ABRC 2021 PRE-WEEK REVIEW MATERIALS

JUSTICE LEONEN DIGESTS

REMEDIAL LAW

Civil Procedure; Forum non conveniens

Philippine National Construction Corporation v Aisavest Merchant Bankers (M)

Berhad, G.R. No. 172301, August 19, 2015, Leonen, J.

Facts: Philippine National Construction Corporation of the Philippines (PNCC) and Asiavest
Holdings (M) Sdn. Bhd. (Asiavest Holdings) caused the incorporation of an associate company
known as Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. (Asiavest-CDCP), through which they entered into contracts
to construct rural roads and bridges for the State of Pahang, Malaysia.

PNCC for the said construction contract, obtained various guarantees and bonds from Asiavest
Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad (AMBB.) AMBB thereof thus guarantees "the due performance by
PNCC of its construction contracts . . . and the repayment of the temporary advances given to
PNCC[.]” These contracts referred to and is governed by the laws of Malaysia.

However, there was failure to perform the obligations under the consrtruction contract, prompting
the State of Pahang to demand payment against AMBB under the secured bonds. AMBB entered
into a compromise agreement with the State of Pahang by paying the reduced amount of
Malaysian Ringgit (MYR) of 3,915,053.54. Consequently, AMBB demanded indemnity from PNCC
in the amount it paid the State of Pahang.

AMBB filed an action for recovery of sum of money against PNCC with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) and based its action on Malaysian Laws. Specifically, it invoked Section 9818 of the
Malaysian Contracts Act of 1950 and Section 1119 of the Malaysian Civil Law Act of 1956. On July
27, 1994 the RTC ruled in favor of AMBB.

Issues:

1. Whether the trial court "erred in not refusing to assume jurisdiction on the ground of
forum non-conveniens[;]"
2. Whether petitioner Philippine National Construction Corporation was deprived of due
process when the trial court declared it in default;
3. Whether respondent Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad's claim already prescribed
under Malaysian laws; and Lastly, whether this case "should be dismissed considering that
respondent [Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad] is no longer an existing corporation."
Ruling:
III

On the jurisdiction issue, jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, is one such law that
provides for the jurisdiction of our courts. A plain reading of Section 19 shows that civil actions
for payment of sum of money are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of trial courts:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.-Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction: . . . .

(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds
One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the
demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000).

These jurisdictional amounts were adjusted to P300,000.00, and P400,000.00 in the case of Metro
Manila. Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig has jurisdiction over respondent's complaint for
recovery of the sum of Malaysian Ringgit (MYR) 3,915,053.54.

Petitioner argues that "[i]n view of the compelling necessity to implead the two foreign
corporations, the Trial Court should have refused to assume jurisdiction over the case on the
ground of forum non-conveniens, even if the Court might have acquired jurisdiction over the
subject matter and over the person of the petitioner." We find that the trial court correctly
assumed jurisdiction over the Complaint.

"Forum non conveniens literally translates to 'the forum is inconvenient.'" This doctrine applies in
conflicts of law cases. It gives courts the choice of not assuming jurisdiction when it appears that
it is not the most convenient forum and the parties may seek redress in another one. It is a device
"designed to frustrate illicit means for securing advantages and vexing litigants that would
otherwise be possible if the venue of litigation (or dispute resolution) were left entirely to the
whim of either party."

Puyat v. Zabarte enumerated practical reasons when courts may refuse to entertain a case even
though the exercise of jurisdiction is authorized by law:

1. The belief that the matter can be better tried and decided elsewhere, either because the
main aspects of the case transpired in a foreign jurisdiction or the material witnesses have
their residence there;
2. The belief that the non-resident plaintiff sought the forum, a practice known as forum
shopping[,] merely to secure procedural advantages or to convey or harass the defendant;
3. The unwillingness to extend local judicial facilities to non residents or aliens when the
docket may already be overcrowded;
4. The inadequacy of the local judicial machinery for effectuating the right sought to be
maintained; and
5. The difficulty of ascertaining foreign law.
On the other hand, courts may choose to assume jurisdiction subject to the following requisites:
1. that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to;
2. that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and
the facts; and
3. that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision."
The determination of whether to entertain a case is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court, which must carefully consider the facts of the particular case. A mere invocation of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens or an easy averment that foreign elements exist cannot operate
to automatically divest a court of its jurisdiction. It is crucial for courts to determine first if facts
were established such that special circumstances exist to warrant its desistance from assuming
jurisdiction.

We discussed in Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Rebesencio how the doctrine grounds on "comity and
judicial efficiency"[105] and how it involves a recognition that other tribunals may be "better
positioned to enforce judgments:”

Forum non conveniens is soundly applied not only to address parallel litigation and undermine a
litigant's capacity to vex and secure undue advantages by engaging in forum shopping on an
international scale. It is also grounded on principles of comity and judicial efficiency.

Consistent with the principle of comity, a tribunal's desistance in exercising jurisdiction on account
of forum non conveniens is a deferential gesture to the tribunals of another sovereign. It is a
measure that prevents the former's having to interfere in affairs which are better and more
competently addressed by the latter. Further, forum non conveniens entails a recognition not only
that tribunals elsewhere are better suited to rule on and resolve a controversy, but also, that
these tribunals are better positioned to enforce judgments and, ultimately, to dispense justice.
Forum non conveniens prevents the embarrassment of an awkward situation where a tribunal is
rendered incompetent in the face of the greater capability — both analytical and practical — of a
tribunal in another jurisdiction.

Saudi Arabian Airlines also discussed the need to raise forum non conveniens at the earliest
possible time, and to show that a prior suit has been brought in another jurisdiction:

On the matter of pleading forum non conveniens, we state the rule, thus: Forum non conveniens
must not only be clearly pleaded as a ground for dismissal; it must be pleaded as such at the
earliest possible opportunity. Otherwise, it shall be deemed waived.

Consistent with forum non conveniens as fundamentally a factual matter, it is imperative that it
proceed from a factually established basis. It would be improper to dismiss an action pursuant to
forum non conveniens based merely on a perceived, likely, or hypothetical multiplicity of fora.
Thus, a defendant must also plead and show that a prior suit has, in fact, been brought in another
jurisdiction.

We deem it more appropriate and in the greater interest of prudence that a defendant not only
allege supposed dangerous tendencies in litigating in this jurisdiction; the defendant must also
show that such danger is real and present in that litigation or dispute resolution has commenced
in another jurisdiction and that a foreign tribunal has chosen to exercise jurisdiction.

The trial court assumed jurisdiction and explained in its Order dated August 11, 1995 that "[o]n
the contrary[,] to try the case in the Philippines, it is believed, would be more convenient to
defendant corporation as its principal office is located in the Philippines, its records will be more
accessible, witnesses would be readily available and entail less expenses in terms of legal
services." We agree.

Petitioner is a domestic corporation with its main office in the Philippines. It is safe to assume
that all of its pertinent documents in relation to its business would be available in its main office.
Most of petitioner's officers and employees who were involved in the construction contract in
Malaysia could most likely also be found in the Philippines. Thus, it is unexpected that a Philippine
corporation would rather engage this civil suit before Malaysian courts. Our courts would be
"better positioned to enforce the judgment and, ultimately, to dispense" in this case against
petitioner.

Also, petitioner failed to plead and show real and present danger that another jurisdiction
commenced litigation and the foreign tribunal chose to exercise jurisdiction.

Civil procedure; Docket fees

First Sarmiento Property Holdings, Inc., v. Philippine Bank of Communications, G.R.

No. 202836, June 19, 2018

Facts: First Sarmiento obtained from PBCOM a P40,000,000.00 loan, which was secured by a
real estate mortgage over a parcel of land. On January 2, 2006 however, PBCOM filed a petition
for extrajudicial foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage, claiming that First Sarmiento failed to pay
the principal amount and accrued interest on the loan.

First Sarmiento filed a complaint for annulment of Real Estate Mortgage with the Regional Trial
Court, yet the Clerk of Court refused to accept the complaint due to the absence of tax
declarations which would be used to assess docket fees.

Issue: Whether the Regional Trial Court obtained jurisdiction over First Sarmiento Corporation,
Inc.'s Complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage with the amount of docket fees paid.

Ruling: Lapitan v. Scandia instructed that to determine whether the subject matter of an action
is incapable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must
first be established. This finds support in this Court's repeated pronouncement that jurisdiction
over the subject matter is determined by examining the material allegations of the complaint and
the relief sought. Heirs of Dela Cruz v. Heirs of Cruz stated, thus:

It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government

agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the
material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether
the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs.82

However, Lapitan stressed that where the money claim is only a consequence of the remedy
sought, the action is said to be one incapable of pecuniary estimation:

A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether an action is
one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, the Court
has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the
courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic
issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim
is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought like in suits to have the
 defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or
for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions
as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance. The rationale of the rule is plainly that the
second class cases, besides the determination of damages, demand an inquiry into other factors
which the law has deemed to be more within the competence of courts of first instance, which
were the lowest courts of record at the time that the first organic laws of the Judiciary were
enacted allocating jurisdiction (Act 136 of the Philippine Commission of June 11, 1901).

Heirs of Sebe v. Heirs of Sevilla likewise stressed that if the primary cause of action
is based on a claim of ownership or a claim of legal right to control, possess, dispose,
or enjoy such property, the action is a real action involving title to real property.

A careful reading of petitioner's Complaint convinces this Court that petitioner never prayed for
the reconveyance of the properties foreclosed during the auction sale, or that it ever asserted its
ownership or possession over them. Rather, it assailed the validity of the loan contract with real
estate mortgage that it entered into with respondent because it supposedly never received the
proceeds of the P100,000,000.00 loan agreement.

Here, the primary reliefs prayed for by respondents in Civil Case No. MAN-4045 is the cancellation
of the real estate and chattel mortgages for want of consideration. In Bumayog v. Tumas, this
Court ruled that where the issue involves the validity of a mortgage, the action is one incapable
of pecuniary estimation. In the more recent case of Russell v. Vestil, this Court, citing Bumayog,
held that an action questioning the validity of a mortgage is one incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Petitioner has not shown adequate reasons for this Court to revisit Bumayog and Russell. Hence,
petitioner's contention [cannot] be sustained. Since respondents paid the docket fees, as
computed by the clerk of court, consequently, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Civil Case
No. MAN-4045.89

It is not disputed that even if the Complaint were filed a few days after the mortgaged properties
were foreclosed and sold at auction to respondent as the highest bidder, the certificate of sale
was only issued to respondent after the Complaint was filed.

Section 6 of Act No. 3135, as amended, provides that a property sold through an extrajudicial
sale may be redeemed "at any time within the term of one year from and after the date of the
sale": In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power hereinbefore
referred to, the debtor, his successors in interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of
said debtor, or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of
trust under which the property is sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term of one
year from and after the date of the sale; and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions
of sections four hundred and sixty-four to four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of
Civil Procedure, in so far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.

In the case at bar, the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the City of Malolos, Bulacan was restrained from
registering the certificate of sale with the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan and the certificate of sale
was only issued to respondent after the Complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage was
filed. Therefore, even if the properties had already been foreclosed when the Complaint was filed,
their ownership and possession remained with petitioner since the certificate of sale was not
registered with the Registry of Deeds. This supports petitioner's claim that it never asked for the
reconveyance of or asserted its ownership over the mortgaged properties when it filed its
Complaint since it still enjoyed ownership and possession over them.

Considering that petitioner paid the docket fees as computed by the clerk of court, upon the
direction of the Executive Judge, this Court is convinced that the Regional Trial Court acquired
jurisdiction over the Complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage.

Furthermore, even if it is assumed that the instant case were a real action and the
correct docket fees were not paid by petitioner, the case should not have been
dismissed; instead, the payment of additional docket fees should have been made a
lien on the judgment award. The records attest that in filing its complaint, petitioner readily
paid the docket fees assessed by the clerk of court; hence, there was no evidence of bad faith or
intention to defraud the government that would have rightfully merited the dismissal of the
Complaint.

Civil procedure; Appeals

SINDOPHIL, INC v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 204594, November 7,

2018

FACTS: The Republic filed a complaint for revocation, annulment, and cancellation of certificates
of title before the RTC. It includes a 2,791 square-meter parcel of land (Tramo Property) alleging
that the Tramo property was initially registered under the name of Teodoro, which eventually
sold to Puma; then Ty; and Ty sold it to Sindophil. However, Teodoro’s registration was spurious
or of doubtful authenticity because the transfer certificate of title can be traced from a subdivision
plan, owned by the Republic. Thus, Sindophil’s transfer certificate of title was null and void and
should be cancelled.

In their answer, Teodoro, Puma, Ty, and Sindophil contended that the Republic was estopped
from questioning the transfers because it already allowed the transfers; even accepted the capital
gains tax; and that they are innocent purchasers for value.

On November 13, 2009, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of the Republic. Sindophil
and Teodoro filed their appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA) but have failed to file their
appellant’s brief. Thus, the Court of Appeals dismissed their petition and considered their appeal
as abandoned. Sindophil moved for reconsideration but the CA likewise denied the motion.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Sindophil's appeal for failure to file an
appeal brief within the required period?
2. Whether the Regional Trial Court erred in deciding the case despite Sindophil's filing of a
Motion to Re-Open Case?

RULING:

1. Rule 50, Section 1(e) of the Rules of Court is the basis for dismissing an appeal for failure to
file the appellant's brief within the required period. Under Rule 50, Section 1(e): Section 1.
 Grounds for Dismissal of Appeal. - An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on
its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds: xxx (e)Failure of the
appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or memorandum within
the time provided by these Rules.

With the use of the permissive "may," it has been held that the dismissal is directory, not
mandatory, with the discretion to be exercised soundly and "in accordance with the tenets
of justice and fair play" and "having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case.

However, in Sindophil's Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals, Sindophil's
counsel, Atty. Obligar, explained that his law office used to be located in Pasig City. However,
when two (2) of his staff left due to "family reasons," he had to transfer his office to Las
Piñas City, which was near Parañaque City where he resided. He then speculated that in the
course of the transfer, the Court of Appeals' resolution directing Sindophil to file its appeal
brief might have been one of the files lost or inadvertently disposed of by his house helpers.

Atty. Obligar's excuse is unacceptable. While he is not prohibited from hiring clerks and other
staff to help him in his law practice, it is still, first and foremost, his duty to monitor the
receipt of notices such as the Court of Appeals' resolution directing the filing of the appellant's
brief. He cannot blame his staff or house helpers as it is already settled that the negligence
of the clerks and employees of a lawyer binds the latter.

That he is not even sure what happened to the Resolution shows his carelessness, and this
negligence is one that ordinary diligence could have guarded against. He should have devised
a system in his law office whereby his clerks are to immediately route the notices they receive
to the handling lawyer because the reglementary period for filing an appeal brief runs from
their receipt. Under the circumstances, the Court of Appeals exercised its discretion soundly
by deeming Sindophil's appeal as abandoned and, consequently, dismissing the appeal.

2. The order of trial is governed by Rule 30, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, with item (f)
specifically governing the reopening of a case to introduce new evidence, thus:

Section 5. Order of trial. - Subject to the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 31, and unless the
court for special reasons otherwise directs, the trial shall be limited to the issues stated in
the pre-trial order and shall proceed as follows:

(a) The plaintiff shall adduce evidence in support of his complaint;

(b) The defendant shall then adduce evidence in support of his defense, counterclaim, cross-
claim and third-party complaint;
(c) The third-party defendant, if any, shall adduce evidence of his defense, counterclaim,
cross-claim and fourthparty complaint;
(d) The fourth-party, and so forth, if any, shall adduce evidence of the material facts pleaded
by them;
(e) The parties against whom any counterclaim or crossclaim has been pleaded, shall adduce
evidence in support of their defense, in the order to be prescribed by the court;
(f) The parties may then respectively adduce rebutting evidence only, unless the court, for
good reasons and in the furtherance of justice, permits them to adduce evidence upon their
original case; and
(g) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision, unless
the court directs the parties to argue or to submit their respective memoranda or any further
pleadings.

If several defendants or third-party defendants, and so forth, having separate defenses

appear by different counsel, the court shall determine the relative order of presentation of
their evidence. xxx

In Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, a party's declaration of the completion of the presentation

of his evidence prevents him from introducing further evidence; but where the evidence is
rebuttal in character, whose necessity, for instance, arose from the shifting of the burden of
evidence from one party to the other; or where the evidence sought to be presented is in
the nature of newly discovered evidence, the party's right to introduce further evidence must
be recognized. Otherwise, the aggrieved party may avail of the remedy of certiorari.

The exercise of the court's discretion under the exception of Section 5 (f), Rule 30 of the
Rules of Court depends on the attendant facts i.e., on whether the evidence would qualify
as a "good reason" and be in furtherance of "the interest of justice."

The introduction of new evidence even after a party has rested its case may,
therefore, be done but only if the court finds that it is for good reasons and in the
furtherance of justice. The admission is discretionary on the part of the court and may
only be set aside if the admission was done with grave abuse of discretion or the capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment, equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or, the exercise of
power in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, so patent
or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, to a virtual refusal to perform the
mandated duty, or to act at all in contemplation of the law.

Sindophil filed an Urgent Motion to Reset Hearing with Notice of Change of Address one (1)
day before its scheduled initial presentation of evidence. On motion by the Solicitor General,
the Regional Trial Court denied the Motion to Reset Hearing for having been filed on short
notice and deemed as waived Sindophil's right to present evidence. The parties were then
ordered to file their respective memoranda thirty (30) days from notice, after which the case
would be deemed submitted for decision.

Thereafter, Sindophil filed a motion for extension, praying for an additional fifteen (15) days
or until February 26, 2009, to file its memorandum. The Regional Trial Court granted the
motion in its February 24, 2009 Order. However, despite the grant of extension, Sindophil
did not file the required memorandum. Instead, it filed the Motion to Re-Open Case more
than a month later or on March 31, 2009. In its Motion to Re-Open Case, Sindophil alleged
that its witness, Sindophil President Chalid, had previously suffered a stroke that rendered
her indisposed to take the stand.80

The stroke suffered by Sindophil's President was not a good reason to reopen the case.

Furthermore, while illness is a valid ground for postponing a hearing, it does not appear that
Sindophil raised Chalid's stroke as a ground to postpone its initial presentation of defense
evidence. The illness was only alleged in the Motion to Re-Open Case filed on March 31,
 2009, more than three (3) months after the scheduled presentation of evidence on December
10, 2008. The excuse, therefore, appears to be an afterthought.

Neither can Sindophil claim that it was not given equal opportunity to present its case. Atty.
Obligar, counsel for Sindophil, admitted that he never objected to the motions for extension
to file formal offer of evidence filed by the Republic. Even if the Court believed that he did
not object to the extensions "as a gesture of consideration bearing in mind the work load
and bulk of cases being attended to by the [Office of the Solicitor General]," he was still not
entitled to expect that the Office of the Solicitor General would grant him the same leniency
by not objecting to the Motion to Reset the initial presentation of defense evidence. Litigation
is primarily an adversarial proceeding. Counsels are to take every opportunity, so long as it
is within the bounds of the law, to advocate their clients' causes.

Furthermore, contrary to Sindophil's claim, the Regional Trial Court entertained the Motion
to Re-Open Case that it even set the Motion for clarificatory hearing and oral argument.
However, Atty. Obligar again absented himself during the scheduled hearing.

Hence, the Regional Trial Court did not gravely abuse its discretion in deciding the case
despite the filing of the Motion to ReOpen Case.

PERSONAL COLLECTION DIRECT SELLING, INC., Petitioner, v. TERESITA L.

CARANDANG, G.R. No. 206958, November 08, 2017

(Withdrawal of Information for lack of probable cause)

FACTS:

Personal Collection filed a Complaint-Affidavit for estafa with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of
confidence against Carandang before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. A warrant
of arrest was issued against the accused.

On July 10, 2009, Carandang filed a Motion for Reinvestigation. She alleged that she did not
appear during the preliminary investigation because she did not receive any subpoena from the
Office of the City Prosecutor. She moved for the reinvestigation of Personal Collection's complaint
to not deprive her of due process.

On January 29, 2010, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution recommending that
the complaint against Carandang be dismissed. After reinvestigation, it found that Personal
Collection's cause of action is anchored primarily on Carandang's failure to liquidate her remaining
cash advances. However, the Office of the City Prosecutor was unconvinced that Carandang's
failure to return the cash advances would be sufficient to hold her liable for estafa. As such,
Prosecutor Morales filed a motion to withdraw the information due to lack of probable cause.

The Regional Trial Court granted the motion to withdraw the information.

ISSUE/S:
 1. Whether petition for certiorari was the correct remedy?
2. Whether or not the Regional Trial Court correctly allowed the withdrawal of the
Information against Teresita L. Carandang upon a finding that there was a lack of probable
cause;
3. Whether withdrawal of the information results in the automatic cancellation of bail

RULING:

1. Petitioner is incorrect. Appeal was available and was the proper remedy.

Rule 122, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Section 1. Who may appeal. - Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the
accused will be placed in double jeopardy.
An order granting a motion to withdraw an information and dismissing a criminal case is final,
and the remedy to question this final order is an appeal.

Respondent filed with the CA the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court instead of an ordinary appeal, not because it was the only plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy available to him under the law, but, obviously, to make up for the loss of his right to an
ordinary appeal. It is elementary that the special civil action of certiorari is not and cannot be a
substitute for an appeal, where the latter remedy is available, as it was in this case. A special civil
action under Rule 65 cannot cure a party's failure to timely appeal the assailed decision or
resolution. Rule 65 is an independent action that cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost
remedy of an ordinary appeal.

Appealing the withdrawal of an information does not violate the right of the accused against being
placed in double jeopardy. In First Women's Credit Corp. v. Baybay:

As to what mode of review petitioners may avail of after a court grants an accused's motion
to withdraw information and/or to dismiss the case, Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure instructs: "Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order,
unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy."

The case cited by petitioner to support its choice of remedy before the Court of Appeals concerns
the filing of a special civil action for certiorari to assail an interlocutory order. In Rodriguez v.
Gadiane, the order being assailed in the petition for certiorari was an order suspending a criminal
proceeding due to a prejudicial question, which was not an order which dismissed the case or
acquitted the accused. If the case is dismissed or if there is an acquittal, the appeal of the criminal
aspect of the case must be instituted by the Solicitor General on behalf of the State;

The Court has nonetheless recognized that if the criminal case is dismissed by the
trial court or if there is an acquittal, the appeal on the criminal aspect of the case
must be instituted by the Solicitor General in behalf of the State. The capability of the
private complainant to question such dismissal or acquittal is limited only to the civil aspect of the
case. This rule is reiterated in the Metrobank case cited by respondent. However, it should be
remembered that the order which herein petitioner seeks to assail is not one
dismissing the case or acquitting respondents. Hence, there is no limitation to the capacity
of the private complainant to seek judicial review of the assailed order.

Despite petitioner's claim that its petition before the Court of Appeals was not an appeal of an
order dismissing the criminal case against respondent, it is evident that the grant of the Motion
to Withdraw Information dismissed the criminal case. Further, in its Petition for Certiorari,
petitioner assails the Regional Trial Court's findings of lack of probable cause due to the alleged
insufficiency of evidence presented by respondent and because all the elements of estafa were
present. Thus, petitioner questions the trial court's allegedly erroneous conclusions of fact and
law, which are errors of judgment that cannot be corrected by an extraordinary writ of certiorari.

