ABRC 2021 PRE-WEEK REVIEW MATERIALS

JUSTICE LEONEN CASE DIGESTS

POLITICAL LAW

Expropriation Suit

National Power Corporation vs. Margarito Asoque and Tarcinia Asoque, G.R. No.
172507, September 14, 2016, Leonen, J.

Facts: Spouses Asoque are the registered owners of a parcel of coconut land in Calbayog City,
covered by an Original Certificate of Title, with land area of 59,099sqm. The NPC entered said
land in November 1995, and installed transmission lines for its 350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power
Transmission Line Project, destroyed coconut trees thereon and forbid any improvement that
could rise a few meters from the ground. Spouses Asoque recalls that the NPC made them
understand that the latter would pay the value of the used portion of the land, and all
improvements that would be destroyed for the project. But upon demand of just compensation,
the NPC refused to pay except for the improvements destroyed. The NPC claimed that it was only
liable to pay for right of way at 10% of the market value under Section 3-A of Republic Act No.
6395,14 as amended. The Spouses then filed a complaint for payment of just compensation.

Issue:

1. Whether petitioner should be made to pay simple easement fee or full compensation for the
land traversed by its transmission lines; and x
2. Whether the trial court erred in its determination of the amount of just compensation to be
paid to respondents.

Ruling:
I.

Petitioner is liable to pay respondents just compensation and not merely an easement fee on the
basis that its acquisition of a right-of-way easement over the portion of respondents' land was a
taking under the power of eminent domain.

While expropriation normally involves a taking of title to and possession of the property, an
easement of right of way on a private property can be considered a taking under eminent domain
under certain conditions. In Republic v. PLDT:

Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title
to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said
power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property,
without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through
expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way.

There is taking in the context of the state's power of eminent domain when the following elements
are present:

x
(1)
The expropriator enters a private property;
(2)
The entrance into the private property is indefinite or permanent;
(3)
There is color of legal authority in the entry into the property;
(4)
The property is devoted to public use or purpose; and
(5)
The use of property for public use removed from the owner all beneficial enjoyment of the
property.

A right-of-way easement or burden becomes a "taking" under eminent domain when there is
material impairment of the value of the property or prevention of the ordinary uses of the property
for an indefinite period. The intrusion into the property must be so immediate and direct as to
subtract from the owner's full enjoyment of the property and to limit his or her exploitation of it.

In Republic v. Andaya, the enforcement by the Republic of its legal easement on Andaya's
property for concrete levees and floodwalls would render the remaining property unusable and
uninhabitable. This Court held that there was a taking of the remaining area of Andaya's property:

We are, however, unable to sustain the Republic's argument that it is not liable to pay
consequential damages if in enforcing the legal easement on Andaya's property, the remaining
area would be rendered unusable and uninhabitable. "Taking," in the exercise of the power of
eminent domain, occurs not only when the government actually deprives or dispossesses the
property owner of his property or of its ordinary use, but also when there is a practical destruction
or material impairment of the value of his property. Using this standard, there was undoubtedly
a taking of the remaining area of Andaya's property. True, no burden was imposed thereon and
Andaya still retained title and possession of the property. But, as correctly observed by the Board
and affirmed by the courts a quo, the nature and the effect of the Jloodwalls would deprive
Andaya of the normal use of the remaining areas. It would prevent ingress and egress to the
property and turn it into a catch basin for the floodwaters coming from the Agusan River. x

National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Sangkay held that the National Power Corporation's
surreptitious construction of a tunnel underneath the respondents' land adversely affected the
respondent's rights and interests. This is because the National Power Corporation's subterranean
intervention prevented the respondents from introducing any developments on the surface and
from disposing of the land or any portion of it. Hence, there was a taking of the land as to entitle
the owners to just compensation:

We agree with both the RTC and the CA that there was a full taking on the part of NPC,
notwithstanding that the owners were not completely and actually dispossessed. It is settled that
the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical
taking or appropriation. Indeed, the expropriator's action may be short of acquisition of title,
physical possession, or occupancy but may still amount to a taking. Compensable taking includes
destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common
and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its
value. It is neither necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the use of his property, nor
material whether the property is removed from the possession of the owner, or in any respect
changes hands. x
The right-of-way easement resulting in a limitation on property rights over the land traversed by
transmission lines also falls within the ambit of the term "expropriation."

In National Power Corporation v. Spouses Gutierrez, the petitioner argued that it should only be
made to pay easement fees instead of the full market value of the land traversed by its
transmission lines. In striking down the petitioner's argument and ruling that the property owners
were entitled to the full market value of the land in question, the Court ruled that:

The trial court's observation shared by the appellate court show that "x x x While it is true that
plaintiff [is] only after a right-of-way easement, it nevertheless perpetually deprives defendants
of their proprietary rights as manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon defendants that
below said transmission lines no plant higher than three (3) meters is allowed. Furthermore,
because of the high-tension current conveyed through said transmission lines, danger to life and
limbs that may be caused beneath said wires cannot altogether be discounted, and to cap it all,
plaintiff only pays the fee to defendants once, while the latter shall continually- pay the taxes due
on said affected portion of their property."

The foregoing facts considered, the acquisition of the right-of-way easement falls within the
purview of the power of eminent domain. Such conclusion finds support in similar cases of
easement of right-of-way where the Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation
for private property condemned for public use[.]

....

In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power of eminent
domain. Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay
transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite
period deprives private respondents of its ordinary use.

In National Power Corporation v. Judge Paderanga, despite the National Power Corporation's
protestation that the traversed land could still be used for agricultural purposes, subject only to
its easement, this Court nevertheless held that the right-of-way easement was a taking under the
power of eminent domain:

From the Commissioners Report chronicling the following findings:

....

IMPROVEMENTS AFFECTED

Per ocular inspection made on lot own[ed] by PETRONA O. DILAO, et al. traversed by a
transmission line of NPC and with my verification as to the number of improvements, the following
trees had been damaged.
1. 55 coco trees productive

2. 10 mango trees productive

3. 30 cacao trees productive

4. 110 bananas

5. 400 ipil-ipil trees

....

it cannot be gainsaid that NPCs complaint merely involves a simple case of mere passage of
transmission lines over Dilao, et al.'s property. Aside from the actual damage done to the property
traversed by the transmission lines, the agricultural and economic activity normally undertaken
on the entire property is unquestionably restricted and perpetually hampered as the environment
is made dangerous to the occupants' life and limb.

In National Power Corporation v. Tiangco:

While the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and
possession of, the expropriated property, no cogent reason appears why said power may not be
availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of the condemned property, without loss of
title and possession. However, if the easement is intended to perpetually or indefinitely deprive
the owner of his proprietary rights through the imposition of conditions that affect the ordinary
use, free enjoyment and disposal of the property or through restrictions and limitations that are
inconsistent with the exercise of the attributes of ownership, or when the introduction of
structures or objects which, by their nature, create or increase the probability of injury, death
upon or destruction of life and property found on the land is necessary, then the owner should
be compensated for the monetary equivalent of the land, in accordance with our ruling in NPC v.
Manubay Agro-Industrial:

....

The evidence suggests that NPCs transmission line project that traverses the respondents'
property is perpetual, or at least indefinite, in nature. Moreover, not to be discounted is the fact
that the high-tension current to be conveyed through said transmission lines evidently poses a
danger to life and limb; injury, death or destruction to life and property within the vicinity. As the
Court held in NPC v. Chiong, it is not improper to assume that NPC will erect structures for its
transmission lines within the property. What is sought to be expropriated in this case is, at its
longest extent, 326.34 meters, and through it may be built several structures, not simply one[.]
x

Hence, due to the nature of the easement, which will deprive the normal use of the land for an
indefinite period and expose the property owners' lives and limbs to danger, just compensation
must be based on the full market value of the affected property.

Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 6395, as amended, states that only 10% of the market value of
the property is due the owner of the property subject to a right-of-way easement. However, this
rule is not binding on the Court. Well-settled is the rule that the determination of just
compensation for property taken in expropriation is a judicial prerogative. Such discretion cannot
be curtailed by legislation.
In Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay:

The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The
executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party
claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for
public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that
its own determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded
from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation. (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, the Regional Trial Court was correct when it adjudged the National Power Corporation
liable to pay the value of the 4,352-square-meter portion of respondents' land that was used for
its transmission line project.

IV

As regards the amount of just compensation, factual issues pertaining to the valuation of the
expropriated property are generally beyond the pale of review under a Rule 45 petition. Factual
findings of the trial and appellate courts will not be disturbed by this Court unless they are
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures, among others, which do not obtain
in this case.

Just compensation has been defined as the "fair and fall equivalent of the loss."In National Power
Corporation v. YCLA Sugar Development Corporation:

The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" and to convey
thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real,
substantial, full and ample. The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to
be a sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly defined as the price fixed by
the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition; or the
fair value of the property; as between one who receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at
the time of the actual taking by the government.

The value and character of the land at the time it was taken by government are the criteria for
determining just compensation. "All the facts as to the condition of the property and its
surroundings, as well as its improvements and capabilities, must thus be considered."

Some factors that have been previously considered by the courts were acquisition cost, current
value of like properties, its actual or potential uses, its size, shape, and location, and the tax
declarations on the property. In this regard, the standards enumerated in statutes such as Section
5 of Republic Act No. 8974 are merely recommendatory, and courts are not bound to consider all
of them.

In this case, the Branch Clerk of Court as Commissioner reported that an inquiry with the Register
of Deeds, Calbayog City involving transfer of realties from January 1998 to December 2000
showed that no transaction involved a parcel of land located at Barangay Bugtong or its adjacent
barangays of Tinaplacan and Caglanipao Sur. On the other hand, he found Exhibits F and G not
sufficient to prove respondents' claim that their land was worth P1,000.00 per square meter as
the properties in Exhibits F and G were located several kilometers away from respondents' land
and were of a different classification.

Furthermore, the Branch Clerk of Court as Commissioner stated that one high-ranking personnel
of the City Assessor's Office of Calbayog observed that the market value of respondents' land in
the Tax Declaration is a very low appraisal. As such, when he made the recommendation, he
considered other factors such as the accessibility of the property, availability of basic services in
the area, land valuation trend in the City of Calbayog (which was somewhere between P600.00
and P3,000.00 per square meter), and interviews with some landowners of the adjacent lots
stating that they would not sell their lands lower than P500.00 per square meter.

The Regional Trial Court found the amount recommended by the Commissioner as just
compensation for the property to be reasonable, thus:

[T]he Court finds the amount recommended by the commissioner as just compensation of the
property expropriated by defendant to be reasonable and fairly based on the evidence adduced
by plaintiff. Exhibits "F" and series, "G" and series, and "H" and series show the comparative
value of the lands in Western Samar. The Court takes note that in the three cases of expropriation
involving lands in Catbalogan, Samar, the National Power Corporation was adjudged to pay the
value of the properties from Php2,000.00 to Php2,200.00 per square meter, and these were cases
decided in 1997. Likewise, this Court takes cognizance of the fact that the commissioner may
avail or consider certain factors in determining the fair market value of the property apart from
the preferred documentary evidences. Thus, the factors taken into account by the commissioner
in arriving at the recommended fair market value of the property at Php800.00 per square meter,
aside from the evidence available, were valid criteria or gauge in the determination of the just
compensation of the subject property.

The determination of just compensation being a judicial function, we find no compelling reason
to disturb the valuation set by the Regional Trial Court and approved by the Court of Appeals. It
has not been sufficiently shown to be grossly exorbitant or otherwise unjustified.

Administrative law; Rule-making power

G.R. No. 188720, February 23, 2016, QUEZON CITY PTCA FEDERATION, INC., vs.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

Facts: On June 1, 2009, the Department of Education, through Former Secretary Jesli A. Lapus,
issued Department Order No. 54, Series of 20093 entitled Revised Guidelines Governing Parents-
Teachers Associations (PTAs) at the School Level.

