Pakistan and India: Politics, Personalities, and Foreign Policy

Author(s): Lawrence Ziring

Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 18, No. 7 (Jul., 1978), pp. 706-730
Published by: University of California Press
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 PAKISTANAND INDIA: POLITICS,
PERSONALITIES,AND FOREIGNPOLICY

LawrenceZiring

THE SPRING AND summerof 1977 produced some unex-

pected developmentsin both India and Pakistan that are destined to
have a profoundimpact on theirforeignas well as domesticpolicies.
Two of the thirdworld's seeminglymore durable and celebratedper-
sonalitiesfellfrompower.Both Indira Gandhi and ZulfikarAli Bhutto
were preeminentleaders who insistedon monopolizingdecision-mak-
ing in their respectivecountries,and each set the course that their
countrieswere obliged to follow. Their forcedretirementwill affect
the policy-making processesin theirrespectivecountries.This has al-
ready become evident in the area of external affairs.1This article is
concernedwith analyzingthe foreignpolicies of India and Pakistan.
Particularemphasisis placed on establishedpatternsof foreignpolicy
and how theyare influencedby dramaticchangesin leadership.

The Shaping of India's Foreign Policy

India has been the dominant power on the subcontinentsince
1947. Although the countrywas humiliated by the Chinese in their
1962encounter,therewas neverany doubt thatits armedforces,indus-
trial plant, scientificcommunity,and relativelystable political system
wereunmatchedby anythingin Pakistan (beforeor afterBangladesh),
Sri Lanka, or Nepal. Indeed, the Indians judged themselvesto be at
least the equal of those other powers that were ranked immediately
1 As this is being writtenZulfikarAli Bhutto is standing trial in a Lahore court,
his future very uncertain. Indira Gandhi has reorganized still another Congress
Party and given its electoral victoriesin Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh in March
1978, the ex-Prime Minister must still be considered a vital political personality.
706

i 1978 by The Regents of the Universityof California

0004-4687/78/0715-0706$00.25

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 THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN 707

below the superpowers.Despite its widespreadpovertyIndia's govern-

ment over the yearssoughtto give the countrya statureat least the
roughequivalentof thatheld by Great Britain,Japan,West Germany,
and France. This helps to explain Jawaharlal Nehru's determination
to lead the thirdworld and his identificationwith Nasser and Tito.
Accordingto Nehru, India's role in the world could be best pursued
througha policyof strictnonalignment.In an era of intenseCold War
and spreadingmilitaryalliances, the Indian leader extolled a moral
choice that enabled nations to avoid becomingembroiledin ideologi-
cal controversies.He feared that weak, dependent,thirdworld coun-
trieswould too easilycompromisetheirsovereignty and independence.
Time and again India's representatives in the United Nations chided
the Americanson theircontainmentpolicy as a way of demonstrating
to otherthirdworld peoples that theyneed not follow the dictatesof
the "materialist"West. By contrast,the Soviet Union was not so im-
mediateor pressinga threat."India did not feel called upon to join a
crusade for preservingdemocracy"in a world threatenedby growing
Soviet power.2
India's foreignpolicy was also shaped by its strained relations
withPakistan.In spite of protestationsto the contrary,Indian leaders
wereperceivedby theircounterpartsacrossthe borderas unreconciled
to the existenceof an independentMuslim state in South Asia. Con-
flictwith Pakistanerupted on the eve of independenceand the depth
of bitternessbetween the two countrieshas been portrayedin their
continuingstruggleover Kashmir.Pakistanifearsthat India was deter-
minedto dismemberthecountryas a prelude to thedestructionof their
statewerereinforcedby India's invasionof East Pakistan and the assis-
tance provided the Bengalis in creating their Bangladesh Republic.
India's distrustof the United States grew in the early Eisenhower
yearswhen Secretaryof State John FosterDulles made Pakistan a link
in the Americanalliance chain that was being constructedaround the
Soviet Union and China. India consideredthis an unfriendlyact and
it seemedto confirmtheirsuspicionsthatthe United Statesand not the
Soviet Union was the principal threatto thirdworld unity and pro-
gress.It was also in thisformativeperiod that Nehru forgedhis close
relationshipwith Communist China. The Tibetan issue, however,
broughtSino-Indianrelationsto the breakingpoint and furtherChi-
nese encroachmentin territorydeemed to be Indian or Indian-pro-
tectedultimatelycaused the two populous Asian statesto collide. The
resultantconflictshatteredthe Nehru policypromotingChinese-Indian
cooperation and forced a reevaluation of India's foreign relations.
India accepted the assistanceofferedby the U.S., but began its tilt
towardthe SovietUnion whichbecame moreexaggeratedfollowingthe

2 Sudershon Chawla, The Foreign Relations of India (Long Beach: Dicken-

son, 1976), p. 93.

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708 LAWRENCEZIRING

deaths of Nehru in 1964 and his immediate successorLal Bahadur

Shastri in January1966. The new Prime Minister,Nehru's daughter
Indira Gandhi, revealed an intense dissatisfactionwith the United
States.She saw India's relationswith the Soviet Union as keepingboth
China and the United States,and especiallytheir "proteg6"Pakistan,
frombringingfurtherdistressto the nation.3

The PakistanEquation
Pakistan had looked to the United States for diplomatic leverage
and militaryassistanceagainst its principal enemy India. Although
the U.S. enthusiastically acceptedPakistan'sinclusionin the Southeast
Asia TreatyOrganization(1954) and theBaghdad Pact (1955) (renamed
the CentralTreatyOrganizationin 1958),Pakistan'spurpose in joining
the alliances had little to do with U.S. objectives.Pakistan was only
marginallyconcernedwith containing internationalcommunism.Its
more immediateinterestslay in defendingitselffromwhat it perceived
as a constantand imminentthreatfromIndia. Thus it was not unusual
forPakistan to expect the U.S. to aid it in obtainingits goal in Kash-
mir. The Pakistanis were convinced that their cause was just and
morally valid and it seemed inconceivable in those more innocent
times of the middle 1950s that the U.S. would not pressureIndia to
relinquish its control of the Vale of Kashmir where several million
Muslimswerebeing "held" againsttheirwill.4 For the record,let it be
said thatthe U.S. did lend its good officesand throughthe UN sought
to achieve a solution acceptable to the two sides. When these efforts
werefrustrated, however,therewas littlethe U.S. was preparedto do to
satisfyPakistani aspirations.Interestingly, the U.S. and Pakistan were
drawn to one another,but neithercountryreally lived up to the par-
ticularexpectationsof the other.Nevertheless,neitherPakistannor the
U.S. wantedto reappraisetheirrelationship.Even withintensifiedanti-
Americanismin Pakistan,provoked firstby America's befriendingof
India during its trial with the Chinese in 1962, and then by U.S. in-
difference(otherswould call it neutrality)during the Indo-Pakistani
War of 1965, therewas no parting of the ways.5True, Pakistan en-
deavored to attractChina to its side but it also soughtto avoid a full
break with the United States.The U.S. embargoedarms shipmentsto
Pakistan and India in 1965 (whichwas officially liftedonly in February
1975), but the Americanpresencein Pakistan was sustained and eco-
nomic and technicalassistancecontinuedmuch as it had in the past,
except forprogrammaticchanges.

3 See P. C. Chakravarti, India's China Policy (Bloomington: Indiana Uni-

versityPress, 1962).
4 Aziz Beg's Captive Kashmir (Lahore: Allied Publishers, 1958), p. 73, is repre-
sentativeof this thinking.
5 See the author's The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan, 1958-1969 (Syra-
cuse: Syracuse UniversityPress, 1971), pp. 44-66.

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 THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN 709

In the meantimePakistanlooked more and more in the direction

of China, a policy which had been carefullyorchestratedby Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto duringhis tenureas foreignministerin the governmentof
Ayub Khan. The alacritywithwhich China accepted Bhutto's offerof
friendshipand cooperationwas promptedby thatcountry'sperception
of its threemajor adversaries-namely,the United States,India, and
the Soviet Union. Moreover,with the U.S. hopelesslymired in Viet-
nam, the Pakistanis came to rely on the Chinese. And given
India's fear of China, followingtheirbriefconflict,the Soviet Union
loomed as a significant elementin its bolstereddefensestructure.Still,
nothingis permanentin internationalpolitics and the relativityof
alliances and powerbalances necessitatescontinuousreappraisal. Each
countryactoris concernedwithits preservation, and beyond that,with
maximizingits advantagesunder optimumconditions.With China ap-
pearing to play a largerrole in Pakistan, the U.S. could ill affordto
antagonizeits old ally. India, on the other hand, viewed Chinese and
AmericanconcernforPakistan as a growingthreatto its securityand
soughtto rightthe imbalance by drawingcloser to the Soviet Union.
This set the scene forthe 1971 civil war in Pakistan and India's even-
tual involvement.

