Freedom Responsibility and Therapy

1st Edition Vlad Beliavsky

Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://ebookmeta.com/product/freedom-responsibility-and-therapy-1st-edition-vlad-b
eliavsky/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...

The Pyramid Mind: The new six-part programme for

confidence, happiness and success 1st Edition Vlad
Beliavsky

https://ebookmeta.com/product/the-pyramid-mind-the-new-six-part-
programme-for-confidence-happiness-and-success-1st-edition-vlad-
beliavsky/

Freedom and Responsibility in Quranic Perspective 1st

Edition Hasan Al-Anani

https://ebookmeta.com/product/freedom-and-responsibility-in-
quranic-perspective-1st-edition-hasan-al-anani/

Agency Freedom and Responsibility in the Early

Heidegger 8th Edition Hans Pedersen

https://ebookmeta.com/product/agency-freedom-and-responsibility-
in-the-early-heidegger-8th-edition-hans-pedersen/

Programming With Types 1st Edition Vlad Riscutia

https://ebookmeta.com/product/programming-with-types-1st-edition-
vlad-riscutia/
How to Be Accountable: Take Responsibility to Change
Your Behavior, Boundaries, and Relationships (5-Minute
Therapy) Joe Biel

https://ebookmeta.com/product/how-to-be-accountable-take-
responsibility-to-change-your-behavior-boundaries-and-
relationships-5-minute-therapy-joe-biel/

Boolean Functions Topics in Asynchronicity 1st Edition

Serban E Vlad

https://ebookmeta.com/product/boolean-functions-topics-in-
asynchronicity-1st-edition-serban-e-vlad/

Learning Domain Driven Design Aligning Software

Architecture and Business Strategy 1st Edition Vlad
Khononov

https://ebookmeta.com/product/learning-domain-driven-design-
aligning-software-architecture-and-business-strategy-1st-edition-
vlad-khononov/

The Palgrave Encyclopedia of the Possible 1st Edition

Vlad Petre Gl■veanu

https://ebookmeta.com/product/the-palgrave-encyclopedia-of-the-
possible-1st-edition-vlad-petre-glaveanu/

Building Your Own JavaScript Framework 1 / converted

Edition Vlad Filippov

https://ebookmeta.com/product/building-your-own-javascript-
framework-1-converted-edition-vlad-filippov/
Freedom,
Responsibility,
and Therapy

Vlad Beliavsky
Freedom, Responsibility, and Therapy
 Vlad Beliavsky

Freedom,
Responsibility,
and Therapy
Vlad Beliavsky
Psychology, Philosophy
University of Warwick
Coventry, UK

ISBN 978-3-030-41570-9    ISBN 978-3-030-41571-6 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41571-6

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature
Switzerland AG 2020
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether
the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of
illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and
­transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar
or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication
does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant
protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book
are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or
the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any
errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional
claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Cover illustration: © Alex Linch shutterstock.com
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
 Preface

Free will is one of the most complex and long-term philosophical issues,
and it is a significant theme for multiple disciplines. The assumption that
people have free will underlies a vast scope of social practices, such as the
system of justice, interpersonal relations, politics, economics, ethics, and
religion. If it is proved that free will does not exist, this may overturn the
world as we know it, entailing one of the biggest social reforms in history.
Yet, little is known about the role of free will in our mental well-being.
Suppose free will is an illusion. Can we still feel well if faced with this
reality?
Free will and responsibility also have direct relevance to psychotherapy.
Any mental disorder can be characterized as a certain loss of freedom,
whereas psychotherapy can be regarded as a tool for people to regain
freedom in their agency and daily life.
Furthermore, many of the issues that are discussed during psychother-
apy have a moral nature. Some try to understand what the right thing
would be to do or how to treat one’s unappealing urges. Still others seek
help to cope with their intense moral feelings such as guilt shame or
indignation. The question of moral responsibility becomes especially
important for those who undergo rehabilitation in prison and reflect on
their misdeeds.

