Garcia vs.

Executive Secretary (1992)

GR 101273, 211 SCRA 219 [Jul 3, 1992]

DELEGATION OF TARIFF POWERS to the President [Art VI, Sec 28(2)] (Executive
Department)

FACTS:

The Tariff and Customs Code (TCC) states that in the interest of national economy,
general welfare and/or national security, the President, may increase xxx existing
protective rates of import duty xxx when necessary. Pursuant to the TCC, the
President issued EO 475 and 478 imposing an additional duty of 9% ad valorem to
imported crude oil and other oil products, and a special duty of P0.95 per liter of
imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products. Rep. Garcia contests
the validity of the foregoing EOs averring that they are violative of Sec 24, Art VI of
the Constitution which provides: All xxx revenue or tariff bills shall originate in the
House of Representatives xxx. He also argues that said EOs contravene the TCC
because the latter authorizes the President to, according to him, impose additional
duties only when necessary to protect local industries.

ISSUE:

Are said EOs unconstitutional?

RULING:

No. There Constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President to,

“subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose”, fix “within
specific limits tariff rates xxx and other duties or imposts xxx.”¹ Moreover, Garcia’s
argument that the “protection of local industries” is the only permissible objective that
can be secured by the exercise of the delegated authority—that which was provided
in the TCC to be exercised by the President in “the interest of national economy,
general welfare and/or national security”—is a stiflingly narrow one. We believe, for
instance, that the protection of consumers is at the very least as important a
dimension of the “the interest of national economy, general welfare and national
security” as the protection of local industries.

Sema vs Comelec (Basis, Delegation of Local Government)

FACTS: On August 28, 2006, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to
create provinces under Section 19 of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy
Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. COMELEC issued
Resolution 7902 renaming the legislative district combining the said provice with
Cotabato as "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City." Sema, here petitioner,
questioned the Resolution combining the Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato CIty into
a single legislative district.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Congress can delegate to the Regional Assembly the
power to create provinces

DECISION: Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it

grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the
power to create provinces and cities. Thus, SC declares VOID Muslim Mindanao
Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. COMELEC
Resolution 7902 is VALID.

RATIO DECIDENDI: SC ruled that Section 19, RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void. Only Congress
can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities
necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can
exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution.

Delegation of Administrative Bodies

Tablarin vs Gutierrez G.R. No. 78164 July 31, 1987 FACTS

Republic Act 2382 known as the “Medical Act of 1959”, was enacted for the purpose of
standardization and regulation of medical education. It created the Board of Medical Education
to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations for the proper implementation requirements
into medical school. Ministry of Education Culture and Sports (MECS), a member of the board
established NMAT, an aptitude test, as an additional requirement into medical school.

The Center for Educational Measurement, one of the respondents, conducted NMAT for SY
1986-1987.

Petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the next school year 1987-
1988. However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National
Medical Admission Test (NMAT).

Petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and
Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction,
contending that there was undue delegation in enacting RA 2382 because it failed to establish
the necessary standard to be followed by the delegate.

The trial court denied the petition. Petitioner prayed with the Supreme Court for reversal.

ISSUE Whether or not there was undue delegation of power of the legislative department to the
Board of Medical Education.

RULING The Supreme Court dismissed the petitioner’s petition and finds that there was no
undue delegation of legislative power when it delegated the Board of Medical Education for the
determination of requirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine. There was
an implied standard which shall be followed by the delegate, which is Sec 5(a) and Sec 7 and the
body of the statute itself. And these considered together are sufficient compliance with the
requirements of the non-delegation principle. Petition is dismissed