India's Preeminence
India's primaryobjective lay in neutralizingPakistan's military
capability.East Pakistan's desire to secede from the larger Pakistan
union provided India with an opportunityit could not ignore. En-
couraged by world public opinion which denounced the Pakistan
army'svicious tacticsin East Pakistan,and provokedby the streamof
Bengali refugeesthat entered eastern India, India became an active
participantin the struggle.First it offeredaid and sanctuaryto the
East Pakistaniresistancemovement,the Mukti Bahini, and finallyit
joined directlyin the conflict.In the summerof 1971 India entered
into a treatyof "Peace and Friendship" with the Soviet Union and
hardlyfourmonthslater its troopswere sentslicingthroughPakistani
defenses.The beleaguered and hopelesslyoutnumberedPakistani gar-
risonfoundcontinuedresistancefutileand in a fewshortdays surren-
dered to the superiorinvasion force.A new sovereignstate of Bangla-
desh was proclaimed,the firstcountryto be createdas a resultof civil
war since the close of World 'War II. In India therewas jubilation.
The Indian leaders were convinced that Pakistan could never again
threatenthe country'sintegrityand that India's major power status
had been reassured.
Neither the U.S. nor China gave Pakistan real assistanceduring
theIndo-PakistaniWar of 1971.The U.S. "tilted" towardPakistan and
orderedthe nuclearcarrierEnterpriseand a small contingentof other
naval vesselsinto the Bay of Bengal, reportedlyto protectand possibly
evacuateAmericanpersonnelin the war-tornregion,but otherwisein-

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710 LAWRENCEZIRING

terpretedas a ploy aimed at intimidatingIndia. Indian authorities

were incensedby the Americanaction. They condemnedthe intrusion
in theirwatersbut were undeterred.The Chinese accused India of
violations of internationallaw but, unlike 1965 when theydeclared
theirintentionto open a frontin northeastern India, theydid nothing
substantiveto come to Pakistan's assistance.In the main, the major
powersconfinedtheiractivitiesto the UN SecurityCouncil where the
Soviet Union consistentlyblocked all effortsto pressurethe Indians
to pull back theirforcesfromEast Pakistan. At the war's end, India,
with Soviet backing,was the indisputablepower on the subcontinent.
Pakistanhad been dramaticallybeaten. Sixtypercentof its population
and one-sixthof its territory were gone. Approximately93,000 Pakis-
tani soldiersand other governmentemployeeswere in Indian prison
camps.Its economywas a shamblesand the nation despaired about its
future.Althoughthe U.S. and China did virtuallynothingto prevent
Pakistan'scollapse, Pakistani authoritieswere in no position to criti-
cize thesepowers.If Pakistan was to surviveand be rebuilt it would
need the aid that only thesecountriescould provide. This realization
also forcedthe Pakistanis to examine theirown performance,and to
recognizethat theirplighthad been caused by theirown mishandling
of importantnational issues.
Pakistan'snew governmentunder the leadershipof Bhuttounder-
stood the self-defeating nature of a policy which aimed criticismat
China and the U.S., and instead moved rapidly to regain their con-
fidence.This new realismin Pakistan'sforeignpolicyalso played a role
in the release of Mujibur Rahman who was permittedto return to
Bangladesh, and in Bhutto's summitmeetingwith Indira Gandhi at
Simla in the summerof 1972 thatpreparedthe blueprintfornormaliz-
ing theirrelations.
Buoyed by successon the battlefieldand at the polls, Prime Minis-
terGandhi hoped to achieveforIndia the long soughtbig powerstatus
that had eluded her father.In May 1974 India detonated an atomic
device and except forthe criticismleveled againstit by Pakistan,there
was morequiet respectthan expressedconcern.India also put the U.S.
and theSovietUnion on notice thatit consideredthe Indian Ocean its
responsibility and condemnedthe naval rivalryin the region.In order
to illustrateits special role in the Indian Ocean, India entered into
waterboundarysettlementsbetweenSri Lanka (June 1974) and Indo-
nesia (August1974).That same yeartheroyalhouseholdin Sikkimwas
removedand the small Himalayan state was prepared for absorption
into theIndian Union. Even the Shah of Iran, whom Bhuttohad come
to lean upon for financial assistance,visited India, and in October
1974pledged to commita generousshare of Iran's oil revenuesto help
India's economic development. With Pakistan's defeat India could
have been expectedto reduce its militarybuilding program;however,
quite the reverseoccurred.India's larger ambitionswere being chal-

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 THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN 711

lenged by powersacrossa broad spectrum.It could not be ignoredthat

the Indian Ocean policies of the U.S. and the Soviet Union hinged
upon the importanceof the Persian Gulf, and the growingmilitary
and naval power of Iran aroused considerableconcernin New Delhi.

Bhutto's Foreign Policy

Afterthe Indo-PakistaniWar of 1971 Bhutto endeavoredto rede-
finePakistan'sforeignpolicy objectives.Shorn of its easternprovince,
he took Pakistan out of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. A
moresurprisingmovewas Bhutto'sremovalof Pakistanfromthe Com-
monwealthof Nations. Accordingto the Pakistani leader, neitheror-
ganizationdid anythingto improvethe statusof his country.In place
of these associationsBhutto developed a policy of bilateralismand
while insistingon friendshipwith all, his immediateaim was to draw
closerto the Muslim world,and especiallyto the Persian Gulf states.6
In addition to Iran, Bhutto began to cultivatethe friendshipof Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait,the United Arab Emirates,Bahrein,and Qatar. There
was also a fascinationwith Qadaffi'sLibya but that relationshipwas
marginalby contrast.In any event Bhutto wanted to publicize Pakis-
tan's SouthwestAsian connectionmore so than its heretoforeSouth
Asian preoccupation.Thus as tensionswere reduced betweenPakistan
and India at Simla, Bhutto found it less useful to reheat the Kashmir
issue. Instead,Bhutto moved to establishhis voice as a Muslim world
leader as well as a dominantfigurein the thirdworld. In the former
Bhuttohostedan Islamic summitmeetingin February1974 whichwas
attendedby representativesof 37 countries,many of them heads of
state.The Islamic summitalso gave him an opportunityto recognize
Bangladesh.In the latter,he called forthe conveningof a summitcon-
ferenceof all the thirdworld nations. In both instances,Bhutto's vi-
sion was to forgea unityof purpose in order to combat the industrial-
ized stateswhomhe was convincedwere determinedto exploit the less
developedcountries.

. . . thehungerwhichstalksotherlands,thechronicdeficits in balance
of payments and worsening termsof tradeare but someindications of
theirplight.When a groupfromamongthemstrivesto end thesein-
equities,themassiveeconomicinstitutions of tradeand capitalin their
favourenablesthesecountries(in theindustrialized world) to shiftthe
weightof internaland externaladjustments to thepoorernations.
. . . This processcannotbe arrested unlessall thedevelopingcountries
coordinate theirobjectivesand act in unison.

6 See my discussion on bilateralism in "Bhutto's Foreign Policy 1972-73," in

Henry J. Korson, ContemporaryProblems of Pakistan (Leiden: Brill, 1974), pp. 56-
80.
7 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, "Development and International Cooperation," United
Nations General AssemblyA/31/208, September 9, 1976, p. 3.

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712 LAWRENCEZIRING

Bhutto's objective, however,was more on gaining third world

leadershipthan publicizingPakistan'sMuslim connection.He was too
dependenton the Muslim statesand he wishedto avoid the appearance
of a supplicant.In thirdworld matters,however,he felthe could, even
withPakistan'slimitedresources,play a major role. His sophistication,
erudition,and familiaritywith the leaders of all the world's nations
gave him a unique opportunityto posturePakistan as a spokesmanfor
thirdworld causes.