Despite the use of an improper remedy, the Court proceeded to decide the issues to pursue
judicial economy.

2. In granting or denying a motion to withdraw an information, the court must conduct a

cautious and independent evaluation of the evidence of the prosecution and must be
convinced that the merits of the case warrant either the dismissal or continuation of the
action. In Baltazar v. People:

The Court held that once a case has been filed with the court, it is that court, no longer
the prosecution, which has full control of the case, so much so that the information may
not be dismissed without its approval. Significantly, once a motion to dismiss or withdraw
the information is filed, the court may grant or deny it, in the faithful exercise of judicial
discretion. In doing so, the trial judge must himself be convinced that there was indeed
no sufficient evidence against the accused, and this conclusion can be arrived at only after
an assessment of the evidence in the possession of the prosecution. What was
imperatively required was the trial judge's own assessment of such evidence, it not being
sufficient for the valid and proper exercise of judicial discretion merely to accept the
prosecution's word for its supposed insufficiency.
However, courts are not absolutely barred from reversing a prior determination of probable cause
upon the reassessment of evidence presented to it. There is no grave abuse of discretion when
an earlier finding of probable cause is overturned, if it can be shown that the judge arrived at the
later conclusion upon an independent study of the available facts, allegations, and evidence on
record.

The order granting the withdrawal of an information must state the judge's
assessment of the evidence and reasons in resolving the motion. It must clearly show
why the court's earlier assessment of probable cause was erroneous. The court should
not merely accept the prosecution's findings and conclusions. Its independent judicial
discretion in allowing the information to be withdrawn must not only be implied but
must be palpable in its order.

When a trial court is confronted to rule on "a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an
Information", it is its "bounden duty to assess independently the merits of the motion, and this
assessment must be embodied in a written order disposing of the motion."

As aptly observed by the CA, the RTC's December 9, 2005 Order denying the Motion to Withdraw
Information failed to state cogent reasons behind the said court's refusal to grant withdrawal of
the Information. To stress, the December 9, 2005 Order merely stated:

ORDER

Acting on the Motion to Resolve "Motion to Withdraw Information["] dated July 13, 2005, and
finding it to be unmeritorious, the Court resolves to deny the motion.

SO ORDERED.

The RTC simply declared that it was denying the motion for being "unmeritorious,"
without further elaborating on the bases of its conclusion.

In Torres, Jr. v. Spouses Torres-Aguinaldo, the trial court was found to have independently
considered not only the findings of the Department of Justice but also the private offended party's
opposition to the motion to withdraw and the accused's comment to it. The trial court erroneously
stated in its November 19, 2010 Order that it is the investigating officers who had sufficient
discretion to determine probable cause:

It is the general policy of the Court not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations,
leaving the investigating officers sufficient discretion to determine probable cause, jurisprudence
nonetheless made some exceptions to the general rule . . .

In the instant case however, no such exception exists. Thus, the Court is of the view that the
finding of the prosecution must be given weight.

However, the trial court rendered a more satisfactory justification. A reading of the Order shows
that the trial court made its own assessment of the prosecution's evidence as embodied in its
January 29, 2010 Resolution, It sufficiently explained how the elements of estafa were not met
based on the additional evidence presented by the accused at the reinvestigation before the
Office of the City Prosecutor. The trial court also considered the opposition filed by petitioner to
the Motion to Withdraw Information, giving even the private offended party the opportunity to
be heard:

This resolves the Motion to Withdraw Information filed by the Public Prosecutor praying that
the Information for estafa under Article 315 par. 1 (b) filed against herein accused be withdrawn
and the case against her be dismissed accordingly.

The Motion is based on the Resolution dated January 29, 2010 finding no probable cause to
indict accused for estafa after a reinvestigation was conducted on the ground of lack of demand.

The Motion is being opposed by the private complainant Personal Collection Direct Selling, Inc.,
through counsel which claims that demand is not an element of the felony or a condition
precedent to the filing of a criminal complaint for estafa. Instead, it is the appropriation or
conversion of money received to the prejudice of the owner thereof that is the sole essential
fact which constitutes the crime of estafa.
 After a consideration of the respective allegations of both parties, the Court finds [that] the
Motion [is] impressed with merit.

Estafa is a crime committed by a person who defrauds another causing him to suffer damages,
by means of unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, or of false pretenses of fraudulent acts.
From the foregoing, the elements of estafa are, as follows: (1) that the accused defrauded
another by abuse of confidence or deceit; and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third party, and it is essential that there
be a fiduciary relation between them either in the form of a trust, commission or administration
(Carmen Liwanag vs. CA, G.R. No. 114398, October 24, 1997). Demand is not an element of
the felony or a condition precedent to the filing of a criminal complaint for estafa. Indeed, the
accused may be convicted of the felony under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code
if the prosecution proved misappropriation or conversion by the accused of the money or subject
of the Information. In a prosecution for estafa, demand is not necessary where there is evidence
of misappropriation or conversion. However, failure to account upon demand, for funds or
property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation (Lee v. People, G.R. No.
157781, April 11, 2005).

While it is true that herein accused failed to fully liquidate the cash advance received in trust from
the private complainant, regardless of whether or not a demand was made upon the former, is
only a circumstantial evidence of misappropriation which can be rebutted. As found by the
prosecution, the accused was able to satisfactorily explain her failure to account or liquidate the
cash advance received in trust, as follows: (1) that accused utilized the cash advance given to
her but the same was used to defray the operational expenses of private complainant's branch in
Iloilo City as evidenced by the Cash Advance Summary as of November 23, 2006 prepared by
Marilou S. Palarca, private complainant's representative; (2) that accused was willing to fully
liquidate her cash advances as in fact she was able to make partial liquidation and that her
unceremonious termination of her employment with the private complainant prevented her from
doing so.

The trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion when it reversed its earlier finding of probable
cause. The earlier finding was about the issuance of the arrest warrant, in which the trial court
evaluated the prosecutor's Resolution and its attached documents. Following this, respondent
prayed for the reinvestigation of the case as she was unable to attend the initial preliminary
investigation. It was during the reinvestigation before the Office of the City Prosecutor that
respondent was able to present her defense against the allegations in the complaint.

Clearly, the additional evidence adduced prompted the prosecutor's reversal of its initial finding
of probable cause and the filing of the motion to withdraw information. It was also this additional
evidence that formed the basis of the trial court's evaluation that there was now a lack of probable
cause sufficient to withdraw the information.

There being insufficient evidence showing that the trial court erred in finding a lack of probable
cause, the grant of the withdrawal of the information must be upheld.

Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping

City of Taguig vs. City of the Makati, G.R. No. 208393, June 15, 2016

Issue: whether respondent City of Makati engaged in forum shopping in simultaneously pursuing:
first, a Petition for Annulment of the July 8, 2011 Regional Trial Court Decision; and second, a
Motion for Reconsideration (later Appeal) of the same July 8, 2011 Decision.

Ruling:
I

Top Rate Construction & General Services, Inc. v. Paxton Development Corporation explained
that:

Forum shopping is committed by a party who institutes two or more suits in different courts,
either simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the courts to rule on the same or related
causes or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, on the supposition that one or the
other court would make a favorable disposition or increase a party's chances of obtaining a
favorable decision or action.

The test for determining forum shopping is settled. In Yap v. Chua, et al.:

To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important factor
to ask is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in another; otherwise stated, the test for determining forum
shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or
causes of action, and reliefs sought.

For its part, litis pendentia "refers to that situation wherein another action is pending between
the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary
and vexatious.” For litis pendentia to exist, three (3) requisites must concur:x

The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing
the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment
in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
On the other hand, res judicata or prior judgment bars a subsequent case when the following
requisites are satisfied:x

(1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits; (4) there is — between
the first and the second actions — identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.
(Emphasis in the original)

These settled tests notwithstanding:x

Ultimately, what is truly important to consider in determining whether forum-shopping exists or

not is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigant by a party who asks different courts
and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or to grant the same
or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions
being rendered by the different fora upon the same issue.

II

Respondent City of Makati pursued two (2) simultaneous remedies: a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
120495); and a Motion for Reconsideration (later, an Appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 98377).

There is identity of parties in both cases: the cities of Makati and Taguig.

Nonetheless, respondent City of Makati argues that it could not have engaged in forum shopping
as its Petition for Annulment of Judgment and Motion for Reconsideration/Appeal were based on
different causes of action, raised different issues, and sought different reliefs. It asserted that the
Petition for Annulment of Judgment related to the validity of the July 8, 2011 Decision, i.e., that
it was void for having been rendered by a retired judge. It added that, in contrast, the Motion for
Reconsideration/Appeal pertained to the merits of the territorial dispute or the substance of the
respective territorial claims of petitioner City of Taguig and respondent City of Makati.

These arguments are specious considering the basic nature of a Rule 47 Petition, and that of an
appeal.

Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure "govern[s] the annulment by the Court of Appeals
of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner."

Alaban v. Court of Appeals discussed the nature, purpose, and availability of petitions for
annulment of judgment:x
An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the
judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. The purpose of such action is to have the final
and executory judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation. It is resorted to in
cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner, and is based on
only two grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. A person need
not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled, and it is only essential that he can prove
his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be
adversely affected thereby. (Emphasis supplied)

No stretch of legal imagination can justify as final and executory the Order assailed in the Petition
for Annulment of Judgment filed by respondent City of Makati. It was still subject to appeal.
Respondent City of Makati's having availed itself of this remedy is, in fact, the entire impetus for
this Decision.

Rule 47, Section 7 specifies the effect of a judgment granting a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment:x
RULE 47
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENTS OR FINAL ORDERS AND RESOLUTIONS
....

SEC. 7. Effect of judgment. — A judgment of annulment shall set aside the questioned judgment
or final order or resolution and render the same null and void, without prejudice to the original
action being refiled in the proper court. However, where the judgment or final order or resolution
is set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the court may on motion order the trial court to try
the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein. (Emphasis supplied)

While petitions for annulment of judgment are governed by Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, motions for reconsideration of judgments and final orders (as opposed to Motions for
Reconsideration of interlocutory orders) are governed by Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 37, Section 1 provides:x

RULE 37
NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION

SECTION 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or reconsideration. — Within the
period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the
judgment or final order and grant a new trial for one or more of the following causes materially
affecting the substantial rights of said party:

x. . . .

Within the same period, the aggrieved party may also move for reconsideration upon the grounds
that the damages awarded are excessive, that the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision
or final order, or that the decision or final order is contrary to law.
Rule 37, Section 3 specifies the effect of granting a motion for reconsideration: "If the court finds
that excessive damages have been awarded or that the judgment or final order is contrary to the
evidence or law, it may amend such judgment or final order accordingly."

Escquivel v. Alegre discussed the nature of amended judgments and contrasting it with
supplemental judgments:x

In an amended and clarified judgment, the lower court makes a thorough study of the original
judgment and renders the amended and clarified judgment only after considering all the factual
and legal issues. The amended and clarified decision is an entirely new decision which supersedes
the original decision... [A] supplemental decision does not take the place or extinguish the
existence of the original. As its very name denotes, it only serves to bolster or adds something to
the primary decision. A supplement exists side by side with the original. It does not replace that
which it supplements. (Emphasis supplied)

In terms of immediacy of relief, there is a difference between motions for reconsideration of

judgments and final orders, on the one hand, and petitions for annulment of judgment, on the
other. The grant of a Motion for Reconsideration grants the movant immediate relief, the court's
issuance granting the Motion is itself the amended judgment superseding the original Decision.
On the other hand, the grant of a Petition for Annulment of Judgment only allows for a "renewal
of litigation.”Nevertheless, the purposes of Motions for Reconsideration and Petitions for
Annulment of Judgment are fundamentally the same: the setting aside of a judgment in order
that a different, favorable, one may take its place. They "grant. . . substantially the same reliefs."

Ley Construction and Development Corp. V. Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corp. involved a civil
action for specific performance and damages filed by Ley Construction against Hyatt Industrial.
During the proceedings, Ley Construction served notices to take several depositions. The trial
court initially allowed the taking of these depositions. Subsequently, however, the trial court
issued orders through which it cancelled all the depositions set for hearing, supposedly not to
delay the disposition of the case. Ley Construction filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the trial court's
(interlocutory) order recalling the taking of depositions. During the pendency of this Petition, the
trial court issued the Resolution dismissing Ley Construction's action for specific performance and
damages. The Court of Appeals also dismissed Ley Construction's Rule 65 Petition. Ley
Construction then appealed to this court. Resolving Ley Construction's appeal, this court stated:x

Third, petitioner's submission that the Petition for Certiorari has a practical legal effect is in fact
an admission that the two actions are one and the same. Thus, in arguing that the reversal of
the two interlocutory Orders "would likely result in the setting aside of the dismissal of petitioner's
amended complaint," petitioner effectively contends that its Petition for Certiorari, like the appeal,
seeks to set aside the Resolution and the two Orders.

Such argument unwittingly discloses a recourse to forum shopping, which has been held as "the
institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition
that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition." Clearly, by its own submission,
petitioner seeks to accomplish the same thing in its Petition for Certiorari and in its appeal: both
assail the two interlocutory Orders and both seek to set aside the RTC Resolution.

Hence, even assuming that the Petition for Certiorari has a practical legal effect because it would
lead to the reversal of the Resolution dismissing the Complaint, it would still be denied on the
ground of forum shopping. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in Ley Construction, even if the specific relief sought by the petitioner's Rule 65 Petition
was the setting aside of the trial court's orders recalling the taking of depositions, it was
recognized that granting this relief would result in the "practical legal effect"of setting aside the
trial court's dismissal of its Complaint for specific performance and damages. Thus, the petitioner
would have "accomplish[ed] the same thing in its Petition for Certiorari and in its Appeal," that
is, its Rule 65 Petition and its appeal would have granted practically, or "substantially," the same
relief.

Ley Construction discredits respondent City of Makati's claim that it could not have engaged in
forum shopping as its Rule 47 Petition and its Motion for Reconsideration/Appeal were grounded
on different causes of action.

Ley Construction involved two (2) remedies: first, a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65; and
second, an Appeal. Rule 65, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that a Petition
for Certiorari is available "[w]hen any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." Thus, a petition for certiorari raises questions of
jurisdiction. It does not, in the strict sense, delve into the merits or substance of the case or the
proceedings, which allegedly occasioned an error in jurisdiction.

In Ley Construction, one could have dwelt on the fine distinction between, on one hand, Rule 65
petitions as proceedings grounded on errors in jurisdiction, and, on the other, appeals as
proceedings that go into the merits or substance of a case. This is not entirely different from
respondent City of Makati's invitation to dwell on the difference between, on one hand, its Rule
47 Petition as assailing the issuance of a judgment without jurisdiction, and, on the other, its
Motion for Reconsideration (later, Appeal), as focusing on the substance of its and of petitioner
City of Taguig's respective territorial claims.

Besides, a Rule 47 petition was not even opportune. It was not as though respondent City of
Makati was left with no other remedy but a Rule 47 petition. Lack of jurisdiction could have just
as easily been raised as an error in its Appeal or in its Motion for Reconsideration. It is as much
a cause for pursuing a motion for reconsideration or an appeal as it is for pursuing a petition for
annulment of judgment.

A petition for annulment of judgment is based only on two (2) grounds: first, extrinsic fraud; and
second, lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. In contrast, a motion for reconsideration of
a judgment or final order may cover "grounds that the damages awarded are excessive, that the
evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or final order, or that the decision or final order is
contrary to law."

Rule 37, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure spells out what a motion for
reconsideration must contain:x
RULE 37
NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION
....

SEC. 2. Contents of motion for new trial or reconsideration and notice thereof. — The motion
shall be made in writing stating the ground or grounds therefor, a written notice of which shall
be served by the movant on the adverse party.

A motion for new trial shall be proved in the manner provided for proof of motion. A motion for
the cause mentioned in paragraph (a) of the preceding section shall be supported by affidavits of
merits which may be rebutted by affidavits. A motion for the cause mentioned in paragraph (b)
shall be supported by affidavits of the witnesses by whom such evidence is expected to be given,
or by duly authenticated documents which are proposed to be introduced in evidence.

A motion for reconsideration shall point out specifically the findings or conclusions of the judgment
or final order which are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law making
express reference to the testimonial or documentary evidence or to the provisions of law alleged
to be contrary to such findings or conclusions.

A pro forma motion for new trial or reconsideration shall not toll the reglementary period of
appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
However, Rule 37, Section 2 is not the sole provision in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that
spells out what a motion for reconsideration must state. Rule 15, Section 8, commonly referred
to as the Omnibus Motion Rule, states:x
RULE 15
MOTIONS
....

SEC. 8. Omnibus motion. — Subject to the provisions of section 1 of Rule 9, a motion attacking
a pleading, order, judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all
objections not so included shall be deemed waived. (Emphasis supplied)
The Omnibus Motion Rule explicitly refers to Rule 9, Section 1. This provision provides for the
following exceptions to the Omnibus Motion Rule:x
(a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter;

(b) litis pendentia;

(c) res judicata; and x

(d) prescription.
Thus, even if these grounds are not pleaded in a motion attacking a judgment, such as a motion
for reconsideration, they are not deemed waived.

Clearly, lack of jurisdiction may be invoked as a ground in a motion for reconsideration. It can
thereby serve as basis for setting aside or amending a judgment or final order. Accordingly, it is
as much a cause for pursuing a motion for reconsideration as it is a petition for annulment of
judgment.

III

Makati points out that there is jurisprudence to the effect that a petition for annulment of
judgment, if based on lack of jurisdiction, need not "allege that the ordinary remedies of new
trial, reconsideration or appeal were no longer available through no fault of his.” Indeed, as
explained in Tiu, "[t]his is so because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the [Regional
Trial Court] without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally
or in a direct action, or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding
whenever it is invoked."

Moreover, it is correct that Nazareno stated that "[a] judgment promulgated after the judge who
signed the decision has ceased to hold office is not valid and binding.” This is so because "[w]hen
a judge[,] retired all his authority to decide any case, i.e., to write, sign and promulgate the
decision thereon also 'retired' with him. In other words, he had lost entirely his power and
authority to act on all cases assigned to him prior to his retirement."

In this case, however, Tiu and Nazareno afford Makati no relief, the crux of the present Petition
being the matter of forum shopping.
Tiu involved a petition for annulment of judgment filed after the assailed judgment attained
finality. In that case, by the time a petition for annulment of judgment was filed, an execution
sale had already been held.

Tiu is markedly different from this case. In Tiu, a petition for annulment of judgment was availed
of at the proper time and not in a manner that indicated an abuse of court processes. Here,
respondent City of Makati's conduct was assailed by petitioner City of Taguig precisely because
respondent City of Makati simultaneously pursued a Petition for Annulment of Judgment and a
Motion for Reconsideration.

Nazareno involved a criminal case for serious physical injuries (Criminal Case No. 2335) in which
a Decision was promulgated by a judge who was substituting for a suspended judge. Specifically,
Acting Judge Aurelio Icasiano, Jr., promulgated a Decision penned and signed by the suspended
Presiding Judge Manuel C. Diosomito. This Decision was dated November 8, 1995.

Following the promulgation of this Decision, Romeo P. Nazareno (Nazareno) filed a Petition for
Annulment of Judgment before the Court of Appeals. This Petition was denied by the Court of
Appeals. A subsequent appeal before this Court was not entertained, it having been filed 12 days
late.

Failing in his Petition for Annulment of Judgment, Nazareno went back to the Municipal Trial Court
of Naic, Cavite and filed a Notice of Appeal. The Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, however,
dismissed his appeal for having been supposedly filed out of time. Nazareno then filed a Petition
for Mandamus and Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which the Court of Appeals dismissed.
Nazareno then filed an appeal before this court.

Deciding Nazareno's Appeal, this Court noted that the November 8, 1985 Decision was a void
judgment. As a void judgment, "it cannot be deemed to have become final and executory.” Citing
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Sison, this Court emphasized that "the
situation is the same as it would be if there were no judgment. Accordingly, it leaves the parties
litigants in the same position they were in before the trial.” Accordingly, "in the interest of justice,”
not only did this court rule that the November 8, 1985 Decision may still be appealed from; it was
ruled that Criminal Case No. 2335 must be remanded to the Municipal Trial Court of Naic, Cavite
"for adjudication and promulgation of [an entirely] new decision."

In Nazareno, the petitioner did not simultaneously pursue a Petition for Annulment of Judgment
and an Appeal. Respondent City of Makati did so here. In Nazareno, the petitioner had the
prudence to not trifle with court processes and "creatje] the possibility of conflicting decisions."
On the contrary, the petitioner deferred to the Court of Appeals where his Petition for Annulment
of Judgment was then pending. It was only after this Court dismissed his Appeal from the Court
of Appeals' adverse Decision that he filed a Notice of Appeal.

Nazareno, far from helping respondent City of Makati's case, actually weakens it. Nazareno shows
that an appeal (or a motion for reconsideration as a prelude to an Appeal) need not be pursued
simultaneously with a Petition for Annulment of Judgment. Nazareno shows that a party burdened
by a decision issued without jurisdiction need not simultaneously go to several fora to obtain
relief. Nazareno shows that the issuance of a decision despite a tribunal's lack of jurisdiction is
no license for forum shopping.
 IV

Respondent City of Makati emphasized that its Motion for Reconsideration and Appeal were mere
precautionary measures. We are not impressed by this argument. Appending the phrase "ad
cautelam" to an application for relief does not alter the nature of the remedy being pursued. Had
it been granted by the trial court, the Motion for Reconsideration—ad cautelam or otherwise—
would have ultimately resulted in the setting aside of the assailed decision.

The antecedents of the present Petition show that respondent City of Makati's actions have
actually and already given rise to the harm sought to be avoided by the rule against forum
shopping. The Regional Trial Court conflicted with the Court of Appeals.

In its December 19, 2011 Order, the Regional Trial Court found that respondent City of Makati
engaged in forum shopping:x

The Rules of Court, the code governing judicial procedure, prescribes the remedies (actions and
special proceedings) that may be availed of for the myriad reliefs that persons may conceivably
have need of and seek in this jurisdiction. But, that the adjective law makes available several
remedies does not imply that a party may resort to them simultaneously or at his pleasure or
whim. There is a sequence and a hierarchical order which must be observed in availing of them.
Impatience at what may be felt to be the slowness of the judicial process, or even a deeply held
persuasion in the Tightness of one's cause does not justify short-cuts in procedure, or playing
fast and loose with the rules thereof.

The rationale against forum shopping is that a party should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous
remedies in two different fora. Filing multiple petitions or complaints constitutes abuse of court
processes, which tend to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial
procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.

Without passing judgment on the Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by Makati with the
Court of Appeals, this Court would like to quote Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court which
provides:x

SECTION 1. Coverage. — This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of
judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
There was still an available remedy for Makati and it correctly and timely filed the present Motion
for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam. If applicable, there is still another remedy available to either
party, appeal to the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.

Among the sanctions provided by the Rules and jurisprudence when there is forum shopping is
the summary dismissal of the action with prejudice.

