OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS 5.

Distinction between Civil and Natural Obligation

MODULE 1: GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 1423. Obligations are civil or natural. Civil obligations give a right of action
to compel their performance. Natural obligations, not being based on positive law
Article 1156. An obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do. but on equity and natural law, do not grant a right of action to enforce their
performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they authorize the
1. Criticism of the Definition retention of what has been delivered or rendered by reason thereof. Some natural
obligations are set forth in the following articles.
The statutory definition views an obligation solely from the perspective of the creditor, who
has a right to demand the performance of a prestation. It fails to take into account the NOTE:
counterpart obligation of the debtor to perform the prestation. It is equally important, if not
even more important, to emphasize the debtor’s obligation to perform the same.
• In civil obligations, there is a juridical necessity to perform an obligation. A
breach thereof exposes the defaulting party to civil sanctions through the
2. Definition of Obligation
alternative actions for specific performance or rescission.
The more accurate definition is that which considers the juridical relation in its totality: An
• On the other hand, in natural obligations, there is no juridical necessity to
obligation is a legal relationship between two or more persons where one of them, called
perform an obligation. As such, a breach thereof carries no sanction.
the creditor or obligee, may demand of the other, called the debtor or obligor, the
fulfillment of a prestation.
6. Examples of Natural Obligations
3. Concept of Juridical Necessity
If a debtor voluntarily pays the creditor a prescribed debt, he cannot
Art. 1424
recover from the creditor what he had voluntarily paid the latter.
The word “juridical” means pertaining to law. Meanwhile, the concept of “necessity” is
synonymous to “indispensable need” and “imperative requirement.” It implies the lack of If a stranger pays a prescribed debt of a debtor without consent or
power to make a choice between performance and non-performance. Thus, juridical against the will of the debtor, and the debtor voluntarily reimbursed
Art. 1425 the stranger the amount thus paid, the debtor cannot recover from
necessity means an indispensable need or an imperative requirement arising from law
which imposes an obligation on a person who does not have any choice but to comply the stranger what he had reimbursed to the latter.
with his obligation. If a debtor is judicially absolved from liability to the creditor for the
performance of an alleged obligation, but nonetheless voluntarily
Art. 1428 performed the same despite the judgment in his favor, he cannot
4. Kinds of Obligation
recover from the creditor what he had voluntarily paid the latter.
Kind Definition If an heir pays an estate debt in excess of his share of the
• This is an obligation based on positive law. Art. 1429 inheritance, he cannot recover from the creditor what he has paid
• It is a juridical necessity to give, to do, or not to do. the latter.
Civil
• It gives birth to a right of action to compel their If a will is denied probate but an heir nonetheless pays a legacy
performance. Art. 1430 contained therein, he cannot recover from the legatee what he has
• This is an obligation based on equity and natural paid or delivered to the latter.
law.
• It merely authorizes the retention of what has 7. Illustrative Cases on Natural Obligations
Natural
been voluntarily delivered or rendered, but does
not grant a right of action to compel their 7.1. Ansay v. National Development Company
performance. G.R. No. L-13667 (29 April 1960)
• This is an obligation based on moral or spiritual
law developed by religious organizations. Primitivo Ansay et al. filed a complaint against National Development Company
Moral (NDC) praying for a 20% Christmas bonus for years 1954 and 1955. The trial court
• In general, it does not grant an enforceable right
in court. dismissed the complaint surrounding the reason that a bonus is an act of liberality,
and the court takes it that it is not within its judicial powers to command respondents
 to be liberal and that Ansay et al. admitted that NDC is not under the legal duty to
give such bonus and that the court has no power to compel a party to comply with a
moral obligation (Art. 142, New Civil Code.). Ansay, et al. appealed and argued that
there exists a cause of action in their complaint because their claim rests on moral
grounds or what in brief is defined by law as a natural obligation. Can the company
be compelled to pay the bonuses? No, the Supreme Court ruled that the company
cannot be compelled to pay the bonuses. A bonus is not a demandable and
enforceable obligation, except when it is made a part of the wage or salary
compensation. Consequently, there must be voluntary performance for retention to
be ordered. In the case at bar, there has been no voluntary performance on the
payment. Retention can be ordered only after there has been voluntary performance.
Thus, the Court cannot order the said performance.
NOTE:
• An element of natural obligation, before it can be cognizable by the court, is
voluntary fulfillment by the obligor. Retention can be ordered only after there
has been voluntary performance. A bonus is not a demandable and enforceable
obligation, except when it is made a part of the wage or salary compensation.
Hence, the grant thereof does not generally constitute a natural obligation on the
part of the company.
7.2. Development Bank of the Philippines v. Adil
G.R. No. L-48889 (11 May 1989)
On February 10, 1940 spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte obtained an
agricultural loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines in the sum of P2,000
evidenced through a promissory note of said date where they bound themselves jointly to
pay in 10 yearly amortizations. The obligation was unpaid. Confesor executed a second
promissory note which expressly acknowledged the loan and to pay the same on or before
June 15, 1961. The loan was not paid which compelled the DBP to file a complaint. The
lower court decided in favour of the bank ordering the spouses to pay plaintiffs a total
P5,760.96 plus a P1.04 interest. Defendants appealed to the CFI which reversed the
decision, dismissed the complaints and counter-claims against plaintiff. Plaintiffs appeals
arguing that the lower court’s decision is contrary to law and refuses to recognize to law
that the right to prescription may be renounced or waived. Was the right to prescription
waived or renounced through the issuance of the second promissory note? Yes, the
Supreme Court ruled that the right to prescription can be expressly renounced or
waived. Art 1112 provides: Persons with capacity to alienate property may renounce
prescription already obtained, but not the right to prescribe in the future. Prescription is
deemed to have been tacitly renounced when the renunciation results from acts which
imply the abandonment of the right acquired. The prescription was set in as to the first
promissory note of Feb 10, 1940. The act that implied the abandonment was when
Confesor executed the second promissory note, promised to pay the amount covered on
or before June 15, 1961 and failed to do so, agreed to the foreclosure of the mortgage,
the respondent effectively and expressly renounced and waived his right to the
prescription covering the first promissory note. The consideration of the new promissory
note is the pre-existing obligation under the first promissory note. The statutory limitations
bar the remedy but does not discharge the debt.
