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Ethics and International Relations
The Library of Essays in International Relations
Series Editor: David A. Deese

Titles in the Series:

Theories of International Relations

David Baldwin

International Political Economy

Benjamin J. Cohen

Globalization: Causes and Effects

David A. Deese

International Environmental Governance

Peter M. Haas

Ethics and International Relations

Ethan B. Kapstein and Joel H. Rosenthal

Comparative Regionalism
Fred H. Lawson

Foreign Policy
Robert J. Lieber

Civil Societies and Social Movements

Ronnie D. Lipschutz

Global Governance
Lisa Martin

International Security and Conflict

Bruce Russett
International Law and Politics
Joel Trachtman
Ethics and International
Relations

Edited by
Ethan B. Kapstein
INSEAD, France
and
Joel H. Rosenthal
Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, USA
First published 2009 by Ashgate Publishing

Published 2016 by Routledge

2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa

business

Copyright © Ethan B. Kapstein and Joel H. Rosenthal 2009. For

copyright of individual articles please refer to the
Acknowledgements.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or

reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical,
or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including
photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or
retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Notice:
Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered
trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation
without intent to infringe.

Wherever possible, these reprints are made from a copy of the

original printing, but these can themselves be of very variable
quality. Whilst the publisher has made every effort to ensure the
quality of the reprint, some variability may inevitably remain.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Ethics and International relations. – (The library of essays in
international relations)
1. International relations–Moral and ethical aspects.
I. Series II. Kapstein, Ethan B. III. Rosenthal, Joel H.,
1960-
172.4-dc22
Library of Congress Control Number: 2009921313

ISBN 9780754628484 (hbk)

Contents
Cover
Half Title
Title
Copyright
Contents
Acknowledgements
Series Preface
Introduction
PART I: PLURALISM, RIGHTS AND FAIRNESS

1 Frances V. Harbour (1995), 'Basic Moral Values: A Shared

Core', Ethics and International Affairs, 9, pp. 155–70.
2 George F. Kennan (1985), 'Morality and Foreign Policy',
Foreign Affairs, 64, pp. 205–18.
3 Marshall Cohen (1984), 'Moral Skepticism and
International Relations', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 13,
pp. 299–346.
4 Terry Nardin (1992), 'International Ethics and
International Law', Review of International Studies, 18, pp.
19–30.
5 John Rawls (1993), 'The Law of Peoples', Critical Inquiry,
20, pp. 36–68.
6 Amartya Sen (2005), 'Human Rights and Capabilities',
Journal of Human Development, 6, pp. 151–66.
7 Robert O. Keohane (1986), 'Reciprocity in International
Relations', International Organization, 40, pp. 1–27.
8 Elinor Ostrom, James Walker and Roy Gardner (1992),
'Covenants With and Without a Sword: Self-Governance is
Possible', American Political Science Review, 86, pp. 404–
17.
PART II: JUST WAR?

9 David Luban (1985), 'Just War and Human Rights', in

Charles R. Beitz, Marshall Cohen, Thomas Scanlon and A.
John Simmons (eds), International Ethics: A Philosophy and
Public Affairs Reader, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, pp. 195–216; a revised version of a paper initially
published in Philosophy and Public Affairs, (1980), 9, pp.
160–81.
10 Neta C. Crawford (2003), 'The Slippery Slope to
Preventive War', Ethics and International Affairs, 17, pp.
30–36.
11 Michael Walzer (1973), 'Political Action: The Problem of
Dirty Hands', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 2, pp. 160–80.
12 David Rodin (2004), 'Terrorism without Intention',
Ethics, 114, pp. 752–71.

PART III: INTERVENTION

13 Stanley Hoffmann (1995), 'The Politics and Ethics of

Military Intervention', Survival, 37, pp. 29–51.
14 Michael J. Smith (1998), 'Humanitarian Intervention: An
Overview of the Ethical Issues', Ethics and International
Affairs, 12, pp. 63–79.
15 Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun (2002), 'The
Responsibility to Protect', Foreign Affairs, 81, pp. 99–110,
[303–10].

PART IV: NUCLEAR ETHICS

16 Henry A. Kissinger (1956), 'Force and Diplomacy in the

Nuclear Age', Foreign Affairs, 34, pp. 349–66.
17 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (1985), 'NPT: The Logic of Inequality',
Foreign Policy, 29, pp. 123–31.

PART V: HUMAN RIGHTS AND CITIZENSHIP

 18 Jack Donnelly (2007), 'The Relative Universality of
Human Rights', Human Rights Quarterly, 29, pp. 281–306
and (2008), 'Human Rights: Both Universal and Relative (A
Reply to Michael Goodhart), Human Rights Quarterly, 30,
pp. 194–6.
19 Martha C. Nussbaum (1996), 'Patriotism and
Cosmopolitanism', in Martha C. Nussbaum and Joshua
Cohen (eds), For Love of Country, Boston: Beacon Press,
pp. 3–17.
20 Joseph H. Carens (1987), 'Aliens and Citizens: The Case
for Open Borders', The Review of Politics, 49, pp. 251–73.
PART VI: ETHICAL GLOBALIZATION

21 Thomas W. Pogge (2002), 'Moral Universalism and

Global Economic Justice', Politics, Philosophy and
Economics, 1, pp. 29–58.
22 Charles R. Beitz (1999), 'International Liberalism and
Distributive Justice: A Survey of Recent Thought', World
Politics, 51, pp. 269–96.
23 Andrew Kuper and Peter Singer (2002), 'Debate: Global
Poverty Relief: More than Charity: Cosmopolitan
Alternatives to the "Singer Solution'", Ethics and
International Affairs, 16, pp. 107–28.
24 Humberto G. Llavador and John E. Roemer (1999), 'An
Equal-opportunity Approach to the Allocation of
International Aid', Journal of Development Economics, 64,
pp. 147–71.
25 Ethan B. Kapstein (2008), 'Fairness Considerations in
World Politics: Lessons from International Trade
Negotiations', Political Science Quarterly, 123, pp. 229–5.

Name Index
 Acknowledgements
The editor and publishers wish to thank the following for permission
to use copyright material.

Academy of Political Science for the essay: Ethan B. Kapstein (2008),

'Fairness Considerations in World Politics: Lessons from International
Trade Negotiations', Political Science Quarterly, 123, pp. 229-45.

Beacon Press, Boston for the essay: Martha C. Nussbaum (1996),

'Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism', in Martha C. Nussbaum and
Joshua Cohen (eds), For Love of Country, Boston: Beacon Press, pp.
3-17. Copyright © 1996 by Martha C. Nussbaum and Joshua Cohen.

Cambridge University Press for the essays: Terry Nardin (1992),

'International Ethics and International Law', Review of International
Studies, 18, pp. 19-30. Copyright © 1992 British International
Studies Association; Elinor Ostrom, James Walker and Roy Gardner
(1992), 'Covenants With and Without a Sword: Self-Governance is
Possible', American Political Science Review, 86, pp. 404-17.
Copyright © 1992 American Political Science Association; Joseph H.
Carens (1987), 'Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders', The
Review of Politics, 49, pp. 251-73. Copyright © 1987 University of
Notre Dame, published by Cambridge University Press; Charles R.
Beitz (1999), 'International Liberalism and Distributive Justice: A
Survey of Recent Thought', World Politics, 51, pp. 269-96. Copyright
© Trustees of Princeton University, published by Cambridge
University Press.