However, this court would not strictly apply the sanctions provided in order to give the parties
the full measure of the proceedings that they are allowed to avail of under the law after the
issuance of this order. (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
For its part, the Court of Appeals has strangely flip-flopped on the question of respondent City of
Makati's forum shopping. Its May 16, 2012 Resolution denying petitioner City of Taguig's Motion
to Dismiss absolved respondent City of Makati of the charge of forum shopping. Its December
18, 2012 Resolution granted petitioner City Taguig's Motion for Reconsideration and dismissed
respondent City of Makati's Petition for Annulment of Judgment for, among other reasons, forum
shopping. Its April 30, 2013 Resolution denied respondent City of Makati's Motion for
Reconsideration but abandoned its earlier conclusion that respondent City of Makati engaged in
forum shopping. Finally, its July 25, 2013 Resolution granted petitioner City of Taguig's prayer
that a pronouncement be made to the effect that respondent City of Makati's Petition for
Annulment of Judgment was moot. This Resolution, however, was silent on the matter of forum
shopping.

Respondent City of Makati's actions have not only vexed courts and an adverse litigant. They
have actually and already given rise to conflicting decisions, not only between different courts—
the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals—but even within the Court of Appeals itself.
The damage to the administration of justice is not hypothetical; it is a realized harm.

Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, apart from being a ground
for summary dismissal, "willful and deliberate forum shopping . . . shall constitute direct contempt,
[and is] a cause for administrative sanctions." Thus, it would be inadequate to stop with a mere
declaration that respondent City of Makati, which acted through its counsels, engaged in forum
shopping.

It was among the matters prayed for by petitioner City of Taguig that appropriate sanctions be
imposed for respondent City of Makati's wilful and deliberate forum shopping. So too, respondent
City of Makati's defenses have been duly pleaded and considered in this case. Under Rule 71,
Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, direct contempt committed against a Regional
Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank is punishable by imprisonment not exceeding
10 days and/or a fine not exceeding P2,000.00. Accordingly, a fine of P2,000.00 is imposed on
each of respondent City of Makati's counsels who filed the Petition for Annulment of Judgment
before the Court of Appeals: Atty. Pio Kenneth I. Dasal, Atty. Glenda Isabel L. Biason, and Atty.
Gwyn Gareth T. Mariano.

Criminal Procedure – Question of Fact in criminal cases may be subjected to Rule

45; Failure to question the validity of arrest before arraignment is deemed waived

SIMEON LAPI y MAHIPUS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 210731,
February 13, 2019

FACTS: Lapi, Allen Sacare, and Kenneth Lim were charged with violation of Article II, Section 15
of Republic Act No. 9165.

According to the prosecution, at around 1:50 p.m. on April 17, 2006, operatives of the Bacolod
City Anti-Illegal Drug Special Operation Task Group conducted a stake-out operation in Purok
Sigay, Barangay 2, Bacolod City. During the operation, PO2 Villeran heard noises from one of the
houses. He peeped through its window and saw Lapi, Sacare, and Lim having a pot session.

PO2 Villeran tried to enter the house through the main door, but the door was locked. He then
tried to enter through the kitchen door. Upon entry, he met someone trying to flee, but PO2
Villeran restrained the person.

Then, PO2 Villeran "peeked into the adjacent room" and saw that the pot session was ongoing.
He entered the room and introduced himself as a police officer. Lapi, Sacare, and Lim tried to
escape, but were caught b PO2 Villeran's team members, who were waiting by the main door.

Having been arrested and their paraphernalia seized, the men were then brought to the City Anti-
Illegal Drug Special Operation Task Group Office, where a police blotter was filed. They were later
brought to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory to undergo drug tests.

The initial laboratory report found that Lapi, Sacare, and Lim tested positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), while their companions, Noel Canlas and Carmelo
Limbaco, tested negative. Another test conducted yielded the same results.

In his defense, Lapi alleged that on April 17, 2006, he was in Purok Sigay, Barangay 2, Bacolod
City to deliver a mahjong set to a certain Antonio Kadunggo. On his way home, two (2) persons
approached him and searched his pocket. They took his money, handcuffed him, and boarded
him on a tricycle with four (4) other persons whom he did not know.

The Regional Trial Court found Lapi guilty. It ruled that the warrantless arrest against him was
legal since he was caught in flagrante delicto. Lapi appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court
of Appeals denied the Appeal and affirmed the Regional Trial Court Decision. Lapi filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, but it was denied by the Court of Appeals.

Hence, Lapi filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. Lapi asserted that while he
failed to question the validity of his arrest before entering his plea, his warrantless arrest was
illegal from the start. He argued that PO2 Villeran committed a malevolent intrusion of privacy,
that such intrusion cannot be equated in plain view; therefore, he cannot be considered caught
in flagrante delicto Hence, any evidence obtained cannot be used against him.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the Petition should be denied for raising questions of fact?
2. Whether the warrantless arrest against petitioner Simeon M. Lapi was valid?

RULING:
1. The Court is not a trier of facts. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court must, as a general rule, only raise questions of law. Parties may only raise
issues that can be determined without having to review or reevaluate the evidence on
record.

In criminal cases, however, the accused has the constitutional right to be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proven. To prove guilt, courts must evaluate the evidence
presented in relation to the elements of the crime charged. Thus, the finding of guilt is
essentially a question of fact. For this reason, the entire records of a criminal case are
 thrown open for this Court's review. In Ferrer v. People, it was held that it is a well settled
rule that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review and
that it becomes the duty of the Court to correct such errors as may be found in the
judgment appealed from, whether they are assigned as errors or not.

The lower court actual findings will not bind this Court if facts that could affect the result
of the case were overlooked and disregarded. On the one hand, an examination of the
factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals shows no error that requires
the Court's review.

2. Petitioner argues that his warrantless arrest was illegal since PO2 Villeran had to peep
through the window to ascertain that something illegal was occurring. He posits that his
case is similar to that of People v. Bolasa. In Bolasa, the police were tipped off by an
informant that people were packing drugs in a certain house. Upon reaching it, the police
officers peeked into a window, where they saw a man and a woman repacking marijuana.
The officers entered the house, introduced themselves as police officers, and arrested the
pair. This Court held that the arrests and the subsequent searches and seizures were
invalid as the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that the people in the house
were committing a crime.

Here, however, petitioner admits that he failed to question the validity of his
arrest before arraignment. He did not move to quash the Information against
him before entering his plea. He was assisted by counsel when he entered his plea.
Likewise, he was able to present his evidence. In People v. Alunday, the Court has
consistently ruled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure
for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused
must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed
waived.

Since the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of
the accused, any defect in the arrest of the accused may be deemed cured when he
voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the trial court.

The appellant went into arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, he
actively participated in his trial. He raised the additional issue of irregularity of his arrest
only during his appeal to this Court. He is, therefore, deemed to have waived such alleged
defect by submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court by his counsel-assisted plea
during his arraignment; by his actively participating in the trial and by not raising the
objection before his arraignment.
Evidence not marked during pre-trial

ANTHONY DE SILVA CRUZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 210266, June 07,
2017

FACTS: Anthony Cruz allegedly tried to purchase products of from Duty Free Philippines Fiesta
Mall using counterfeit credit cards. He was charged with violation of Section 9(a) and (e) of
Republic Act No. 8484, which provide: The following acts shall constitute access device fraud and
are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(a) producing, using, trafficking in one or more counterfeit access devices;
(e) possessing one or more counterfeit access devices or access devices fraudulently applied for

In the proceedings, after the prosecution formally offered their evidence, Cruz filed a Demurrer
to Evidence asserting that the credit card was inadmissible since it was presented and offered by
the prosecution in violation of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC. This was denied by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Parañaque City. It stated that the credit card receipts were properly identified by the
witnesses and that the alleged counterfeit credit card was offered in evidence by the prosecution.

Despite notice, Cruz and his counsel did not appear during the scheduled hearings for the
presentation of his defense. Later, Cruz manifested to the trial court that he was waiving his right
to present evidence.

On May 5, 2010, the trial court rendered its Judgment finding Cruz guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged. This ruling was upheld by the Court of Appeals upon appeal, and
denied his motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether the alleged counterfeit credit card is inadmissible since it was not marked and
identified during pre-trial? (YES)

RULING: The Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

1. Under Section 9(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 8484, the possession and use of an access
device is not illegal. Rather, what is prohibited is the possession and use of a counterfeit access
device. Therefore, the corpus delicti of the crime is not merely the access device, but also any
evidence that proves that it is counterfeit.

Petitioner was found in possession of Citibank Visa credit card number 4539 7207 8677 7008,
which bore the name "Gerry Santos."58 He used the same credit card to purchase Ferragamo
shoes worth US$363.00 at Duty Free Fiesta Mall.59 Citibank Visa credit card number 4539 7207
8677 7008 was later proven to be a counterfeit access device.

2. A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, sec. I(A)(2) provides that:

2. The parties shall submit, at least three (3) days before the pre-trial, pre-trial briefs containing
the following:
....

d. The documents or exhibits to be presented, stating the purpose thereof. (No evidence shall be
allowed to be presented and offered during the trial in support of a party's evidence-in-chief other
than those that had been earlier identified and pre-marked during the pre-trial, except if allowed
by the court for good cause shown.

The rule is that no evidence shall be allowed during trial if it was not identified and
pre-marked during trial. This provision, however, allows for an exception: when
allowed by the court for good cause shown. There is no hard and fast rule to determine
what may constitute "good cause," though this Court has previously defined it as any substantial
reason "that affords a legal excuse."

The trial court retains its discretion to allow any evidence to be presented at trial even
if not previously marked during pre-trial. Here, the trial court allowed the
presentation of the counterfeit credit card at trial due to the prosecution's
explanation that during pre-trial, the counterfeit credit card was still in the Criminal
Investigation and Detective Group's custody.

The prosecution was able to present and mark during pre-trial Citibank's certification that the
access device used was counterfeit. It is this certification that makes the possession and use of
the access device illegal. Therefore, the trial court determined that the access device could still
be presented at trial since it merely formed part of an exhibit that had already been presented
and marked during pre-trial.

Civil procedure; Pre-trial

G.R. No. 208792, July 22, 2015, BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES ROBERTO
AND TERESITA GENUINO

Facts:

The Spouses Genuino executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over a 10,000-square-meter
parcel of land in General Trias, Cavite City to secure loans obtained from the bank. They later
defaulted in their installment payments. BPI foreclosed on the properties mortgaged but a
deficiency in the amount arose. Despite demand, the same went unheeded. Hence, a suit was
filed by the latter. The RTC dismissed the complaint by BPI for having failed to file a motion to
set case for pre-trial conference.

Issue: Whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case without
prejudice on the ground of failure to prosecute when Bank of the Philippine Islands failed to file
a motion to set case for pre-trial conference.

Ruling:

The trial court dismissed the Complaint pursuant to Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court.

A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC entitled Re: Proposed Rule on Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court
Judges and Clerks of Court in the Conduct of Pre-Trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures
took effect on August 16, 2004. This provides that:

I. Pre-Trial

A. Civil Cases

1. . . .Within five (5) days from date of filing of the reply, the plaintiff must promptly move ex
parte that the case be set for pre-trial conference. If the plaintiff fails to file said motion within
the given period, the Branch COC shall issue a notice of pre-trial.32 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)

Respondents Spouses Genuino cannot rely on Olave v. Mistas as this involved a trial court Order
dated October 20, 1997 dismissing the Complaint with prejudice. The facts in Olavetook place
before the effectivity of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC on August 16, 2004.

Espiritu, et al. v. Lazaro, et al. quoted by petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands "clarified the
application of [A.M.] No. 03-1-09[-SC] to cases filed after its effectivity on August 16, 2004":

In every action, the plaintiffs are duty-bound to prosecute their case with utmost diligence and
with reasonable dispatch to enable them to obtain the relief prayed for and, at the same time, to
minimize the clogging of the court dockets. Parallel to this is the defendants’ right to have a
speedy disposition of the case filed against them, essentially, to prevent their defenses from being
impaired.

Since the incidents occurred prior to the effectivity of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC on August 16, 2004,
the guidelines stated therein should not be made applicable to this case. Instead, the prevailing
rule and jurisprudence at that time should be utilized in resolving the case.

Section 1 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court imposes upon the plaintiff the duty to set the case for
pre-trial after the last pleading is served and filed. Under Section 3 of Rule 17, failure to comply
with the said duty makes the case susceptible to dismissal for failure to prosecute for an
unreasonable length of time or failure to comply with the rules.35 (Emphasis supplied, citation
omitted)

Reading A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC together with Rule 17, Section 3 and Rule 18, Section 1 of the Rules
of Court accommodates the outright dismissal of a complaint upon plaintiff’s failure to show
justifiable reason for not setting the case for pre-trial within the period provided by the Rules.

This court has allowed cases to proceed despite failure by the plaintiff to promptly move for pre-
trial when it finds that "the extreme sanction of dismissal of the complaint might not be
warranted".

It must be stressed that even if the plaintiff fails to promptly move for pre-trial without any
justifiable cause for such delay, the extreme sanction of dismissal of the complaint might not be
warranted if no substantial prejudice would be caused to the defendant, and there are special
and compelling reasons which would make the strict application of the rule clearly unjustified.

A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC states that: "Within five (5) days from date of filing of the reply, the plaintiff
must promptly move ex-parte that the case be set for pre-trial conference. If the plaintiff fails to
file said motion within the given period, the Branch COC shall issue a notice of pre-trial." As such,
the clerk of court of Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos should issue a notice of pre-
trial to the parties and set the case for pre-trial.

On the other hand, this court has sustained dismissals due to plaintiff’s fault after finding that
plaintiff’s failure to prosecute or comply with the rules was without justifiable reason.
This court discussed that "[w]hile under the present Rules, it is now the duty of the clerk of court
to set the case for pre-trial if the plaintiff fails to do so within the prescribed period, this does not
relieve the plaintiff of his own duty to prosecute the case diligently."

Regner does not involve the non-filing of a motion to set case for pretrial, but the failure to serve
summons on respondents in a Complaint for declaration of nullity of deed of donation filed in
June 1999.50

The Court of Appeals Decision discussed that petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands "cannot
simply ‘fold its hands’ and say that it was the duty of the clerk of court to set the case for pre-
trial for the prompt disposition of its case."

Trial courts should be more proactive in ensuring the progression of cases to pre-trial considering
the significance of this stage in civil actions.

Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. Although it was
discretionary under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was made mandatory under the 1964 Rules and
the subsequent amendments in 1997. Hailed as "the most important procedural innovation in
Anglo-Saxon justice in the nineteenth century," pre-trial seeks to achieve the following:
(a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to alternative modes of dispute
resolution;
(b) The simplification of the issues;
(c) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(d) The possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents to avoid
unnecessary proof;
(e) The limitation of the number of witnesses;
(f) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner;
(g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of dismissing
the action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist;
(h) The advisability or necessity of suspending the proceedings; and
(i) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action.

Pre-trial promotes efficiency of case proceedings by allowing the parties to stipulate on facts and
admissions that no longer need proof, and to agree on key issues, among others. It protects the
right to speedy trial without compromising substantive justice.

However, petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands also has the duty to set the case for pre-trial
after the last pleading has been served and filed, and to diligently pursue its case and comply
with the rules. Failure to do so without justifiable cause warrants an outright dismissal of the
Complaint.

Petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands’ explanation of misfiling by previous counsel’s secretary
of the case records together with terminated cases in the office bodega cannot be considered as
justifiable cause for its failure to set the case for pre-trial. This court has held that "a counsel is
required to inquire, from time to time, and whenever necessary, about the status of handled
cases, as well as motions filed for a client." Also, petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands is one
of the oldest and more established banks in the country. There is reasonable expectation that it
has the necessary organizational structures, system flows, and procedures to address urgent
matters and meet litigation deadlines.

Between the parties, petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands is in a better position to bear the
costs of a procedural misstep of its own doing as compared with respondents Spouses Genuino.
The bank may have had its reasons to waive payment or the pursuit of its claims. For instance,
it could have weighed that the costs of pursuing its litigation against respondents Spouses
Genuino outweigh the potential benefits. It could be that their business with the bank was far
more valuable than the incidental rupture in their relationship caused by this transaction. In all
these possible cases, respondents Spouses Genuino and other debtors have a right to rely on the
non-action of the plaintiff. In their view, the non-filing of the basic motion for setting of pre-trial
would have been, at best, a reasonable economic signal that the bank was no longer interested.
At worse, it was clearly negligence of an entity with enough institutional resources to maintain a
large arsenal of in-house and external counsel. The bank’s explanation for its own negligence is
unavailing. While it is true that A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC does provide that the Clerk of Court set the
date of pre-trial, plaintiff should not be rewarded for his or her negligence.

Evidence; Testimony

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JUANITO ENTRAMPAS, G.R. No. 212161, March 29,
2017

FACTS:

Entrampas and BBB were common-law spouses. They co-habited for eight (8) years, from 1995
to 2003. AAA, BBB's daughter from a previous relationship, lived with them. She looked up to
Entrampas as her adoptive father. Entrampas raped AAA. Entrampas was charged with two (2)
counts of qualified rape under the Revised Penal Code. The Regional Trial Court found the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of statutory rape. Hence, Entrampas appealed
before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S: Whether accused-appellant Juanito Entrampas is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

two (2) counts of statutory rape?

RULING:

MINOR INCONSISTENCIES

The alleged inconsistencies "are collateral and minor matters which do not at all touch upon the
commission of the crime nor affect the minor victim's credibility." AAA's inability to recall the
precise date and time of the rape is immaterial as these are not elements of the crime. Moreover,
"rape victims are not expected to cherish in their memories an accurate account of the dates,
number of times, and manner they were violated.

Inconsistencies on minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance,
truth, or weight of the victim's testimonies. Minor inconsistencies may be expected of a girl
of such tender years ... who is unaccustomed to a public trial, particularly one where she would
recount such a harrowing experience as an assault to her dignity. The inconsistencies and
contradictions in AAA's declarations are quite expected. The victim is a child less than 12 years
old and, therefore, more likely to commit errors than teenagers or adults.

Jurisprudence has consistently given full weight and credence to a child's

testimonies. Youth and immaturity are badges of truth and sincerity. Leeway should
be given to witnesses who are minors, especially when they are relating past
incidents of abuse.

AAA, then only 11 years old, had no reason to concoct lies against petitioner. Her declarations
are generally coherent and intrinsically believable. In People v. Dimanawa:

[R]everence and respect for the elders is deeply rooted in Filipino children and is even recognized
by law. Thus, it is against human nature for a . . . girl to fabricate a story that would expose
herself, as well as her family, to a lifetime of shame, especially when her charge could mean the
death or lifetime imprisonment of her own father.

Her failures to resist the sexual aggression and to immediately report the incident to
the authorities or to her mother do not undermine her credibility. The silence of the rape
victim does not negate her sexual molestation or make her charge baseless, untrue, or fabricated.
A minor "cannot be expected to act like an adult or a mature experienced woman who would
have the courage and intelligence to disregard the threat to her life and complain immediately
that she had been sexually assaulted."

FORCE AND INTIMIDATION

Force and intimidation must be appreciated in light of the victim's perception and
judgment when the assailant committed the crime. In rape perpetrated by close kin,
such as the common-law spouse of the child's mother, actual force or intimidation
need not be employed.

"While [accused-appellant] was not the biological father of AAA ... [she] considered him as her
father since she was a child." Moral influence or ascendancy added to the intimidation of AAA. It
enhanced the fear that cowed the victim into silence. Accused-appellant's physical superiority and
moral influence depleted AAA's resolve to stand up against her foster father. The threats to her
and her mother's lives, as well as the knife within accused-appellant's reach, further prevented
her from resisting her assailant. As accused-appellant sexually assaulted AAA, she cried and
pleaded him to stop. Her failure to shout or tenaciously repel accused-appellant does not mean
that she voluntarily submitted to his dastardly act.

AGE OF THE VICTIN

Accused-appellant questioned the Regional Trial Court's appreciation of the age of the victim at
the time of the commission of rape. He claimed that the birth certificate cast doubt on whether
the victim was indeed below 12 years old in February 2003, when the offense was first committed.
According to him, AAA's birth certificate should be questioned as it was registered late. This
allegation is speculative.
Absent proof to the contrary, accused-appellant's objection must be set aside. A public
document such as a birth certificate generally enjoys the presumption of regularity.
Accused-appellant failed to present any evidence to overturn this legal presumption. In Baldos v.
Court of Appeals:

Applications for delayed registration of birth go through a rigorous process. The books making up
the civil register are considered public documents and are prima facie evidence of the truth of
the facts stated there. As a public document, a registered certificate of live birth enjoys the
presumption of validity. It is not for [the owner of the birth certificate] to prove the facts stated
in his [or her] certificate of live birth, but for petitioners who are assailing the certificate to prove
its alleged falsity.

Thus, it is not for AAA to prove that the Certificate of Live Birth reflects the truth of the facts
stated in it; rather, it is for accused-appellant to rebut the presumption that AAA's birth certificate
sufficiently establishes her birth on November 11, 1991. Accused-appellant miserably failed to do
this.

CREDIBILITY OF THE WITNESS

A careful examination of the records shows that there is nothing that would warrant a reversal of
the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. "[W]hen a woman, especially
a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape
was committed.

Settled is the rule that "factual findings of the trial court and its evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal,
unless the trial court is shown to have overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied any fact or
circumstance of weight and substance."

On the two (2) charges of qualified rape, AAA clearly and consistently communicated how
accused-appellant threatened and forced her into having sexual congress with him. Sometime in
February 2003, accused-appellant made AAA lie down on the floor and warned her that he would
kill her and her mother if she called for attention. He removed AAA's panty, undressed himself,
and stripped her of her innocence. AAA cried and pleaded him to stop. She grew more fearful as
she saw a knife within the assailant's reach.83 Accused-appellant again threatened her and her
mother's lives. Terrified of accused-appellant's threats, AAA did not tell her mother what
happened.

The incident occurred again a week later in February 2003. Accused-appellant told her to lie
down, penetrated her vagina, and then went outside. AAA stayed in the room upstairs, crying,
until BBB came home later that evening. "For the succeeding months, [Entrampas] continued to
rape AAA who [kept silent] out of fear."

Accused-appellant's acts amounted to statutory rape through carnal knowledge under Article 266-
A(l )(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended:

Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed -

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
Accused-appellant also committed the crime with the aggravating/qualifying circumstance that
he was the common-law spouse of AAA's mother. Under Article 266-B (1) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended:
Article 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua.
….

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a ... guardian ... or
the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim[.]

As to the circumstances qualifying rape, the prosecution established that the victim was less than
12 years old when the incident happened in February 2003, and that the offender was her
guardian.90 AAA's Certificate of Live Birth proved her minority. AAA was accused-appellant's
foster daughter. AAA and her mother, who was accused-appellant's former live-in partner, resided
with accused-appellant in his house.