7.3. Specified Contractors & Development, Inc. v. Pobocan
G.R. No. 212472 (11 January 2018)
Respondent Jose A. Pobocan was employed by Specified Contractors as president until
his retirement sometime in March 2011. Architect Olonan allegedly agreed to give
respondent one unit for every building Specified Contractors were able to construct as
part of respondent’s compensation. Respondent then sent a letter to petitioners
requesting the execution of the Deeds of Assignment or Deeds of Sale over the subject
units in his favor. After his demand was unheeded, he filed a complaint before the RTC
praying that petitioners be ordered to execute and deliver the appropriate deeds of
conveyance and to pay moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees.
Petitioner claim said agreement had prescribed as they were entered into in 1994 and
1999. Had respondent’s cause of action already prescribed? Yes, because the present
suit is essentially for specific performance – a personal action. It is therefore
erroneous to treat it as a real action which prescribes after 30 years under Article 1141 of
the New Civil Code. In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal
property, the enforcement of a contract, or the recovery of damages. Real actions, on the
other hand, are those affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein.
As a personal action based upon an oral contract, Article 1145 providing a prescriptive
period of six years applies in this case instead. The shorter period provided by law to
institute an action based on an oral contract is due to the frailty of human memory. The
complaint for specific performance was instituted on November 21, 2011, or 17 years from
the oral agreement of 1994 and almost 12 years after the December 1, 1999 oral
agreement. Thus, the respondent's action upon an oral contract was filled beyond the six-
year period within which he should have instituted the same.
NOTE:
• Under Article 1424 of the New Civil Code, when a right to sue upon a civil
obligation has lapsed by extinctive prescription, the obligor who voluntarily
performs the contract cannot recover what he has delivered or the value of the
service he has rendered.
• Since the obligation that is to be enforced is civil in nature, the respondent does
not have a right to sue the petitioners because the obligation has lapsed by
extinctive prescription. The respondent may no longer be compensated for his
services as president of Specified Contractors as the prescriptive period for the
oral agreement which they agreed upon had already lapsed.
8. Overview on Civil Obligations 10. Three Essential Elements of an Obligation:

8.1 Sagrada Orden de Predicadores Del Santisimo Rosario de Filipinas v. 10.1. Subject
National Coconut Corporation This refers to the personal elements of an obligation. This consists of the parties
G.R. No. L-3756 (30 June 1952) in an obligation who may either be natural or juridical persons. This need not be
specifically identified at the time of the constitution of the obligation.
The subject land belongs to Sagrada Orden De Predicadores Del Santisimo Rosario De 10.1.1. Active Subject – refers to the creditor who has the right to demand
Filipinas (Order of Preachers/Dominicans) in whose name the title was registered before the fulfillment of obligation
the war. During the Japanese military occupation, the land was acquired by a Japanese
corporation Taiwan Tekkosho. After liberation, the Alien Property Custodian of the United 10.1.2. Passive Subject – refers to the debtor who has the obligation to
States took possession, control, and custody thereof under the Trading with the Enemy perform the obligation
Act because it belonged to an enemy national. Copra Export Management Company
occupied it followed by the National Coconut Corporation.It repaired the warehouse then 10.2. Object or Prestation
leased it to Dioscoro Sarile. The Dominicans claim that the sale was executed under This does not refer to a person or a thing but to the particular conduct that is
threats, duress, and intimidation from the Japanese. Hence, the sale is void. Is the party demanded under the obligation.
that was allowed to use and occupy an enemy property has the obligation to pay rentals
to the “pre-war owner of a property” even if such was acquired by the enemy under threats, 10.2.1. Kinds of Prestation
duress, and intimidation? No, the Dominicans cannot claim an obligation to pay
rentals that arose from the actual use and occupation of its property without any refers to the delivery of a thing, whether real or
basis from law, contract or quasi-contract, crime, or negligence. The Supreme Court personal, generic or specific, for the purpose of
To give
ruled on the basis of Article 1089 of the Spanish Civil Code which provides that a liability creating a real right thereto; or for the use of recipient;
to an obligation must arise from any of the four sources of obligations, namely, law, or for the possession of the recipient
contract or quasi-contract, crime, or negligence. As to law, the Supreme Court, tried in refers to the rendition of some service, whether
vain to find a law or provision thereof but there is none. As to contract, there was no To do
physical or mental
express agreement between the Alien Property Custodian and the National Coconut negative prestation; requires the debtor to abstain or
Corporation for the latter to pay rentals on the property. As to quasi-contracts or equity, Not to do
refrain from doing some act.
the claim cannot be supported. As to any negligence or offense, the claim cannot be
predicated on it. Hence, there is no obligation to pay rentals to the Dominicans. 10.2.2. Requisites of a Valid Prestation:
1. Physically and juridically possible
NOTE: 2. Determinate or at least determinable according to
pre-established criteria
• This case illustrates that obligation arises from only four (4) sources namely law, 3. Have an equivalent in money, but it need not
contract, quasi-contract and crime. However, this interpretation of the Supreme necessarily have an economic value
Court may no longer be controlling as this case was decided based on the
Spanish Civil Code. At present, we now have our own Civil Code and include 10.3. Efficient Cause or Juridical Tie
quasi-delicts.
The source of obligation which refers to the juridical or legal tie which
9. Reciprocity of Rights and Obligations binds the parties to an obligation from which the relationship between the debtor
and the creditor is established.
The reciprocity of rights and obligations means that every right has a counterpart
obligation. The creditor has the right to demand and insist upon the performance of an 11. On Form; In General, Not an Essential Element of an Obligation
obligation, while the debtor has the duty to fulfill such obligation.
