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decolonizing human rights
In his extensive body of work, Professor Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naim challenges

both historical interpretations of Islamic Sharia and neocolonial understanding of
human rights. To advance the rationale of scholarship for social change, An-Naim
proposes advancing the universality of human rights through internal discourse
within Islamic and African societies and cross-cultural dialogue among human
cultures. This book proposes a transformation from human rights organized
around a state-determined practice to one that is focused on a people-centric
approach that empowers individuals to decide how human rights will be under-
stood and integrated into their communities. Decolonizing Human Rights aims to
illustrate the decisive role of human agency on the subject of change, without
implying that Islamic, or any other, society is exceptionally disposed to politically
motivated violence and consequent profound political instability.
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naim is Charles Howard Candler Professor of Law at Emory

University. He is an internationally recognized scholar of Islam and human rights
and human rights in cross-cultural perspectives. An-Naim teaches courses in
international law, Islamic law, human rights, and comparative law. His research
interests include constitutionalism in Islamic and African countries, Islam and the
secular state, and Islam and politics.
Decolonizing Human Rights
ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NAIM

Emory University
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education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence.
www.cambridge.org
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doi: 10.1017/9781108264921
© Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naim 2021
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Emory University

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Contents
Preface: Beyond the Myth of Enforcement page vii

Acknowledgments xv
1 Evolution of Founding Vision 1
2 Marriage of Futility: International Law and Human Rights 26
3 The Deadly Mirage of “Humanitarian Intervention” 49
4 People-Centric Protection of Human Rights 81
5 Human Rights Are the Measure of Our Humanity 102
References 125
Index 133
v
Preface
Beyond the Myth of Enforcement
The purpose and rationale of this book is to expose the myth of legal
enforcement and promote more effective and sustainable practice of human
rights norms through what I call cultural transformation and political mobil-
ization. The pretensions of legal enforcement of the current human rights
regime distort the concept of universality of human rights and impede its
legitimacy and relevance to the lives of the totality of humanity. One aspect of
this drastic distortion is that any legal protection requires the consent and
cooperation of the territorial state where protection and accountability for
violations can reach both victim and perpetrator. By denying or controlling
access, the state is obstructing the essential quality of universality of human
rights (the unrestricted entitlement of every human being) as prescribed by
international norms, which undermines prospects of total and inclusive
protection.
For example, reservations imposed by the United States of America on its
obligations under the Torture Convention of 1984 limit the meaning of torture
to the domestic standard of the United States, which distorts the universality of
protection against torture because it restricts the meaning of torture to the
domestic standard in US legislation. What is the point of ratifying a major
international treaty prohibiting torture if the United States (or any other state
party to the treaty) can avoid responsibility by imposing such drastic reserva-
tions? It is true that Articles 20–21 of The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties 1969 permits states that are party to any treaty, including human rights
treaties, to make reservations limiting their obligations under the treaty in
question. As I will discuss later, this is exactly my point about the futility of
international human rights law.
Other impediments of the myth of legal protection include the total lack of
legal basis for the intervention of any state into another state in the name of
protecting human rights. In addition to the profoundly destabilizing and
vii
viii Preface
excessive human and material costs of military conflicts, as can be seen

recently in Afghanistan and Iraq, illegal interventions diminish the integrity
and credibility of international law regulation of the use of force and violate
specific treaties like the Charter of the United Nations. The legal enforcement
approach necessarily fails to deliver the protection of human rights because it
is premised on coercive illegality under international law.
The alternative I am seeking to further promote is already the basis of
whatever respect and protection human rights have had because it is premised
on the struggle for sustained decolonization and holistic independence. My
critique of the first approach and advocacy of the second are both necessary
because the harmful outcome of the state-centric approach is not generally
acknowledged, while the efficacy of the people-centered approach is not
sufficiently recognized.
The familiar human rights narrative since the mid-twentieth century is that
the vision and determination to ensure the international protection of univer-
sal human rights was born of the world that emerged from the shock and
outrage at the atrocities of the Second World War.
To advance this goal, the purposes of the United Nations included . . .
“promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”1 The
Charter charged the United Nations with promoting “universal respect for,
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion” (Article 55 (c)), but the
Charter did not define or determine what human rights actually are. That
task was left to the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations, which
drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; this was subsequently
adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 10, 1948. Since the
Declaration is not binding under the UN Charter, it was assumed that human
rights norms must be further elaborated and made binding through subse-
quent treaties to be negotiated and adopted by states.
I will discuss that founding doctrine in terms of what I call the “three Cs,”
namely, the Concept, Content, and Context of human rights. The concept of
universality of human rights is easy for all people to accept in principle,
provided it is not used to impose a normative content of those rights that has
been determined by others for their practice in a different context. My primary
concern in this book is the operational futility of attempting to protect human
rights under international law. The whole human rights paradigm was, from
1
United Nations, Charter of the United Nations 1945, Article 1 (3).
Preface ix
the beginning, premised on the notion that the obligation to protect human
rights is based on treaties which are binding on states under the normal rules of
the international law of treaties. This premise is drastically inappropriate
because human rights treaties are fundamentally different from normal treat-
ies simply because states do not have the same self-interested motivation for
enforcing human rights treaties as they do for their treaties on such matters as
trade, security, and international boundaries.
To briefly explain, the problem with human rights treaties is that they are
accessible to individuals who are supposed to be the beneficiaries of those
treaties except through the institutions of the same state that is responsible for
violations. If human rights are incidentally implicated in the self-interested
motivation of states, then the outcome will still fail to benefit the victims of
violations because the nature, method, and duration of the action states are
able to take will be inappropriate for protecting the human rights of victims.
A related contradiction to be emphasized here is that it is practically
impossible and politically untenable for any state or international organization
like the UN to stay in the territory of another state long enough to be able to
do what is necessary to protect human rights in that state. The point here is not
simply the prohibition of interference in the internal affairs of other states, and
possible legal or practical exceptions to that principle. It is not only the tragic
spectacle of the so-called international community waiting at the borders of a
state requesting permission to enter in order to prevent or investigate charges
of human rights violations in that country, as happened in the case of Darfur,
western Sudan, following the massive killings and destruction of communities
since 2003. Rather, the point is that foreign intervention cannot succeed in
achieving sustainable protection of human rights in any country. Other states
and the international community at large do not have the political legitimacy,
material resources, cultural competence, or language skills to be able do what
it takes to protect human rights.
In contrast, when we consider the commonsensical nature and rationale of
human rights outside the paradoxical paradigm of protection under inter-
national law, we can see that there is in fact a much higher and broader level
of practice of human rights norms and values in spontaneous social relation-
ships. Since, in the final analysis, every human rights violation or protection
always begins with a person doing (or failing to do) something to another
person, the whole paradigm depends on the values and the political choices of
people everywhere. Spontaneous conformity with human rights norms is what
makes social life possible, and the basis of the notion of universality of human
rights as entitlements of all human beings around the world. In a related sense,
Eleanor Roosevelt said that universal human rights begin in small places,
x Preface
close to home “Such are the places where every man, woman and child seeks
equal justice, equal opportunity, equal dignity without discrimination. Unless
these rights have meaning there, they have little meaning anywhere. Without
concerned citizen action to uphold them close to home, we shall look in vain
for progress in the larger world.”2
Still, my objective here is not to immediately discard the European state
system altogether. Given the realities of modern global international relations
in all economic, political, security and other vital concerns of communities at
all levels, everywhere, it is impossible to bypass the state, and we do not need
to do that in this context. The question is, rather, one of what (or who) the
state is, and how it can be approached or deployed in the most useful way in
the interest of the human rights of those subject to the state’s jurisdiction. Yet,
whatever level of protection of human rights can be achieved through state-
centric models is totally dependent on the cultural and political force of
spontaneous social relations, which reflect the orientation of the human and
material resources and institutions that drive state policy and practice.
This book calls for reclaiming the glorious rationale and vision of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as the universal rights of all human
beings, as defined and realized by all human beings for themselves. There are
universal human rights that can be identified and implemented in ways that
are consistent with the essence and rationale of these rights, but never coer-
cively enforced by external so-called humanitarian intervention, even if sanc-
tioned by the Security Council of the United Nations. Authorization of the
use of force by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations may be necessary and effective in restoring peace and security
in the short term, but it is unlikely to have any sustainable benefit in stopping
or preventing gross and systematic human rights violations, or holding perpet-
rators accountable. As most recently illustrated by the cases of Afghanistan and
Iraq, the highest level of determination and massive resources of the United
States succeeded only in raising the scale and magnitude of human rights
violations throughout the region to an unprecedented level.
The imperial gate of humanitarian intervention may perpetuate neocolo-
nial design, but it cannot protect human rights. The Preamble of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights indicates that the General Assembly
of the United Nations seems to be relying on the cultural transformation and
political mobilization I am proposing in this book:
2
Eleanor Roosevelt, “In Our Hands,” 1958 speech delivered on the tenth anniversary of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Available at: www.fdrfourfreedomspark.org/blog/2015/
2/18/human-rights-day-december-10.
Preface xi
The General Assembly Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human

Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations,
to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this
Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to
promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures,
national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition
and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and
among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.3 (My italics.)
The fundamental paradox of the human rights system is therefore in its

foundational statement – namely, how can these norms be the standard of
achievement for domestic protection of human rights when that can only be
done through progressive, incremental national and international measures
for the “recognition and observance” of these rights? In the familiar refrain of
its critics and skeptics, what is the use of an external standard without effective
means for its enforcement against offending states? This paradox is integral to
the international law foundations of the human rights system, which is
premised on state sovereignty as the expression of the collective human right
of national self-determination.
However, the argument I am advancing here is that this paradox should be
acknowledged, even celebrated, as inherent to the rationale and nature of
universal human rights norms, and not simply as an unprincipled expedient of
international relations. I will also argue that elements of the same paradox are
the bases of its mediation. The key to the thesis I am presenting here is that
coercive enforcement of human rights norms by external actors is neither
acceptable in principle nor possible in practice. Coercive enforcement by
external actors is an unacceptable violation of national sovereignty, but the
implementation of human rights by the people themselves is a legitimate and
appropriate exercise of their own right to self-determination.
The basic thesis and research questions of this study can be summarized as
follows:
International law and intergovernmental institutions are incapable of pre-
empting or providing effective remedies for human rights violations to meet
the legitimate expectations of self-determining human beings in their com-
munities around the world. This fundamental critique of the present state-
centric approach to the protection of human rights is premised on the obvious
paradox of expecting states to protect human rights against the organs and
officials of the same state.
3
United Nations, Preamble, Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948.
xii Preface
According to present international law, only states can have human rights
obligations and only states can discharge those obligations. A harmful action
or omission may be a crime or tort if caused by a private actor and must be
legally attributed to a state to constitute a human rights violation. Yet, external
coercive enforcement against the will of the state is neither lawful under
international law (because it violates the sovereignty of the state) nor capable
of reaching victims among the general population without the permission of
the same state that is accused of having committed that action or omission in
the first place.
External intervention in the name of protected human rights is not only
ineffective – because it cannot be sustained for a sufficient degree or time –
but also a source of major and persistent human rights violations. The rights of
women or children, for instance, cannot be protected by following them into
their homes or supervising their daily interactions with their families and
communities.
In the absence of verifiable means of evaluating the level or degree of actual
protection of human rights, factors such as the ratification of treaties, adoption
of laws, and descriptive self-reporting by states or highly selective and arbitrary
reporting by international human rights organizations (NGOs) are taken as
“evidence” of negative or positive human rights performance by the state. The
priorities of so-called donor governments and northern-based NGOs are taken
as the sole reliable means of promoting human rights in postcolonial states in
Africa and Asia.
Since human rights are by definition universal claims asserted and realized
by self-determining human beings, our ability to define and implement these
norms is integral to our humanity. The present state-centric international law
system and its institutions can provide only limited and contingent protection
of human rights norms. Shifting the human rights paradigm from state-centric
bureaucratic formalism to people-centered social and political movements
will still need states or other forms of large-scale political formations that are
subject to total transparency and effective accountability.
This essay explores the nature and implication of the mutual linking of
being human and human rights, whereby perceptions of what the human is
define the scope, content, and methods of the protection of human rights, and
the quality of being human is enabled and realized through the protection of
those rights. By “human rights,” I mean moral and political entitlements that
are due to all human beings equally by virtue of their humanity, without any
distinction on such grounds as race, sex, religion, or national origin. In other
words, I am entitled to these rights simply by being a human being, without
any other requirement or qualification. I prefer to present these rights as moral
Preface xiii
and political – instead of legal – entitlement because the legal dimension is

