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Defence Beyond Design
Contours of India’s Nuclear Safety & Security
Defence Beyond Design
Contours of India’s Nuclear Safety & Security
Dr Sitakanta Mishra
Introduction by
Air Marshal Vinod Patney SYSM PVSM AVSM VrC (Retd)
Centre for Air Power Studies

in association with New Delhi
First published 2017
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2017 Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi and KW Publishers
Pvt Ltd
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or
other means, now known or hereafter invented, including
photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval
system, without permission in writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
registered trademarks, and are used only for identiﬁcation and
explanation without intent to infringe.
Print edition not for sale in South Asia (India, Sri Lanka, Nepal,
Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Pakistan or Bhutan)
British Library Cataloging in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
A catalog record for this book has been requested
ISBN: 9781138243774 (hbk)
ISBN: 9781315272092 (ebk)
Typeset in Palatino
by KW Publications
CENTRE FOR AIR POWER STUDIES
VISION
To be an independent centre of excellence on national security
contributing informed and considered research and analyses on
relevant issues.
MISSION
To encourage independent and informed research and analyses
on issues of relevance to national security and to create a pool of
domain experts to provide considered inputs to decision-makers.
Also, to foster informed public debate and opinion on relevant
issues and to engage with other think-tanks and stakeholders
within India and abroad to provide an Indian perspective.
Contents
Preface ix
Introduction xv
1. Safety-Security-Safeguards: The Intricate Interface 1
2. Civil Nuclear Network: A Reality Check 29
3. Siting of Nuclear Power Plants: Modus Operandi 65
4. Contours of Nuclear Safety: Defence In-depth 97
5. Security of Nuclear Facilities: The Envelope 143
6. Waste Management: A Gordian Knot? 199
7. Social Acceptance Fuss: A Challenging Opportunity 225
8. Post-Fukushima Discourse: Let’s Not Feed Political Panic 255
9. Defence Beyond Design: Towards A New Paradigm 279
Index 303
Preface
Science cannot change anything if people do not pay head. Today,

nuclear science is facing such a fate for various reasons. The societal
taboo over the invisible radiation, delay in reaching the benefits of the
atom to the grassroots, its high-technology nature that is beyond the
comprehension of average citizens, the out of proportion portrayal of
sporadic disasters, etc. have contributed in making nuclear science
an awesome discourse for the common man. Consequently, nuclear
projects have to face pockets of furious opposition fostered by vested
interests, making them the subject of politics and psychology, rather
than physics. This study attempts to deconstruct some of these
untoward notions involving nuclear technology, and India’s tryst with
nuclear energy within the global discourse.
The term ‘Defence Beyond Design’ is a suggested paradigm to look
beyond the common method of ensuring nuclear safety and security
based on the ‘Defence By Design’ concept – where high level safety
features are built-in during the design phase of the plant – to deal
with postulated threats, if they ever occur. A serious concern, as learnt
from the Fukushima disaster, is how to manage the ‘unimaginable
risks’. Literally, there can be no absolute safety or security, and there
can be no perfect parameter to judge how much safety is safe enough.
However, the capability to imagine, and absolute preparedness
to meet all contingencies comprise the key to restore confidence in
nuclear technology. We must acknowledge that nuclear energy has
not failed; it is we who have failed to utilise it, with the appropriate
technology and strategy. A more robust defence (safety-security)
system to enhance management and technical capability by looking
beyond the conventional standard operating procedures to deal with
all risks is the conceptual prescription of this study.
x | Defence Beyond Design
The nine chapters that follow delve into different aspects of

India’s nuclear energy debate. Admittedly, most of the contents and
facts have been gathered from open sources, official reports, opinions;
and many arguments and information have been reproduced
verbatim to bring to the fore the status and the prevailing debate
undiluted. Given the fast evolving nature of the Indian nuclear
energy programme, it is extremely difficult to include all the new
developments in this volume. Also, this study does not claim to have
brought out anything hitherto unknown or new on India’s nuclear
energy programme or nuclear safety-security discourse. It is only
an attempt to coherently compile, and articulate on, the intricate
issues involving India’s nuclear energy debate, the evolving trends,
and the systems in place, to ponder over them. This might help to
address some international scepticism over India’s preparedness
and safety-security standards, and also it may help educate the
interested domestic public.
By the time this manuscript was getting ready, the Nuclear Threat
Initiative (NTI) Index 2016 had been published, ranking India, as
usual, low, and categorising it among countries like Pakistan, Iran,
and North Korea. Chapters 4 and 5 in this study categorically address
the issues that show that the NTI Index is abysmally imprecise. It is
not that it does not have information regarding India’s improved
safety-security-safeguards systems that have been put in place
after NTI published its first Index. During my visit, along with Dr
Happymon Jacob, to NTI, for an informal presentation on India’s
nuclear security governance, on July 17, 2014, based on our joint
research at the Cooperative Monitoring Centre of Sandia National
Laboratories, Albuquerque (USA), I discussed in detail about the
inaccuracies in the Index on India’s ranking by furnishing factual
evidence and official reports which otherwise were unknown to
them. Kelsey Hartigan, the senior programme officer in NTI, and
Lord Browne, vice chairman of NTI, among others, present in the
discussion, were “very impressed by the vigour of my work and by
my obvious knowledge of the issues”. Upon enquiring on ranking
Preface | xi
of India to a higher level in their subsequent Index, as they now

had more positive information on India’s system, they expressed
scepticism, especially in view of the integrity of the Index; frequent
adjustments or revisions in the parameters of the Index, they said,
would raise questions about its integrity and reliability, and there
would be more demands from other countries to revisit their status
as well.
In Chapters 3, 6 and 7 respectively specific attention is given to
domestic public concerns on the siting of reactors, waste management,
and public acceptance of nuclear energy. They highlight a number
of contentious issues and the inconclusive debates in these respects.
The sporadic opposition witnessed in pockets to new nuclear
projects during the last few years cannot be considered India’s anti-
nuclear movement per se. Neither is there any ‘green movement’ in
the country like in some of the European countries where political
parties are formed on this basis. Opposition to nuclear projects
in the country largely emanates from the fear of project-induced
displacement, affecting the livelihoods of people. There are vested
interests who try to propagate an anti-nuclear ideology, though they
have largely remained unsuccessful. So far, neither has any political
party subscribed to the anti-nuclear ideology, nor has any party
taken it up ‘anti-nuclear’ as its ideology. The intermittent support
and sympathy extended by some parties comprises only the ‘vote
bank’ politics. For example, the Aam Admi Party (AAP) tried to
woo the Kudankulam protesters and offered support to the People’s
Movement Against Nuclear Energy (PMANE) leader Udayakumar,
for contesting the Assembly election. This temporary courtship
ended with Udayakumar’s defeat and subsequently leaving the
AAP “over lack of clear-cut policy”.
Despite the post-Fukushima scepticism and vehement anti-
nuclear pressure the world over, India has managed to sign nuclear
deals with around two dozen countries and industrial houses.
Reluctant partners like Japan and Australia have finally understood
India’s genuine cause and interest in nuclear energy. The world
xii | Defence Beyond Design
is now very receptive to India’s nuclear energy demand unlike

in the pre-Indo-US nuclear deal, when India was considered a
nuclear pariah or apartheid country struggling under the technology
restriction regime. But, today, when India has been unshackled
from the international technology denial regimes, it is shackled
within by domestic political and public opposition to new nuclear
projects. Chapter 2 examines the network of nuclear deals that India
has signed and the dual challenge of maintaining its record of a
‘responsible state with advanced nuclear technology’ while taking
along the domestic public in its nuclear energy expansion drive.
Whether India will succeed or how far it will achieve its objective,
is a subject of speculation. Certainly there would be no looking
back unless a major disaster befalls, or a strong political decision
taken. But the degree of success and acceptance would depend upon
how quickly the benefits of nuclear projects reach the aam admi.
Moreover, the binary debate on whether the nuclear route can be a
viable and safe component of India’s energy security, will continue
to reverberate, largely due to the country’s argumentative culture
and participatory political process.
In the course of shaping my arguments, I have accumulated a
series of intellectual debts. Knowingly or otherwise, I have borrowed
facts and figures heavily from various sources, especially from the
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, Department of Atomic Energy
and Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (AERB, DAE,
and NPCIL) for accuracy. But the inconsistencies, if any, are solely
mine. Whatever is worthwhile in this study is certainly due to the
contributions of many. I am indebted to the late Air Commodore Jasjit
Singh for showing me the direction. I am extremely grateful to Air
Marshal Vinod Patney, Director General of the Centre for Air Power
Studies (CAPS), for his wholehearted support, advice and affection,
and for accepting my request to introduce the book. My sincere
gratitude to Dr Manpreet Sethi for her guidance and unconditional
support in all my academic pursuits during the last one decade.
Loving affection and support by Professor SD Muni and Professor
Preface | xiii
Savita Pande have always kept me upbeat. I am thankful to many

experts like KS Parthasarathy, former Secretary AERB, Dr Pradeep
Kumar, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), Ambassador Sheel
Kant Sharma, and Dr Reshmi Kazi for their expert advice.
This study is the product of four years of intensive research in
CAPS; I had the privilege of working with very generous faculties and
staff there. I am indebted to many of my close friends like Yeonjung
Ji, Sangheeta, Nihar, Tennyson, Prabira Sethy, and Minakshi Sethy
who have always stood by me in days of toil and kept my morale
high all along.
Also, my sincere gratitude goes to Ms Rehana Mishra for
meticulous editing of the contents. I am equally thankful to Jose
Mathew and KW Publishers Pvt. Ltd. for enthusiastically taking up
my work. It would not have been possible to bring to light this volume
had I had not the strong support of my family and blessings from
my parents. Lastly, I appreciate the unwavering encouragement by
Prof. Nigam Dave, Director of School of Liberal Studies (SLS), and
the ambience that Pandit Deendayal Petroleum Unviersity (PDPU),
Gandhinagar, has provided me to give the final touch to this study,
as I joined there as faculty member in July 2015.
February 27, 2016 Sitakanta Mishra

Introduction
The world has, for long, been aware of the awesome power of nuclear
energy and that it may be used for both beneficial or destructive
purposes. Unfortunately, it was its destructive use in the bombing
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, that ended World War
II, and caught the imagination of mankind. The nuclear bomb was
viewed as a wonder weapon, with the result that horizontal and, more
importantly, vertical proliferation occurred at an astonishing pace.
Much worse, it was conjectured that a nuclear war could be fought,
and was winnable. An article in the Washington Post of December
28, 2015, quoting from recently declassified documents said that in
1956, the Pentagon listed for attack with nuclear weapons as many as
1,200 cities and 1,100 airfields in Eastern Europe, the USSR and China.
Such an eventuality would have been catastrophic many times over.
Fortunately, the world lived through that dangerous period and now
use of a nuclear weapon has a taboo tag attached to it, except when it
may be used in retaliation. All possessor countries recognise that use
of a nuclear weapon will invite international opprobrium and worse.
That is a deterrent in its own right. However, the existential danger
remains but it is a far cry from the nuclear war-fighting strategies of
yore. Nuclear power is in a separate category.
Right from the beginning of the nuclear age, the technology
that could use nuclear energy to power our electrical grids was
considered a boon. The first Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) to get
connected to the grid was at Obninsk, USSR, on June 27, 1954. It
had a net capacity of a mere 5 Mega Watts Electric (MWe). There
followed a rush to build more and better plants. As the book brings
out, to date there have been as many as 15,000 cumulative years of
commercial operation of NPPs in 32 countries. In India alone, we
xvi | Defence Beyond Design
have more than 300 cumulative years of commercial experience.