Gandhi and Bhutto: Individual Perspectives

Under the leadership of Indira Gandhi and ZulfikarAli Bhutto
India and Pakistanwere being mobilized to play a largerrole in world
affairs.India would strive to make the major powers recognize its
strengthand hence its rightfulplace to a seat in the councils shaping
the world's destiny.Pakistan,more so than in the past, would project
an image greaterthan itself,and therebymanage to influencedecisions
between the less developed and more developed nations. The former
wanted what it judged to be its due. The latter insistedon a voice
larger than its capability.But what was perhaps overlookedin these
maneuveringswas thefactthattwocountrieswhichhad passed 25 years
in fearof one another,had foughtthreewarsand manyskirmishes, had
villifiedeach other unceasingly,were now set on courses that empha-
sized otherconcernsand objectives.Old suspicionshad not diminished,
the bitternessremained as did the more outstandingpolitical differ-
ences,but the realitiesof theirworld demanded a new set of priorities
and these,at least for the moment,servedas a distraction.
The paradox of Indira Gandhi and ZulfikarAli Bhutto is best ob-
servedin theirdefthandlingof affairsbetweentheirtwo countriesand
the heavy-handedand oftencrude manner theyemployedin adminis-
tering their domestic responsibilities.The two leaders managed to
establishan ambience which facilitateda dialogue among themselves
and theirsubordinates.Sufficient goodwill was engenderedto arrange
foreconomicand culturalexchanges,and in 1976,to renewfull diplo-
maticrelations.In addition,aftera ten yearinterruptionthe two coun-
triesagreed to the restorationof overflights of their territoryas well
as the reopening of railway links. Earlier India had released all the
Pakistani prisonersof war, including the 195 that Bangladesh wanted
triedforalleged war crimes.The calculated realismthatmade it possi-
ble forthe twoadversariesto reach theseagreementsis to be contrasted
with the repressivetacticsemployed to hold their countrymen in a
tightgrip. Governmentshave been known to fall as a result of mis-
conceived foreignpolicies,but what is so curious about the demise of
Indira Gandhi and ZulfikarAli Bhutto is that foreignpolicy played
virtuallyno role. It would be useful thereforeto examine brieflythe
eventsleading to theirfall frompower.

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 THE FOREIGNPOLICIESOF INDIAAND PAKISTAN 713
Indiraand India: Following the Indo-PakistaniWar of 1971, Prime
Minister Gandhi's governmentaddressed those socioeconomic chal-
lengesthathad been postponedor delayedby the conflict.By the time
the administration was in position to thinkseriouslyabout improving
India's well-being,the problemshad multiplied several fold. Compli-
catingtheirefforts was the soaringprice of petroleumand petroleum
productsthatfollowedin the wake of the 1973 Arab-IsraeliWar. The
industrialWest was hard hit by the astronomicalrise and in order to
balance offtheincreasedcoststheyraised priceson theirfinishedgoods
and agriculturalcommodities.Inflation,already an ongoingdilemma,
now gained momentum.The resultwas devastatingfor countrieslike
India whose economicdependenceon the outside world is marked.In
short,Indira Gandhi could not satisfythe expectationsof an aroused
population. Moreover,the inability of the administrationto deliver
on its promisesrenewedcries of corruptionand the Congressgovern-
mentwas hardpressedto answerits critics.The euphoria createdby the
defeat of Pakistan faded rapidly,particularlyas India and Pakistan
weremovingtowarda new understanding.Foreignpolicyand military
accomplishments were hardlysufficient to silence an oppositionwhich
focusedits attentionon social and economic issues.
The political oppositionwas not the only group that took Prime
MinisterGandhi to task. The open and erudite press was also highly
criticalof the administration'shandling of the economy,and particu-
larlythe aggravatedfood shortage.As a consequence,the government
lost the popularityit enjoyed earlier. It also provided the opposition
with an opportunityto capitalize on the situation. Several political
partiesrepresentinga broad cross section of the body politic agreed
to combinetheirefforts and join togetherin a singleorganization.Led
by the OppositionCongress,the alliance included the conservativeJan
Sangh and Bharatiya Lok Dal as well as the liberal Socialist Party.
Leading the organizationwere two of Mahatma Gandhi's outstanding
disciples,Jaya Prakash Narayan and Morarji Desai. The appeal of
these two personalitiesand the influencegeneratedby the combined
opposition had an immediate impact. Given the attentivesociety's
growingdisaffection forthosein authority,and desirousof change,the
oppositionwas able to assemblemassiverallies, and in a seriesof by-
electionsrouted Mrs. Gandhi's followers.Excited by these resultsthe
oppositionbegan layingtheirstrategyforthe national electionsslated
for1976.In themeantimenumerousprogramswereorganizedthrough-
out the countrywith the opposition exploiting everyopportunityto
belabor the government.The large demonstrationswere impossibleto
control,however,and oftentheydegeneratedinto open riots.In addi-
tion,manyunaffiliated groups used the turbulenceas a cover for the
pursuitof theirown movement,or for privategain. Terrorismwas a
major concernof the Gandhi administration.The Naxalites reasserted
themselvesand theyalong with other outlawed groups began to press

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714 LAWRENCEZIRING

their radical views. The assassination of Railways Minister L. N.

Mishra in January1975 and attemptson the lives of otherIndian lead-
ers aroused the governmentto take countermeasureswhich did not
augur well forIndia's future.
In the best of timesIndia's political processcan be describedas
managed anarchy.By mid-1975,however,the government'sability to
cope withthe prevailingproblemswas dealt a seriousblow. Justwhen
Mrs. Gandhi arguedforthe need to strengthen her authority,the High
Court in Uttar Pradesh handed down a judgmentin a case in which
the Prime Minister was the defendant.The Court ruled that Mrs.
Gandhi was guiltyon two countsof electionmalpracticesand was dis-
qualified fromholding political officefor a period of six years. Al-
thoughthe same order permittedher to stayin officepending an ap-
peal to the Supreme Court, the judgmentstruckdirectlyat her capa-
cityto govern.Moreover,the opposition could not ignore the chance
to strikeat the Prime Minister and they called upon her to resign
along withher entirecabinet and to call new elections.The mobiliza-
tion of the disenchantedmasseswas stepped up as Narayan and Desai
accusedthePrimeMinisterof dictatorialpracticesand insistedthatthe
Gandhi governmentwas no longer legal and need not be followed.
With possibilityof large-scalecivil disobediencein the offing,the gov-
ernmentdeclared a State of Emergencythroughoutthe countryand
orderedthe police to arrestall political dissidents.A formof censor-
ship was imposedon the presswith only thosenewspapersand periodi-
cals favorableto the governmentbeing permittedto continue publica-
tion. In addition, 26 political organizationswere declared illegal al-
though the governmentwas constrainedto note that none of them
were representedin the parliament.All the same, the leaders of the
parliamentary oppositionpartiesweresoon arrested,includingNarayan
and Desai, and politicsas India had come to knowit ceased to function.
The state of emergencyremained in effectfor more than twenty
months.In that period the governmentattemptedto eliminateall op-
positionto its authority.The constitutionwas amended both to rein-
forceand to justifythe sternmeasuresalready in effect.Fundamental
rightswere suspended,including the rightof habeus corpus. The ju-
diciarylost its capacity to protectthe nation fromexecutivefiatand
police agencies proliferated.Even lingeringpocketsof resistancesuch
as in Tamil Nadu and Gujarat were neutralizedthroughthe ousting
of theirestablishedgovernments. Mrs. Gandhi insistedher concernwas
to preservedemocracyin India, but the methodsemployedto achieve
her goal suggestedthat the purposewas somewhatdifferent. Moreover,
the Prime Ministerbegan to lean more heavily upon her son Sanjay
and seemedto neglecther long-timeassociates,whichled to speculation
thatthe Prime Minister'sreal interestlay in creatinga familydynasty.
It is curious that the Prime Ministershould have exposed herself
to such criticismgiven eventsin Bangladesh. Hardly two monthsafter
the proclaimedemergencyin India, Mujibur Rahman had been over-

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 THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN 715

thrownand killed by membersof his own army.Mujib had been un-

able to quell the turbulencethat had caused him to suspend Bangla-
desh's constitutionin December 1974. Althoughhe assumed all power
in thestatehe foundit desirableto withdrawinto a tightfamilycircle
ratherthan trustthe other membersof his government.Frustration
and suspicionwere the natural outcome,especiallyas the country'sills
were not being addressed.When Prime Minister Gandhi learned of
Mujib's death she was shocked and dismayed.But rather than look
forcausationin Mujib's own behavior,she chose to thinkthat it was
the resultof a weak, ineffective government.Thus while Prime Minis-
terGandhi endeavoredto constructa stronggovernment,she failed to
graspthe importof her dependenceon her son and his associates.8
Mrs. Gandhi's failureto comprehendaccuratelythe Indian scene
can be seen fromher action in calling for parliamentaryelectionsin
March 1977. It is reasonable to assume that Mrs. Gandhi expected to
win a popular vote of confidenceforher policies and conduct.She ob-
viouslyhad been convincedof thenecessityof hergovernment'sactions,
and she musthave assumedthatthe masseswerewith her. Reportshad
been passed to her describingimprovementsin the economy,the as-
sumptionbeing thatthe population had benefitedand would certainly
expresstheirappreciationat the polls. The Prime Ministeralso held
the view, bolsteredby her advisors,that the rigorouslaw and order
situationimposed on the countrymet with popular approval. The
urban intelligentsia was consideredher onlyreal opposition,and it was
judged to have limited followers.Furthermore,the loose coalition of
opposition parties representedso many differentpoints of view and
identifiedwith such disparatephilosophiesthat it was difficult to con-
ceive theirmakingan effective campaign.And froma logisticalangle,
onlythegovernment partyhad the physicalmeans to reach into remote
villages.Given the shortduration of the campaign, it was extremely
doubtful that the opposition could reach their voters, and if they
could,get themto the polls. All thingsconsidered,Mrs. Gandhi's Con-
gressPartycould not lose-and yetit did-and big!
Prime Minister Gandhi set out to prove to a critical Western
world thatshe was not a dictator,that she had not terminatedIndia's
democraticexperiment.The results of the election, however, only
seemed to confirmthat she had acted contraryto constitutionalpro-
cesses,thather programsand policies,particularlycoercedsterilization,
wereunacceptableto the greatmajorityof Indians. The vote in effect
foundMrs.Gandhi guiltyon all countsleveled againsther by the poli-
tical opposition.It also put an end to a forecastconstitutionalreform
whichwould have transformed India froma parliamentaryto a rigidly
organizedpresidentialsystemwith all institutionssubordinatedto the
8 Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, "India's Election: Backing
Into the Future," Foreign Affairs,55:4 (July 1977), pp. 838-839; and Norman D.
Palmer, "The Two Elections: A Comparative Analysis," Asian Survey 17:7 (July
1977), p. 651.