Elsevier for the essay: Humberto G. Llavador and John E. Roemer

(1999), 'An Equal-opportunity Approach to the Allocation of
International Aid', Journal of Development Economics, 64, pp. 147-
71. Copyright © 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Foreign Affairs for the essays: Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun
(2002), 'The Responsibility to Protect', Foreign Affairs, 81, pp. 99
110, [303-310]; Henry A. Kissinger (1956), 'Force and Diplomacy in
the Nuclear Age', Foreign Affairs, 34, pp. 349-66. Copyright © 2004
Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. www.ForeignAffairs.org.

Foreign Policy and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for

the essay: Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (1985), 'NPT: The Logic of Inequality',
Foreign Policy, 29, pp. 123-31.

George F. Kennan for his essay: George F. Kennan (1985), 'Morality

and Foreign Policy', Foreign Affairs, 64, pp. 205-18. Copyright ©
1985 by George F. Kennan.

Johns Hopkins University Press for the essays: Jack Donnelly (2007),
'The Relative Universality of Human Rights', Human Rights Quarterly,
29, pp. 281-306 and (2008), 'Human Rights: Both Universal and
Relative (A Reply to Michael Goodhart), Human Rights Quarterly, 30,
pp. 194-6. Copyright © 2007/8 by the Johns Hopkins University
Press.

MIT Press for the essay; Robert O. Keohane (1986), 'Reciprocity in

International Relations', International Organization, 40, pp. 1-27.
Copyright ©1986 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and
the World Peace Foundation.

Princeton University press for the essay: David Luban (1985), 'Just
War and Human Rights', in Charles R. Beitz, Marshall Cohen, Thomas
Scanlon and A. John Simmons (eds). International Ethics: A
Philosophy and Public Affairs Reader, Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, pp. 195-216; a revised version of a paper initially
published in Philosophy and Public Affairs, (1980), 9, pp. 160-81.
Copyright © 1980 by Princeton University Press.

Sage Publications for the essay: Thomas W. Pogge (2002), 'Moral

Universalism and Global Economic Justice', Politics, Philosophy and
Economics, 1, pp. 29-58.
Taylor & Francis for the essays: Amartya Sen (2005), 'Human Rights
and Capabilities', Journal of Human Development, 6, pp. 151-66.
Copyright © 2005 United Development Programme; Stanley
Hoffmann (1995), 'The Politics and Ethics of Military Intervention',
Survival, 37, pp. 29-51.

The University of Chicago Press for the essays: John Rawls (1993),
'The Law of Peoples', Critical Inquiry, 20, pp. 36-68; David Rodin
(2004), 'Terrorism without Intention', Ethics, 114, pp. 752-71.
Copyright © 2004 by the University of Chicago Press. All rights
reserved.

Wiley-Blackwell Publishing for the essays: Frances V. Harbour

(1995), 'Basic Moral Values: A Shared Core', Ethics and International
Affairs, 9, pp. 155-70; Marshall Cohen (1984), 'Moral Skepticism and
International Relations', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 13, pp. 299-
346; Neta C. Crawford (2003), 'The Slippery Slope to Preventive
War', Ethics and International Affairs, 17, pp. 30-36. Copyright ©
2003 EBSCO Publishing; Michael Walzer (1973), 'Political Action: The
Problem of Dirty Hands', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 2, pp. 160-
80; Michael J. Smith (1998), 'Humanitarian Intervention: An
Overview of the Ethical Issues', Ethics and International Affairs, 12,
pp. 63-79; Andrew Kuper and Peter Singer (2002), 'Debate; Global
Poverty Relief: More than Charity: Cosmopolitan Alternatives to the
"Singer Solution'", Ethics and International Affairs, 16, pp. 107-28.

Every effort has been made to trace all the copyright holders, but if
any have been inadvertently overlooked the publishers will be
pleased to make the necessary arrangement at the first opportunity.
Series Preface
International Relations is one of the most intensely studied and
debated areas of intellectual inquiry. This is, in part, due to the
distinctive theories and theoretical debates which have enriched
research and writing in the field since World War II. Neorealist,
neoliberal, constructivist, and structuralist schools of thought all
contribute insights which advance the leading research agendas.
Despite the occasional frustration and wasted effort created by
clearly different theoretical perspectives, International Relations as a
whole has benefited profoundly from extensive theoretical
deliberation and debate. Consider the scholarly output and
understanding triggered by controversy in only two key domains of
research, the democratic peace and globalization.
International Relations also benefits from a wide range of research
approaches. Sharp increases in the quality and availability of data
and quantifiable information have triggered improved formal analysis
and modeling. The internet has catalyzed standardization of, and
access to, data sources, as well as fruitful cross national and
transnational research efforts. At the same time, emphasis on the
role of ideas, communication, and identity have stimulated invaluable
institutional analysis, process tracing, and case studies. Bargaining
and game theory, as tested and applied in many different ways,
have generated a series of critical insights and fertile research
agendas.
The field has also grown in salience and prominence by engaging
students and scholars from multiple disciplines on key sets of
questions. Questions of peace, war and security engage sociologists,
psychologists, physicists, physicians, and anthropologists in addition
to political scientists. Issues of globalization and political economy
are tackled by economists, political scientists, and sociologists,
among others. Civil society, transnational issue networks, and
cultural identity and change are studied intensively by almost all of
these disciplines. International institutions and treaty systems are
analyzed by scholars of law, political science, and business alike.
Finally, International Relations is also contested because it is
increasingly important to citizens, immigrants, students, public
officials, workers, private sector managers, teachers and scholars in
countries worldwide. Many aspects of life inside countries are ever
more affected by the decisions and actions taken by people in other
countries. In this environment, being an informed voter, student,
official or manager requires at least basic and renewed
understanding of International Relations and foreign policies. One
key tool for developing this understanding is the articles published in
scholarly journals.
A substantial share of the leading work in International Relations
has been published in scholarly journals. The Library of Essays in
International Relations captures these crucial articles, organizes
them into coherent, structured volumes with each editor's
Introduction, and represents the field as a whole with volumes for
each of its ten main sub-areas. Students and teachers alike will find
The Library to be an invaluable tool for both research and pedagogy.
The editor of each volume has carefully reviewed a large literature to
select the pieces which substantially advanced thinking in the field at
the time of publication and, in turn, proved to be of enduring value
to students and scholars. The result is a highly accessible, organized,
and authoritative Library of the most important articles ever
published in International Relations.
DAVID A. DEESE
Series Editor
Boston College, USA
Introduction
Writing in the mid-1980s, George Kennan stated, 'When we talk
about the application of moral standards to foreign policy...we are
not talking about compliance with some clear and generally accepted
international code of behaviour' (Chapter 2, p. 22 this volume).
Instead, Kennan believed that each country had its own standards of
ethical behaviour grounded in its particular history and conception of
justice. What this meant for policymakers was that moral differences
should not be used as the 'source of grievances' with other nations,
and Kennan warned that statesmen exploited such differences at
their peril. Instead, leaders must focus solely on the 'national
interest', as if the meaning of that term was self-evident.
Kennan's implicit theory of international morality followed a long
tradition dating back at least to the time of Thomas Hobbes, As
Hobbes had written in A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a
Student of the Common Laws of England, 'It is not wisdom but
Authority that makes a law'. Given the absence of any single
international authority, the notion of global morality for Hobbes was
quite literally nonsense, and this is the position that self-styled
'realist' scholars of world politics have adopted ever since.
Contemporary political and economic theory and practice, however,
casts doubt upon this time-honoured Hobbesian claim.
We contend that scholars - and practitioners - of international
politics need to revisit their long and deeply held views about the
role of moral considerations in policymaking. This is not to assert
that by the early twenty-first century we have entered some new
age of cosmopolitan thought in which widespread agreement has
been achieved about what constitutes a just and fair global order -
far from it. The forces of power and greed remain unabated, and
leaders seem as willing as ever to settle their disputes by force
rather than through negotiation.
 Still, as depressing as the daily coverage of world events might be,
one can spot distant glimmers of convergent ideas and views about
common concerns upon observing such undertakings as the United
Nations' Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) aimed at reducing
world poverty, the global mobilization against HIV/AIDS, and
ongoing multilateral discussions to reach agreement over global
climate change policy. Human rights violations, which undoubtedly
continue around the world, are at least no longer anywhere
considered legitimate, and states that practise such abuses -
including the United States - are subject to widespread domestic and
international condemnation.
Given these emergent ideas about what is just and fair, and the
array of public policies that provide if only a dim reflection of such
ideas, the position we take in this essay is that moral considerations
do matter in shaping world politics, perhaps more than ever, and in
this volume we have gathered together a number of the major
articles that have influenced contemporary ethical thought. We thus
assert that the time has come to move beyond the old debate
between 'realists' and 'idealists' over whether morality matters in an
effort to understand how and why it matters, and that is the topic
that we first explore.
Following this we provide a brief introduction to the study and
practice of international morality, using the essays in this volume as
our main (though not exclusive) touchstone. Then we examine what
we consider to be the central points upon which theories of
international morality now converge, especially on issues of war;
membership and authority; humanitarian concern; and the social
consequences of globalization. In so doing, we look at three ethical
concepts in particular detail, namely the ideas of pluralism, rights,
and fairness, which we believe are especially influential in modern
international relations. Finally, we reach some conclusions and make
recommendations for further research.
Realism Reconsidered
We launch our analysis with what many scholars will take to be an
outrageous claim: that no sub-field of world politics has been more
engaged with ongoing events in the 'real world' than the study of
international morality. What do we mean by such a statement? What
we mean is that students of international ethics are generally
concerned not only with observing and theorizing world politics, but
in influencing it in fundamental ways. In analysing international
relations, ethicists usually take as their starting-point actual policy
debates over such issues as the use of military power in a given
conflict, the pros and cons of globalization, and how the costs of
climate change policies can be fairly distributed. The question that
they apply to these issues of public policy is not only, why do leaders
act the way they do? - which informs much of international relations
theory - but they push beyond this query in asking, how should
leaders behave when faced with a particular international challenge?
Indeed, we believe that the search for an answer to this question is
what ultimately drives the study of world politics, and scholars of
international morality, to their credit, face it head-on. In short, our
view is that the study of international relations is normative no less
than positive in its orientation, no matter the methodological
approach that is taken by a particular scholar.
Thus, even a critic of the application of moral considerations to
foreign policy like Kennan had come to study ethics because he
believed that
American statesmen of the turn of the twentieth century were unduly legalistic
and moralistic in their judgment of the actions of other governments. This
seemed to be an approach that carried them away from the sterner
requirements of political realism and caused their statements and actions,
however impressive to the domestic political audience, to lose effectiveness in
the international arena. (Chapter 2. p. 19)