Like any other industrial undertaking, some problems and ‘events’
have occurred but the safety record is not only comparable to other
industries but, indeed, commendable. The casualties have been few
and far in between.
In the nearly six decades of commercial operation of nuclear
power plants, there have been three serious accidents: at the Three
Mile Island NPP on March 28, 1979; the April 26, 1986 Chernobyl
accident; and the March 11, 2011 disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi
reactors. Yet, by and large, an increasing number of NPPs are being
constructed. The USA stopped building any more nuclear reactors
after the Three Mile Island accident and cancelled the planned
construction of about 100 more reactors, but by then it was already
operating about 100 nuclear reactors anyway! In contemporary
times, the USA is once again seriously considering building more
reactors. Japan closed down all its nuclear reactors after Fukushima
but now wants to start them again. Two of them were brought back
on line in 2015.
Nuclear energy remains an attractive proposition as it provides
clean and continuous power with an insignificant contribution to
greenhouse gases. It helps to reduce the energy shortfalls and also
satisfies the growing concerns about climate change. A nuclear
reactor that uses 200-300 tons of uranium will produce an energy
equivalent of three to four million tons of coal. Similarly, though
Germany decided to shut down all its nuclear reactors for its energy
needs by 2020, it is estimated that it would end up releasing an
additional 300 million tons of CO2 into the atmosphere. We should
be kinder to our environment. Nuclear power is a good substitute
for fossil fuels and, more importantly, we are witnessing an upward
graph in technology in terms of the output, design and manufacture,
and safety features of NPPs.
Yet, fears and apprehensions of a nuclear mishap are neither
unwarranted nor misplaced. The damage that will result from an
NPP blowout can be very severe indeed. Whilst this must remain
Introduction | xvii
an important consideration, we have to ensure, to the degree that

we can, that the design forecloses such possibilities. The technology
to produce nuclear power is still only 60 years old and, given time,
it will progress to produce safer, less expensive, and more efficient
power plants. The technology to produce molten salt reactors and
small modular reactors is already well advanced. However, we have
to ensure that the existing plants are safe and will remain so for the
duration of their planned life.
A critical factor is that the planned life of a reactor can be 40 years
or more. That implies that towards the end of the life of the reactor, the
design would be 40 years old and may be, at that time, the essential
pitfalls were not really perceived, established or even understood.
Technology marches at a fast pace. A similar situation prevails for
reactors that are under construction. Whilst such considerations are
equally applicable for all industrial endeavours, a nuclear reactor
is a special case as mistakes made in the design can be very costly
indeed. The design specifications must be stringent and studiously
followed. Continued research is also needed for better systems,
maintenance procedures and health monitoring of the reactors. It
would be inadvisable to hinder progress. There are no easy answers
except that great care has to be exercised in the planning, construction
and operation of the plants. Any short cuts must be eschewed. A
system of constant monitoring is essential. It is also advisable that
any shortfall noticed at a plant should automatically trigger a
detailed check and rectification of detected problems everywhere
else. Fortunately, these issues are well recognised and constant care
and monitoring have resulted in a reasonably good report card.
There are many Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and
Greenpeace activists who are against nuclear power. In fact, today,
in some quarters, the opposition to nuclear power is almost at par
with the desire for a nuclear weapon free world. The dangers and,
indeed, the chances of a nuclear accident can be readily exaggerated
to a gullible public. This has happened in India as well and the
authorities have a difficult time in convincing the population of
xviii | Defence Beyond Design
the advantages of nuclear power and that they are concerned with
the safety and well-being of the populace. That is easier said than
done. It is extremely difficult to convince the people who have been
adversely indoctrinated, that nuclear power is safe, particularly
when other means to provide power are available. It is equally
difficult to explain the concepts of clean and plentiful energy to those
with a questionable understanding of the concepts. Be that as it may,
somehow we must be able to get the average citizen to accept that
he is a stakeholder in the success of the nuclear power programme.
Three other issues merit discussion. The first is the question of
how to deal with nuclear waste even after due reprocessing. This
is a live problem that demands continued study but should not
become a stumbling block to greater reliance on nuclear energy.
Scientists worldwide are seized of the requirement and one can
be optimistic that the problem will not get out of hand. Secondly,
terror strikes could occur but the construction of a nuclear reactor
makes a successful strike difficult unless local support is provided
to the terrorists. There are means to obviate such eventualities.
All reactors have to be well guarded. Thirdly, there is the fear
that the reactor may not be earthquake or tsunami resistant. After
Fukushima, this factor takes on added relevance but it is a fact that
we have had earthquakes and tsunamis in close proximity of our
reactors without any untoward consequences. This should give us
the desired confidence in the planning and designing of our reactors.
With time, it is more than possible that other issues may crop up but
again, solutions will be found if the eventuality was not foreseen.
The important point is that nuclear power is a safe, sustainable and
environment friendly source of energy, and a boon for mankind and,
by extension, for India.
In a very readable book full of information and facts, Dr Sitakanta
Mishra gives us an insight into India’s work in the nuclear power
domain, the difficulties faced, the lessons learnt, and the experience
gained. Our nuclear power story is a saga of ups and downs, but
also one of commitment, insistence on standards and a confident
Introduction | xix
approach towards becoming one of the nations with advanced

nuclear capability. In discussing safety and security issues, this book
traces India’s nuclear power programme and the rough road we
have had to traverse at times. It is a commendable effort that should
be read by everyone interested in nuclear issues and India’s quest
for energy.
Air Marshal Vinod Patney SYSM PVSM AVSM VrC (Retd)

Director General
Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi
1
Safety-Security-Safeguards:
The Intricate Interface
Since its inception, nuclear technology has evoked a sense of

optimism as well as awe and fear because of its immense constructive
as well as destructive potential. By now, the world has come a long
way, experiencing both: around 430 commercial nuclear reactors
operating in 31 countries producing 375,000 Mega Watt Electric
(MWe) (11 percent of the world’s electricity)1, radioactive materials
used in many sectors enriching human life; on the other hand, two
nuclear bombs have been used in war and around 19,000 more are
stockpiled; during the same time, three major nuclear accidents have
occurred,2 resulting in some human suffering; and misuse of nuclear
material by non-state actors is widely apprehended. Therefore, the
balance sheet may be argued to be mixed, implying that we succeeded
as much we failed with nuclear technology. After the Fukushima
nuclear disaster, what the fate of nuclear technology will be or which
direction the nuclear energy discourse will move in has been a matter
of speculation.
This study, premised on the assumption that nuclear technology
or nuclear energy cannot be ignored as it has an edge over other forms
of energy, especially for India, argues for a better management
paradigm by looking beyond the design basis framework to address
inherent loopholes. The successive chapters scrutinise India’s tryst
with nuclear energy and the safety-security governance. This chapter
specifically lays down the dynamics of nuclear safety-security-
safeguards conceptually and the global governance regime of nuclear
2 | Defence Beyond Design
technology. On the basis of empirical analyses of various aspects of

India’s nuclear energy discourse, the study attempts to deconstruct
the real and assumed threats (accident, misuse, and terror), the
nomenclature of India’s safety-security architecture in place, and
prescribes at the end a coherent and integrated strategy to devise a
defence mechanism by looking beyond the ‘design basis’construct.
Edge over Other Forms

Despite the past half century’s global experience, it is not yet fully
established that “nuclear power has an edge over other forms of energy,
in terms of limiting day-to-day adverse health and environmental
effects, including greenhouse gas emissions, and in terms of the
frequency and toll of major accidents”.3 In comparison to coal, gas,
hydro, and wind energy sources, the morbidity and greenhouse gas
emission per terawatt-hour in the case of the nuclear energy source is
much lower. According to a study by Edward D. Blandford and Michael
M. May of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, nuclear energy,
that constitutes around 14 percent of global energy consumption, has
the lowest morbidity (0.04 deaths per terawatt-hour) compared to the
coal-related energy production process (161 deaths per terawatt-hour)
that constitutes 42 percent of global energy consumption. In terms
of greenhouse gas emissions, while coal produces 800-1,400 tons per
gigawatt-hour, the nuclear industry produces less than 50 tons.4
Table 1.1: Sources of Electricity, their Morbidity and Greenhouse Gas

Emission Per Unit of Electricity Produced
Source (% of world Deaths per terawatt- Tons of greenhouse
use, 2007) hour gas emissions per
gigawatt-hour (life)
Coal (4.2%) 161(U.S. average is 15) 800-1,400
Gas (21%) 4 300-500
Hydro (16%) 0.1 (Europe) Small-100
Wind (<1%) 0.15 Small-50
Nuclear (14%) 0.04 Small-50
Source: Edward D. Blandford and Michael M. May, “Lessons Learned from Lessons
‘Learned’: The Evolution of Nuclear Power Safety after Accidents and Near-Accidents”,
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2012, p. 23.
Safety-Security-Safeguards | 3
The low morbidity in the nuclear sector is mainly owing to the

fact that the same amount of electricity can be obtained from about
200 to 300 tons of uranium ore as from 3 to 4 million tons of coal or
similarly large quantities of gas or oil. No combustion is involved
in nuclear energy generation; rather, smaller tonnage is mined,
transported, and processed in comparison to other sources. However,
the relative costs and benefits of nuclear energy have remained a
subject of heated debate. While critics argue that nuclear energy is
not only dangerous but also unnecessary for tackling climate change,
supporters claim that the risks are small and that abandoning the
nuclear source would make an already huge challenge even more
difficult and expensive.
Undoubtedly, there is a lot of uncertainty about the cost of nuclear
power compared to the alternatives and these uncertainties increase
as one looks towards the future.5 For decades ahead, decarbonising
electric power will be critical for solving climate change concerns.
The world will need twice as much electricity in 2050 as it does today.
As other alternatives are depleting or not up to the mark, nuclear
power has the potential to address both the concerns, provided the
uncertainties are clarified at the earliest. The Committee on Climate
Change, UK, in a study has estimated the cost of nuclear energy as
falling somewhere above ‘low cost’ options such as onshore wind,
mini-hydro and some bio-fuels, but below ‘expensive’ options such
as offshore wind and Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS).6 The report
asserts that deep reductions in levelised costs are possible if the policy,
regulatory, and licensing regimes are supportive.7 A lot more needs
to be accomplished in these matters to clear much of the air which
will automatically facilitate greater social acceptance of nuclear power.
However, it is necessary to keep in mind that accidents or incidents
may occur in the nuclear industry like in any other industry; the
chances of misuse of nuclear knowhow are likely to remain; and the
fear of nuclear technology falling into terrorists’ hands will persist. All
this does not mean that there is no future role whatsoever for nuclear
technology or nuclear energy. Partly, the fear of radioactive mutated
monsters generated by anti-nuclear propaganda has turned the

atomic dreams, and atomic nightmares into “one of the most powerful
complexes of images ever created outside of religions”.8And there is
no easy solution to these fears except bringing abundant benefits out
of nuclear energy to the people as early as possible, while addressing
their concerns promptly.
The Threat Triangle