futile without sufficient moral foundation and the political will to
implement it.
My purpose in this study of the viability and efficacy of international human
rights from an inclusive global perspective is to overcome the limitations of the
liberal relativism of this paradigm. I appreciate that the human rights project
may completely fail – indeed, I see indications of that already – but the
question for me is what can be done to contribute to supporting this project
here and now, as the process of defining and defending human rights con-
tinues. Failure and success are appreciated in retrospect, often long after the
fact, because reliable assessment is difficult when events and developments are
still in progress. Moreover, assessment is a matter of approach, criteria, and
timeframe – what may appear as success or failure may in fact be short-term, a
stage in a gradual process of change. After all, the transformative outcomes of
major ideas in human history always take time, and often several attempts are
made to revive a dying or diminishing project.
Acknowledgments
As I approach the end of my academic career, I look back to twenty-five years

of the stimulating and instructive company of the students and faculty of
Emory Law School. Most of all, I am profoundly grateful for the confidence
and support of Howard Hunter, the former dean of Emory Law School, who
“took a chance on me” in 1995 and continued to believe in my academic and
scholarly competence through the years. I am also profoundly grateful for the
gratuitous confidence and support of my senior faculty colleague, John Witte,
who supported Dean Hunter and senior faculty colleagues in taking that
fateful chance on me.
I also gratefully acknowledge the instructive insights and critical comments
of generations of my seminar students and research assistants of Emory Law
School. I am also obliged to those among my students who resisted seeing the
irrationality of the liberal relativism of their views on human rights. It is
reassuring to know that some of my communities do not have a monopoly
on cultural relativism and contextual exceptionalism. I am obliged to other
Emory Law students for contesting my call for possibilities of promoting
overlapping consensus on the universality of human rights through internal
discourse and cross-cultural dialogue. To all students and colleagues alike, the
universality of the concept, content, and context of the protection of human
rights is too important to be taken for granted. As my experiences at home and
abroad confirm to me:
My views are not relevant if they are not resisted.
xv
1
Evolution of Founding Vision
The premise of this book is that, like everything else in life and human
experience since the beginning of time, evolution is the key for understanding
how the world works. For me, as a Muslim, only God is the permanent reality,
while everything else evolves with time and in response to changing circum-
stances. Since human rights are rendered in the service of human beings, they
must evolve with the life experience of their subject, namely, human beings
on the ground everywhere, for each person and community on their own
terms. This is the true meaning of universal human rights which are worthy of
global struggle for their realization and protection. By the principle of the
concept itself, no other person, group, or entity can impose their view in
defining, interpreting, or elaborating human rights norms and institutions for
others. The way remains open for respectful debate, contestation, suggestions,
and recommendations, but these should never violate the dignity and freedom
of the human subject. This is what we all know as the Golden Rule, or the
principle of reciprocity. If in doubt as to whether a debate or challenge is in
violation of this fundamental principle, imagine the situation with you as the
subject of violation of human dignity and freedom.1
Any apparent compliance in the area of international human rights that is
perceived as the result of economic or security pressure by other states in fact
reflects neocolonial power relations. In the realities of what I call “human
rights dependency,” the power of developed states to influence the human
rights policies and legislation of developing states always flows from former
colonial and richer countries of the Global North2 against former colonies and
1
I have applied this principle to issues of Sharia and human rights. See, e.g., An-Naim, Toward
an Islamic Reformation.
2
I will use the term “Global North” to refer to developed former colonial societies of Western
Europe (including Russia) and North America, and “Global South” to refer to former
1
2 Evolution of Founding Vision
poorer countries of the Global South, and never the other way round. This
process is so tainted by the coercive geopolitical power of former colonial
states – in violation of the underlying rationale of human dignity – that it is
difficult to accept both the influence and its outcome as the result of friendly
relations among “equal” members of the same human rights treaty. Since
such influence is never coming from former colonized states toward former
colonial states, the relationship should not be taken as being among peers
sharing the same commitment to upholding human rights values and norms.
Instead, we should see the coercive nature of influence from rich, powerful
states toward poor, weak states, and how reliance on such power relations is
also legitimizing other manifestations of unequal power relations. Such
dependency is legitimized by affiliation to human rights, thereby hiding the
underlying historical hegemony and exploitation.
Still, we need to understand how the protection of human rights still benefits
from “state-centric enforcement” in reaffirming the founding people-centered
doctrine of the Universal Declaration. To begin with, states had the power of
creating and convening international organizations, such as the United Nations
itself, that are presumably founded on the equal sovereignty of state members of
those organizations, despite the realities of their inequality in power and wealth.
Yet, those inequalities contributed to global geopolitical relations that facilitated
the process of decolonization and promoted a dynamic process of self-
determination in international relations. Another development in favor of the
protection of human rights is the rise in the protection of constitutional rights in
some countries. Although this was initially primarily of the rights of citizens, and
the specification of these rights and remedy for their violation were at the
discretion of the state, the expansion and entrenchment of the process encour-
aged people to organize to demand their entitlements beyond the discretion of
the state. A third factor to be briefly noted here is that the idea of universal
human rights was totally inconceivable under colonial and imperial rule, when
the vast majority of human beings around the world had no possibility of having
their rights respected even as citizens of their own countries. It was only after
these colonized peoples achieved political independence that the potential
possibility of universal human rights emerged during the second half of the
twentieth century for the first time in human history.
In view of the nature and process of economic, political, and social/cultural
change, tactical benefits for the protection of human rights can still be
realized despite the lack of structural changes in the present state-centric
colonized, developing societies of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. To me these terms indicate
geopolitical concepts, rather than physical geographies.
Paradoxical Founding Narrative 3
regime. In other words, the limited concessions powerful states make for weaker
states can be organized to achieve more relative equality in the relationship than
what the powerful states originally intended to concede. The underlying
inequality in power relations among states can be diminished in two ways.
First, by ensuring consistent practice of the rule of law in international
relations, for instance, to diminish the false promise of so-called humanitarian
intervention. The protection of human rights should build on transparent and
accountable political and legal processes rather than the vague and manipu-
lative promise of intervention which can never achieve its unrealistic promise,
as I will explain in Chapter 3.
Second, by continuing to promote strategic and systemic reliance on cultural
transformation and political mobilization, and seeking solidarity with sympa-
thetic forces within developed states, instead of waiting for legal enforcement to
achieve sustainable human rights outcomes on its own. I am referring here to
the difficulty of appreciating the force and magnitude of change resulting from
cultural transformation and political mobilization. Major revolutions are appre-
ciated in retrospect, rather than while they are actually happening.
The crucial aspect of the dynamic of change is that there is now relative
development of the effective agency of human subjects of human rights within
and among postcolonial states to challenge and resist external imposition of
human rights norms throughout the world. As often happened in transforma-
tive phases in human history, change is gradual and incremental, rather than
immediate and total. The age of European colonialism is over and its attempt
to survive through neocolonial strategies is also failing. Such positive changes
are already in the process of happening, though they are taking the time they
need to materialize. The cause and effect of these and related changes is the
rise of total and systemic self-determination within and among societies.
Women and other disenfranchised and marginalized groups everywhere are
realizing that they are entitled to equal human dignity and the right of self-
determination, without waiting for these to be granted by the elites or trad-
itional structures of powers at home or abroad. These and related geopolitical,
cultural, and political transformations since the adoption of the UN Charter
in 1945 are now irreversible and are bound to advance to their logical
conclusions on their own terms, probably as customary international law if
used in formal adjudication or arbitration.
paradoxical founding narrative

Several factors contribute to and reinforce the paradox of limiting to the
authority of the state both the capacity to violate and competence to protect
the human rights of those subject to the state’s jurisdiction. Yet, the paradox of
entrusting protection to the only possible legal suspect continues to frustrate
the core values and purposes of the United Nations itself because the UN
Charter (binding treaty for its member states) prohibits the use of force or
intervention into the internal affairs of other states. Article 1 of the Charter
affirms that maintaining international peace and security is the primary
purpose of the United Nations, and requires all Members States of the UN:
to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats
to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of
the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the
principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the
peace.3
It is therefore clear that the protection of human rights as such does not
constitute an exception to the prohibition of the use of force against another
state, even one that is suspected of massive and persistent violations of human
rights. To emphasize that this prohibition applies to the UN itself, as well as its
Member states, Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter provides: “Nothing contained
in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or
shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of
enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”
The exemption of enforcement measures under Chapter VII relate to the
authority of the Security Council “determine the existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommenda-
tions, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles
41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.” Chapter
VII provides for the gradual acceleration of response by the Security Council
up to taking action, including military force “as may be necessary to maintain
or restore international peace and security. . ..” Since the Security Council
does have military forces of its own, it can only appeal to Member states of the
UN to provide the forces and resources for enforcement measures. One of the
rare examples of successful action by the Security Council on this authority by
the Security Council was the international coalition military campaign to
expel Iraq from Kuwait in 1991. The only two exceptions to this strict prohib-
ition of the use of force/aggression in international relations are (1) when
3
United Nations, Charter of the United Nations 1945, Article 1.
authorized by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter

or (2) when a state is acting in self-defense as authorized by Article 51 of
the Charter.
In addition to such textual confirmation of the categorical illegality of
intervention by one or more states into the affairs or territory of another state,
the realities of armed conflict on the ground, from Viet Nam to Afghanistan,4
consistently confirm that it is practically impossible and politically untenable
for any state or an international organization such as the UN to stay in the
territory of another state long enough to be able to do what is necessary to
protect human rights in that state. It is true that international relations
continue to be dominated by powerful states who invade and exploit other
states with impunity, despite the UN Charter’s categorical prohibition of the
use of force in international relations. None of such unlawful or lawful actions
by any state of whatever standing – superpower or not – can claim to have
succeeded in protecting human rights in another country or their own. In
other words, other states and the international community at large do not have
the political legitimacy, material resources, cultural competence, language
skills, etc., to be able do what it takes to protect human rights at home
or abroad.
I agree with Antony Anghie that colonialism continues to thrive and
dominate the development of international law. He shows how colonial
relations have been reproduced even as they have been obscured by inter-
national law developments, from the sixteenth-century Spanish conquests of
the Americas to the twenty-first-century War on Terror. I also agree with him
on the enduring, evolving operation of the “civilizing mission” – the grand
project that served to legitimize European colonialism and justified the
measures colonial powers used to control and transform non-European soci-
eties. As he correctly argues, the civilizing mission played a powerful role in
international law across time periods and across jurisprudential paradigms
(natural law, positivism, pragmatism), all schools of thought which served to
reproduce colonial inequalities.5
Anghie examines the role of Francisco de Vitoria, the sixteenth-century
Spanish author of De Indis Noviter Inventis, widely regarded as the first
international law text from a European perspective.6 Vitoria argued that the
4
I am referring here to military interventions in Viet Nam by the United States in the 1960s–
1970s following the end of French colonial rule, and the military interventions in Afghanistan
by both the Soviet Union and the United States since the 1970s.
5
Anghie, Imperialism, p. 268.
6
This Eurocentric imperial claim about the origins and nature of international law ignores the
fact that other civilizations had their own conceptions of international law (see, for instance,
extension of the empire was not a just cause of war but he legitimized Spanish
imperial rule by interpreting Spanish action in the Americas as self-defense!
Vitoria asserted the existence of a system of norms that were inevitably violated
by the Indians of the Americas. Vitoria affirmed a legal framework in which
the right to “travel” and “sojourn” freely made it entirely legitimate for the
Spanish to enter Indian territories.7 When the Indians attacked the Spanish
who entered their territory, this justified the Spanish in defending themselves,
according to Vitoria. Since Indians were pagans, he reasoned, they could not
be sovereign. Anghie moves on to the late nineteenth century, the peak of
colonial expansion and the period when positivism replaced natural law as the
principal theory of international law. Positivism focused on sovereignty as the
foundation of law and on the primacy of the state actor. A central feature of
positivism was the distinction it made between “civilized” and “uncivilized”
states. By deeming the non-European world “uncivilized,” Europeans
excluded the rest of humanity from the realms of sovereignty and international
law,8 thereby holding that there were virtually no legal restrictions on the
actions of European states with respect to non-European societies.
The Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 highlights the interconnectedness of
colonial expansion, trade, and the civilizing mission. One of the ways in
which European leaders at the conference justified colonial expansion in
Africa was by asserting that opening of the interior of the continent to
commerce would allow for “the improvement of the conditions of their
[‘the natives’] moral and material well-being” and help suppress the African
slave trade.9 The jurisprudence of the period between the First and Second
World Wars involved the project of transforming colonial territories into
sovereign states and was characterized by profound ambiguity in relation to
the colonial past. For example, the Mandate System sought to eliminate
native customs that were perceived by the colonial powers to be in conflict
with humanitarian ideals and civilized society. Economics was viewed as a
universal “scientific” discipline that transcended cultural particularities, and
Anghie argues that the invocation of economics was a new justification and
guise for colonial practices.10
Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations). The Muslim scholar al-Shaybani, one of the founders
of the Hanafi School of Islamic jurisprudence, died in 805 CE. Francisco de Vitoria died in
1546 CE.
7
Anghie, Imperialism, p. 21.
8
Ibid., p. 63.
9
Ibid., p. 97.
10
Ibid., p. 185.
In Anghie’s view, the War on Terror is a new form of imperialism premised