More specifically, the Department Order provides for:

(1) The approval of the school head as a prerequisite for PTAs to be organized:
II. Organization of PTAs at the School Level
....
2. Within fifteen (15) days from the start of the school year the Homeroom Adviser and the
Parents/Guardians shall organize the Homeroom PTA with the approval of the School Head.
(2) The terms of office and manner of election of a PTA’s board of directors:
II. Organization of PTAs at the School Level
....
3. The elected presidents of the Homeroom PTAs and their respective Homeroom Advisers shall
elect the Board of Directors within thirty (30) days from the start of the school year. The Board
of Directors shall immediately elect from among themselves the executive officers of the PTA on
the same day of their election to the Board.
....
IV. Board of Directors and Officers

1. The administration of the affairs and management of activities of the PTA is vested [in] the
Board of Directors and its officers in accordance with these guidelines or their respective
Constitution and By-Laws, if any, which shall adhere to the following:
....
e. The term of office of the Board of Directors and its Officers shall be one (1) year from the date
of election. In no case shall a PTA Board Director serve for more than two (2) consecutive terms;

(3) The cessation of recognition of existing parents-teachers community associations (PTCAs) and
of their federations effective school year 2009–2010. The Department Order gave them until June
30, 2009 to dissolve, wind up their activities, submit financial reports, and turn over all documents
to school heads and schools division superintendents:

X. Transitory Provision

Existing and duly recognized PTCAs and its [sic] Federations shall no longer be given recognition
effective School Year 2009-2010. They shall cease operation at the end of School Year 2008-2009
and given until June 30, 2009 to dissolve, wind up their activities, submit their financial reports
and turn-over all documents to the School Heads and Schools Division Superintendents,
respectively.

Petitioner Quezon City PTCA Federation filed the present Petition in the belief that the above-
quoted provisions undermine the independence of PTAs and PTCAs, effectively amend the
constitutions and by-laws of existing PTAs and PTCAs, and violate its constitutional rights to
organize and to due process, as well as other existing laws.

On November 17, 2009, the Department of Education filed its Comment,21 and on February 9,
2010, Quezon City PTCA Federation filed its Reply.

In the Resolution dated January 8, 2013, this court gave due course to the Petition and required
the parties to submit their memoranda. Quezon City PTCA Federation complied on March 22,
2013,24 and the Department of Education on May 15, 2013.

Issues: First, whether the issuance of the Department Order was a valid exercise of the
Department of Education’s rule-making powers.

Second, whether the assailed provisions of the Department Order (i.e., Article II (2) and (3),
Article IV (1)(e), and Article X) undermine the organizational independence of parent-teacher
associations.
Ruling:

First issue: Petitioner argues that the present Petition justifies direct recourse to this court
"considering the pervasive effect of the assailed Department Order to all the different PTCAs or
PTAs across the country and in order to avoid multiple suits that would only serve to further clog
the court’s dockets."

This reason fails to impress.

That the effects of the Department Order extend throughout the country is a concern that can
be addressed by recourse to the Court of Appeals. Its territorial jurisdiction, much like this court’s,
also extends throughout the country. Moreover, the Court of Appeals is well-equipped to render
reliable, reasonable, and well-grounded judgments in cases averring grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Recourse to the Court of Appeals is not a futile exercise
that results to nothing more than the clogging of court dockets.

Second issue: The three powers of government—executive, legislative, and judicial—have been
generally viewed as non-delegable. However, in recognition of the exigencies that contemporary
governance must address, our legal system has recognized the validity of "subordinate
legislation," or the rule-making power of agencies tasked with the administration of government.
Administrative agencies, however, are not given unfettered power to promulgate rules. As noted
in Gerochi v. Department of Energy, two requisites must be satisfied in order that rules issued by
administrative agencies may be considered valid: the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test:

In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life, delegation of legislative power to various
specialized administrative agencies is allowed as an exception to this principle. Given the volume
and variety of interactions in today’s society, it is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws
that will deal adequately with and respond promptly to the minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the
need to delegate to administrative bodies – the principal agencies tasked to execute laws in their
specialized fields – the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute
and effectuate its policies. All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate
legislation is that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that the
regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law.
These requirements are denominated as the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.

In the first place, all that a school head has is recommending authority. More importantly,
petitioner overlooks the qualifier to the school head’s recommending authority.

A parent-teacher association is a mechanism for effecting the role of parents (who would
otherwise be viewed as outsiders) as an indispensable element of educational communities.
Rather than being totally independent of or removed from schools, a parent-teacher association
is more aptly considered an adjunct of an educational community having a particular school as
its locus. It is an "arm" of the school. Given this view, the importance of regulation vis-à-vis
investiture of official status becomes manifest. According a parent-teacher association official
status not only enables it to avail itself of benefits and privileges but also establishes upon it its
solemn duty as a pillar of the educational system.
G.R. No. 192803, December 10, 2013, 723 Phil. 160 EN BANC, ALLIANCE FOR RURAL
AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC., ALSO KNOWN AS ARARO PARTY-LIST,
Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, LEONEN, J.

Facts: Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc.,(ARARO) was a duly accredited party-
list under Republic Act No. 7941. It garnered a total of one hundred forty-seven thousand two
hundred four (147,204) votes in the May 10, 2010 elections and ranked fiftieth (50th). The
Commission on Elections En Banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers initially proclaimed
twenty-eight (28) party-list organizations as winners involving a total of thirty-five (35) seats
guaranteed and additional seats. The result was based on the Commission on Elections’ count of
one hundred twenty-one (121) Certificates of Canvass or a total of twenty-nine million seven
hundred fifty thousand and forty-one (29,750,041) votes for the Party-List System.

Petitioner then filed an election protest before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
questioning the Resolution of the Commission on Elections that proclaimed the 28 party-list
groups listed above.

Without waiting for the resolution of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, the
petitioner filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction
and Temporary Restraining Order. The petitioner asks that this Court:

1. To modify the Commission on Elections’ interpretation of the formula stated in BANAT v.

COMELEC by making the divisor for the computation of the percentage votes, from total number
of votes cast minus the votes for the disqualified party-list candidates, to the total number of
votes cast regardless whether party-list groups are disqualified;
2. To enjoin the public respondent Commission on Elections from proclaiming the remaining
winning party-list candidates until it modifies the interpretation of the formula used in BANAT v.
COMELEC to the formula proposed by the petitioner; and
3. To issue a Temporary Restraining Order against the public respondent until it modifies the
present formula for computing the number of seats for the winning party-list candidates to the
formula proposed by the petitioner. This Court did not issue any Temporary Restraining Order.
By Resolution, the National Board of Canvassers proclaimed the winning party-list groups with
the following computation:

The petitioner suggests that the formula used by the Commission on Elections is flawed because
votes that were spoiled or that were not made for any party-lists were not counted. According to
the petitioner, around seven million (7,000,000) votes were disregarded as a result of the
Commission on Elections’ erroneous interpretation.

Second, the number of votes for disqualified party-list groups is again deducted from the number
of votes for party-list candidates which the petitioner pegged at thirty million five hundred
seventy-two thousand nine hundred fourteen votes (30,572,914).17 The difference then is thirty
million two hundred sixty-four thousand five hundred seventy-nine (30,264,579) votes.

Lastly, to get the total number of votes disregarded by the Commission on Elections’
interpretation, 30,264,579 is subtracted from 37,377,371.The computation then results to seven
million one hundred twelve thousand seven hundred ninety-two (7,112,792) votes disregarded
using the Commission on Elections’ interpretation.
The petitioner argues that the Commission on Elections’ interpretation of the formula used in
BANAT v. COMELEC is flawed because it is not in accordance with the law. The petitioner
distinguishes the phrases, valid votes cast for party-list candidates on the one hand as against
votes cast for the party-list system on the other.

The petitioner puts in issue the interpretation of Sections 11 and 12 of Republic Act No.7941 or
"An Act Providing for the Election of Party-List Representatives Through the Party-List System,
and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The sections provide the guidelines in allocating seats to
party-list representatives:

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives
including those under the party-list.

For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of
party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the
Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be
observed:

(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based
on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

The petitioner argues that the correct interpretation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941
or the Party-list Law does not distinguish between valid and invalid votes, to wit:
Therefore, votes for specific party lists are not the same as votes for the party-list system. Hence,
people whose votes were spoiled for instance (like checking or failure to properly shade the ovals
in the ballots, or voted for two party lists when the requirement is only one, or had erasures on
their ballots for instance), or did not vote for any party-list at all are still voters for the party-list
system. The votes for the party-list system [include] all those people who voted whether their
votes were counted or not as long as the mechanism for the selection of party-list is in place.

Issues: I. Whether the case is already moot and academic

II. Whether petitioners have legal standing
III. Whether the Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion in its interpretation
of the formula used in BANAT v. COMELEC to determine the party-list groups that would be
proclaimed in the 2010 elections.

Ruling: This case is moot and academic. Mendoza v. Villas defines a moot and academic case:
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. As a rule, courts
decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness.

Several supervening events have already rendered this case moot and academic. First, the
Commission on Elections En Banc already proclaimed other winning party-list groups.28 Second,
the term of office of the winning party-list groups in the May 2010 national elections ended on
June 30, 2013. Finally, the conduct of the May 13, 2013 elections resulted in a new set of party-
list groups.

SC held that the expiration of the challenged term of office renders the corresponding Petition
moot and academic. This leaves any ruling on the issues raised by the petitioner with no practical
or useful value.

However, the following exceptions to the rule of declining jurisdiction over moot and academic
cases are allowed: (1) there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case involved a
situation of exceptional character and was of paramount public interest; (3) the issues raised
required the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and
(4) the case was capable of repetition yet evading review. On the importance of the assailed
formula, this Court will discuss the issues raised by the petitioner as these are capable of repetition
yet evading review and for the guidance of the bench, bar, and public.

The petitioner is not the real party in interest.

"A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgement in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." The party’s interest must be direct,
substantial, and material. In this case, the petitioner attacks the validity of the formula used and
upheld in BANAT. It also proposes its own interpretation of the formula to determine the
proportional representation of party-list candidates in the House of Representatives. However
despite any new computation, ARARO’s proposed divisor of total votes cast for the party-list
system whether valid or invalid still fails to secure one seat for ARARO. Reviewing the figures
presented by the petitioner. The petitioner does not suffer a direct, substantial or material injury
from the application of the formula interpreted and used in BANAT in proclaiming the winning
party-lists in the assailed National Board of Canvassers Resolution. The computation proposed by
petitioner ARARO even lowers its chances to meet the 2% threshold required by law for a
guaranteed seat. Its arguments will neither benefit nor injure the party. Thus, it has no legal
standing to raise the argument in this Court.

Veterans laid down the "four inviolable parameters" in determining the winners in a Philippine-
style party-list election based on a reading of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941:

First, the twenty percent allocation-the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not
exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those
elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold-only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the
total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of
Representatives.
Third, the three-seat limit-each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional
seats.

Fourth, proportional representation-the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall
be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."

In Partido ng Manggagawa (PM) and Butil Farmers Party (Butil) v. COMELEC,39 the petitioning
party-list groups sought the immediate proclamation by the Commission on Elections of their
respective second nominee, claiming that they were entitled to one (1) additional seat each in
the House of Representatives. We held that the correct formula to be used is the one used in
Veterans and reiterated it in Ang Bagong Bayani – OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC.40 This Court
in CIBAC v. COMELEC41 differentiates the formula used in Ang Bagong Bayani but upholds the
validity of the Veterans formula.

In BANAT v. COMELEC, we declared the 2% threshold in relation to the distribution of the

additional seats as void. SC said in that case that:

The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section
5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives." (Republic
Act No. 7941, Section 2)

There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by
the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats
reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The
whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds
to a party’s share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each
of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all
of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat
cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.

The most recent Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC does not in any way modify the formula set in
Veterans. It only corrects the definition of valid party-list groups. We affirmed that party-list
groups maybe national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. We abandoned the
requirement introduced in Ang Bagong Bayani that all party-list groups should prove that they
represent a "marginalized" or "under-represented" sector.

SC agree with the petitioner but only to the extent that votes later on determined to be invalid
due to no cause attributable to the voter should not be excluded in the divisor. In other words,
votes cast validly for a party-list group listed in the ballot but later on disqualified should be
counted as part of the divisor. To do otherwise would be to disenfranchise the voters who voted
on the basis of good faith that that ballot contained all the qualified candidates. However,
following this rationale, party-list groups listed in the ballot but whose disqualification attained
finality prior to the elections and whose disqualification was reasonably made known by the
Commission on Elections to the voters prior to such elections should not be included in the divisor.
Number of votes. of party-list Total number of valid votes for party-list candidates Proportion or
Percentage of votes garnered by party-list.

The divisor shall be the total number of valid votes cast for the party-list system including votes
cast for party-list groups whose names are in the ballot but are subsequently disqualified. Party-
list groups listed in the ballot but whose disqualification attained finality prior to the elections and
whose disqualification was reasonably made known by the Commission on Elections to the voters
prior to such elections should not be included in the divisor. The divisor shall also not include
votes that are declared spoiled or invalid.

Eminent domain

G.R. No. 198008, February 04, 2019, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED
BY THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, REGION X, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, Petitioner vs. BENJOHN FETALVERO

Facts: Fetalvero owned a 2,787-square meter parcel of land in Iligan City, Lanao del Norte. The
lot was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25,233 (a.f.).

