Republic v. Purisima, G.R. No.

L-36084, 31 August 1977

FACTS: The jurisdictional issues raised by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza on behalf
of the Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding arose from the
failure of respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First Instance of Manila to
apply the well-known and of-reiterated doctrine of the non-suability of a State, including its
offices and agencies, from suit without its consent. It was so alleged in a motion to dismiss
filed by defendant Rice and Corn Administration in a pending civil suit in the sala of
respondent Judge for the collection of a money claim arising from an alleged breach of
contract, the plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc.
ISSUE: Can an agreement between the Rice and Corn Administration and Yellow Ball
Freight Lines, Inc. operate as a waiver of the national government from suit?
HELD: NO.
The consent to be sued, to be effective must come from the State thru a statute, not through
any agreement made by counsel for the Rice and Corn Administration.Apparently
respondent Judge was misled by the terms of the contract between the private respondent,
plaintiff in his sala, and defendant Rice and Corn Administration which, according to him,
anticipated the case of a breach of contract within the parties and the suits that may
thereafter arise. The consent, to be effective though, must come from the State acting
through a duly enacted statute as pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever
counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had no binding force on the
government. That was clearly beyond the scope of his authority.

Merritt vs Government of the Philippine Islands

FACTS: Merrit was riding a motorcycle along Padre Faura Street when he was bumped by
the ambulance of the General Hospital. Merrit sustained severe injuries rendering him
unable to return to work. The legislature later enacted Act 2457 authorizing Merritt to file a
suit against the Government in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his
motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the
damages, if any, to which he is entitled. After trial, the lower court held that the collision was
due to the negligence of the driver of the ambulance. It then determined the amount of
damages and ordered the government to pay the same.

ISSUES:

1. Did the Government, in enacting the Act 2457, simply waive its immunity from suit or did
it also concede its liability to the plaintiff?

2. Is the Government liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance?

HELD:

1. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby
concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability
to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting
liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any
lawful defense.

2. Under the Civil Code, the state is liable when it acts through a special agent, but not
when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to
do the act performed. A special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order or
commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official. This
concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting
administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent
in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations. The
driver of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not a special agent; thus the
Government is not liable. (Merritt vs Government of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. L-
11154, March 21 1916, 34 Phil. 311)

NOTE:

■ The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when
the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains. (Art.
2180 par. 6, Civil Code)

■ The state is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in
consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions
pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the
part of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of
its agents. (Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands)

■ The State is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs,
except when expressly made so by legislative enactment. The government does not
undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs
since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and
losses, which would be subversive of the public interest. (Merritt vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands)

VICTORIA AMIGABLE vs. NICOLAS CUENCA G.R. No. L-26400 February 29, 1972

FACTS: Victoria Amigable is the is the registered owner of a lot which, without prior
expropriation proceedings or negotiated sale, was used by the government. Amigable's
counsel wrote the President of the Philippines requesting payment of the portion of her lot
which had been expropriated by the government.

Amigable later filed a case against Cuenca, the Commissioner of Public Highways, for
recovery of ownership and possession of the said lot. She also sought payment for
comlensatory damages, moral damages and attorney's fees.

The defendant said that the case was premature, barred by prescription, and the
government did not give its consent to be sued.
ISSUE: W/N the appellant may properly sue the government.

HELD: Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use
without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved
party may properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit.

The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice to a citizen. The only relief available is for the government to make due
compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine just
compensation of the land, the basis should be the price or value at the time of the taking.

Department of Agriculture v. NLRC (G.R. No. 104269)

November 11, 1993 | G.R. No. 104269

FACTS:

On April 1, 1989, the Department of Agriculture (DoA) office in Cagayan de Oro and Sultan
Security Agency (SSA) entered into a contract where the latter was to provide security
services to the former. On September 13, 1990, several guards from SSA filed a complaint
for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift
differential pay, holiday pay, as well as for damages, against DoA and SSA. Both the DoA
and SSA were subsequently found guilty by the Executive Labor Arbiter, which also held
both of them liable for the payment of money claims amounting to P266,483.91.

