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Masterpieces of History | Svetlana Savranskaya, Thomas
Blanton, Vladislav Zubok

Document No. 116:

Four Soviet
Foreign Ministry
Documents
regarding the
 Situation in
Romania,
December 20-25,
1989
Translated by Vladislav Zubok.
p. 661-667

To Comrade Gorbachev M.S.

Full text
1 The final document in this chronological sequence—a
conversation between U.S. Ambassador Jack Matlock and
Deputy Foreign Minister Ivan Aboimov on Christmas Eve
1989—is clearly the headline item of this group, which was
declassified and published by the Russian Foreign Ministry
in 1994 (with obvious public relations benefits in mind). But
the whole sequence rewards attention for the evidence the
documents provide on the Soviet role in Eastern Europe’s
1989 revolutions, and specifically in the lone violent
transition—the bloody ending of the Ceauşescu dictatorship
in Romania.
2 The first document below, a note from Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze to General Secretary Gorbachev, reports that
Moscow is relying on Western telegraph services for news
of Romania as of December 20. This is the day the
Romanian army ceases its attacks on the mass
demonstrations in Timisoara and the protesters proclaim it
a liberated city; it is also five days after the first protests
sought to protect dissident pastor László Tőkés, and three
days after the Securitate (with the army) began shooting.
This note suggests the KGB is providing little good
information to the top leadership in Moscow, and, contrary
to certain suspicions afterwards, probably is not conspiring
 to overthrow Ceauşescu. (The Yeltsin government, which
released this document, would surely have declassified any
material derogatory of Gorbachev and his pledges of non-
intervention.)
3 Ceauşescu himself thinks Moscow is behind the troubles, as
the second document relates: Romanian Ambassador Bukur
calls on Deputy Foreign Minister Aboimov on December 21
with specific allegations from a Ceauşescu speech that the
Timisoara protests were “allegedly prepared and organized
with the consent of member-states of the Warsaw Treaty
Organization” and that “interference in the internal affairs
of the SRR [is] allegedly being prepared in the Soviet
Union.” The reference to WTO members points to Hungary,
since the Transylvanian region had been part of Hungary
until 1920, and the dissident Tőkés, himself of Hungarian
descent, had spoken out for the rights of the Hungarian
minority.
4 The third document shows exactly who has the best
information in real time about events on the ground in
Romania—Yugoslav diplomats, whose consulate in
Timisoara and embassy in Bucharest are witnessing the
events first-hand. Yugoslav Ambassador Veres notes
succinctly that the causes of the uprising are “rooted in
profound popular dissatisfaction with the economic
situation in the country accumulated over [many] years,
with low living standards, with the lack of basic food and
consumer goods, and with the leadership’s unwillingness to
undertake at least some measures to democratize the
political system.”
5 The final document represents one of the most striking
examples anywhere of American recognition of the end of
the Cold War. After Ceauşescu flees Bucharest on December
22, the provisional government appeals for international
support against continuing violence, and on December 23
French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas actually mentions
the possibility of Soviet assistance. Secretary of State James
Baker, set to appear on a major American television show
on Sunday, December 24, and expecting questions about
 Romania, tasks his ambassador in Moscow (eight hours
ahead of Washington time) to query the Soviets urgently
about the situation there.
6 The key exchange between Matlock and Aboimov comes
when the U.S. ambassador “hinted at an idea, apparently
on instructions from Washington.” that “the military
involvement of the Soviet Union in Romanian affairs might
not be regarded in the context of ‘the Brezhnev doctrine.’”
The Soviet diplomat quickly and vehemently declines the
invitation: “We stand against any interference in the
domestic affairs of other states. Thus, the American side
may consider that ‘the Brezhnev doctrine’ is now theirs as
our gift.” This last phrase clearly refers to the American
invasion of Panama which has just occurred on December
20, to remove the longtime U.S. intelligence asset and
dictator, Manuel Noriega, and reveals the Soviet attitude
toward Matlock’s (and subsequently Baker’s own)
invitation as at best “stupid” (Shevardnadze’s subsequent
characterization), and at worst a provocation to put the
Soviet Union on a par with the United States in Panama.
The White House would disavow Baker’s television
statement, but that invitation, together with the Matlock-
Aboimov exchange, stand as perhaps the most dramatic
American expressions of changed attitudes marking the end
of the Cold War.
7 Mikhail Sergeyevich:
8 Regarding the events in Romania in the last few days, we can