Article 1356. Contracts shall be obligatory, in whatever form they may have
The two components of an obligation are: (i) credit or the claim of the creditor and (ii) debt been entered into, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are
or the obligation of the debtor. present. However, when the law requires that a contract be in some form in order
that it may be valid or enforceable, or that a contract be proved in a certain way,
 that requirement is absolute and indispensable. In such cases, the right of the
parties stated in the following article cannot be exercised. (1278a)
Article 1357. If the law requires a document or other special form, as in the acts
and contracts enumerated in the following article, the contracting parties may
compel each other to observe that form, once the contract has been perfected.
This right may be exercised simultaneously with the action upon contract.
NOTE:
- No particular form is required to make a contractual obligation, except in
specified cases where the law requires a particular form.
Article 1157. Obligations arise from:
(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts
1. Sources of Obligations; Not Exclusive
Consider the case of a unilateral promise. An example of which is a promise of reward
often advertised in the classified ads section of the newspapers. Where a person
responds to the ad and delivers to the promisor that which the promisor needs, the
promisor is bound to make good the promised reward to the responder.
2. Case in Point
2.1. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. Rosales and To
G.R. No. 183204 (13 January 2014)
Respondents Rosales and To opened joint peso and dollar accounts in two of the
petitioner Metrobank’s branches. Consequently, Metrobank issued a Hold Out Order
against the respondents’ accounts and filed a criminal case for Estafa through False
Pretenses, Misinterpretation, Deceit and Use of Falsified Documents against respondent
Rosales. Petitioner bank accused Rosales and an unidentified woman for the
unauthorized and fraudulent withdrawal of US $75,000.00 from Liu Chiu’s Dollar Account
in the bank’s Escolta Branch. Respondent Rosales denied such accusations and filed a
counter complaint against Metrobank and alleged that they attempted several times to
withdraw their deposits but were unable to because the petitioner had placed their
accounts under "Hold Out" status. Did Metropolitan Bank breach its contract with
respondents Rosales and To? Yes, the Court found the petition filed by petitioner
bank bereft of merit and that the petitioner is guilty of breach of contract when it
unjustifiably refused to release respondents’ deposit despite demand. Having
breached its contract with respondents, the petitioner is liable for damages. The Court
explained that the petitioner bank’s reliance on the Hold Out Clause in the Application and
Agreement for a Deposit Account is misplaced. The said clause is only applicable if there
is a valid and existing obligation arising from any of the sources of obligation enumerated
in Art. 1157 of the Civil Code, to wit: law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts (crimes; acts
or omissions punished by law), and quasi-delicts.
NOTE:
• It is significant to emphasize the important observation of the Court that at the
time Metrobank issued the Hold Out Order, the criminal complaint was not even
filed yet. Thus, considering that respondent Rosales is not liable under any of
the five sources of obligation, there was no legal basis for petitioner to issue the
"Hold Out" order.
Article 1158. Obligations derived from law are not presumed. Only those
expressly determined in this Code or in special laws are demandable, and shall
be regulated by the precepts of the law which establishes them; and as to what
has not been foreseen, by the provisions of this Book.
Obligations Arising from Law – Ex Lege
1. Not Presumed
Obligations arising from law should be, without exception, expressed. The norm of
conduct the law requires must be made known to all persons who are obliged to comply
therewith following the principle of due process. Thus, a law that is published according
to Art. 2 of the Civil Code provides for a constructive notice to the people.
1.1. Examples of Obligations Arising from Law: The System of Compulsory
Succession
Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the
property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the
Art. 774
inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to
another or others either by his will or by operation of law.
Legitime is that part of the testator’s property which he cannot
Art. 886 dispose of because the law has reserved it for certain heirs who
are, therefore, called compulsory heirs.
The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to
their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and
ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
Art. 887
descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children
by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.

Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not
excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one
another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly
proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes
mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the
extent established by this Code.
The testator cannot deprive his compulsory heirs of their
Art. 904
legitime, except in cases expressly specified by law.
Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title
Art. 906 less than the legitime belonging to him may demand that the
same be fully satisfied.
The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance
of children and descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:
(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an
attempt against the life of the testator, his or her spouse,
descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of
a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for six
years or more, if the accusation has been found groundless;
(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of
Art. 919 adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence,
intimidation, or undue influence causes the testator to make
a will or to change one already made;
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parent
or ascendant who disinherits such child or descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child
or descendant;
(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or
disgraceful life;
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of
civil interdiction.
The following shall be sufficient causes for disinheriting a
spouse:
Art. 921
1) When the spouse has been convicted of an attempt
against the life of the testator, his or her descendants, or
ascendants;
(2) When the spouse has accused the testator of a crime for
which the law prescribes imprisonment of six years or more,
and the accusation has been found to be false;
(3) When the spouse by fraud, violence, intimidation, or
undue influence cause the testator to make a will or to
change one already made;
(4) When the spouse has given cause for legal separation;
(5) When the spouse has given grounds for the loss of
parental authority;
(6) Unjustifiable refusal to support the children or the other
spouse.
NOTE:
• Had the Civil Code not provided a system of compulsory succession, a testator
would be completely free to dispose his estate by will to whomever he may wish
to favor. There would have been no legal obligation on his part to reserve and
deliver the legitime to his compulsory heirs.