Especially in the aftermath of 9/11 and 3/11 (Fukushima nuclear
disaster), safety, security, and safeguarding of nuclear material
and technology has been a major global concern. Many assume
that “catastrophic nuclear accidents are inevitable, because
designers and risk modelers cannot envision all possible ways in
which complex systems can fail”9 as there is no “absolute safety”;
security measures can become obsolete as time passes; and misuse
of technology is inevitable. Undoubtedly, “assuring safety is hard
work” and “an obligation that demands constant attention”. 10
However, to fathom “how much safe is safe enough” is probably
the most stupendous task in the security discourse. There is also
the view that risk is inherent in every industrial activity, including
nuclear, but it can be made quite small. With proper management
techniques, the security risks, proliferation hazards, and safety risks
can be minimised to the extent that the benefits can outweigh the
inherent risks. Noteworthy safety-security lapses continue to occur
in every industrial sector around the globe, even in countries with
extensive operational experience and strong regulatory capabilities.
The world has not abandoned those industrial projects—rather,
the focus has been to study what went wrong and try to fix it.
Conversely, the case with the nuclear industry is strange.
Today, the nuclear industry is “suffering from the cumulative
impacts of the world economic crisis, the Fukushima disaster,
ferocious competitors and its own planning and management
difficulties.”11 Which way the nuclear energy discourse will move is a
matter of conjecture.Taking the middle position, this study advocates
that safe nuclear power is possible and desirable. This could be a reality
by a balanced understanding of technology-society correlation
– if technology is misunderstood, development is missed, and if
technology is uncontrolled, civilisation is at stake. The imperative is
to make this correlation even-handed or objective. However, when
both sets of issues (the efficacy of nuclear power as a viable source of
energy, and the threat to the nuclear industry) are clubbed together,
as everyone tends to do, nuclear technology becomes the subject of
myriad controversies.
At the outset, it needs to be kept in mind that the threat to the
nuclear industry emanates largely from the nature of the strategic
environment. The 9/11 and terrorists activities have increased
attention to ensure adequate security at nuclear installations.
Clandestine nuclear programmes and technology transfer networks
have warranted attention to ensure adequate safeguarding of nuclear
materials. At the same time, nuclear accidents have long provided the
justification for a particular emphasis on safe operations at nuclear
power plants. The nuclear industry, therefore, is subject to intricacies
and concerns of safety, security and safeguards. While safety is aimed
at preventing accidents, security is aimed at preventing intentional
acts that might harm the nuclear power plant or result in the theft
of nuclear materials, and safeguards are aimed at preventing the
diversion of nuclear materials for nuclear weapon purposes.12
Nuclear Safety
Like any other industrial enterprise, safety risks are inherent in every
component of the nuclear industry: uranium mining, reprocessing,
conversion, energy generation, waste management, and even at
the decommissioning phase. According to the Safety Glossary of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), nuclear safety denotes
“the achievement of proper operating conditions, prevention of
accidents or mitigation of accident consequences, resulting in
protection of workers, the public and the environment from undue
radiation hazards”. 13 This suggests that safety evaluations focus
on the risks arising from unintended events initiated by natural

phenomena (like earthquakes, tsunamis, tornadoes, or flooding),
internal hardware interruptions (such as fire, pipe breakage, or loss
of electric power supply), or human mistakes (such as the incorrect
application of procedures, or incorrect alignment of circuits). So,
nuclear safety involves the designing, construction and operating of
nuclear facilities to protect against the accidental release of radioactive
material to the workers, the public or the environment. It also includes
the responsibility to respond effectively to an incident or accident to
minimise the radiological and other consequences.14However, with
adequate caution and management techniques, these can be effectively
minimised.
Normally, every nuclear facility is designed and built to withstand
postulated accidents (design-basis threat) without loss to the systems,
structures and components necessary to ensure public health and
safety.15 To ensure this, the basic requirement is adequate infrastructure
as well as the commitment of the national government, the operator,
regulator, vendor and other organisations, to achieve the best possible
safety. This involves creation and application of excellent management,
design and operation of the nuclear organisation, strictly as per the
guidelines laid down.
Normally, the “defence-in-depth” concept is employed within
the nuclear safety arena to lessen the frequency of trigger events; to
prevent them from leading to more severe events; and to mitigate the
consequences, if they occur. In addition, there is nurturing of a national
“nuclear safety culture” (safety values and behaviours modelled by its
leaders and internalised by the members involved, to make nuclear
safety the overriding priority), an intangible concept based on a safety-
conscious work environment, and collective responsibility to adhere to
the safety principles is the cardinal virtue.16 A variety of international
legal instruments, including conventions and codes of conduct and
the IAEA safety standards, supplemented by IAEA safety support
programmes, and a global network of experts constitute the global
nuclear safety regime.
Nuclear Security
In the IAEA statute and publications, the term “nuclear security”is often
abbreviated to “security”. However, a working definition of nuclear
security, according to the IAEA Safety Glossary, is “the prevention
and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized
access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear or
other radioactive substances or their associated facilities”.17To further
amplify, one can demarcate nuclear security as certain responses to
mainly four types of threats: (1) theft of nuclear material; (2) nuclear
explosive devices manufactured using the stolen nuclear material; (3)
dispersion of devices for radioactive material (dirty bombs); and (4)
sabotage or destruction of nuclear power facilities or of radioactive
material in transport.18Another type can be a combined disaster, in
which opportunistic antagonists time their malicious activity to
take advantage of natural disasters that weaken the nuclear safety
systems. The apparent lack of security in the immediate aftermath of
the Fukushima meltdown highlighted the need for planning for such
combined nuclear dangers.19
All these aspects necessitate strict physical protection measures
like guards, guns, limits on access to vital areas, and intelligence
on adversaries to thwart their nefarious designs. With a sound
management system and shared responsibility by operators and
authorities, and confidentiality of information regarding the facility,
unauthorised access can be prevented. Nuclear security, therefore,
“deals with any activity or system that contributes to the protection
of nuclear and high hazard radioactive materials from unauthorised
access, theft, diversion or sabotage, including inter alia guarding,
physical protection, facility design, personnel vetting, IT security,
technical measures, etc.”20 According to a report, between 1972 and
2007, altogether 17 major terror attacks or acts of sabotage were carried
out against nuclear power plants although none of them resulted in an
uncontrolled radioactive release.21
At the beginning of the nuclear age till the late 1950s, nuclear
security was not specifically regarded as a matter of grave concern in
comparison to nuclear safety and safeguards. However, during the

1960s and 1970s, nuclear security issues were first taken up from the
perspective of the physical protection of nuclear material as, during the
same period, there was a sharp rise in nuclear reactors transfers and
nuclear energy production the world over. Therefore, in 1975, the IAEA
brought out a recommendation (INFCIRC225, 1975), adopted as the
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in 1977 as a
legally binding document. With nuclear terrorism becoming a realistic
scenario during the 1990s, more so after 9/11, nuclear security issues
began to be examined in earnest.22 One can find a gradual expansion of
concern from the physical security of nuclear material to the security of
Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs), technology, and knowhow. Therefore,
a comprehensive security structure encompassing personnel, material,
technology, knowhow and their movement is devised along with the
legal obligations.
To manage security risks to nuclear installations, the method of
‘vital area protection’ is adopted. ‘Vital area’ is an area that contains
vital equipment whose destruction or manipulation could endanger
public health and safety due to exposure to radiation. Normally the
nuclear installations take into account the Design Basis Threat (DBT)
and embed many security measures in the design itself as certain
threats are predictable. The DBT concept is based on the assumption
that terrorist acts show a considerable degree of predictability with
regard to their method of attack as well as the scope of their criminal
action. As a standard practice, site-specific DBTs are classified for
security reasons. However, the major components of a DBT, taking
into account the threat from both insiders and outsiders, are: (1)
identification of the threat; (2) defending against potential attackers;
(3) delaying the attackers until security reinforcements have arrived.23
To protect against intruders, a series of fences with various
sensors and multiple CCTV cameras is installed on-site and at the
site perimeter; and inspection of all persons and vehicles entering
the site is carried out. To deal with the probable threats from the
insiders, personnel reliability programmes are put in place, with
criminal background checks and psychological tests of employees.

Mock attacks on NPPs are planned and carried out to test the security
readiness of the on-site security forces at successive intervals and
sometimes without prior notice. After 9/11, the security arrangements
in and around the NPPs have also been designed to defend against
aerial attacks and cyber attacks. To address the threats from the air,
no-fly zones and anti-aircraft guns, etc. have become an integral part
of the security system. Defending against cyber terrorism is a complex
endeavour. A tiny disk or hard drive is enough to execute a cyber
terror plan even if the computer system in a plant is isolated from
the internet. The primary objective of any cyber security programme
is to protect the confidentiality, integrity and attributes of electronic
data or computer systems and processes in a highly complex and
integrated environment. Appropriate measures against cyber attacks
targeting the digital Information and Communication Technology
(ICT) systems of nuclear plants, therefore, include detection, response,
mitigation, recovery.24 However, the global nuclear security regime is
not as mature as the safety regime.25 It comprises some international
legal instruments, including conventions and codes of conduct and
the IAEA Nuclear Security Series publications, and IAEA security
services.
Nuclear Safeguards
As the same technologies, infrastructure and materials used for
civilian applications are also used in the nuclear weapon programme,
chances of their diversion leading to misuse is always apprehended.
Safeguards measures, therefore, aim to prevent the diversion of
nuclear technology and materials for nuclear weapon purposes.
The first official reference to “safeguards” with respect to nuclear
power can be found in the November 1945 Declaration on the Atomic
Bomb by President Harry S. Truman and Prime Ministers C.R. Attlee
and W.C. Mackenzie King of the UK and Canada respectively. The
“Atoms for Peace” speech to the UN General Assembly in December
1953 led to the creation of the IAEA in 1957 whose primary duty is
to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the implemention

of safeguards. The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the
IAEA constitute the core of the non-proliferation regime looking into
nuclear safeguards issues.
However, the global nuclear non-proliferation regime today faces
three intricate challenges: enforcement; a crisis of confidence; and
the three “T’s” – theft, trafficking and terrorism.26 Non-compliance
by countries like Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and Iran has greatly
undermined confidence in the regime. Also, the regime contains a
number of loopholes that are exploited by the state parties. A state can
acquire all the elements of the nuclear fuel cycle as long as it declares
them and subjects them to safeguards. But, on six months’ notice, it
may withdraw legally from the treaty on national security grounds
and move immediately to acquire nuclear weapons, the way North
Korea did.
Among various legal and technological procedures, the
non-proliferation regime relies on inspections as the primary
element in investigating any diversion of nuclear technology and
material. The IAEA initially implemented certain provisions of
the safeguards and after the NPT came into force in 1970, it was
given responsibility for full-scope safeguards under the NPT. In
the 1990s, an Additional Protocol and supplementary measures
were implemented to streamline the safeguards. In the safeguards
agreements pursuant to the NPT, a state is required to establish
and maintain a State System of Accounting and Control (SSAC)
of nuclear material within its territory, jurisdiction or control.27
However, instances of nuclear material smuggling are on the rise
and their slippage into the wrong hands would be disastrous.
The endeavour has been to put in place both legal obligations as
well as technical measures to reduce the chances of diversion or
misuse of nuclear materials. While many bilateral and multilateral
non-proliferation regimes are in place, efforts are on to invent
proliferation resistant reactors and fuel cycle.
The Intricate Interface