In 1999, the Department of Public Works and Highways, Region X took 569 square meters from
Fetalvero's property to be used in its flood control project. Fetalvero stated that the project's
construction on that portion of land rendered the remaining part useless, so he demanded
payment for the entire area at ₱15,000.00 per square meter. However, under Presidential
Administrative Order No. 50, series of 1999, the just compensation Fetalvero was entitled to was
only ₱2,500.00 per square meter, or a total of ₱1,422,500.00, plus 10% thereof. The rate was
based on the Bureau of Internal Revenue zonal valuation in 1999, when the property was taken.
Despite negotiations, the parties failed to agree on the amount of just compensation.

On February 13, 2008, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the
Solicitor General, filed before the Regional Trial Court a Complaint 11 for expropriation against
Fetalvero. It prayed "for the determination and payment of the just compensation and the entry
of a judgment of condemnation of the 569 square meters portion of [Fetalvero's] property." 13
The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 7118, was raffled to Branch 3 under Presiding Judge Albert
B. Abragan.

On April 16, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General filed before the trial court a Notice of
Appearance dated April 10, 2008. On June 27, 2008, the trial court issued an Order and referred
the case to the Philippine Mediation Center for mediation. On October 17, 2008, the trial court
issued an Order approving the Compromise Agreement. On November 6, 2008, the Republic
received a copy of the Order.

In a letter dated May 13, 2009, Jaime A. Pacanan, Assistant Secretary and Central Right of Way
Committee Chair of the Department of Public Works and Highways, Manila, requested advice from
the Office of the Solicit General regarding the Compromise Agreement's legality.

Issues:
Whether or not government funds may be seized under a writ of execution or a writ of
garnishment in satisfaction of court judgments.

Ruling:

The general rule is that government funds cannot be seized by virtue of writs of execution or
garnishment. This doctrine has been explained in Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego:

The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by
general or special law, it may limit claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings
anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the Judgment is
rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy.
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required
by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed
or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as
appropriated by law.

Simply put, "no money can be taken out of the treasury without an appropriation[.’’87 Here, the
trial court already found that:

[T]here is an appropriation intended by law for payment of road-rights-of-way. Defendant

[respondent here] even called the attention of the court of the existence of SAA-SR 2009-05-
001538 of the DPWH Main and/or Regional Office appertaining to the fund intended for payment
of the road-rights- of-way.

Even petitioner admitted in its Memorandum "the approval of allocation for payment of road right
of way projects within Region 10 under SAA-SR 2009-001538[.]’’ Since there is an existing
appropriation for the payment of just compensation, and this Court already settled that petitioner
is bound by the Compromise Agreement, respondent is legally entitled to his money claim.
However, he still has to go through the appropriate procedure for making a claim against the
Government.

In Atty. Roxas v. Republic Real Estate Corporation,90 this Court elaborated on the proper process
of raising money claims against the government. In that case, the trial court issued a writ of
execution over the government funds for payment of land reclaimed by Republic Real Estate
Corporation.

This Court held:

The case is premature. The money claim against the Republic should have been first brought
before the Commission on Audit.

The Writ of Execution and Sheriff De Jesus' Notice [of Execution] violate this Court's
Administrative Circular No. 10-2000 and Commission on Audit Circular No. 2001-002, which
govern the issuance of writs of execution to satisfy money judgments against government.
Administrative Circular No. 10-2000 dated October 25, 2000 orders all judges of lower courts to
observe utmost caution, prudence, and judiciousness in the issuance of writs of execution to
satisfy money judgments against government agencies.

Here, as in Atty. Roxas, respondent failed to show that he first raised his claim before the
Commission on Audit. Without this necessary procedural step, respondent's money claim cannot
be entertained by the courts through a writ of execution.

Under Article III, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution, "[p]rivate property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation."

This Court notes that for almost 20 years now, petitioner had been enjoying the use of
respondent's property without paying the full amount of just compensation under the Compromise
Agreement. Respondent had been deprived of his property for almost two (2) decades. In keeping
with substantial justice, this Court imposes the payment of legal interest on the remaining just
compensation due to respondent. Consistent with this Court's ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames,93
this Court imposes interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the time of taking
until June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid.

Thus, respondent's money claim under the Compromise Agreement should be adjusted to reflect
the interest rates imposed by this Court.

Eminent domain

G.R. No. 193618, November 28, 2016, HEIRS OF LEOPOLDO DELFIN AND SOLEDAD
DELFIN, NAMELY EMELITA D. FABRIGAR AND LEONILO C. DELFIN, Petitioners, v.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, LEONEN, J.

Facts:

In a Complaint for "Payment of Parcel(s) of Land and Improvements and Damages" the Delfin
Spouses claimed that they were the owners of a 28,800 square meter parcel of land in Townsite,
Suarez, Iligan City (the "Iligan Property"). They allegedly bought the property in 1951 from Felix
Natingo and Carlos Carbonay, who, allegedly, had been in actual possession of the property since
time immemorial. The Delfin Spouses had been declaring the Iligan Property in their names for
tax purposes since 1952, and had been planting it with mangoes, coconuts, corn, seasonal crops,
and vegetables.

They further alleged that, sometime in 1982, respondent National Housing Authority forcibly took
possession of a 10,798 square meter portion of the property.10 Despite their repeated demands
for compensation, the National Housing Authority failed to pay the value of the property. The
Delfin Spouses thus, filed their Complaint.

They asserted that the property's reasonable market value was not less than P40 per square
meter and that its improvements consisting of fruit-bearing trees should be valued at P13,360.00
at the time of taking. They similarly claimed that because the National Housing Authority occupied
the property, they were deprived of an average net yearly income of P10,000.00.
In its Answer, the National Housing Authority alleged that the Delfin Spouses' property was part
of a military reservation area. It cited Proclamation No. 2151 (actually, Proclamation No. 2143,
the National Housing Authority made an erroneous citation) as having supposedly reserved the
area in which property is situated for Iligan City's slum improvement and resettlement program,
and the relocation of families who were dislocated by the National Steel Corporation's five-year
expansion program.

According to the National Housing Authority, Proclamation No. 2151 also mandated it to
determine the improvements' valuation. Based on the study of the committee it created, the value
of the property was supposedly only P4.00 per square meter, regardless of the nature of the
improvements on it.

It emphasized that among all claimants, only the Delfin Spouses and two others remained unpaid
because of their disagreement on the property's valuation.

Issue: Whether petitioners are entitled to just compensation for the Iligan City property occupied
by respondent National Housing Authority.

Ruling: The right to be justly compensated whenever private property is taken for public use
cannot be disputed. Article III, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution states that
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
The case now hinges on whether the petitioners and their predecessors-in-interests have been in
possession of the Iligan Property for such duration and under such circumstances as will enable
them to claim ownership.

Petitioners are erroneously claiming title based on acquisitive prescription under Section 14(2) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529. Section 14 reads in full:

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of
existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of
accession or accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.

Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the application jointly.

Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may file an application for
the original registration of the land, provided, however, that should the period for redemption
expire during the pendency of the registration proceedings and ownership to the property
consolidated in the vendee a retro, the latter shall be substituted for the applicant and may
continue the proceedings.
A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any land held in trust by
him, unless prohibited by the instrument creating the trust.
For acquisitive prescription to set in pursuant to Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
two (2) requirements must be satisifled: first, the property is established to be private in
character; and second the applicable prescriptive period under existing laws had passed.

Accordingly, only publicly owned lands which are patrimonial in character are susceptible to
prescription under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529. Consistent with this, Article
1113 of Civil Code demarcates properties of the state, which are not patrimonial in character, as
being not susceptible to prescription.

For land of the public domain to be converted into patrimonial property, there must be an express
declaration - "in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in
cases where the President is duly authorized by law" - that "the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property
has been converted into patrimonial."

This Court's 2009 Decision in Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic explains:

Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public dominion, when no
longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of
the State". It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted into
patrimonial properly susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes
clear that those property "which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth" are public
dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified
as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when * it is "intended for
some public service or for the development of the national wealth".

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property
is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the
property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property,
even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to
Article 420 (2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable
and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription
can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.

This was reiterated in this Court's 2013 Resolution in Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic:

[W]hen public land is no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of
such conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential
proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect.
While petitioners may not claim title by prescription, they may, nevertheless, claim title pursuant
to Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (the Public Land Act).

Section 48 enabled the confirmation of claims and issuance of titles in favor of citizens occupying
or claiming to own lands of the public domain or an interest therein. Section 48 (b) specifically
pertained to those who "have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and,
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, since June 12, 1945".

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act therefore requires that two (2) requisites be satisfied before
claims of title to public domain lands may be confirmed: first, that the land subject of the claim
is agricultural land; and second, open, continuous, notorious, and exclusive possession of the
land since June 12, 1945.

Having shown that the requisites of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act have been satisfied and
having established their rights to the Iligan Property, it follows that petitioners must be
compensated for its taking.

Rizalito Y. David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal And Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares, G.R.
No. 221538, September 20, 2016, Leonen, J.

FACTS: Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a foundling whose biological parents are
unknown. As an infant, she was abandoned at the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo. She was later
adopted and raised by spouses FPJ and Susan Roces. She took her college degree in the USA.
She returns to the Philippines frequently.

On July 29, 1991, Senator Poe decided to settle in the US with her husband and children and
lived there for some time. She was naturalized and granted American citizenship on October 18,
2001. She was subsequently given a United States passport.

When FPJ ran for President in 2004, she returned to support her father's candidacy. After the
elections, she returned to the United States on July 8, 2004.

On December 14, 2004, FPJ died. She stayed in the country until February 3, 2005 to attend her
father's funeral and to attend to the settling of his estate.

In 2004, Senator Poe resigned from work in the United States and decided to return home in
2005. She came back on May 24, 2005. On July 7, 2006, she took the Oath of Allegiance to
Republic of the Philippines

In July 2006, her Petition for Retention and or Re-acquisition of Philippine Citizenship and
derivative citizenship on behalf of her three children were granted. Senator Poe became a
registered voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on August 31, 2006.

Senator Poe made several trips to the United States of America between 2006 and 2009 using
her United States Passport. She used her passport "after having taken her Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic on 07 July 2006, but not after she has formally renounced her American citizenship
on 20 October 2010.

On October 6, 2010, President Aquino appointed Senator Poe as Chairperson of the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). On October 20, 2010, Senator Poe executed
an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of
American Citizenship.

Senator Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States on

July 12, 2011.

Senator Poe decided to run as Senator in the 2013 Elections and eventually won.

David, a losing candidate in the 2013 Senatorial Elections, filed before the Senate Electoral
Tribunal a Petition for Quo Warranto on August 6, 2015. He contested the election of Senator
Poe for failing to "comply with the citizenship and residency requirements mandated by the
Constitution.