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716 LAWRENCEZIRING

executivebranchof government.Indeed, had Indira Gandhi achieved

the mandate she expected to obtain in the election, India's political
systemwould have crystallizedin a noncompetitive, highlycentralized,
and stronglyauthoritarianform.
The successof theJanataParty,the coalitionof oppositionorgani-
zations that foughtthe election against the CongressParty,restored
India to its older role as "the world'slargestdemocracy."The apoliti-
cal nature of the Indian militaryestablishmentwas never so pro-
nounced as on thisoccasion. There was never any indication that the
Indian Armywould interferewith the results of the election. The
Indian nation had spoken by way of the ballot box and the new ad-
ministrationtook controlof the Indian government.

Bhuttoand Pakistan:There are few similaritieswith India in the

Pakistanstory.ZulfikarAli Bhutto came to power in the dark days of
1971 afterthe debacle in East Pakistan.Pakistan'shistoryhad already
centeredon the emergenceof several "greatleaders" and the timewas
certainlyripe forthe appearance of still another.Bhutto sensed thatit
was his destinyto lead the nation out of the morassof defeat and to
instillin his countrymena new confidence.Reputed to be the only na-
tional figurecapable of resurrectingthe demoralized nation, Bhutto
had a broad socioeconomiccoalition supportinghis elevation to the
presidencyof Pakistan.He was also the popular choice of the Pakistan
militaryand the undisputed leader of the only significantpolitical
partyin the country.How then,it mightbe asked,did Bhutto lose his
popularityand therebyexpose himselfto the attacksof his weakerop-
ponents?
Answersto thisquestionwill have to be foundin Bhutto'spersonal-
ityand temperament. It has oftenbeen mentionedthatBhluttowas the
productof a long aristocratictradition.The scion of one of Sind prov-
ince's oldest landed familieswith linkagesin Baluchistan,the Punjab,
and Rajputana in India, he was born into wealth and privilege.The
Sindhi landlord or zamindar has a notorious reputation. Masud ex-
plains how the Sindhi landlord mustconstantlydisplay his power and
strengthin order to sustainhis prestigeamong his followers.

He must,therefore, keep up a reputationforzulmand zabardastiby

spreading awe all-round. One wayof doingthisis to have in his com-
manda gangof thievesand robbers,who would strikefearinto the
heartsof his rivals,thelargerthenumberof thievesand dacoitsat his
command, thegreater his awe and fearwouldbe.9

The successfullandlord controlsthe local governmentapparatus and

9 M. Masud, Hari Report: Note of Dissent, New Edition (Karachi: The Hari
Publications, 1976), p. 11.

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 THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN 717

easily influencesvillage officialswith a combination of threatsand

bribes.Above all the Sindhi landlord is proud of his place and power.
He stands in vivid contrastto those impoverishedpeasants that serve
his everywhim.As Masud notes: "The hari and the Zamindar present
two extremesof mankind(original italics): one lives in the heightof
depravityand misery,the other in the height of luxury and extrava-
gance."10It could be suggestedthateven so sophisticatedand educated
an individualas Bhuttocould not detach himselffromthe primaryin-
fluencesof thisenvironmentand his ancestrallegacy.
Bhutto'scriticshave argued that he is a typicalSindhi landlord,
and thathe chose to governPakistan withessentiallythe same percep-
tionsand techniquesdevelopedat his estatein Larkana in centralSind.
Bhuttoinsistedon monopolizingthe decision-making processand tried
to create a mystiqueof infallibility.He demanded blind obedience
fromhis associatesand countrymenand behaved as thoughhe was en-
titledto an unconditionalgrantof authority.Bhutto not only desired
total power, he genuinelybelieved that Pakistan's futuredepended
upon his perpetuatinghis authority.Bhutto also harboredthe familiar
suspicionsof the Sindhi zamindarswho were always competingwith
one another.Seldomdoes thehistoricrecordreveal anythingbut rivalry
and antagonismbetween these "royal" figures.Each household is an
island unto itselfand only the more clever and clearlymore ruthless
landlordsare capable of sustainingtheirpreeminence.Thus the Sindhi
landlordis conditionedto mistrusthis own kind,and particularlythose
who are in close proximity.Fear of one's neighborunleashes a contest
forpowerthatsustainsits own momentum.By the same token thereis
littleto fearfromthe peasantswho are confinedto servilestatus,and
made utterlydependenton theminimalgratuitiesdispensedby the rul-
ing feudal lord. It is evidentfromBhutto's performancein officethat
his troublesbegan when he sensedhe could no longertrusthis closest
advisorsand colleagues,or when he feltthat theyno longerservedhis
purpose.:"The heavy-handedtacticsemployedto removehis associates
fromtheirimportantpositionswas the beginningof the undoing of
Bhutto'sreign.With his compatriotsout of the picture,Bhutto'sSindhi
landlord characteristics became more apparent. Instead of people see-
ing in him the change agent forPakistan'smoderntransformation, he
took on the appearance of a traditionalfeudal master (wadera) and
henceexposedhimselfto attacksfromhis bittercriticsand adversaries.
During the electioncampaign in January-February 1977 national
issueswere subordinatedto the issue of Bhutto. His personal life and
behaviorwere savagelyattackedas he was accused of anti-Islamiccon-
10 Ibid., p. 15.
11See my article "Pakistan: A Political Perspective," Asian Survey 15:7 (July
1975), pp. 629-644; and Anwar Syed, "The Pakistan People's Party: Phases One and
Two," in Lawrence Ziring,Ralph Braibanti, and Howard Wriggins,eds., Pakistan:
The Long View (Durham: Duke UniversityPress, 1977), pp. 70-116.

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718 LAWRENCEZIRING

duct,indulgingin intoxicantsand generallymisbehaving.The opposi-

tion stressedone centraltheme: Bhutto was runningthe countryas a
private fiefand was siphoningprecious and scarce resourcesfor his
personalgratification. The capacityof the nine small,disparatepoliti-
cal partiesto combineforcesunder thebannerof the PakistanNational
Alliance (PNA) reveals how widespread this perception of Bhutto's
performancewas. Bhutto was the chairman of the Pakistan People's
Party(PPP), the only trulynational organizationin the country.The
partiescomprisingthe PNA were eithersectarian,religiousgroupings
or regional congeriesof disgruntledelements. Only Ashgar Khan's
Tehrik-i-Istiqlalmarginallyreflectedbroad interestsand it was too
limitedin constituencyto be classifiedas a full-fledged threatto the
dominanceof thePPP. Collectively,however,theseincongruousorgani-
zationswageda campaignthatfrightened even the stalwartswithinthe
PPP. Fearingthattheiroppositioncould triumph,theyconcluded that
it would be necessaryto guaranteetheirsuccessat the polls. The results
of theballottingrevealed too much overkill,however,and the opposi-
tionwas morethanconfirmed in itsview thatBhuttoand his supporters
would go to any fraudulentextremeto remainin power.The situation
was especiallygalling given the outcomeof the Indian electionswhich
sweptMrs. Gandhi fromoffice.Pakistanisprided themselveson being
morallysuperiorto theirIndian neighborsand the knowledgethat a
strongpersonalitylike Mrs. Gandhi could be removedfromher high
officein an open electoralcontest,while theywere compelled to accept
a riggedelection,added to theirdissatisfaction.
Bhuttohad promiseddemocracyand had delivereda dictatorship.
A Stateof Emergencydeclaredin December 1971 was neverfullylifted
and criticsof the Bhutto administrationdescribed the government's
hard line as "martial law by the back door." Bhutto used his extraor-
dinarypowers to undermineand replace provincial governmentsop-
posed to his PPP regimein Baluchistan and the North West Frontier
Province.He imprisonedtheir leaders and moved the Armed Forces
into the fieldto crushany resistanceto his authority.The mostsuccess-
ful political party in the frontierarea, the National Awami Party
(NAP), was at firstthwartedin its effortsto build a national consti-
tuency,and finallybanned in February1975. Its principalleader,Wali
Khan, was arrestedand aftera long period of incarcerationwas put on
trialforhigh crimesagainstthe nation. Bhutto organizeda networkof
secretpolice activity,the most publicized being the Federal Security
Force (FSF). The FSF assumed a paramilitaryrole when opposition
fromthe militarycurtailedhis equipping the People's Guards under
the aegis of the PPP. The People's Guard was not disbanded but the
FSF assumedthe role that had originallybeen intended for it.
The FSF and other intelligence gathering agencies were both
fearedand hated by the Pakistanipublic who resentedPakistan being
transformed into a replica of the Iranian police state.The muzzlingof