In September 2003, Dr. Bagaporo administered AANs pregnancy test and found her to be with
child. AAA gave birth on November 3, 2003, within nine (9) months from the date of the first rape
in February 2003.
Meanwhile, CCC averred that accused-appellant admitted the crime to him, after which CCC
reported the incident to the barangay captain and then to the police.
As against these details and testimonies, all that accused-appellant offered in defense were
denials and alibis, which jurisprudence has long considered weak and unreliable.
The Regional Trial Court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, properly found that the testimonies
of AAA, BBB, CCC, and Dr. Bagaporo corroborated each other and supported the physical
evidence. There was no showing that the witnesses for the prosecution had ill motives to testify
against accused-appellant. Their testimonies are, therefore, accorded full faith and credence.

Criminal procedure; Bail

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MANUEL ESCOBAR, G.R. No. 214300, July 26, 2017

FACTS: On June 18, 2001, four-armed men allegedly forced Mary Grace, Burca, and Torres
inside a vehicle. Manuel Escobar was suspected of conspiring in the kidnap for ransom of Mary
Grace Cheng-Rosagas and two other victims. An information was filed against him and he was
arrested on February 14, 2008.
Escobar filed his first petition for bail but was denied in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and Court
of Appeals (CA). The Courts recognized that extrajudicial confession of Cubillas, a co-accused,
was generally incompetent evidence and was admissible against himself only for violating the res
inter alios acta rule.

Subsequently, the police arrested one of the co-accused, Rolando Fajardo. Rolando Fajardo
applied for bail, which the RTC granted. It came about after the trial court considered that,
according to Cubillas, Rolando was not present before, during and after the kidnapping. There
was paucity of evidence on Rolando's alleged participation he was compelled to file a second
petition for bail.

Meanwhile, Escobar saw Rolando's release on bail as a new "development which warranted a
different view" on his own bail application. As such, Escobar filed his second application for bail.
He noted that Rolando's petition for bail was granted based on the unreliability of Cubillas'
testimony; that Cubillas could not explain how either Rolando or Escobar advised Villaver and that
both Rolando and Escobar were absent before, during, and after the kidnapping.

The RTC denied his second petition on the ground of res judicata. Upon elevating the case to the
CA, it overturned the decision. It upheld that it was not barred by res judicata, which applies only
if the former judgment is a final order or judgment and not an interlocutory order. An order
denying a petition for bail is interlocutory in nature.

On November 6, 2014, the prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Petition
for Review via Rule 45 before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S: Whether Manuel Escobar's second petition for bail is barred by res judicata?

RULING: In its literal meaning, res judicata refers to "a matter adjudged." This doctrine bars the
re-litigation of the same claim between the parties, also known as claim preclusion or bar by
former judgment. It likewise bars the re-litigation of the same issue on a different claim between
the same parties, also known as issue preclusion or conclusiveness of judgment. It exists as an
obvious rule of reason, justice, fairness, expediency, practical necessity, and public tranquillity.

In Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan, the Court held that the doctrine of res judicata is set forth in
Section 47 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

Escobar's Second Bail Petition is not barred by res judicata as this doctrine is not recognized in
criminal proceedings. Trinidad v. Marcelo declares that res judicata, as found in Rule 39
of the Rules of Civil Procedure, is a principle in civil law and has no bearing on criminal
proceedings. Rule 124, Section 18 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure states: Application of
certain rules in civil procedure to criminal cases. - The provisions of Rules 42, 44 to 46 and 48 to
56 relating to procedure in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court in original and appealed
civil cases shall be applied to criminal cases insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Rule.

Even assuming that this case allows for res judicata as applied in civil cases, Escobar's Second
Bail Petition cannot be barred as there is no final judgment on the merits.
Res judicata requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) The judgment sought to bar
the new action must be final; (2) The decision must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter; (3) The disposition of the case must be a
judgment on the merits; and (4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity of
parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.

Rule 45; Questions of fact

QUIRINO T. DELA CRUZ vs. NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, G.R. No. 215545,
January 07, 2019

FACTS: Sonny H. Villarias was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 after he
was arrested on October 13, 2001 for allegedly possessing two (2) firearms without permits.

On August 15, 2002, Villarias filed before the National Police Commission. He narrated that at
about 8pm, police officers awakened him namely: SPO4 Dela Cruz, PO1 Cantorna, and two others.
He said that he was poked by an armalite by SPO4 Dela Cruz, pulled him up, and frisked him
without any explanation. He was handcuffed and the police officers took most valuable fighting
cocks, a large plastic bag containing items from his house, two (2) air guns, and two (2) bolos.
Based on Villarias's Complaint, the National Police Commission filed a complaint against SPO4
Dela Cruz and PO2 Cantorna. Pending resolution of the administrative complaint against SPO4
Dela Cruz and PO2 Cantorna, Villarias was exonerated by the Regional Trial Court.

In its January 12, 2010 Decision, the National Police Commission declared SPO4 Dela Cruz and
PO2 Cantorna culpable of grave misconduct. SPO4 Dela Cruz filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
but it was denied in the National Police Commission. As such, SPO4 Dela Cruz filed before the
Civil Service Commission an Appeal but it was denied. SPO4 Dela Cruz then filed before the Court
of Appeals a Petition for Review, but it was dismissed for lack of merit. He moved for
reconsideration but was likewise denied.

Hence, SPO4 Dela Cruz filed before the Supreme Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether the petition shall be dismissed for raising questions of fact?

RULING:

Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a petition for review on certiorari shall only pertain to
questions of law. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals bind this Court. While several
exceptions to these rules were provided by jurisprudence, they must be alleged, substantiated,
and proved by the parties so this Court may evaluate and review the facts of the case.

Both of petitioner's arguments are questions of fact not proper for review in this case. The date
he received the assailed National Police Commission Resolution is a question of fact that was
resolved by the Civil Service Commission. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, the Civil Service
Commission might have resolved his motion for reconsideration differently, had petitioner
substantiated his claim with evidence that he received the National Police Commission Resolution
on January 4, 2011. Yet, petitioner failed to do so. It is not this Court's role to review the evidence
to resolve this question. Further, petitioner has not addressed the December 15, 2010 Resolution
of the National Police Commission, which found that his motion for reconsideration was filed out
of time. Thus, the January 12, 2010 Decision would have already attained finality when he failed
to timely seek its reconsideration, regardless of whether the December 15, 2010 Resolution was
received on January 4, 2011.

Similarly, whether there was sufficient evidence to find petitioner liable of grave misconduct is
also an evidentiary matter, which this Court will not look into. He claims that the judgment was
based on a misapprehension of facts to persuade this Court to review the case's factual questions.
However, he has failed to sufficiently substantiate this claim to convince this Court to look into
the evidence.

This Court notes that the findings of the National Police Commission were based on its
appreciation of testimony, together with the conclusions of the Regional Trial Court in its July 23,
2009 Decision, which, in turn, found that petitioner made an unlawful warrantless arrest. This
Court further notes that petitioner has neither denied nor explained the circumstances
surrounding Villarias's unlawful warrantless arrest.

Supported by substantial evidence, the National Police Commission Decision was properly
affirmed by the Civil Service Commission and the Court of Appeals. There is no cogent reason to
reverse their factual findings.

Finally, the relaxation of procedural rules is warranted only if compelling and justifiable reasons
exist. In Asia United Bank v. Goodland Company:

The relaxation or suspension of procedural rules or the exemption of a case from their
operation is warranted only by compelling reasons or when the purpose of justice requires
it.

As early as 1998, in Hon. Fortich v. Hon. Coronate expounded on these guiding principles:

Procedural rules, we must stress, should be treated with utmost respect and due regard
since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening
problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. The
requirement is in pursuance to the [B]ill of [R]ights inscribed in the Constitution which
guarantees that "all persons shall have a right to the speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies." The adjudicatory bodies and
the parties to a case are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While it is true that a
litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be
prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice. There have been some instances wherein this Court allowed a
relaxation in the application of the rules, but this flexibility was "never intended to forge
a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity." A liberal interpretation and
application of the rules of procedure can be resorted to only in proper cases and under
justifiable causes and circumstances.
This is not a case that calls for relaxation of the rules. This Court will not tolerate abuse of police
authority over civilians. Where a police officer has been shown to have committed atrocities
against a civilian, such as in this case, and is punished for his actions, he will find no relief in this
Court.

Provisional remedies; Injunction

SEC. HERMOGENES E. EBDANE, JR, AND METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT

AUTHORITY, REPRESENTED BY CHAIRMAN BAYANI F. FERNANDO v. CITY
ADVERTISING VENTURES CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY DEXTER Y. LIM, G.R. No.
182944, November 09, 2016

FACTS: On December 28, 2005, City Advertising Ventures Corporation entered into a lease
agreement with the MERALCO Financing Services Corporation for the use of 5,000 of Manila
Electric Company's (MERALCO) lampposts to display advertising banners. Under this contract,
City Advertising Ventures Corporation obtained sign permits from Quezon City's Department of
Engineering, Office of the Building Official, Signboard Permit Section. It obtained similar permits
for the cities of Pasay and Makati. City Advertising Ventures Corporation likewise obtained permits
for setting up pedestrian overpass banners in Quezon City.

When Typhoon Milenyo hit in September 2006, several billboards in Metro Manila were blown by
strong winds and fell. In its wake, Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, through Executive
Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, issued Administrative Order No. 16018 dated October 4, 2006
directing the Department of Public Works and Highways to conduct field investigations,
evaluations and assessments of all billboards and determine those that are hazardous and pose
imminent danger to life, health, safety and property of the general public and to abate and
dismantle the same.

Six (6) days later, on October 10, 2006, Administrative Order No. 160-A20 was issued,
supplementing Administrative Order No. 160 and specifying the legal grounds and procedures for
the prohibition and abatement of billboards and signboards constituting public nuisance or other
violations of law.

On October 6, 2006, the Department of Public Works and Highways announced that they would
start dismantling billboards. During its operations, it was able to remove 250 of City Advertising
Ventures Corporation's lamppost banners and frames, 12 pedestrian overpass banners, 17
pedestrian overpass frames, and 36 halogen lamps.

City Advertising Ventures Corporation then filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City its
Complaint for Violation of Administrative Order No. 160, Tort, and Injunction with Prayer for
[Temporary Restraining Order], Preliminary Injunction, and Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction" dated October 18, 2006.

After conducting summary hearings on October 25 and 30, 2006, the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City issued the Order dated October 31, 2006, granting City Advertising Ventures
Corporation's prayer for a temporary restraining order.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction was proper.
RULING:

A writ of preliminary injunction is issued in order to:

Prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their
claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status
quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully[.] Thus, it will be issued only upon a showing
of a clear and unmistakable right that is violated. Moreover, an urgent necessity for its issuance
must be shown by the applicant. (Emphasis supplied)

Rule 58, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure identifies the instances
when a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued:

Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction may

be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such
relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained
of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts either for a limited period or
perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained
of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do,
or is procuring or suffering to be done some act or acts probably in violation of the rights
of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render
the judgment ineffectual.

As Marquez v. Sanchez summarized, "the requisites of preliminary injunction whether

mandatory or prohibitory are the following":

1) the applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right, that is a right in esse;
(2) there is a material and substantial invasion of such right;
(3) there is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and
(4) no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of
irreparable injury.

Clearly, a writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary and interlocutory order issued as a

result of an impartial determination of the context of both parties. It entails a procedure for the
judge to assess whether the reliefs prayed for by the complainant will be rendered moot simply
as a result of the parties' having to go through the full requirements of a case being fully heard
on its merits. Although a trial court judge is given a latitude of discretion, he or she cannot grant
a writ of injunction if there is no clear legal right materially and substantially breached from
a prima facie evaluation of the evidence of the complainant. Even if this is present, the trial court
must satisfy itself that the injury to be suffered is irreparable.

Respondent satisfied the standards for the issuance of a writ of preliminary

injunction. The Regional Trial Court acted in keeping with these standards and did
not gravely abuse its discretion in extending temporary relief to respondent.
 There was no allegation nor contrary proof "[t]hat the ordinary course of business has
been followed." Respondent must have obtained the customary permits and clearances (e.g.,
Mayor's and business permits as well as registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission
and with the Bureau of Internal Revenue) necessary to make itself a going concern.

Respondent's lease agreement with MERALCO Financing Services Corporation and its
having secured permits from local government units, for the specific purpose of putting up
advertising banners and signages, gave it the right to put up such banners and signages.
Respondent had in its favor a property right, of which it cannot be deprived without due process.
This is respondent's right in esse, that is, an actual right. It is not merely a right in posse, or a
potential right.

Turning to the other requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, we find
that respondent adequately averred and showed a material and substantial invasion of its
ostensible right, for which the writ or preliminary injunction was necessary lest that invasion
persist and it be made to suffer irreparable injury.

As respondent pointed out, the filing of its Complaint was precipitated by the removal of
no less than 250 of its lamppost banners and frames, as well as 12 of its pedestrian overpass
banners, 17 pedestrian overpass frames, and 36 halogen lamps. All these were done in the span
of less than two (2) weeks. Petitioners do not dispute this. Moreover, nowhere does it appear
that petitioners intended to restrict themselves to these 250 lamppost banners and frames, 12
pedestrian overpass banners, 17 pedestrian overpass frames, and 36 halogen lamps. On the
contrary, their incessant attempts at having the Regional Trial Court's writ of preliminary
injunction lifted-first, on reconsideration at the Regional Trial Court itself; next, on certiorari and
prohibition, and later, on reconsideration at the Court of Appeals; then, on appeal before this
Court; and still later, on their June 15, 2010 Motion before this Court-are indicative of their sheer
resolve to dismantle more. Respondent was left with no justifiable recourse but to seek relief
from our courts.

Petitioners claim that Republic Act No. 8975's prohibition applies to their efforts to protect
the public's welfare by dismantling billboards.

Republic Act No. 8975 was enacted to "ensure the expeditious and efficient
implementation and completion of government infrastructure projects," specificalLy for the
purposes of "avoid[ing] unnecessary increase in construction, maintenance and/or repair costs
and to immediately enjoy the social and economic benefits therefrom."96 Its scope and aims are
clear.

Removing or dismantling billboards, banners, and signages cannot qualify as acts relating
to the implementation and completion of "government infrastructure projects," or of "national
government projects"97 within the contemplation of Republic Act No. 8975. They do not involve
the construction, operation, maintenance, repair, or rehabilitation of structures for public use.
Neither do they involve the acquisition, supply, or installation of equipment and materials relating
to such structures; nor the reduction of costs or the facilitation of public utility. What they entail
are preventive and even confiscatory mechanisms. Moreover, while it is also true that public
taking may be a prelude to the completion of facilities for public use (e.g., expropriation for
infrastructure projects), petitioners' removal and confiscation here do not serve that specific end.
Rather, they serve the overarching interest of public safety.

Petitioners prevented and threatened to prevent respondent from engaging in its cardinal
business activity. Their admitted actions and apparent inactions show that the well-defined due
process mechanisms outlined by Administrative Order No. 160 and 160-A were not followed.
Confronted with acts seemingly tantamount to deprivation of property without due process of
law, the Regional Trial Court acted well within its competence when it required petitioners to
temporarily desist, pending a more complete and circumspect estimation of the parties' rights.

Appeal; Interlocutory order

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY v. G & P BUILDERS, INCORPORATED,

SPOUSES ELPIDIO AND ROSE VIOLET PARAS, SPOUSES JESUS AND MA. CONSUELO
PARAS AND VICTORIA PARAS, G.R. No. 189509, November 23, 2015

Facts: On March 17, 2003, respondent G & P Builders, Incorporated (G & P) filed a Petition for
Rehabilitation.
Among the allegations in the Petition is that G & P "obtained a loan from Metrobank and
mortgaged twelve (12) parcels of land as collateral." G & P's loan obligation amounted to
P52,094,711.00 at the time of the filing of the Petition before the trial court. However, while the
rehabilitation proceedings were pending, Metrobank and G & P executed a Memorandum of
Agreement (first MOA) on August 11, 2003, where the parties agreed that four (4) out of the 12
parcels of land mortgaged would be released and sold. The trial court approved the first MOA as
a compromise agreement between parties.
G&P entered into compromise agreements with its other creditors as approved by the
rehabilitation court. Metrobank entered into a Loan Sale and Purchase Agreement with Elite Union
Investments Limited (Elite Union). Metrobank sold G&P’s loan account for P10,419,000.00.
The rehabilitation court granted G&P’s motion and ordered the release of unapplied deposit with
Metrobank. Metrobank moved for reconsideration of the court’s Order. However, the motion was
denied on October 10, 2007. Metrobank then filed before the CA a Petition for Review under Rule
43 of the Rules of Court assailing the April 2, 2007 and October 10, 2007 Orders of the
rehabilitation court.
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the April 2, 2007 Order of the rehabilitation court.
According to the Court of Appeals, G & P has no interest nor personality in asking for the release
of the deposit since the loan account was finally sold to Spouses Victor and Lani Paras.
The Court of Appeals also observed that the Petition should have been dismissed outright since
the assailed April 2, 2007 Order was a mere interlocutory order and could not be assailed through
a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

Issue: Whether or not the Orders of the trial court are interlocutory orders and, thus, not
appealable to the Court of Appeals via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Ruling: Yes. Petitioner's argument is devoid of merit. Under A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC, which provides
for the mode of appeal in cases involving corporate rehabilitation, all decisions and final orders
rendered by the trial court shall be appealed to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court:
 1. All decisions and final orders in cases falling under the Interim Rules of Corporate
Rehabilitation and the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate
Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799 shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals
through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

xxxxx

The court has laid down the test to determine whether an order is final or merely interlocutory:
"Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it
does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final." Interlocutory order refers to something between
the commencement and end of the suit which decides some point or matter but it is not the final
decision on the whole controversy." Conversely, a final order is one which leaves to the court
nothing more to do to resolve the case. . . .
In this case, the assailed orders of the trial court are interlocutory in nature. The orders pertained
to an incidental matter: entitlement to the P15,000,000.00 deposit as proceeds of the sale of
properties that secured respondent G & P's loan obligation. In contrast, the main proceeding
before the commercial court concerns the approval of the rehabilitation plan under the Interim
Rules. To resolve the merits of the case, the trial court, sitting as commercial court, must either
approve or disapprove the rehabilitation plan, depending on the feasibility of the proposed plan
to rehabilitate the corporation.
Petitioner committed a procedural error when it filed a Petition for Review before the Court of
Appeals instead of filing a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The
distinction is important because "the remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an
appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.” The reason behind the rule is to
prevent multiplicity of suits:
The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals
in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of the action
during the pendency of the appeals.
Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for a
considerable length of time and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for
one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him
and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court.
An interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been
rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being included in the appeal of the judgment
itself. Moreover, in contrast to a final judgment or order, an interlocutory order "may not be
questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the
final judgment rendered in the case."

Certiorari

HEIRS OF TEODORA LOYOLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND ALICIA R. LOYOLA, G.R. No.
188658, January 11, 2017

Facts: The Heirs of Teodora Loyola filed a Complaint for annulment of free patent and original
certificate of title, reconveyance of ownership and possession, and damages against respondent
Alicia Loyola (Alicia). The Heirs claimed that the property belonged to the parents of their mother,
Teodora Loyola (Teodora), who had been in possession of the property since time
immemorial. Teodora inherited the property from her parents upon their demise. In tum, when
Teodora died in 1939, the Heirs inherited it from her.

The Heirs insisted that they since maintained open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession until the present. However, Alicia was allegedly able to obtain Free Patent No. (III-
14) 001627 and Original Certificate of Title No. 1784 over the property through fraud and
misrepresentation. Alicia was the wife of their deceased cousin Gabriel Loyola (Gabriel), who was
given permission to use part of Teodora's property.

In her Answer, Alicia denied the allegations of fraud and illegality on the registration of the free
patent and issuance of the original certificate of title. She countered that the Complaint was
barred by laches and prescription as the free patent was registered as early as December 1985.

The Regional Trial Court did not rule on the merits. Instead, it dismissed the case without
prejudice for failure to implead an indispensable party. The trial court found that the successors
of one of the heirs, Guillermo Mendoza (Zosimo's deceased brother), were not impleaded as
party-plaintiffs.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it went beyond
the issue of dismissal and ruled on the sufficiency of petitioners' evidence before the
Regional Trial Court.
2. Whether or not petitioners were able to sufficiently establish their title or ownership over
the property.

Ruling:

1. Petitioners availed themselves of the wrong remedy. They should have filed a petition for
review under Rule 45 instead of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.

In Microsoft Corp. v. Best Deal Computer Center Corp.:

A special civil action for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is
manifested. For an abuse to be grave the power must be exercised in an arbitrary
or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of
law. There is grave abuse of discretion when respondent acts in a capricious or
whimsical manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.

Petitioner asserts that respondent trial court gravely abused its discretion in
denying its application for the issuance of an ex parte order. However, other than
this bare allegation, petitioner failed to point out specific instances where grave
abuse of discretion was allegedly committed ....
 Significantly, even assuming that the orders were erroneous, such error would
merely be deemed as an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari.
As long as the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or
it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment
which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal. The distinction is clear: A
petition for certiorari seeks to correct of jurisdiction while a petition for review
seeks to correct errors of judgment committed by the court. Errors of judgment
include errors of procedure or mistakes in the court's findings. Where a court has
jurisdiction over the person and subject matter, the decision on all other questions
arising in the case is an exercise of that jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors
committed in the exercise of such jurisdiction are merely errors of
judgment. Certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy designed for the correction of
errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. (Citations omitted)

Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion
when it went beyond the issue of dismissal of the Complaint and / touched on the factual
findings of the Regional Trial Court. They allege that respondent did not contest the trial
court's factual findings as she did not file an appellee's brief. They posit that the Court
of Appeals should have just ruled on the issue of dismissal alone.

The Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion in - dismissing
petitioners' Complaint. It had jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of the
case, and there is no showing that it whimsically or capriciously exercised this jurisdiction.
At most, it may have committed an error of procedure, as petitioners question its ruling
on the merits of the case and not just on the issue of dismissal for failure to implead
indispensable parties.

As petitioners fail to avail themselves of the proper remedy, the Petition ought to
be dismissed. Nonetheless, so as not to further delay the disposition of this case, this
Comi resolves the issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling on the merits of
the case and not just on the issue of dismissal for failure to implead indispensable parties.

As a general rule, only matters assigned as errors in the appeal may be resolved.
Rule 51, Section 8 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 8. Questions that May Be Decided - No error which does not affect the
jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from
or the proceedings therein will be considered unless stated in the assignment of
errors, or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued
in the brief, save as the court may pass upon plain errors and clerical errors.

In a number of cases that the appellate court is accorded a broad discretionary

power to waive the lack of proper assignment of errors and to consider errors not
assigned. It is clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are not assigned
as errors in the appeal. Inasmuch as the Court of Appeals may consider grounds other
than those touched upon in the decision of the trial court and uphold the same on the
basis of such other grounds, the Court of Appeals may, with no less authority, reverse the
 decision of the trial court on the basis of grounds other than those raised as errors on
appeal. We have applied this rule, as a matter of exception, in the following instances:

(1) Grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject
matter;
(2) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical
errors within contemplation of law;
(3) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is
necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or
to serve the interest of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice;
(4) Matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court
and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which
the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored;
(5) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error
assigned; and
(6) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of
a question properly assigned, is dependent. (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)

Thus, the Court of Appeals has the discretion to consider the issue and address
the matter where its n1ling is necessary (a) to arrive at a just and complete resolution of
the case; (b) to serve the interest of justice; or (c) to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice.
This is consistent with its authority to review the totality of the controversy brought on
appeal.