On November 17, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal promulgated its assailed Decision finding
Senator Poe to be a natural-born citizen and, therefore, qualified to hold office as Senator.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the Senate Electoral Tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner's Petition for Quo Warranto
based on its finding that private respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen, qualified to hold a
seat as Senator under Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution.
Ruling: Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen qualified to hold office as
Senator of the Republic.
Electoral Tribunal as the sole judge of election contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the elective officials falling within the scope of their
powers
The Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET), along with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET), is a creation of Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue of such provision,
the Constitution segregates from all other judicial and quasi-judicial bodies (particularly, courts
and the Commission on Elections) the power to rule on contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of members of the Senate (as well as of the House of Representatives). These
powers are granted to a separate and distinct constitutional organ.
The 1935 Constitution similarly created an Electoral Commission, independent from the National
Assembly. The 1973 Constitution did away with these electoral tribunals, but they have since
been restored by the 1987 Constitution.
The electoral tribunal shall be the "sole" judge. Exclusive, original jurisdiction over contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the elective officials falling within the scope
of their powers is, thus, vested in these electoral tribunals. It is only before them that post-
election challenges against the election, returns, and qualifications of Senators and
Representatives (as well as of the President and the Vice-President, in the case of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal) may be initiated. Judgments of electoral tribunals are not beyond the scope of
judicial review
The judgments of these tribunals are not beyond the scope of any review. Article VI, Section 17's
stipulation of electoral tribunals' being the "sole" judge must be read in harmony with Article VIII,
Section l's express statement that "judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice ... to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." Judicial review is,
therefore, still possible.
In Robles vs. HRET, the Court has explained that while the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond
judicial interference, the Court may do so, however, but only "in the exercise of this Court's so-
called extraordinary jurisdiction, ... upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution
was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or
paraphrasing [Morrero vs. Bocar], upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by
the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration
of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of discretion that there
has to be a remedy for such abuse.“
This Court reviews judgments of the House and Senate Electoral Tribunals not in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction. Our review is limited to a determination of whether there has been an
error in jurisdiction, not an error in judgment. Petition for certiorari as a remedy to question a
decision of the electoral tribunal
A petition for certiorari is allowed in Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution and described in
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as an independent civil action. The viability of such a petition is
premised on an allegation of "grave abuse of discretion. The term "grave abuse of discretion" has
been generally held to refer to such arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.
A glaring misinterpretation of the constitutional text or of statutory provisions, as well as a
misreading or misapplication of the current state of jurisprudence, is also considered grave abuse
of discretion. The arbitrariness consists in the disregard of the current state of our law. Moreover,
adjudication that fails to consider the facts and evidence or frivolously departs from settled
principles engenders a strong suspicion of partiality. This can be a badge of hostile intent against
a party. SET did not act with grave abuse of discretion
We find no basis for concluding that the SET acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The SET's conclusions are
in keeping with a faithful and exhaustive reading of the Constitution, one that proceeds from an
intent to give life to all the aspirations of all its provisions.
The SET was confronted with a novel legal question: the citizenship status of children whose
biological parents are unknown, considering that the Constitution, in Article IV, Section 1(2)
explicitly makes reference to one's father or mother. Acting within this void, the SET was only
asked to make a reasonable interpretation of the law while heedfully considering the established
personal circumstances of private respondent. It arrived at conclusions in a manner in keeping
with the degree of proof required in proceedings before a quasi-judicial body: not absolute
certainty, not proof beyond reasonable doubt or preponderance of evidence, but "substantial
evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to justify a conclusion.“
Natural-born citizen
The term "natural-born citizen" first appeared in this jurisdiction in the 1935 Constitution's
provision stipulating the qualifications for President and Vice-President of the Philippines. While
it used the term "natural-born citizen," the 1935 Constitution did not define the term.
The 1973 Constitution was the first instrument to actually define the term "natural-born citizen."
Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution provided: "A natural-born citizen is one who is a
citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his
Philippine citizenship.“
The present 1987 Constitution adopted most of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution on
citizenship. Article IV, Section 2 also calibrated the 1973 Constitution's previous definition of
natural-born citizens. (a) Interpretation of the Constitution
The Constitution should be appreciated and read as a singular, whole unit -ut magis valeat quam
pereat. It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the
Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the
provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted
as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. In other words, the court must harmonize
them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of construction which will render every word operative,
rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory. (Civil Liberties Union versus
Executive Secretary)
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, which enumerates who are citizens of the
Philippines, may be compared with counterpart provisions, not only in earlier Constitutions but
even in organic laws and in similar mechanisms introduced by colonial rulers whose precepts
nevertheless still resonate today. 16. Contemporaneous construction and aids that are external
to the text may be resorted to when the text is capable of multiple, viable meanings. It is only
then that one can go beyond the strict boundaries of the document. Nevertheless, even when
meaning has already been ascertained from a reading of the plain text, contemporaneous
construction may serve to verify or validate the meaning yielded by such reading.
In the hierarchy of the means for constitutional interpretation, inferring meaning from the
supposed intent of the framers or fathoming the original understanding of the individuals who
adopted the basic document is the weakest approach. These methods leave the greatest room
for subjective interpretation. While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the
resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings
are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the
constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as
indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority
who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave the
instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what
appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than in the framer's understanding thereof.
Foundlings are natural-born citizens unless there is substantial evidence to the
contrary.
The assumption should be that foundlings are natural-born unless there is substantial evidence
to the contrary. This is necessarily engendered by a complete consideration of the whole
Constitution, not just its provisions on citizenship. As much as we have previously harmonized
Article IV, Section 2 with Article IV, Section 1(2), constitutional provisions on citizenship must not
be taken in isolation. They must be read in light of the constitutional mandate to defend the well-
being of children, to guarantee equal protection of the law and equal access to opportunities for
public service, and to respect human rights. They must also be read in conjunction with the
Constitution's reasons for requiring natural-born status for select public offices. Further, this
presumption is validated by contemporaneous construction that considers related legislative
enactments, executive and administrative actions, and international instruments.
Equal protection clause.
Certain crucial government offices are exclusive to natural-born citizens of the Philippines.
Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino citizens is tantamount to permanently
discriminating against our foundling citizens. Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born
citizens creates an inferior class of citizens who are made to suffer that inferiority through no
fault of their own.
The equal protection clause serves as a guarantee that "persons under like circumstances and
falling within the same class are treated alike, in terms of 'privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced.' Other than the anonymity of their biological parents, no substantial distinction
differentiates foundlings from children with known Filipino parents. They are both entitled to the
full extent of the state's protection from the moment of their birth.
Contemporaneous acts
The presumption that foundlings are natural born citizens of the Philippines (unless substantial
evidence of the foreign citizenship of both of the foundling's parents is presented) is validated by
a parallel consideration or contemporaneous construction of the Constitution with acts of
Congress, international instruments in force in the Philippines, as well as acts of executive organs
such as the Bureau of Immigration, Civil Registrars, and the President of the Philippines.
Section 4(b) of the Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) defines the
"best interest of the child" as the "totality of the circumstances and conditions which are most
congenial to the survival, protection and feelings of security of the child and most encouraging to
the child's physical, psychological and emotional development."
Consistent with this statute is our ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child. This specifically requires the states parties' protection of: first, children's rights to
immediate registration and nationality after birth; second, against statelessness; and third,
against discrimination on account of their birth status.
The Philippines likewise ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This
treaty requires that children be allowed immediate registration after birth and to acquire a
nationality. It similarly defends them against discrimination.
Our statutes on adoption allow for the recognition of foundlings' Filipino citizenship on account of
their birth. They benefit from this without having to do any act to perfect their citizenship or
without having to complete the naturalization process. Thus, by definition, they are natural born
citizens.
Accordingly, by the Constitution and by statute, foundlings cannot be the object of discrimination.
They are vested with the rights to be registered and granted nationality upon birth. To deny them
these rights, deprive them of citizenship, and render them stateless is to unduly burden them,
discriminate them, and undermine their development.
Senator Poe is a natural born-citizen.
Today, there are only two (2) categories of Filipino citizens: natural born and naturalized. A
natural-born citizen is defined in Article IV, Section 2 as one who is a citizen of the Philippines
"from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship." By
necessary implication, a naturalized citizen is one who is not natural-born.
Senator Poe was a Filipino citizen at birth. This status' commencement from birth means that she
never had to do anything to consummate this status. By definition, she is natural-born. Though
subsequently naturalized, she reacquired her natural-born status upon satisfying the requirement
of Republic Act No. 9225. Accordingly, she is qualified to hold office as Senator of the Republic.
Petitioner's restrictive reliance on Section 1 and the need to establish bloodline is- misplaced.
Between Article IV, Section 1(2), which petitioner harps on, and Section 2, it is Section 2 that is
on point. To determine whether Senator Poe is a natural-born citizen, we must look into whether
she had to do anything to perfect her citizenship. In view of Bengson, this calls for an inquiry into
whether she underwent the naturalization process to become a Filipino. She did not. 30. Section
1(2) stipulates that to be a citizen, either one's father or one's mother must be a Filipino citizen.
Section 1(2) does not require one's parents to be natural-born Filipino citizens. It does not even
require them to conform to traditional conceptions of what is indigenously or ethnically Filipino.
One or both parents can, therefore, be ethnically foreign. There is no need, as petitioner insists,
for a pure Filipino bloodline.
Circumstantial evidence to prove parentage
Proving Senator Poe's biological parentage is now practically impossible. To begin with, she was
abandoned as a newborn infant. She was abandoned almost half a century ago. Even the
identification of individuals against whom DNA evidence may be tested is improbable, and by
sheer economic cost, prohibitive.
However, our evidentiary rules admit of alternative means for Senator Poe to establish her
parentage. In lieu of direct evidence, facts may be proven through circumstantial evidence.
Although the Revised Rules on Evidence's sole mention of circumstantial evidence is in reference
to criminal proceedings, this Court has nevertheless sustained the use of circumstantial evidence
in other proceedings.
Senator Poe was found as a newborn infant outside the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo on September
3, 1968. In 1968, Iloilo, as did most-if not all-Philippine provinces, had a predominantly Filipino
population. Senator Poe is described as having "brown almond shaped eyes, a low nasal bridge,
straight black hair and an oval-shaped face." She stands at 5 feet and 2 inches tall. These
circumstances are substantial evidence justifying an inference that her biological parents were
Filipino. Her abandonment at a Catholic Church is more or less consistent with how a Filipino who,
in 1968, lived in a predominantly religious and Catholic environment, would have behaved.
Further, in 1968, there was no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo. The absence of an international
airport in Jaro, Iloilo precludes the possibility of a foreigner mother, along with a foreigner father,
swiftly and surreptitiously coming in and out of Jaro, Iloilo just to give birth and leave her offspring
there. Though proof of ethnicity is unnecessary, her physical features nonetheless attest to it.
The Solicitor General underscored how it is statistically more probable that Senator Poe was born
a Filipino citizen rather than as a foreigner. out of the 900,165 recorded births in the Philippines
in 1968, only 1,595 or 0.18% newborns were foreigners. This translates to roughly 99.8%
probability that Senator Poe was born a Filipino citizen.
Burden of proof in quo warranto proceedings falls on the petitioner to show that
respondent is ineligible for the office.
Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to
establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law." Burden of proof lies
on the party making the allegations; that is, the party who "alleges the affirmative of the issue."
Burden of proof never shifts from one party to another. What shifts is the burden of evidence. .
This shift happens when a party makes a prima facie case in his or her favor. The other party
then bears the "burden of going forward" with the evidence considering that which has ostensibly
been established against him or her.
In an action for quo warranto, the burden of proof necessarily falls on the party who brings the
action and who alleges that the respondent is ineligible for the office involved in the controversy.
In proceedings before quasi-judicial bodies such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the requisite
quantum of proof is substantial evidence. This burden was petitioner's to discharge. Once the
petitioner makes a prima facie case, the burden of evidence shifts to the respondent.
Petitioner's claim that the burden of evidence shifted to private respondent upon a mere showing
that she is a foundling is a serious error. Petitioner invites this Court to establish a jurisprudential
presumption that all newborns who have been abandoned in rural areas in the Philippines are not
Filipinos. His emphasis on private respondent's supposed burden to prove the circumstances of
her birth places upon her an impossible condition.
Private respondent's admitted status as a foundling does not establish a prima facie case in favor
of petitioner. While it does establish that the identities of private respondent's biological parents
are not known, it does not automatically mean that neither her father nor her mother is a Filipino.
The most that petitioner had in his favor was doubt. A taint of doubt, however, is by no means
substantial evidence establishing a prima facie case and shifting the burden of evidence to private
respondent.
Further, as discussed above, the Constitution sustains a presumption that all foundlings found in
the Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino mother and are thus natural-
born, unless there is substantial proof otherwise. Under Article IV, Section 1 (2 ), any such
countervailing proof must show that both-not just one-of a foundling's biological parents are not
Filipino citizens.
Reliance on presumptions to resolve citizenship issue
Petitioner intimates that no inference or presumption in favor of natural-born citizenship may be
indulged in resolving this case. It is true that there is jurisprudence (Paa v. Chan and Go v.
Ramos) to the effect that presumptions cannot be entertained in citizenship cases. However,
these pronouncements are no longer controlling in light of this Court's more recent ruling in
Tecson vs. Comelec. In 2004, this Court resolved Tecson on the basis of presumptions.
The factual backdrop of Paa is markedly different from those of this case. Its statements,
therefore, are inappropriate precedents for this case. In Paa, clear evidence was adduced showing
that respondent Quintin Chan was registered as an alien with the Bureau of Immigration. His
father was likewise registered as an alien. These pieces of evidence already indubitably establish
foreign citizenship and shut the door to any presumption. In contrast, petitioner in this case
presents no proof, direct or circumstantial, of private respondent's or of both of her parents'
foreign citizenship.
On the other hand, Go was decided by this Court sitting in Division. It cannot overturn Tecson,
which was decided by this Court sitting En Banc.
Senator Poe re-acquired natural-born Filipino citizenship when she complied with the
requisites of RA 9225.
Commonwealth Act No. 63, which was in effect when Senator Poe was naturalized an American
citizen on October 18, 2001, provided in Section 1(1) that "[a] Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship ... by naturalization in a foreign country." Thus, she lost her Philippine citizenship when
she was naturalized an American citizen. However, on July 7, 2006, she took her Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225. Three (3)
days later, July 10, 2006, she filed before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation a Petition
for Reacquisition of her Philippine citizenship.
RA 9225 superseded CA 63 and RA 8171 specifically "to do away with the provision in CA 63
which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized
citizens of other countries.“ What RA 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino
citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country. RA 9225 made natural-born Filipinos' status permanent and immutable despite
naturalization as citizens of other countries.
Natural-born Philippine citizens who, after RA 9225 took effect, are naturalized in foreign countries
" retain," that is, keep, their Philippine citizenship, although the effectivity of this retention and
the ability to exercise the rights and capacities attendant to this status are subject to certain
solemnities (i.e., oath of allegiance and other requirements for specific rights and/or acts, as
enumerated in Section 5). On the other hand, those who became citizens of another country
before the effectivity of RA 9225 "reacquire" their Philippine citizenship and may exercise
attendant rights and capacities, also upon compliance with certain solemnities. Read in
conjunction with Section 2' s declaration of a policy of immutability, this reacquisition is not a
mere restoration that leaves a vacuum in the intervening period. Rather, this reacquisition works
to restore natural-born status as though it was never lost at all.
Thus, natural-born Filipinos who have been naturalized elsewhere and wish to run for elective
public office must comply with all of the following requirements: (1) taking the oath of allegiance
to the Republic. This effects the retention or reacquisition of one's status as a natural-born
Filipino. This also enables the enjoyment of full civil and political rights, subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws, provided the solemnities recited in. Section 5 of
RA 9225 are satisfied. (2) compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, RA 9189,
otherwise known as the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, and other existing laws. This is
to facilitate the exercise of the right of suffrage; that is, to allow for voting in elections. (3) making
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath. This, along with satisfying the other qualification requirements
under relevant laws, makes one eligible for elective public office.
Senator Poe has complied with all of these requirements. First, on July 7, 2006, she took the Oath
of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.256 Second, on August 31, 2006, she became a
registered voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan. Lastly, on October 20, 2010, she executed
an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of
American Citizenship. She has, therefore, not only fully reacquired natural born citizenship; she
has also complied with all of the other requirements for eligibility to elective public office, as
stipulated in RA 9225.
It is incorrect to intimate that private respondent's having had to comply with RA 9225 shows
that she is a naturalized, rather than a natural-born, Filipino citizen. It is wrong to postulate that
compliance with RA 9225 signifies the performance of acts to perfect citizenship.
RA 9225 may involve extended processes not limited to taking the Oath of Allegiance and
requiring compliance with additional solemnities, but these are for facilitating the enjoyment of
other incidents to citizenship, not for effecting the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship itself.