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 THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN 719

an independentpress,the manipulationof the economyto rewardthe

regime'ssupportersand punish its detractors,the generaldisregardfor
the rule of law, and the almost completedismantlingof the judicial
systemweresome of the keyissues thatprovokedthe postelectionriots
fromMarch to June 1977.Justas Bhuttohad come to power on a wave
of popular support,so he was sweptfrompower on a wave of popular
protest.For the firsttime in Pakistan's thirtyyear history,students,
lawyers,doctors,journalists,businessmen,women, religious leaders,
and secularteachersjoined withtheurban poor in a violentoutpouring
of disfavor.The political partiesof the PNA proved to be the organiz-
ing spiritbehind thedemonstrations, but it was evidentthat the urban
folk had much to complain about. Lewis Simons, writing in the
WashingtonPost, reportedthat

Bhutto also built an enormous account of personal hate among those

politicianswho are now attemptingto drive him out. Virtuallyevery
importantpolitical opponent has a storyof being beaten or torturedor
sexuallyabused, his home or businessburned or ransacked,or his wife
or daughterraped duringperiods of arrestand interrogation."Now all
these chickensare coming home to roost," commentedthe editor of a
once-respected and now-banned magazine. . . . Bhutto, despite the
veneerof a Britishand Americaneducation,has deep roots in his base
as a powerfullandlord and feudal baron. In interviewswith this cor-
respondent,he regularlydismissedhis opponents as "idiots" and the
country'sIslamic religiousleaders as "the beards."12

The man who would remakePakistan could not remake himself.

A victimof his own environmentand personality,Bhutto managed to
pull the nation togetherafterthe Bangladesh tragedy.He promised
Pakistan'sneglectedpoor a betterlife,he promotedsocioeconomicre-
form,and he seemeddeterminedto root out administrativecorruption.
But when he was overthrownin a militarycoup on July 5, 1977,
Bhuttohad littleexceptrhetoricand societalchaos to showforhis more
thanfiveyearsin power.

Pakistan and the UnitedStates

Pakistanhas alwayshad difficulty developingand maintainingas-
sociationswithothercountries.As a debtornation it has needed more
than it could possiblyofferin return.More important,its stubborn
strugglewith India has made it difficult
foreven sympatheticstatesto
provideit withthe typeof assistanceit sorelyrequires.No countryhas
reallychampioneditsclaim to Kashmir,and despitethepublicitygiven
to thedisputeinsideand outsidetheUnited Nations,India would seem
to have successfullyincorporatedthe mountain state into its Union.

12 The WashingtonPost, April24, 1977.

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720 LAWRENCEZIRING

Althoughthe Pakistaniscontinueto talk as if the Kashmirdisputewill

one day be resolvedin theirfavor,past historysuggeststhat Pakistan
will have to managewithoutit. Given thislatterthought,Pakistancan-
not affordto severrelationshipswithstatesthatare reluctantto become
embroiledin Pakistan-Indiasquabbling. Although emotionsrun high
on thisissue,effortshave alwaysbeen made to controlpopular passion.
Nowhere is thismore obvious than with Pakistan'srelationswith the
United States.
No countryhas been moreintimatewithPakistanthan the United
States.Almost25 yearshave passed since the U.S. and Pakistanentered
into a mutual assistancearrangement, and in thattimethe U.S. became
Pakistan'sprimarysupporter,supplier,and benefactor.Without U.S.
assistanceand influence,Pakistan's economic plight would be even
moregravethanit now is. Politically,it mighthave pursueda different
course and in all likelihood would today more resemble the systems
prevailingin Iran, Afghanistan,or Burma. But its associationwith the
U.S. and its orientationwith the Western industrializedworld have
caused its successivegovernmentsand attentivepopulation to thinkin
termsof a modernpolityendeavoringto achieve a democraticbalance
betweenindividual freedomand national order.A major consequence
of thisWesternorientationhas been confusionbetweenPakistan'spoli-
tical theoryand political practice.Practice and theoryhave oftendi-
vergedcausing considerablehardship. On the one side is a theoryof
autocraticvice-regalism-one-manrule and all its attendantcircum-
stances. On the other side is this persistentexperimentationwith
democraticpractices.The practiceis foreverbeing underminedby the
theory,but the latterhas neverbeen able to root out and obliteratethe
former.Thus Pakistan's political historyreads like a case in national
schizophrenia.And while efforts have been made to bring the practice
in line with the theoryand vice-versa,the countrystill stumbles,half-
blind,in searchof its identity.
The U.S. became interestedin Pakistan several years after the
state'screationwhen Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan
wereno longerpresentto help shape the relationship.Indeed, Pakistan
had entereda period of innercontroversy whichhas not been resolved
to this day. The legally constitutedgovernmentof Prime Minister
Nazimuddin had been dismissedby Governor-GeneralGhulam Mo-
hammad in 1953 and a sequence of eventswas set in motion which
eventuallycaused the dissolutionof the original constituentassembly
and ultimatelyled to the abrogationof a constitutionwhich had only
been in forcetwo years.This latteract by another Governor-General,
Iskander Mirza, proved to be transitional as General (later Field
Marshal) Ayub Khan assumed full powers for ruling the state in the
autumn of 1958. This latter event marked the end of Pakistan's first
parliamentary experiment.In thefiveyearsleading up to Ayub'sseizure
of the Pakistan government,the United States had broughtPakistan

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 THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN 721

into the SoutheastAsia Treaty Organizationand the Baghdad Pact. A

crucialtestof Pakistan'sties to the U.S. came in 1956 when Egyptwas
invadedby theBritishand Frenchas well as the Israelis and the entire
Muslim worldexploded. Pakistan'sPrime Minister,H. S. Suhrawardy,
was abused by his countrymen when he refusedto granttheirdemands
and removePakistanfromthe Westernsponsoredalliances. When pas-
sions ebbed Pakistanwas even more sharplydefinedas an ally of the
United States.Moreover,afterAyub's ascension to the presidencyof
Pakistan,that relationshipwas furtherstrengthened.On a state visit
to the U.S. in 1961,Ayub addresseda joint meetingof Congressand
declaredthatPakistanwas the onlyAsian countrythe U.S. could really
depend upon in a crisis.
Pakistan-American relations,however,entereda morerealisticbut
also moredifficult phase in 1962 when Chinese armiespoured through
the Himalayas into India. The U.S. answereda desperateNehru gov-
ernment'scall formilitaryaid which angered the Pakistanisand em-
barrassedAyub Khan. No less importantthan the militarysuppliesbe-
ing sent to India, the Pakistaniswere incensed that theirgovernment
did not use the opportunityto push its claim to Kashmir-indeed, to
invade and seize the stateforcibly.Ayuz'sdependenceon the U.S. was
judged to be the reason why Pakistan's armyremained in place. But
whateverthe explanation, Ayub's rule was never the same. In 1965
Pakistanwentto war withIndia and the inconclusivenessof thatstrug-
gle as well as the proclaimed neutralityof the U.S. furtherimpaired
Ayub'sabilityto govern.Althoughhe made strenuouseffortsto cling
to power,Ayubwas forcedfromofficeand a militaryjunta led by Gen-
eral Yahya Khan succeededhim.
Relations between the U.S. and Pakistan between 1965 and De-
cember20, 1971 (the date when Yahya transferred authorityto Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto)were strainedbut sustained.Americaneconomic and tech-
nical assistancecontinuedmuch as it had in the past (except for pro-
jects which the Pakistan governmentno longer desired,e.g., in educa-
tion), but militaryaid was halted almost completely.Nevertheless,a
guaranteeof protectionwas reaffirmed and Pakistan continuedto look
to theAmericangovernment.With the windingdown of the American
involvementin Indochina, the Nixon administrationfound it impera-
tive to open a dialogue with the Chinese communists.In 1971 Henry
Kissingerexploited Pakistan's good officeswith China to work out a
secretmissionto Peking while civil war raged in East Pakistan. Offi-
cially,the U.S. did little to influencethe Yahya government.It also
misreadthe outcomeof the strugglein Bangladesh,and especiallyIn-
dia's role in dismemberingthe Pakistanistate.NeitherPakistan'smili-
tary establishmentnor the U.S. and China could hold Pakistan to-
gether.And while the U.S. was gratefulto Yahya forassistingwith its
new China policy,it was just as pleased to have Bhutto assume the
reinsof Pakistan'sgovernment.