on the notion that “if rogue, ‘pre-modern states’ became ‘too dangerous for
established states to tolerate’, it will become necessary to inaugurate a ‘defen-
sive imperialism’.”11 This is the twenty-first-century form of an old project: the
control and salvation of backward peoples, with backwardness constructed as a
threat to developed states as well as a pitiful condition in need of advance-
ment. Anghie sees similarity between the doctrines of preemptive self-defense
of President George W. Bush and Vitoria’s ideas about waging a “defensive”
war on the Indians of the Americas. Anghie argues that international law
continuously attempts to efface its complicity with colonialism, perpetuating
its relationship to colonialism while striving to erase its connections with the
inequalities and exploitation of the colonial encounter.
One of the themes of this book is to promote the legitimacy and efficacy of the
true universality of human rights, and that can be achieved by simply minimizing
reliance on international law. However, I would argue, the process of reforming
traditional international law is already happening through the same strategies of
cultural transformation and political mobilization I am proposing for universal
human rights norms. From this perspective, I am in agreement with Balakrishnan
Rajagopal. For instance, I support his critique of the idea that nationalism is the
best way to counter colonialism and agree with his objection to the fact that
international law remains bound to the will of states and institutions, rather than
serving the masses of the Third World whose will is not best represented by their
states. He also argues that international law must acknowledge the importance of
development discourse and appreciate social movements as foundational to
changing international law. As he put it, “Social movements seek to construct
alternative visions of modernity and development that constitute valid Third
World approaches to international law.”12 In my analysis, indigenous social
movements emerge out of and are sustained by cultural transformation and
political mobilization. He argues that Third World states cannot guarantee
“democratic aspirations of the masses in the Third World, as state sovereignty
has been parceled out up (to international institutions such as the World Trade
Organization) and down (to market actors and NGOs).”13 I am also in agreement
with his view that “A new Third World approach to international law will have to
engage with social movements to transcend the impasse in which it finds itself,”14
but in relation to human rights for me, and not “development” for Rajagopal.
11
Ibid., p. 279.
12
Rajagopal, International Law, p. 3.
13
Ibid., p. 12.
14
Ibid., p. 23.
Oona Hathaway examines the core questions of the effect of human rights
treaties on compliance by states party to such treaties: Do countries comply
with or adhere to the requirements of the human rights treaties they have
joined? Are countries more likely to comply with a treaty’s requirements if
they have joined the treaty than would otherwise be expected? Drawing on a
database encompassing the experiences of 166 countries over a nearly 40-year
period on genocide, torture, fair and public trials, civil liberties, and political
representation of women,15 her findings support the conclusion that human
rights treaties either have no statistically significant effect on the practice of
countries or lead to poor human rights practices within the countries that
ratify them. She does not find a single treaty “for which ratification seems to be
reliably associated with better human rights practices and several for which it
appears to be associated with worse practices.”16 Hathaway concludes that the
existing theories (normative, rationalist, institutionalist, and liberal) are insuffi-
cient for explaining her findings.17
My reading of Hathaway’s long and complex study is that it strongly
supports the conclusion that ratification of human rights treaties is not an
effective means of ensuring that human rights are actually protected on the
ground. Yet, instead of questioning the international law framework of the
human rights regime, Hathaway observes that human rights treaties offer
countries rewards for positions rather than outcomes.18 This reminds me of
how people failed to recognize that “the emperor has no clothes” for fear of
the stigma of being thought stupid or uncivilized. For my part, I ask the
question: why rely on a treaty-based regime for the protection of human rights
if that regime does not have a real effect or outcome of protection?
Stephen Hopgood presents a persuasive critique of the idea of human rights
as a product of nineteenth-century humanist norms and European secular
religiosity. His thesis is that “We are living through the endtimes of the
civilizing mission. The foundations of universal liberal norms and global
governance are crumbling, creating a vacancy where sovereignty and religion
now make dramatic inroads in the post–Cold War world.”19 Hopgood
develops the concept of the “secular sacred” to describe the nineteenth-
century bourgeois European cult of sentiment, moral improvement, and
innocent suffering. In the face of modernity, the “secular sacred” provided
15
Hathaway, “Do human rights treaties make a difference?,” p. 1939.
16
Ibid., p. 1940.
17
Ibid., p. 2001.
18
Ibid., p. 2013.
19
Hopgood, The Endtimes, p. 1.
continuity between the Christian Church of the past and the secular future.
An emphasis on human suffering, innocent victims, and other values of
Christian civilization helped to channel formerly Christian work into secular
human rights work. In a remarkably short period of time, human rights
became “the lingua franca of international morality.”20
Hopgood critiques the role of Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch as self-appointed “gatekeepers” over what constitutes Human Rights at
the global level. He supports this argument by pointing to these organizations’
opposition to forms of local justice in Uganda and Rwanda and their reluc-
tance to embrace restorative justice. They want to trump existing forms of
local authority in favor of universal norms. “Human Rights advocates want the
final power to decide what are valid rules and therefore what are legitimate
exceptions to those rules.”21 He also reflects on the human rights crusade for
the eradication of female genital mutilation:
The difficulty historically of eradicating the practice of female circumcision
or female genital mutilation (FGM) is an object lesson to the hubristic.
Nothing could seem on the surface more like a human rights abuse than
FGM, but despite colonial and missionary activism and law, postcolonial
condemnation, and several decades of INGO activism, it remains deeply
entrenched and legitimate among millions of African women who see it . . .
as an identity marker and a key requirement for marriage.22
I agree with the general point Hopgood is making but would also want to
make explicit what might be implicit in his cautious expression: “Nothing
could seem on the surface more like a human rights abuse than FGM.”23 As
I see the point, FGM is simply not accepted as a human rights violation by
those who practice it, e.g., East African mothers on their own daughters. As
the facts on the grounds clearly confirm, it is futile to tell me that I am
“blaming the victim” or to tell practitioners of FGM that they are subjects
of “false consciousness.” Since it is both unacceptable and futile to attempt to
coerce those who engage in this practice into abandoning it, the only effective
and sustainable way to combat FGM is to persuade its practitioners that it is
harmful and unnecessary. It may not even be wise to bring human rights into
the conversation at that stage.
Hopgood’s view of an alternative to the global human rights regime is that
because religious, nationalist, ethnic, and family structures are located much
20
Ibid., p. 4.
21
Ibid., p. 120.
22
Ibid., p. 161.
23
Ibid.
closer to people and integrated within their everyday needs and identities,
such structures may be better able to create “sustainable reciprocity-based and
socially reinforced norms that reduce suffering, even if they fail to deliver on
the promise of global liberal norms.”24 He advocates a “syncretic, political,
ground-up process of mobilization.” He acknowledges that such a process may
not prevent mass atrocities but points out that the global human rights
paradigm has failed in that endeavor as well. I generally agree with
Hopgood’s critique but will try to elaborate further on a proactive alternative
approach of cultural transformation and political mobilization.
Another feature of my analysis is what I call “human rights dependency,”
which indicates how new states emerging out of European colonialism in
Africa and Asia remain dependent on their former colonial powers. The
relationship is not mutual because former colonizers can hide or cover their
trade or other benefits they continue to draw from their former colonies. In
the absence of other means of protecting human rights, the primary means of
applying pressure on offending states is to publicize their abuses and failure to
protect human rights, a process known as “naming and shaming.” The first
step is to monitor, verify, and document states’ violations of their human rights
obligations. The second step is to publicize violations widely and strongly by
circulating reports documented by international human rights organizations
like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. This is done by sending
missions to “investigate” news of violations in the country in question, usually
by taking information from local advocacy organizations and interviewing
their staff or local political figures from the government accused of violations.
Here is what is wrong with this process, as I personally experienced it working
as Director of Africa Watch (the Africa Division of Human Rights Watch at
the time) from July 1993 to April 1995:
(1) The selection of countries to be investigated and issues to be researched
and documented is exclusively decided by international human rights
organizations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch,
which take such determinations as essential to their global mandate.
(2) The primary “constituencies” – and by this I mean the sources of funding
for international human rights organizations (i.e., the donors to whom
those organizations hold themselves accountable) – are based almost
exclusively in Western Europe and North America. I say “hold themselves
accountable” because there is no other mechanism or independent
24
Ibid., p. 21.
Expose the “Confidence Trick” 11
process by which international human rights organizations are held

accountable.
(3) The primary purpose of investigations and publicity for reports is to influ-
ence so-called donor governments in Western Europe and North America
to impose conditions or limitations on states receiving “development aid”
or other economic, financial, or security (military) assistance from
Western Europe and/or North America. International monitoring and
civil society organizations tend to coordinate their activities to coincide
with meetings and other gatherings of intergovernmental organizations or
economic aid settings to provide maximum impact among donors
targeting aid-recipient governments.
(4) The nature and mechanism of the entire process does not provide any
accountability or possibility of influencing international human rights
organizations regarding which suspected violations to be investigated or
documented, what to do with the reports, or subsequent follow-up.
Although organizations like Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch appear to be all-powerful or irresistible, they do not have any legal
right or authority against any state.
The ultimate limitation of the role of international human rights organiza-
tions is the total lack of remedy or redress except against another state. Civil
society and non-governmental organizations (NGO) have no standing, no
competence to sue any state. In fact, there is no forum or tribunal before
which such action against any state can be adjudicated or litigated. None of
the international human rights treaties provides a forum for legal accountabil-
ity of states for violation of their human rights obligations.
expose the “confidence trick” of the twentieth

century
By “the confidence trick of the twentieth century,” I mean the way in which
former colonial powers renamed their own domestic civil rights “human
rights” while limiting the application of those same civil rights to citizens
and legal residents instead of extending entitlements to the rights to all human
beings as human rights should be. In that way, the liberal colonial powers who
controlled the formation of the human rights system at the end of the Second
World War had their own civil rights approved as human rights through the
relevant international process (the UN global system, and European, inter-
American, and African regional systems). The emerging states of Africa and
Asia were excluded from that formation process because they were not
members of the international organizations due to their lack sovereignty under

