kuin koskaan ennen, oleskeltuansa Parisissa,
jossa hän oli joutunut n.s. salatieteilijäin seuraan, jotka ovat
eriskummaisia puoleksi hupsuja ihmisiä. Niin, hänellä on omituinen
mielitekonsa, — lisäsi Magdalena hymyillen: hermosähköllä
nukuttajia, aaveennäkijöitä, haaveilijoita, siinä hänen miehensä!…
 — Ja niiden avulla hän kokonansa panee Kaarlo-herttuankin
sekaisin.
Niin, kuinka voisi tämä tulla toimeen ilman parhainta ystäväänsä!
Kuningas…

— Pentti-hyväni, — keskeytti häntä heleästi naurahtaen

Magdalena, — etpä ole tänään muuta tehnytkään, kuin puhunut
kuninkaasta!

— Enkö muuta? Noh, niin, eipä sitä paljo olekaan ihmettelemistä,

sillä minä olin tänään aamiaisilla, ja siellä puhuttiin… Niin, minuun ei
kaikki tuo todellakaan koske! Mutta Kustaa-kuninkaalla on suuri
puolue vastassansa, ja nuori Ribbing nauroi sydämellisesti
kolttosellansa, kun hän meni kuningasta vastaan punaiseen
hännystakkiin puettuna (50), ja sekä hän että Liljehorn sanoivat
suorastaan kuninkaan menettäneen järkensä!

— Liljehorn, jonka on kiittäminen Kustaa-kuningasta kaikesta? Ei,

tämä on mahdotointa! — huudahti Magdalena. — Olenpa hänen
äsken kuullut puhuvan kuninkaalle mitä nöyrimmillä ja
mielittelevimmillä sanoilla… Ja että hän sitte rupeaa… ei, älä
seurustele, Pentti, näiden ihmisten kanssa, joiden vilppi herättää
minussa todellista inhoa!

— Malla-kultani, älä tule noin tuimetuksiisi monioista ohimennen

lausutuista sanoista. Jospahan olisit kuullut…

— En tahdo enään kuulla enempää! "Ohimennen lausuttuja

sanoja!" Minä tunnen ne sellaiset: kerrottuina mies mieheltä käyvät
ne pian täysistä tosista. — Magdalena vaikeni muutamaksi
silmänräpäykseksi, ja sitte lisäsi hän hymyillen kiivaudellensa: —
Niin, panetteleminen ja väärät syytökset takanapäin,
mielisteleminen, mateleminen ja epäjumaloiminen edessäpäin,
sellainen on tavallisesti maailman meno! Ja mitä Kustaa-
kuninkaasen erittäin tulee, tarvitsee hän todellakin suuren neronsa,
ett'ei menettäisi järkeänsä!

Magdalena oli viimeisiä sanoja lausuessansa kietonut huivin

olkapäillensä ja laskien tuon pienen puolalaisen lakin päähänsä,
lausui hän äidillensä sydämelliset jäähyväiset, ojensi Pentille
kätensä ja lisäsi iloisesti:

— Hoida vaan itseäsi, Pentti-kultani, ja sitä sinä todella

tarvitsetkin, sillä pitihän sinun tulla kenraaliksi mitä pikemmin!

— Ja rikkaaksi sekä mahtavaksi, älä suinkaan tätä unohda, —

lisäsi hän hymyillen, seuraten sisartansa ulkona odottavaan
kantotuoliin.

Kun se, vieden neiti Rudenschöld'iä, kulki Pohjoismalmi-torin

poikki (nykyisen Kustaa Aadolfin torin), näkyi hänen vierellänsä äkkiä
loistava ratsastaja-joukko, jonka eturivissä paroni Armfelt, pää
pystyssä ja uljaalla ryhdillä, antoi tulisen ratsunsa vitkallisesti ravata,
tervehtien ritarillisesti Magdalenaa. Tämän äidin tuskalliset
silmäykset ja puolittain lausumat viittaukset olivat kalvavia
muistutuksia, ja samalla kuin purppuranpuna peitti hänen otsansa ja
poskensa, loi hän silmäyksensä pois Armfelt'ista.
NELJÄSKYMMENESKOLMAS LUKU.

— Epämääräisiä lupauksia, makeoita miellittelysanoja; mutta joku

sellainenkin sana, jonka tulee ottaa huomioonkin… Niin, parasta on
tallentaa kaikki hänen kirjeensä, — sanoi kuningas eräänä
toukokuun päivänä, vuonna 1791, paroni Armfelt'ille, joka taaskin
kohdeltuna tuolla entisellä ystävyydellä, auttoi kuningasta lukemaan
joitakuita Katharina-keisarinnalta tulleita kirjeitä, joita Kustaa-
kuningas ennen Aacheniin matkustamistansa halusi järjestää ja
tallentaa. — Kas tässä on hän kirjoittanut jotakin ranskalaisista
oloista… niin, Parisista tulevat uutiset muuttuvat yhä
peloittavimmiksi.

— Todellinen murhenäytelmä, teidän majesteettinne, johon

historiasta saa etsimällä etsiä vastakohtia.

— Mutta jota voivat ruveta seuraamaan, — vastasi Kustaa-

kuningas, jonka sääliminen noiden ranskalaisten Bourbonein
kohtaloa ei ainoastansa ilmaantunut ystävyyden osoituksissa ja
turvapaikan tarjoamisessa, vaan hän oli myöskin ensimäinen
Europan ruhtinoista, joka oli tarjonnut sotajoukkonsa ja laivastonsa
Ludvig XVI:sta valtaistuimen ylläpitämiseksi.