Administrative law; Due process

ALBERTA DE JOYA IGLESIAS vs. THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, GEORGE M.

JEREOS, ROBERTO G. GEOTINA, JUAN T. TAN, KRISTINE MORALES, AND ALBERTO
LINA, G.R. No. 180745, August 30, 2017

Facts: Petitioner Iglesias was employed as Acting District Collector by the Bureau of Customs on
October 1, 2002. On January 28, 2004, the Department of Finance filed a Complaint-
Affidavit against Iglesias before the Office of the Ombudsman. They claimed that Iglesias failed
to file her Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALNs) prior to the year 2000. They
also alleged that Iglesias made false entries in her 2000, 2001, and 2002 SALNs with respect to
two (2) real properties in Quezon City and Pangasinan. The Quezon City property’s tax
declarations revealed that Iglesias purchased the property on August 1, 1996 from the spouses
Rosario and Elpidio Ablang. Likewise, the Pangasinan property’s Transfer Certificate of Title was
issued by virtue of a deed of sale. However, in her SALNs, Iglesias indicated that these properties
were acquired through inheritance.

Atty. Acuña and Pizarro also discovered three (3) real properties in Pangasinan under Iglesias’
name that were not declared in her SALNs. They further asserted that Iglesias acquired several
real and personal properties from 1999 to 2002 amounting to P15,230,000.00, which was
disproportionate to her lawful source of income. They also contended that there are properties
that were unlawfully acquired.

Iglesias countered that she did not falsify the mode of acquisition of the Pangasinan and Quezon
City properties in her SALNs. Iglesias explained that she did not declare the three (3) Pangasinan
properties because these were classified as public lands and the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources had yet to award the properties to her. She contended that she was merely
considered an applicant for the grant of the public lands.

On April 15, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued an Order in connection
with the administrative case, preventively suspending Iglesias for six (6) months while the
investigation was ongoing.

Prosecution Officer Reñido found that Atty. Acuña and Pizarro did not conduct an intensive
investigation before they filed the complaint against Iglesias, who was able to submit authentic
copies of her filed SALNs from 1989 to 1999.

He gave merit to Iglesias’ explanation that the Quezon City and Pangasinan propertis were part
of her inheritance from her parents Since Iglesias inherited a great portion of the Quezon City
property from her parent, she did not err in declaring the property as acquired through
inheritance. Meanwhile, the Pangasinan property was intended to be donated to Iglesias by her
mother. They relied on the credibility of the lawyer who made a deed of sale instead of a deed
of donation to facilitate the transaction.

Iglesias moved for reconsideration, which was denied. Iglesias appealed before the Court of
Appeals arguing that she was denied administrative due process. She claimed that there was
failure to meet the substantial evidence requirement in administrative proceedings.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was denied due process of law (specifically the right to be
informed of the charges against her).

Ruling: Administrative due process demands that the party being charged is given an opportunity
to be heard. Due process is complied with “if the party who is properly notified of allegations
against him or her is given an opportunity to defend himself or herself against those allegations,
and such defense was considered by the tribunal in arriving at its own independent conclusions.”

In F/O Ledesma v. Court of Appeals:

Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and
given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing
of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the
accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The
essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings,
an opportunity to explain one's side, or an o£portunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of.

An important component of due process is the right of the accused to be

informed of the nature of the charges against him or her. A proper appraisal of the
accusations would give the accused an opportunity to adequately prepare for his or
her defense. Otherwise, substantial justice would be undermined.

In this case, petitioner insists that the February 7, 2005 Resolution of the Office of the
Ombudsman was based on new accusations that were not included in the Complaint Affidavit
filed by Atty. Acuña and Pizarro. She anchors her argument on the findings of the Ombudsman:

“In her first year in the government service, respondent reported a net worth of
P245,000.00 in her 1989 SALN, which swiftly grew to P1,685,000.00 during her second
year (1990 SALN). The additional P1,440,000.00 accumulated by respondent is a 60%
jump from her 1989 net worth. During that same period, respondent was able to
purchase a property in Paco, Manila, in the amount of P800,000.00, acquired additional
jewelry worth P250,000.00, and maintained cash in the bank in the amount of
P400,000.00. This sudden upsurge in respondent’s net worth, within the short period of
one (1) year, is unjustified considering that she had no other employment, business
activity or financial interests from which the acquisitions can be funded other than her
employment in the Bureau of Customs.
“Respondent’s 1991 and 1992 SALN likewise reflected the meteoric rise of her assets.
From the declared cash of P250,000.00 in 1991, the same soared high to the amount of
P1,770,000.00 which was not sufficiently justified or explained by her income from the
 government, or her reported total new loans of P610,000.00, consisting of jewelry loan in
the amount of P110,000.00 and an agricultural loan in the amount of P500,000.00.
“Apart from the properties in New Manila, Quezon City, and Pampanga which respondent
justified as to have been inherited by her from her parents, respondent is likewise the
owner of several properties located in Baguio City, Parañaque City, and Novaliches,
Quezon City, which she acquired beginning 1994 to 2000.” (Emphasis in the original)

Considering the above, this Court finds that there was a violation of due process
with respect to the other charges which were not in the original complaint. This Court
sternly reminds the Ombudsman that he cannot add new findings which were not part
of the original complaint. To do so would violate the right of the accused to due
process.

However, there were charges in the original complaint which should prosper. A reading of
the Office of the Ombudsman Resolution reveals that she was dismissed from service not solely
on the irregularities found in her 1989 to 1999 SALNs but also because of anomalies found in her
2000 to 2002 SALNs, which she was informed of and was given the opportunity to refute.
Petitioner conveniently left out in her pleadings the following findings of the Office of the
Ombudsman:

It should be noted, however, that respondent has two (2) Baguio ropertyes indicated in
her 2000-2002 SALNs. The first Baguio property was acquired in 1995, thus, its declaration
in her 1996 SALN. From 1996-1999, she had been maintaining that same property.
However, as evidenced by her 2000 SALN, she acquired another property in Baguio.
Presuming that, as claimed by respondent, the PNB loan paid for the acquisition of the
first Baguio property, with what funds did she acquire the second Baguio property?

Moreover, on the same year, respondent also acquired the Para[ñ]aque

property. Although respondent claims that she sold one of the Baguio properties to buy
the Para[ñ]aque property, she continued to declare the Baguio properties as her own in
her SALN for 2000-2002. This, therefore, would belie any assertion of sale . . .

Incidentally, it should be noted that during the years 2000-2002, respondent was no
longer declaring any cash in bank as part of her assets. She did not declare the proceeds
received from the sale of the Baguio property to Mario Nicolas despite her admission that
she was given the initial payment of P1,100,000.00. Granted that she used P1,000,000.00
thereof to make the [down payment] on the Para[ñ]aque property, this would still leave
her with P100,000.00 cash in hand, not to forget the balance of P1,100,000.00 still owing
her, which should have been declared as patt of her assets.

As for the monthly amortization for the Para[ñ]aque property that had to be paid to BPI,
the claim that the rentals on the New Manila property answered for it does not seem to
hold water. First, respondent claims that in view of the fact that she has defaulted on the
payments on the PNB loan, the PNB has since foreclosed the property. The inscription at
the back of the title states that the property was foreclosed in 1999. This, thus, precludes
respondent from having the place rented. Second, assuming that the said foreclosure is
being contested and is now the subject of pending litigation, it is a puzzle how the lease
was effected and why it was made for a lengthy period of time. Third, respondent did not
 specify how much the lease rental was and if it were sufficient to pay for the monthly
mortgage owing BPI, and, most importantly, respondent failed to present evidence to
substantiate the claim of lease by JIM-Mar Enterprises.
....
As for the trucks and vans, respondent justifies that the same were acquired by virtue of
a loan from PNB-Dagupan Branch in the amount of Two Million Pe os (P2,000,000.00).
She claims that the same loan was used to buy the dump trucks, van, and other
equipment, and as operating capital for her trucking business. Respondent, however,
failed to present evidence regarding the said loan and the security used to obtain it. She
also did not present any evidence regarding the trucking business. Also, she did not
disclose this in her SALN as one of her business interests.
As for the trucks and vans, respondent justifies that the same were acquired by virtue of
a loan from PNB-Dagupan Branch in the amount of Two Million Pe os (P2,000,000.00).
She claims that the same loan was used to buy the dump trucks, van, and other
equipment, and as operating capital for her trucking business. Respondent, however,
failed to present evidence regarding the said loan and the security used to obtain it. She
also did not present any evidence regarding the trucking business. Also, she did not
disclose this in her SALN as one of her business interests. (Emphasis Supplied)

Even if the findings in relation to petitioner’s 1989 to 1999 SALNs were

disregarded, petitioner would still be liable for the discrepancies in her 2000 to 2002
SALNs. These discrepancies were stated in the Complaint Affidavit and were given
clarification by petitioner in her Counter-Affidavit and Position Paper. Moreover, she
was able to move for reconsideration of the Office of the Ombudsman February 7,
2005 Resolution. These circumstances preclude petitioner from claiming that she was
denied her right to due process.

On a final note, this Court endeavors to strike a balance between the accountability of
public officers as a result of public office being a privilege, on the one hand, and their right to
privacy as protected in the Bill of Rights, on the other. Although this Court has held that the
requirement of submitting a SALN does not violate the right to privacy of public officers, it does
not mean that they should completely shed this right. Therefore, minor or explainable errors in
the SALN, which cannot be related to an attempt to conceal illicit activities should not be
punishable. This Court may relax the rule on strictly complying with the SALN in cases where
minor errors were committed since these may simply be used to harass and obstruct public
officers in the performance of their duties. However, the errors in this case were so substantial
and glaring that they should not escape prosecution.

Locus standing

Teodulfo Lao, et.al. vs. LGU of Cagayan De Oro, et.al G.R. No. 187869, September 13,
2017

FACTS: The City Council of Cagayan De Oro passed City Ordinance No. 10557-2007, which
approved See's unsolicited proposal "for the redevelopment of Agora Complex into a Modern
Integrated Terminal, Public Market, and Vegetable Landing Area." The redevelopment would be
under a build-operate-transfer scheme. This unsolicited proposal was the basis of a draft Build-
Operate-Transfer (BOT) Contract, in which the project proponent was Mega Farm. The Cagayan
De Oro City Government published an Invitation to Qualify and to Bid for Comparative Proposal
for the Agora Complex redevelopment. However, no bid was submitted to compete with Mega
Farm's proposal. Mega Farm, through See, and the then newly elected Mayor Jaraula executed
the Agora Complex BOT Contract.