Kennan unwittingly reminds us that self-styled realists are not only

'positive' analysts of how governments act and react in the face of
international pressures, but they also have a normative mission of
telling governments how they should behave on the world stage.
Indeed, today's realism might be considered an ethical theory by
stealth, using the concept of 'interest' as a smokescreen for its
normative concerns. Bernard Brodie writes in his book War &
Politics:
While morality by its very nature must finally be justified entirely on its own
terms, it is not amiss to remind ourselves that especially in this world of
abundant and rapid communications, any of our policies abroad that are either
conspicuously immoral to begin with or likely to lapse into behaviour that can
be easily so labeled, whether justly or not so justly, is likely to prove quite
inexpedient and ultimately self-defeating. (Brodie, 1973, pp. 376)

In other words, immoral policies are likely to be perceived as

illegitimate and therefore difficult if not impossible to sustain over
time.
Of course, we note that realists were not always so 'stealthy' in
their approach to ethics. The 'classical' realists like Morgenthau and
Niebuhr struggled mightily with ethical issues, which they realized
must loom larger than ever in the nuclear age, with mankind ever on
the brink of total annihilation. From that perspective, it is
disappointing to say the least that contemporary realists tend to
dismiss the importance of moral considerations in shaping world
politics.
Yet they have not been let off the hook by other members of the
profession. In contrast to the realist's blindness to moral concerns,
scholars like Michael Walzer have effectively exploited strongly held
ethical beliefs - specifically in his case, the belief that innocent lives
should be protected - to write a virtual jeremiad on how modern
wars should be conducted (Walzer, 1977 and Chapter 11 this
volume).
Walzer provides perhaps the most prominent example of how
moral reasoning may influence decision-makers, and today few
scholars of military policy would dispute the statement that a
concern with civilian casualties has powerfully shaped the strategies
and tactics of many armed forces since the end of World War II
(Kahl, 2006; David Luban, Chapter 9). It thus seems fair to say that
international relations theorists of all stripes have, at some point,
appealed to moral considerations as a way of either explaining
and/or influencing policy decisions.
Have these appeals mattered in any material way? Have ethical
ideas really shaped the foreign policies of the great powers? It is one
thing to assert the importance of moral considerations in world
politics; it is another thing to show it.
In order to answer these questions, let us begin with a brief
thought experiment. Imagine a world that was driven solely by the
'interests' of nations. Can we readily explain the world we live in by
an appeal to such interests?
Now some would claim that such a question cannot be answered,
because the notion of 'interest' is too elastic and thus virtually non-
falsifiable. Thus, whatever states do in practice must, by definition,
be in their interest. Of course, policymakers may have cognitive
limitations of various kinds (such as bounded rationality;
overconfidence in their own judgements, and so forth), but they can
still be usefully modelled as 'rational' actors driven by some
overriding notion of power, security, or the national interest.
But in recent years an array of empirical studies across the
substantive sub-fields (for example, security studies, political
economy) and theoretical traditions (for example, constructivism,
positivism) of international relations have cast doubt upon the
robustness of the rational actor model and the conception of interest
that is associated with it. And as we will see below, these empirical
findings have been bolstered by recent theoretical and experimental
work in behavioural economics among other fields. Overall, this work
suggests the need for new understandings of how decision-makers
actually operate.
Within security studies, for example, the influence of Walzer's
work has already been mentioned, and more policy-oriented scholars
have confirmed the shift in military policy toward a focus on the
reduction of civilian casualties, even when that makes war-fighting
more difficult (Kahl, 2006). Scholars like Joseph Nye (1986 and
Chapter 17 this volume) and Scott Sagan (2004) have also written
about how moral considerations have shaped nuclear weapons
policy, giving rise, for example, to debates over the principle of 'no
first use'. In the sphere of international political economy, a growing
number of studies have pointed to the role of ethical considerations
in shaping policies over trade (Kapstein, Chapter 25 this volume), aid
(Lumsdaine, 1993), and poverty reduction (Finnemore, 1975).
For now, the point we wish to make is that a growing body of
theoretical, experimental, and empirical work in social science is all
pointing toward a finding of fundamental importance for students of
world politics: namely, that moral concerns play a significant role in
how actors actually behave in a variety of settings. To be sure, we
do not wish to exaggerate this claim. As the collapse in the summer
of 2008 of the recent Doha Round of the World Trade Organization
suggests, states are far from acting 'fairly' toward one another in the
pursuit of some cosmopolitan objective of, say, greater world trade
or income; the selfish drive for greater relative wealth and power
obviously matter greatly to outcomes. Still, moral considerations do
seem to influence state actions in ways that are non-trivial.
Specifically, we see growing global convergence around a particular
set of ethical norms that are well documented in the essays selected
for this volume.