The trio – safety, security, and safeguards –represents specific
aspects of the nuclear domain, symbolising an exclusive sphere of
responsibilities, but they overlap in many respects. But the three
aspects have been regulated and managed traditionally in isolation
from each other. While safety management has been the responsibility
of operators, engineers, safety managers and scientists, ensuring
security tends to be the responsibility of the security personnel with a
different professional background and range of competencies.
As all the three overlap considerably, the interface among them is
extremely intricate. “As the security framework matures, safety and
security obligations serve to reinforce each other. Measures related
to non-proliferation (safeguards) also contribute to the overall goal
of protecting public health and the environment….”28 Especially,
interconnectedness between safety-security, security-safeguards,
and safeguards-safety denotes an intricate paradigm that is to be
coherently addressed. To ensure a safe and secure nuclear project,
better understanding of the three interfaces is necessary.
Firstly, all these three aspects have a similar objective – protection
of the people, society and environment. Such protection is achieved
by preventing a large release of radioactive material. Second, as their
spheres overlap, and are, therefore, mutually reinforcing, the principles
to ensure protection and consequent elements or actions are common
even though their implementation may differ. Thirdly, the philosophy
applied to achieve the fundamental objectives of the three domains is
similar. While nuclear security aims to follow the ‘defence in-depth’
philosophy by establishing a series of protective layers, nuclear safety
strives to address ‘design basis threats’ by a comprehensive strategy
for the defence of the facility to withstand a postulated event. The
principle of optimisation of protection is common to both safety and
security and based on the idea that radiation risks must be kept As
Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA).29 Also the steps taken to
provide protection against malicious acts incorporate specific features
to ensure physical protection, and rely on provisions that may have
been installed for safety reasons. For example, nuclear plants are
constructed with protective barriers of steel and reinforced concrete
that serve both a security and a safety function.
There are many other arrangements that enhance both safety and
security simultaneously. For example, the reactor containment serves
to prevent release of radioactive material to the environment in the
event of an accident, while simultaneously providing a robust structure
that protects the reactor from a terrorist assault. Similarly, controls to
limit access to vital areas not only serve a safety function by preventing
or limiting exposure but also serve a security purpose by inhibiting
unauthorised access by intruders. Especially, there are five elements
that are central, and have direct applicability, to the nuclear security
regime: (a) regularised assessments; (b) information sharing; (c) peer
reviews; (d) reviews of the implementation of relevant international
conventions; and (e) strong trade organisations.30
Further, “peace” and “safety” are the keywords for securing and
regulating nuclear power. Preventing nuclear material and technology
from diversion to military purposes or slippage into wrong hands
constitutes another dimension of nuclear security, and is aimed
to deter and detect unauthorised removal of nuclear material – to
provide assurance that all nuclear material is accounted for. Therefore,
safeguards measures enhance safety by preventing diversion and
misuse of nuclear material, mainly relying on the methods of
‘safeguards by design’ and proliferation resistant technology. There
are areas where safeguards and security can interact to improve
effectiveness and efficacy in achieving their objectives like Research
and Development (R&D) and surveillance system, analysis capability
(nuclear forensics), nuclear trade and illicit trafficking analysis,
advisory missions, Information Technology (IT) security, quality
management system, risk assessment and emergency response.31
Therefore, the interrelationship among the three spheres is
straightforward: safeguards can be thought of as addressing
“peace”; nuclear safety as addressing “safety”; and nuclear security
as spanning both “peace” and “safety”. 32 While nuclear security
focusses on prevention, detection of, and response to, the theft of

nuclear material that can be used for nuclear weapons or nuclear
explosive devices (therefore, connected with “peace”), nuclear
safety addresses the malicious intentions of terrorists. In other
words, nuclear safeguards fundamentally target state actors,
nuclear security focusses on terrorists, and nuclear safety covers
engineering phenomena but all aim to ensure safe and secure
nuclear power.
Fig 1.1: Interrelationship Among Safety, Security, and Safeguards
Nuclear security
Protection of nuclear material
Scope of Nuclear
activity power safety Prevention Protection Safeguard
Prevention Prevention of nuclear from
of sabotage/ of threat smuggling radioactive
destruction sources
National regulatory authorities IAEA

(National
regulatory
authorities) (Nuclear power companies (implementing actor) National regulatory
Principal authorities
Nuclear power
actor
companies
(implementing Nuclear power
actor) companies (subjected
Insiders Offenders (terrorists, etc.) Insiders
to safeguards)
Prevention of conversion to non-peaceful uses Prevention of

Objective Prevention of (including military uses) conversion to
accidents military use
Prevention of
accidents
Source: “Countries Planning to Introduce Nuclear Power Generation and the 3S: Making the
3S an International Standard”, http://icnnd.org/Documents/endo_3s_int_standard.pdf, p. 8.
The Dilemma
Taking into account the increasing number of nuclear reactors
under construction in various parts of the world, one may
assume that problems related to safety, security and safeguards
are inevitable. Since the three spheres overlap considerably, the
importance of a coordinated approach with the objective to
have greater uniformity is oft-emphasised. However, there exist

some tensions between each of these aspects that may lead to a
dilemma if they are frantically integrated. For example, nuclear
safety measures rely on transparency and a culture that strongly
encourages an open review of past mistakes; nuclear security, on
the other hand, relies on confidentiality of information that may be
of use to an adversary.33Nuclear security relies on limiting access
to vital areas of plants, while an effective emergency response
may require immediate access by nuclear safety personnel and
emergency responders. For example, the introduction of delay
barriers for security reasons can limit rapid access to respond to
a safety event or can limit emergency egress by plant personnel.
Security considerations might serve to bar plant personnel from
certain areas of the facility in the event of an attack that might
need to be accessed for safety reasons. In the same way, certain
safeguards are considered confidential, whereas nuclear security,
by its very nature, requires the maintenance of secrecy and, thus,is
not suited to public disclosure. The focus on sovereignty with
respect to nuclear security is especially highlighted in the area of
information security. Therefore, “information exchanges and peer
reviews have not played a large role in the nuclear security regime”
so far.34
Moreover, the three regimes are at different stages of their
evolution. While the nuclear safety regime encompasses a broad
spectrum and a long history, the nuclear security regime has a
shorter history and the security culture has not matured as much as
the safety culture. The IAEA security guidance has been developed
but is viewed as somewhat less comprehensive/mature than the
counterpart safety standards. The fact is, nuclear safety and security
have developed along different trajectories in the last few decades.
The nuclear safety regime, comprising national laws and regulations,
voluntary international agreements and conventions, has matured
relatively quickly following the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl
incidents. The nuclear security regime has advanced largely in
response to the 9/11 attacks. The nuclear safeguards regime, on the

other hand, is not yet universal and the non-proliferation regime is
marred by numerous controversies. Above all, the implementation
of nuclear safety and security measures is largely voluntary and
national in nature.
Therefore, strengthening the safety-security-safeguards
interface is a complex undertaking. A security-heightened approach,
though necessary, would not suffice to address all the threats to
safety. Similarly, a culture of nuclear safety practice is necessary,
but that alone cannot protect people or the environment from
malicious acts. What is needed, therefore, is a new strategic paradigm
in the development and expansion of nuclear energy based on the
3S (Safety, Security, and Safeguards). 35 An international initiative
on the 3S-based nuclear energy infrastructure was first proposed
in the G-8 Summit 2008 at Chitose, Hokkaido, Japan. The G-8
Initiative on Nuclear Energy Infrastructure recognised “the need
to establish common understanding that implementation of non-
proliferation/safeguards, safety and security (3S) is indispensible
for the use of nuclear energy.”36 Against this background, the G-8
Initiative, aimed at raising awareness of the importance of the 3S
worldwide and assisting the countries concerned in developing the
3S, was discussed in the Nuclear Safety and Security Group (NSSG),
established at the Kananaskis Summit, and found broad support.37
Fig 1.2: International Initiative on 3S-based Nuclear Energy

Infrastructure (Proposed first in the G8 Summit 2008, Japan)
Source: Jor-Shan Choi, http://www.jaea.go.jp/04/np/activity/2011-12-08/2011-12-08-22.pdf
The first Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in Washington DC (2010)

focussed on the theme of securing nuclear materials and preventing
illicit nuclear trafficking and nuclear terrorism. Therefore, it aimed
at a 2S approach by integrating safeguards and security measures on
nuclear materials. The 2012 Nuclear Security Summit at Seoul focussed
on nuclear security and safety to address facility related radiological
consequences.
The Seoul Communiqué at best renewed the political commitments
generated from the 2010 Washington Summit “to work toward
strengthening nuclear security, reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism,
and preventing terrorists, criminals, or other unauthorized actors
from acquiring nuclear materials.”38 The summit stressed on the
states’ fundamental responsibility to maintain effective security of
all nuclear material through measures which would not hamper their
right to develop and utilise nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The
summit also urged for universal adherence and support to multilateral
instruments like the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM),
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism
(ICSANT), Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT),

and Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials
of Mass Destruction.39 Moreover, the leader of the summit recognised
the importance of ‘capacity building’ as fundamental to promote a
strong nuclear security culture and “maintain robust communication
and coordination of activities”. In this regard, it reaffirmed “the need
for various public diplomacy and outreach efforts to enhance public
awareness of actions taken and capacities built to address threats to
nuclear security, including the threat of nuclear terrorism”.
Global Nuclear Governance