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722 LAWRENCEZIRING

Pakistan'ssoldier-leaders generallygot on well with the American

government,but afterthe Bangladesh tragedythe U.S. was ready to
accept a returnto civilian governmentin Pakistan. Bhutto had never
been a friendof the U.S., but he was classifiedas a pragmatistwho
would mold his policies to fitthe situation-and the U.S. was too im-
portantto reject altogether.Moreover,Bhutto's declared socialist in-
tentionswere no differentfrom those of other third world leaders.
Pakistan'speculiar circumstancesdeterminedits course of action. Not
only was India the choice of the Soviet Union (given the need to take
sides), but the conservativeMuslim countriesthat Pakistan appealed
to for assistance(Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab
Emirates)would not appreciate Bhutto puttingPakistan firmlyin the
communistcamp. Nor had Bhutto any such inclination. The Nixon
administrationsent Henry Byroade, one of its senior foreignservice
officers,as ambassador to Pakistan. Byroade and Bhutto developed a
close relationship,especiallyas the formerpromisedto do everything
withinhis power to reestablishclose workingties that had been cut
in 1965. Bhutto was primarilyinterestedin renewingAmerican arms
shipmentsto Pakistan and AmbassadorByroade spent a considerable
amount of time tryingto satisfythis request.Byroade played a major
behind-the-scenes role in gettingthe U.S. governmentto lift the arms
embargoin February1975. The firstlarge ordersof Americanmilitary
hardwarewere scheduled to arrivein 1977 when Pakistan's domestic
scene again blew up.

PresidentCarterand the Subcontinent:The Carteradministrationhad

a differentperception of Pakistan than its predecessors.President
Carterdisplaysan affinity forIndia givenhis mother'sPeace Corps ser-
vicetherein the 1960s.He is also consciousof India's largerimportance
in South Asia and itspositionastridethe Indian Ocean, and he and his
advisorssaw littlepurposebeing servedby supportingPakistanover In-
dia. Moreover,Carter'sthinkingcoincided with the State Department
viewthattheU.S. needlesslyantagonizedIndia by promotingPakistan's
militarycapability.Therefore,withoutdisassociatingitselffromPakis-
tan the Cartergovernmeentlabored to establisha new set of priorities
foritspoliciesin SouthAsia. It was perhapscoincidencethatthe March
electionsin India and Pakistanmeshedwith thisreappraisal.The elec-
toral defeat of Indira Gandhi opened excitingopportunitiesfor the
U.S. in South Asia. The new Indian leaders made statementsabout an
even-handedapproach to foreignpolicy,and particularlytheirdesire
to improverelationswith the United States.The U.S. governmentwas
quick to respondand declarationsof friendshipprecipitateda number
of high-levelconversationsand communications.
The riotsthatfollowedthePakistanelections,however,caused the
U.S. to question Bhutto's tacticsand the harsh measuresemployedto
controlhis disaffected population. Carter'shuman rightsprogramwas

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 THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN 723

applied to Pakistanand its governmentwas judged to be wanting.On

June3, 1977theU.S. government announcedit was holdingup delivery
of 110 A-7 Corsairlightbombersthat had been promisedto Pakistan
in earlier negotiationsinvolving Henry Kissinger.The cancellation
of the sale to Pakistan impressedIndia, and revealed the Carter ad-
ministration'sdesire to encourage betterrelations between their two
countries.The United States,however,did not stop all militaryaid to
Pakistanand agreed to deliver two World War II type destroyers.It
was also reportedthat wire-guidedTOW anti-tankmissiles,bombs,
machine-gunammunition,communicationsequipment, and armored
vehiclesand truckswould be sentlater.
These projectedarmssales did not keep Bhuttofromattackingthe
United States.Several weeks before,a special order fromPakistan for
$68,000worthof tear gas was rejected by the State Department.The
decision had been taken at a lower level and later approved by the
Secretaryof State and the President.The U.S. governmentexplained
it did not want to become entwinedin the disturbancesshakingPak-
istan.But the decisionwas also a signal to thoseopposing Bhutto that
the U.S. was not wedded to his survival.Bhutto's impassionedspeech
denouncingthe U.S. and its clandestinearm, the CIA, for allegedly
passing twenty-five million dollars to the opposition Pakistan Na-
tional Alliance was not unexpected. Referringto President Carter,
Bhuttoshouted,"I could affordto be worriedabout human rightstoo,"
if the PPP was the recipientof such a substantialsum of money.13
Bhutto's attack on the U.S. was followed by demonstrationsin the
streetsof Islamabad where slogans were chanted about "Death to Im-
perialistLackeys" and "Down With JimmyCarter." Americanswork-
ing in Pakistanalso receivedthreateningletters,but therewere no re-
portsof physicalharm to United Statespersonnel.
Pakistanis had every reason to believe the U.S. was arranging
secretdeals withtheIndian governmentnow headed by PrimeMinister
Morarji Desai. PresidentCarterand Desai exchangedletterson a wide
rangeof world issuesand the Indian Prime Ministernoted that "from
whathe [Carter]says,he believesin thesame values thatI believe in."14
The lettersfolloweda series of gesturesof friendshipto India which
was capped by approval fromthe U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission
to sell India 5,573poundsof uraniumto refuelan Indian nuclearpower
reactor.Opponents of the sale had argued that the material could be
used to develop atomic bombs as India had not signed the Nuclear
NonproliferationTreaty. The Commissionbrushed aside these fears
with the disclosurethat the new Indian governmenthad agreed to re-
turnspentfuel containingplutoniumto the United States.Plutonium
is used to manufacturenuclear weapons. The Commissionalso noted

13 The WashingtonPost, April 27, 1977.

14 The New York Times, July 5, 1977.

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724 LAWRENCEZIRING

that it had receivedan urgentappeal fromthe State Departmentindi-

cating a "failure to act promptlyon this license could impair U.S.
relationswithIndia."15
The decisionto provideIndia with nuclear fuel must be weighed
against the strenuousefforts of both the Ford and Carter administra-
tionsto preventPakistanfromobtaininga nuclear reprocessingplant.
Ever since the Indian detonation of an atomic device, Pakistan has
been interestedin developinga similarcapacity.Finally Pakistan was
able to enterinto an agreementwith France,which promisedto build
a nuclear reprocessingplant. Since that announcementthe U.S. has
attemptedto pressureFrance to renege on its agreement.From time
to timerumorscirculatedthat Washingtonhad succeeded in convinc-
ing the French the deal was unwise,but Paris has given everyindica-
tion that it will go throughwith the original contract.During Kis-
singer'slast visitto South Asia as Secretaryof State,he warned Bhutto
thatif he went ahead with the constructionof the reprocessingplant
he ran theriskof losingall Americaneconomicas well as militaryassis-
tance.Bhutto,angeredby the ultimatum,argued he could not bow to
pressurewithout irrevocablyweakening his position. Moreover, the
country'snational pride was at stake and Pakistan could not yield to
Americandemands.It is importantto note thatBhuttoused thistheme
in condemningthe U.S. forits alleged supportof the PNA in the cam-
paign to oust him. On April 28, 1977 Bhuttomade an impassionedad-
dressto his parliamentand accused the U.S. of a "colossal conspiracy"
against him. In that speech he insistedthat one of the principal rea-
sons for the United States wantinghim out of the way was his deter-
minationto give Pakistan a nuclear capability.
The U.S. governmentdenied thesecharges.Nevertheless, sentiment
in the State Departmentwas opposed to Bhutto and his intransigence
on thenuclearreprocessing issuewas certainlyimportant.Furtherproof
of U.S. dissatisfactionwith Bhutto was the sudden decision to with-
draw George S. Vest as ambassador-designate to Pakistan. Vest had a
reputationfor being a French specialist as well as knowledgeablein
nuclear affairs, hence he was slated to be the government'skeynegotia-
torbetweenPakistanand France.The plant at Chashma in the Punjab
is reportedto be under construction.With the French insistingon
honoringtheiragreementwith Pakistan,it would have been Vest's as-
signmentto work out the necessarynuclear safeguards.The replace-
mentof Vest by ArthurHummel, a formerAssistantSecretaryof State
forEast Asia and PacificAffairs,was possiblydue to Bhutto's precari-
ous tenureand the realization that the plant would take ten years to
complete.Nevertheless,Secretaryof State Vance met Pakistani Foreign
MinisterAziz Ahmad in Paris on May 31, 1977 in an effortto reduce
some of the strainsthat had developed between their two countries.
15 The New York Times, June 30, 1977.