International Norms: Pluralism,

Rights and Fairness
A 'norm" signifies expected and required behaviour. Norms shape
expectations while suggesting duties and restraints, requirements
and standards. Norms modify behaviour and as such they are deeply
connected to the capacity to act. Most norms emerge from hard-won
lessons of experience in an attempt to guide future decision making
and action. And because they confer legitimacy, norms are bound
ultimately to moral claims.
 Norms depend deeply on context and therefore there is no single
normative theory to which we can appeal. Isaiah Berlin gave up his
chair in normative theory, as the story goes, because he felt he had
no normative theory to purvey. Perhaps this was because he
understood the complexities of agency, contingency, interpretation
and genuine clashes of interests. Berlin eventually resorted to what
might be called a 'humanistic approach', based on observing,
describing and commenting. He did not pretend to offer a grand
theory that would stand the test of the multiplicity of cases he was
interested in. Perhaps the best we can do, he concluded, is to be
clear about choices, tradeoffs, and justifications. In this way, he was
deeply interested in empirical observation as his starting point
(Berlin, 1997).
Many normative analysts begin with strong realist assumptions:
for them, conflict and difference define human society. These
analysts do not seek homogenization; rather, they explore the
possibilities of mutual understanding based on what is common in
the human experience. Paradoxically, the most common aspect of
human experience is difference itself. How we live with difference -
especially in light of common problems - is the question to be asked
and answered by any serious student of international relations. A
good clue as to how to these analysts proceed is offered by Berlin in
his idea of 'objective pluralism' (Berlin, 1997). The pluralist
understands that while 'central truths are eternal, local answers
differ'. A full understanding of international relations will recognize
that core human values such as self-interest, fear, and honour will
manifest differently according to time, place and circumstance.
The two enemies of pluralism are monism and relativism. Monists
are purveyors of moral clarity, single-minded advocates of truth as
they see it. As such monists avoid moral argument - they will prefer
to adhere to dogma, the validity of which is based on faith and will
remain beyond human reason and reach. Monists neglect the fact
that new information often changes our views: while truth may be
our ultimate goal and guide, our understanding of truth may change
over time especially in light of new information and experience.
Humility is required even in the face of conviction. Ironically, the one
thing we should all agree upon is that we can be wrong.
Relativism presents its own challenges, particularly the idea that
every moral claim is just as good as another and that norms are
merely the reflection of powerful actors who stand to gain from their
enforcement. Pluralists hold firm against the cynicism and potential
nihilism of relativist challenges. They put forward the observation
that every society has strongly developed codes of duty and restraint
that promote some notion of human well-being. What makes us
human is our capacity to understand these norms, how they
developed and why - even if we disagree with them strongly. This
empathy enhances the prospects for moral argument. So for
example, we first must understand how a concept like 'honour
killing' becomes a duty in some societies; and then we engage in
moral argument as to why it is not acceptable.
Pluralism, simply put, is empathy for diversity while seeking what
is common in humanity. It is the attempt to see some common
human value even in the midst of different cultural practice. Looking
at ethics in international relations in terms of pluralism - what is
simultaneously common and different - is a trend that is growing
especially in light of discussions of not only realism and its critics,
but also cosmopolitanism and its critics. Issues of citizenship and
sovereignty are the forefront of many research agendas (Joseph
Carens, Chapter 20). The idea of pluralism informs and enhances
many of these projects.
The rock bottom principle for any normative analysis continues to
be the idea of 'rights'. By 'rights' we mean entitlements and
protections in relation to duties and responsibilities. Rights
arguments are put forward against arguments of utility. According to
rights theorists from Kant to Jefferson and beyond, there is
something fundamental about being human (an inalienable
characteristic) that prohibits any person from being treated as
something merely 'useful', as a means to an end. The source of
human rights is an unending debate. However, we are persuaded by
the arguments of Shklar (1989) and Ignatieff and Gutmann (2001)
that in the end, perhaps foundational arguments do not really
matter. Empirical observation of the mass murders of the twentieth
century (think of the body counts under the regimes of Hitler, Stalin
and Mao) should be sufficient as an argument for the necessity of
human rights. The fact that we witnessed the genocides and gulags
of twentieth century should be enough to make the case that
protection is needed and duties therefore follow.
The challenge for rights-based analysis comes from the challenge
of how to draw boundaries for such claims. What does it mean to
have a universal right? How can such rights be enforced? What is
the relevant community for individual claims of rights? As Michael
Walzer wrote about Avishai Margalit's The Ethics of Memory, 'ethics
flourishes within an enclosed social space' (Walzer, 2003, pp. 36). Or,
in another formulation by Walzer, ethics govern our 'thick
relationships' - those to whom we share history, culture and
community. By contrast, morality governs 'thin' relationships - that
is, those to whom we have no connection, distant strangers who live
in other communities (Walzer, 1994). This distinction becomes
blurred in the context of globalization. In an age of deep economic
integration, shared concerns about global climate change, extensive
migration, increasing flows of technology and information, is it viable
to continue to speak about separate communities? Or is a planetary
focus necessary and/or inevitable? Thomas Pogge (Chapter 21) for
example, argues that globalization is an empirical fact that requires
corresponding normative adjustments.
The issue of rights raises the spectre of 'ethical demands'. These
demands may take the form of 'perfect' obligations or 'imperfect'
obligations - the policy areas we examine usually require both.
Perfect obligations are specific and direct; for example, do not
torture. Imperfect obligations are 'more general, and less exactly
specified'; in the case at hand, this signals 'the requirement to
consider the ways and means through which torture can be
prevented' (Sen, 2004).
As we consider imperfect obligations, we inevitably move toward
the slippery concept of 'fairness'. We have earlier noted that the
empirical study of fairness has been bolstered in recent years by
theoretical and experimental research in psychology and behavioural
economics. One of the most widely-used models for illustrating
fairness considerations is provided by the Ultimatum Game (UG), in
which two players have the opportunity to divide a pot of money.
Under the UG, a Proposer (P) makes an offer to a Respondent (R)
over how the money should be divided; R can either accept the offer
- in which case the money is divided as P proposed - or reject the
offer, in which case both players walk away empty-handed.
The classic, rational actor model of behaviour would have
predicted that, in such cases, the split might be something along the
lines of 99:1; that is, P would offer R 1 unit while keeping 99 for
herself. For profit-maximizing agents, this division makes both
parties better off and so there is no reason for R to reject it.
Maximization strategies therefore lead to unequal divisions of a given
pie.
But behavioural economists, repeating the UG in a variety of
countries and under and a variety of conditions, have observed a
puzzling result. When R's are offered an amount that they consider
to be 'unfair' they reject it - they would prefer nothing to something.
Indeed, knowing that 'unfair' offers are likely to be rejected, P's
routinely offer about one-half the pot at the outset, and when asked
why they do so they normally answer that 'this seems fair'.
Researchers have drawn several significant findings from the UG,
all 01 which are relevant to the study of moral considerations in
world politics (Kapstein, 2006 and Chapter 25 this volume). First, P's
adopt moral reasoning or other-regarding behaviour out of their self-
interest. Proposers who do not care about what others think must
nonetheless fear rejection of an 'unfair' offer and the absence of any
payoff whatsoever. The adoption of 'fairness considerations' is
therefore efficiency enhancing to the extent that it leads to an
agreement and thus an increase in welfare for both of the agents.
Second, the Proposer's concern with achieving an equitable or fair
result arises in part from uncertainty about how R will respond to its
offer. If P knows that R will willingly accept a greedy offer, P will be
much more inclined to propose a lopsided division. Not knowing R's
response ex ante, P offers the amount that intuitively seems to be
fair (that is, equal division).
 In this age of globalization, whither reciprocity? Who owes what to
whom? What is the nature of our economic, social and political
connections? What constitutes our horizontal duties (to others) and
vertical duties (across generations)? It is no longer sufficient to think
of ourselves as single actors acting within one set of social
arrangements. We are not only citizens, but consumers and
members of civil society nested within a global economy, a global
climate and a global culture. Our capacity to act takes on several
dimensions. Seen in this way, self-interests are defined broadly in
what might be called enlightened self-interest - that is, what is good
for you is likely to be what is good for others involved. This is the
nature of complex problems and decisions. Taken to the state level,
national interests must be seen in terms of global responsibilities.
National aspirations must be tempered by the palpable forces of
complex interdependence and international norms.