A cursory look at the concerns raised and initiatives undertaken
brings one the impression that the world is standing at a “nuclear
turning point”.40 A resolve seems to be emerging to strengthen the
global concerns to pursue the objectives of reducing the nuclear threat
by building a tangible foundation41 through the NSS which strive to
balance national sovereignty vis-à-vis international obligations of
nation-states in the sphere of global nuclear governance.
So far, atomic power has remained a state domain and the
‘responsibility for nuclear safety rests with the state’. For the last few
decades, there has been increasing fear of non-state actors gaining
access to nuclear technology. Therefore, the issue of the safety and
security of nuclear technology has become more acute. Secondly, a
nuclear disaster respects no national border and radiation can travel
far, affecting surrounding nations. The nuclear industry, therefore,
needs to be based on consensus and cooperation, taking into account
the different stakeholders. Thirdly, the best practices of different
countries can be shared and utilised for safe and secure nuclear
energy production globally. All these indicate an effective global
nuclear governance architecture regulating all aspects of the nuclear
energy process. This is increasingly being shared among states,
inter-governmental and non-state actors through standards and best
practices that play complementary and parallel roles in ensuring
nuclear safety, security and safeguards in the last two NSS.42
In the current international political lexicon, ‘nuclear governance’

refers to “the web of international treaties, agreements, regulatory
regimes, organisations and agencies, monitoring and verification
mechanisms and supplementary arrangements that help determine the
way that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, notably the generation
of nuclear electricity, is governed”.43 These exist at the international,
regional and sub-regional or bilateral levels and largely depend on
national implementation arrangements which ensure that each country
fulfills its obligations in the nuclear field. It is a collaborative enterprise
involving many players at various levels that indeed emphasises on a
holistic approach.44
The current status of global nuclear governance is linked mainly
to various regimes in its nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation
arena. The 1994 Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) that entered into
force in October 1996 is the most important legally-binding instrument
in the nuclear safety field. Though the treaty applies to land-based
civilian nuclear power reactors, radioactive waste management, and
storage of spent fuel, it excludes other nuclear fuel cycle facilities for fuel
fabrication, uranium conversion and enrichment, and reprocessing. In
fact, fuel cycle facilities face unique nuclear safety challenges which
need urgent attention. Also, the CNS has no monitoring, verification or
compliance system and no penalties for non-compliance. It is alleged
that the CNS suffers from a lack of openness and transparency, making
it impossible for outsiders to truly assess the system’s effectiveness.45
The IAEA is considered as the global hub of nuclear safety
and security. It acts as the secretariat for all the new safety-related
conventions, and sets and promotes safety standards, safety advisory
missions and management of peer review processes. It also establishes
guidelines and codes of conduct and provides significant advice
and assistance to member states on all nuclear-related matters. The
Operational Safety Review Teams (OSART) programme is designed
to aid states in improving the operational safety of their nuclear plants
essentially through the process of peer review. The IAEA’s Integrated
Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) provides advice and assistance to
enhance the effectiveness of the regulatory infrastructure for both

safety and security. The IAEA Incident Reporting System (IRS) collects
information from participating states’ national regulators on unusual
events in nuclear power plants, assesses, analyses and extends feedback
to operators to prevent similar occurrences at other plants. However, all
these do not legally oblige states to implement IAEA standards. Many
countries do not even report to the IAEA. The question arises as to
whether such standards and practices should be made legally binding
and compliance with them verified by international inspectors,as in the
case of nuclear safeguards. In 2000, the IAEA initiated the International
Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) and
released the INPRO methodology.
Many other international bodies have also undertaken the
responsibility of ensuring nuclear safety like the World Association of
Nuclear Operators (WANO), Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), World
Nuclear Association (WNA) European Atomic Energy Community
(Euratom) and European Commission (EC). Especially, WANO runs
a peer review system to facilitate “communication, comparison and
emulation” and technical support missions among its members in
order to maximise safety and reliability. The NEA focusses on research
and information exchange in selected areas like nuclear sciences,
safety, regulation, waste management, technical and economic
studies, nuclear law and radiation protection. The Euratom helps
promote nuclear safety through the cultivation of common views and
by identifying best practices. The European Nuclear Safety Regulators
Group (ENSREG) is the focal point of cooperation between European
regulators and intends to lead to continuous improvement in nuclear
safety, especially in new reactors.
The oldest but least understood legal regime fostering nuclear
safety is the ‘liability’one that emerged in the 1960s. This is the
most important legal mechanism by which an operator can be held
internationally accountable for a nuclear accident that causes trans-
boundary hazards. Also, it aims to sustain public confidence in
nuclear energy by ensuring adequate compensation to those harmed
if an accident occurs. While imposing responsibility on operators to

run the reactors safely,the regime provides stronger legal protection
against unlimited liability for vendors that operate outside their own
countries.
However, the liability regime has remained “paradoxical” and
“less welcome” for various reasons.46It is alleged that it reduces the
incentive for pursuing nuclear safety as it is based on the idea that
the operator is ultimately responsible for the safety of its reactors. As
the cost of liability insurance is not internalised, it provides a small
but hidden subsidy to the nuclear industry, making it cheaper than it
normally would be. Further, the liability regime has become complex
as it is based on two separate international legal frameworks. The
oldest is the Paris/Brussels framework, established under the auspices
of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD)/NEA, covering the OECD members. The Vienna framework,
under the IAEA auspices, was intended to be universal by providing
the framework for a global regime. The 1997 Protocol to Amend the
Vienna Convention and the 1997 Convention on Supplementary
Compensation for Nuclear Damage are two attempts to modernise
the regime. The Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of
Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material, 1971, deals with the liability
issue with nuclear operators who transport nuclear material. More
importantly, it has been marked that states have been remarkably
reluctant to become parties to the liability conventions and protocols.
According to different studies, fewer than half of the world’s nuclear
power plants are currently covered by the regime and the largest civil
nuclear programmes have stayed away, providing disincentives for
other states to join it.47
The nuclear global governance, especially on the security
aspects and the regime thereof, is nowhere near as extensive,
advanced or entrenched as the regime for nuclear safety governance.
Comparatively, there is less collaboration between nuclear plant
operators worldwide in this sphere. Practically, there is no peer review
as there exists an abiding sense that nuclear security is too sensitive
an issue to be subject to global governance. In fact, “the pervasive

secrecy surrounding nuclear security means that no global mechanism
is in place to identify the worst security performers and help them
come up to the level of the best performers”. 48 Even the treaties
and conventions that exist are laden with many handicaps that are
challenging to address. The CPPNM (1980) strives to commit states to
ensure nuclear material protection and organise review conferences
every five years to assess the implementation of the convention as a
whole. However, it does not focus on the compliance of individual
parties. There is no peer review mechanism, nor does the IAEA have
any particular role beyond transmitting information about national
contact points.49An amendment to the convention was brought in 1998
to extend its ambit to domestic use, storage and transport aspects of
nuclear activities. However, the amendment is not yet in force. In the
same manner, the ICSANT entered into force in July 2007 and as of
2010, there were only 63 state parties and 115 signatories. It also does
not have any monitoring, verification or compliance provisions or
system of peer review, accountability or review meetings. The Security
Council Resolution 1540 is a valuable and novel addition to global
nuclear governance, but even its compliance and implementation have
been “slow and uneven”.50
The global non-proliferation regime is comparatively more
binding and relies on the compliance and verification process. Though
the NPT has managed to restrict the number of nuclear weapon states
to within ten, serious cases of non-compliance have undermined its
credibility over the years. Successive Review Conferences have been
forums of contention, and without tangible outcomes. Article VI of
the treaty prescribes “negotiations in good faith” for all NPT parties
to achieve nuclear disarmament; however, no significant step has been
undertaken in this regard by any state-party yet. The IAEA safeguards
framework has been increasingly authoritative and intrusive. At the
same time, it could only monitor and inspect materials and facilities
formally declared to it by the parties. There are reports saying that
at least 24 states have not complied with their obligation to have a
comprehensive safeguards agreement. As of December 2009, 93 states

had an Additional Protocol in force, 34 had signed one and another
eight countries’ agreements had been approved by the IAEA Board of
Governors (BOG).51 Iran’s clandestine nuclear weapons programme
brings home the fact that the old safeguards system failed to detect
its almost 20 years of non-compliance and, therefore,was inadequate.
The widely-proclaimed strengthened safeguards arrangements,
including the Additional Protocol, are still viewed to leave space for
non-detection of undeclared facilities. The IAEA is viewed to be away
from the “anytime, anywhere” verification capability and the “special
inspection of cases” remains a highly politicised option within the
BOG.
Informal non-proliferation arrangements have emerged in the last
few decades, sometimes supplementing the NPT and sometimes in
reaction to its loopholes. The Zangger Committee and the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) are multilateral arrangements that strive to
restrict and monitor nuclear technology flow. However, their role has
been criticised by many as “they breach the spirit if not the letter of
states’ inalienable right to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology
under the NPT”. They seem to remain as “political lightning rods”,
therefore,the question arises as to whether these frameworks can ever
be integrated into the formal structures of the IAEA.52
Three other relatively recent frameworks are the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI), Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP)
and Nuclear Security Summit (NSS). The PSI, which aims to interdict
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) technologies, started in 2003 and
a growing number of countries are becoming its members. However,
China objects to the PSI, regarding it as a threat to the Law of the Sea
and interdiction of dual use technologies. The GNEP, while promoting
civilian nuclear applications through the highest non-proliferation
standards, aims to develop ‘proliferation resistant’ technology
which is yet to be developed. The two NSS have been successful to
a certain extent in highlighting the imperatives of nuclear security
and the substantive measures to be undertaken. However, there is
considerable dilemma on how to reconcile national sovereignty with

global responsibility to meet nuclear security objectives. It is really
worrisome as some countries do not recognise the nuclear threat at all
and even countries that do recognise the threat, may not recognise its
full scope.53
Keeping in mind the contemporary realities, Graham Allison says,
“It is hard to avoid the conclusion that, on our present trajectory,
the likelihood of a nuclear avalanche is greater than the prospect of
reaching the peak”.54 While Iran and North Korea have produced
enough nuclear material, Pakistan, a troubled state, is hurrying to
expand its inventory. According to the IAEA’s Illicit Trafficking Data
Base, from January 1993 to December 2012, a total of 2,331 incidents
was reported out of which 419 involved unauthorised possession and
related criminal activities.55 Unless and until “a brand-new innovative
design, or architecture, based on long range views and shared
understanding of risks and their transversal impacts”56, which the NSS
is aiming for, is put in place within a specific timeframe, the nuclear
industry would only inch towards doomsday.
Many other regional and bilateral security frameworks like Nuclear
Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) and non-attack of nuclear installations
seem to have been effective in certain cases. One nuclear weapon-free
zone treaty – the African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (ANWFZ),
known as the Treaty of Pelindaba – contains provision for ensuring the
physical security of nuclear materials. It extends to the entire African
continent and bans attacks on nuclear facilities. The treaty facilitates
exchanges of information, consultations and compliance with the
treaty obligations. Similarly, in South Asia, India and Pakistan have
signed the treaty on Non-Attack on Each Other’s Nuclear Facilities. The
treaty was drafted in 1988, signed by Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto and her Indian counterpart, Rajiv Gandhi, on December 21,
1988, and entered into force in January 1991.57This obliges each party
to refrain from undertaking, encouraging, or participating in, directly
or indirectly, any action aimed at causing destruction or damage to any
nuclear installation or facility in either country. It specifies each party
to inform the other of the precise locations (latitude and longitude)

of nuclear installations and facilities by January 1 of each year and
whenever there is any change. For the last two decades, both countries
have maintained the sanctity of the treaty and it has remained a
significant nuclear (security) Confidence Building Measure (CBM)
between them.
Most critical to global nuclear governance is the role of national
nuclear regulators. They comprise the channel through which global
governance norms, treaty obligations and recommended standards
are implemented. A clear-cut separation of responsibilities between
the nuclear regulatory and promoting agency is prescribed for strict
and unbiased implementation of safety standards. Having a regulatory
body too close to organisations that promote nuclear projects is not
healthy for the fact that it may compromise on implementation of
safety rules and procedures. It is alleged that regulatory bodies in
Brazil, India and South Africa are more proximate to the promoting
agency. However, to utilise the best practices and benefit from each
other’s experiences, the effort has been to establish cooperation among
nuclear regulators across the globe. There are now many such forums
that facilitate interaction and cooperation. For example, the Network
of Regulators of Countries with Small Nuclear Programmes (NERS);
CANDU Senior Regulators; Cooperation Forum of State Nuclear
Safety Authorities of Countries which operate WWER Reactors;
and European Nuclear Safety Regulatory Group (ENSREG). The
International Nuclear Regulators Association (INRA) established in
1997, having 31 regulators as its members, provides a periodic forum
to discuss nuclear safety and collective strategy. But there is no
universal international organisation that encompasses all regulators
worldwide.
Balancing Sovereignty with Responsibility