European colonialism. In fact, colonial rule deprived colonized societies the
opportunity to practice their indigenous self-governance, thereby denying
them the ability to counter the colonial claim of “rights” asserted by the
colonial powers. The inevitable nature of colonial relations is that colonized
societies lacked the opportunity to learn from their experiences under colonial
rule, including the ability to practice their sovereignty in international
relations.
The premise of the critique and transformation I am proposing is the now-
plausible conviction in the reality of human evolution and development in
social and political institutions. As human consciousness evolves, so does the
ability of persons in their communities to transform their social and political
institutions to advance their quest for individual freedom and social justice.
Yet, such transformation should not be taken for granted or assumed to
materialize in the same manner and degree in every human community.
The manner and speed of change tends to depend on the ability of people
to learn from their experiences, and to coordinate solidarity and alliances to
advance shared interests and evade risks. The theme and framework here is for
each community to work with its own “three Cs,” for each community to
coordinate its Concept, Content, and Context. The concept of human rights
for each community is to identify and affirm its own meaning of the inherent
human dignity and protection of self-determination. The content is the
substance of entitlements of human dignity through the exercise of self-
determination; and the context is cultural and geopolitical location for the
exercise of human rights as locally defined.
By “decolonizing” human rights I mean that the concept, norms, and
institutions of the global human rights paradigm have been hijacked by the
North Atlantic colonial powers, including Russia (the Soviet Union at the
time) and the United States, to protect their strategic interests and enhance
their geopolitical and economic hegemony. This neocolonial purpose and
strategy are hidden in such liberal notions as individual justiciability of rights,
which assumes the political will and human and material resources for the
state to enforce legally-binding international law obligation by ratifying and
incorporating human rights treaties in their national legal systems. Ironically,
this notion of legally-binding individual rights in fact ensures lack of enforce-
ment. Fortunately, on the other hand, this new cycle of colonialization is
confronted and rejected this time through global solidarity among former
colonized peoples. By the same token of human agency to promote social
justice and secure individual and collective freedoms, the rest of humanity is
even more able to challenge this neocolonial project and recover the initiative
for a more sustainable, people-centric decolonizing process. The term

“hijacked” is used to indicate the malicious nature of illegitimate seizure of
the human rights paradigm by neocolonial powers. This serious abuse of
international protection of human rights can be resisted effectively, but this
requires political mobilization, which is the second arm of the proposed
strategy that should be deployed by advocates of human rights.
Far from attempting to challenge or undermine the profound significance
of human rights or contest their universality, this book seeks to contribute to
achieving appropriate and sustainable protection of human rights on a truly
global, universal scale. To this end, I begin by focusing on the double paradox
at the foundations of the international human rights legal framework to expose
the inherent contradiction of the entire structure of the system, as if it was
designed to fail. By double paradox, I mean the claim of “universality” of
human rights norms in the reality of fundamental cultural and contextual
difference. The second paradox is the claim of self-regulation by the state.
These contradictions can be mediated in practice, provided that notions of
state sovereignty and exclusive territorial jurisdiction are accepted to work in
negotiable terms. The key to the entire process of negotiating sovereignty and
territorial jurisdiction is the realization that coercive enforcement of human
rights norms is simply out of the question. Conformity and compliance with
human rights norms must be with the agreement and cooperation of the
relevant population. Coercive outcomes must be emphatically rejected as
imperial imposition and replaced by cooperative compliance among the
concerned population. The manner and scale of effective and legitimate
protection of human rights must be consistent with the nature and rationale
of the concept and content of the norms, and this cannot be achieved through
pretensions of legal enforcement under international law.
Institutionalized coercive enforcement of human rights norms under inter-
national law is a contradiction in terms that is doomed to generate more
violations than protection of some rights. To the extent that coercive enforce-
ment of some human rights by the agency of the subject of those norms, like
the prevention and punishment of genocide, may be appropriate in extreme
emergencies. Relief for victims tends to be extremely fleeting and arbitrary.
Such relief should be sought and reinforced because it may indeed mean the
difference between life and death for a multitude of victims. Yet, coercive
intervention cannot last long enough to establish relevant policies and insti-
tutions for their implementation. Intervention cannot be extended into a long-
term solution for situations of armed conflict and genocide, because that
negates self-determination for both local and external populations. Despite
the moral contradiction of imposing solutions on people in the name of their
self-determination, and the practical futility of so-called humanitarian inter-

vention, this ploy of European imperialism is the pretext to rationalize new
forms of neocolonialism. The selective deployment of massive suffering is
invoked to rationalize military intervention to serve the imperial objectives of
former colonial powers. Nothing is done to establish institutional collective
action to stop and punish the crime of genocide, except in the highly selective
use of force in the name of the so-called international community to stop and
punish genocide when it threatens the foreign policy objectives of colonial
powers.
My objective in this book is not simply to confirm the obvious futility of so-
called enforcement of human rights, but to show the incoherence of the
notion of international enforcement itself. The purpose I seek to advance is
the implementation of human rights in the manner normally deployed by all
human communities throughout the history, namely, promoting cultural
legitimacy of alternative values and political mobilization for their implemen-
tation. This is the only way positive sustainable change can be achieved in any
society anywhere. My purpose is therefore to promote consensus and compli-
ance with evolving human rights norms as identified by local communities
and internalized through socialization processes. I realize that this strategy
seems to take too long, yet it is in fact the fastest and most productive approach
to generating and reinforcing a human rights culture.
There are major legal and political impediments to judicial and adminis-
trative enforcement of human rights norms. In contrast, indigenous socializa-
tion strategies of what I call cultural transformation and political mobilization
are more consistent with the human dignity of people and their communities.
This procedural formula is of course part of normal socialization strategies that
have emerged out of the many centuries of trial-and-error practice on various
issues of social, ethical, and political mediation in all societies. In my view this
is a case of contrasting the false pretensions of legal protection under
developed European and North American legal systems versus honest acknow-
ledgment of the need for promoting indigenous advocacy of human rights in
order to support and promote the voluntary popular practice of rights in
those communities.
It is essential to the dignity of every human being for every person to have
the ability to strive to define or present her own conception of her human
dignity in ways that render the rights “both the ends and means” of self-
determined universality. In the same way that colonial tyranny and domin-
ation of the peoples of South America, Africa, and much of Asia were
misrepresented and rationalized as necessary to achieve the civilizing mission
of European colonialism, the discourse of protection of universal human
rights is misrepresented and rationalized as necessary to fulfil the civilizing

mission of the postcolonial hegemony and exploitation of former colonies to
justify “imperial uniformity” as necessary for centralized production of human
rights norms through international law principles and institutions. The histor-
ical reality, however, is that such formations merely assert self-proclaimed
imperial uniformity as perceived by the imperialists’ self-evident universal
principles, though such outcomes are necessarily relative to historical and
geopolitical context. The production of universality of human rights under
principles and institutions of international law is merely liberal relativism
pretending to be global universalism. The pragmatic approach I am proposing
is what I call incremental promotion of universal and sustainable protection
among all human societies, each on its own terms, everywhere.
Human rights are the entitlement of every human being, while all other
entitlements are either contractual, situational, or limited to members of one
group or another. Regardless of the actual quality or level of provision or
protection of human rights on a local, regional, or global scale, they must be
accepted by all their subjects as the entitlement of all human beings every-
where, equally and without distinction. This quality of universal inclusivity is
the distinguishing feature of human rights. Yet, it is probably impossible to
verify that any specific human right is practiced universally on global terms.
Paradoxically, the right to difference itself is a human right which is necessary
for promoting consensus on human rights norms and their implementation.
Navigating such subtleties requires advanced insight and goodwill, which are,
by definition, lacking wherever human rights are in desperate need of protec-
tion. It is also the vulnerability of “victims” of human rights violations which
facilitate their clearer view of the remedy they need, while it is the power of
privilege which sustains the ulterior motives of self-appointed “intervener.”
Working with these and related factors and processes as elaborated in the
course of this volume indicates a permanently tentative quality of the entire
field of identifying and implementing rights, like trying to distinguish between
competing claims of freedom of speech and its abuse. Such factors and
processes emphasize the need for tentative discourse and mediation among
competing claims. Yet, the history of the human rights movement since the
1940s seems to have been driven by a perceived need for categorical claims
and absolute assertions about what the rights are and how they are to be
implemented. Developed states and privileged constituencies within states
and communities seek to impose their views on claims of rights and the
consequences of those claims. Instead of mediating and moderating compet-
ing claims, the human rights paradigm itself has been appropriated to serve
the geopolitical struggle of states over power and resources. Former colonial
powers in particular are now resorting to the dated discourse of “civilizing

mission” to justify neocolonial domination and exploitation of former
colonies.
In this way, imperial projections of the normative authority of former
colonial powers are now misrepresented as the only viable source of univer-
sality of human rights. This illusion has been reinforced by the global reach
and transformative impact of European colonialism in the formation of the
nation-state, global capitalism, and the development of international law.25
Since liberal European powers have apparently successfully imposed their
liberal values, social institutions, legal systems, and political practice through-
out most of the world, it seemed to follow by the late 1940s and early 1950s that
the “civilizing mission” of European colonialism authorized the imposition of
the same liberal values and institutions of that colonial mandate. By requiring
former colonies to follow the new human rights paradigm as defined and
operationalized by European colonial powers, the civilizing mission con-
tinues without the destabilizing, security, and material costs of military con-
quest or occupation.
One of the primary purposes of this book is to present and elaborate a
radical critique of the colonial model of international human rights law and
present an alternative approach that is more consistent with human dignity as
the rationale. According to the process-oriented approach I am advocating, the
universality and practice of human rights are the integral and legitimate
outcome of a truly inclusive and pragmatic process of cultural transformation
and political mobilization. This approach also includes a fundamental cri-
tique of the colonial appropriation of the theory and practice of the human
rights paradigm. The only way to claim allegiance to human rights and
commitment to their implementation must be through the free choice and
dignity of the human subjects of these rights. Yet, the postcolonial hegemony
of former colonial powers continues to misrepresent the ethos of human rights
in exclusively liberal terms, while condemning the theory and practice of the
rest of humanity as primitive cultural relativism.
The most significant fallacy of the seven decades since the adoption of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was used to justify colonial
domination as well as postcolonial hegemony, has been the misrepresentation
of the civil rights of citizens and lawful residents as universal human rights. In
this way, former colonial powers claim conformity with universal human
rights norms by following their own domestic standards and avoiding
25
Benton and Ford, Rage for Order.
responsibility for violating broader or more affirmative human rights norms.