v
vi Preface

In this work, I will take Sigmund Freud’s and Carl Rogers’s theories as
a case study, focusing and elaborating on free will and responsibility. By
this inquiry, we will fill several gaps in the scientific literature.
To start with, it will be one of the first comprehensive works that cover
the territory between philosophy and psychotherapy, extending our
knowledge of the role of freedom and responsibility in therapy and men-
tal health. Though almost every counseling school mentions free will at
some point, the literature lacks an extensive review and analysis of this
subject. How do counselors define free will and responsibility? Is free will
meaningful for mental health? Should therapists promote the belief in
free will and responsibility? How can counselors boost human free will
and responsibility?
I will argue, for one, that counselors can define free will as the capacity
for rational choosing, and by helping clients to get used to making con-
scious and autonomous choices, therapists can facilitate human welfare
and therapeutic process. Furthermore, I will contend that therapists can
refer to three senses of responsibility—role responsibility, causal respon-
sibility, and capacity responsibility—during the therapeutic work, which
would be conducive in different ways for enhancing the psychological
conditions of their clients.
Second, it will be the first work that investigates the role of free will
and responsibility in integrative psychotherapy. We will explore, in par-
ticular, whether it is possible to reconcile different personality and coun-
seling schools with regard to free will and responsibility.
This point demands a bit more explanation. Currently, there are a few
big schools of personality and psychotherapy that are in competition
with one another: the psychodynamic, behaviorist, cognitive, trait,
humanistic, and existential schools. Each school, in turn, may contain
dozens of concepts and counseling approaches. In recent years, one of the
mainstreams in psychology, however, has been the integrative movement,
which aims to bridge the gap between different schools. The general idea
is that the existing schools are not fully antithetical, and we can benefit if
we draw upon the advantages of some approaches and try to combine at
least some elements. It is expected that if we integrate different tech-
niques and approaches, for example, we can fashion the most universal
and effective method of psychotherapy. Today, integrative psychotherapy
 Preface vii

has already become an independent therapeutic approach and practiced

by thousands of counselors worldwide. Arguably, integrative psychother-
apy will become the predominant method of psychotherapy in this
century.
Meanwhile, free will is one of the questions that represent a consider-
able challenge to the integrative project. Provided two schools of person-
ality and psychotherapy hold opposing metaphysical views on free will,
we can infer that these theories are fundamentally incompatible, and they
cannot be integrated. A common view, for example, is that Freud’s psy-
choanalysis denies that free will exists, while Rogers’s client-centered
approach advocates the belief in free will.
I will show, however, that we can harmoniously integrate Freud’s and
Rogers’s theories both with regard to free will and responsibility. Though
this research will focus mainly on Freud and Rogers, I will also take into
account other counseling schools in this inquiry, in particular: Skinner’s
behaviorism, Frankl’s existential theory, and Ellis’s cognitive theory. In
the final analysis, we will have enough information to judge whether the
subject of free will represents a threat to the integrative enterprise at all.
In summary, this manuscript will be of interest for a very broad audi-
ence: philosophers and psychologists who study the role of free will in
mental health and psychotherapy; counselors who would like to learn
about the place of freedom and responsibility in their practice; research-
ers who develop the integrative psychotherapy or unified theory of per-
sonality; and students who would like to learn more of what free will is.

Coventry, UK Vlad Beliavsky

 Acknowledgments

I wish to offer my special thanks for comments and helpful conversations

to Stephen Butterfill, Christoph Hoerl, Naomi Eilan, Hanna Pickard,
Matthew Soteriou, Liz Blagrove, Rhena Branch, John Norcross, Windy
Dryden, Edward Deci, Richard Ryan, John Fischer, Per-Erik Milam,
Jonathan Lear, Ernest Wallwork, and Jay Wallace. I owe a debt of grati-
tude to my publisher, Brendan George, and to the whole team of Palgrave
Macmillan for their guidance at every step of the publishing process.
I am highly indebted to my family, parents, and friends for their
encouragement during the years of this research. This work would have
been impossible without them.

ix
 Contents

Part I Free Will   1

1 On Freedom  3
1.1 Introduction   3
1.2 The Meaning of Free Will   4
1.3 Free Will Perspectives   5
1.4 The Definition of Free Will   9
1.5 The Ability to Do Otherwise  11
1.6 The Sourcehood of Agency  14
1.7 The Belief in Free Will  18
1.8 The Sense of Free Will  21
1.9 Freedom of Action  24
1.10 Autonomy  26
1.11 Conclusion  30
References 31

2 Free Will in Psychoanalysis 39

2.1 Introduction  39
2.2 A Hard Determinist Reading of Freud  40
2.3 A Libertarian Reading of Freud  44
2.4 A Compatibilist Reading of Freud  48

xi
xii Contents

2.4.1 A Libertarian Free Will  49

2.4.2 A Compatibilist Free Will  53
2.4.3 Free Will in Different Periods  54
2.4.4 Freud’s Conundrum Revisited  57
2.5 Conclusion  58
References 61