Nuclear safety and security comprises a sovereign responsibility
but only individual state determination of standards and their
implementation is not enough. Strong international cooperation and
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"Now, if I hadn't showed up here just now, what did you intend to do?"
"I intended to stop the machine, of course," Trelawney said. His
expression hadn't changed while Dowland was talking. "Preferably
without involving the Solar Police Authority in our activities. But since
you've now involved yourself, I urgently suggest that we go to the
laboratory immediately and take care of the matter together."
Dowland nodded. "That's what I had in mind, Trelawney. Technically

you're under arrest, of course, and you'll do whatever has to be done
in there at gun point. Are we likely to run into any difficulties in the
operation?"
"We very probably will," Trelawney said thoughtfully, "and it's just as
probable that we won't know what they are before we encounter
them."
Dowland stood up. "All right," he said, "let's go. We'll stop off at the
house on the way. I want to be sure that Miss Trelawney isn't in a
position to do something thoughtless."
He emptied the magazine of Trelawney's rifle before giving it to him.
They started down to the house, Trelawney in the lead, the IPA gun in
Dowland's hand.
The house door was closed. Trelawney glanced back questioningly.
Dowland said in a low voice, "It isn't locked. Open it, go on in, and
stop two steps inside the hallway. I'll be behind you. They're both in
the living room."
He followed Trelawney in, reaching back to draw the door shut again.
There was a whisper of sound. Dowland half turned, incredulously felt
something hard jab painfully against his backbone. He stood still.
"Drop your gun, Dowland," Jill Trelawney said behind him. Her voice
was as clear and unslurred as if she had been awake for hours.
Dowland cursed himself silently. She must have come around the
corner of the house the instant they went in.
"My gun's pointing at your uncle's back," he said. "Don't do anything
that might make me nervous, Miss Trelawney."
"Don't try to bluff Jill, friend," Paul Trelawney advised him without
turning his head. There was dry amusement in the man's voice. "No
one's ever been able to do it. And she's quite capable of concluding
that trading an uncle for an SPA spy would still leave Terra ahead at
this stage. But that shouldn't be necessary. Jill?"
"Yes, Paul?"
"Give our policeman a moment to collect his wits. This does put him
in a very embarrassing position, after all. And I can use his help in the
lab."
"I'll give you exactly three seconds, Dowland," Jill said. "And you'd
better believe that is not a bluff. One...."
Dowland dropped his gun.
The two Trelawneys held a brief, whispered conversation in the living

room. Dowland, across the room from them, and under cover of two
guns now, couldn't catch much of it. Jill was in one of the radiation
suits he'd brought in from the storeroom. Miguel was dead. He had
still been unconscious when she woke up, and had stopped breathing
minutes afterwards. Medic had done what it could; in this case it
simply hadn't been enough. Jill, however, had found another use for
it. Dowland thought the possibility mightn't have occurred to anyone
else in similar circumstances; but he still should have thought of it
when he left the house. As she began to struggle up from sleep, she
remembered what Dowland had told her about medic, and somehow
she had managed to inject a full ampule of it into her arm. It had
brought her completely awake within minutes.
The murmured talk ended. The girl looked rather white and frightened
now. Paul Trelawney's face was expressionless as he came over to
Dowland. Jill shoved the gun she had put on Dowland into her belt,
picked up Paul's hunting rifle, held it in her hands, and stood waiting.
"Here's the procedure, Dowland," Trelawney said. "Jill will go over to
the lab with us, but stay outside on guard. She'll watch...."
"Did you tell her," Dowland interrupted, "to keep an eye out for
something that stands twice as high as this house?"
Trelawney looked at him a moment. "So you ran into it," he said. "I
was wondering. It's very curious that ... well, one thing at a time. I
cautioned her about it, as it happens. Now come over to the table."
Dowland remained standing beside the table, while across from him
Trelawney rapidly sketched out two diagrams on a piece of paper.
The IPA gun lay on the table near Trelawney's right hand. There
might have been an outside chance of reaching it if one could have
discounted Jill's watchfulness. Which, Dowland decided, one couldn't.
And he'd seen her reload the rifle she was holding. He stayed where
he was.
Trelawney shoved the paper across to him.
"Both diagrams represent our machine," he said, "and they should
give you a general idea of what you'll see. This wheel here is at the
far side of the console when we come in the door. The wheel is the
flow regulator—the thing you have to keep in mind. There are scale
markings on it. The major markings have the numbers one to five.
Yesterday morning the regulator was set at five—full flow. Spin the
wheel back to one, and the Ym-400 that's been producing the flow
goes inert. Is that clear?"
Dowland nodded. "Clear enough."
"After that," Trelawney remarked, "we may be able to take things a
little easier."
"What's the quantity you're using in there?"
"No real reason I should tell you that, is there? But I will. The sixty-
eight kilograms the Overgovernment's been grieving about are under
the machine platform. We're using all of it." He grinned briefly,
perhaps at Dowland's expression. "The type of job we had in mind
required quantities in that class. Now, about yourself. We're not
murderers. Jill tells me you can't be bribed—all right. What will
happen, when this thing's settled, is that you'll have an attack of
amnesia. Several months of your life will be permanently lost from
your memory, including, of course, everything connected with this
operation. Otherwise you won't be harmed. Understand?"
"I've heard of such things," Dowland said drily.
It wouldn't, however, be done that way. It was the kind of thing told a
man already as good as dead, to keep him from making a desperate
attempt to save himself. The Freeholders really wouldn't have much
choice. Something had loused up their plans here, and if Dowland
either disappeared or was found suffering from a sudden bout of
amnesia, the IPA would turn its full attention on Terra at once. If he
died, his death could be plausibly arranged to look like an accident or
a killing for personal motives. These people were quite capable of
sacrificing one of their group to back such a story up. And it would
pass. Terra was under no more immediate suspicion than any other
world. Dowland had been on a routine assignment.
There were a few brief preparations. Paul Trelawney checked the

batteries in the radiation suits he and Jill were wearing, then
exchanged his set for that of the spare suit. Dowland left his own AR
field off for the moment. It was at least as adequate as the one
developed by the Trelawneys' suits, and in some respects a much
more practical device. But the suit batteries had an effective life of
twenty-four hours, expending them automatically while the suits were
worn. His field would maintain itself for a minimum of an hour and a
half, a maximum of two hours. In this situation, Dowland wasn't sure
how long he would have to depend on the field. A few more minutes
of assured protection might make a difference.
He saw Trelawney studying the mountaineering rig on the floor; then
he picked up the harness and brought it over to him.
"Here, put it on," he said.
"What for?" Dowland asked, surprised.
Trelawney grinned. "We may have a use for it. You'll find out in a
minute or two."
They left the house by a back entrance. Clouds were banked low on
the eastern horizon now; the first sunlight gleamed pale gold beneath
them. In the west the sky was brown with swirling dust. Jill stopped
twenty yards from the laboratory building and stood on the slope, rifle
in hand, watching the men go on. At the door, Dowland switched on
his AR field. Trelawney tossed the disk-shaped key over to him.
"Know how to use it?"
Dowland nodded.
"All right. After you've snapped it in and it releases again, throw it
back to me. It may be the last one around, and we're not taking it into
the laboratory this time. When the door starts moving down, step
back to the right of it. We'll see what the lab is like before we go in."
Trelawney indicated a thimble-sized instrument on his suit. "This'll tell
whether the place is hot at the moment, and approximately how hot."
He waved the IPA gun in Dowland's direction. "All right, go ahead."
Dowland fitted the key into the central depression in the door,
pressed down, felt the key snap into position with a sharp twisting
motion of its own, released his pressure on it. An instant later, the key
popped back out into his hand. He tossed it back to Trelawney, who
caught it left-handed and threw it over his head in Jill's direction. The
disk thudded heavily into the grass ten feet from her. The girl walked
over, picked it up, and slid it into one of her suit pockets.
The slab of metasteel which made up the laboratory door began
moving vertically downward. The motion stopped when the door's top
rim was still several inches above the level of the sill.
A low droning came from the little instrument on Trelawney's suit. It
rose and fell irregularly like the buzz of a circling wasp. Mingled with it
was something that might have been the hiss of escaping steam.
That was Dowland's detector confirming. The lab reeked with
radiation.
He glanced over at Trelawney.
"Hot enough," the Freeholder said. "We'll go inside. But stay near the
door for a moment. There's something else I want to find out
about...."
Inside, the laboratory was unpartitioned and largely empty, a great

shell of a building. Only the section to the left of the entrance
appeared to have been used. That section was lighted. The light
arose evenly from the surfaces of the raised machine platform
halfway over to the opposite wall. The platform was square, perhaps
twenty feet along its sides. Dowland recognized the apparatus on it
from Trelawney's diagrams. The central piece was an egg-shaped
casing which appeared to be metasteel. Near its blunt end, partly
concealed, stood the long, narrow instrument console. Behind the
other end of the casing, an extension ramp jutted out above the
platform. At the end of the ramp was a six-foot disk that might have
been quartz, rimless, brightly iridescent. It was tilted to the left, facing
the bank of instruments.
"A rather expensive bit of equipment over there, Dowland," Trelawney
said. "My brother developed the concept, very nearly in complete
detail, almost twenty-five years ago. But a great deal of time and
thought and work came then before the concept turned into the
operating reality on that platform."
He nodded to the left. "That's Miguel's coat on the floor. I wasn't sure
it would still be here. The atomic key you were searching for so
industriously last night is in one of its pockets. Miguel was standing
just there, with the coat folded over his arm, when I saw him last—
perhaps two or three seconds before I was surprised to discover I
was no longer looking at the instrument controls in our laboratory."
"Where were you?" Dowland asked. "Six hundred thousand years in
the past?"
"The instruments showed a fix on that point in time," Trelawney said.
"But this was, you understand, a preliminary operation. We intended
to make a number of observations. We had not planned a personal
transfer for several more weeks. But in case the test turned out to be
successful beyond our expectations, I was equipped to make the
transfer. That bit of optimistic foresight is why I'm still alive."
What was the man waiting for? Dowland asked, "What actually
happened?"
"A good question, I'd like to know the whole answer myself. What
happened in part was that I suddenly found myself in the air, falling
toward a river. It was night and cloudy, but there was light enough to
show it was a thoroughly inhospitable river.... And now I believe"—his
voice slowed thoughtfully—"I believe I understand why my brother
was found outside the closed door of this building. Over there,
Dowland. What does that look like to you?"
Near the far left of the building, beyond the immediate range of the
light that streamed from the machine stand, a big packing crate
appeared to have been violently—and rather oddly—torn apart. The
larger section of the crate lay near the wall, the smaller one
approximately twenty feet closer to the machine platform. Assorted
items with which it had been packed had spilled out from either
section. But the floor between the two points of wreckage was bare
and unlittered. Except for that, one might have thought the crate had
exploded.
"It wasn't an explosion," Trelawney agreed when Dowland said as