2.2. Office of the Solicitor General v. Ayala Land, Inc.
G.R. No. 177056 (18 September 2009)
Ayala Land, SM Prime, Robinsons and Shangri-la are malls that own and operate their
own parking facilities. They provide security personnel to protect the vehicles parked in
their parking facilities and maintain order within the area. In turn, they collect the following
parking fees from the persons making use of their parking facilities. The parking tickets
contain the stipulation that respondents shall not be responsible for any loss or damage
to the vehicles parked in respondents' parking facilities. An inquiry initiated by the Senate
looked into the legality of charging parking fees in these malls. They concluded that these
malls were violating the National Building Code; the Senate made an interpretation that
the parking spaces are for free. (Side note: This practice was consistent in the US where
parking spaces are free) SM Prime applied for declaratory relief in the RTC after receiving
information from the Senate. The latter made a directive to the following LGUs and the
OSG to institute proceedings against these malls. The proceedings seek to prohibit these
malls from collecting parking fees and impose penal sanctions for violation of the National
Building Code. RTC ruled in favor of SM Prime and the other malls. The Court found that
the Building Code did not impose any obligation to the malls to provide free parking
spaces pursuant to Art. 1158 of the Civil Code. CA affirmed. Are the malls obligated to
provide free parking spaces pursuant to the National Building Code in relation to Art. 1158
of the Civil Code? No, since Section 803 of the National Building Code and Rule XIX
of its IRR do not mention parking fees, then simply, said provisions do not regulate
the collection of the same. The RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly applied Article
1158 of the New Civil Code, which states: Art. 1158. Obligations derived from law are not
presumed. Only those expressly determined in this Code or in special laws are
demandable, and shall be regulated by the precepts of the law which establishes them;
and as to what has not been foreseen, by the provisions of this Book. In conclusion, the
total prohibition against the collection by respondents of parking fees from persons who
use the mall parking facilities has no basis in the National Building Code or its IRR.

Article 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between
the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.
Obligations Arising from Contracts – Ex Contractu
1. Meaning of a Contract
Article 1305. A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby
one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some
service.
2. Binding Force of a Contract
Obligatory force of law means that the contract entered into has the force and
effect of law between the parties and will govern their respective agreements.
The phrase “have the force of law” indicates that a breach of the obligation will
merit civil sanctions. This obligatory force is further emphasized in Art. 1305
through the use of the phrase “whereby one binds himself.”
Moreover, the obligatory force of a contract under Art. 1159 is hinged upon Art.
1309, which emphasizes that one is not bound to enter into any contract since
one has the autonomy of will. However, once entered into, it is essential that the
contracting parties comply with it in good faith.
3. Autonomy of the Will Not Absolute
The contractual obligation must not be contrary to law, morals, good
Art. 1306
customs, public policy or public order.
The doctrine of unforeseen events provides that when the service
Art. 1267 has become so difficult as to be manifestly beyond the contemplation
of the parties, the obligor may be released in whole or in part.
If a written contract is altered by the unauthorized insertion of
additional stipulations which have not been agreed to by the
Art. 1420 contracting parties, the contract is not entirely voided. It may still be
enforced under the principle of separability, but the unauthorized
stipulations shall be disregarded.
No contractual obligation arises unless the parties have reached an
Art. 1319
agreement through a meeting of the minds.
4. Coverage of a Written Agreement
4.1. Philippine School of Business Administration v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 84698 (4 February 1992)
Bautista died due to the stabbing incident which occurred at the 2nd floor of the premises
of the (PSBA) wherein he was enrolled. It was established that his assailants were not
from PSBA’s academic community. This prompted Bautista’s parents to file a suit claiming
damages against PSBA and its corporate officers. Bautista’s parents argued that PSBA
should be liable because of their negligence, recklessness, and lack of security
precautions. On the other hand, PSBA contended that the suit should be dismissed
because the complaint states no cause of action against them as they were presumably
sued under Art. 2180, CC since jurisprudence pronounced that academic institutions are
beyond the ambit of the said law. Was there a contractual relation between PSBA and
Bautista so as to justify the CA’s application of Art. 2176 (quasi-delict) in its decision?
Yes, there was a contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. When an
academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract
between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply
with. Institutions of learning must meet the implicit or “built-in” obligation of ensuring that
adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and
to prevent the breakdown thereof. A perusal of Art. 2176 shows that obligations arising
from quasi-delicts or tort arise only between parties not in any other way bound by
contract, whether express or implied. Bautista was enrolled in PSBA; thus, he and PSBA
had a contractual relation. This implies that rules on quasi-delict or, as in this case, Art.
2176 should not apply. However, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between
PSBA and Bautista had been breached through the former’s negligence in providing
security measures, which is for the trial court to determine.
NOTE:
• It must be noted in this case that there are circumstances wherein there exists a
tort despite having a contract. In Air France v. Carrosco, private respondent was
awarded civil damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat
aboard the petitioner-airline.
• The Court pronounces here that the petitioner-airline’s liability as one arising
from tort, not one arising from a contract of carriage. In this case, Air France was
penalized for its racist policy, violating Art. 21, CC. This implies that an act done
in bad faith which breaches a contract and is violative of Art. 21 constitutes as a
quasi-delict.
• Furthermore, even if there was a finding of negligence on the part of PSBA, the
same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only because
contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school’s liability. The
negligence of the school cannot exist independently on the contract, unless the
negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Art. 21.