Petitioners' appeal primarily focused on the Regional Trial Court's dismissal of the
Complaint for failure to implead an indispensable party. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals
correctly ruled on whether petitioners were able to prove their claim. It had the discretion
to properly consider this separate issue in order to arrive at a complete resolution of the
case.

Ordinarily, this case should have been remanded to the Regional Trial Court to
make the proper factual determination. However, due to judicial economy, or "the goal to
have cases prosecuted with the least cost to the parties," the Court of Appeals correctly
reviewed the case in its entire context.

2. Petitioners insist that respondent has no rights over the land. They insist that she
committed fraud. According to petitioners, the Land - Registration Authority, the Register
of Deeds of Bataan, the PENRO, and the CENRO certified that the documents of
respondent's application could not be found in their respective offices. Petitioners posit
that these certifications show that respondent did not comply with the requirements for
the issuance of a free patent or title.

However, these certifications contain no explicit statement that respondent did not
comply with the requirements for patent application. What was certified, rather, was that
the requested documents were not to be found in their particular office. Some of these
certifications even refer to other offices where the documents may be found. There is no
categorical statement that the documents do not exist.
 Such certifications are not enough to prove respondent's alleged fraud and
irregularity. Fraud and irregularity are presupposed in an action for reconveyance of
property. The party seeking to recover the property must prove, by clear and convincing
evidence, that he or she is entitled to the property, and that the adverse party has
committed fraud in obtaining his or her title. Allegations of fraud are not
enough. "Intentional acts to deceive and deprive another of his right, or in some manner
injure him, must be specifically alleged and proved." In the absence of any proof, the
complaint for reconveyance cannot be granted.

Furthermore, we sustain the Court of Appeals' finding that petitioners failed to

adequately prove their claim over the property against respondent. The testimonies of
their witnesses and the tax declaration issued in 1948 without tax receipts are not
sufficient to overcome the presumption of validity of patents and titles as well as the
presumption of regularity of the performance of official duties of the government offices
responsible for the issuance.

There is no evidence of any anomaly or irregularity in the proceedings

that led to the registration of the land. Tax declarations and tax receipts "are
not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land, in the
absence of any other strong evidence to support them. . . . The tax receipts and
tax declarations are merely indicia of a claim of ownership."

Petitioners failed to show that Teodora Loyola is the only heir to the . property.
Testimonies revealed that she has a brother. Likewise, petitioners failed to show that they
are the only heirs of Teodora Loyola. Failing to prove their title over the property,
petitioners cannot rightfully claim that they have been fraudulently deprived
of the property.

Criminal procedure; Amendment of information

MAYOR "JONG" AMADO CORPUS, JR. AND CARLITO SAMONTE, v. HON. JUDGE RAMON
D. PAMULAR , G.R. No. 186403, September 05, 2018

FACTS: Angelito was shot by Samonte causing his death. Samonte was caught in flagrante delicto
and thereafter was arrested. After the inquest proceedings, an Information for murder dated June
5, 2008 was filed against him. Upon arraignment, Samonte admitted the killing but pleaded self-
defense. Bonifacio (Asst. Public Prosecutor) was not able to comply with the directive to personally
submit his resolution by January 22, 2009, prompting Florendo to order him to surrender the
records of the case as the latter was taking over the resolution of the case based on the evidence
presented by the parties. In his January 26, 2009 Resolution, Florendo found probable cause to
indict Corpus for Angelito's murder. He directed the filing of an amended information before the
Regional Trial Court.

Despite Florendo taking over the case, Bonifacio still issued a Review Resolution dated January
26, 2009, where he reinstated the Regional Trial Court October 7, 2008 Resolution and affirmed
the dismissal of the murder complaint against Corpus.
They averred that Judge Pamular's action was premature considering that the Motion to Amend
Information has yet to be scheduled for hearing. Moreover, Samonte was already arraigned.
However, despite the manifestation, Judge Pamular granted the motion to amend the information
and to admit the attached amended information. The assailed Order also directed, among others,
the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Corpus.

ISSUES: Whether or not Judge Pamular committed grave abuse of discretion when he conducted
further proceedings on the Amended Information and consequently issued a warrant of arrest
against petitioner Amado Corpus, Jr. despite the pendency of his and petitioner Carlito Samonte's
Petition for Review before the Department of Justice;

Ruling: Petitioners question the inclusion of Corpus and the insertion of the phrase "conspiring
and confederating together" in the amended information. They contend that Rule 110, Section
14 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibits substantial amendment of information
that is prejudicial to the rights of the accused after his or her arraignment.

Before an accused enters his or her plea, either formal or substantial

amendment of the complaint or information may be made without leave of court.
After an entry of plea, only a formal amendment can be made provided it is with leave
of court and it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, there
can be no substantial amendment except if it is beneficial to the accused.

Since only petitioner Samonte has been arraigned, only he can invoke this rule.
Petitioner Corpus cannot invoke this argument because he has not yet been
arraigned.

Once an accused is arraigned and enters his or her plea, Section 14 prohibits
any substantial amendment especially those that may prejudice his or her rights. One
of these rights includes the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusations against him or her, which is given life during
arraignment.

Arraignment is necessary to bring an accused in court and in notifying him or her of the
cause and accusations against him or her. "Procedural due process requires that the accused be
arraigned so that he [or she] may be informed of the reason for his [or her] indictment, the
specific charges he [or she] is bound to face, and the corresponding penalty that could be possibly
meted against him [or her]."

It is during arraignment that an accused is given the chance to know the particular charge
against him or her for the first time. There can be no substantial amendment after plea because
it is expected that the accused will collate his or her defenses based on the contents of the
information. "The theory in law is that since the accused officially begins to prepare his [or her]
defense against the accusation on the basis of the recitals in the information read to him [or her]
during arraignment, then the prosecution must establish its case on the basis of the same
information." Aside from violating the accused's right to due process, any substantial amendment
in the information will burden the accused in preparing for his or her defense.
 In a criminal case, due process entails, among others, that the accusation must be in due
form and that the accused is given the opportunity to answer the charges against him or her.
There is a need for the accused to be supplied with the necessary information as to "why he [or
she] is being proceeded against and not be left in the unenviable state of speculating why he [or
she] is made the object of a prosecution, it being the fact that, in criminal cases, the liberty, even
the life, of the accused is at stake."

Any amendment to an information which only states with precision something which has
already been included in the original information, and therefore, adds nothing crucial for
conviction of the crime charged is only a formal amendment that can be made at anytime. It
does not alter the nature of the crime, affect the essence of the offense, surprise, or divest the
accused of an opportunity to meet the new accusation.

On the other hand, "[a] substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court."

The facts alleged in the accusatory part of the amended information are similar to that of
the original information except as to the inclusion of Corpus as Samonte's coaccused and the
insertion of the phrase "conspiring and confederating together." The allegation of conspiracy does
not alter the basic theory of the prosecution that Samonte willfully and intentionally shot Angelito.
Hence, the amendment is merely formal.

The records of this present case show that the original information for murder against
Samonte was dated June 5, 2008. Based on Lozano's affidavit dated on June 30, 2008, Corpus
was implicated as the one who instructed Samonte to kill Angelito. This prompted the prosecution
to conduct a reinvestigation, which resulted in the filing of the amended information.

Petitioners quote the portion of People v. Montenegro that cited the case of People v.
Zulueta as their basis for asserting that the allegation of conspiracy is a substantial amendment
because it warrants a new defense for the accused. However, Zulueta is inapplicable. In that
case, this Court declined the admission of the amended information because it would change the
nature of the crime as well as the prosecution's theory.

Additionally, Montenegro is also inapplicable in this case because the amendment to the
information in that case was considered as substantial due to the effect of changing the original
crime charged from Robbery under Article 209 to Robbery in an Uninhabited Place under Article
302 of the Revised Penal Code. With this, the accused were exposed to a charge with a higher
imposable penalty than that of the original charge to which they pleaded "not guilty."

It is undisputed that upon arraignment under the original information, Samonte admitted
the killing but pleaded self-defense. While conspiracy is merely a formal amendment, Samonte
will be prejudiced if the amendment will be allowed after his plea. Applying the test, his defense
and corresponding evidence will not be compatible with the allegation of conspiracy in the new
information. Therefore, such formal amendment after plea is not allowed.

Soliven v. Makasiar provided that as dictated by sound policy, an issuing judge is not
required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses as long as he or she has
satisfied himself or herself of the existence of probable cause. To rule otherwise would unduly
burden judges with preliminary examination of criminal complaints instead of attending to more
important matters. However, due to recent developments in the legal system which include the
judicial affidavit rule, the evil sought to be prevented in Soliven does not exist anymore. To
minimize the time required for completing testimonies of witnesses in litigated cases, this Court
approved the use of judicial affidavits in lieu of witnesses' direct testimonies. Thus, this is more
in tune with the Constitutional mandate by lessening the burden imposed upon judges by
expediting litigation of cases for them to attend to their exclusive and personal responsibility of
satisfying themselves with the existence of probable cause when issuing a warrant.

Rule 112, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

It is required for the judge to "personally evaluate the resolution of the

prosecutor and its supporting evidence." In case the evidence on record fails to
substantiate probable cause, the trial judge may instantly dismiss the case.

The records of this case reveal that the February 26, 2009 Order presented a discussion
showing both the factual and legal circumstances of the case from the filing of the original
information until the filing of the Motion to Amend Information. Respondent Judge Pamular,
therefore, is familiar with the incidents of this case, which were his basis for issuing the warrant.
Thus, before he issued the assailed Order and warrant, a hearing was conducted on February 13,
2009 regarding the motions and manifestations filed in the case.

Judge Pamular has a working knowledge of the circumstances regarding the amended
information that constrained him to find probable cause in issuing the warrant. The pertinent
portion of the Order provided:

Elementary is the rule that the existence of probable cause is

indispensable in the filing of complaint or information and in the issuance of
warrant of arrest. The legion of jurisprudence has defined probable cause to be concerned
with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The
prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. The standards
of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man and not the exacting calibrations of
a judge after a full blown trial. No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific
kind of evidence. It is determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a given situation.

Apart from respondent judge's personal examination of the amended information and
supporting documents, the hearing conducted on February 13, 2009 enabled him to find probable
cause prompting him to issue the warrant of arrest.

On finding probable cause

Two (2) kinds of determination of probable cause exist: executive and judicial.
These two (2) kinds of determination of probable cause were distinguished in People v. Castillo:

There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial.
The executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary
investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given
a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom
 he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for
trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether
or not a criminal case must be Bled in court. Whether or not that function has been
correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct
ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court
itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by
the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused.
The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity
for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the
judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.
[T]he public prosecutor exercises a wide latitude of discretion in determining
whether a criminal case should be Bled in court, and that courts must respect the exercise
of such discretion when the information Bled against the person charged is valid on its
face, and that no manifest error or grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the public
prosecutor.

Thus, courts do not meddle with the prosecutor's conduct of a preliminary

investigation because it is exclusively within the prosecutor's discretion. However,
once the information is already filed in court, the court has acquired jurisdiction of
the case. Any motion to dismiss or determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused is
within its discretion.

Crespo v. Mogul provided:

The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court
thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case.
When after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is
issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the Court or was
duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining
whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon
the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said
information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find
it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must
be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be
submitted to the Court for appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial
discretion to determine whether a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had
already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the
case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. The only qualification is
that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of
the People to due process of law.

Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a
reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss
was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or
deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.
 However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the motion to dismiss filed by
the fiscal upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice will there not be a vacuum in the
prosecution? A state prosecutor to handle the case cannot possibl[y be] designated by the
Secretary of Justice who does not believe that there is a basis for prosecution nor can the fiscal
be expected to handle the prosecution of the case thereby defying the superior order of the
Secretary of Justice.

The answer is simple. The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to see that
justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before the
Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the
presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own
independent judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal
should not shirk from the responsibility of appearing for the People of the Philippines even under
such circumstances much less should he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to the
hands of a private prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be null and void. The least that
the fiscal should do is to continue to appear for the prosecution although he may turn over the
presentation of the evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his direction and control.

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in
Court any disposition of the case as [to] its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused
rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of
the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his
opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before
it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to
dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant
or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused
or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice
who reviewed the records of the investigation.

Appeals

LUZ ANATOLIA E. CRISPINO, CARIDAD O. ECHAVES REESE AND ZENAIDA ECHAVES

REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN- FACT, REUBEN CAPILI ECHAVES VS.
ANATOLIA TANSAY AS SUBSTITUTED BY LILIAN YAP, G.R No. 184466, December 5,
2016

Facts: Anatolia, now deceased, was twice widowed. In 1947, Anatolia established her residence
in Oroquieta. There, she met 20-year old Zenaida who was then single. Anatolia took in Zenaida
and treated her as her own child.

Subsequently, Anatolia and Zenaida moved to Cebu City, where Anatolia acquired a 3,107 sq. m.
parcel of land (Lot No. 1048) known as the Tansay Compound. Anatolia subdivided the compound
into three lots.
In 1991, Zenaida returned from abroad and discovered that the titles of the lots were missing
from her room where she had left them. Hence, she filed a petition before the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City for reconstitution of the certificates of title, which was granted.
Meanwhile, Anatolia filed an action for Revocation of Trust, Declaration of Nullity of Transfer, and
Cancellation of Title. Based on the evidence on record, the trial court found that Zenaida, Luz
Anatolia, and Caridad did not pay any monetary or other valuable consideration for the transfer
of the properties in their names. Hence, the deeds of sale could not have been valid.
Zenaida, Luz Anatolia, and Caridad appealed the Decision before the Court of Appeals. During the
pendency of the appeal, Anatolia died. On August 16, 2001, Zenaida, Luz Anatolia, and Caridad
filed an Urgent Motion to Remand Records of the Case for the Re-Opening of Trial. They anchored
their motion on an Affidavit allegedly executed by Anatolia after the Regional Trial Court had
rendered its Decision.
The CA denied the motion and the appellate court considered the same as a motion for new trial
based on newly discovered evidence under Rule 53 of the Rules of Court and ruled that the
Confirmation of Previous Sales was "not the kind of newly discovered evidence contemplated by
the Rules that would warrant a new trial." The CA also rendered a Decision, which affirmed the
Regional Trial Court's Decision in toto.
Issues:
1) Whether an interlocutory order may be assailed in an appeal of the appellate court's
Decision. (NO)
2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in treating petitioners' motion to remand as a motion
for new trial under Rule 53 of the Rules of Court. (NO)
3) Whether the Court of Appeals' power to grant new trials is limited to motions based on
newly discovered evidence. (YES)
Ruling:
1.) NO. The remedy against an interlocutory order is not appeal but a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The reason for the prohibition is to prevent multiple
appeals in a single action that would unnecessarily cause delay during trial. In Rudecon v.
Singson:
The rule is founded on considerations of orderly procedure, to forestall useless appeals and avoid
undue inconvenience to the appealing party by having to assail orders as they are promulgated
by the court, when all such orders may be contested in a single appeal.
A final judgment or order, from which an appeal may be taken, is one that finally disposes of the
case and leaves nothing more to be done by the court (e.g. an adjudication on the merits of the
case on the basis of the evidence). In contrast, an interlocutory order is one that merely resolves
incidental matters and does not finally dispose of the case. When an interlocutory order is issued,
the court is still tasked with adjudicating on the merits of the case.
Faced with an interlocutory order, parties may instantly avail of the special civil action of certiorari.
This would entail compliance with the strict requirements under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Aggrieved parties would have to prove that the order was issued without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and that
there is neither appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
This notwithstanding, a special civil action for certiorari is not the only remedy that aggrieved
parties may take against an interlocutory order, since an interlocutory order may be appealed in
an appeal of the judgment itself. In Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals it was held:
Unlike a "final" judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an "interlocutory"
order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually' be
taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.
The Court of Appeals' Resolution dated July 25, 2006, which denied petitioners' motion to remand,
was an interlocutory order. It did not finally dispose of the case because the appellate court still
had to determine whether the deeds of sale executed by Anatolia were valid. Rather than availing
of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari under Rule 65, petitioners opted to wait for the Court of
Appeals to render its decision before challenging the July 25, 2006 Resolution.

2.) NO. this Court finds that the Court of Appeals correctly treated petitioners' motion to remand
as a motion for new trial under Rule 53 of the Rules of Court.
Essentially, petitioners sought the introduction of evidence pursuant to the Court of Appeals'
expanded power under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended which expresses that:
The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive
evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling
within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including 'the power to grant and conduct new trials
or further proceedings.
These provisions shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor
Code of the Philippines and by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals
Subsequently, Republic Act No. 7902[74] amended Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129:
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,
habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or
not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgment of
Regional Trial Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees
Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with
the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree
No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the
third paragraph and subparagraph
(4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence
and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its
original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further
proceedings. Trials or hearings in the Court of Appeals must be continuous and must be
completed within three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice.
Clearly, the Court of Appeals, pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction under Section 9 or Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, is empowered to receive evidence to resolve factual issues
raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction. However, Section 9 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, should be read and construed together with the Court of
Appeals' internal rules.
Thus, in Republic v. Mupas the Court held that the power of the Court of Appeals to receive
evidence is qualified by its internal rules:
Under Section 3, Rule 6 of the Internal ,Rules of the CA, the CA may receive evidence in the
following cases:
(a) In actions falling within its original jurisdiction, such as (1) certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, (2) annulment of judgment or final order, (3) quo
warranto, (4) habeas corpus, (5) amparo, (6) habeas data, (7) anti money
laundering, and (8) application for judicial authorization under the Human
Security Act of 2007;
(b) In appeals in civil cases where the Court grants a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence, pursuant to Sec. 12, Rule 53 of the Rules of Court;
(c) In appeals in criminal cases where the Court grants a new trial on the ground
of newly discovered evidence, pursuant to Sec. 12, Rule 124 of the rules of Court;
and
(d) In appeals involving claims for damages arising from provisional remedies.

3.) YES. The Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals enumerates instances when the Court of
Appeals may receive evidence depending on the nature of the case filed.
In a special civil action for certiorari, which is an action falling within the Court of Appeals' original
jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals has "ample authority to make its own factual determination"
and may receive evidence for this purpose. In Maralit v. Philippine National Bank:
In a special civil action for certiorari, the Court of Appeals has ample authority to receive new
evidence and perform any act necessary to resolve factual issues. Section 9 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, as amended, states that, "The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and
conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual
issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to
grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.”
Thus, the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals provide:
SECTION 3. Power of the Court to Receive Evidence. – The Court may receive
evidence in the following cases:
(a) In actions falling within its original jurisdiction, such as: (1) certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus under Rules 46 and 65 of the Rules of Court; (2)
annulment of judgment or final order; (3) quo warranto; (4) habeas corpus; (5)
amparo; (6) habeas data; (7) anti-money laundering and (8) application for
judicial authorization under the Human Security Act of 2007. (Emphasis
supplied)
As may be gleaned from above, in actions falling within the original jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals, such as a special civil action for certiorari, the Court of Appeals' power to receive
evidence is unqualified. This does not hold true with respect to appeals in civil cases, criminal
cases, as well as appeals involving claims for damages.
In this case, petitioners filed an ordinary appeal from the Regional Trial Court's Decision dated
February 16, 1996. At the time the Court of Appeals ruled on petitioners' motion to remand,[82]
the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals was in effect:
SECTION 3. Power of the Court to Receive Evidence. - The Court may receive evidence in the
following cases:
(a) In actions falling within its original jurisdiction, such as: (1) certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus under Rules 46 and 65 of the Rules of Court; (2)
action for annulment of judgment or final order under Rule 46 of the Rules of
Court; (3) quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court; (4) habeas corpus
under Sections 2 and 12, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court;
(b) In appeals in civil cases where the court grants a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 53 of the Rules of Court;
(c) In appeals in criminal cases where the court grants a new trial on the ground
of newly discovered evidence pursuant to Section 12, Rule 124 of the Rules of
Court; and
(d) In appeals involving claims for: damages arising from provisional remedies.
Although the Court of Appeals has the power to receive evidence pursuant to its expanded powers
under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, this power is not without limit. The Court of Appeals
cannot simply accept additional evidence from the parties. If the interpretation were otherwise,
then there would be no end to litigation.
Hence, in appeals in civil cases, the Court of Appeals may only receive evidence when it grants a
new trial based on newly discovered evidence.
This notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals cannot accept any kind of evidence in a motion for
new trial. A motion for new trial under Rule 53 is limited to newly discovered evidence:
SECTION 1. Period for filing; ground. – At any time after the appeal from the lower court has
been perfected and before the Court of Appeals loses jurisdiction over the case, a party may file
a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence which could not have been
discovered prior to the trial in the court below by the exercise of due diligence and which is of
such character as would probably change the result. The motion shall be accompanied by
affidavits showing the facts constituting the grounds therefor and the newly discovered evidence.
The document petitioners seek to present before the appellate court does not fall under the
concept of newly discovered evidence.
Newly discovered evidence has a specific meaning under the law. Under Rule 53 of the Rules of
Court, the following criteria must be satisfied for evidence to be considered newly discovered: (a)
the evidence could not have been discovered prior to the trial in the court below by exercise of
due diligence; and (2) it is of such character as would probably change the result.
The document denominated as Confirmation of Previous Sales was allegedly executed on January
15, 1998, three years after the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision. Hence, it could not
have been discovered by petitioners prior to trial by the exercise of due diligence.
However, the document is not of such character that would probably change the lower court's
judgment. The nature of the deeds of sale executed would not have been affected even if the
Confirmation of Previous Sales was admitted in evidence since the validity of a contract is
determined by law and not by the stipulation of the parties. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals
can determine whether the deeds of sale were valid independent of said document. Thus, the
Court of Appeals correctly denied petitioners' motion to have the Confirmation of Previous Sales
admitted in evidence.

Indirect contempt

BRO. BERNARD OCA, BRO. DENNIS MAGBANUA, CIRILA N. MOJICA, ALEJANDRO N.