On July 18, 1991, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution. As a response, the DoA filed
a petition for injunction, prohibition, and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ of
injunction, before the NLRC. The DoA's petition was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of its petition before the NLRC, DoA filed a petition before the SC
arguing that: (a) it was COA, not NLRC, that was supposed to have jurisdiction over money
claims against the Government pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 327 as amended by PD
No. 1445; and (b) that NLRC had disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the
State.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not it was COA that has exclusive jurisdiction over money claims against the
Government.
2. Whether or not DoA, as an agency of the State, is covered by the principle of the non-
suability of the State.

HELD:

1. Yes, the Court ruled that money claims against the Government should be filed before
the Commission on Audit pursuant to CA Act No. 327 as amended by PD No. 1445. In the
instant case, underpayment of wages, holiday pay, overtime pay, and other similar items
arising from the Contract for Service clearly constitute money claims. As such, the writ of
execution issued by the Labor Arbiter and the resolution issued by NLRC were reversed by
the Court in favor of DoA.

2. No, DoA cannot use the principle of non-suability of the State as an excuse not to be
sued.

Section 3, Art. XVI of the 1987 Constitution states that "the State may not be sued without
its consent." This principle reflects a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and
an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of the
courts. As per Justice Holmes, a sovereign State is exempt from suits "not because of any
formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can
be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends."

U.S.A. vs Guinto, 182 SCRA 644

TITLE: USA et. al. vs. Hon. Guinto, et. al. G.R. No. 76607. February 26 1990

USA et. al. vs. Hon. Rodrigo et. al. G.R. No. 79470 February 26 1990

USA et. al. vs. Hon. Ceballos et. al. G.R. No. 80018 February 26 1990

USA et. al. vs. Hon. Vergara et. al. G.R. No. 80258 February 26 1990

FACTS: The cases brought before the Supreme Court are consolidated for they are issues
on immunity of the state from being sued.

In G.R. No. 76607 (U.S.A et. al vs. Guinto et. al. Feb. 26, 1990), the private respondents
sued several officers of the US Air Force regarding a bidding for barbering services
contract. A bid from Okinawa Area Exchange was solicited through James Shaw, a
contracting officer. Private respondents and concessionaires inside the Clark Air Base,
Roberto T. Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao and Pablo C. del Pilar, were among the
bidders, however, Ramon Dizon won the bidding. The private respondents complained with
the contention that Dizon also bid for the Civil Engineering (CE) area which was not
included in the bidding invitation. PHAX or the Philippine Area Exchange, to whom the
respondents complained to, represented by petitioners Yvonne Reeves and Frederick
Smouse clarified that the CE area is yet to be awarded to Dizon because of a previous
solicitation. Dizon was already operating the NCO club concession, however, and the
contract expiry of the CE barbershop was extended only until the end of June 1986. Hence,
the respondents filed a petition, with a prayer to compel PHAX and the individual petitioners
to revoke the award to Dizon, and conduct a rebidding to allow the private respondents to
continue operating their concessions by a writ of preliminary injunction pending litigation. To
maintain status quo, Respondent court issued an ex parte order to the petitioners.
Petitioners filed a motion for dismissal and petition to oppose the preliminary injunction.
They contended that the action was in effect a suit against the US Force. Both were denied
by the trial court. A petition for certiorari and prohibition for preliminary injunction were filed
before the Supreme Court and a TRO was issued.

In G.R. No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners
Anthony Lamachia, Wilfredo Belsa, Rose Crtalla and Peter Orascion for his dismissal as a
cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center. Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion testified that
Genova poured urine into the soup stock that was served to customers. Lamachia
suspended him and referred the case to a board of arbitrators who found Genove guilty and
recommended his dismissal. Genove then filed an MS complaint in the RTC of Baguio
against the individual petitioners, who moved to dismiss the case in the basis that Lamachia
was immune from suit as per acts done in his official capacity as an officer of the US Air
Force. The motion was denied by the RTC, so the petitioners filed a petition for Certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court.