For instance, western liberal states relegated economic, social, and cultural
rights to the bottom of the normative hierarchy of human rights because they
assume such claims to be nonjusticiable, without explaining why judicial
enforcement should be a criterion of human rights in the first place. This
same liberal bias for judicial enforcement has been used to reject a range of
collective and intergenerational entitlements like rights to social and eco-
nomic development and protection of the environment. Despite the vulner-
ability of the elderly, the judicial enforcement of the individual and collective
rights of this group are rejected by the current human rights discourse because
the judicial protection of this group is incomprehensible to the liberal mind.
The “confidence trick” of misrepresenting civil rights as human rights has
been reinforced by presenting an apparent continuity of claims of the “civiliz-
ing mission” that were used earlier by the same European powers to justify
their colonial expansion. Another factor in this process is that the same former
colonial powers have established themselves as “gate-keepers” of the so-called
international community by controlling membership and operations and
functioning of the UN.26 Membership and operation of international finan-
cial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) are governed by the constituent documents of the organization. The
IMF is governed by charter of the organization, while voting power in such
agencies is proportionate to each state’s contribution to the agency’s total
budget; since the richest members of those agencies are nearly always former
colonial states, this enables them to wield disproportionate power and influ-
ence in matters of international finance. Another factor enabling former
colonial states to exercise disproportionate power and influence in inter-
national relations in general is that they have the most experience in the
workings of international organizations, from the League of Nations to the
World Trade Organization. Because of this, their national experts tend to
dominate when it comes to negotiations and arbitration of disputes. Former
colonies, however, have little choice when engaging lawyers and business
experts than to turn to the nationals of former colonial powers. Even the
national languages of colonial states contribute to limiting the choice of
26
According to Article 4(2) of the Charter of the United Nations of 1945, admission of any state to
membership in the United Nations “will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly
upon the recommendation of the Security Council.” Combined with the veto power of each of
the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, this means that any of these five
permanent members can deny any state membership of the UN.
new states when they seek legal advice or representation in their disputes with
other states.
One result of this is that any outcomes or settlements achieved by inter-
national arbitration and negotiations between developing countries and inter-
national organizations have already been anticipated and shaped by the legal
and administrative systems of former colonial powers. Similarly, the ability of
former colonial states to perform “gatekeeping functions” demonstrates their
ability to exercise what is called “the power of the initiative,” which refers to
their ability to mobilize their resources, in the form of their media and civil
society organizations, and to combine their foreign policy objectives with their
role as gatekeepers of the current legal framework of international relations. In
this way, European powers have in recent history been able to control
membership in the club of “civilized nations,” which Article 38 (c) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) officially recognizes as one
of the sources of international law to be applied by the ICJ. Other factors
shaping the disproportionate influence of former colonial states include, for
instance, the legal and technical power of the ICJ, although the decisions
ofthe Court are supposed to apply only to the parties to each case decided by
the Court.
In this book I seek to affirm the true universality of human rights, in ways
that enhance the practical and sustainable protection of these rights through a
variety of strategies beyond piecemeal, reactive, and expensive judicial
enforcement. The universality of the concept itself means that human rights
are the entitlement of all human beings by virtue of their humanity. This
quality of globally inclusive scope of the rights of every human being, equally
and without any distinction, can be used to enhance the “value added” of
human rights regardless of judicial enforcement of human rights norms as
such. The belief that these rights should override any rights asserted by virtue
of membership in a group (e.g., citizens of a state, or members of an ethnic or
religious group) is prerequisite for the validity of the concept and the possibil-
ity of practically applying the specific rights claimed under this framework.
Since neither the human rights paradigm nor the universality of these rights as
prerequisite for their global validity is an end unto itself, the pursuit of the
practical viability and normative universality of these rights must also be “good
means to the end,” the end being one of sustainable protection for the human
rights of every human being, anywhere in the world.
The validity of any human right cannot be confirmed at the expense of
other rights, and human rights cannot be simply what the state wishes to grant
its citizens and other persons or groups subject to the state’s jurisdiction. Yet,
no authoritative institution or process exists by which competing claims of
rights can be arbitrated or adjudicated. The apparent consensus around the

impetus for the protection of human rights by the end of the Second World
War has been the failure of the state to protect its own citizens against itself
and other authorities, which is the basic rationale for the pursuit of universal
rights. It is from this perspective that I am presenting this strong critique of
the present human rights system and proposing an alternative, in tribute to
the concept, its potential content, and the prospects of implementation of
human rights.
The premise of this critique of the present international human rights
regime is twofold: First, the regime’s ineffectiveness in achieving any of its
purported benefits indicates deliberate purpose and inherent institutional
quality. Second, the weakness and ambiguity of the present human rights
regime, which expects states to hold themselves accountable to humanity at
large, is also counterproductive because it entrenches profound hypocrisy and
perpetuates complacency. This book is an urgent plea to take the protection of
human rights seriously enough to either earnestly strive for their practical and
sustainable realization or stop the cynical pretense of adherence to this
humane principle.
The basic credibility challenge for the claim that universal human rights
are the equal rights of all human beings by virtue of their humanity is to
transcend the inherent neocolonial nature of the project as founded on the
present system of international law. By asserting their own values and social
relations as the global model of universal human rights, former colonial
powers have identified themselves as the embodiment of human rights and
doomed the rest of the world to struggling to “catch up.” Submission to the
legal obligation of the western model of human rights has become the
essential requirement for acceptance of statehood by other states, and admis-
sion to the membership of the United Nations. Once a country’s statehood has
been accepted by other states it cannot be legally lost because of the failure of
the state to protect human rights – neither the normative criteria nor any
institutional mechanism exists by which recognition of statehood can be
withdrawn by other states. Yet, the western requirement of justiciable enforce-
ment of human rights is difficult for emerging postcolonial states and develop-
ing countries that were not colonized to achieve due to the lack of judicial
resources and administrative competence for protecting human rights on
the ground.
It is clear to me that the inevitable consequence of the neocolonial fallacy
that liberal relativism has exclusive claim to being the universal norm is the
practical failure of the liberal model of juridical protection of human rights by
the state. This combination of conceptual fallacy and practical inadequacy of
the foundational myth of the universality of human rights seems to hint at