A complaint to nullify the agreement was filed. In their complaint, petitioners, as public officers
and in their personal capacity, questioned the execution and the contents of the Agora Complex
BOT Contract. They alleged that it was issued in bad faith and with fraudulent maneuvers between
Mega Farm and the City Government of Cagayan De Oro.

The RTC ruled in favor of the public respondents holding that it was covered by RA 6975, as
amended by RA 7718, was considered a national government project under Section 2[37] of RA
8975. Due to this classification of the project and petitioners' failure to prove that the exceptions
applied, the trial court was prohibited from issuing temporary restraining orders or preliminary
injunctions over the project.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Teodulfo E. Lao, Jr., Roger A. Abaday, Zaldy O. Ocon, and Enrico D.
Salcedo have locus standi to file a complaint to have the Agora Complex Build-Operate-
Transfer Contract declared null and void.

RULING:

The dismissal by the trial court of the complaint due to petitioners' lack of personality to file suit
is erroneous. Petitioners, as members of the City Council of Cagayan De Oro, may file a case to
question a contract entered into by the city mayor allegedly without the City Council's authority.

Rule 3. Section 2 of the Rules of Court defines the real party in interest that may
institute a case:

Section 2. Parties in interest. - A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted
or defended in the name of the real party in interest.

The real party in interest which may file a case, questioning the validity of a contract entered into
by the city mayor, who is alleged to have no authority to do so, is the city itself. It is the local
government unit which stands to be injured or benefited by any judgment that may be made in
this case. The city councilors merely represent the city in the suit. As explained in City Council of
Cebu v. Cuizon:

It seems clearly self-evident from the foregoing recitation of the undisputed antecedents
and factual background that the lower court gravely erred in issuing its dismissal order on
the ground of plaintiffs' alleged lack of interest or legal standing as city councilors or as
taxpayers to maintain the case at bar. The lower court founded its erroneous conclusion
on the equally erroneous premise of citing and applying Article 1397 of the Civil Code that
 "the action for the annulment of contracts may be instituted (only) by all who are thereby
obliged principally or subsidiarily."

The lower court's fundamental error was in treating plaintiffs' complaint as a personal suit
on their own behalf and applying the test in such cases that plaintiffs should show personal
interest as parties who would be benefited or injured by the judgment sought. Plaintiffs'
suit is patently not a personal suit. Plaintiffs clearly and by the express terms of their
complaint filed the suit as a representative suit on behalf and for the benefit of the city of
Cebu.

City councilors may file a suit for the declaration of nullity of a contract on the basis that the city
mayor had no authority to do so because the city mayor's authority to bind the city to obligations
must emanate from the City Council. Under Title III, Chapter III, Article I, Section 455(b)(l)(vi)
of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the city mayor may
sign all bonds, contracts, and obligations on behalf of a city only upon authority of the
sanggumang panlungsod or pursuant to law or ordinance:

Section 455. Chief Executive: Powers, Duties and Compensation

(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the city mayor
shall:
(1) Exercise general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services,
and activities of the city government, and in this connection, shall: ....
(vi) Represent the city in all its business transactions and sign in its behalf all
bonds, contracts, and obligations, and such other documents upon authority of
the sangguniang panlungsod or pursuant to law or ordinance

The requirement of the sangguniang panlungsod's prior authority is a measure of check and
balance on the powers of the city mayor:

Yet, this is obviously not the effect Congress had in mind when it required, as a condition to the
local chief executive's representation of the local government unit in business transactions, the
prior authorization of the sanggunian concerned. The requirement was deliberately added as a
measure of check and balance, to temper the authority of the local chief executive, and in
recognition of the fact that the corporate powers of the local government unit are wielded as
much by its chief executive as by its council.

As the City Council is the source of the mayor's power to execute contracts for the city, its
members have the authority, interest, and even duty to file cases in behalf of the city to restrain
the execution of contracts entered into in violation of the Local Government Code:

Under such circumstances. in the same manner that a stockholder of a corporation is

permitted to institute derivative or representative suits as nominal party plaintiff for the
benefit of the corporation which is the real party in interest, more so may plaintiffs as city
councilors exclusively empowered by the city charter to "make all appropriations for the
expenses of the government of the city" and who were the very source of the authority
granted to the city mayor to enter into the questioned transactions which authority was
 later revoked by them, as per the allegations of the complaint at bar, be deemed to
possess the necessary authority, and interest, if not duty, to file the present suit on behalf
of the City and to prevent the disbursement of city funds under contracts impugned by
them to have been entered into by the city mayor without lawful authority and in violation
of law.

Here, it is undisputed that petitioners are members of the City Council of Cagayan De Oro. They
have alleged that public respondent Mayor Jaraula entered into the Agora Complex BOT Contract
without being authorized by the City Cquncil of Cagayan De Oro, in violation of the requirement
in Title III, Chapter III, Article I, Section 455(b)(l)(vi) of the Local Government Code. Clearly, as
they are part of the very body in which authority is allegedly being undermined by the city mayor,
they have the right and duty to question the basis of the mayor's authority to sign a contract
which binds the city.

Agrarian reform law

Heirs of Augusto Salas, Jr., et.al. vs. Marciano Cabungcal, et.al., G.R. No. 191545,
March 29, 2017

FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari which came from the decision of the CA’s 2nd
division dated October 26, 2009. August Salas, Jr. was the registered owner of a vast tract of
agricultural land which transverses five barangays. Respondents are tenant farmers in his
agricultural land and some were agrarian reform beneficiaries under the CARP. According to the
TCT, the agricultural lands of Salas’ spanned 56.1361 and 92.2993 hectares. Under Section 3, RA
2264, which was the applicable law at the time, municipal and city councils were empowered to
adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations. Former President Marcos established the
National Coordinating Council but was later on dissolved and replaced by the Human Settlements
Regulator Commission, the power of the LGU to convert or reclassify agricultural lands became
subject to the approval of the Human Settlements Regulatory Council.

On December 1981, the Human Settlements Regulatory Council approved the townplan
and zoning of Lipa which reclassified as a farmlot subdivision for cultivation, livestock production,
or agro-forestry. Salas’ agricultural land. Salas then entered into an agreement with Laperal Realty
Corp for the development, subdivision, and sale of his land. The HSRC, which was later on
converted to HLURB, granted a permit for a nature farmlots subdivision to Laperal Realty. Later
on RA 6657 was signed into law effective June 15, 1988, this law sought the expand the coverage
of the governments agrarian reform program. Salas’ landholdings were among those
contemplated for acquisition and distribution to qualified farmer beneficiaries. Salas applied for a
permission to sell his subdivided lots which the HLURB granted. On June 10, 1989, Salas went on
a business trip but never came back. Pursuant to the SPA given by Salas to Laperal Realty, Laperal
Realty sold Salas’ property to several corporations and individuals.

Petitioners Heirs of Salas assailed the inclusion of their landholdings, they filed protest
letters before the DAR. Before the protests were resolved the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
of Lipa sent a notice of coverage of the landholdings which indicated the landholdings that would
be subject to acquisition and distribution to qualified farmer beneficiaries. The DAR denied the
petitioner’s protest for lack of merit and the DAR Adjudication board dismissed it for lack of
jurisdiction. DAR denied the petitioner’s action for the cancellation of respondent’s certificates of
land ownership award.

Tereista Salas, administrator of the estate, filed an application for exemption/exclusion

from the CARP which was not acted upon. The Estate of Salas claimed that the property had been
reclassified as non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of RA 6657. It anchored the alleged
exclusion of the 17 lots on DOJ Opinion No. 44, series of 1990. The farmer beneficiaries opposed
the estate’s petition for exemption, arguing that they had already received Certificates of Land
Owenership Award over the properties. The RTC granted the application for exemption, according
to respondents, they were neither informed nor furnished copies of the petitioner’s application
for exemption and the RTC’s January 07, 2004 orders. Respondents moved for reconsideration
on February 18, 2004. They asserted that the lots were agricultural and teeming the agricultural
activity, as defined under RA 6657. The motion for reconsideration filed by the respondents were
granted by the DAR. The petitioner’s appealed to the Office of the President which in turn reversed
the decision of the DAR, the subsequent motion for reconsideration of the respondents was
denied, which led them to elevate it to the CA which overturned the decision of the Office of the
President and reinstated the order of the DAR. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied by the CA, hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether Republic Act No. 6657 covers lands classified into non-agricultural uses prior to
its effectivity;
2. Whether Salas' farm lot subdivision falls under an "agricultural land" as defined by
applicable laws; and
3. Whether the 17 lots are covered under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

RULING:

FIRST ISSUE:

The 1987 Constitution mandates the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to the limits
prescribed by Congress. Under Article II, Section 21 of the Constitution, "The State shall promote
comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform." Article XIII, Section 4 provides that
an agrarian reform program shall be carried out in the country:

Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the
rights of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively
the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits
thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all
agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the
Congress may prescribe, talcing into account ecological, developmental, or equity
considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention
limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide
incentives for voluntary land-sharing.

On June 10, 1988, Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law was enacted
to fulfill this constitutional mandate.
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law covers all public and private agricultural lands, as
provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public
domain suitable for agriculture, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced.
However, a maximum of five (5) hectares of the landowner's compact or contiguous landholdings
may not be distributed to qualified beneficiaries, as it is within the landowner's rights to retain
this area.

The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program covers the following lands:

(1) all alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for
agriculture;
(2) all lands of the public domain exceeding the total area of five hectares and below to
be retained by the landowner;
(3) all government-owned lands that are devoted to or suitable for agriculture; and
(4) all private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture, regardless of the agricultural
products raised or can be raised on these lands

Meanwhile, Section 10 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform provides the types of lands that
are excluded therefrom:

1. Lands that are actually, directly and exclusively used for parks, wildlife, forest reserves,
reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, and watersheds and mangoes;
2. Private lands that are actually, directly and exclusively used for prawn farms and
fishponds;
3. Lands that are actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for:
a. National defense;
b. School sites and campuses including experimental farm stations operated by
public or private schools for educational purposes;
c. Seeds and seedling research and pilot production center;
d. Church sites and convents appurtenant thereto;
e. Mosque sites and Islamic centers appurtenant thereto;
f. Communal burial grounds and cemeteries;
g. Penal colonies and penal farms actually worked by the inmates;
h. Government and private research and quarantine centers.
4. All lands where the topography is hilly, i.e. with at least eighteen percent (18%) slope
and over, and are not developed for agriculture

The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law covers all agricultural lands, save for those not used or
suitable for agricultural activities.

The law defines agricultural land as "land devoted to agricultural activity . . . and not classified
as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." For agricultural land to be
considered devoted to an agricultural activity, there must be "cultivation of the soil, planting of
crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such
farm products, and other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with
such farming operations done by persons whether natural or juridical.
Aside from being devoted to an agricultural activity, the land must, likewise, not have been
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial, or industrial land. Administrative Order No.
01-90 states:

III. Coverage
Agricultural land refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as defined in [Republic Act No.]
6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and its predecessor agencies and not classified in town plans and zoning
ordinances as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its
preceding authorities prior to 15 June 1988 for residential, commercial, or industrial use.

Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657, as reiterated by Administrative Order No. 01-90, states that
reclassification or conversion of agricultural lands into non-agricultural lands is subject to the
approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The law has given the Department of Agrarian
Reform the power to "approve or disapprove applications for conversion . . . of agricultural lands
into non-agricultural uses,” such as "residential, commercial, industrial, and other land uses.

Before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on June 15, 1988, the Department of Agrarian
Reform had no authority to approve the conversion or reclassification of agricultural lands by local
governments. Under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2264, local governments had the power to
approve reclassification of agricultural lands. Municipal and city councils could adopt zoning and
subdivision ordinances or regulations reclassifying agricultural lands in consultation with the
National Planning Commission.

The question of whether the reclassification by local governments prior to the enactment of
Republic Act No. 6657 still needed the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform was raised
by then Secretary of Agrarian Reform Florencio Abad to the Department of Justice. In response,
then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon issued Department of Justice Opinion No. 44 on March
16, 1990, stating that the conversion of agricultural lands covered by Republic Act No. 6657 did
not need the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform before the date of effectivity of
Republic Act No. 6657 on June 15, 1988. The Department of Agrarian Reform's authority to
approve conversions only began on June 15, 1988.

In light of Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, the Department of Agrarian Reform issued
Administrative Order No. 06-94 to streamline the issuance of exemption clearances by the
Department of Agrarian Reform. It affirms the rule that a local government reclassification before
June 15, 1988 does not need the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform.