3 Free Will in Rogerian Theory 65

3.1 Introduction  65
3.2 Rogers on Freedom  66
3.3 The Most Deeply Satisfying Choice  69
3.4 Conclusion  73
References 73

4 Integrative Approach 75
4.1 Introduction  75
4.2 Frankfurt’s Theory  76
4.3 Watson’s Theory  78
4.4 The Integration  81
4.5 Further Integration  83
4.6 Conclusion  84
References 85

5 Ways to Work with Free Will 87

5.1 Introduction  87
5.2 Adjusting the Belief in Free will  88
5.3 Learning to Choose  90
5.4 Learning to Be a Conscious Chooser  92
5.5 Self-Forming Choice  95
5.6 Conclusion  97
References 98

6 Sanity and Choice 99

6.1 Introduction  99
6.2 The Pull of Choice 100
6.3 The Burden of Choice 106
 Contents xiii

6.4 The Fallouts of Choice 113

6.5 Conclusion 118
References122

Part II Responsibility 127

7 On Responsibility129
7.1 Introduction 129
7.2 The Meaning of Responsibility 130
7.3 The Experience of Responsibility 135
7.4 The Belief in Responsibility 140
7.5 Conclusion 143
References144

8 Three Senses of Responsibility147

8.1 Introduction 147
8.2 Role Responsibility 148
8.3 Capacity Responsibility 155
8.4 Causal Responsibility 157
8.5 Conclusions 168
References170

9 The Puzzle of Alternate Possibilities173

9.1 Introduction 173
9.2 Alternate Possibilities 175
9.3 The Challenge to the PAPm 176
9.4 The Dilemma Objection 177
9.4.1 The Deterministic Scenario 178
9.4.2 The Indeterministic Scenario 181
9.5 Keeping Things in Perspective 183
9.6 Conclusion 185
References187

10 Neutral Attitude189
10.1 Introduction 189
10.2 The Participant Attitude 190
xiv Contents

10.3 The Objective Attitude 191

10.4 The Neutral Attitude 193
10.4.1 Freud’s Neutrality 194
10.4.2 Rogers’s Helping Relationship 197
10.5 Conclusion 202
References203

11 Blame in Therapy205
11.1 Introduction 205
11.2 No Blame at All? 206
11.3 Detached Blame 207
11.4 The Rescue-Blame Trap 209
11.5 Conclusion 214
References215

12 Coping with Blame217

12.1 Introduction 217
12.2 Adopting New Beliefs 218
12.3 Uprooting Underlying Beliefs 222
12.4 Conclusion 228
References229

Conclusions233

Index239
 List of Tables

Table 1.1 The table summarizes the main distinctions between the five
views on free will: hard determinism, hard incompatibilism,
compatibilism, libertarianism, and revisionism 9
Table 1.2 The table explains four views that depend on whether one
believes in free will and autonomy or not 27
Table 6.1 The table outlines three types of choice and their negative
consequences for one’s well-being or behavior 106
Table 7.1 The table summarizes five different types or senses of the
term responsibility 135
Table 10.1 The table sums up three conditions for taking an objective
attitude191

xv
Part I
Free Will
 1
On Freedom

1.1 Introduction
Freedom is a common term in our everyday vocabulary. But what is it
specifically? And how is it connected to our mental health?
This chapter will introduce different freedom-related subjects and shed
some light on how they relate to our mental health and psychotherapy.
Section 1.2 starts with what the free will debate is all about. Section
1.3 outlines the main views on free will, such as hard determinism, com-
patibilism, libertarianism, and so on. Section 1.4 illuminates the contro-
versy of how to understand and define free will. Section 1.5 deals with
the arguments that understand free will as the ability to do otherwise.
Section 1.6 moves on to the arguments that comprehend free will as the
ability to be the source of one’s actions. Section 1.7 explains the implica-
tions of the disbelief in free will while Sect. 1.8 brings about the question
of what the experience of freedom is. Section 1.9 makes a distinction
between free will and freedom of action (negative and positive freedom),
whereas Sect. 1.10 demarcates free will and autonomy. Importantly, each
section establishes how its topic relates to therapy and mental health.