Fairness for Realists: The Role of

Reciprocity
For international relations theorists of the realist school, cooperation
among states is scarce because world politics resembles a prisoner's
dilemma game. Since states are always insecure, the threat of
conflict and war inevitably casts a shadow over their relations. The
result is less cooperation and more conflict than states would
rationally choose if their sole objective were welfare maximization.
Some realists therefore assert that a dominant power, a hegemon,
may be necessary to overcome this 'tragedy' by imposing order on
the international system. Conversely, cooperation is unlikely to occur
when the distribution of international power is characterized by
multipolarity; that is, when several states possess similar levels of
power resources. Under the condition of multipolarity, security will
be in short supply and the logic of relative gains will predominate.
The probability of achieving durable cooperation in this setting is
therefore miniscule.
Does realist logic therefore lead states toward conflict and war? If
that is the case, it means that security must be the major
preoccupation of every leader, since otherwise they risk state
survival. But it is by no means clear that realist theory in fact leads
to this sombre conclusion. In fact, if one believes that a balance of
power will ultimately form against any aggressor state, we would
then expect states to avoid violence and instead seek to redress
their grievances through either negotiation or acceptance of the
status quo. If they fail to do so, this must be because of the foreign
policy decisions made within states, as opposed to an inevitable
product of systemic forces.
We are now getting closer to an ethical theory of international
relations, one that is grounded in the policy choices that states
make. If governments know, for example, that peace is more likely
the more they trade with other states, and that war is more likely
when trade is curtailed or halted - as some scholars and
policymakers have contended, going back at least to Montesquieu -
this suggests that they can shape the international environment in
which they live, for better or for worse. They can act in such a way
as to promote a more peaceful world, again for example by
increasing trade with one another (if such an association indeed
holds empirically). As Robert Keohane (Chapter 7) has written,
'Without altering the basic structure of anarchy, governments can
make the world safer, or more dangerous, through the strategies
they follow' (p. 169).
But on what basis should cooperative relations among states take
place? After all, 'cooperation' can take many forms, and various
international actors might not agree on what constitutes a 'fair' set
of collective governance mechanisms. Should all states have a more
equal voice in global governance? Should the more powerful states
be a greater than equal share of influence in making these rules In
answering these questions, let us pursue the case of international
trade somewhat further.
 Traditionally, states that have pursued trade agreements have
done so on the basis of what Keohane has called 'specific
reciprocity', meaning 'situations in which specified partners exchange
items of equivalent value in a strictly delimited sequence' (p. 146).
In trade negotiations, for example, countries offer up tariff
'concessions' of equal value in the quest for a deal, with the
European Union, say, opening its markets to the United States if and
only if the US acts reciprocally toward the EU. The game-theoretic
strategy of 'tit-for-tat' provides an example of specific reciprocity,
and its power in promoting cooperative outcomes should not be
underestimated. As Robert Axelrod showed in The Evolution of
Cooperation (1984), tit-for-tat maximizes payoffs to the players in an
iterated as opposed to a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game. Since
trading relations are likely to be iterated, specific reciprocity would
appear to be a sound strategy for the players to adopt, and indeed it
figures prominently in the international trade regime that is
institutionalized in the World Trade Organization.
But cooperation based on specific reciprocity should not be
confused with an international arrangement that is necessarily just
or fair to all parties, especially in a world that is constituted by states
that are very unequal in their power capabilities. Imagine a trade
regime that was based only on specific reciprocity. In this case, the
United States would offer up, say, $10 billion in trade concessions if
all its trading partners are willing to do the same. That might work
for the European Union, but Bangladesh is hardly in a position to
counter with trade opening on that scale. In this case, fairness
dictates that each country open its borders on the basis of its
national income or capability. Following Keohane, I call that
arrangement one that is based on 'diffuse reciprocity', or what trade
negotiators call 'relaxed reciprocity'.
In policy terms, the notion of diffuse reciprocity could mean that
countries exchange concessions on the basis of their relative
economic size, as opposed to equivalent exchanges of equal value.
In short, diffuse reciprocity suggests that 'special and differential'
treatment for certain states, namely those that are poor and
underdeveloped, may be required as part of a just trading order.
Only by incorporating some notion of diffuse reciprocity can a truly
inclusive international system be built.
Why would great powers adopt a policy of diffuse or relaxed
reciprocity in which they negotiate a level of benefits to smaller
states that might not be returned in full? The answer is because the
resulting international structure is likely to be more robust, more
stable as a result. World politics is full of uncertainty and at some
point the small, dissatisfied powers might seek to alter the status
quo. Psychological studies of violent behaviour reveal that 'the idea
of justice or fairness may be more centrally related to attitudes
toward violence than are feelings of deprivation. It is the perceived
injustice underlying the depravation that gives rise to anger or
frustration' (Blumenthal, 1975, pp. 108).
Legal theorists Francesco Parisi and Nita Ghei (2003) provide,
from a game-theoretic perspective, a rationale for why the norm of
diffuse reciprocity can provide a stable basis for cooperation. They
examine a game setting in which players undertake repeated games
with repeated 'shocks' to the possible outcomes. What this means is
that there is an element of randomness attached to player payoffs,
and thus a large amount of uncertainty regarding how to play the
game and how the other player will behave. What they found was
that the players do not adopt tit-for-tat strategies in this setting, but
instead cooperate in the expectation of some general reciprocal
return in the future.
The more general finding from this line of research, coupled with
the results of experimental work with the Ultimatum Game described
earlier, suggest that uncertainty can help promote cooperation rather
than undermine it. That uncertainty causes governments to act fairly
in an effort to keep states from becoming dissatisfied with the status
quo and' leaving the reservation'. Henry Kissinger put this sentiment
well when he wrote that 'agreement on shared values inhibits the
desire to overthrow the world order' (Kissinger, 1994, pp. 77).
Andrew Hurrell makes a similar point when he argues 'A great deal
of the struggle for political power is the quest for authoritative
control that avoids costly and dangerous reliance on brute force and
coercion' (Ref?, p. 000). 'As usual, E.H. Carr said it best when he
wrote, "Those who hope to profit most by [a political] order can in
the long run only hope to maintain it by making sufficient
concessions ... to those who profit by it least'" (Kapstein, Chapter
25, p. 528, this volume. In other words, there is power in moral
reasoning.
Intriguingly, the game-theoretic setting described above, in which
agents must make decisions about their interactions in the face of
considerable uncertainty, reminds us of the Rawlsian model of
decision-making with respect to a society's 'basic institutions' or its
social contract. It will be recalled that Rawls's 'original position'
imagines a group of representative individuals who meet from
behind a veil of ignorance, knowing only that they are expected to
create enduring principles for their interactions and their institutions
(Rawls, 1971 andChapter 5 this volume). These self-interested
agents may nonetheless reach agreements that are ultimately in the
collective interest because they must imagine their changing life
circumstances over time: in short, they must confront uncertainty
about the future, whereby a healthy person becomes ill or a rich
person becomes poor. Keohane makes a similar point when he writes
of international cooperation under the principle of diffuse reciprocity
that 'in such international regimes, actors recognize that a "veil of
ignorance" separates them from the future but nevertheless offers
benefits on the assumption that these will redound to their own
advantage in the end' (Chapter 7, p. 165).
The concept of diffuse reciprocity is also consistent with Rawls's
'difference principle' or the notion that 'just' societies should
maximize the life chances of those who are least advantaged. As
Rawls wrote of this principle, it 'expresses a conception of
reciprocity. It is a principle of mutual benefit ... The social order can
be justified to everyone, and in particular to those who are least
favored; and in this sense it is egalitarian' (1971, p. 102-103).
The Future of Ethics in International
Relations
Drawing on the concepts of pluralism, rights, fairness, and
reciprocity, we can see how it is possible for rational egoists to
cooperate, even in the absence of some external enforcement
mechanism or 'higher authority' (see Ostrom, Walker and Gardner,
Chapter8). And indeed, cooperation - lest we forget - is a significant
feature of human existence at every level of analysis, including
among nation-states. Conflict may grab our attention, but much of
daily life is about cooperating. But as Keohane (Chapter 7) reminds
us, nations that interact on the basis of diffuse reciprocity will enjoy
a much wider scope for multilateral cooperation than those that
adopt only strict reciprocity as the basis for their international
relations.
In emphasizing the promise of cooperation through agreement
over common concerns, we have shown that the grim view that
realist theory holds about world politics has questionable theoretical
much less empirical foundations. We have argued instead that moral
considerations can play a significant role in shaping state behaviour,
and that despair about the possibility of improving the human
condition is unwarranted. Still, we are by no means 'starry eyed'
idealists, and recognize that the international community has a very
far distance to travel before it agrees on what the world's major
challenges are, much less confronts them in a way that its
constituent members (mainly states, but increasingly made up of
other actors as well - more on this below) view as just and fair.
What then should the future research agenda on ethics in
international affairs focus on? Here we will highlight a few of the
areas which we think should command particular attention.
First, it will come as no surprise at this point that we believe that
much of the future action in ethical research will consist of
'mainstreaming morality' by exploring the connections between
behavioural economics and ethics with respect to public policy at the
global level. While most of the work to date has used 'individual
subjects' as its level of analysis (thus, how do students behave when
confronted with x, y, or z problem), more research is needed to
examine 'corporate' entities like firms or states. While game
theorists, for example, have long assumed that their models could
be translated from individual to corporate entities (by assuming that
the corporate actor is a single rational agent), experimentalists have
been more reticent to make that leap beyond the individual subject.
Second, we accept the commonplace observation that
international relations are being stretched beyond the nation-state
model, and for us this means that innovative ways of incorporating
the authority and moral standing of new loci of power, including
multinational corporations and global civil society, is of crucial
importance to the study of world politics. Today, the largest
corporations play a tremendous role in shaping our economic and
social relations, but incredibly they have been largely absent from
the agenda of modern international relations theory. In a related
vein, the success of such non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as
Human Rights Watch and Doctors without Borders (generally known
by its French acronym MSF) in staking their political claims has
spurred similar social justice advocacy groups in areas ranging from
arms control (for example, banning landmines) to public health (for
example, access to AIDS vaccines). Still we know relatively little
about why some groups and causes succeed in influencing policy
agendas while others struggle. The 'independent' role of
international organizations such as the United Nations and the World
Bank in shaping the global response to such functional issues as
terrorism, climate change, poverty, and disease also deserves more
analysis.
We find no particular reason to believe that these non-state actors
will decrease in influence in the coming years, even as renewed
security concerns (for example, over terrorism) have again
strengthened the role of the state. As such, the state-centric
(essentially realist) take on international morality may need
adaptation and revision. The relatively limited or restrained demands
for ethical behaviour in the international system made by those who
adopt the state-centric approach, as expressed for example in such
works as Rawls's Law of Peoples, will be increasingly challenged by
the countervailing forces of cosmopolitan concerns along with real
threats to the global commons. The task facing students of
international morality today is to articulate just what it means to
behave ethically in the context of an emerging world polity, as well
as to address the politically feasible pathways toward a brighter
future for all.