In Natalia Realty Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform, lands not devoted to agricultural activity,
including lands previously converted to non-agricultural use prior to the effectivity of Republic Act
No. 6657 by government agencies other than the Department of Agrarian Reform, were declared
outside the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Thus:

Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of
[Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law]. These include lands previously converted to non-
agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of [Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law] by
government agencies other than respondent [Department of Agrarian Reform]
Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988, respondent DAR is bound by
such conversion. It was therefore error to include the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills
Subdivision within the coverage of [Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law]

SECOND ISSUE:

As a general rule, agricultural lands that were reclassified as commercial, residential, or industrial
by the local government, as approved by the HLURB, before June 15, 1988 are excluded from
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

A farmlot is not included in any of these categories.

Respondents correctly argue that the 17 lots are still classified and devoted to agricultural uses.
The definition of a "farmlot subdivision" under the HLURB Rules and Regulations Implementing
Farmlot Subdivision Plan (HLURB Regulations) leaves no doubt that it is an "agricultural land" as
defined under Republic Act No. 3844.

Rule V, Section 18 (d) of the HLURB Regulations provides:

d. A Farmlot Subdivision - is a planned community intended primarily for intensive

agricultural activities and secondarily for housing. A planned community consists of the
provision for basic utilities judicious allocation of areas, good layout based on sound
planning principles.

Under the HLURB Regulations, a farmlot for varied farm activities, such as milking cow and raising
poultry, is allowed only on a "backyard scale" or a small-scale operation, and not for mass
production. In a farmlot for agro-industrial purposes, the maximum buildable area for food
processing or preservation is limited to only twenty-five percent (25%) of the total lot area.
Likewise, a rice mill must be less than 300 square meters in size, and must be more than one
hectare away from another mill.

In contrast, under Rule 2, Section 9 (G) of the HLURB Regulations, a farmlot subdivision plan for
planting tree crops, mixed orchard, or diversified crops has none of these restrictions in scale,
size, or use, thus recognizing a farmlot subdivision's principal use for farming.

The HLURB Regulations also provide for the minimum site criteria for a farmlot subdivision plan.
First, it must be near a marketplace where the farm produce can be utilized and marketed.
Second, it must meet the needs of farming activities. Third, the topography, soil, and climate
must be suited for planting crops. These highlight a farmlot subdivision's primarily agricultural
nature. Thus:

SECTION 7. SITE CRITERIA. Farmlots subdivision shall conform to the following criteria:
A. Accessibility.
The site must be accessible to transportation lines. Road, railroad facilities should add to
the site's proximity to market center and industries where farm produce maybe utilized.

B. Availability of Community Services and Facilities

 Basic utilities like roads and water sources must be found and readily available to
adequately serve the needs of the intended/prospective farm activities. Where available,
subdivision development must include the provision of power lines to the farm lots.

C. Distance from the Urban Centers

Farmlot subdivisions must be away from the center of Metro Manila and/or in the fringes
of the urban core of the metropolis and of cities and municipalities. However, they shall
be accessible from employment centers and population centers where the products of the
farmlots can be readily marketed.

D. Physical suitability of the site varies with respect to the intended farm activities within
the subdivisions. Natural features considered for varied activities are slope,
climate/temperature and types of soil.

Even succeeding HLURB issuances affirm the agricultural use of a farmlot subdivision. In 2003,
the HLURB declared that devoting an agricultural land into a farmlot subdivision does not change
its principal use for agricultural activities. HLURB Director Atty. Manuel's letter dated December
19, 2005 also confirmed that a farmlot subdivision is considered to be within an agricultural zone.

Moreover, HLURB Board Resolution Nos. 922-14,[151] 926-15,[152] and 921-14[153] all state
that a farmlot subdivision is "primarily intended for agricultural production, with a minimum lot
area of 1,000 sq.m. and with a twenty-five percent (25%) maximum allowable buildable area."
HLURB Memorandum Circular No. 001-15[154] reiterates the same definition.

The records show that the 17 lots are agricultural in nature. In its Investigation Report, the
Department of Agrarian Reform Center for Land Use, Policy, Planning, and Implementation II
found that the lots, being flat, were suitable for cultivating crops, and had been cleared for
planting, or were planted with corn. The areas covered by the original TCT No. T-2807 had been
tilled for several years and had been found to be irrigable. Even the "land uses of adjacent areas
are agricultural and idle agricultural" in nature.

The reclassification of Salas' landholding into a farmlot subdivision, although effected before
Republic Act No. 6657, has not changed the nature of these agricultural lands, the legal
relationships existing over such lands, or the agricultural usability of the lands. Thus, these lots
were properly subjected to compulsory coverage under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.

Invoking Natalia Realty v. Department of Agrarian Reform, petitioners argue for the exclusion of
the 17 lots. They claim that, as in Natalia, a zoning ordinance prior to the effectivity of Republic
Act No. 6657 prescribed the uses for the landholdings as non-agricultural; therefore, these lots
are exempted from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

Petitioners cite other cases where, with the approval of HLURB, the local government converted
agricultural lands into residential or commercial lands, or reclassified an agricultural zone into an
urban zone prior to June 15, 1988. Unfortunately, none of these cases applies.

For instance, Natalia involves a land that was converted into a town site or residential land,
intended for residential use. De Guzman v. Court of Appeals involves a land that was converted
into a wholesale market complex, intended for commercial use. Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries
Association v. Nicolas involves the reclassification of a farming area into an urban zone.

When Salas' agricultural land was reclassified as a farmlot subdivision, the applicable law was
Republic Act No. 3844, as amended.

Republic Act No. 3844, sought "to make the small farmers more independent, self-reliant and
responsible citizens, and a source of genuine strength in our democratic society." Thus, Republic
Act No. 3844 established the Land Authority to initiate proceedings for the acquisition of private
agricultural lands, and the subdivision of these lands into economic family-size farm units for
resale to bona fide tenants, occupants, and qualified farmers.

Section 166 (1) of Republic Act No. 3844 defined an agricultural land as "land devoted to any
growth, including but not limited to crop lands[.]" The law neither made reference to a "farmlot
subdivision," nor did it exclude a farmlot from the definition of an agricultural land.

Not being excluded, Salas' landholdings were thus contemplated in the definition of an agricultural
land under Republic Act No. 3844.

Likewise, Republic Act No. 6657 does not exclude a farmlot subdivision from the definition of an
agricultural land. Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 6657 states that agricultural lands refer to "land
devoted to agricultural activity . . . and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial,
or industrial land." Section 76 expressly provides that any other definition inconsistent with
Republic Act No. 6657 has been repealed by this law.

THIRD ISSUE:

Insisting on the exclusion of the 17 lots from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program,
petitioners rely on the definition of an agricultural land under the HLURB Regulations. Rule V,
Section 18 (e) states that agricultural lands are "parcels of land ranging from 0.2 to 50 or more
hectares . . . exclusively or predominantly used for cultivation, livestock production and agro-
forestry without the intended qualities of the farmlot subdivision."

A farmlot subdivision has the following intended qualities under the HLURB Regulations: it is a
planned community primarily for intensive agricultural activities, and secondarily for housing.

Petitioners argue that, to be considered an agricultural land, the property must be used
exclusively for agricultural purposes and cannot be used secondarily for housing. Since the
reclassification as a farmlot subdivision rendered the lots no longer exclusively for agricultural
purposes, then these lots ceased to be agricultural land.
Petitioners are mistaken.

First, an executive regulation cannot go beyond the law. Republic Act No. 3844 (1963) broadly
defined an agricultural land as "land devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop
lands." Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, also broadly defines agricultural land as land devoted
to agricultural activity. In contrast, the HLURB Regulations restrict the definition of agricultural
lands to those lands "exclusively or predominantly used for cultivation," not being a farmlot
subdivision.
In limiting the definition of an agricultural land to one "without the intended qualities of a farmlot
subdivision," the HLURB Regulations are overriding, supplanting, and modifying a statutory
definition. This is prohibited. A mere executive issuance cannot alter, expand, or restrict the
provisions of the law it seeks to enforce.

It bears stressing that neither Republic Act No. 3844 nor Republic Act No. 6657 excludes a farmlot
subdivision, which is primarily agricultural in nature, from the definition of an agricultural land.

Second, in case of doubt, any other definition of an agricultural land inconsistent with the law,
such as that found under the HLURB Regulations, has been expressly repealed by Section 76 of
Republic Act No. 6657.

Republic Act No. 6657 never required that a landholding must be exclusively used for agricultural
purposes to be covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. What determines a
tract of land's inclusion in the program is its suitability for any agricultural activity.

The Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 01-90 (Revised Rules and
Regulations Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses) defines
agricultural land as follows:

III. Coverage
Agricultural land refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as defined in [Republic Act No.]
6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and its predecessor agencies and not classified in town plans and zoning
ordinances as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its
preceding authorities prior to 15 June 1988 for residential, commercial, or industrial use.

We parse this definition into its three elements. Agricultural lands consist of lands:

1. Devoted to agricultural activity, as defined in Republic Act No. 6657;

2. Not classified as mineral or forest by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources; and
3. Prior to June 15, 1988, not classified for residential, commercial, or industrial use under a
local government town plan and zoning ordinance, as approved by the HLURB (or its
predecessors, the National Coordinating Council and the Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission)

Salas' farmlot subdivision fulfills these elements.

For the first element, the lots are devoted to agricultural activity.

Agricultural activity refers to the "cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees,
raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm
activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done
by persons whether natural or juridical.

Petitioners never denied the continued existence of agricultural activity within these lots.
Moreover, the Department of Agrarian Reform Center for Land Use, Policy, Planning, and
Implementation II, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, found that the estate's landholdings have
been used for agricultural purposes.

In issuing a Notice of Coverage and Notice of Valuation to the Estate of Salas, the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Office also found that the lots are for agricultural use, and therefore, covered
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. The awarding of the lands to the agrarian
reform beneficiaries bolsters the agricultural activity present in them.

For the second element, it is undisputed that the lots have not been declared as mineral or forest
lands by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. No application has been filed to
declare the landholdings as mineral or forest lands, and neither has the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources ever declared the properties as such.

As to the third element, the lands were not classified by the Lipa City Town Plan/Zoning Ordinance
as commercial, residential, or industrial lands prior to June 15, 1988. Rather, the reclassification,
which was approved by HLURB's predecessor agency, was that of a "farmlot subdivision.”

Section 4 (d) of Republic Act No. 6657 covers "all private lands devoted to or suitable for
agriculture, regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon." As the
estate's private lands are (a) devoted to or suitable for agriculture; and (b) not classified as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial, or industrial, then these may be included in the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

Finally, whenever there is reasonable uncertainty in the interpretation of the law, the balance
must be tilted in favor of the poor and underprivileged.

Republic Act No. 6657 was enacted as social legislation, pursuant to the policy of the State to
pursue a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Agrarian reform is the means towards a viable
livelihood and, ultimately, a decent life for the landless farmers.

In Perez-Rosario v. Court of Appeals:

Agrarian reform is a perceived solution to social instability. The edicts of social justice
found in the Constitution and the public policies that underwrite them, the extraordinary
national experience, and the prevailing national consciousness, all command the great
departments of government to tilt the balance in favor of the poor and underprivileged
whenever reasonable doubt arises in the interpretation of the law. But annexed to the
great and sacred charge of protecting the weak is the diametric function to put every
effort to arrive at an equitable solution for all parties concerned: the jural postulates of
social justice cannot shield illegal acts, nor do they sanction false sympathy towards a
certain class, nor yet should they deny justice to the landowner whenever truth and justice
happen to be on her side. In the occupation of the legal questions in all agrarian disputes
whose outcomes can significantly affect societal harmony, the considerations of social
advantage must be weighed, an inquiry into the prevailing social interests is necessary in
the adjustment of conflicting demands and expectations of the people, and the social
interdependence of these interests, recognized.
The general policy of Republic Act No. 6657 is to cover as many lands suitable for agricultural
activities as may be allowed. Where there is doubt as to the intention of the local government in
the area where the property is located, the interpretation should be towards the declared intention
of the law.

Due process of law

Sunrise Garden Corporation vs. CA, et.al., G.R. No. 158836, September 30, 2015

FACTS:

In 1999, the Sangguniang Barangay of Cupang requested the Sangguniang Panlungsod

of Antipolo City to construct a city road to connect Barangay Cupang and Marcos Highway. The
request was approved through the enactment of Resolusyon Big. 027-99. In view of the same
The Technical Committee created by City Ordinance No. 08-98 and posted notices to property
owners that would be affected by the construction of the city road.

Sunrise Garden Corporation was an affected landowner, and through Cesar T. Guy they
executed an Undertaking stating that they are willing to undertake and finance the development
of the City Park and City Road which the costs shall be applied to their [t]axes and other fees
payable to the City Government; and that they are willing to sign and execute all legal instrument
necessary to transfer ownership of the same to the City government.