still only judge on the basis of information from news
agencies, primarily Western ones. This information is often
contradictory and does not allow one to construct a true
picture.
9 Our attempts to obtain the official version via Bucharest
have produced no results. Today, December 20, the
Romanian ambassador will be invited to the MFA USSR in
order to elicit information from him on this issue.
10 Until we have complete and objective information, we should
not, in our opinion, be in haste to issue a statement from the
USSR Congress of People’s Deputies. At best we could go no
 further than to instruct the Commission on Foreign Affairs
[of the Congress’ Supreme Soviet] to prepare a draft
proposal on our possible reaction with all circumstances in
mind.
11 E. Shevardnadze
12 December 20, 1989
***
13 Memorandum of conversation
with Ambassador of the SRR in the USSR I. BUKUR
14 December 21, 1989
15 I received I. Bukur at his request.
16 The ambassador recounted the address of N. Ceauşescu on
Romanian radio and television on December 20, and handed
over its complete text.
17 When I asked if the events in Timişoara involved human
casualties and what the present situation was in that region,
the ambassador responded that he possesses no information
on this issue. He referred to the fact that the address of N.
Ceauşescu also says nothing on this score.
18 I told the ambassador that during N. Ceauşescu’s meeting
with the Soviet charge d’affaires in the SRR on December 20
[the former] expressed surprise that Soviet representatives
made declarations on the events in Timişoara. Besides,
during the meeting it was asserted [by Ceauşescu] that the
Romanian side possesses information that the action in
Timişoara was allegedly prepared and organized with the
consent of member-states of the Warsaw Treaty
Organization. Moreover, the actions against Romania were
allegedly plotted within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty
Organization.
19 According to our information, officials in Bucharest in
conversation with ambassadors of the allied socialist states
expressed the view concerning some kind of interference in
the internal affairs of the SRR allegedly being prepared in
the Soviet Union.
20 I must declare on behalf of our side that such assertions can
only puzzle us; they have no foundation and do not
correspond with reality.
21 Answering the ambassador’s question as to whether my
words reflected the official viewpoint of the Soviet
government, I told him that so far I have no instructions to
make any declarations on behalf of the Soviet government,
but my words certainly reflect our official position, which is
that the Soviet Union builds its relations with allied socialist
states on the basis of equality, mutual respect and strict non-
interference in domestic affairs. Considering the grave
character of the statements by Romanian officials I cannot
help tentatively expressing our attitude toward these
statements. […]
***
22 Record of conversation
with the Ambassador of the SFRY in the USSR, MILAN
VERES
23 22 December 1989
24 I received M. Veres at his request.
25 He referred to instructions from the Union Secretariat on
Foreign Affairs of the SFRY and shared available information
on the events in Romania, corroborated by the General
Consulate of the SFRY in Timişoara and by numerous
Yugoslav citizens who have returned from the SRR. He also
reported on Yugoslav evaluations of the developments in
Romania.
26 The beginning of these dramatic developments could be
traced to the events of December 15-16 in Timişoara where a
large group of people protested the actions of the authorities
with regard to the priest, L. Tőkés. This process grew into a
huge demonstration by the population of the city against the
existing order. According to the estimates of officials of the
General Consulate of the SFRY, up to 100,000 people,
including workers, university and school students,
participated in the demonstration. Protest actions also took
place in Arad, Brasov, and Cluj. Large contingents of militia
and military were used against the demonstrators in
Timişoara. According to the Yugoslavs, during those clashes
several hundred people died, and according to certain
unverified data the number of casualties exceeded 2,000. In
 the downtown area, shops, restaurants and cafes were
destroyed, and many streetcars and automobiles were also
burned. Timişoara is surrounded by troops, but protest
actions continue in the city. Workers have seized factories
and are threatening to blow them up if the authorities do not
satisfy the people’s demands. Officials of the General
Consulate of the SFRY, the ambassador remarked, noticed
that a number of soldiers and militiamen expressed their
sympathies with the demonstrators. There were also slogans:
“The Army will not shoot at students and school children.”
27 The Yugoslav-Romanian border is practically sealed; its
defenses are fortified by troops along its whole length,
including check-points. So far the Romanian side has
authorized passage only for people with diplomatic and other