References
Axelrod, Robert (1984), The Evolution of Cooperation, New York:
Basic Books.
Berlin, Isaiah (1997), The Pursuit of the Ideal: The Proper Study of
Mankind, New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.
Blumenthal, Monica D. et al (1975), More about Justifying Violence:
Methodological Studies of Attitudes and Behavior, Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan.
Brodie, Bernard (1973), War and Politics, New York: Macmillan
Publishing.
Finnemore, Martha (1975), National Interests in International
Society, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Hobbes, Thomas (1971 [1681]), A Dialogue Between a Philosopher
and a Student of the Common Laws of England, USA: University
of Chicago.
Hobbes, Thomas (2003 [16601]), Leviathan, Bristol: Thoemmes
Continuum.
Ignatieff, Michael and Amy Gutmann (2001), Human Rights as
Politics and Idolatry, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Kahl, Colin H. (2006). 'How We Fight', Foreign Affairs, 85, pp. 83-
101.
Kapstein, Ethan B. (2006), Economic Justice in an Unfair World,
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Kissinger, Henry (1994), Diplomacy, New York: Simon & Schuster.
Lumsdaine, David Halloran (1993), Moral Vision in International
Politics: the Foreign Aid Regime, 1949-1989, Princeton. NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Nye, Joseph S. (1986). Nuclear Ethics, New York: Free Press.
Parisi, Francesco and Nita Ghei (2003), 'The Role of Reciprocity in
International Law'. Cornell International Law Journal, 36, pp. 93-
123.
Rawls, John (1971), A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Belknap
Press.
Sagan, Scott D. (2004), 'Realist Perspectives on Ethical Norms and
Weapons of Mass Destruction', in D.H. Scott. Sohail H. Hashmi
and Steven P. Lee, eds, Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction,
Cambridge University Press, pp. 15-31.
Sen, Amartya (2004), "Elements of a Theory of Human Rights',
Philosophy & Public Affairs, 32. pp. 315-56.
Shklar, Judith (1989), 'The Liberalism of Fear', in Nancy L.
Rosenblum, ed., Liberalism and the Moral Life, Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, pp. 21-38.
Walzer, Michael (1977), Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument
with Historical Illustrations, New York: Basic Books.
Walzer, Michael (1994), Thick arid Thin. Moral Argument at Home
and Abroad, Notre Dame,IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
Walzer, Michael (2003), 'The Present of the Past', New Republic,
228, pp. 36-7.
 Part I
Pluralism, Rights and Fairness
 [1]
Basic Moral Values: A Shared
Core
Frances V. Harbour