much. He was silent a moment, went on, "In this immediate area, two
space-time frames have become very nearly superimposed. There is
a constant play of stresses now as the two frames attempt to adjust
their dissimilarities. Surrounding our machine we have a spherical
concentration of those stresses, and there are moments when space
here is literally wrenched apart. If one were caught at such an instant
—ah!"
To Dowland it seemed that a crack of bright color had showed briefly
in the floor of the building, between the door and the machine
platform. It flickered, vanished, reappeared at another angle before
his ears had fully registered the fact that it was accompanied by a
curiously chopped-off roar of sound. Like a play of lightning. But this
was....
The air opened out before him, raggedly framing a bright-lit three-
dimensional picture. He was staring down across a foaming river to
the rim of a towering green and yellow forest. The crash of the river
filled the building. Something bulky and black at the far left ... but the
scene was gone—
The interior of the laboratory building lay quiet and unchanged before
them again. Dowland said hoarsely, "How did you know what was
going to happen?"
"I was in a position to spend several hours observing it," Trelawney
said, "from the other side. You see now, I think, that we can put your
mountaineer's kit to some very practical use here."
Dowland glanced across the building. "The walls...."
"Metasteel," Trelawney said, "and thank God for that. The building's
sound; the stresses haven't affected it. We'll have some anchor
points. A clamp piton against that wall, six feet above the console
walk and in line with it, another one against the doorframe here, and
we can rope across."
Dowland saw it, unsnapped his harness, fed the end of the
magnerope through the eye of a piton, and twisted it tight. "Are we
going together?" he asked.
Trelawney shook his head. "You're going, Dowland. Sorry about that,
but this is no time for sporting gestures. The rope doesn't eliminate
the danger. But if you find your feet suddenly dangling over the air of
a very old time, you'll still stay here—I hope. If you don't make it
across, I'll follow. We get two chances to shut Ymir down instead of
one. All right?"
"Since you have the gun, yes," Dowland said. "If I had it, it would be
the other way around."
"Of course," Trelawney agreed. He watched in silence then as
Dowland rammed the threaded piton down the muzzle of the gun,
locked it in position, took aim across the machine platform, and fired.
The piton clamp made a slapping sound against the far wall, froze
against it. Dowland gave the loose end of the rope a few tugs, said,
"Solid," cut the rope, and handed the end to Trelawney.
The Freeholder reached up to set a second piton against the
doorframe, fed a loop of the rope through it, and twisted it tight.
Dowland slipped a set of grappling gloves out of the harness, pulled
one over his right hand, tossed the other to Trelawney. "In case," he
said, "you have to follow. Magnerope gets to be wearing on bare
hands."
Trelawney looked briefly surprised, then grinned. "Thanks," he said.
"Can you do it with one glove?"
"No strain at that distance."
"Too bad you're not a Terran, Dowland. We could have used you."
"I'm satisfied," Dowland said. "Any point in waiting now for another
run of those cracks in space before making the trip?"
Trelawney shook his head. "None at all, I'm afraid. From what I saw,
there's no more regularity in those stress patterns than there is in a
riptide. You see how the rope is jerking right now—you'll get pulled
around pretty savagely, I'd say, even if you don't run into open splits
on the way across."
Dowland was fifteen feet from the door, half running with both hands
on the rope, when something plucked at him. He strained awkwardly
sideways, feet almost lifting from the floor. Abruptly he was released,
went stumbling forward a few steps before the next invisible current
tugged at him, pulling him downward now. It was a very much
stronger pull, and for endless seconds it continued to build up. His
shoulders seemed ready to snap before he suddenly came free
again.
The rest of the way to the platform remained almost undisturbed, but
Dowland was trembling with tensions before he reached it; he could
feel the drag of the AR field on his breathing. The steps to the
platform were a dozen feet to his right—too far from the rope.
Dowland put his weight on the rope, swung forward and up, let the
rope go and came down on the narrow walk between instrument
board and machine section. The panels shone with their own light; at
the far end he saw the flow-control wheel Trelawney had indicated, a
red pointer opposite the numeral "5." Dowland took two steps toward
it, grasped the wheel, and spun it down.
The pointer stopped at "1." He heard it click into position there.
Instantly, something slammed him sideways against the console, sent
him staggering along it, and over the low railing at the end of the
platform. The floor seemed to be shuddering as he struck it, and then
to tilt slowly. Dowland rolled over, came up on hands and knees,
facing back toward the platform. Daylight blazed again in the building
behind him, and the roar of a river that rolled through another time
filled his ears. He got to his feet, plunged back toward the whipping
rope above the platform. The light and the roaring cut off as he
grasped the rope, flashed back into the building, cut off again.
Somewhere somebody had screamed....
Dowland swung about on the rope, went handing himself along it,
back toward the door. His feet flopped about over the floor, unable to
get a stand there for more than an instant. It was a struggle now to
get enough air through the antiradiation field into his lungs. He saw
dust whip past the open door, momentarily obscuring it. The building
bucked with earthquake fury. And where was Trelawney?
He saw the red, wet thing then, lying by the wall just inside the door;
and sickness seized him because Trelawney's body was stretched
out too far to make it seem possible it had ever been that of a man.
Dust blasted in through the door as he reached it, and subsided,
leaving a choking residue trapped within the radiation screen. If he
could only cut off the field....
His gun lay too close to the sodden mess along the wall. Dowland
picked it up, was bending to snatch the climbing harness from the
floor when light flared behind him again. Automatically, he looked
back.
Once more the interior of the building seemed to have split apart.
Wider now. He saw the rushing white current below. To the right,
above the forest on the bank, the sun was a swollen red ball glaring
through layers of mist. And to the left, moving slowly over the river in
the blaze of long-dead daylight, was something both unmistakable
and not to be believed. But, staring at it in the instant before the
scene shivered and vanished again, Dowland suddenly thought he
knew what had happened here.
What he had seen was a spaceship.
He turned, went stumbling hurriedly out the door into the whistling
wind, saw Jill Trelawney standing there, white-faced, eyes huge,
hands to her mouth.
He caught her shoulder. "Come on! We've got to get away from here."
She gasped, "It—tore him apart!"
"We can't help him...." Dust clouds were spinning over the back of the
mesa, concealing the upper slopes. Dowland glanced to the west,
winced at the towering mountain of darkness sweeping toward them
through the sky. He plunged up the slope, hauling her along behind
him. Jill cried out incoherently once, in a choking voice, but he didn't
stop to hear what she was trying to say. He shoved her into the
house, slammed the door shut behind them, hurried her on down the
hall and into the living room. As they came in, he switched off his AR
field and felt air fill his lungs easily again. It was like surfacing out of
deep water. The detector still hissed its thin warning, but it was
almost inaudible. They would have to risk radiation now.
"Out of your suit, quick! Whatever's happening in the lab has whistled
up a dust storm here. When it hits, that radiation field will strangle you
in a minute outdoors."
She stared at him dumbly.
"Get out of your suit!" Dowland shouted, his nerves snapping. "We're
going down the eastern wall. It's our only chance. But we can't get
down alive if we can't breathe...." Then, as she began unbuckling the
suit hurriedly with shaking fingers, he turned to the pile of camping
equipment beside the fireplace and pawed through it.
He found the communicator and was snapping it to the
mountaineering harness when the front door slammed. He wheeled
about, startled. Jill's radiation suit lay on the floor near the entry hall.
She was gone.
He was tearing the door open three seconds later, shouted, and saw
her through the dust forty feet away, running up toward the forest.
He mightn't have caught her if she hadn't stumbled and gone
headlong. Dowland was on top of her before she could get up. She
fought him in savage silence like an animal, tearing and biting, her
eyes bloodshot slits. There was a mechanical fury about it that
appalled him. But at last he got his right arm free, and brought his fist
up solidly to the side of her jaw. Jill's head flew back, and her eyes
closed.
He came padding up to the eastern side of the mesa with her minutes
later. Here, beyond the ranch area, the ground was bare rock, with
occasional clusters of stunted bushes. The dust had become blinding,
though the main storm was still miles away. There was no time to
stop off at the house to look for the quiz-gun, though it would have
been better to try the descent with a dazed and half-paralyzed young
woman than with the twisting lunatic Jill might turn into again when
she recovered from his punch. At least, he'd have her tied up.
Underfoot were grinding and grumbling noises now, the ground
shaking constantly. At moments he had the feeling of plodding
through something yielding, like quicksand. Only the feeling, he told
himself; the rock was solid enough. But....
Abruptly, he was at the mesa's edge. Dowland slid the girl to the
ground, straightened up, panting, to dab at his smarting eyes. The
mesa behind them had almost vanished in swirling dust.
And through the dust Dowland saw something coming over the open
ground he had just traversed.
He stared at it, mouth open, stunned with a sense of unfairness. The
gigantic shape was still only partly visible, but it was obvious that it
was following them. It approached swiftly over the shaking ground.
Dowland took out his gun, with the oddly calm conviction that it would
be entirely useless against their pursuer. But he brought it up slowly
and leveled it, squinting with streaming eyes through the dust.
And then it happened. The pursuer appeared to falter. It moved again
in some manner; something thundered into the ground beside
Dowland. Then, writhing and twisting—slowly at first, then faster—the
dust-veiled shape seemed to be sinking downward through the rock
surface of the mesa.
In another instant, it was gone.
Seconds passed before Dowland gradually lowered the gun again.
Dazedly, he grew aware of something else that was different now. A
miniature human voice appeared to be jabbering irritably at him from
some point not far away. His eyes dropped to the little communicator
attached to his harness.
The voice came from there.
Terra's grid-power had returned to Lion Mesa.
A week later, Lieutenant Frank Dowland was shown into the office of
the chief of the Solar Police Authority. The chief introduced him to the
two other men there, who were left unidentified, and told him to be
seated.
"Lieutenant," he said, "these gentlemen have a few questions to ask
you. You can speak as openly to them as you would to me."
Dowland nodded. He had recognized one of the gentlemen
immediately—Howard Camhorn, the Coordinator of Research.
Reputedly one of the sharpest minds in the Overgovernment's top
echelons. The other one was unfamiliar. He was a few years younger
than Camhorn, around six inches shorter, chunky, with black hair,
brown eyes, an expression of owlish reflectiveness. Probably,
Dowland thought, wearing contact lenses. "Yes, sir," he said to the
chief, and looked back at the visitors.
"We've seen your report on your recent visit to Terra, Lieutenant
Dowland," Camhorn began pleasantly. "An excellent report,
incidentally—factual, detailed. What we should like to hear now are
the things that you, quite properly, omitted from it. That is, your
personal impressions and conclusions."
"For example," the other man took up, as Dowland hesitated, "Miss
Trelawney has informed us her uncles were attempting to employ the
Ym-400 they had acquired to carry out a time-shift to an earlier Earth
period—to the period known as the Pleistocene, to be somewhat
more exact. From what you saw, would you say they had succeeded
in doing it?"
"I don't know, sir," Dowland said. "I've been shown pictures
representing that period during the past few days. The scene I
described in the report probably might have existed at that time." He
smiled briefly. "However, I have the impression that the very large
flying creature I reported encountering that night is regarded as being
... well, er ... ah...."
"A product of excited nerves?" the short man said, nodding. "Under
such extraordinary circumstances, that would be quite possible, you
know."
"Yes, sir, I know."
The short man smiled. "But you don't think it was that?"
"No, sir," Dowland said. "I think that I have described exactly what I
did hear and see."
"And you feel the Trelawneys established contact with some previous
Earth period—not necessarily the Pleistocene?"
"Yes, I do."
"And you report having seen a spaceship in that prehistorical
period...."
Dowland shook his head. "No, sir. At the moment I was observing it, I
thought it was that. What I reported was having seen something that
looked like a spaceship."
"What do you think it was?"
"A timeship—if there is such a word."
"There is such a word," Camhorn interrupted lazily. "I'm curious to
hear, lieutenant, what brought you to that conclusion."
"It's a guess, sir. But the thing has to fit together somehow. A timeship
would make it fit."
"In what way?"
"I've been informed," Dowland said, "that the Overgovernment's
scientists have been unable to make a practical use of YM because
something has invariably gone wrong when they did try to use it. I
also heard that there was no way of knowing in advance what would
happen to make an experiment fail. But something always would
happen, and frequently a number of people would get killed."
Camhorn nodded. "That is quite true."
"Well, then," Dowland said, "I think there is a race of beings who
aren't quite in our time and space. They have YM and use it, and
don't want anyone else to use it. They can tell when it's activated
here, and use their own YM to interfere with it. Then another
experiment suddenly turns into a failure.
"But they don't know yet who's using it. When the Trelawneys turned
on their machine, these beings spotted the YM stress pattern back
there in time. They went to that point and reinforced the time-blending
effect with their own YM. The Trelawneys hadn't intended a complete
contact with that first test. The aliens almost succeeded in blending
the two periods completely in the area near the laboratory."
"For what purpose?" Camhorn asked.
"I think they're very anxious to get us located."
"With unfriendly intentions?"
"The ones we ran into didn't behave in a friendly manner. May I ask a
question, sir?"
"Of course," Camhorn said.
"When the Trelawneys' machine was examined, was the supply of
YM adequately shielded?"
"Quite adequately," Camhorn said.
"But when I opened the door, the laboratory was hot. And Miguel
Trelawney died of radiation burns...."
Camhorn nodded. "Those are facts that give your theory some
substance, lieutenant. No question about it. And there is the
additional fact that after you shut off the YM flow in the laboratory,
nearly ten minutes passed before the apparent contact between two
time periods was broken. Your report indicates that the phenomena
you described actually became more pronounced immediately after
the shutoff."
"Yes, sir."
"As if the aliens might have been making every effort to retain contact
with our time?"
"Yes, sir," Dowland said. "That was my impression."
"It's quite plausible. Now, the indications are that Paul Trelawney
actually spent considerable time—perhaps twelve to fourteen hours,
at any rate—in that other period. He gave no hint of what he
experienced during those hours?"
"No, sir, except to say that it was night when he appeared there. He
may have told Miss Trelawney more."
"Apparently, he didn't," Camhorn said. "Before you and he went into
the laboratory, he warned her to watch for the approach of a creature
which answers the description of the gigantic things you encountered
twice. But that was all. Now, here again you've given us your
objective observations. What can you add to them—on a perhaps
more speculative basis?"
"Well, sir," Dowland said, "my opinions on that are, as a matter of
fact, highly speculative. But I think that Paul Trelawney was captured
by the aliens as soon as he appeared in the other time period, and
was able to escape from them a number of hours later. Two of the
aliens who were attempting to recapture him eventually followed him
out on Lion Mesa through another opening the YM stresses had
produced between the time periods, not too far away from the first."
Camhorn's stout companion said thoughtfully, "You believe the
birdlike creature you saw arrived by the same route?"
"Yes, sir," Dowland said, turning to him. "I think that was simply an
accident. It may have been some kind of wild animal that blundered
into the contact area and found itself here without knowing what had
occurred."
"And you feel," the other man went on, "that you yourself were
passing near that contact point in the night at the time you seemed to
be smelling a swamp?"
Dowland nodded. "Yes, sir, I do. Those smells might have been an
illusion, but they seemed to be very distinct. And, of course, there are
no swamps on the mesa itself."
Camhorn said, "We'll assume it was no illusion. It seems to fit into the
general picture. But, lieutenant, on what are you basing your opinion
that Paul Trelawney was a captive of these beings for some time?"
"There were several things, sir," Dowland said. "One of them is that
when Miss Trelawney regained consciousness in the hospital she
didn't remember having made an attempt to get away from me."
Camhorn nodded. "That was reported."
"She made the attempt," Dowland went on, "immediately after she
had taken off her radiation suit to avoid being choked in the dust
storm on the way down from the mesa. That is one point."
"Go ahead," Camhorn said.
"Another is that when I discovered Paul Trelawney early in the
morning, he was wearing his radiation suit. Judging by his
appearance, he had been in it for hours—and a radiation suit, of
course, is a very inconvenient thing to be in when you're hiking
around in rough country."
"He might," the stout man suggested, "have been afraid of running
into a radioactive area."
Dowland shook his head. "No, sir. He had an instrument which would
have warned him if he was approaching one. It would have made
much more sense to carry the suit, and slip into it again if it became
necessary. I didn't give the matter much thought at the time. But then
the third thing happened. I did not put that in the report because it
was a completely subjective impression. I couldn't prove now that it
actually occurred."
Camhorn leaned forward. "Go ahead."
"It was just before the time periods separated and the creature that
was approaching Miss Trelawney and myself seemed to drop through
the top of the mesa—I suppose it fell back into the other period. I've
described it. It was like a fifty-foot gray slug moving along on its tail ...
and there were those two rows of something like short arms. It wasn't
at all an attractive creature. I was frightened to death. But I was
holding a gun—the same gun with which I had stopped another of
those things when it chased me during the night. And the trouble was
that this time I wasn't going to shoot."
"You weren't going to shoot?" Camhorn repeated.
"No, sir. I had every reason to try to blow it to pieces as soon as I saw
it. The other one didn't follow up its attack on me, so it probably was
pretty badly injured. But while I knew that, I was also simply
convinced that it would be useless to pull the trigger. That's as well as
I can explain what happened....
"I think these aliens can control the minds of other beings, but can't
control them through the interference set up by something like our AR
fields. Paul Trelawney appeared in the other time period almost in
their laps. He had a rifle strapped over his back, but presumably they
caught him before he had a chance to use it. They would have
examined him and the equipment he was carrying, and when they
took off his radiation suit, they would have discovered he belonged to
a race which they could control mentally. After that, there would have
been no reason for them to guard him too closely. He was helpless.
"I think Trelawney realized this, and used a moment when his actions
were not being controlled to slip back into the suit. Then he was free
to act again. When they discovered he had escaped, some of them
were detailed to search for him, and two of those pursuers came out
here in our time on the mesa.
"As for Miss Trelawney—well, obviously she wasn't trying to get away
from me. Apparently, she wasn't even aware of what she was doing.
She was simply obeying physically the orders her mind began to
receive as soon as she stepped out of the radiation suit. They would
have been to come to the thing, wherever it was at the moment—
somewhere up to the north of the ranch area, judging from the
direction in which she headed."
There was silence for some seconds. Then Camhorn's companion
observed, "There's one thing that doesn't quite fit in with your theory,
lieutenant."
"What's that, sir?"
"Your report states that you switched off your AR field at the same
time you advised Miss Trelawney to get out of her suit. You should
have been equally subject to the alien's mental instructions."
"Well," Dowland said, "I can attempt to explain that, sir, though again
there is no way to prove what I think. But it might be that these
creatures can control, only one mind at a time. The alien may not
have realized that I had ... well ... knocked Miss Trelawney
unconscious and that she was unable to obey its orders, until it came
to the spot and saw us. My assumption is that it wasn't till that
moment that it switched its mental attack to me."
The stout man—his name was Laillard White, and he was one of
Research's ace trouble-shooters in areas more or less loosely related
to psychology—appeared morosely reflective as he and Camhorn left
Solar Police Authority Headquarters, and turned toward the adjoining
Overgovernment Bureau.