ideological and cultural relativity in European conceptions of human rights,
though bridging the gap remains possible in practice.
universality or uniformity
Why must the apparent dichotomy of universality versus uniformity be a
choice of one or the other? And how can the two be reconciled so that
universality becomes the global ideal within which local uniformity is asserted
against coercive dichotomy? For example, gender equality is the universal
ideal, while uniform practice of the norm is not violated by granting working
mothers “maternity leave.” Accepting such differentiations within broader
universality can sustain pragmatic practice so that, for instance, maternity
leave for mothers does not immediately require “paternity leave” for fathers,
unless justified by other factors.
To speak of human rights as a preordained uniform set of presumably
universal rights for all human beings by virtue of their humanity requires
the capacity to imagine humanity in different socioeconomic and cultural
contexts. To promote and defend human rights requires the ability to empa-
thize and identify with all varieties of people, their needs, and their expect-
ations, especially when they are unable to articulate these for themselves.
Such requirements are what the capacity to imagine, empathize, and identify
would facilitate and support. For instance, the neocolonial premise and
presumed outcome of the current human rights discourse are too flawed to
qualify as protection of human rights at all.
The democratic principle of self-governance is premised on the sovereignty
of the human person as the subject of human rights in defining and imple-
menting those rights, through the radical democratization of the entire system.
Granted, the state has an indispensable role in the protection of human rights
through intergovernmental relations and regulating access for international
agencies (such as the World Health Organization and the International Labor
Organization) to provide their services to local populations. Yet it is the role of
civil society and the democratic process which ensures the proper working of
these agencies and organizations. Every aspect of self-governance and inter-
national cooperation presupposes the active and well-informed role of the
public at large without demands or supervision by local civil society organiza-
tions. Every aspect of the protection of human rights starts and ends with the
role of the human subject of those rights.
By decolonizing human rights, I mean an ongoing dynamic process of
reversing the colonial domination of the norms, institutions, and processes
Universality or Uniformity 21
for protecting human rights, in order to bring all aspects of the system into
conformity with the rationale of equality of all human beings in dignity and
rights. The present international human rights system is inherently neocolo-
nial because it is premised on the uniformity of a set of norms and institutions
proclaimed by a self-select group of colonial powers that presume to speak for
humanity on a global scale. As to be expected, it is that self-select group of
former colonial powers (including Russia/the Soviet Union and the United
States) which prescribe their own values and institutions as the exclusive and
uniform universal model of human rights to be imposed on former colonies as
their “passport” to political independence and membership of the so-called
international community.
To speak of reconciling in this context is to indicate the pragmatic, incre-
mental, and progressive nature of the process, and should not be perceived as
implying submissive compromise on the goals of upholding the universality of
human rights. Emphasizing the tentative and contingent nature of social
change is to indicate the role of the sovereignty of the human subject, which
includes choice or preference of sequence of outcomes. In other words, we
should not attempt to override the priorities or choices people wish to make in
the name of protecting their human dignity and self-determination.
The protection of human rights is a means to the end of ensuring respect for
the dignity of each and every human being, everywhere in the world, by virtue
of her humanity, without any requirement or qualification other than being
human. The premise of universality of human rights affirms the global
inclusion of every human being according to his or her own understanding
of the meaning and implications of human dignity. On its own terms, the
universality of human rights means that each person has the right to define
and protect her own human rights. Conversely, any claim to protect human
rights through imposition by the state or in the name of the so-called inter-
national community is a neocolonial assertion of “the civilizing mission” of
European colonialism, and as such is inherently incompatible with the core
premise of universality. Such imperial projects rely on an expectation of
uniformity of universal human rights norms, which presume to authorize
imposition of a predetermined set of rights by a centralized hierarchy of power
through international institutions like the United Nations. Some form or
degree of normative uniformity may emerge over time out of an overlapping
consensus among different communities around the world, but never through
imposition by imperial powers in the name of the so-called international
community.
This book seeks to clarify and facilitate the possibility of protection of
universal human rights because the present state-centric system is incapable
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aliment; the tail is long and shaggy, and curled back towards the
neck from whence its name is derived, (bandeira, flag or ensign;) it
has short and very thick legs with five toes on each foot, each toe
being furnished with a short and thick claw. It imprints a foot-mark
like a child’s, runs little, scarcely makes any exertion to escape from
its aggressor, and when irritated will advance against a man; but it is
only necessary to give it a blow upon the snout and it falls dead on
the ground. When it perceives itself attacked it lies on its back and
waits for the enemy, which on drawing near, it instantly fastens upon,
and will never leave its hold unless the tendons of its legs are cut.
Ounces have been found dead with Tamanduhas, firmly fastened to
each other. For hunting this animal, the flesh of which is insipid but
medicinal in certain diseases, it is necessary to have a dog that will
trace its track, but, in order not to run any risk, it is necessary that it
should be timorous and cautious.
The Tatu, or Armadillo, of which there are various sorts, differing
only in the size and the number of bands of shells which cover them,
is of a wonderful figure; the head and ears are similar to those of a
pig, the eyes small, the snout long and pointed, the mouth small, the
tail long, somewhat similar to the tail of a rat. The legs are short, and
the feet are furnished with large and strong claws, with which they
can burrow a hole in the ground, for their safety, almost in an instant.
This quadruped is covered with a coat of mail, which in its
conformation is one of the most extraordinary phenomena in Natural
History. The body is dressed in shells, disposed one over the other
as in the tail of a lobster, and forms a sort of housing cloth, that
conceals the belly; the whole uncovered with hair, and black. Some
of the kinds, when danger is near, can roll themselves up entirely in
the shell, like a hedge hog, but others not so completely. That kind
denominated Tatuim, or Tatuette, is small. The Verdadeiro is larger,
and its flesh good,. The Peba has a flat head. The Canastra is of the
size of a pig, and its flesh unwholesome. The Bola, (or Ball,) so
called in the Brazil, in consequence of concealing all its members
under its shell, is of a whitish colour, and its flesh of good flavour.
There are five sorts of Deer, Galheiros, which are large;
Sucuaparas, do mato (of the woods;) Catingueiros[46] and
Campeiros.[47]
The amphibious monster, with the figure of a lizard, resembling
the crocodile in Africa and Asia, has, in the Brazil, the name of
Jacare, or Aligator, and is met with in all the lakes and rivers of
tranquil current.
The plains of Brazil abound with a great number of Land
Tortoises, which never enter the water; their flesh is of fine flavour,
and the liver is considered delicious.
Man has less to fear from wild beasts in the Brazil than from
reptiles, the species of which are various, and some exceedingly
numerous and generally venomous.
The Sucuriuba are affirmed to grow to the extraordinary length
of forty feet, and are confined to lakes and pools of dead water,
firmly attaching its tail to a root, or the point of a stone at the bottom
of the water; it seizes all living animals that approach the margin,
and swallows the whole, as a snake in Europe would a mouse or any
small animal. It makes a hollow noise below the water, on hearing
any sound from without: the otter is its greatest enemy.
The Surucucu, or Surroco, seldom exceeds fifteen feet in
length, is of proportionable width, and usually met with in cool and
shady places. Its tail is armed with two spears, and its bite is cured
with difficulty. Its skin is marked with great symmetry, and is of an
ash colour, with brownish spots, and covered with scales.
In the beginning of 1819, a gentleman accompanied by six other
persons arrived one evening upon the margins of a lake, near the
river Pardo, in the province of St. Paulo, where they dismounted to
take some repose. They perceived at a short distance what they
supposed to be the trunk of a tree, which shortly afterwards began to
move; the contents of a gun was immediately discharged at it, and
they then despatched it with their knives. It was a Serpent of the
surucucu species, and the gentleman above mentioned assured me
that it measured twenty-one feet in length, and four in girth. He had a
variety of articles besides several pairs of boots made from its skin,
in the city of St. Paulo, one pair of which I brought with me to
England. The torpid state which this serpent at first exhibited, arose
from its having recently gorged a young bull.
The Jiboia, which is scarcely distinguishable from the preceding
serpent in size or colour, has no spears to its tail, nor does it bite.
When it seizes any living creature it is always for the purpose of
eating it. It never attacks its prey without first winding its tail round
the trunk of a tree, in order that its prisoner may not drag it away,
and, after having fatigued it by its first attack, it then draws itself so
closely round the animal that it breaks its bones and kills it.
The Cobra, of Cascavel, or Rattle Snake, is so called in
consequence of its tail terminating with some similitude to the husks
of a species of dried pulse. It has scarcely the thickness of a man’s
leg, with proportionable length. It never bites without beating three
times with its cascavel, or rattle, upon the ground, and its bite is
almost always fatal. It is said that the number of the divisions of the
tail is equal to the age in years of this snake. The snake caninana is
very long, of a slender form, black and spotted with yellow. The
jararaca is a species the most numerous, and its bite is fatal. That
denominated the cauda-branca (white tail) is not more than a span in
length, and there is yet no known antidote against its venom. The
living creature that has the misfortune to be stung by it immediately
becomes convulsed, sweats blood, and expires in a short time. The
jararacucu is of a deep green colour, of considerable length, and
slender. Its bite is generally mortal.
The Cobra de Coral (Coral Serpent) is small, of slender form,
venomous, and beautified with rings of various colours.
Duas Cabecas, (Two Heads,) so called because all its length is
of the same thickness. It is also venomous. It is said that the best
antidote for its bite is to eat the liver of the said snake.
The Cobra Verde, or Green Serpent, is of little length, and very
small.
The Papapintos is a large gray snake, said to be harmless. It is
seldom met with but upon the margins or in the vicinity of lakes,
where it catches toads and rats.
There is another species of serpent, called by the Brazilians
Campo-limpa, (Field Cleaner,) in consequence of its cleaning the
fields of the smaller snakes. It is light coloured, with a yellowish cast,
ornamented with a variety of spots, and is about six feet long. Almost
all these species of snakes are said to be viviparous.
The Padre Manoel Ayres de Cazal says, that in the parish of
Muritiba, near Cachoeira, in the province of Bahia, a serpent was
shown to him, killed within an hour, as a curiosity, in consequence of
being wholly unknown to the people. It was scarcely a foot in length,
but thick and round, and smooth as an eel, to which its head
assimilated. The tail was short and pointed in a pyramidical form. It
had four feet extremely small, without any appearance of legs.
In the Brazil there are various species of Spiders, which furnish
excellent silk.
The Caranquejeira, so denominated in consequence of being
of the size of a moderate sized caranguejo, or crab-fish, is covered
with long hair, and is venomous.
The Cigarra, or Cricket, has more of the species of beetle than
the locust.
The species of Butterflies are here very numerous, as I have
before observed. A collection of sixteen hundred different sorts has
already been made in the Brazil, and unquestionably there are an
infinite number yet for collection to occupy the industry of the
naturalist. The most beautiful are found in the vicinity of the tropic
and the temperate zone.
There are also a great variety of flies and phosphoric insects,
which illuminate the hedges at night by the brilliant lights they emit.
There are also a great diversity of Ants. The most remarkable
are those of Mandioca, of Correiçao, and the Cupim. The first are of
a reddish colour, and a pest to agricultural productions, as well as
fruit trees, such as the orange, and others equal in size or larger. It is
necessary every day, in order to preserve the mandioca from the
destructive attacks of this insect, to lay something for them to eat, in
order that they may not devour the plantations at night or strip the
trees of their foliage. It is during the night alone that they commit
these depredations. They form spacious subterraneous cavities, with
many entrances and outlets, distant one from the other. When it
happens that they form this cavity below the foundation-wall of a
house sometimes it sinks, and, during the rainy season, most
probably falls to the ground. The Correiçao[48] Ant is small, and
moves from one district to another in innumerable legions, covering
many roods of territory in their march. No living insect can remain
upon their line of march: the smaller ones are killed, and the larger
obliged to fly. The Cupim is a small Ant, light coloured, and flat,
subsisting upon the flour or small particles of wood, with which, and
a species of glue that issues from its body, it constructs an arch or
vault over the road by which it travels, in order that it may not be
seen by other insects and birds which destroy it. It is very destructive
to the timbers of dwelling-houses, and builds its residence in the
ceilings of the same materials, in a round form full of little cells;
sometimes it constructs it upon the points of branches of trees, but
the greater number of Cupims erect them upon the ground, with
earth, rendered solid by the admixture of the said glue, the whole of
the interior being full of cells, saloons, and covered ways: their form
is pyramidical, some with many feet in height, and they resist for
several winters the tempests of rain that assail them; but the claws of
the ant-bear crumble them to dust in a moment, when their
inhabitants are as quickly devoured.
There are divers species of the Bee, but none of them can be
compared with the European bee in the utility and excellence of its
honey.
That called Urucu is the most numerous, and of a gray colour. Its
hive is of wood, and the door is an orifice by which one can pass
commodiously at a time, and where there is always one upon the
watch, with its head out, in order to impede the entrance of small
insects. This sentinel is subject to the inconvenience of drawing back
upon the entrance or going out of any one of the commonwealth.
The mumbuca is of a blackish colour. The mandassaia is black and
short. These three kinds are of the size of the European bee. The
tubim is smaller. The theuba is also small, and of a yellow cast. The
cupimeira, so denominated because it occupies the houses deserted
by the Cupim ant, makes good honey. The tatahira and the saranho
are the only species that are mordacious. The getahi is of the size of
a mosquito, and manufactures a honey of a very liquid and delicious
nature. The caruara is a little larger than the preceding. The
pregiuçoza is of the size of the getahi, and produces an insipid
honey. That named mosquitinho is very small and black, and lives on
the ground. None of these species form the honey-comb like those
of Europe; the combs are round, and the cells unequal, in the form of
a bubble, without regularity, and the wax is more or less glutinous,
and never has the whiteness of that of the old world. All the bee-
hives, of whatever species of bees they are, have few inhabitants,
comparatively speaking.
There are also various casts of Wasps, or Morimbondos, as they
are called in the country. The inxuy is delicate, and makes its
habitation generally of a round form, plain, and of an ash colour,
attached to a branch, or fastened to some plant; its combs are deep,
and introduced one into the other, the orifices or cells are full of a
yellow savoury honey, which ultimately becomes like refined sugar.
The inxu is large, fabricates its combs according to the method of the
preceding, and fills them with most excellent honey.
If the Brazil cannot boast of so great a variety of quadrupeds as
some countries, perhaps no other region of the world equals it in the
innumerable species of birds which it possesses, more wonderful still
in the beauty of their plumage and variety of their song.
Amongst them are those which follow, namely: —
The Alma de Gato (Soul of a Cat) is of the size of a pigeon, the
lower part ash-coloured, and the upper of a gold colour, with a long
tail, short and curved beak. It has no song.
There are various kinds of Andorinhas, or Swallows,
distinguished alone by the size or the colour, being more or less
black.
The Anum is of the size of a blackbird, the whole of a brilliant and
jet black, the tail long and rounded, with only eight feathers. The bill
curved, thick at the root, and the upper part pointed. Its song is a
kind of sad lamentation; and its flight is short. They always proceed
in flocks not very numerous, and never alight upon high trees. It is
said that these flocks all lay their eggs in one common nest. It is,
however, certain, that if the nest of these birds is found with a great
number of eggs, there are numerous compartments, and the various
little nests are separated by portions of dried grass. There are other
casts of the Anum, of the size of the preceding one, but of an ash-
colour, with a slender beak, a little curved, and a tuft or plume of
feathers, which it elevates and lowers at pleasure.
The Araponga, or Guiraponga, is of the size of a small pigeon,
white as snow, with a beak wide at the root, a portion unfeathered,
and of a green colour around the eyes. This bird perches upon the
top of the highest trees in the woods, and there passes the principal
part of the day in a song, which imitates well a farrier just finishing a
horse’s shoe upon the anvil.
Azulao is a species of sparrow, of an indigo-colour, which, after
being accustomed to the cage, imitates various other small birds.
Bemtevi, so called by the Europeans in consequence of its
articulating with accuracy the words which compose its name, is the
size of a lark, with a white circle around the head, a thick and pointed
bill, having a yellow belly, and a gold colour above.
Bicudo is a kind of sparrow, either of an agate or gold colour,
sings, and has a very short thick bill.
Barbudo is little less than a blackbird, also black, with a large
white spot on the back, and a yellow one on the neck, a short tail
and legs, a large head, with thick eyebrows, a jet black bill, a little
curved and pointed, having whiskers.
Cabeca de Rubim (Head of Ruby) is a species of duck, of a
green colour, with a little crimson cap, which it conceals at pleasure,
as well as the feathers of its sides. The female has a larger and
black cap.
Cabore is the small Spanish owl.
Caiçu, which signifies large head, is of the size of a lark, of a
disagreeable aspect, with the wings and tail of a tobacco and the
belly of an ash colour, having a white spot upon the neck, the upper
part of the body gray and speckled with white, a thick neck and bill,
the latter black pointed.
Canario (Canary) has the form, and almost the same colour, but
not the song of those of the Canary islands. It is the first amongst the
small birds that announces the dawn of day.
Cancao is of the size of a blackbird, the belly white, the upper
part dark, with a long round tail, and white at the extremity. The fore
part of the head, neck, and breast, are of a jet colour. It has a large
white spot upon the back part of the head, a small black crest, a
small round spot above the eyes, beginning with blue and finishing in
white; the iris is yellow, which it extends and compresses, and the
beak thick and short. This bird always goes near the ground, and on
perceiving any living creature immediately gives a signal. It is the
most choleric bird of the country, and a destroyer of the others,
eating the eggs and the young ones whilst unfeathered.
Cardial (Cardinal) is a little larger than the linnet, which it
resembles. It has a small crimson cap, or hood, which covers a part
of the neck, and from which it derived the name: its song is loud and
pleasant.
Carrica (Hedge-sparrow) differs from that of Europe only in
being a little larger, and less fearful. It makes its nest, with little care,
in inhabited houses or the fields.
Chama-Coelho is a little less than the blackbird, with a black
head, the lower part yellow, and the upper of a tobacco colour.
Cegonha, or Stork, is common, and similar to that of Europe.
Cazaca de Coiro is of the size of a lark, yellow above, and gray
under the belly.
Colhereira, which with justice has the pre-eminence of king
amongst birds of the morasses, is the size of a large capon, without
a tail, of a rose colour above, the belly white, with long legs, long
white neck, the bill also long and thick at the root, square in the
middle, wide and flat at the point, like a Spatula.
Colibri, or Humming-bird, and known in the Brazil only by the
name of Beija Flor, (Kiss the Flower,) is the smallest bird existing.
Mr. Robert has represented it to be as small as a fly, in which he
does not appear to be correct, as none so diminutive are seen in this
country. Their varieties have been stated at six or seven, but there
are a great many more: Padre Cazal has seen ten different kinds. An
European would never have supposed that a bird so small as the
end of one’s finger could exist, furnished as it is with a bill, feathers,
wings, and intestines, similar to the larger kind, and he would be
naturally disposed to consider it but a creature of imagination, until
he visited its native country, and daily beheld it fluttering like a
butterfly at every flower, and humming a gentle chirrup. It has long
wings compared with the size of the body. The largest, of the size of
a very small wren, are of an indigo colour, with a white spot upon the
back. The second species differ only from the first in being smaller
and not having a spot, both have a long tail much forked. The third
kind and size are gray, and make their nests in inhabited houses, in
the form of a little pocket, suspended from the point of a straw. The
fourth variety are entirely green. The fifth are the same colour and
size, with a white spot upon the breast. The sixth differs only from
the preceding in having a very short tail. The seventh is of the same
colour and size, with the tail yellow. The eighth is the colour of the
nightingale, the breast finely speckled with white. The ninth is of a
brilliant green, with the wings and tail dark, the beak short, slender,
and yellow. All the others have it long, pointed, very delicate, and
straight, with the exception of the gray ones and those of the
nightingale colour, who have it a little curved. The tenth kind is dark,
or almost black, with a short tail of the colour of fire, the bill black,
and of medium length; when turned towards the spectator, the throat
and breast exhibit at one instant various colours, according to the
movements of the bird, at one time that of Aurora, when most bright,
or like gold melted in the crucible, followed, on a sudden, sometimes
by a suffusion of green, at others by blue, and by white, without ever
losing an inimitable brilliancy. The head, which is black, appears
ornamented with a little crest of the same colour when the bird has
its side towards the observer, and when it presents the front it
appears studded with sparkling rubies, or all of a brilliant scarlet,
which insensibly changes to refulgent yellow. They generally have
the tongue very long, the legs exceedingly short, and the eyes black;
their principal aliment is the juice or honey of flowers, which they
extract, not as the bee but in the same manner as the butterfly.
Some of them have the tongue cleft.
Ema, or Emu, is the Ostrich of the old world, and is the largest
bird of this country; its body is round, and covered with long gray
feathers, standing on end; the legs thick and long, with three short
and stout toes; two sort of spears are at the joints of the wings,
which are not sufficient to fly with, but in the plains it surpasses the
horse in swiftness, and is difficult to laço, even when the laçador is
mounted upon a fleet horse. It has no tail, and when it elevates its
head it is the height of a man. Its feathers are esteemed for plumes,
and the skin is used for shoes.
Encontro is the size of a greenfinch, long, delicate, and dark,
with a yellow spot at the joint of the wing. There are two other sorts,
of a jet colour, one of which has white spots, and the other red.
Feiticeiro is the size of a lark, between yellow and green on the
upper part, the belly ash colour, with the bill of a blackbird, eyes like
rubies, and a small crest,
Galleirao is the size of a pigeon, the upper part green, and the
lower purple, with a very short tail, long yellow legs, the neck
slender, the head small, with a flat comb, smooth and white, the bill
short and thick and the colour of red sealing wax, with the extremity
yellow. It frequents the margins of lakes, and its flesh is savory.
There is another species of this bird, somewhat varying from it.
Gallo do Bando is the size of a sparrow, black, with a white
spot upon the back, and the top of the head green, having a long tail.
Guara, one of the handsomest birds that frequent the morasses,
has the body similar to a partridge, a long neck and legs, with the bill
long and a little curved, and without a tail. The first feathers are
white, after a short time they turn black, and finally scarlet,
preserving the second colour at the extremity of the wings.
Garca, or Heron, consists of small and large white ones, and
also others which are large and of an ash colour.
Gaviao, or Hawk, includes various kinds, of which the Cauhan is
small, and the Corocuturu gray, being four spans in length from the
head to the extremity of the tail, and will seize a small monkey and
fly away with it with great facility.
Grunhata is the size of a robin-red-breast, yellow below and on
the front of the head, the rest of a dark colour, except some blue
parts. Its song is harmonious. There are other sorts, some of them
yellow, with the tail and wings green, and a black stroke the whole
length of the lower part.
Jaburu is larger than the turkey-cock, without a tail, and white as
snow; the neck, legs, and bill are very long; the latter is pointed.
Jacanan is little less than the thrush, the breast green, the upper
part of a tobacco colour, with the wings short and round, the tail very
short, with eight small feathers, the eyes and legs of a rosy hue, a
fine bill, and a green spot on the front part of the head. It goes
always upon the ground.
Jacu is the size of a large capon, black, with the figure of a
turkey-hen.
Jacutinga is a little larger, with the same figure and colour,
having green legs, and half of the wings white, a green bill and large
black eyes, the feathers on the upper part of the head are long and
white, the breast is speckled with white.
Jacu-Pemba is smaller than the first, with the breast of an ash
colour. The aracuan is also a species of jacu, the size of a pigeon,
with the tail and neck long, of a dark yellowish hue. These four birds
have wattles at the throat similar to a turkey-hen.
Japu is the size of a pigeon, black, with a yellow tail, the bill of
the same colour, thick, long, round, and finely pointed; when it sings
it suspends itself by the feet, at the same time beating with its wings.
Japue is less, and of the same colour, with a large green spot
upon the back, the eyes small and the iris blue. Both construct the
same kind of nests, which are remarkable for the form and for the art
with which they make them at the extremity of the highest horizontal
branches, in the shape of a bag or pocket, and five or six spans in
length; they are of moss, woven in such a way that they move
continually to and fro with the wind, without sustaining any injury.
Such is their precaution to prevent their young from being injured by
surrounding enemies. They destroy oranges profusely to obtain the
seed.
Inhuma is the size of a capon, with dark sides, the belly ash
colour, and the wings of an extraordinary length, being ten spans
when extended, each with two spurs of an unequal size, and a horn
of a bony substance half a span in length and the thickness of a
large turkey-quil, sharp pointed, and a little curved at the extremity,
with a magnetic virtue, and also with the property of counter-poison.
When about to drink it introduces this antidote against poison into
the water, and the birds and quadrupeds near it, it is said, then only
drink. Its flesh is spongy and not eaten. There are other kinds of this
bird about the size of a pigeon.
Joao-de-Barro is a species of lark, yellow, with a whitish streak
above the eyes, and only remarkable for the arrangement of its nest
of burro, or clay, from which its name is derived. The nest is
constructed with much art and perfection between the forked
branches of a tree, and consists of a corridor, something more than a
span in length, having a window at the end, between it and an
apartment almost of the same length at one side, whose entrance is
small, and always on that side the least exposed to the wind. This
edifice withstands the winters for many years.
Joao Tolo (Foolish John) is the size of a bullfinch, of a greenish
changeable colour above, the belly yellow, with a white spot upon
the throat, the neck very long, the bill also long and pointed. It is
tame, and without any song.
Lavandeira is small and white, with the wings black.
Amongst various sorts of Macaricos, which inhabit the margins
and lakes, there is one somewhat smaller than the thrush, ash-
coloured above, and white below, with a very short tail; the legs long
and green; the head large and flat, with a narrow white circle around
it, which is relieved by another that is wide and black, and a collar of
the same colour; the eyelids are rosy, with two ferrels or spears at
the joints of the wings, which are white, with the extremities black.
There are a variety of the Wild Duck and Water Fowl.
Marido-he-dia (Husband it is Day) does not differ from the
female of the bird called tendilhao (or chaffinch:) its song is its name
badly articulated.
Morcegos, or Bats, are numerous everywhere, some being of
the size of a pigeon; they are exceedingly prejudicial to cattle, to
certain fruits, and to houses and churches, where they frequently
discharge a black liquid that cannot be washed away.
Mutun is almost the size of a turkey-cock, of a beautiful jet black,
very graceful, with a curled tuft or plume, quick eyes, the bill yellow,
the legs green, and the thighs white. Its song is mournful; its flesh
delicious. The female has the plume spotted.
There are also different sorts of Night-crows (Noitibos) or
Coliangas, as they are commonly called. One kind frequents the
margins of lakes during the day, and is of a beautiful and inimitable
gray on the upper part, the lower part white, having a white spot in
the middle of the wings, the extremities being black. The head is
large and flat, with large black eyes. It has scarcely the appearance
of a bill, with a crooked, and extremely large mouth; the largest toe,
which is not proportioned to the smallness of the others, has a saw
or comb towards the inner side. The flesh of this bird, when fat, is
considered good.
Paho is the size of a pigeon, black, with the breast of a rosy hue,
and the beak proportionate. Its flesh is also good when fat.
Papa-arroz is small and entirely black. It goes in bands.
There are upwards of twenty sorts of Parrots, reckoning from
the smallest parroquet to the arara, or macaw. The flesh of the whole
is deemed good, especially that of the juru. Those which compose
the last class are of three sorts: the Araruna is entirely blue; the
Caninde, also blue above, with the belly of a gold colour; and others
which have the lower part and the head of a rose colour.
In lakes distant from inhabited places there are large Wild
Geese some gray, some white, and others coralline.
The bird called the Pavao, or Peacock, is of the size of a lark
when unfeathered; but, while feathered, is larger than a thrush. It is
of a beautiful, brilliant, and changeable colour, beginning with green,
and finishing with a bluish green upon the back; the belly is of a rose
colour; the wings small and round, and of an exquisite gray; the
lower parts of the thighs are dressed in dark feathers, covering the
legs, which are very delicate and short; the tail is six inches long, the
two central feathers are dark and of changeable colour, the four next
are of a jet black, and all the six equal,—the other six have the
extremities white, and gradually diminishing from the others in
length: the head is rather large, covered with curled feathers, which
form a little plume of dark blue; the bill is very short and a little
curved, extremely wide at the root, and terminating in a point
encircled with mustachoes or foretops thick and black; the eyes are
large and black, with yellow eyelids.
There are five species of Partridges, all gray, and without tails.
The smallest, called nambus, have a rosy beak; those called zabelez
are a little larger than the European partridge, and have the legs
yellow; the enapupez is still larger, with a long bill; those named
macucos are more bulky, and of a dark colour, with two spurs at the
joints of the wings, and a species of saw (such at least have the
males) upon the hinder part of the legs; the capueiras, which are a
little larger than the nambus, go in bands: all the others disperse
after the mothers leave them. The whole sit upon the ground,
excepting the macuco, which always perches upon a tree at night.
Peru do Mato, (the Wood Turkey,) improperly so called, is the
size of a blackbird, of a dark ash colour, well furnished with feathers,
which terminate like hair, the tail jet black, the bill red, thick, and
pointed; when it sings it elevates the beak perpendicularly.
Queroquero, which is almost the size of a partridge, has a
white belly, with the breast and throat white, of a changeable colour
above, with a white spot near the wings, which are armed with two
spurs, and whose largest feathers are black, much exceeding the
length of the tail, which is short, with the extremity white, the eyes
are green and handsome, it has the bill similar to a pigeon, green,
and the end black; the head is ornamented with a small black crest,
and pointed; the legs are long, and the thighs still longer, with the
lower portion unfeathered and green. Its flesh is good, and it would
appear not to sleep, as its cry is heard at all hours of the night. It
feeds upon the margins of lakes.
The Rola, or sort of Turtle-Dove, is of various species: those
called juritis are a little less than a similar kind which pass from
Africa to Europe in the spring, but are not so handsome; their song,
consisting of one long note, is somewhat melancholy; those called
turtles de cascavel, in consequence of the rattling of their wings
when they rise, are beautified with white spots, and are somewhat
larger than a sparrow, they fight with their wings, and commonly
procure their sustenance in bands. The third kind, called coboclas,
from being the colour of a brick, are the same size as the preceding.
The other sorts all pass under the name of pombas (pigeons); the
cardigueras are small; those called aza branca (white wing)
resemble the troquaze pigeon, or ring dove of Europe. The ring
doves of the country are large, and have their beaks green; as have
also those called pararis.
Sabia is a kind of thrush, and the greatest singer in the Brazil; its
song does not differ from the blackbird; some, but very rarely, have
the feathers and the bill yellow.
The Sahys are a species of beautiful little bird, and divided into
various sorts. The sahy da secia is the size of a hedge-sparrow,
having a similar beak; its sides and belly are purple, with the wings
black above, and the under parts yellow, the tail black, the feet of a
rose colour, the head silvery, and the eyes blue. The sahy bicudo is
the size of a robin, of a green colour, with the tail and wings black,
and the bill pointed. The sahy roxo (or purple sahy) is the size of a
sparrow, with the tail and wings black, the head and breast purple,
and the bill short and pointed. The sahy de colleira, has the form and
size of a sparrow, with the head purple, the neck rosy, the belly
green, the sides, wings, and tail, of a greenish hue, and the bill short.
The sahy-xe, has the head, wings, and tail of a greenish colour, the
breast between blue and green, and black near the blade bone or
shoulders and the throat, the hinder part of the back yellow, and the
beak short. The sahy papagaio is the size of a greenfinch, of a
changeable colour, between blue and green, with a black tail and
short bill, wide at the root and fine at the extremity.
Sanhaco is a sort of greenfinch.
Seriema is a little larger than the turkey-hen; its song is simple
and tender, it goes generally upon the ground, and flies little.
Serrador is a small bird of a blackish colour, with the beak
similar to a sparrow, it only perches upon dry and naked branches, is
like the ortolan, and is incessantly rising perpendicularly two or three
spans, alighting upon the same place, and keeping in its movement
the time of a serra, or saw; it has no song, nor is its plumage
beautiful.
Soffrer, to which the whites have given the name, pretending
that it articulates the word in its inharmonious song, is little less than
the blackbird, of a gold colour, with the head, throat, tail, and wings,
black, excepting a white spot in the middle of the wings; the tail is
long, the bill round, long, and pointed, likewise black, with two white
spots on each side of the lower part; the iris yellow.
Soco is a bird comprising various kinds, the white ones are the
size of a large capon, without a tail, with the legs a little long, the bill
also long and blue, the fore part of the head is black, the hinder part
ornamented with a long pointed crest, falling back upon the neck,
which is rather long. The ash-coloured ones differ only from the
preceding in colour. There is another larger than the blackbird, being
two spans and a half when the wings are opened, and three from the
extremity of the bill to that of the feet; it is green on the upper part,
and ash-coloured below, the bill is long and pointed, the iris yellow,
the neck a span in length, slightly covered with feathers, and spotted
on the under side; the tail is two inches long, the head is black, with
a crest.
Tapera is a little larger than the blackbird, the whole of the body
white, with the head, tail, and wings black, the bill stout and pointed.
Tyhe, or Tapiranga, is much larger than the sparrow, the feathers
of the wings large, and those of the tail black, the rest entirely
crimson; the bill is thick and black, with two white spots upon the
lower part. The tyhé negro (black tyhe) is the same size, with a
green spot upon the head.
Tingara is the size of a tentilhao, or chaffinch, of a sea green
colour, with the head green, the tail short, and the bill fine, short, and
pointed.
Tucano is the size of a pullet, black, with the breast between
green and yellow; the bill, a little curved, is of a thickness and length
disproportionably large for the body. The arassary is another species
of tucano, differing in the colour of the feathers; the bill is a little less
and straight, its song is the name by which it is designated. The
tucano builds its nest in the cavities of old trunks, lays only two eggs,
and its first plumage is white, it has on each side of the head a
naked portion of a red colour and varnished.
Tuyuyu is much larger than the turkey-cock, white, with the legs
black, is very high, with rather a long neck, the bill pointed, without a
tail, and is the height of a man; it feeds at the margins of lakes, and
its sustenance is fish.
Viuva is the size of a sparrow, black, with the head white, and the
tail proportioned. There is another species of viuva the size of a red
robin, also black, with the head white, and the body a little large from
the feathers curling very much upon the upper part; the bill is short
and delicate; it always perches upon dry branches and does not
sing.
Urubu is a species of vulture, of the size of a turkey-cock, black,
with the head hairy like it, the bill proportioned and curved at the
upper part. There are two other sorts of the urubu, both rare, the one
differs only in having a portion green, the other, which is called
urubu-rey, is of a whitish ash colour, with the tail and wings black,
the neck absolutely naked and fleshy, the head imperfectly covered
with a soft fur, the crop hairy, the eyelids green, the iris very white,
and the bill black. and has on the upper part of the bill a caruncle,
composed of various yellow globules of divers sizes, attached to a
delicate pedicle.
In the interior lakes there is a species of gull, the size of a
swallow, the lower part very white, and the upper of a pearl colour;
the tail forked, the wings long and narrow, with the three leading
feathers black, as likewise the fore part of the head; the bill is long
and yellow.
Patativa of an ash colour, is less than a robin, and sings.
Rendeira is the size of a bullfinch and white, with the head, tail,
and wings black, the bill and tail short.
Ticotico is of the size of a hedge-sparrow, having its colour
almost upon the sides, with the belly yellow, and a white semicircle
above the eyes.
Tacoara is larger than a blackbird, of a greenish colour, with the
tail very long, the upper part of the head a gold colour, having a large
black spot round the eyes.
PHYTOLOGY.
Perhaps no country in the world presents such an infinite variety