service passports. The ambassador informed us that the
Yugoslavs had evacuated family members of officials from
their General Consulate. He disavowed reports by a number
of Western news agencies that participants of the
demonstration [in Timişoara] found refuge on the territory
of the Yugoslav compound, whose premises allegedly were
penetrated by Romanian militia.
28 According to Yugoslav estimates, stressed M. Veres, the main
reason for the disorders in Timişoara and for their
subsequent spreading to a number of other cities, including
the capital of the SRR, is rooted in profound popular
dissatisfaction with the economic situation in the country
accumulated over [many] years, with low living standards,
with the lack of basic food and consumer goods, and with the
leadership’s unwillingness to undertake at least some
measures to democratize the political system.
29 The ambassador pointed out that the Yugoslav public is very
concerned about the situation in their neighboring country.
The SFRY mass media are informing the population in detail
about the events, including many reports about reactions
abroad. On December 19 the Union Executive Vece
[executive branch of the Yugoslav state] came out with an
appropriate declaration expressing profound concern and
regret with regard to casualties during the crack-down on the
 demonstrations. On December 20, the CC CPY Presidium
denounced the actions of the Romanian authorities and laid
political responsibility at the door of the leadership of the
RCP [Romanian Communist Party]. [The CC] declared a
temporary suspension of all contacts with the RCP and
repealed an earlier invitation [to the RCP] to send a
delegation to the 14th Congress of the CPY (January 1990).
Every Yugoslav public organization, as well as both
chambers of the Skupcina [parliament], made sharp
protests. Late on December 21, the Presidium of the SFRY
adopted a resolution denouncing reprisals against the
demonstrators, which had led to a large loss of human life.
30 M. Veres stressed that a particular cause for concern in
Belgrade is the situation with Yugoslav ethnic minorities in
the SRR. He said that the SFRY supports a peaceful
resolution of the situation in Romania and is against any
foreign interference in Romanian affairs […]
31 Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR I. ABOIMOV
***
32 Record of conversation
with U.S. Ambassador to the USSR J. MATLOCK
33 24 December 1989
34 I received U.S. Ambassador J. Matlock at his request.
35 Referring to instructions received from Washington, the
ambassador said that, in the opinion of the American
leadership, the Soviet Union and the United States should
continue to exchange opinions with regard to the events in
Romania. The situation in Romania is still very uncertain.
The American side is very concerned by the fact that warfare
between the forces of state security and army units
continues, and casualties among the civilian population are
mounting. In this regard Matlock referred to the positive
significance of the fact that the opinions of the Soviet Union
and the United States coincided, to the effect that support
should be given to the group that is trying to govern
Romania and fulfill the will of the Romanian people.
36 Then the American presented the following thought. The
United States took note of the belief expressed by the Soviet
 Union that military intervention is out of question. The
United States regarded with equal interest the declaration of
the Soviet government concerning its readiness to lend
immediate humanitarian assistance to the Romanian people.
The American side would be greatly interested to hear the
Soviet assessment of developments in Romania, as well as
the opinion of the Soviet side with regard to the most
effective ways of supporting the Romanian people and the
new leadership of Romania. […]
37 I informed the ambassador that earlier, in addition to the
declaration of the Soviet government, a TASS declaration
was published. This step by our side was necessitated by
grave concern over the very tense situation at the residential
building occupied by officials of the Soviet trade mission in
Bucharest. It turned out to be in the epicenter of combat and
for some time was partially under siege by the terrorist
forces. Only by the end of the day were they dispersed, and
we were able to evacuate the inhabitants from the house. I
drew the American’s attention to the fact that two of them
were lightly wounded, not one, as had been earlier reported.
Now these people are on Soviet Embassy territory.
38 At present the main task is to carry out the evacuation of
Soviet citizens from Romania, above all women and children.
I informed the U.S. ambassador of the options that are under
consideration. […]
39 We maintain contact with representatives of the new
Romanian leadership, if only via telephone. We have
informed them about our steps directed at giving
humanitarian assistance to the Romanian population.
Several times we inquired of the new leadership of Romania
as to their urgent needs. We received no clear answer to our