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Defence Beyond Design Contours of

India s Nuclear Safety and Security 1st

The Purpose of India s Security Strategy Defence

Japan s Nuclear Disaster and the Politics of Safety

Transgenders in India 1st Edition Veerendra Mishra

Cloud Security: Attacks, Techniques, Tools, and

India Pakistan Nuclear Diplomacy Constructivism and the

Principles of Computer Security: CompTIA Security+ and

Reliability and Probabilistic Safety Assessment in

Science and Religion in India Beyond Disenchantment 1st

Air Marshal Vinod Patney SYSM PVSM AVSM VrC (Retd)

Centre for Air Power Studies

1. Safety-Security-Safeguards: The Intricate Interface 1

2. Civil Nuclear Network: A Reality Check 29

3. Siting of Nuclear Power Plants: Modus Operandi 65

4. Contours of Nuclear Safety: Defence In-depth 97

5. Security of Nuclear Facilities: The Envelope 143

6. Waste Management: A Gordian Knot? 199

7. Social Acceptance Fuss: A Challenging Opportunity 225

8. Post-Fukushima Discourse: Let’s Not Feed Political Panic 255

9. Defence Beyond Design: Towards A New Paradigm 279

Science cannot change anything if people do not pay head. Today,

The nine chapters that follow delve into different aspects of

of India to a higher level in their subsequent Index, as they now

is now very receptive to India’s nuclear energy demand unlike

Savita Pande have always kept me upbeat. I am thankful to many

February 27, 2016 Sitakanta Mishra

have more than 300 cumulative years of commercial experience.

an important consideration, we have to ensure, to the degree that

approach towards becoming one of the nations with advanced

Air Marshal Vinod Patney SYSM PVSM AVSM VrC (Retd)

Since its inception, nuclear technology has evoked a sense of

technology. On the basis of empirical analyses of various aspects of

Edge over Other Forms

Table 1.1: Sources of Electricity, their Morbidity and Greenhouse Gas

The low morbidity in the nuclear sector is mainly owing to the

monsters generated by anti-nuclear propaganda has turned the

The Threat Triangle

on the risks arising from unintended events initiated by natural

comparison to nuclear safety and safeguards. However, during the

criminal background checks and psychological tests of employees.

to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the implemention

The Intricate Interface

focusses on prevention, detection of, and response to, the theft of

National regulatory authorities IAEA

Prevention of conversion to non-peaceful uses Prevention of

have greater uniformity is oft-emphasised. However, there exist

response to the 9/11 attacks. The nuclear safeguards regime, on the

Fig 1.2: International Initiative on 3S-based Nuclear Energy

Source: Jor-Shan Choi, http://www.jaea.go.jp/04/np/activity/2011-12-08/2011-12-08-22.pdf

The first Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in Washington DC (2010)

(ICSANT), Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT),

Global Nuclear Governance

In the current international political lexicon, ‘nuclear governance’

enhance the effectiveness of the regulatory infrastructure for both

if an accident occurs. While imposing responsibility on operators to

an issue to be subject to global governance. In fact, “the pervasive

comprehensive safeguards agreement. As of December 2009, 93 states

considerable dilemma on how to reconcile national sovereignty with

to inform the other of the precise locations (latitude and longitude)

Balancing Sovereignty with Responsibility

Dowland nodded. "That's what I had in mind, Trelawney. Technically

The two Trelawneys held a brief, whispered conversation in the living

8. Post-Fukushima Discourse: Let’s Not Feed Political Panic 255

February 27, 2016 Sitakanta Mishra