5. Obligations may Arise from a Sworn Statement
5.1. Cruz and Ibias v. Gruspe
G.R. No. 191431 (13 March 2013)
The claim arose from an accident when the ominibus owned and operated by Cruz and
driven by one Arturo Davin collided with the Toyota Corolla car of Gruspe, leaving the car
in a total wreck. The next day, Cruz, along with Leonardo Q. Ibias went to Gruspe’s office,
apologized for the incident, and executed a Joint Affidavit of Undertaking promising jointly
and severally to replace Gruspe’s damaged car in 20 days, or until November 15, 1999,
of the same model or of at least the same quality; in the alternative, they would pay the
cost of Gruspe’s car amounting to P350,000.00, with interest at 12% per month for any
delayed payment after November 15, 1999, until fully paid. When Cruz and Leonardo
failed to comply with their undertaking, Gruspe filed a complaint to collect the sum of
money against them. Cruz and Leonardo denied Gruspe’s allegation, claiming that
Gruspe, a lawyer, prepared the Joint Affidavit of Undertaking and forced them to affix
their signatures thereon, without explaining and informing them of its contents. Is there a
valid contract between Gruspe and Cruz & Ibias? Yes, there is a valid contract between
Gruspe and Cruz & Ibias. Contracts are obligatory no matter their forms, whenever the
essential requisites for their validity are present. In the construction or interpretation of an
instrument, the parties' intention is primordial and is to be pursued. In this case, the Joint
Affidavit of Undertaking, which is an attestation of the parties involved, contained terms
and conditions that are clear and leave no doubt on the intention of the contracting parties;
thus, its literal meaning takes control. In fact, Cruz and Ibias admitted the genuineness
and due execution of the Joint Affidavit and Undertaking when they said that they signed
the same to secure possession of their vehicle, which does not indicate that their consent
was forced. Although they may have signed grudgingly, it does not imply a vitiated
consent, which is a valid ground for the annulment of a contract. Thus, an allegation of
vitiated consent must have been proven by a preponderance of evidence, which Cruz and
Ibias were unable to do in support of their allegation, deeming the existence of a valid
contract between both parties.
6. Obligation is Determined by Law, not by the Title of the Document
6.1. Ace Foods, Inc. v. Micropacific Technologies Co., Ltd.
G.R. No. 200602 (11 December 2013)
An agreement was entered into by ACE Foods and MTCL concerning the sale and
delivery of certain computer hardwares and equipments, where it was stipulated that
payment shall be made 30 days upon delivery. A delivery was made but no payment for
the purchase price was effected despite the demand made. A letter was sent by MTCL to
ACE Foods stating it had been returning the subject products to MTCL thru its sales
representative who has agreed to pull out the said products but had failed to do so. ACE
Foods then filed a complaint against MTCL praying that the former pulls out from its
premises the subject products since MTCL breached its "after delivery services''
obligations to it; and that the subject products MTCL delivered were defective and not
working. The RTC ruled in favor of ACE and declared that the subject agreement was a
contract to sell and such contract did not materialize. The CA ruled otherwise and declared
that what was involved was a contract of sale and the payment of the purchase price is
fitting. It was held that ACE should pay MTCL as the agreement in question is a contract
of sale and being consensual in nature, the contract in the present case had been
perfected at the precise moment ACE Foods accepted the latter's proposal to sell the
subject products in consideration of the purchase price. Therefore, from that point in time,
the reciprocal obligations of the parties — of MTCL to deliver the said products to ACE
Foods, and of ACE Foods to pay the purchase price therefor within thirty (30) days from
delivery — already arose and consequently may be demanded under Art. 1475 of the
NCC. Should ACE Foods pay MTCL the purchase price for the subject products? Yes,
ACE should pay MTCL as the agreement in question is a contract of sale and being
consensual in nature, the contract in the present case had been perfected at the
precise moment ACE Foods accepted the latter's proposal to sell the subject
products in consideration of the purchase price. Therefore, from that point in time, the
reciprocal obligations of the parties — of MTCL to deliver the said products to ACE Foods,
and of ACE Foods to pay the purchase price therefor within thirty (30) days from delivery
— already arose and consequently may be demanded under Art. 1475 of the NCC.
NOTE:
• A contract of sale is a consensual contract which is perfected by mere
consent. Upon perfection of the contract, the parties may reciprocally demand
performance, and the vendor may require the vendee to pay the thing sold.
Considering that MTCL had already complied with its obligation, ACE Foods's
corresponding obligation arose and was then duty bound to pay the agreed
purchase price within thirty (30) days from delivery. The very essence of a
contract of sale is the transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or
promised.
• A contract to sell, on the other hand is a bilateral contract where the prospective
seller, while expressly reserving the ownership of the property despite delivery
thereof to the prospective buyer, binds himself to sell the property exclusively to
the prospective buyer upon fulfillment of the condition agreed upon, such as the
full payment of the purchase price.
Article 1160. Obligations derived from quasi-contracts shall be subject to the
provisions of Chapter 1, Title XVII, of this Book.
Obligations Arising from Quasi-Contracts – Quasi Ex-Contractual
1. Definition of Quasi-Contracts
Article 2142. Certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation
of quasi-contract to the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the
expense of another.
2. Characteristic of a Quasi-Contract
The most important characteristic of a quasi-contract is that it is unilateral. There is only
one person doing something, that is under the ambit of the law; it is a judicial necessity.
The basis for this is that it is a unilateral act of the party, there is implied consent upon
making a payment and the person is consenting because of that knowledge of mistake
(solutio indebiti).
3. Two Main Kinds of Quasi Contract:
3.1. Negotiorum Gestio (Officious Management)
Art. 2144. Whoever voluntarily takes charge of the agency or management of the
business or property of another, without any power from the latter, is obliged to continue
the same until the termination of the affair and its incidents, or to require the person
concerned to substitute him, if the owner is in a position to do so. This juridical relation
does not arise in either of these instances:
(1) When the property or business is not neglected or abandoned;
(2) If in fact the manager has been tacitly authorized by the owner.
3.1.1. Requisites of Negotiorum Gestio:
1. The intervention of the officious manager relates to a definite and existing thing
or business which is neglected or abandoned.
2. There is no administrator or representative of the owner who is charged with the
management.
3. The owner of the thing or business has not expressly prohibited the management
of the same. If there is a prohibition and the same is ignored by the officious
manager who intervened, there are two schools of thought with respect to his
entitlement of compensation:
(1) the prohibition denies compensation to the officious manager; and
(2) the prohibition notwithstanding, the officious manager is entitled to
compensation to the extent of the benefit of the owner in order to avoid unjust
enrichment on the part of the owner.
4. The officious manager has not been authorized by the owner to intervene in the
management of the thing or business. Where authority is given by the owner to
the officious manager either expressly or impliedly, a relationship of agency
would exist between the parties. There would be no quasi-contract.