question. It looks like the [National Salvation] Front Council
still lacks clear ideas on this score.
40 With regard to the question raised by the American about
the most effective approaches to organizing humanitarian
assistance to Romania, I repeated that there is no full clarity
about that. The Soviet Union is carrying out measures to
prepare such assistance and its practical implementation,
 according to [the USSR’s] own understanding of Romania’s
needs.
41 We informed the new Romanian leadership and also the
International Committee of the Red Cross and the World
Health Organization that we had set up hospitals in border
cities of the Soviet Union to receive wounded from Romania.
In Moldavia they are already expecting the first group of 600
wounded.
42 On the means of assistance. The first load valued at a half
million rubles (11 rail cars) will be sent by rail. Trains in
Romania are still functioning. In addition, we gave
instructions to the Moldavian leadership to get in touch with
border districts in Romania and clarify two issues. First,
what do they need most. Second, what is their advice as to
the best way to transport these loads.
43 To finish our thoughts on the situation in Romania, I
remarked that we are in close contact on these questions
with our Warsaw Treaty allies as well as with all other states
that are approaching us. So we take as a positive sign the
desire of the American side to exchange opinions. We
consider contacts of this kind very useful.
44 Reacting to our words, Matlock believed that now the United
States was seeking optimal means of cooperation in order to
give assistance to Romania. According to Matlock, the
United States would be ready to provide assistance with
medicine and food as well as with the logistics of
transporting this assistance. In this context the American
ambassador made the following request. If the Soviet side
develops some ideas on this score, the American side will be
very interested in being kept up to date.
45 I responded that naturally we would be ready at any moment
to share our considerations with the American side.
46 Then Matlock touched on the issue that, apparently, he
wanted to raise from the very beginning of the conversation.
The administration, he said, is very interested in knowing
whether the possibility of military assistance by the Soviet
Union to the Romanian National Salvation Front is totally
out of the question. Matlock suggested the following option:
 what would the Soviet Union do if an appropriate appeal
came from the Front? Simultaneously, the ambassador
hinted at an idea, apparently on instructions from
Washington. He let us know that under the present
circumstances the military involvement of the Soviet Union
in Romanian affairs might not be regarded in the context of
“the Brezhnev doctrine.”
47 To this sounding out by the American I gave an entirely clear
and unequivocal answer, presenting our principled position.
I declared that we did not visualize, even theoretically, such a
scenario. We stand against any interference in the domestic
affairs of other states and we intend to pursue this line firmly
and without deviations. Thus, the American side may
consider that “the Brezhnev doctrine” is now theirs as our
gift.
48 Developing this thesis further, by way of clarification, I drew
the interlocutor’s attention to the fact that it was on the basis
of these considerations that the Soviet Union was and still is
against convening the Security Council (SC) to consider the
situation in Romania.
49 The American, however, immediately inquired what the
Soviet reaction would be if the National Salvation Front itself
appeals to convene the SC.
50 I said that we are still not ready to contemplate such a
hypothetical possibility.
51 In the end, both sides confirmed their positive evaluation of
the exchange of opinions that had taken place. They
expressed support for continuing contacts regarding the
rapidly changing situation in Romania.
52 Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR I. ABOIMOV
53 [Source: Diplomaticheskii vestnik, no. 21/22, November
1994, pp. 74-79. Translated by Vladislav Zubok.]

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Electronic reference of the chapter

SAVRANSKAYA, Svetlana ; BLANTON, Thomas ; and ZUBOK, Vladislav.
Document No. 116: Four Soviet Foreign Ministry Documents regarding
the Situation in Romania, December 20-25, 1989 In: Masterpieces of
History: The Peaceful End of the Cold War in Europe, 1989 [online].
Budapest: Central European University Press, 2010 (generated 02 avril
2024). Available on the Internet:
<http://books.openedition.org/ceup/2902>. ISBN: 978-615-5211-88-1.

Electronic reference of the book

SAVRANSKAYA, Svetlana ; BLANTON, Thomas ; and ZUBOK, Vladislav.
Masterpieces of History: The Peaceful End of the Cold War in Europe,
1989. New edition [online]. Budapest: Central European University
Press, 2010 (generated 02 avril 2024). Available on the Internet:
<http://books.openedition.org/ceup/2752>. ISBN: 978-615-5211-88-1.
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