Sunrise Garden Corporation filed a Complaint for damages with prayer for temporary
restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction against Hardrock Aggregates, Inc. The trial
court granted Sunrise Garden Corporation's Motion and issued an Order requiring K-9 Security
Agency to comply with the Amended Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. thus filed a Petition for Certiorari before the
Court of Appeals. Sunrise Garden Corporation argued that the Petition should be dismissed
outright due to insufficiency of form and substance. Sunrise Garden Corporation argues that First
Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. failed to prove its ownership over the properties in dispute.
Thus, it did not establish any right that would entitle it to the reliefs prayed for.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. was
denied due process when the trial court issued its January 29, 2003 Order
requiring respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. to comply
with the Amended Writ of Preliminary Injunction?

RULING: Due process requires that a party be given the chance to be heard. The general rule
is that "no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a
case are not bound by a judgment rendered by the court." Corollarily, an ancillary writ of remedy
cannot affect non-parties to a case.
Fernandez v. Court of Appeals involved an Administrative Complaint against three Court of
Appeals Justices.

One of the acts complained of was the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
enjoining the implementation of an Order of the trial court. This court dismissed the
Complaint on the ground that an Administrative Complaint is not a substitute for a lost
appeal. This court also held that in any case, complainants did not have the personality
to question the Writ of Preliminary Injunction since they were not the aggrieved parties.
Complainants had the option to intervene in the Petitions filed but did not do so.
This court discussed that, Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court
Provides that a person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success
of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of
an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action.
Conversely, a person who is not a party in the main suit cannot be bound by an ancillary
writ, such as a preliminary injunction. Indeed, he cannot be affected by any proceeding
to which he is a stranger.
In Mabayo Farms, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
A Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued against Juanito Infante, Domingo Infante, Lito
Mangalidan, Jaime Aquino, John Doe, Peter Doe, and Richard Doe. A certain Antonio
Santos, who claimed ownership over the parcel of land, filed a Petition for Certiorari before
the Court of Appeals, arguing that to enforce the Writ of Preliminary Injunction against
him would be grave abuse of discretion since the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over his person. Mabayo Farms countered that Antonio Santos was covered by the Writ
because it was issued against three Does, and these Does include Antonio Santos. Also,
since Santos received a copy of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction, he cannot claim lack of
due process, and it was his duty to intervene in the case. The Court of Appeals granted
the Petition for Certiorari and enjoined the trial court from enforcing the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction against Santos.
This court affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals and held that:
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to final
judgment, requiring a person to refrain from a particular act. As an ancillary or preventive
remedy, a writ of preliminary injunction may therefore be resorted to by a party to protect
or preserve his rights and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action.
Its object is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. It is not
a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. Thus,
a person who is not a party in the main suit, like private respondent in the instant case,
cannot be bound by an ancillary writ, such as the writ of preliminary injunction issued
against the defendants in Civil Case No. 6695. He cannot be affected by any proceeding
to which he is a stranger.
Regarding Mabayo Farms' argument that Santos should have intervened, this court discussed
that:
 First, private respondent had no duty to intervene in the proceedings in Civil Case No.
6695. Intervention in an action is neither compulsory nor mandatory but only optional and
permissive. Second, to warrant intervention, two requisites must concur: (a) the movant
has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, and (b) intervention must not unduly delay
or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties nor should the claim of the
intervenor be capable of being properly decided in a separate proceeding. The interest,
which entitles a person to intervene in a suit, must involve the matter in litigation and of
such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the
direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. Civil Case No. 6695 was an action for
permanent injunction and damages. As a stranger to the case, private respondent had
neither legal interest in a permanent injunction nor an interest on the damages to be
imposed, if any, in Civil Case No. 6695. To allow him to intervene would have unnecessarily
complicated and prolonged the case.
It may be argued that respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. should have
intervened in the case filed before the trial court. However, respondent First Alliance Real Estate
Development, Inc.'s interests, or its properties, were not part of the issues raised in petitioner
Sunrise Garden Corporation's Complaint. That Complaint was against Hardrock Aggregates, Inc.
and not respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. or its properties.

Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, et. al. vs. Elisa Abucay,
et.al., G.R. No. 186432, March 12, 2019

FACTS:

On October 14, 1983, the Spouses Redemptor and Elisa Abucay purchased a 182-hectare
parcel of land from Guadalupe Cabahug. The Deed of Absolute Sale provided that the property
"consists of various classifications, and is untenanted except for 39.459 hectares, and per
certification of the Agrarian Reform Team No. 08-28-231 appears to be within the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer as to the tenanted area of over 39 hectares. Sometime in 1986, 22.8409
hectares of the lot were declared covered under the Operation Land Transfer Program pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 27. Emancipation patents were then issued to the farmer- -
beneficiaries. Later, the Register of Deeds issue d original certificates of title in their names.

The Heirs of Spouses Abucay filed before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator a
Complaint for the proper determination of just compensation. They alleged that they inherited
the 182-hectare property upon their parents' death and they claimed that they did not receive
any just compensation for the 22 hectares of the property that was placed under the Operation
Land Transfer Program.

In his March 8, 2004 Decision, Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator Felixberto M. Diloy
held that there was no proper valuation of the property to determine just compensation. He found
that the Final Notification Letter was not sent to the property's then registered owner, Cabahug,
but to her father, the deceased Sotero Cabahug. Thus, administrative due process was not
followed, which nullified the coverage of the 22-hectare property under the Operation Land
Transfer program. Regional Adjudicator Diloy declared the emancipation patents issued to the
farmer-beneficiaries void.
 The heirs of Abucay filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the DAR Adjudication Board
denied. Hence, they filed a petition for review through the CA. CA reversed the previous ruling
and held that the cancellation of emancipation patents only if these were not yet registered with
the Register of Deeds. Since the emancipation patents had already been registered with the
Register of Deeds of Leyte, jurisdiction over the Complaint properly belonged to the Regional
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator. Consequently, the appeal's jurisdiction lies with the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board.

The Department of Agrarian Reform Regional Director for Region VIII and the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Officer of Leyte separately filed their Motions for Reconsideration, both of which
were denied by the CA. Two Petitions for Review on Certiorari were filed before this Court and
one was filed by the Department of Agrarian Reform Regional Director for Region VIII. These
petitions were then consolidated.

Petitioners maintain that respondents' Complaint for cancellation of original certificates of

title and emancipation patents is essentially an Operation Land Transfer protest. The case,
therefore, is an agrarian reform law implementation case under the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the Regional Director; the appellate jurisdiction, under the Department of Agrarian Reform
Secretary. Petitioners assert that the DAR Adjudication Board correctly refused to take cognizance
of the appeal and dismissed the Complaint. They further argue that respondents had no legal
personality to file the Complaint for cancellation of original certificates of title and emancipation
patents.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator Felixberto Diloy and the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board have jurisdiction over the Complaint for
cancellation of original certificates of title and emancipation patents filed by respondents,
the Heirs of Redemptor and Elisa Abucay
2. Whether or not respondents had legal personality to file the Complaint before the Regional
Adjudicator
3. Whether or not the acquisition proceedings involving the 22-hectare property were void
for lack of administrative due process

RULING:

FIRST ISSUE:

It is settled that the Regional Trial Courts, sitting as special agrarian courts, have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the determination of the value of just compensation. Nonetheless, the
Department of Agrarian Reform still exercises primary jurisdiction to preliminarily determine this
value. This is different from determining the validity of property transfer to the farmer-
beneficiaries and, consequently, the validity of the certificates of title issued to them. When the
issue in a case hinges on whether a beneficiary has made insufficient or no payments for the land
awarded to him or her, primary administrative jurisdiction is under the Department of Agrarian
Reform.
Indeed, per the rules it has promulgated, the Department of Agrarian Reform has taken
cognizance of cases involving either the issuance or cancellation of certificates of land ownership
award and emancipation patents. Cases involving registered certificates of land ownership
awards, emancipation patents, and titles emanating from them are agrarian reform disputes, of
which the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board takes cognizance. Meanwhile, cases
involving unregistered ones are agrarian law implementation cases, put under the jurisdiction of
the Regional Directors and the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform.

In 2009, however, Congress amended the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law through Republic
Act No. 9700. Under the new Section 24, all cases involving the cancellation of registered
emancipation patents, certificates of land ownership awards, and other titles issued under any
agrarian reform program are now within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Secretary. He or she takes jurisdiction over cases involving the cancellation of
titles issued under any agrarian reform program, whether registered with the Land Registration
Authority or not.

Here, the doctrine should be read amid the ambient facts and without prejudice to a future case
that will deal with transfer certificates of title, considering the relevant statutes, as well as the
equal protection and social justice provisions of the Constitution.

SECOND/THIRD ISSUE:

At the time of the Complaint's filing on April 26, 2004, the 2003 Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board Rules of Procedure governed the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board. Rule II provided that adjudicators have exclusive original jurisdiction
over registered certificates of land ownership award and emancipation patents, while the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board has appellate jurisdiction:

RULE II Jurisdiction of the Board and its Adjudicators

SECTION 1. Primary and Exclusive Original Jurisdiction. -The Adjudicator shall have
primary and exclusive original jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate the following cases:

1.6 Those involving the correction, partition, cancellation, secondary and subsequent
issuances of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents
(EPs) which are registered with the Land Registration Authority[;]

SECTION 2. Appellate Jurisdiction of the Board. - The Board shall have exclusive appellate
jurisdiction to review, reverse, modify, alter, or affirm resolutions, orders, and decisions
of its Adjudicators.

No order of the Adjudicators on any issue, question, matter, or incident raised before
them shall be elevated to the Board until the hearing shall have been terminated and the
case decided on the merits.

However, it is "not sufficient that the controversy [simply] involves the cancellation of a
[certificate of land ownership award] already registered with the Land Registration Authority.
What is of primordial consideration is the existence of an agrarian dispute between the parties."
Section 3(d) of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law defines agrarian dispute as those relating
to tenurial arrangements, including leasehold and tenancy. Thus:

SECTION 3. Definitions. - For the purpose of this Act, unless the context indicates
otherwise:
(d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including
disputes concerning farmworkers' associations or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements.

It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other
terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other
agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm
operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.

Indeed, the emancipation patents involved here have already been registered with the Land
Registration Authority, and the grant of the Complaint filed by respondents will result in the
cancellation of these registered emancipation patents. Nonetheless, respondents primarily
assailed in their Complaint the land coverage under the Operation Land Transfer Program because
the original owner, Cabahug, had not been properly notified of it. Specifically, they contended
that the notices were erroneously sent to Cabahug's father, Sotero Cabahug. The Complaint,
therefore, is essentially an Operation Land Transfer protest, which is an agrarian law
implementation case belonging to the Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary's jurisdiction.

Tenancy is a real right that is attached to the land and survives the sale. As such, when Spouses
Abucay purchased the land from Cabahug, they were subrogated to the rights and obligations of
Cabahug as an agricultural landowner. Respondents, being the land buyers' heirs, were likewise
subrogated to these rights and obligations. A tenancy relationship exists between respondents
and the farmer-beneficiaries.

Still, the controversy must relate to the tenurial arrangement between the parties for the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board to properly take cognizance of the case. Here,
the controversy does not involve negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange
the tenurial arrangement's terms or conditions. Respondents alleged that emancipation patents
should not have been issued to begin with since no notice of coverage was sent to Cabahug. In
other words, they contend that the property was not properly acquired through the Operation
Land Transfer Program. The controversy involves the administrative implementation of the
agrarian reform program, which, as mentioned, is under the Department of Agrarian Reform
Secretary's jurisdiction.

Since the Complaint filed by respondents involves an agrarian law implementation case, Regional
Adjudicator Diloy had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of it. At that time, he should have referred
the case to the proper office of the Department of Agrarian Reform for appropriate action as
provided in Rule I, Section 6 of the Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order 03-03.
However, with the enactment of Republic Act No. 9700, the exclusive and original jurisdiction
over cases for cancellation of registered emancipation patents now belongs to the Department of
Agrarian Reform Secretary.

In line with this, the Department of Agrarian Reform has issued Administrative Order No. 07-14,
which outlines in Article III the procedure for the cancellation of registered emancipation patents,
certificates of land ownership awards, and other agrarian titles. The petition for cancellation shall
be filed before the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator, which would then
undertake the case buildup before forwarding it to the Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary
for decision.

Thus, under Administrative Order No. 07-14, the Complaint for cancellation of original certificates
of title and emancipation patents filed by respondents should be referred to the Office of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Leyte for case buildup. Then, the case shall be decided
by the Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary.

This Court makes no determination of whether the area can still be covered by agrarian reform.
The character of the land as agricultural is not affected. We leave the issue of the propriety of
the coverage to the executive branch for its own determination.

NOTHING FOLLOWS