MOJICA, JOSEFINA PASCUAL, SILVESTRE PASCUAL AND ST. FRANCIS SCHOOL OF
GENERAL TRIAS, CAVITE, INC. v. LAURITA CUSTODIO, G.R. No. 199825, July 26, 2017

Facts: To formalize the relationship between the De La Salle Greenhills (DLSG) and the St. Francis
School, a MOA was executed. This agreement permitted DLSG to exercise supervisory powers
over the School’s academic affairs. Pursuant to the terms of the MOA, DLSG appointed supervisors
who sit in the meetings of the Board of Trustees without any voting rights. The first such
supervisor was Bro. Victor Franco. Later on, Bro. Franco also became a member of the Board of
Trustees and President of the School. Then, on September 8, 1998, petitioner Bro. Bernard Oca
joined Bro. Franco as DLSG supervisor. In a while, Bro. Oca also served as a member of the Board
of Trustees and President of the School. Bro. Dennis Magbanua also joined Bro. Franco and Bro.
Oca as DLSG supervisor and also as a Treasurer of the School.
Petitioners declare that the membership of the DLSG Brothers in the Board of Trustee[s] as its
officers was valid since an election was conducted to that effect.
On the other hand, Custodio challenges the validity of the membership of the DLSG Brothers and
their purported election as officers of the School. The legality of the membership and election of
the DLSG Brothers is the main issue of the case in the lower court.
CUSTODIO’S CONTENTION:
The composition of the membership of the School had no basis since there was no formal
admission as members nor an election of officers. Custodio contends that while Pascual and
Mojica remained to be Members and Trustees of the School, upon retirement, they stopped
reporting for work. Mr. Al Mojica, son of Mrs. Mojica, who was then the school cashier, also
stopped reporting for work. Thus, Custodio avers that being the only remaining Administrator,
she served as the Over-all Director of the School. Being the Over-all Director, Custodio made
appointments to fill in the vacuum created by the sudden retirement of Pascual and Mojica. Hence,
she appointed Mr. Joseph Custodio as OIC both for Finance and PRD and [Ms. Herminia] Reynante
as Cashier.
PETITIONERS’ CONTENTION:
Custodio admitted to having opened an account with the Luzon Development Bank in her own
name for the alleged purpose of depositing funds for and in behalf of the School. Petitioners
alleged that a directive was issued for the immediate closing of this account. Still, Custodio refused
to close such account. due to the repeated refusal of Custodio to close the account she opened
in her own name with the Luzon Development Bank, the Board of Trustees, in a meeting held on
March 7, 2002, approved a resolution to file a case against the latter. Consequently, the Board of
Trustees also approved resolutions to the effect that Custodio, Mr. Joseph Custodio and Reynante
be stopped from performing their functions in the School.
PRESENT CASE:
As Custodio was removed from her post, she filed a Complaint with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Preliminary Injunction against petitioners again assailing the legality of the membership of the
Board of Trustees of St. Francis School.
Issues: Whether or not petitioners are guilty of indirect contempt.
Ruling: The Court ruled that petitioners Oca, Magbanua, Cirila, and Josefina are guilty of indirect
contempt. There is a contumacious refusal on their part to comply with the RTC Orders. Contempt
of court is willful disobedience to the court and disregard or defiance of its authority, justice, and
dignity.It constitutes conduct which "tends to bring the authority of the court and the
administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of
justice" or "interfere with or prejudice parties’ litigant or their witnesses during litigation."
There are two (2) types of contempt of court: (i) direct contempt and (ii) indirect contempt. Direct
contempt consists of "misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt
the proceedings before [it]." It includes: (i) disrespect to the court, (ii) offensive behavior against
others, (iii) refusal, despite being lawfully required, to be sworn in or to answer as a witness, or
to subscribe an affidavit or deposition. It can be punished summarily without a hearing.
Indirect contempt is committed through any of the acts enumerated under Rule 71, Section 3 of
the Rules of Court. (a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his [or her]
official duties or in his [or her] official transactions; (b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful
writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being
dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of
competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real
property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs
the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto; (c) Any abuse of or any
unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct
contempt under Section 1 of this Rule; (d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly,
to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice; (e) Assuming to be an attorney or
an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority; (f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly
served; (g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer
by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him [or her].
Indirect contempt is only punished after a written petition is filed and an opportunity to be heard
is given to the party charged. In the case at bar, petitioners were charged with indirect contempt
through "disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court."
The RTC’s orders were clear that not only the marticulation fees should be turn over but all the
fees collected but the petitioners were still not able to comply rather they Manifestation,
Observation, Compliance, Exception and Motion which was denied by the RTC and reiterated their
previous order to be complied which was refused by the petitioners. As Custodio filed a petition
to cite in contempt the petitioners instead of complying with the previous orders, they instead
argued in the contempt proceedings. All these acts show petitioners' contumacious refusal to
abide by the orders of the trial court. Again, the trial court did not exclude any other kind of
money in its October 21, 2002, March 24, 2003, and August 5, 2003 Orders, all of which directed
petitioners to turn over all monies.
Petitioners argue that contempt proceedings are similar to criminal proceedings, and thus, there
must be proof beyond reasonable doubt of their guilt. The punishment for contempt is
classified into two (2): civil contempt and criminal contempt. Civil contempt is
committed when a party fails to comply with an order of a court or judge "for the
benefit of the other party." A criminal contempt is committed when a party acts
against the court's authority and dignity or commits a forbidden act tending to
disrespect the court or judge. This stems from the two (2)-fold aspect of contempt
which seeks: (i) to punish the party for disrespecting the court or its orders; and (ii)
to compel the party to do an act or duty which it refuses to perform. The difference
between civil contempt and criminal contempt was further elaborated in People v.
Godoy: It has been said that the real character of the proceedings is to be determined
by the relief sought, or the dominant purpose, and the proceedings are to be regarded
as criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment, and civil when the purpose is
primarily compensatory or remedial. While the nature of the punishment imposed is
a mixture of both criminal and civil, the contempt proceeding in this case is more civil
than criminal. The purpose of the filing and the nature of the contempt proceeding
show that Custodio was seeking enforcement of the trial court orders in the intra-
corporate controversy because petitioners refused to comply.
Hence, this is a civil contempt case, which does not need proof beyond reasonable
doubt. The Court finds that it was sufficiently proven that there was willful disobedience on the
part of petitioners. Therefore, petitioners ought to be cited in contempt. The Court rules that the
charges against Alejandro and Atty. Silvestre ought to be dismissed. While they were not parties
to SEC Case No. 024-02, the trial court ruled that they were guilty of indirect contempt. In Ferrer
v. Rodriguez, the Court ruled that a non-litigant may be cited in contempt if he or she acted in
conspiracy with the parties in violating the court order: Nevertheless, persons who are not parties
in a proceeding may be declared guilty of contempt for willful violation of an order issued in the
case if said persons are guilty of conspiracy with any of the parties in violating the court's order.
However, there is no evidence of conspiracy in this case. The power to punish contempt must be
"exercised cautiously, sparingly, and judiciously." Without evidence of conspiracy, it cannot be
said that the non-litigants are guilty of contempt.
The Court finds that there is no sufficient evidence of conspiracy to hold both Alejandro and Atty.
Silvestre liable for contempt. Although Alejandro collected marticulation fees, he doesn’t have
authority to order how it would be kept or disposed and moreover it was turnover to Reynante.
Atty. Silvestre was indeed a member of the Board of Trustees but the decisions of BOT was not
subject to the control of one man. Thus, it is not correct to say that a board member is empowered
to cause compliance of the trial court orders. The burden of proving contempt is upon
complainants and there is no presumption of guilt in contempt proceedings such that the party
accused of contempt must prove that he is innocent.

Civil procedure; Deposition

INGRID SALA SANTAMARIA and ASTRID SALA BOZA vs. THOMAS CLEARY, G.R. No.
197122, June 15, 2016
Facts: Thomas Cleary, an American citizen with office address in California, filed a Complaint for
specific performance and damages against Miranila Land Development Corporation. The
Complaint involved shares of stock of Miranila, for which Cleary paid US$191,250.00. Paragraph
9.02 of the Agreement provides:

Any suit, action or proceeding with respect to this Agreement may be brought in (a) the
courts of the State of California, (b) the United States District Court for the Central District
of California, or (c) the courts of the country of Corporation's incorporation, as Cleary may
elect in his sole discretion, and the Parties hereby submit to any such suit, action
proceeding or judgment and waives any other preferential jurisdiction by reason of
domicile.

Cleary elected to file the case in Cebu.

Santamaria, Boza, and Go-Perez filed their respective Answers with Compulsory
Counterclaims. The trial court then issued a notice of pre-trial conference. In his pre-trial brief,
Cleary stipulated that he would testify "in support of the allegations of his complaint, either on
the witness stand or by oral deposition." Moreover, he expressed his intent in availing himself "of
the modes of discovery under the rules."

Cleary moved for court authorization to take deposition. He prayed that his deposition be
taken before the Consulate-General of the Philippines in Los Angeles and be used as his direct
testimony.

Santamaria and Boza opposed the Motion and argued that the right to take deposition is
not absolute. They claimed that Cleary chose the Philippine system to file his suit, and yet he
deprived the court and the parties the opportunity to observe his demeanor and directly propound
questions on him.

Go-Perez filed a separate Opposition, arguing that the oral deposition was not intended
for discovery purposes if Cleary deposed himself as plaintiff. Since he elected to file suit in the
Philippines, he should submit himself to the procedures and testify before the RTC of Cebu.
Moreover, Go-Perez argued that oral deposition in the United States would prejudice, vex, and
oppress her and her co-petitioners who would need to incur costs to attend.

The trial court denied Cleary's Motion for Court Authorization to Take Deposition in the
Order dated June 5, 2009. It held that depositions are not meant to be a substitute for actual
testimony in open court. As a rule, a deponent must be presented for oral examination at trial as
required under Rule 132, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. "As the supposed deponent is the plaintiff
himself who is not suffering from any impairment, physical or otherwise, it would be best for him
to appear in court and testify under oath." The trial court also denied reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in granting the Petition for Certiorari and
reversing the trial court’s denial of respondent’s Motion for Court Authorization to Take
Deposition.
Ruling: As regards the taking of depositions, Rule 23, Section 1 is clear that the testimony of any
person may be taken by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories at the instance
of any party. San Luis explained that this provision "does not make any distinction or restriction
as to who can avail of deposition." Thus, this Court found it immaterial that the plaintiff was a
non-resident foreign corporation and that all its witnesses were Americans residing in the United
States.

Jurisprudence has discussed how "under the concept adopted by the new Rules, the
deposition serves the double function of a method of discovery — with use on trial not necessarily
contemplated — and a method of presenting testimony." The taking of depositions has been
allowed as a departure from open-court testimony. Jonathan Landoil International Co., Inc. v.
Spouses Mangundadatu is instructive:
The Rules of Court and jurisprudence, however, do not restrict a
deposition to the sole function of being a mode of discovery before trial. Under
certain conditions and for certain limited purposes, it may be taken even after
trial has commenced and may be used without the deponent being actually
called to the witness stand. In Dasmariñas Garments v. Reyes, we allowed the
taking of the witnesses' testimonies through deposition, in lieu of their actual
presence at the trial.
Thus, "depositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any
action, whenever necessary or convenient." There is no rule that limits
deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition
against the taking of depositions after pre-trial." There can be no valid
objection to allowing them during the process of executing final and executory
judgments, when the material issues of fact have become numerous or
complicated.
In keeping with the principle of promoting the just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding, depositions are
allowed as a "departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of
examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed
by the trial judge." Depositions are allowed, provided they are taken in
accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court (that is, with leave of
court if the summons have been served, without leave of court if an answer
has been submitted); and provided, further, that a circumstance for their
admissibility exists.

Provisional remedies; Preliminary injunction

PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE, VS. HON. MAXIMO M. DE LEON,

PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE MAKATI CITY REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 143, AND
PHILIPPINE GAMING AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
G.R. Nos. 236577 and 236597, August 15, 2018

FACTS: The original contract between PCSO and respondent Philippine Gaming and Management
Corporation is the Equipment Lease Agreement with a term of eight (8) years-from 1995 to 2003.
On November 14, 1997, the Equipment Lease Agreement was amended to extend the term until
2007. The parties executed the Amendments to Equipment Lease Agreement on December 29,
2004, which extended the term of the lease to another eight (8) years-from August 23, 2007 to
August 22, 2015.
On December 11, 2013, while the Amendments to Equipment Lease Agreement was still in effect,
PCSO and respondent Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation entered into an Interim
Settlement and agreed to bring the exclusivity issue before an arbitral tribunal. Thus, on March
12, 2014, respondent Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation initiated the arbitration
before the International Chamber of Commerce.

While the arbitration case was pending, PCSO and respondent Philippine Gaming and
Management Corporation executed a Supplemental and Status Quo Agreement, extending the
term of the Equipment Lease Agreement to another three (3) years "to ensure unhampered lotto
operation."

Since the extended Equipment Lease Agreement between PCSO and respondent Philippine
Gaming and Management Corporation was about to expire in August 2018, PCSO started
preparing for the bidding of the Nationwide On-line Lottery System, which would have a term of
five (5) years-from August 2018 to August 2023. Claiming that it is "the exclusive supplier/lessor
of lottery equipment for Luzon," respondent Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation
applied for a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction on July 11, 2017. It
sought to enjoin PCSO from further proceeding with the bidding process.

Respondent judge De Leon issued the writ. PCSO went to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Presiding Judge Maximo M. De Leon committed grave abuse
of discretion when he granted respondent Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation's
application for injunctive relief.

RULING: This Court finds that the Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion in
granting respondent Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation's application for injunctive
relief.
A Writ of Preliminary Injunction is issued "to prevent threatened or continuous
irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and
adjudicated."
In Mabayo Farms, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to final

judgment, requiring a person to refrain from a particular act. As an ancillary or preventive
remedy, a writ of preliminary injunction may therefore be resorted to by a party to protect
or preserve his rights and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action.
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

The issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is governed by Rule 58, Section 3 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary
injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in
requiring performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of
during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or

(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.

In Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) v. City Advertising Ventures

Corporation, this Court held that "[f]or a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the applicant
must show, by prima facie evidence, an existing right before trial, a material and substantial
invasion of this right, and that a writ of preliminary injunction is necessary to prevent irreparable
injury."
Respondent Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation's claim of exclusive rights,
as stated in the Interim Settlement and which was brought to arbitration, pertained to its rights
under the Amendments to Equipment Lease Agreement, which will expire on August 21, 2018. It
failed to provide proof that the Amendments to Equipment Lease Agreement was extended
beyond August 21, 2018. It cannot claim that it has alleged exclusive rights to be protected and
that it will suffer irreparable injury if petitioner continued with the Nationwide On-line Lottery
System bidding process. This is precisely because the bidding was for the next supplier of the
Nationwide On-line Lottery System for a period of five (5) years after August 21, 2018 or
commencing on August 22, 2018.
Additionally, with the Regional Trial Court's confirmation of the arbitral tribunal's Final
Award, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction is deemed lifted and petitioner may now proceed with
the bidding process of the Nationwide Online Lottery System for Luzon.

Civil procedure; Failure to state a cause of action

MIGUEL "LUCKY" GUILLERMO and AV MANILA CREATIVE PRODUCTION CO. vs.

PHILIPPINE INFORMATION AGENCY and DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
HIGHWAYS, G.R. No. 223751, March 15, 2017

Facts: Guillermo filed a Complaint for a sum of money and damages before the Regional Trial
Court of Marikina City. They alleged that in the last few months of the Administration of Former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo Administration), then Acting Secretary of the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Victor Domingo (Acting Secretary Domingo),
consulted and discussed with Guillermo and AV Manila the urgent need for an advocacy campaign
(Campaign) to counteract the public's negative perception of the performance of the outgoing
Arroyo Administration.

After meetings, Guillermo and AV Manila formally submitted in a letter-proposal the concept of
"Joyride," a documentary film showcasing milestones of the Arroyo Administration. Acting
Secretary Domingo signed it with a comment indicating "OK, proceed!"

Guillermo and AV Manila further claimed that communications and meetings on the Campaign
and "Joyride" ensued between them and various government agencies. These covered
instructions from government agencies, emphasis on the proprietary nature of "Joyride," and
discussions on the terms of reference, deliverables, and submissions.
Petitioners further alleged that Acting Secretary Domingo informed them that the total
consideration of ₱25,000,000.00 for their services and deliverable items was acceptable and
approved. After all the deliverables had been delivered, petitioners followed up on the payment
from the Philippine Information Agency. Despite several demands, no payments were made.
Petitioners said that they made demands through letters. However, respondents refused and
failed to pay the amount of ₱25,000,000.00.

The Office of the Solicitor General moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a cause of
action and for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Issue: Whether or not the Complaint was properly dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.

Ruling: In Zuniga-Santos v. Santos-Gran:

A complaint states a cause of action if it sufficiently avers the existence of the three (3)
essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (b) an obligation on the
part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (c) an act or
omission on the part of the named defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter
may maintain an action for recovery of damages. If the allegations of the complaint do
not state the concurrence of these elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a
motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
x x x It has been held that only ultimate facts and not legal conclusions or
evidentiary facts are considered for purposes of applying the test. This is consistent with
Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court which states that the complaint need only allege
the ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. A fact is
essential if they cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of
action inadequate. Since the inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material
allegations, it follows that the analysis should be confined to the four comers of the
complaint, and no other.

Thus, to determine the sufficiency of a cause of action in a motion to dismiss, only the facts
alleged in the complaint should be considered, in relation to whether its prayer may be granted.
In Heirs of Maramag v. Maramag:

When a motion to dismiss is premised on this ground, the ruling thereon should be based
only on the facts alleged in the complaint. The court must resolve the issue on the strength
of such allegations, assuming them to be true. The test of sufficiency of a cause of action
rests on whether, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged in the complaint to be true,
the court can render a valid judgment upon the same, in accordance with the prayer in
the complaint. This is the general rule.

To sufficiently state a cause of action, the Complaint should have alleged facts showing that the
trial court could grant its prayer based on the strength of its factual allegations.

The Complaint in this case prayed:

 WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that,
after proper proceedings, judgment be rendered ordering the defendants to jointly and
severally:
1. Pay the plaintiffs the amount of PESOS: TWENTY-FIVE MILLION (Php25,000,000.00)
to cover plaintiffs' services and the delivered items which were received and used by
the defendants as above-mentioned;
2. Pay the plaintiff Guillermo an amount of not less than PESOS: ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (₱l00,000.00) as and by way of moral damages;
3. Pay the plaintiffs an amount of not less than PESOS: ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(₱l00,000.00) as and by way of exemplary or corrective damages;
4. Pay the plaintiffs an amount of not less than PESOS: ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(₱l00,000.00) as and by way of attorney's fees and litigation expenses; and
5. Pay the cost of the suit.

To support the foregoing prayer, the Complaint attempted to lay down the elements of a contract
between the petitioners on one hand, and respondents on the other. Thus, it alleged a series of
communications, meetings, and memoranda, all tending to show that petitioners agreed to
complete and deliver the "Joyride" project, and that respondents agreed to pay ₱25,000,000.00
as consideration.

Assuming that the Complaint's factual allegations are true, they are not sufficient to establish that
the Regional Trial Court could grant its prayer. The Complaint attempts to establish a contract
that involves expenditure of public funds. As pointed out by respondents, contracts involving the
expenditure of public funds have additional requisites to be valid. Sections 46, 47, and 48 of Book
V, Title I, Subtitle B, Chapter 8 of the Administrative Code provides for essential requisites for the
validity of contracts:

SECTION 46. Appropriation Before Entering into Contract. - (1) No contract involving the
expenditure of public funds shall be entered into unless there is an appropriation therefor,
the unexpended balance of which, free of other obligations, is sufficient to cover the
proposed expenditure; and

(2) Notwithstanding this provision, contracts for the procurement of supplies and materials
to be carried in stock may be entered into under regulations of the Commission provided
that when issued, the supplies and materials shall be charged to the proper appropriations
account.

SECTION 47. Certificate Showing Appropriation to Meet Contract. - Except in the case of
a contract for personal service, for supplies for current consumption or to be carried in
stock not exceeding the estimated consumption for three (3) months, or banking
transactions of government-owned or controlled banks, no contract involving the
expenditure of public funds by any government agency shall be entered into or authorized
unless the proper accounting official of the agency concerned shall have certified to the
officer entering into the obligation that funds have been duly appropriated for the purpose
and that the amount necessary to cover the proposed contract for the current calendar
year is available for expenditure on account thereof, subject to verification by the auditor
concerned. The certificate signed by the proper accounting official and the auditor who
verified it, shall be attached to and become an integral part of the proposed contract, and
 the sum so certified shall not thereafter be available for expenditure for any other purpose
until the obligation of the government agency concerned under the contract is fully
extinguished.

SECTION 48. Void Contract and Liability of Officer. - Any contract entered into contrary
to the requirements of the two (2) immediately preceding sections shall be void, and the
officer or officers entering into the contract shall be liable to the Government or other
contracting party for any consequent damage to the same extent as if the transaction had
been wholly between private parties.

In Philippine National Railways v. Kanlaon Construction Enterprises Co., lnc., this Court has held
that contracts that do not comply with the foregoing requirements are void:

Thus, the Administrative Code of 1987 expressly prohibits the entering into contracts
involving the expenditure of public funds unless two prior requirements are satisfied. First,
there must be an appropriation law authorizing the expenditure required in the contract.
Second, there must be attached to the contract a certification by the proper accounting
official and auditor that funds have been appropriated by law and such funds are available.
Failure to comply with any of these two requirements renders the contract void.

In several cases, the Court had the occasion to apply these provisions of the
Administrative Code of 1987 and the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines. In
these cases, the Court clearly ruled that the two requirements-the existence of
appropriation and the attachment of the certification-are "conditions sine qua non for the
execution of government contracts."

The law expressly declares void a contract that fails to comply with the two requirements, namely,
an appropriation law funding the contract and a certification of appropriation and fund availability.
The clear purpose of these requirements is to insure that government contracts are never signed
unless supported by the corresponding appropriation law and fund availability.

The Complaint, however, completely ignored the foregoing requisites for the validity of contracts
involving expenditure of public funds. Thus, the Regional Trial Court could not order the
enforcement of the alleged contract on the basis of the Complaint, and the Complaint was
properly dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.

Rule 45; Questions of law

Cordillera Global Network vs. Paje, et.al, G.R. No. 215988, April 10, 2019

Facts: On 2001, DENR issued an ECC to SM Investment Corporation for its SM Pines Resort
Project. On December 29, 2010, SM Investments Corporation submitted an Environmental
Performance Report and Management Plan as part of its application to amend its Environmental
Compliance Certificate. Subsequently, the City Planning and Development Office of Baguio City
granted locational clearance for the Expansion Project.

The petitioners then filed a complaint against SM Investment Corporation, et.al and prayed that
a temporary environmental protection order be immediately issued to enjoin SM Investments
Corporation from cutting and/or earth-balling the 182 Benguet pine and Alnus trees on Luneta
Hill. While the first complaint is pending, the petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of
the Temporary Environmental Protection Order with a Prayer for the Conduct of an Ocular
Inspection. RTC then granted the TRO.

On April 13, 2012, Adajar, et al. filed a new Complaintagainst SM Supermalls, et.al. The two
environmental cases and the contempt petition were consolidated. RTC dismissed the
consolidated cases the cases did not fall under any of the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies.

Petitioners filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals, the latter upheld the lower court’s ruling.
Petitioners then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

Issue: Whether or nor the petition should be dismissed for raising questions of facts
which are not allowed under Rule 45 and for failure to observe the rule on exhaustion
of administrative remedies?

Ruling: No, the petition prospered.

It is well-established that a review of appeals filed before this Court is "not a matter of right, but
of sound judicial discretion[.]" The Rules of Court requires that only questions of law should be
raised in petitions filed under Rule 45, as factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal
by certiorari. It is not this Court's function to weigh all over again evidence that were already
considered in the lower courts.

However, these rules do admit of 10 exceptions, as listed in Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr.:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures .
. .; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible . . .; (3) Where
there is a grave abuse of discretion . . .; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension
of facts . . .; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting . . .; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions
of both appellant and appellee . . .; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those
of the trial court. . .; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based . . .; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in
the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents . . .; and (10) The
finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is
contradicted by the evidence on record . . .