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 THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN 725

Aziz Ahmad reported after their meeting that "the talks were very
friendlyand constructive. In the end we agreed,irrespectiveof the dif-
ferencesthatcroppedup recentlybetweenour two countries,thatboth
countrieswish to restoretheirrelationsto the formerstate of mutual
friendshipand confidenceand we would like to see them improve
further."'16 Vance's replywas in the same vein but the Americandeci-
sion to cancel theshipmentof A-7bomberscame a fewdayslater.In ad-
dition the U.S. resumedpressureon both France and Pakistan to ter-
minate their agreementon the reprocessinginstallation.Outraged by
the Americanposture,and especiallyby what he judged to be a policy
aimed at him personally,Bhutto warnedhe was thinkingof withdraw-
ing Pakistan fromthe Central Treaty Organization(CENTRO). In a
speech to the National Assemblyon June 10, 1977,Bhutto referredto
the recent American decisions and opined: "If CENTO meant for
Pakistanthatwe are going to get thissortof treatment, thenthe people
of the countrywould ask what was thejustificationof being in such an
organisation."Commentingon the deal with France, the Pakistani
Prime Ministernoted that "no thirdcountryhad the rightto say that
the decision was not correct."17 He was also disturbedby U.S. reluc-
tance to accept his assurancesthat the reprocessingplant was strictly
forpeacefulpurposes.
Pakistan's desire to build a nuclear reprocessingfacilityhad be-
come a national issue of primaryimportancefor the Bhutto regime.
But the countryhad fewexternalsupporters.The Pakistaniauthorities
envisaged the reprocessingplant fittinginto a larger scheme of
nuclear power which would enable the countryto maximize the utili-
zation of uranium at a time its reservesof thisresourcewas diminish-
ing. The Chashma plant was estimatedto cost threehundred million
dollars,a thirdof thissum being providedby Saudi Arabia and Libya.
The completedplant would have a capacityforreprocessingbetween
80 and 600 tons of fuel annually or roughlysix times the spent fuel
produced at the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP). Thus sev-
eral otherpower plants similarto the Karachi unit were scheduledfor
constructionbefore the Chashma reprocessingfacilitycould be fully
integratedin a new power network.Despite thispublic disclosure,the
U.S. governmentconcluded that the facilitycould be used to develop
nuclear weapons. Pakistan'sleadersrefusedto accept the notion that a
Third World countrywas less trustworthy withnuclear power than an
industrializedstate. Moreover, they could not understand why the
U.S. fearedPakistan'snuclearcapabilityand at the same timeappeared
to supportNew Delhi's nuclear development.If the U.S. were not aid-
ing India, the Pakistanismightnot have been agitated by the Ameri-
can performance.However,the realizationthat the Carter administra-

16 Dawn (Overseas Weekly), July 5, 1977.

17 Ibid., June 19, 1977.

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726 LAWRENCEZIRING

tion accepted India's explanation for its nuclear programand found

faultwithPakistan'swas continuingcause forfriction.
It could be hypothesizedthatPakistanis frozenin time.All matters
considered,its foreignpolicy continuesto be influencedby fear and
bitternesstowardIndia. It thereforecontinues to judge the U.S. by
its remotenessor intimacywith its larger neighborand swornenemy.
While it appearsthesame testhas not been applied to the SovietUnion
whichhas openlyassistedIndia in humiliatingPakistan,it seemsobvi-
ous thatnot muchwas expectedfromthe Soviet Union. Indeed, Pakis-
tan'spolicytowardtheSovietUnion has emphasizedone theme:do not
disturbthe Russian bear! The U.S. is another matter.The U.S. has
been instrumental in shaping Pakistan'ssocioeconomicfoundation,in
trainingits elites,and in fosteringa liberal, democraticvalue system.
For more than 20 yearsPakistanishave permittedAmericansto influ-
ence theirpublic and privatesectorsand the many personal contacts
have createdexpectationsthatdo not diminishwithoutpain. Bhutto's
feverisheffortsto acquire the support of select Muslim stateson the
one hand speaksto Pakistan'scommonheritage.On the other,however,
is the recognitionthat Pakistan has nowhereelse to go given decreas-
ing Americaninterest.Bhutto's call on June 20, 1977 for a treatyof
mutual defenseby all the Muslim stateswas undoubtedlyprompted
by disillusionmentwith the U.S. and a desire to terminatePakistan's
last alliance with the West. It was also given credenceby the efforts
made bySaudi Arabia, Kuwait,and the United Arab Emiratesto medi-
ate Bhutto'sdisputewith his political opponentsin the PNA.
The United States,however,is more interestedin adjustingto the
changingalignmentsin South Asia. The fall of Indira Gandhi and the
rise of the more conservativeJanata leadershipopens the way forim-
provingU.S. relationswith India. The Carteradministrationsignalled
New Delhi that its ties with Pakistan are veryflexibleand that it no
longerwishesto promotePakistanimilitarypowerin theregion.While
Pakistan'sterritorialintegritymustbe protected,the U.S. sees no pur-
pose being servedin providingPakistanwith a militarycapabilitythat
would challenge Indian preeminence.But beyond the Pakistan equa-
tion,the U.S. wishesto assure India that it does not seek to transform
theIndian Ocean into a possible theaterof war. Indian Ocean sea-lanes
are vital to the prosperityand strengthof the Westernindustrialized
statesand the U.S. looks with suspicionon Soviet maneuveringsin the
area. Fear that the Soviet Union is seekingthe means to control the
Indian Ocean has provoked a U.S. response.The establishmentof a
naval and air facilityon the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia was
reportedlynecessitatedby Soviet naval power concentrationsin the
Indian Ocean and along much of its littoral.Prime MinisterGandhi
saw the Americanbase on Diego Garcia not as a counter to Soviet
initiativesbut ratheras an Americandeterminationto dominate the
watersbetween Indonesia and the east coast of Africa. She was also

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 THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN 727

suspicious of American policies aimed at swelling Iran's military

prowess.Given the climatecreatedby Morarji Desai, however,the U.S.
is seekingeveryavenue to convincethe Indians that the United States
poses no director indirectthreatto theirsecurity.
The Carteradministration's call to demilitarizethe Indian Ocean
was onlya firststep forIndia, whichinsistedon the dismantlingof all
bases in the Indian Ocean. The Janata Ministerfor External Affairs,
A. B. Vajpayee, took note of the disarmamenttalks between the U.S.
and the Soviet Union in June 1977 and commentedthat despite ad-
vance publicitythattheirIndian Ocean rivalrywould be given promi-
nence,verylittletimewas devoted to the subject.Vajpayee offeredthe
opinion thatonly a bindingcommitmentto make the Indian Ocean a
"zone of peace" would satisfyhis government.At the same timehe was
not sanguine about the possibilityof the major powers agreeing to
withdrawtheirforcesgiven the vast stakesobtainingin the regionand
thegeneralbrittleness of political life among the manynationsborder-
ing the Indian Ocean. Vajpayee made referenceto Americaninterests
in the Omani island of Masirah near the Persian Gulf and seemed to
be concernedwith the expandingconflicton the Horn of Africa,espe-
cially that betweenEthiopia and the Somali Republic.
This concernwas given substantialcredencewith the escalation
of the war betweenSomalia and Ethiopia which witnessedthe Soviet
Union rushinga billion dollars in modernarmamentsto the latter,as
well as thedespatchof thousandsof Soviet and Cuban militaryperson-
nel. In March 1978, the Ethiopian governmentconfirmedthat Cuban
forceswere fightingside-by-sidewith their own and that the Soviet
Union was also providing battlefieldguidance and support. Soviet
and Ethiopian pledges to the U.S. that theirforceswould not invade
Somalia did littleto take the heat out of thesituation.More important,
the heavySovietinvolvementon the Horn of Africacaused discussions
between Moscow and Washington to break down on the matterof
demilitarizingthe Indian Ocean. The Carteradministrationcalled for
a freezeon militaryposturingin the region but it was clear fromthe
unfoldingeventsthatthiswas littlemore than a declaratorystatement.
In thesecircumstances, as well as with linked problemsthatinten-
sifiedsuper-powerrivalrynear or in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea,
theJanatagovernmentof Morarji Desai acknowledgedthatrealpolitik
guided nationsin theirrelationswith one another.The Indian Ocean
as a "Zone of Peace" would have to wait on more tranquil times.Ap-
proximately25% of the world's nations ring the Indian Ocean and
India could not expect to influencemany of them.Their peculiar in-
terestswill thereforeattractthe major powers irrespectiveof India's
desiresor posture.India will continue to encourage negotiationsbe-
tween the U.S. and the USSR, and it anticipatesbeing consulted on
mattersthatconcernit,but it is less likelyto declare one countrymore
guiltyof upsettingthe peace than the other.