In G.R. No. 80018, the respondent, Louis Bautista, was arrested pursuant to RA 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act) in a buy-bust operation conducted by the petitioners, Tomi J. King,
Darrel D. Dye and Stephen F. Bostick, who were officers and special agents of the US Air
Force and Air Force Office of Special Investigators. He was charged before the RTC which
caused his dismissal as a barracks boy in Camp O’Donnell, an extension of Clark Air base.
Bautista then filed a complaint against the petitioners. The petitioners, in defense, filed a
motion to dismiss the case with the contention that they were acting in official capacity when
the acts were committed, hence the suit against them is, in effect, a suit against the US. The
motion was denied by the judge, with the contention that the immunity covers only civil
cases that are not criminal under the Military Bases Agreement. Ergo, the petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition for preliminary injunction. A TRO was issued.

In G.R. No. 80258, the private respondents, Ricky Sanchez, et. al., filed a complaint for
damages against the respondents, Major General Michael Carns, et. al., for the extensive
injuries allegedly sustained by the petitioners, who beat them up, handcuffed and unleashed
dogs on them who bit them. The petitioners denied the accusation and instead said that the
respondents were bitten by dogs because they resisted arrest when they committed theft,
and they were brought to the medical center for treatment thereafter. The petitioners, USA
together with Carns et. al., contended that they are immune against this suit, invoking their
right under the RP-US Bases Treaty, as they acted in the performance of their official
functions. The matter was brought before the Supreme Court after their motion was denied,
wherein they filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction. A TRO
was issued.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners can use State Immunity (Art. XVI, Sec. 3, 1987
Constitution) as defense.

RULING: The Supreme Court rendered judgment as follows:

1. In , the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent judge is directed to proceed with the
hearing and decision of Civil Case No. 4772. The temporary restraining order was LIFTED.
2. In G.R. No.79470, the petition is GRANTED and the Civil Case No.0829-R(298) is
DISMISSED.
3. In G.R. No80018, the petition is GRANTED and the Civil Case No. 115-C-87 is
DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order is made permanent.
4. In G.R. No. 80258, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent judge is directed to
proceed with the hearing and decision of Civil Case No. 4996. The temporary restraining
order was LIFTED.

Reason: Under Art. XVI, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution, “The State may not be sued without its
consent.” However, this does not mean that at all times, the State may not be sued. There
needs to be a consideration on if they were indeed acting within the capacity of their duties,
or if they enter into a contract with a private party.

Festejo vs. Fernando

FACTS: Carmen Festejo filed a suit against Isaias Fernando, Director of the Bureau of
Public Works, for taking possession of three parcels of land she owned and causing an
irrigation canal to be constructed thereon without obtaining first a right of way, without her
consent and knowledge , and against her express objection. Festejo demanded the return
of the land and its restoration to its former condition.

ISSUE:

Is the Fernando immune from suit for being a public officer?

HELD:

Defendant committed acts outside the scope of his authority. When he went outside the
boundaries of the right of way upon plaintiff's land and damaged it or destroyed its former
condition and usefulness, he must be held to have designedly departed from the duties
imposed on him by law. There can be no claim that he thus invaded plaintiff's land
southeasterly of the right of way innocently. Surveys clearly marked the limits of the land
appropriated for the right of way of this trunk highway before construction began.

Ordinarily the officer or employee committing the tort is personally liable therefor, and may
be sued as any other citizen and held answerable for whatever injury or damage results
from his tortious act.

If an officer, even while acting under color of his office, exceeds the power conferred on him
by law, he cannot shelter himself under the plea that he is a public agent.

It is a general rule that an officer-executive, administrative quasi-judicial, ministerial, or

otherwise who acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction and without authorization of law may
thereby render himself amenable to personal liability in a civil suit. If he exceed the power
conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent
acting under the color of his office, and not personally. In the eye of the law, his acts then
are wholly without authority.

ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights
and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
xxx
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law; (Festejo vs.
Fernando, G.R. No. L-5156, March 11, 1954)