5. The officious manager does not intend to profit from his intervention. His intention
is intended to avert loss or damage to the owner because of the abandonment
of the property or business.
6. The officious manager is not acting on the basis of an error that the property or
the business belongs to him.
3.2. Solutio Indebiti (Payment not Due)
Art. 2154. If something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly
delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises.
3.2.1. Application of Solutio Indebiti:
1. A payor makes payment which the payee actually received.
2. There exists no binding legal relationship between the payor, who has no
obligation to pay, and the payee, who is not entitled to receive payment.
3. The payment was made through the payor’s mistake, and not due to his
liberality or any other cause (generally, a mistake of fact).
3.3. Case in Point
3.3.1. Locsin II v. Mekeni Food Corporation
G.R. No. 192105 (9 December 2013)
After hiring petitioner Antonio Locsin II as Regional Sales Manager, respondent Mekeni
Food Corporation offered petitioner a car plan on a 50-50 basis. The company furnished
him a used Honda Civic car valued at P280,000.00 in which he paid P5,000.00 per month
through salary deductions. Locsin eventually tendered his resignation. He made an offer
to Mekeni to purchase his service vehicle by paying the outstanding balance. They failed
to reach an agreement. May Mekeni retain the installment payments made by Locsin on
the car plan and treat them as rents for the use of the service vehicle in the event that the
employee ceases his employment and is unable to complete the installment payments on
the vehicle? No, Mekeni may not retain the installment payments made by Locsin on
the car plan and treat them as rents for the use of the service vehicle because there
is no evidence to suggest that if petitioner failed to completely cover one-half of
the cost of the vehicle, then all the deductions from his salary going to the cost of
the vehicle will be treated as rentals for his use thereof while working with Mekeni,
and shall not be refunded. The Supreme Court clarified its pronouncement in Elisco
Tool Manufacturing Corporation v. Court of Appeals: installments made on the car plan
may be treated as rentals only when there is an express stipulation in the car plan
agreement to such effect. Here, there is precisely no stipulation in their agreement that
payments made on the car plan should be forfeited by Mekeni and treated simply as
rentals for petitioner's use of the company service vehicle nor may they be retained by it
as purported loan payments. Therefore, absent any stipulation to that effect, Mekeni may
not retain the installment payments made by Locsin on the car plan and treat them as
rents.
NOTE:
• Doctrine of Unjust Enrichment - Mekeni may not enrich itself by charging
petitioner for the use of its vehicle which is otherwise absolutely necessary to the
full and effective promotion of its business. Conversely, petitioner cannot recover
the monetary value of Mekeni's counterpart contribution to the cost of the vehicle
since Mekeni’s share was not part of the petitioner’s compensation package.
 Article 1161. Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed
by the penal laws, subject to the provisions of Article 2177, and of the pertinent 3. Distinction Between Quasi-delicts and Crimes
provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title, on Human Relations, and of Title
XVII of this Book, regulating damages. Quasi-Delict Crime
Negligence Criminal/malicious intent,
How committed
1. Obligations Arising from Delicts (culpa aquiliana) or criminal negligence
Generally, both civil and
As to Liability Civil only
Obligations arising from criminal offenses under Art. 1161 are governed by penal laws. If criminal
one commits a felony, the law that will be applicable is the Revised Penal Code. Art. 100 Liability subject Criminal liability cannot
taken together with Art. 1161 highlights that criminal liability generally carries with it civil Can be compromised
to compromise be compromised
liability. Moreover, Art. 1161 is also covered by Art. 2177 that emphasizes the civil liability Indemnification of offended
arising from negligence. Furthermore, it deals with the civil liability that arises from the Purpose Punishment
party
provisions on human relations. Beyond reasonable
Burden of Proof Preponderance of evidence
doubt
2. Obligations Arising from Delicts are Governed by the Following Laws:
2.1. Relevant penal statute that was violated
2.2. Article 2177, in respect of civil liability for criminal negligence - Responsibility
Summary of Related Legal Provisions on Overview on Civil Obligations
for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But
the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the Article 1106. By prescription, one acquires ownership and other real rights through the
defendant. lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law.
2.3. Article 19 to 36, on human relations
2.4. Articles 2195 to 2235 on Damages In the same way, rights and actions are lost by prescription.

NOTE:
Article 1162. Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by the
1. Prescription is a mode of acquiring (or losing) ownership and other real rights
provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, and by special laws.
through the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by
law.
1. Obligations Arising from Quasi-delicts – Ex-Delictu or Culpa Criminal
1.1. Governed by Articles 2176 to 2194 of the Civil Code.
Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born
1.2. Article 2176, definition of a quasi-delict.
for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions
specified in the following article.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
Article 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
completely delivered from the mother’s womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after
its complete delivery from the maternal womb.
2. Requisites of Quasi-delicts
Article 44. The following are juridical persons:
2.1. A person commits an act or omission;
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
2.2. Such act or omission is due to fault or negligence;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose,
2.3. The act or omission causes damage to another;
created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted
2.4. There must be a direct relation or connection of cause and effect between the
according to law;
act or omission, and the damage; and
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to
2.5. There must be no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.
which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each
shareholder, partner, or member.
Article 2014. No action can be maintained by the winner for the collection of what he has
won in a game of chance. But any loser in a game of chance may recover his loss from
the winner, with legal interest from the time he paid the amount lost, and subsidiarily from
the operator or manager of the gambling house.
Article 921(4). The following shall be sufficient causes for disinheriting a spouse:
(4) When the spouse has given cause for legal separation;
Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
Article 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Article 2144. Whoever voluntarily takes charge of the agency or management of the
business or property of another, without any power from the latter, is obliged to continue
the same until the termination of the affair and its incidents, or to require the person
concerned to substitute him, if the owner is in a position to do so. This juridical relation
does not arise in either of these instances:
(1) When the property or business is not neglected or abandoned;
(2) If in fact the manager has been tacitly authorized by the owner.