Pascual v. Burgos instructs that parties must prove with convincing evidence that their case
clearly falls under the exceptions to the rule:

Parties praying that this court review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals must
demonstrate and prove that the case clearly falls under the exceptions to the rule. They have the
burden of proving to this court that a review of the factual findings is necessary. Mere assertion
and claim that the case falls under the exceptions do not suffice.
Here, petitioners claim that the issuance of a zoning clearance was tainted with irregularity,
maintaining that a regional mall like SM City Baguio and its Expansion Project should not have
been allowed in a low-density commercial zone like Luneta Hill. Rather, the mall belonged in a
high-density commercial zone, while the parking building belonged in a medium-density
commercial zone.

Furthermore, petitioners stress that private respondents were not authorized to cut and earth-
ball the trees as they failed to obtain a separate environmental compliance certificate or conduct
an environmental impact assessment before felling the trees.

Upon careful review, this Court finds that this case falls under the exceptions in Medina,
particularly: "(4) [w]hen the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts";107 and "(8)
[w]hen the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based[.]"

(II)

The general rule is to first exhaust the available administrative remedies before a party can bring
the case to a court for judicial review." In connection with the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Under this doctrine, courts will hold off from
determining a controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction of an administrative agency,
particularly when its resolution demands the "special knowledge, experience[,] and services of
the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact."

However, Pagara v. Court of Appeals emphasized that the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It may be disregarded when any of the following exceptions
are present:

It is not applicable (1) where the question in dispute is purely a legal one, or (2) where the
controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction; or (3) where the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter ego
of the President bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved
by him, or (4) where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention . . . .

Said principle may also be disregarded when it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy, . . . when there is no due process observed . . . or where the protestant has no other
recourse . . . .

Article II, Section 6 of Department of Environment and Natural Resources Administrative Order
No. 2003-30 provides:

Section 6. Appeal. —

Any party aggrieved by the final decision on the [Environmental Compliance

Certificate]/[Certificate of Non-Coverage] applications may, within 15 days from receipt of such
decision, file an appeal on the following grounds:

a. Grave abuse of discretion on the part of the deciding authority, or

b. Serious errors in the review findings.

The [Department of Environment and Natural Resources] may adopt alternative conflict/dispute
resolution procedures to settle grievances between proponents and aggrieved parties to avert
unnecessary legal action. Frivolous appeals shall not be countenanced.

The proponent or any stakeholder may file an appeal to the following:

Deciding Authority Where to file the appeal

EMB Regional Office Director Office of the EMB Director
EMB Central Office Office of the DENR Secretary
DENR Secretary Office of the President115

The first sentence of Section 6 shows that the remedy of appeal is only available to a party that
applied for an environmental compliance certificate or certificate of non-coverage. This is
bolstered by the period provided for the filing of an appeal—within 15 days from receipt of such
decision—since only a party to the application is entitled to receive it. However, as respondents
posit, stakeholders are not precluded from filing an appeal as stated in Section 6's last sentence.

This apparent contradiction was clarified in Boracay Foundation, Inc., where this Court ruled that
an appeal under Section 6 only applies to a party to the proceedings before the appropriate
agency:

As petitioner correctly pointed out, the appeal provided for under Section 6 of DENR DAO 2003-
30 is only applicable, based on the first sentence thereof, if the person or entity charged with the
duty to exhaust the administrative remedy of appeal to the appropriate government agency has
been a party or has been made a party in the proceedings wherein the decision to be appealed
was rendered.

It is not disputed that petitioners were never a party to the application of environmental
compliance certificates, both the original and amended, for the Expansion Project. Hence, they
were never furnished a copy of the Decision on the Environmental Compliance Certificate, which
would trigger the start of the 15-day appeal period provided for under Section 6.

Jurisdiction

Geraldine Ornales, et. al. vs. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman of Luzon,et. al. G.R.
No. 214312, September 05, 2018

Facts: On 2002, Tabunda from the Office of Amellar Solutions wrote a letter to Mayor Bendaña
with an offer to automate various municipal operations. The Sangguniang Bayan of Lemery issued
a resolution authorizing Bendaña to enter in a loan agreement with Landbank and the said loan
was granted.

Bendaña formed a committee and they recommended that a proprietary computerization package
be procured through direct contracting. Subsequently, Bendaña and Amellar Solutions executed
an agreement. In 2004, Amellar Solutions delivered computer equipment and software to the
municipality.

In 2004, the Sangguniang Bayan issued Resolution No. 04-1075, enacting Ordinance No. 04-77,
which appropriated the Landbank loan proceeds for the municipality's computerization program.
On October 29, 2004, the Commission on Audit disallowed the municipality's direct procurement
of computer equipment and software from Amellar Solutions.

Modesto et. al., filed a complaint against the petitioners before the Office of the Ombudsman for
violation of R.A 3019 and R.A 9184. Sangguniang Bayan members denied said violations and
alleged good faith. On February 7, 2013, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued
a Joint Resolution indicting the Sangguniang Bayan members for violating Article 177 of the
Revised Penal Code and Section 3, paragraphs (e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019. Petitioners
moved for reconsideration but was denied.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. However, the CA dismissed
the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The CA ruled that it only had jurisdiction over issuances of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases and that jurisdiction over the Office
of the Ombudsman's issuances in criminal cases lay with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction?

Ruling: No, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction.

Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, granted the Court appellate
jurisdiction over orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases:

Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. - (1) All provisionary orders of the
Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.

A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall
be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
(1) New evidence has been discovered which materialy affects the order, directive or
decision;

(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of
the movant. The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days
from filing: Provided, that only one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
Findings of fact by the [office] of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are
conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one (1) month's salary shall be final and unappealable.

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten
(10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the
motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest of
justice may require.
However, Fabian v. Desierto, struck down Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 for being
unconstitutional as it increased this Court's appellate jurisdiction without this Court's advice and
consent, contrary to the prohibition imposed in Article VI, Section 30 of the Constitution.

Namuhe v. Ombudsman elaborated on the import of the Fabian ruling as follows: In Fabian, the
Court held that appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.

In so holding, the Court en Banc, through Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, declared
unconstitutional Section 27 of Republic Act 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which provided
that decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by way
of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Such provision was held
violative of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution, as it expanded the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court without its advice and consent.

The Court also took note of the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, it held that "[u]nder the present
Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari, but only from
judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Section 1 thereof. Appeals from
judgments and final orders of quasi judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the Court
of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43
which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure
for quasi-judicial agencies." The Office of the Ombudsman is a quasi-judicial agency falling under
Rule 43. As the Court succinctly stated:

"It is suggested, however, that the provisions of Rule 43 should apply only to 'ordinary quasi-
judicial agencies,' but not to the Office of the Ombudsman which is a 'high constitutional
body.' We see no reason for this distinction for, if hierarchical rank should be a criterion, that
proposition thereby disregards the fact that Rule 43 even includes the Office of the President and
the Civil Service Commission, although the latter is even an independent constitutional
commission, unlike the Office of the Ombudsman, which is a constitutionally-mandated but
statutorily-created body."
Thus, as a quasi-judicial agency, decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases may only be appealed to the Court of Appeals through a Rule 43 petition.

While Republic Act No. 6770 may have been silent on the remedy available to a party aggrieved
with the Office of the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause in a criminal case, Tirol, Jr. v. Del
Rosario clarified that the remedy in this instance is not an appeal, but a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before this Court: True, the law is silent on the remedy of an
aggrieved party in case the Ombudsman found sufficient cause to indict him in criminal or non-
administrative cases. We cannot supply such deficiency if none has been provided in the law. We
have held that the right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the
manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of law. Hence, there must be a law
expressly granting such privilege. The Ombudsman Act specifically deals with the remedy of an
aggrieved party from orders, directives, and decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases. As we ruled in Fabian, the aggrieved party is given the right to appeal to the
Court of Appeals. Such right of appeal is not granted to parties aggrieved by orders and decisions
of the Ombudsman in criminal cases, like finding probable cause to indict accused persons.

However, an aggrieved party is not without recourse where the finding of the Ombudsman as to
the existence of probable cause is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. An aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

This Court has repeatedly pronounced that the Office of the Ombudsman's orders and decisions
in criminal cases may be elevated to this Court in a Rule 65 petition, while its orders and decisions
in administrative disciplinary cases may be raised on appeal to the Court of Appeals. Hence, the
Court of Appeals did not err in denying the petition questioning public respondent's finding of
probable cause for lack of jurisdiction. Thus, petitioners' failure to avail of the correct procedure
with respect to the criminal case renders public respondent's decision final. Furthermore, the
present case fails even on its merits.

Dichaves v. Office of the Ombudsman explained that this Court generally does not interfere with
the Office of the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause out of respect for its investigatory and
prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution. Dichaves pointed out that the Office of the
Ombudsman's power to determine probable cause is executive in nature, and with its power to
investigate, it is in a better position than this Court to assess the evidence on hand to substantiate
a finding of probable cause or lack of it. Thus, for their petition to prosper, petitioners would have
to prove that public respondent "conducted the preliminary investigation in such a way that
amounted to a virtual refusal to perform a duty under the law."

The law on public bidding is not an empty formality. The purpose of subjecting all government
procurements to competitive bidding is to encourage transparency and ensure that the
government acquires the most advantageous contract at the least price. There is no question that
the respondent's failure to submit the computerization project to competitive bidding resulted in
injury to the government. Considering the amount involved and considering further that no funds
were appropriated for said purpose, the Municipality of Lemery was induced to obtain a loan to
acquire the contract from Amellar Solutions. Moreover, the Municipality of Lemery had to increase
its loan from PhP7.5 Million to Ph P8.193 Million, which not only caused injury to the Municipality
as it was forced to incur a substantial financial obligation, but also gave Amellar Solutions
unwarranted benefits as the contract was awarded to it without compliance with the requirements
of the Procurement Law. Needless to state, the contract was manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the Municipal Government of Lemery, Batangas.

Jurisdiction; Hierarchy of courts

Liza Maza, et.al., vs. Hon. Evelyn Turla, et.al., G.R. No. 187094, February 15, 2017

FACTS: Police Senior Inspector Arnold M. Palomo referred to the Provincial Prosecutor of
Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, three (3) cases of murder against petitioners and 15 other persons.
Inspector Palomo named 19 individuals, including Petitioners, who were allegedly responsible for
the death of Carlito Bayudang, Jimmy Peralta, and Danilo Felipe. That the named individuals
conspired, planned, and implemented the killing of the supporters of AKBAYAN Party List.

On July 18, 2008, Judge Turla held that the proper procedure in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation was not followed in the Palayan cases and remanded the case back to the
prosecutor’s office for another preliminary investigation.

Petitioners moved for partial reconsideration, praying for the outright dismissal of the Palayan
cases against them for lack of probable cause. The Motion was denied by Judge Turla.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts in bringing

their petition directly before this Court?
2. Whether respondent Judge Turla gravely abused her discretion when she
remanded the Palayan cases to the Provincial Prosecutor for the conduct of
preliminary investigation?
3. Whether admissibility of evidence can be ruled upon preliminary investigation?

RULING:

First issue:

This petition is an exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts.

This Court thoroughly explained the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in The Diocese of Bacolod
v. Commission on Elections:

The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court to
ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and
efficient manner. Trial courts do not only determine the facts from the evaluation of the
evidence presented before them. They are likewise competent to determine issues of law
which may include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in
relation to the Constitution. To effectively perform these functions, they are territorially
organized into regions and then into branches. Their writs generally reach within those
territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-important task of inferring
the facts from the evidence as these are physically presented before them. In many
instances, the facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction, which properly present the
'actual case' that makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such action. The
consequences, of course, would be national in scope. There are, however, some cases
where resort to courts at their level would not be practical considering their
decisions could still be appealed before the higher courts, such as the Court of
Appeals.
The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that reviews the determination
of facts and law made by the trial courts. It is collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more
standpoints in the review of the actions of the trial court. But the Court of Appeals also has original
jurisdiction over most special civil actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a nationwide
scope. It is competent to determine facts and, ideally, should act on constitutional issues that
may not necessarily be novel unless there are factual questions to determine.

The Supreme Court's role to interpret the Constitution and act in order to protect constitutional
rights when these become exigent should not be emasculated by the doctrine in respect of the
hierarchy of courts. That has never been the purpose of such doctrine.

Thus, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. This court has "full
discretionary power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil actions for
certiorari ... filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature
of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition."

As correctly pointed out by petitioners, we have provided exceptions to this doctrine:

1. a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are genuine issues of
constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time. A direct
resort to this court includes availing of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition to assail
the constitutionality of actions of both legislative and executive branches of the
government.
2. when the issues involved are of transcendental importance. In these cases, the
imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the
necessity for prudence. The doctrine relating to constitutional issues of transcendental
importance prevents courts from the paralysis of procedural niceties when clearly faced
with the need for substantial protection.
3. cases of first impression warrant a direct resort to this court. In cases of first impression,
no jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts on this matter.

In Government of the United States v. Purganan, this court took cognizance

of the case as a matter of first impression that may guide the lower courts:

In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue
of bail in extradition proceedings, we deem it best to take cognizance of
the present case. Such proceedings constitute a matter of first impression
over which there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.

4. the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this court.

In Drilon v. Lim, this court held that:

... it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to
defer to the higher judgment of this Court in the consideration of its
validity, which is better determined after a thorough deliberation by a
collegiate body and with the concurrence of the majority of those who
participated in its discussion.
 5. Exigency in certain situations would qualify as an exception for direct resort to this court.
6. the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ.
7. There is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. (The
lack of other sufficient remedies in the course of law alone is sufficient ground to allow
direct resort to this court.)
8. the petition includes questions that are "dictated by public welfare and the advancement
of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained
of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an
inappropriate remedy.

In the past, questions similar to these which this court ruled on immediately
despite the doctrine of hierarchy of courts included citizens' right to bear arms,
government contracts involving modernization of voters' registration
lists, and the status and existence of a public office.

It is not, however, necessary that all of these exceptions must occur at the same
time to justify a direct resort to this court.

In this case, the presence of compelling circumstances warrants the exercise of this Court's
jurisdiction. At the time the petition was filed, petitioners were incumbent party-list
representatives. The possibility of their arrest and incarceration should the assailed Orders be
affirmed, would affect their representation of their constituents in Congress.

Although the circumstances mentioned are no longer present, the merits of this case necessitate
this Court's exercise of jurisdiction.

On the second issue:

The remand of the criminal cases to the Provincial Prosecutor for the conduct of
another preliminary investigation is improper.

Petitioners assert that the documents submitted along with the Information are sufficient for
Judge Turla to rule on the existence of probable cause. If she finds the evidence inadequate, she
may order the prosecutors to present additional evidence. Thus, according to petitioners, Judge
Turla's action in remanding the case to the prosecutors for further preliminary investigation lacks
legal basis.

Petitioners' contention has merit.

Rule 112, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

RULE 112
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. -

 (a) By the Regional Trial Court. -Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or
information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and
its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a
warrant of arrest, or a commitment order when the complaint or information was filed
pursuant to section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause,
the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days
from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from
the filing of the complaint or information.

A plain reading of the provision shows that upon filing of the information, the trial court judge
has the following options: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest or a commitment order if findings show probable
cause; or (3) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence if there is doubt on the existence
of probable cause.

The trial court judge's determination of probable cause is based on her or his personal evaluation
of the prosecutor's resolution and its supporting evidence. The determination of probable cause
by the trial court judge is a judicial function, whereas the determination of probable cause by the
prosecutors is an executive function

The courts do not interfere with the prosecutor s conduct of a preliminary investigation. The
prosecutor s determination of probable cause is solely within his or her discretion. Prosecutors
are given a wide latitude of discretion to determine whether an information should be filed in
court or whether the complaint should be dismissed.

Thus, when Judge Turla held that the prosecutors' conduct of preliminary investigation was
"incomplete" and that their determination of probable cause "has not measured up to [the]
standard," she encroached upon the exclusive function of the prosecutors. Instead of determining
probable cause, she ruled on the propriety of the preliminary investigation.

Regardless of Judge Turla's assessment on the conduct of the preliminary

investigation, it was incumbent upon her to determine the existence of probable
cause against the accused after a personal evaluation of the prosecutors' report and the
supporting documents. She could even disregard the report if she found it unsatisfactory, and/or
require the prosecutors to submit additional evidence. There was no option for her to remand
the case back to the panel of prosecutors for another preliminary investigation. In
doing so, she acted without any legal basis.

On the third issue:

The admissibility of evidence cannot be ruled upon in a preliminary investigation.

In a preliminary investigation,

...the public prosecutors do not decide whether there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt
of the guilt of the person charged; they merely determine whether there is sufficient
 ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.

To emphasize, "a preliminary investigation is merely preparatory to a trial; it is not a trial on the
merits." Since "it cannot be expected that upon the filing of the information in court the prosecutor
would have already presented all the evidence necessary to secure a conviction of the accused,"
the admissibility or inadmissibility of evidence cannot be ruled upon in a preliminary
investigation.

Criminal procedure; Probable cause

Joseph Pemberton vs Hon. Leila De Lima, et.al, G.R. No. 217508, April 18, 2016

FACTS: A complaint for murder was filed by the PNP-Olongapo City and private respondent
Marilou Laude y Serdoncillo against petitioner Joseph Scott Pemberton.

Laude filed an Omnibus Motion on October 21, 2014 praying that petitioner be issued by the City
Prosecutor of Olongapo City subpoenas:

a) directing petitioner to be subject to the lifting of his fingerprint and buccal swabs during
the clarificatory hearing and
b) the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory through the Chief of Office to assign
forensic personnel to gather fingerprints and buccal swabs from Petitioner and subject
him to “forensic examination and analysis, and DNA testing”.

Pemberton opposed the motion by filing a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion: a) for clarification;
b) declaration of absence of probable cause for murder or any other crime; and c) in the event
that absence of probable cause is not declared, at the very least, the charge be reduced to
homicide considering the lack of circumstances qualifying the offense to murder.

Probable cause for murder against petitioner was found, and the trial court issued a warrant of
arrest. On December 18, 2014, Pemberton filed his Petition for Review before the DOJ and a
Motion to Defer the Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court which were denied for lack of
merit.

Hence, this Petition for Certiorari with application for the ex-parte issuance of a TRO and/or writ
of preliminary injunction.

Petitioner argued that Sec. De Lima: a) committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining a finding
of probable cause amounting to excess or absence of jurisdiction based on the grounds of Sec.
De Lima’s taking into account additional evidence which prosecutor allegedly had no authority to
receive and which petitioner had no chance to address and rebut thereby constituting denial of
due process of law; b) that Sec. De Lima found probable cause to indict petitioner despite the
evidence on record not supporting the existence of probable cause to indict him with homicide or
murder; and c) that Sec. De Lima found that the killing was attended with the qualifying
circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength, and cruelty despite prevailing
jurisprudence dictating that elements of such circumstances be established by direct evidence.
Secretary De Lima, through the Office of the Solicitor General, points out that this Petition is
procedurally infirm. The Petition assails the appreciation of evidence and law by Secretary De
Lima, which are ―errors of judgment . . . [that] cannot be remedied by a writ of certiorari.
Further, by filing this Petition before this court and not the Court of Appeals, Pemberton violated
the principle of hierarchy of courts. Moreover, the case is moot and academic, considering that
the Regional Trial Court has convicted Pemberton for the crime charged.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether respondent Secretary Leila M. De Lima committed grave abuse of discretion in

sustaining the finding of probable cause against petitioner Joseph Scott Pemberton,
thereby denying petitioner due process of law.
2. Whether petitioner violated the principle of hierarchy of courts by filing his Petition before
this Court instead of the Court of Appeals
3. Whether this case has been rendered moot and academic.

RULING:

1. NO. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, as the
investigating officer acts upon probable cause of reasonable belief. Probable cause implies
probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion but less than evidence which
would justify a conviction. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the suspect.

Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to
entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person charged is guilty of the
crime subject of the investigation. Being based merely on opinion and reasonable
belief, it does not import absolute certainty. Probable cause need not be based on
clear and convincing evidence of guilt, as the investigating officer acts upon
reasonable belief. Probable cause implies probability of guilt and requires more
than bare suspicion but less than evidence which would justify a conviction.

There is no basis to doubt that respondent De Lima judiciously scrutinized the evidence
on record. Based on respondent De Lima‘s assessment, there was ample evidence
submitted to establish probable cause that petitioner murdered the victim.

Foregoing circumstances all taken together leads to the fair and reasonable inference that
respondent is probably guilty of killing Laude through treachery, abuse of superior
strength, and cruelty. Absence of direct evidence does not preclude a finding of
probable cause. It has been the consistent pronouncement of the Supreme Court that,
in such cases, the prosecution may resort to circumstantial evidence. Crimes are usually
committed in secret and under conditions where concealment is highly probable. De
Lima‘s determination was based on a careful evaluation of evidence presented.

2. YES. It is not clear why any action by the Court of Appeals, which has concurrent original
jurisdiction in petitions for certiorari under Rule 65, cannot be considered as sufficient for
 review of petitioner‘s case. Furthermore, the possibility of the conclusion of the trial of the
case against petitioner is not a reason that is special and important enough to successfully
invoke this Court‘s original jurisdiction. Once there has been a judicial finding of probable
cause, an executive determination of probable cause is irrelevant.

3. YES. A petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the preliminary

investigation in any other venue is rendered moot by the issuance of a warrant
of arrest and the conduct of arraignment.

Once the information is filed in court, the court acquires jurisdiction of the case and any
motion to dismiss the case or to determine the accused‘s guilt or innocence rests within
the sound discretion of the court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured.
After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be
submitted to the Court for appropriate action.

Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a
reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to
dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant
the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper
determination of the case.

Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases
even while the case is already in Court he [or she] cannot impose his [or her] opinion on
the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it.
The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion
to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option
to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment
of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of
the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

Even without the conviction, this Petition has already been rendered moot and academic
by virtue of the judicial finding of probable cause in the form of the Regional Trial Court's
issuance of an arrest warrant against petitioner.

Civil procedure; Cause of action, litis pendentia

Philippine Shell Foundation, Inc. vs. Tomas Fredeluces, et.al., G.R. No. 174333, April
20, 2016

FACTS:

Pursuant to PD 87, the Rep. of the Philippines entered into a service contract with Shell for the
exploration, development, and production of petroleum. The service contractors eventually
discovered 2.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas deposit in Palawan. Concrete structures needed to
be made which was to be constructed in Subic. After a socio-economic survey, it was found that
there were about 200 households that lived near or on the site proposed, and it was determined
that at least 80 of them needed to be relocated.
SBMA and Shell Philippines entered into an agreement for the construction of the concrete
structure. Subic undertook to relocate the households while Shell gave them financial assistance.
In exchange for the financial assistance, some of the claimants voluntarily dismantled their houses
and relocated. Other claimants were denied however for failure to show that they were affected
by said project.