Students annually torture teachers of ethics and international affairs

with a long list of impossible questions. Among the hardest for me to
answer has always been whether moral values have any basis other
than the conventions of a particular culture or the whims of a single
individual. Is morality merely a matter of either private or national
taste, on a par with preferring apple pie to baklava? Or do some
moral principles have a weight that extends beyond subjectivity?
When applied to international affairs the already sticky question is
made even worse by a serious empirical tangle. If morality is entirely
objective, how can we explain well-known differences between
cultures and between individuals on specific moral questions? But,
on the other hand, if morality is merely subjective, why is there so
much concurrence between societies at the most basic level of
morality? These questions have pedagogical and policy implications
as well. If we do not recognize and respect differences in moral
values, why should we or our students practice tolerance? But if
there are no objective limits, how can we avoid letting leaders like
Adolf Hitler, Josef Stalin, and Idi Amin off the hook morally? This
article is the result of my attempts to wrestle with these intractable
questions on my own account and for my students.
Certainly the first side of the problem is better known than the
second. Attempts to apply moral and ethical concepts to
international affairs are widely criticized on the grounds that moral
values differ too much from society to society to make valid cross-
cultural judgments possible. And certainly one must acknowledge
very important value differences between cultures. In some
societies, for example, revenge killing may be considered a duty. In
others, it is forbidden. In some societies women vote. In others they
do not even drive. Sometimes the differences extend to individuals
in the same culture. One American considers abortion wrong.
Another does not. Differences between cultures or between
individuals often make political relationships difficult inside a country,
much less across borders. This insight captures an important part of
the reality of the international world. But it is only one part.
The other side of the problem is less well known. As important as
the variation in local codes is a surprising concurrence, on a very
general or basic level, of ethical evaluations among cultures with
very different traditions and circumstances. As anthropologists Alfred
Louis Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn point out, "considering the
exuberant variation of cultures in most respects, the circumstance
that in some particulars almost identical values prevail throughout
mankind is most arresting.'"1
How then is the scholar, practitioner—or teacher—to deal with
both sides of the issue? My answer has two parts. First, a shared
core of human moral values does exist, but only at the most basic
level: approval of beneficence, justice, courage, and so on. My
hypothesis is that secondary and tertiary moral values differ between
societies because cultures build on these basic, shared building
stones in different ways. Secondary values are elaborations and
specifications of the general values in the form of culturally shaped
definitions and principles of conduct. For example, is there a moral
difference between murder and killing in war? Am I bound by my
promises in business transactions? The definitions or intermediate-
level principles, in turn, are used to construct specific codes of
behavior at a tertiary level. What is the just punishment for murder?
May I kill male noncombatants in war? Am I bound by contracts with
foreigners?
If moral conventions are constructed from shared human values
the observer can explain not only differences between societies but
also seemingly puzzling similarities. This hypothesis does not,
however, explain why there are shared core values in the first place.
Many, including Kroeber and Kluckhohn, would argue that human
beings simply respond in similar ways to the necessities of our
nature and environment.2 My argument is that the basic, foundation-
level moral values are shared across cultures because they share the
same objective property. There is a right and wrong that we perceive
and to which we react by means of an emotional trace. However,
since the original signal is delicate— and the secondary and tertiary
levels are constructed from the basic level by fallible human beings—
the further the applications get from the shared core, the less
assurance we have that a given principle, character trait, or rule
shares the objective property.
The main reason moral philosophers have not been very
interested in the empirical issue of whether or not universal moral or
ethical values exist is that they quite rightly point out that this data
would not prove the existence of objective moral values one way or
the other. All the cultures in the world might simply be incorrect. I
am not claiming here that near universal acceptance proves that
morality is real property in certain evaluations—that "ought" follows
from "is." I am simply arguing that, if objective moral values do exist
at a very general level, it would be extremely odd if there were no
shared moral values at all. There are, however, a few shared moral
values. This fact is consistent with and, indeed, suggestive of some
underlying objective causal factor.

Defining Morality
An important problem arises when we try to explain why morality, if
it is objective rather than a matter of taste or convention, is so
difficult to define precisely. Here the job is not to identify the content
of morality and thus to distinguish right from wrong; instead, the
metaethical question is how we can tell if a judgment belongs in the
domain of morality at all. That this is a controversial undertaking
supports the notion that morality is "nonnatural." According to
philosophers, if moral values were "naturalistic" we could simply
translate them into "factual, nonvaluational terms" with nothing
important left over.3
The problem, at least from the perspective of the ordinary user of
moral language, is that there seems no valid answer to G. E, Moore's
famous open question argument.4 For example, if a property of good
things—such as Bertrand Russell's definition of good as "that which
we desire to desire"—is synonymous with goodness, we would not
be able to ask sensibly, "It may be that which I desire to desire, but
is it good?"5 The reason the question makes sense is that, at least
for the average user of moral language, the first clause simply does
not have the same meaning as the second. Technically, it represents
an open, not a closed question. The same seems to be true of any
naturalistic definition of moral terms that we can offer. (For example,
try asking Moore's question with the principle of utility—right
consists of producing the greatest net happiness.) This means any
naturalistic definition of moral terms does not fully capture the
concept.
There is nothing logically wrong with stipulatively defining or
proposing reform of moral language, but stipulation and proposal do
not by themselves change meaning except for those who choose to
accept the definition. Goodness, rightness, and other normative
concepts thus do not seem to be naturalistic in and of themselves.
In this sense the intuitionists seem to be correct.
The intuitionists miss something important, however, in their
insistence that moral properties are not knowable by standard
perceptual means, but only by the somewhat mysterious faculty of
intuition.6 What they do not take sufficient account of is that, while
the moral properties do not simply consist of their naturalistic
counterparts, we can recognize that such properties are present
through their effects on our nervous systems. Thus, moral-sense
philosophers such as David Hume and Annette Baier (and more
recently political scientist James Q. Wilson) have an important
insight: humans register morality through emotional reactions. And,
as this moral-sense school points out, the emotional stimulus plays
an important role in motivating us to act morally.
I would argue then that moral feelings are the naturalistic trace
caused by the perception of objective but nonnatural moral
properties. The problem is, individuals and societies can train
themselves to ignore these feelings or even to feel similar sensations
in response to inappropriate stimuli, as in genocidal behavior. Thus,
there is naturalistic, value-neutral evidence that we have correctly
perceived a basic moral value only when we both feel a sentiment of
approval or disapproval and there exists a matching, persistent,
intercultural pattern of positive or negative affect toward the general
category of behavior or character represented. Values bolstered in
this way may be (with only a little trepidation) regarded as
authoritative.
By definition, there is no way to prove empirically the correctness
of the hypothesis: the proposed property is nonnatural. There are,
however, good reasons for holding the position and arguing that the
objections raised to similar hypotheses do not demolish it. This is an
argument like some in physics. Nonnatural, objective value at the
most basic level is comparable to the hypothesized "weak" and
"strong" forces at work in the nuclei of atoms. Its presence, like
theirs, cannot be apprehended directly. However, there is empirical
evidence for its possible, even probable, existence; its existence
would explain observable phenomena that are otherwise puzzling;
and objections to its existence do not appear decisive.
To say that morality cannot be rally denned in empirical terms is
not to say that it cannot be recognized or that we cannot separate
moral from nonmoral judgments. Here philosopher William Frankena
offers some particularly useful ideas. He points out that morality as
an institution is a more or less self-conscious "action-guide, some
kind of standard for conduct, character formation, and life,
something by which, together with the facts or what we believe or
take to be the facts about ourselves, our situation, and the world,
we do or may determine how we should act or shape ourselves."
What distinguishes morality from other social-action guides such as
law and etiquette is that the judgments are not merely tools for
judging the effectiveness, prudence, or beauty of actions, and so on.
Like law and etiquette, morality mostly deals with how people ought
to relate to each other, but unlike law and etiquette, Frankena
argues, the judgment is in some sense "ultimate or for its own
sake...[although taken] from the point of view of the consideration
of the effects of actions, motives, traits, etc. on the lives of persons
or sentient beings as such."7 Thus, a moral value is not akin to a
mere preference for apple pie over baklava. Morality involves
evaluations that bear on the essence of being human. Hume and
Baier and other subjectivists explain these evaluations simply as
conventionalized responses to the human condition, but they offer
no persuasive evidence that the emotion they catalog could not be
stimulated by perception of an objective property.