In the first case, the provisions of Articles 1317, 1403, No. 1, and 1404 regarding
unauthorized contracts shall govern.
In the second case, the rules on agency in Title X of this Book shall be applicable.
Article 2154. If something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it was
unduly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises.
Act. No. 2031, Sec. 191. Definition and meaning of terms. - In this Act, unless the
contract otherwise requires:
(4) "Bearer" means the person in possession of a bill or note which is payable to
bearer
Sec. 9. When payable to bearer. - The instrument is payable to bearer:
(a) When it is expressed to be so payable; or
(b) When it is payable to a person named therein or bearer; or
(c) When it is payable to the order of a fictitious or non-existing person, and such
fact was known to the person making it so payable; or
(d) When the name of the payee does not purport to be the name of any person;
(e) When the only or last indorsement is an indorsement in blank.
1987 CONSTITUTION, §18(2), Art. III
Section 18. (2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment
for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.
Executive Order No. 209:
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
(2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and
liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net
profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall
be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of Article 43(2);
(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent
spouse by intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending
spouse made in the will of the innocent spouse shall be revoked by operation of
law.
Art. 64. After the finality of the decree of legal separation, the innocent spouse may revoke
the donations made by him or by her in favor of the offending spouse, as well as the
designation of the latter as beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation
be stipulated as irrevocable. The revocation of the donations shall be recorded in the
registries of property in the places where the properties are located. Alienations, liens and
encumbrances registered in good faith before the recording of the complaint for revocation
in the registries of property shall be respected. The revocation of or change in the
designation of the insurance beneficiary shall take effect upon written notification thereof
to the insured.
Revised Penal Code:
Article 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. - Every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable.
Justifying Circumstances
Where there is no criminal liability, there can be no civil liability.
These include:
1. Self-defense;
2. Defense of relatives;
3. Defense of strangers;
4. Avoidance of an evil or injury.
NOTE: When these are proved as an affirmative defense, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal. The accused is not civilly liable. (Article 11, RPC)

Other Cases on Overview on Civil Obligations
1. Leung Ben v. O’Brien
G.R. No. L-13602 (6 April 1918)
In December 1917, an action was instituted by P. J. O'Brien to recover the sum of P15,000
from Leung Ben. It was alleged that Leung Ben lost against O’brien in a series of
gambling, banking, and percentage games conducted during the two or three months prior
to the institution of the suit. Leung Ben is now defending himself by claiming that the
provision of law under which this attachment was issued requires that there should be a
"cause of action arising upon contract, express or implied." The contention of O’brien is
that the statutory action to recover money lost at gaming is not such an action as is
contemplated in this provision, and he therefore insists that the original complaint shows
on its face that the remedy of attachment is not available in aid thereof. Is the obligation
to restore money won at gaming/gambling considered a contract, therefore subject to a
writ of attachment? Yes, obligations incurred through gaming/gambling, are
considered as contracts, specifically implied contracts. Therefore, it is subject to writs
of attachment by the court.
NOTE:
• These contracts are considered innominate quasi-contracts since they do not fall
under the definition of quasi-contracts in the civil code in 1917.
• Innominate = not named or classified.
2. Pelayo v. Lauron
G.R. No. L-4089 (12 January 1909)
Arturo Pelayo, a physician, rendered medical assistance to the daughter-in-law of Marcelo
Lauron and Juana Abella, who was about to give birth to a child. The just and equitable
value of the services rendered by Pelayo was P500, which Marcelo Lauron and Juana
Abella refused to pay. Pelayo filed a complaint praying that the judgment be entered in
his favor as against the defendants, or any of them, for the sum of P500 and costs,
together with any other relief that might be deemed proper. Are Lauron and Abella bound
to pay the fees due to Pelayo for the professional services that he rendered to their
daughter-in-law during her childbirth? No, it is the husband of the patient who is bound
to pay Pelayo’s fees. The Lauron and Abella were not, nor are they now, under any
obligation by virtue of any legal provision, to pay the fees claimed, nor in consequence of
any contract entered into between them and Pelayo from which such obligation might
have arisen. Spouses are mutually bound to support each other and when either of them
by reason of illness should be in need of medical assistance, the other is under the
unavoidable obligation to furnish the necessary services of a physician in order that health
may be restored, and he or she may be freed from the sickness by which life is
jeopardized; the party bound to furnish such support is therefore liable for all expenses,
including the fees of the medical expert for his professional services.
NOTE:
• In Articles 1156-1158, it is unquestionable that the person bound to pay the fees
due to the plaintiff for the professional services that he rendered to the daughter-
in-law of the defendants during her childbirth, is the husband of the patient and
not her father and mother- in-law, the defendants herein.
3. Bautista v. Borromeo
G.R. No. L-26002 (31 October 1969)
On September 15, 1964, Abelardo Bautista drove Roberto Tan’s Ford truck and Federico
Borromeo’s Volkswagen delivery panel truck were involved in a traffic accident which led
to the death of Quintin Delgado, a helper in Borromeo’s delivery panel truck. Borromeo
then paid Delgado’s widow the amount of P4,444 representing the compensation (death
benefit) and funeral expenses due Delgado under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
Borromeo started a suit against petitioners to recover the compensation and funeral
expenses paid to Delgado’s widow since the accident was due to petitioner’s negligence.
Should Borromeo establish the contractual relationship between Delgado and Baustita
and Tan Ting for Borromeo to recover the compensation and funeral expenses paid? No,
the court ruled that Borromeo does not need to establish a contractual relationship
between Quintin Delgado, the deceased employee and petitioners, owner and
driver of the Ford Truck, that hit the panel truck driven by Delgado thereby causing
his death. The cause of action for recovery from petitioners, the compensation and
funeral expenses it paid the widow of said deceased employee, is one which does not
spring from the creditor-debtor relationship. It arises by virtue of its subrogation to the right
of Quintin Delgado to sue the guilty party. Such subrogation is sanctioned by the
Workmen’s Compensation Law.