of vegetation as the Brazil, or so spacious a field for the labours of
the botanist. It abounds in a diversity of excellent timber, dye-woods,
and medicinal plants. Nature, here so spontaneous, has not,
amongst its innumerable indigenous species, any plants and trees of
the European world. The colonists have naturalized a great number,
but they do not prosper so well as in their native soil. Those of Africa
and Asia sustain no injury when planted in the same latitude. The
olive-tree grows little, soon droops, and does not fructify in the torrid
zone. The chestnut-tree is only known in the southern provinces,
where peaches grow in perfection; also the apple, plum, and cherry
trees. The pomegranite and quince also prosper in the torrid zone.
The vine and fig grow generally, but more especially out of the tropic.
Oranges, of which there are various kinds, grow universally. Grain
does not grow in all the provinces, with the exception of rice and
Indian corn. Water-melons are every where excellent; the melon is
good only in a few places. The cabbage and lettuce are cultivated,
together with other indigenous hortulans unknown in Europe. The
pea, bean, and turnip are little cultivated; with these were also
naturalized rosemary, rue, wormwood, lavender, parsley, coriander,
aniseed, mint, the pink, and jasmine. The rose-tree has a great
enemy in the ant: its flower is not handsome.
Amongst other trees of excellent wood for building, carpenter and
joiner’s work, are the ajetahypeta, buranhe, cedar, conduru, coraçao
de negro, (negro’s heart,) gonçalo alves, jacaranda, jacarandatan,
jacarando-mulato, jequitiba, jetahy, loiro, massaranduba,
mocetahyba, mocuhyba, which is high, having a small tuft, similar to
a parasol, and affords a small walnut, somewhat like an olive, with a
thin and smooth rind, inclosing an oval kernel, from which is
extracted an oil that is applied to various seus, brahuna, or maria
preto, olandim, bow wood, oil wood, violet wood, peguim, putumuju,
oyty, oytycica, itapicuru, sapucaya, sebastiao d’arruda, male and
female, sucupira, sucupirassu, vinhatica, sassafras, and many more.
Alecrim Brazilico (Brazilian Rosemary) is a shrub, only similar
to that of its name in the colour of its flower, bark, and wood; the leaf
resembles that of mint, but is small, with the smell of savory. There is
another sort of rosemary, which differs only from the latter in its
flower, which is white and formed like that of savory. Both grow best
in a dry and sandy soil. Algodeira, or Cotton-Tree, is a shrub which
begins to ramify immediately on appearing, its leaves resembling the
vine leaf. It has five large yellow petals, encircling each other; a great
number of capillaments united in one column, in the centre of which
a pistil arises to a greater height, of whose germ a capsule is formed
more than two inches in length, triangular, and enclosing in three
lodgements a great number of seed, resembling that of the pear,
contiguous and in two orders, and unfolding in a white and long
cotton wool, supplying the most extensive branch of commerce in
the Brazil.
The Ambuzeiro, or Ambuzo Tree, is of small size, and grows in
sterile lands, not requiring any culture. It begins to have branches on
issuing from the ground, and they are exceedingly intertwined with
each other; the leaves are small, elliptical, and varnished on both
sides; the flower is in small bunches, like the olive-tree; the fruit is
similar in appearance to the sloe, between a green and white colour,
having a thick skin, disagreeable to the taste, with a large round
stone, never separating from the pulp, which resolves itself into a
thick fluid, generally pleasant when ripe. It is much esteemed in the
certams, particularly by the quadrupeds. The people of the country
make of its fluid and curdled milk, well mixed together, and
sweetened with sugar or honey, a beverage, which they call
ambuzada, and say that it might do for a royal repast. This tree
produces at the root one large potatoe, and sometimes more, and
also small ones of a spongy and transparent substance, which turn
into cold water on being compressed, and is a great resource to
caravans and travellers passing plains devoid of water.
Andiroba is a plant, very similar to that of a cucumber, affording
a round fruit, without smell, the size of a large apple, with eleven or
twelve seeds, round and flat, disposed in three cavities or cells, from
which is extracted a clear medicinal oil, being also good for lights.
Angelim is a tree of medium height, having many branches, the
leaf small, the flower, with five petals in an ear, between a violet and
rose-colour, having a pistil and nine capillaments; the fruit is a two-
valved capsule of an ash-colour, affording an oval almond, covered
with a thick membrane, and which is used in pharmacy.
Araca Mirim is a tree of considerable growth, with a small leaf;
the bark is as smooth on the epidermis as the inner side.
Argueiro, or Argua-Tree, is the size of the olive-tree, its trunk
and branches overspread with short prickles; the leaves, which it
annually sheds, are of the shape of a heart; the flowers are in
bunches, of one or two spans in length, at the extremity of the
branches, disposed three and three; it has five petals of which one
only unfolds itself, this is of a beautiful rose-colour, with little less
than two inches of length, and more than one in width. Upon the
lower part of the pistil, which is amongst ten capillaments, there is a
pod, containing an indeterminate number of feijoes, or beans,
entirely of a red colour, or with black spots; they are very hard, and