A complaint was then filed against Shell before the RTC of Olongapo City. Fredeluces, et al.
alleged that they resided in the construction site and allegedly constructed houses and
improvements such as fruit trees. Some admitted having received financial assistance but alleged
that the amounts given were insufficient to compensate the damages suffered. It was also alleged
that Shell acted in bad faith in arbitrarily and unlawfully evicting the complainants, thus they
should pay actual damages. The complainants moved that they be allowed to litigate as pauper
litigants.

Shell did not answer, but filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of litis pendentia, failure to
state cause of action, and lack of cause of action. Shell alleged that 5 of the plaintiffs earlier filed
a complaint for sum of money. Shell argued that the complaint for damages and complaint for
sum of money had substantially similar causes of action and relief sought thus, litis pendentia.
According to Shell, Fredeluces et al. were praying for payment of damages corresponding to the
value of the land they occupied, a right they do not have because they do not even own the land.
In addition, Shell alleged that the improvements they made had been compensated.
Consequently, the complaint failed to state a cause of action.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not complaint for damages should be dismissed on the ground of litis
pendentia?
2. Whether or not the complaint for damages should be dismissed on the ground of failure
to state a cause of action?

RULING:

As to the first issue:

The complaint for damages should have been dismissed as to one of the plaintiffs on the ground
of litis pendentia. As for the rest of the respondents, their complaint failed to state a cause of
action.

Only one suit may be instituted for a single cause of action. Hence, any suit subsequently filed
for the same cause of action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. When there is more than
one suit pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, litispendentia exists
and a motion to dismiss may be filed on this ground.

Rule 16, Section 1 (e) of the Rules of Court provides:

 SECTION 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the answer to
the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made
on any of the following grounds:

1. That there is another action pending between the same parties

for the same cause[.]

Litis pendentia in Latin means "a pending suit." Occasionally referred to as lispendens or auter
action pendant, litispendentia has the following elements:

1. identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same interests in
both actions;
2. identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same
facts;
3. identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any
judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case."

The SC held that the elements were only present with respect to Bebiana San Pedro, thus, as to
her, dismissed on the ground of litispendentia.

Respondent Bebiana San Pedro was a party plaintiff both in the Complaint for sum of money and
in the Complaint for damages. Unlike respondents Dante U. Santos, Efren U. Santos, Miguel
Santos, and Ric U. Santos, respondent Bebiana San Pedro did not sign any document similar to
the Revocation and Cancellation of Special Power of Attorney. Thus, she did not revoke the
authority of Atty. Renato H. Collado to file the Complaint for sum of money on her behalf. The
Complaint for sum of money was filed with her authority and was pending when the Complaint
for damages was subsequently filed before the same trial court.

As to second issue:

The trial court and the Court of Appeals differed as to whether the Complaint for damages should
be dismissed. The Complaint for damages was initially dismissed on the ground of failure to state
a cause of action, but the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the Complaint to the trial
court for further proceedings. The ground of failure to state a cause of action is based on Rule
16, Section 1 (g) of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the answer to
the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made
on any of the following grounds:
1. That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action[.]

Failure to state a cause of action goes into the sufficiency of the allegation of the cause of action
in the complaint. "When the facts alleged in the complaint show that the defendant has committed
acts constituting a delict or wrong by which he violates the rights of the plaintiff, causing [the
plaintiff] loss or injury, there is sufficient allegation of a cause of action. Otherwise, there is none."
In this respect, a pleading sufficiently states a cause of action if it "contain[s] in a methodical and
logical form, a plain, concise[,] and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party
pleading relies for his [or her] claim[.]" Ultimate facts are the "important and substantial facts
which either directly form the basis of the primary right and duty, or which directly make up the
wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant." Allegations of evidentiary facts and conclusions of
law in a pleading are omitted for they are unnecessary in determining whether the court has
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action.

In filing a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, a

defendant "hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint." Since allegations
of evidentiary facts and conclusions of law are omitted in pleadings, "[t]he hypothetical admission
is . . . limited to the relevant and material facts well pleaded in the complaint and inferences fairly
deducible therefrom." However, it is mandatory that courts "consider other facts within the range
of judicial notice, as well as relevant laws and jurisprudence" in resolving motions to dismiss.

Even assuming the truth of the ultimate facts alleged in the Complaint for damages, the Complaint
states no cause of action. Respondents may have resided in Sitio Agusuhin, constructed their
houses, and planted fruit trees in the area. However, they failed to allege any circumstance
showing that they had occupied Sitio Agusuhin under claim of ownership for the required number
of years.

It follows that respondents may not ask compensation equivalent to the value of the parcels of
land they previously occupied in Sitio Agusuhin. The right to demand compensation for
deprivation of property belongs to the owner.

Respondents nevertheless argue that they are entitled to damages because of their unlawful
and summary eviction from Sitio Agusuhin. Their own allegations, however, belie their claim
that they were unlawfully and summarily evicted. As alleged in their Complaint, petitioners "tried
to work out an acceptable compensation package for the [respondents.]" Also alleged in the
Complaint and as evidenced by quitclaims and the Final Report on the Compensation Claims,
some of the respondents received certain amounts as compensation.

In receiving the compensation, respondents declared in their respective quitclaims that they
waived, released, and abandoned any claims that they might have had over the parcels
of land they occupied in Sitio Agusuhin as well as the improvements they introduced in the
property.

All told, the Motion to Dismiss was correctly granted on the ground of failure to state
a cause of action.

Special proceedings; Writ of habeas corpus

Datukan Malang Salibo vs. Warden, et.al, G.R. No. 197597, April 8, 2015

FACTS: Butukan S. Malang, one of the accused in the Maguindanao massacre, had a pending
warrant of arrest issued by the trial court in People vs Ampatuan Jr. et. al. When Datukan Malang
Salibo learned that the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station in Maguindanao suspected him
to be Butukan S. Malang, he presented himself to clear his name. Salibo presented to the police
pertinent portions of his passport, boarding passes and other documents tending to prove that a
certain Datukan Malang Salibo was in Saudi Arabia when the massacre happened. The authorities,
however, apprehended and detained him. He questioned the legality of his detention via Urgent
Petition for Habeas Corpus before the CA, maintaining that he is not the accused Batukan S.
Malang. The CA issued the writ, making it returnable to the judge of RTC Taguig.

After hearing of the Return, the trial court granted Salibo’s petition and ordered his immediate
release from detention.

On appeal by the Warden, the CA reversed the RTC ruling. The CA held that even assuming Salibo
was not the Batukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, orderly course of trial must
be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before the writ of habeas corpus may be invoked.
Salibo’s proper remedy, according to the CA, should have been a motion to quash information
and/or warrant of arrest.

On the other hand, Salibo believes that the Warden erred in appealing the RTC decision before
the CA. Salibo argued that although the CA delegated to the RTC the authority to hear the
Warden’s Return, the RTC’s ruling should be deemed as the CA ruling, and hence, it should have
been appealed directly before the SC.

ISSUE/S:

1. WON Salibo properly availed the remedy of a petition for writ of habeas corpus
2. WON a motion to quash information and/or warrant of arrest is the proper remedy in
cases where a person with a mistaken identity is detained
3. WON the Warden correctly appealed the RTC ruling on the Return before the CA

RULING:

1. Yes. Habeas corpus is the remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to mistaken
identity. In such cases, the person is not under any lawful process and is continuously
being illegally detained.

Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus shall
extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto. The primary purpose of the writ is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if
such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is
sufficient.

The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be related to any offense so as to
entitle a person to the efficient remedy of habeas corpus. It may be availed of as a post-
conviction remedy or when there is an alleged violation of the liberty of abode.
In other words, habeas corpus effectively substantiates the implied autonomy of citizens
constitutionally protected in the right to liberty in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.
 Habeas corpus being a remedy for a constitutional right, courts must apply a conscientious
and deliberate level of scrutiny so that the substantive right to liberty will not be further
curtailed in the labyrinth of other processes.

In the case at bar, it was Butukan S. Malang, not Salibo, who was charged and accused
in the Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued in the case of People vs Ampatuan.
Based on the evidences presented, Salibo sufficiently established that he could not have
been Butukan S. Malang. Therefore, Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant
charging him of an offense, nor restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court.
Second, Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant. When he was in the presence
of authorities, he was neither committing nor attempting to commit an offense, and the
police officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that he might have committed.
Salibo was also not an escape prisoner.

It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police
Station to clear his name and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang.
When petitioner Salibo was in the presence of the police officers of Datu Hofer Police
Station, he was neither committing nor attempting to commit an offense. The police
officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that he might have committed.
Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner.

The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest petitioner Salibo without a
warrant. They deprived him of his right to liberty without due process of law, for which a
petition for habeas corpus may be issued.

To reiterate, Petitioner Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of
an offense. He was not restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court. He was
illegally deprived of his liberty, and, therefore, correctly availed himself of a Petition for
Habeas Corpus.

2. No, the CA’s contention is not correct. Salibo’s proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash
Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. None of the grounds for filing a Motion to Quash
Information apply to him. Even if petitioner Salibo filed a Motion to Quash, the defect he
alleged could not have been cured by mere amendment of the Information and/or Warrant
of Arrest. Changing the name of the accused appearing in the Information and/or Warrant
of Arrest from “Butukan S. Malang” to “Datukan Malang Salibo” will not cure the lack of
preliminary investigation in this case. Likewise, a motion for reinvestigation will not cure
the defect of lack of preliminary investigation.

3. Yes. An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition filed
before CA or any of its members, the CA or any of its members in instances authorized by
law, or the RTC or any of its presiding judges. The court or judge grants the writ and
requires the officer or person having custody of the person allegedly restrained of liberty
to file a return of the writ. A hearing on the return of the writ is then conducted.

The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which issued the writ.
Should the court issuing the writ designate a lower court to which the writ is made
 returnable, the lower court shall proceed to decide the petition of habeas corpus. By
virtue of the designation, the lower court acquires the power and authority to determine
the merits of the petition for habeas corpus. Therefore, the decision on the petition is a
decision appealable to the court that has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the lower
court.

Special civil actions; Indirect contempt

Atty. Herminio Harry Roque vs. Armed Forces of the Philippines, G.R. No. 214986,
February 15, 2017

Facts: Petitioner, Atty. Herminio “Harry” Roque, Jr. filed a Petition to Cite for Indirect Contempt
against herein respondents Gen. Gregorio Catapang, Brig. Gen. Arthur Ang and Lr. Col. Harold
Cabunoc for violation Rule 139-B, Section 18 of the Rules of Court.

The premise of the case was that on October 2014, Jeffrey “Jennifer” Laude, 26-year old Filipino
was allegedly killed at a motel in Olongapo City by 19-year old US Marine Private Joseph Scott
Pemberton. After nearly a month since the killing, police had not been able to obtain Pemberton's
latent fingerprints and oral swabs, because he was confined by his superiors on a ship and placed
under their custody. Thus, the question of custody over Pemberton was subject of public
discussions. Pemberton was eventually transferred from his ship to a facility in the headquarters
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. However, Philippine authorities maintained that until a
case was filed against Pemberton, custody over him remained with the United States of America.
On November 4, respondents filed a disbarment complaint against petitioner, before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. On the same day, respondent Cabunoc called a conference at
Camp Aguinaldo, and publicly announced that a disbarment complaint had been filed against
petitioner.

Petitioner alleges that this press statement was reported on, and generously quoted from, by
media. Petitioner asserts that respondents' acts are contumacious violations of
Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. Further, petitioner claims that respondents'
acts put to question his professional and personal reputation.

Respondents argue that the press statements are not among the contumacious acts prescribed
under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The subject of the disbarment case pertains to a
serious breach of security of a military zone. The statements were official statements made in the
performance of a public function to address a public concern.

The circumstances, which led to the filing of the disbarment complaint and the acts alleged therein
were witnessed by the public and duly reported by the media. The filing of the disbarment case
was not meant to malign petitioner as a lawyer but rather was a response to the events that
transpired at Camp Aguinaldo.

Respondents also claim the issue is a matter of public interest, which is a defense in
contempt proceedings such as this. With the Laude Murder case being of public concern,
petitioner has attained the status of a public figure, susceptible of public comment in connection
with his actions on the case. In any case, respondents instituted the disbarment
complaint against petitioner in good faith. They are laymen and are not familiar with the
confidentiality rule.

Issues:

1. Whether a violation of the confidentiality rule constitutes contempt of court;

2. Whether respondents' public pronouncements violate Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court;

3. Whether respondents may raise public interest as a defense; and

4. Whether non-lawyers may be punished for contempt.

Ruling:

As to the rule on confidentiality:

Publicity does not, in and of itself, impair court proceedings. Even in the highly publicized case
of Webb, where the parties, their sympathizers, and lawyers all participated in a media blitz, this
Court required proof that the fairness and impartiality of the investigation was actually affected
by the publicity.

Proceedings against lawyers, however, are treated differently, for several reasons.

Disbarment proceedings are covered by what is known as the confidentiality rule. This is laid
down by Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 18. Confidentiality. - Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential.
However, the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions in other cases.

Law is a profession and not a trade. Lawyers are held to high standards as officers of the court,
and subject to heightened regulation to ensure that the legal profession maintains its integrity
and esteem. As part of the legal profession, lawyers are generally prohibited from advertising
their talents, and are expected to rely on their good reputation to maintain their practice.

The confidentiality rule is intended, in part, to prevent the use of disbarment proceedings as a
tool to damage a lawyer's reputation in the public sphere. Thus, the general rule is that publicly
disclosing disbarment proceedings may be punished with contempt.

The confidentiality rule requires only that "proceedings against attorneys" be kept
private and confidential. It is the proceedings against attorneys that must be kept
private and confidential. This would necessarily prohibit the distribution of actual disbarment
complaints to the press. However, the rule does not extend so far that it covers the mere
existence or pendency of disciplinary actions. Some cases are more public than others,
because of the subject matter, or the personalities involved. Some are deliberately conducted in
the public as a matter of strategy. A lawyer who regularly seeks attention and readily welcomes,
if not invites, media coverage, cannot expect to be totally sheltered from public interest, himself.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to
bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings.
The power to punish for contempt should be invoked only to ensure or promote the proper
administration of justice. Accordingly, when determining whether to declare as contumacious
alleged violations of the confidentiality rule, we apply a restrictive interpretation. The court
declined to exercise contempt power under the conditions of this case. Petitioner assails two
acts as violating the confidentiality rule: first, respondents' supposed public threats of filing
a disbarment case against him, and second, respondents' public statement that they had filed a
disbarment complaint. Where there are yet no proceedings against a lawyer, there is nothing to
keep private and confidential. Respondents' threats were made before November 4, 2014, and
there was no proceeding to keep private.
In any case, the Press Statement does not divulge any acts or character traits on the
part of petitioner that would damage his personal and professional reputation.
Although the Press Statement mentioned that a disbarment complaint had been filed against
petitioner, no particulars were given about the content of the complaint or the actual charges
filed.
Furthermore, prior to the filing of the complaint, petitioner even made his own public
statement regarding respondents' possible filing of a disbarment complaint.
As to the issue of public interest:
Controversial cases of public interest cases can be challenging for lawyers. This Court is cognizant
of the hardships lawyers must face as they may continually be pressed by media for details of
their cases. Nonetheless, it must strike a balance between protecting officers of the court from
harassment on one hand, and the interests of freedom of speech on the other. Given this case's
factual milieu, the balance is served by denying the petition.

Rules on Evidence; Parol evidence

G.R. No. 171601, April 8, 2015, SPOUSES BONIFACIO AND LUCIA PARAS, Petitioners,
vs. KIMWA CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, LEONEN, J.

Facts: Lucia was a "concessionaire of a sand and gravel permit at Kabulihan, Toledo City[.] On
December 6, 1994, Lucia and Kimwa entered into a contract denominated "Agreement for Supply
of Aggregates" where 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates were "allotted" by Lucia as supplier to
Kimwa. Kimwa was to pick up the allotted aggregates at Lucia’s permitted area in Toledo City at
₱240.00 per truckload.

Pursuant to the Agreement, Kimwa hauled 10,000 cubic meters of aggregates. Sometime after
this, however, Kimwa stopped hauling aggregates. Claiming that in so doing, Kimwa violated the
Agreement, Lucia, joined by her husband, Bonifacio, filed the Complaint for breach of contract
with damages that is now subject of this Petition.

Spouses Paras added that within a few days, Kimwa was able to extract and haul 10,000 cubic
meters of aggregates. However, after extracting and hauling this quantity, Kimwa allegedly
transferred to the concession area of a certain Mrs. Remedios dela Torre in violation of their
Agreement. They then addressed demand letters to Kimwa. As these went unheeded, Spouses
Paras filed their Complaint.

In its Answer, …Kimwa asserted that the Agreement articulated the parties’ true intent that
40,000 cubic meters was a maximum limit and that May 15, 1995 was never set as a deadline.
Invoking the Parol Evidence Rule, it insisted that Spouses Paras were barred from introducing
evidence which would show that the parties had agreed differently.

Issue: Whether respondent Kimwa Construction and Development Corporation is liable to

petitioners Spouses Paras for (admittedly) failing to haul 30,000 cubic meters of aggregates from
petitioner Lucia Paras’ permitted area by May 15, 1995.

Ruling: The SC reverse the Decision of the CA and reinstate that of the RTC. Respondent Kimwa
is liable for failing to haul the remainder of the quantity which it was obliged to acquire from
petitioner Lucia Paras.

Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides for the Parol Evidence Rule, the
rule on admissibility of documentary evidence when the terms of an agreement have been
reduced into writing:

Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. — When the terms of an agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be,
between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement.

However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written
agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:

(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;

(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties
thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the
execution of the written agreement.

The term "agreement" includes wills. Per this rule, reduction to written form, regardless of the
formalities observed, "forbids any addition to, or contradiction of, the terms of a written
agreement by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that different terms were agreed
upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract."

This rule is animated by a perceived wisdom in deferring to the contracting parties’ articulated
intent. In choosing to reduce their agreement into writing, they are deemed to have done so
meticulously and carefully, employing specific — frequently, even technical — language as are
appropriate to their context. From an evidentiary standpoint, this is also because "oral testimony
. . . coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome of the case, depending exclusively
on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence. Spoken words could
be notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which speaks of a uniform language." As
illustrated in Abella v. Court of Appeals:
Without any doubt, oral testimony as to a certain fact, depending as it does exclusively on human
memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence. "I would sooner trust the smallest
slip of paper for truth," said Judge Limpkin of Georgia, "than the strongest and most retentive
memory ever bestowed on mortal man." This is especially true in this case where such oral
testimony is given by . . . a party to the case who has an interest in its outcome, and by . . . a
witness who claimed to have received a commission from the petitioner.

This, however, is merely a general rule. Provided that a party puts in issue in its pleading any of
the four(4) items enumerated in the second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9, "a party may
present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the agreement[.]" Raising any of these
items as an issue in a pleading such that it falls under the exception is not limited to the party
initiating an action. In Philippine National Railways v. Court of First Instance of Albay, this court
noted that "if the defendant set up the affirmative defense that the contract mentioned in the
complaint does not express the true agreement of the parties, then parol evidence is admissible
to prove the true agreement of the parties[.]" Moreover, as with all possible objections to the
admission of evidence, a party’s failure to timely object is deemed a waiver, and parol evidence
may then be entertained.

Apart from pleading these exceptions, it is equally imperative that the parol evidence sought to
be introduced points to the conclusion proposed by the party presenting it. That is, it must be
relevant, tending to "induce belief in [the] existence" of the flaw, true intent, or subsequent
extraneous terms averred by the party seeking to introduce parol evidence.

In sum, two (2) things must be established for parol evidence to be admitted: first, that the
existence of any of the four (4) exceptions has been put in issue in a party’s pleading or has not
been objected to by the adverse party; and second, that the parol evidence sought to be
presented serves to form the basis of the conclusion proposed by the presenting party.

Here, the CA found fault in the RTC for basing its findings "on the basis of evidence presented in
violation of the parol evidence rule." It proceeded to fault petitioners Spouses Paras for showing
"no proof . . . of [respondent Kimwa’s] obligation."Then, it stated that "[t]he stipulations in the
agreement between the parties leave no room for interpretation."

The Court of Appeals is in serious error. At the onset, two (2) flaws in the Court of Appeals’
reasoning must be emphasized. First, it is inconsistent to say, on one hand, that the trial court
erred on the basis of "evidence presented" (albeit supposedly in violation of the Parol Evidence
Rule),and, on the other, that petitioners Spouses Paras showed "no proof." Second, without even
accounting for the exceptions provided by Rule 130, Section 9, the Court of Appeals immediately
concluded that whatever evidence petitioners Spouses Paras presented was in violation of the
Parol Evidence Rule.

It is true that petitioners Spouses Paras’ Complaint does not specifically state words and phrases
such as "mistake," "imperfection," or "failure to express the true intent of the parties."
Nevertheless, it is evident that the crux of petitioners Spouses Paras’ Complaint is their assertion
that the Agreement "entered into . . . on 6 December 1994 or thereabouts" was founded on the
parties’ supposed understanding that the quantity of aggregates allotted in favor of respondent
Kimwa must be hauled by May 15, 1995, lest such hauling be rendered impossible by the
rechanneling of petitioner Lucia Paras’ permitted area. This assertion is the very foundation of
petitioners’ having come to court for relief.

Considering how the Agreement’s mistake, imperfection, or supposed failure to express the
parties’ true intent was successfully put in issue in petitioners Spouses Paras’ Complaint (and
even responded to by respondent Kimwa in its Answer), this case falls under the exceptions
provided by Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Accordingly, the testimonial
and documentary parol evidence sought to be introduced by petitioners Spouses Paras, which
attest to these supposed flaws and what they aver to have been the parties’ true intent, may be
admitted and considered.

[W]e find that petitioners have established that respondent Kimwa was obliged to haul 40,000
cubic meters of aggregates on or before May 15, 1995. Considering its admission that it did not
haul 30,000 cubic meters of aggregates, respondent Kimwa is liable to petitioners.

The Pre-Trial Order issued by the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. MAN-2412 attests to
respondent Kimwa’s admission that: Prior to or during the execution of the contract[,] the
Plaintiffs furnished the Defendant all the documents and requisite papers in connection with the
contract, one of which was a copy of the Plaintiff’s [sic] special permit indicating that the Plaintiff’s
[sic] authority was only good for (6) months from November 14, 1994.

Having been admittedly furnished a copy of this Special Permit, respondent Kimwa was well aware
that a total of only about 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates may be extracted by petitioner Lucia
from the permitted area, and that petitioner Lucia Paras’ operations cannot extend beyond May
15, 1995, when the Special Permit expires.

Our evidentiary rules impel us to proceed from the position (unless convincingly shown otherwise)
that individuals act as rational human beings, i.e, "[t]hat a person takes ordinary care of his
concerns[.]" This basic evidentiary stance, taken with the. supporting evidence petitioners
Spouses Paras adduced, respondent Kimwa's awareness of the conditions under which petitioner
Lucia Paras was bound, and the Agreement's own text specifying exclusive allotment for
respondent Kimwa, supports petitioners Spouses Paras' position that respondent Kimwa was
obliged to haul 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates on or before May 15, 1995. As it admittedly
hauled only 10,000 cubic meters, respondent Kimwa is liable for breach of contract in respect of
the remaining 30,000 cubic meters.