© The Author(s) 2020 3

V. Beliavsky, Freedom, Responsibility, and Therapy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41571-6_1
4 V. Beliavsky

I will argue, for one, that therapy promotes various types of freedom
by default, such as freedom of action, the experience of freedom, auton-
omy, and even free will (if understood correctly). Moreover, it may be
essential to sustain and reinforce the belief in free will (at least a certain
kind), as there is evidence that the disbelief in free will is associated with
low mental well-being.

1.2 The Meaning of Free Will

One common view is that free will amounts to sufficient control over
one’s actions. If we have free will, then it is “up to us” as to how we will,
what we choose, and how we act. It certainly “feels” at least sometimes
that we have a choice, control, and that we are the authors of our actions.
But whether it is actually true has been a bone of contention for two
millennia.
Free will is often related to other important notions, such as moral
responsibility (desert, blame, punishment, praise, justice), autonomy,
originality, creativity, self-worth, and love. One question that is frequently
asked is, “How should we change our life if there is no free will?” Would
we change our political system if people were not in full control of their
behavior? Would we alter our perception of love, if people were simply
hard-wired to love someone but not others?
Most often, free will is discussed in relation to moral responsibility.
Many believe that free will involves the type of control that is necessary
or even sufficient for moral responsibility (McKenna and Pereboom
2016). If people have a sufficient amount of control over their behavior,
if their actions are up to them, it appears fair to blame or praise individu-
als for the choices they decide to make. But if people are bereft of suffi-
cient control over their choices, they do not seem to deserve to be blamed
or praised for their behavior (either wrongdoings or achievements). Yet,
some deny the link between free will and moral responsibility. One view
is that people can be morally responsible even if they do not have free will
(Fischer and Ravizza 1998).
Technically, there are two debates: (a) do we have free? and (b) are we
morally responsible? (or in what sense can we be responsible?) Though
 1 On Freedom 5

these questions are often interconnected, it is possible to set the discus-

sions apart.
I will focus on free will in Part I and move on to the notion of moral
responsibility in Part II.

1.3 Free Will Perspectives

One crucial issue of the debate is whether people can have free will in a
deterministic Universe. Causal determinism is a thesis that every event is
necessitated by some prior events and laws of nature (Hoefer 2016).
Think of the law of cause and effect. Every event is caused by some prior
events while those events are caused themselves by some earlier events,
and so on to infinity. Human choices, for example, can be said to result
from some preceding events such as desires, beliefs, experience, child-
hood, and so on. In turn, those events have been caused by some prior
events and so on. One implication of causal determinism is that there can
be only one possible physical outcome. That is, prior events determine
only one specific event in the present. This suggests that if determinism is
true, the Universe allows only one possible present and only one possi-
ble future.
The issue of determinism splits philosophers into numerous conflict-
ing camps concerning free will. There are six main standpoints on free
will: hard determinism, hard incompatibilism, compatibilism, libertari-
anism, revisionism, and illusionism.
Hard determinism is a thesis that determinism is true, free will does not
exist, and moral responsibility is unjustified (James 1884; Vilhauer 2004).
With regard to determinism, hard determinists believe that the Universe—
including human behavior—is governed by the rule of cause and effect.
The Universe can be compared to a clockwork mechanism. Once wound
up, it moves inevitably in a strict order and one direction. This suggests
that it is already determined what should happen in the near or distant
future. It is already fixed, for example, what you will do in ten years at
10.34 a.m. on March 23. It is already “written” whether you will marry
or not, whether you will divorce, whether you will succeed in your career
or not, or whether you will ever travel to Barbados. If we knew all the
6 V. Beliavsky