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Decolonizing Human Rights Abdullahi

Grounding Human Rights in Human Nature Szymon

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the

Prosecuting Human Rights Offences Rethinking the Sword

Judging International Human Rights Courts of General

Performing Human Rights 1st Edition Anika. Marschall

Reinventing Human Rights 1st Edition Mark Goodale

Human Rights Human Wrongs In the Scale of Human

The Effectiveness of the UN Human Rights System Reform

In his extensive body of work, Professor Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naim challenges

Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naim is Charles Howard Candler Professor of Law at Emory

ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NAIM

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

In his extensive body of work, Professor Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naim challenges

Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naim is Charles Howard Candler Professor of Law at Emory

ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NAIM

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

In his extensive body of work, Professor Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naim challenges

Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naim is Charles Howard Candler Professor of Law at Emory

ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NAIM

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

Preface: Beyond the Myth of Enforcement page vii

1 Evolution of Founding Vision 1

2 Marriage of Futility: International Law and Human Rights 26

3 The Deadly Mirage of “Humanitarian Intervention” 49

4 People-Centric Protection of Human Rights 81

5 Human Rights Are the Measure of Our Humanity 102

excessive human and material costs of military conﬂicts, as can be seen

The General Assembly Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human

The fundamental paradox of the human rights system is therefore in its

and political – instead of legal – entitlement because the legal dimension is

As I approach the end of my academic career, I look back to twenty-ﬁve years

Evolution of Founding Vision

paradoxical founding narrative

authorized by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter

In Anghie’s view, the War on Terror is a new form of imperialism premised

process by which international human rights organizations are held

expose the “confidence trick” of the twentieth

members of the international organizations due to their lack sovereignty under

for a more sustainable, people-centric decolonizing process. The term

self-determination, and the practical futility of so-called humanitarian inter-

rights is misrepresented and rationalized as necessary to fulﬁl the civilizing

powers in particular are now resorting to the dated discourse of “civilizing

responsibility for violating broader or more afﬁrmative human rights norms.

rights can be arbitrated or adjudicated. The apparent consensus around the

the foundational myth of the universality of human rights seems to hint at

Perhaps no country in the world presents such an infinite variety

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