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728 LAWRENCEZIRING

LookingTowardtheFuture
Pending unforeseeablecircumstances, India is more likely to de-
velop a policy of nonalignmentthat is more genuine than anything
heretoforeexperienced.The visit of Andrei Gromykoto New Delhi
was a consequenceof Morarji Desai's commentsafterassuminghis new
office.Desai delighted the U.S. when he intimated that the Soviet
Union had no special corneron Indian friendship.The Janata govern-
mentcame to poweras a championof human rightsand it seriouslybe-
lievesthatIndia has gained "new respectin the eyesof the world" as a
resultof the defeatof Indira Gandhi. The Desai governmentstresses
economiccooperationbetween the more fortunateand less fortunate
statesand downplaysthe bellicose postureassumedby its predecessor.
Above all, it wants to removeIndia fromany commitmentheretofore
enteredinto which allowed a foreignpower to give the appearance of
utilizingIndian facilitiesfor militarypurposes. Commentingon this
importantaspect of Indian foreignpolicy,Vajpayee explained: "The
constitutionalrightsof political libertywhichwe enjoy will not be ex-
tendedto permitthe use of Indian soil forhostileactivitiesagainstour
partnernations.If we have to permitsuch freedomwe would be going
against the fundamentalprinciples of co-existenceand noninterfer-
ence."'8
India's intentionto participateonly in socioeconomicand scien-
tificinternationalorganizationslike the UN and the Group of 77 will
please the U.S. more than the Soviet Union. But the Indians are not
to be interpretedas choosingor shiftingsides.It is reasonableto assume
that India wants to removeitselfas far as possible fromthe rivalries
betweenthe two superpowers.Indeed it mightthenbe in a positionto
influencetheir behavior better and possibly to help accelerate the
movementtoward accommodation.To play this role, however,India
must improveits relationswith China, and it is notable that Indian
ships were admitted to Chinese ports in June 1977. Also trade links
betweenthe two countrieshave been revivedand officialexchangesof
government personnelare growingin number.It is too earlyto suggest
that theirconflicthas been resolved,but the new governmentof Hua
Kuo-fengmay findit easier to deal with a Janata administrationthat
has somewhatdisassociateditselffromthe Soviet Union.
The coup which overthrewthe Bhutto governmentwas greeted
withmixed emotions.Indian leadershad no reason to like Bhutto but
they felt he understood the essentials of internationalpolitics and
would not do anythingrash. Moreover,the war in 1965 and the other
in 1971occurredwhile generalsdominatedPakistan'sgovernment.The
realizationthatstillanothergeneralhad come to powerarousedvisions
ofrenewedconflict.But the assurancesgiventhe Indian governmentby
the martiallaw authoritiesin Pakistan and the conversationsentered
18 India News, July4, 1977.

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 THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN 729

into by the Pakistan Ambassador to India with the Indian Foreign

Ministerappeared to dispel thesefearsforthe moment.The Pakistanis
agreedto abide bytheSimla Accordsof 1972 and therewas no interrup-
tion of anyactivitiescommencedduringthe last year.The bordercross-
ing points remainedopen and traffic was sustained at a normal rate.
The visit to Pakistan by India's Foreign Minister in February 1978
also reinforceda postureof improvedrelationsbetweenthe two coun-
tries.The anticipatedvisitof General Zia ul-Haq to India laterin 1978
and discussionson both sides of the borderconcerningexpanded trade
also seemedto indicate a more positiveoutlook in theirinternational
dealings.
In a similarmaneuver,the new Indian governmentacted to clear
the air withBangladesh.Afterthe coup whichtook the life of Mujibur
Rahman,relationswithBangladeshdeteriorated.Each side accused the
other of fomentingtrouble across their mutual frontierand Bangla-
desh's militarypresident,Ziaur Rahman, charged Indian authorities
witha plot to destroyhim. Ziaur also displayedhis outragewith Mrs.
Gandhi'sgovernment overtheFarakkaBarrageissue,whichhe said pre-
ventedBangladeshfromreceivingits "fairshare" of Ganges waterdur-
ing the drymonths.Desai and Vajpayee met with Ziaur Rahman in
London during the 1977 summerCommonwealthmeetingsand the
Bangladesh President'sanger with India was apparentlyreduced by
their talks. In November 1977, after crash negotiations,the Indian
governmentagreed to yield to many of Bangladesh's demands over
Farakka,and a five-year agreementwas enteredinto. The two govern-
mentsalso agreed to preventhostile forcesfromusing bases in their
respectivecountriesfromwhichguerrillaactivitieswere alleged to have
been launched against them.In December 1977 Ziaur paid an official
visit to new Delhi signifyingthe beginningof a new period in Indo-
Bangladeshrelations,the essentialthemeof whichwas India's recogni-
tion of Bangladesh'ssovereignequality.
India's overall foreignpolicy in 1978 accentuated a more sys-
temic,non-zerosum relationshipwith its near neighbors,and a more
conciliatoryattitudewith referenceto China and the United States.
Althoughtherewas little to suggesta change in Indo-Sovietrelations,
the general impressionseemed to point to the Soviet Union's larger
interestin India than vice-versa.Indeed, comparisonswiththe Gandhi
periodmay be more a responseto stylethan to substance,but the fact
remainedthat the Desai governmentreceivedhigh marksfor altering
India's somewhatmore militantpostureunder Mrs. Gandhi's leader-
ship. The awareness,however,that beneath a seeminglycalm surface
rush turbulentwaterswas made evidentwhen PresidentCartervisited
India in January1978.The open-microphone episode revealedthe hard
bargaining that the two countrieswere engaged in with respect to
India's oppositionto nuclearsafeguardsproposedby the United States.
This incidentseemedto suggesttheexistenceof otherdifferences which

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730 LAWRENCEZIRING

are effectively obscured throughthe observanceof proper diplomatic

protocol and ceremonial oratory.Nevertheless,style cannot be con-
sidered insignificantin internationalpolitics and it is reasonable to
conclude thatIndia is going to be activein promotingpeace initiatives
if Desai is capable of holding his domesticpolitical coalition together.
Pakistan too is engagedin a campaign aimed at reducingtensions
with its neighbors.The martiallaw government'sdesire to improveits
relationswith India suggeststhat the Kashmirissue will receive little
attention.Pakistan has all it can handle in tryingto ameliorate its
nationalitiesdilemmawithouttryingto add still anotherethnicgroup
to thePakistanistate.By thesame token,improvements in Indo-Bangla-
desh relationswould appear to deemphasizea Pakistan-Bangladeshar-
rangementthatmightbe judged threateningby India. Clearly,Pakis-
tan is in no position to threatenanyone. General Zia's October 1977
visit to Afghanistanand Pakistani effortsdirectedat pacifyingPresi-
dentMohammadDaud revealeda strongdesireto resolvefrontierques-
tions.The coup in Afghanistanand the death of Daud in April 1978
raise anew the question of Pakistan'sterritorialintegrity.The Pakistan
governmentwill endeavor to maintain cordial relations with Kabul,
but dealing with the new Marxistregimewill not be an easy matter.
General Zia's visits to Iran, China, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the
United Arab Emirates,Jordan,Turkey, and Libya during the latter
threemonthsof 1977 are indicativeof the strenuousmeasuresbeing
taken to assure Pakistan's friendsand benefactorsthat the countryis
stable and that the new governmentis not about to change direction.
These countriesalso loom large in Pakistan's developmentas well as
defenseplans, given the reluctanceof the United States to become too
deeply involved in its affairs.Carter'sdecision not to visit Islamabad
prior to or followinghis stop-overin Teheran and New Delhi was not
lost on the Pakistanis.The U.S. would preferthat Pakistanisput their
house in orderratherthan again entertainthe notion of engagingin
dramaticinternationaldisplays.Hence the United Stateswill continue
to providePakistanwith economicand technicalassistance,but it will
refrainfromprimingthe country'smilitarypump. AlthoughPakistanis
may quarrel with this policy theyalso know that theirprimaryprob-
lemsare domestic,and thatinnovativeforeignpoliciesinvolvinga large
degreeof riskare a luxurytheycan ill afford.

LAWRENCE ZIRING is Professorof Political Science at Western Michigan Uni-

versity,Kalamazoo.

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