initial conditions (past causes), it would be possible not only to forecast

events but also to report exactly how the future would unwind. With
regard to free will, hard determinists normally define free will as the abil-
ity to choose otherwise. That is, there should be the ability that could
empower people to swerve away from the predetermined course of action.
Yet, since the Universe is deterministic, people do not have the ability to
do other than what they do. The preceding events and laws of nature
necessitate only one course of action. There can be only one possible past,
only one possible present, and only one possible future. Since no alterna-
tives are available, hard determinists infer that people do not have free
will. By extension, hard determinists infer that people are not morally
responsible; that is, they do not deserve to be blamed or praised for their
actions. If determinism is true, it was simply preordained that some peo-
ple would become cruel criminals, while others would become priests,
police officers, brilliant inventors, successful entrepreneurs, doctors, or
billionaires. Yet, hard determinists tend to agree that criminals can and
should be still imprisoned or isolated to prevent their misdeeds and
maintain social order.
With the development of quantum mechanics, it became known,
however, that the Universe contains both deterministic and indetermin-
istic processes. The very fact that indeterminism exists has issued a serious
challenge to hard determinism. Yet, hard determinists can still argue that
what science shows is that indeterminacy exists only among subatomic
particles, but it does not show that there is any indeterminacy among the
developed organisms or large material objects (McKenna and Pereboom
2016). In other words, while indeterminacy might exist at a micro level,
there is no evidence that it extends to a macro level. This suggests that
human behavior may still remain fully subject to the rule of determinism.
Hard incompatibilism is a view that determinism is false, yet free will
still does not exist and moral responsibility is unjustified (Pereboom
2001). Hard incompatibilists concede that there is both determinism and
indeterminism in the Universe. Yet, it is argued that neither determinism
nor indeterminism makes it possible for people to have free will. The
threat of determinism is that it necessitates how people behave. The threat
of indeterminism is that it robs people of control over their actions, intro-
ducing the existence of chance. Hard incompatibilists tend to define free
 1 On Freedom 7

will as the ability to be the ultimate source of one’s actions. It is argued,

however, that people cannot possibly be the ultimate sources of their
behavior. It is always possible to find some antecedent causes outside
human control, which determine human actions. Hard incompatibilists
also argue that society should abandon the belief in free will and moral
responsibility. This would primarily entail a reform of the penitentiary
system and change common interpersonal relations.
Compatibilism (sometimes also called full compatibilism or soft deter-
minism) is a view that determinism is true, free will exists, and moral
responsibility is justified. The premise of compatibilism is that determin-
ism does not threaten free will. Two phenomena can coexist provided we
coin a definition of free will that does not conflict with determinism.
Compatibilists propose various definitions of free will. Some define it as
the power to act as you want to without constraints and coercion
(Grünbaum 2013, 87f; Mill 1865, 285). Others hold that free will
requires action on a particular type of desire (Frankfurt 1971). Still, oth-
ers relate free will to self-control (Baumeister 2008; Dennett 1984;
Fischer and Ravizza 1998).
Compatibilism can be broken down into two subdirections. Hard
compatibilism posits that free will is compatible with determinism and
even hidden manipulation (Watson 1999). Semi-compatibilism holds that
determinism is compatible only with moral responsibility but not with
free will (Fischer 2002; Fischer and Ravizza 1998).
Libertarianism is a view that determinism is false, free will exists, and
moral responsibility is justified. It is believed that since the Universe con-
tains some indeterminacy, there is a possibility for people to have free
will. Like hard determinists, libertarians tend to define free will as the
ability to do otherwise. Libertarian theories are unanimous that free will
requires indeterminism, but they differ in terms of the type of indetermi-
nacy required for free action.
Libertarianism consists of three subdirections. Event-causal theories
affirm that a free act should be caused by prior events (e.g., desires,
beliefs), but it should be caused in an indeterministic manner (Doyle
2010; Kane 1985). Non-causal theories hold that a free act should be
uncaused at all (neither by desires nor by beliefs) (Pink 2011). Agent-­
causal theories hold that people are enduring substances that can cause
8 V. Beliavsky

actions without being caused themselves by prior events (sort of prime

mover unmoved) (O’Connor 2011).
Revisionism is a view that a certain form of free will exists, people
should retain the belief in free will, but the human ordinary intuition of
free will should be revised (Vargas 2007). Revisionists are former libertar-
ians who came to believe that a libertarian free will was impossible. Yet,
revisionists, unlike hard incompatibilists, do not argue that the belief in
free will should be abandoned. Revisionists concede that people can have
a compatibilist type of free will. There is also a certain distinction between
revisionists and compatibilists. Compatibilists argue that the human
common-sense intuition of free will is compatibilist, and, for this reason,
there is no need to make any revision in what people believe. Revisionists,
on the other hand, hold that the human intuition of free will contains
libertarian beliefs. Given this, we need to revise the human common-­
sense intuition about free will, expunging libertarian beliefs and reinforc-
ing compatibilist beliefs.
Illusionism posits that free will does not exist, but society should main-
tain the illusion of free will (Smilansky 2000). The argument is that the
belief in free will is beneficial for both the individual and society. If dis-
abused, the consequences could be devastating. People may lose faith in
morality, social order, and self-worth.
Incompatibilism refers to any position which denies the compatibility
of free will with determinism. Hard determinists, hard incompatibilists,
libertarians, illusionists, and revisionists (to a certain extent) are all variet-
ies of incompatibilism (Table 1.1).
Turn now to psychotherapy. A certain view on free will, in fact, can be
found in every therapeutic school. For example, it is widely believed that
Freud’s psychoanalysis and Skinner’s behaviorism advocate hard deter-
minism—that is, they hold that determinism is true and people do not
have free will.
One serious problem for the accurate interpretation of any personality
theory is the lack of precision. Most personality theorists never state
explicitly their positions on free will, which creates much confusion and
room for speculation. Take Skinner’s position as an example. As I already
said, the most widespread view is that Skinner was a hard determinist,
who rejected both free will and moral responsibility (Begelman 1978).
 1 On Freedom 9