The Objectivity of Moral Values

Much of the metaethical debate of the twentieth century has
concerned what statements such as "X is evil" mean if there is no
such thing as objective moral value. Radical emotivists have
suggested that a plausible translation is "X, ick!" The prescriptivist
translation would be something like "No doing X, please."8
At least in one sense, both of these translations suffer from a
serious shortcoming. They do not reflect what the "ordinary user of
moral language" means when she makes a judgment or exhorts
someone to some behavior. As J. L Mackie points out, "the ordinary
user of moral language means to say something about whatever that
he categorizes morally...as it is in itself, or would be if it were
realized, and not about, or even expressive of, his or anyone else's
attitude or relation to it."9 Mackie correctly argues that most
ordinary users of moral language at least think they are making a
statement about the actual state of some aspect of the universe.
Belief is not enough to prove objectivity, of course. Nevertheless,
philosophers who depend heavily on linguistic analysis of meaning
but do not take this intention into account make prescriptions
without having fully dealt with the nature of their empirical data.
Although the fact that this belief in objectivity is widely held does
not make it true, that it is so widespread at least suggests the
possibility that there is something objective that stimulates the
shared experience. Moreover, it is not merely unsophisticated people
who have believed that moral properties in some sense represent
objective reality. Until comparatively recently the mainstream of
Western philosophical thinking (including Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas,
Kant, Sidgwick, and Mill) also held this view.
There is thus an empirical problem. If an objective property of
morality does not exist, why is there such a persistent, intercultural
pattern of taking morality to have objective authority? The position
here is like Kant's, a view that while it is the mind that puts together
the pieces of the outside world, its creation has objective force,
necessity, and universality.10 If we as human beings have similar
reactions under similar conditions, it is somewhat odd to say that
there is no objective condition to which we are reacting.
If a scientist were told of a belief that, like the belief that morality
is objective, was shared by most human beings throughout Western
recorded history but was rejected by some of the people living in
one time period, the scientist would need very strong evidence for
believing that what was operating was not some parochial aspect of
that one group's culture or material circumstances.
Regarding moral properties as merely subjective thus leaves open
an empirical problem of a persistent erroneous belief. This problem
does not arise if moral principles or virtues have objective weight
beyond the individual or society that affirms this authority. This
suggests that subjectivism needs a very strong case in order to carry
the day against the prima facie plausibility of the objectivity of at
least some ethical values.
Do Variations in Ethical Codes Mean
No Objective Value?
Although regarding moral properties as merely subjective is
problematic, regarding all moral beliefs as equally objective leaves
open a serious problem on the other side of the intercultural
dilemma. Different societies assign different priorities to the general
values they share. Moreover, J. L. Mackie is only one of the
philosophers who spotlight "the well known variation in moral codes
from one society to another." He argues that "actual variations in the
code are more readily explained by the hypothesis that they reflect
ways of life than by the hypothesis that they express perceptions,
most of them inadequate and badly distorted, of objective values."11
As Mackie himself points out, the strength of this argument
against objective value depends in part on how general one believes
the original values reflected in resulting judgments to be.12 If, for
example, virtues such as "justice" or "beneficence," or even
principles such as "do not murder," are what are intrinsically
valuable, then the guidance they provide will be quite general. The
values will lead to outlines and tendencies rather than to detailed
codes. Thus, we should not find it surprising that some—although
not all—behavior considered morally proper in one culture is not
considered morally proper in another. As Stephen Toulmin points out,
shared central moral values "are recognized in just about all societies
and communities." It is primarily definitions of situations, the derived
or secondary evaluations, the "marginal issues and considerations
about which different societies, cultures, and groups display much
less unanimity."13
If this conclusion is correct, specific definitions and rules derived
from the general principles are in part contingent on local conditions.
Only the general values and the resulting tendency to react
emotionally to them are universal. For example, all societies require
some individual sacrifices for the good of the community, but these
sacrifices differ in degree. Some of the disagreements between
China and the United States over human rights arise because
Chinese culture is more communally oriented than contemporary
U.S. society. But, unless we are talking about a general concept
shared by both cultures, how can we compare differences between
conceptions? We do not normally compare baklava to trees.
One should not assume automatically that division and discord are
inherent even at the secondary and tertiary levels. For example, in
September 1993, representatives of more than 125 religions signed
a nine-page document called "The Declaration of a Global Ethic."
Among other concepts, it condemns violence and leaders who "incite
aggression, fanaticism, hate, and xenophobia." It advocates respect
for nature and between the sexes. The signers were both Eastern
and Western and included groups as diverse as Roman Catholics,
Sikhs, Hare Krishnas, Zoroastrians, and Lutherans. What surprised
Hans Kung, the author of the original draft, was that "there was no
objection to any important point."14
Political leaders, too, have endorsed documents that indicate at
least some shared values. In international law the least controversial
of these include the United Nations Charter, the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Prevention of
the Crime of Genocide, and the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment. Certainly there are
important disputes about the meaning and priority of these
conventions. Nevertheless, each shares such widespread acceptance
that it is considered customary international law. At minimum,
genocide, slavery, and torture are globally condemned. As Norman
Bowie points out, a government accused of torture does not defend
the practice but, rather, denies it or accuses others of starting the
practice or of being equally guilty.15
Judgments about the validity of a particular aspect of the local
code or of an individual's version of it depend on its connection to
the relevant general categories of interculturally accepted value.
Primary Values and War
The next step is to see whether conceiving morality as a nonnatural
but objective general property is a workable approach. This moves
the hypothesis out of the realm of metaethical musings about the
nature of morality and into normative ethics. It requires the actual
evaluation of the right and wrong of acts, states of affairs, and the
characters and motives of people. In theory at least, an analyst
armed with this approach can work at all three levels: the content of
the shared primary values, the fit of given social definitions and
intermediate-level constructs with the primary values, and the
acceptability of specific rules and behavior, motives, and character. I
intend to apply the three-level approach to the problem of war, one
of the critical areas of ethics and international affairs. At the first
level, I will identify and demonstrate the relevance of primary values
to the conduct of war. At the second level, I will argue that both
defensive war and pacifism are reasonable applications of the
primary values of special beneficence and war. At the third level, I
will defend the moral value of the Western just war tradition's
principle of double effect.
What are some of the primary values that might be relevant to the
conduct of war? How would we know them? One way to begin is to
survey lists of purportedly universal values. Three fairly extensive
lists of moral values that have been cross-culturally validated and
aspire to universality are Christian theologian C. S. Lewis's
"Illustrations of the Tao"; anthropologist Clyde Klukhohn's examples
of values shared around the globe, including some additions by
philosopher Richard B. Brandt; and psychologist M. Rokeach's list of
moral and nonmoral human values, as applied transculturally by
Shalom H. Schwarz and Wolfgang Bilsky.16
Because none of the lists is intended to be absolutely exhaustive,
none can stand alone as a compendium of primary values. (By the
same token, absence from all three does not prove that a value is
not primary.) To minimize individual or disciplinary bias, only moral
values cited by two or more of the lists are tentatively identified as
primary

Primary Moral Values

Approval of:

justiceac
beneficenceabc
special beneficence to kin/compatriotsabc
subordinating interests of individual to groupab
good faith and veracityabc
courageac
self-controlabc

Disapproval of:

murderab
incest or rapeabc
a
Lewis, The Abolition of Man, 95—120.
b
Brandt, "Relativism and Ultimate Disagreements about Ethical
Principles," 38.
c
Schwarz and Bilsky, "Toward a Theory of the Universal Content
and Structure of Values," 881.

Which of the primary values are relevant to fighting wars? The

answer is virtually all of them. Beneficence, special beneficence, and
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