NOTE:
• The cause of action stems from the virtue of its subrogation to the right of
Delgado, the deceased employee of Borromeo, to sue the guilty party. Such
subrogation is sanctioned by the Worker’s Compensation Law.
• Subrogation is defined as the substitution of one person or group by another in
respect of a debt or insurance claim, accompanied by the transfer of any
associated rights and duties.
4. Juan F. Nakpil & Sons v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-47851 (3 October 1986)
The plaintiff, the Philippine Bar Association, decided to construct an office building and
the construction was undertaken by defendants, United Construction, Inc. on an
“administration” basis while the plans and specifications were prepared by the other third-
party defendant, Juan Nakpil & Sons. Two years after its construction, a strong
earthquake occurred which caused the building to sustain damage and as a temporary
remedial measure, the building was shored up by United Construction. Plaintiff then
commenced the action for recovery of damages against United while United then filed a
third-party complaint against the architects who prepared the plans and specifications.
Are petitioners United and Nakpil liable for damages incurred by the building during the
earthquake? Yes, they are liable since there is no dispute that the event that
occurred was an Act of God or a fortuitous event. However, in order to exempt the
obligor from liability under Art. 1174 of the NCC, the following must occur: (1) the cause
of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor; (2) the event
must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (3) the event must be such as to render it
impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; (4) the debtor must
be free from any participation in or aggravation of the injury to the creditor. Here, the
negligence of the petitioners were established by the lower courts when defendant United
deviated from the plans and specifications and when they failed to observe the requisite
workmanship in the construction as well as to exercise the requisite degree of supervision;
while third-party defendant Juan Nakpil & Sons, were found to have inadequacies in the
plans and specifications they prepared. Therefore, they cannot claim to be exempt from
liability despite the occurrence of an act of God.
NOTES:
• Act of God: an accident, due directly and exclusively to natural causes without
human intervention, which by no amount of foresight, pains or care, reasonably
to have been expected, could have been prevented.
• General rule: No person shall be responsible for those events which could not
be foreseen or which though foreseen were inevitable.
• Exception:
§ In cases expressly specified by law
§ When it is otherwise declared by stipulation
§ When the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk
5. Jimenez v. City of Manila
G.R. No. 71049 (29 May 1987)
Bernardino Jimenez (petitioner) stepped on an uncovered opening while he was
purchasing “bagoong” in the Sta. Ana public market. A dirty and rusty 4-inch nail, stuck
inside the uncovered opening, pierced Jimenez’s left leg. He suffered high fever and
severe pain thereafter, and was confined for 20 days. He had to walk around with crutches
for 15 days and his injury prevented him from attending to the school buses he was
operating. Jimenez sued for damages the City of Manila and the Asiatic Integrated
Corporation under whose administration the Sta. Ana Public Market had been placed by
virtue of a Management and Operating Contract. Should the respondent City of Manila be
jointly and severally liable with Asiatic Integrated Corporation for the injuries the petitioner
suffered? Yes, the City of Manila is liable for damages under Art. 2189 of the Civil
Code, respondent City having retained control and supervision over the Sta. Ana
Public Market and as tort-feasor under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.
In the case of City of Manila v. Teotico, the Court held that Art. 2189 of the Civil Code
governs the liability due to “defective streets, public buildings and other public works.” It
was held that for liability under Art. 2189 to attach, control and supervision by the province,
city, or municipality over the defective public building in question is enough. It is not
necessary that such belongs to such province, city, or municipality. In the case at bar,
there is no question that Sta. Ana public market remained under the control of the City. It
is thus the duty of the City to exercise care to keep the public market reasonably safe for
people frequenting the place for their market needs. The negligence of the City is the
proximate cause of the injury suffered. AIC and City are joint tortfeasors and are solidarily
liable.
6. Gutierrez v. Gutierrez
G.R. No. 34840 (23 September 1931)
Plaintiff Narciso Gutierrez was a passenger of the private automobile owned by Maria and
Manuel Gutierrez, which was driven by their 18 yr old son Bonifacio Gutierrez. The
passenger truck was owned by Saturnino Cortez, which was driven by his driver Abelardo
Velasco. On February 2, 1930, the passenger truck and the private automobile collided
while approaching a narrow bridge from opposite directions in Rizal. At the time of the
collision, the father (Manuel) was not in the car, but the mother (Maria) along with several
members of the Gutierrez Family were all passengers of the vehicle. Plaintiff Narciso was
one of the passengers who suffered a fractured right leg which may result in permanent
lameness due to the collision. It is conceded that the collision was caused by negligence
of both drivers for not slowing down and giving right of way. Should the petitioner be able
to recover damages from the defendants for the injury he suffered due to the collision
caused by both drivers’ negligence? Yes, the Court ruled that both sets of defendants
(Manuel and Maria Gutierrez) (Abelardo Velasco and Saturnino Cortez) are jointly
and severally obliged to indemnify Narciso Php 5,000 for the vehicular collision
caused due to the negligence of both drivers based on culpa aquiliana and culpa
contractual, respectively. Pursuant to Art 1903 of the Old Civil Code, the father alone
and not the minor or the mother would be liable for the damages caused by the minor.
(Culpa aquiliana - no pre-existing contractual relations) The liability of Abelardo as the
truck driver, and Saturnino as the owner, rests on a different basis which is that of
contract. (Contractual negligence) The CFI established the facts that with respect to the
position of both vehicles, and the excessive speed, there was negligence from both
drivers.
NOTE:
• Since the case was decided prior to the enactment of the New Civil Code, the
parents of the minor driver (18 years old), specifically the father is responsible for
the damages due to the negligence caused by his child.
• The basis of damages due to the negligence of the truck driver is culpa aquiliana,
while the basis of responsibility of the owner of the truck is culpa contractual.
• In the absence of criminal negligence of both drivers, the basis of their liability due to
their negligence is that of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.