Table 1.1 The table summarizes the main distinctions between the five views on
free will: hard determinism, hard incompatibilism, compatibilism, libertarianism,
and revisionism
Is free will Are we
Is determinism compatible with Do we have morally
true? determinism? free will? responsible?
Hard + − − −
determinism
Hard − − − −
incompatibilism
Compatibilism + + + +
(semi-­
compatibilism
will say “no”)
Libertarianism − − + +
Revisionism − + + +
(Yes, but
we need
some
revision)

But some argue that Skinner’s view is an epitome of hard compatibil-

ism—when free will is compatible with both determinism and methods
of covert non-constraining control (Kane 1996, 67). For example,
“Walden Two”, Skinner’s project of a perfect society, can be regarded as a
clear example of a hard compatibilist society. On the one hand, we have
people who have been covertly and deliberately controlled by others since
their birth; on the other hand, this does not prevent them to enjoy vari-
ous freedoms (e.g., to act as they want to).
One of my main arguments in this work will be that compatibilism
appears to be the main view on free will among counseling schools. And
if true, it is natural to expect that integrative psychotherapy (and integra-
tive theory of personality) will advocate compatibilism as well.

1.4 The Definition of Free Will

As mentioned earlier, there is no generally accepted definition of free will.
One common view is to associate free will with the ability to make a
choice. One research indicates, for example, that laypeople associate
10 V. Beliavsky

belief in free will with making choices (Feldman et al. 2014). It was also
found that the stronger people believed in free will, the more they enjoyed
and valued their ability to make choices.
Yet, we face a problem straight away: what kind of choice specifically?
The term choice is a murky and contentious one. And we have no univer-
sally recognized understanding of what it takes to choose freely. Honderich
makes a comment which is on target: “We don’t have a single settled idea
of what has to be true if a choice is to count as free. And our ordinary
language does not contain such a single idea. The fact of the matter is that
“free” and a lot of related terms are systematically ambiguous” (2002, 112).
Incompatibilists, for example, tend to understand free choice as the
possibility to have a “leeway” choice. A leeway choice implies the ability
to act otherwise, given that the past events and laws of nature remain the
same. To put it otherwise, the agent should be able to choose A to the
very same extent as to choose B at time T given all conditions remain
unchanged. Suppose Mr. A decides to make a cup of tea. According to
the incompatibilist thesis, Mr. A has a choice only if he has at least two
equally possible alternatives for action at time T. For example, he can
equally decide to make a cup of tea or decide to make coffee. If Mr. A
could do only one thing, incompatibilists would argue that Mr. A’s decid-
ing is, in fact, an illusion. Since there are no alternatives available, Mr. A
could not escape doing what he does.
Some libertarians argue, however, that free will implies a “torn leeway”
choice. In a torn choice, the agent experiences the equipoise of two or
more alternatives. That is, there are equally good reasons for two or more
actions. Because of this, the agent is at a loss about which option to pick,
they feel an internal conflict of the wills, and experience being “torn”
(uncertain and hesitant) right up to the moment of choice. The agent
may say, “I have equal reasons to make tea and coffee; I can decide either
way, I should just pick” (Balaguer 2012, 75; Kane 1996, 130).
Compatibilists, by contrast, tend to define free choice as the ability to
make a “definite” choice. A definite choice, broadly speaking, refers to the
ability to identify the best course of action and to realize it. Of course, an
agent can deliberate, doubt, and waffle before making a choice. Yet, it is
expected that eventually the agent assertively determines what they want
to do and acts intentionally. Think again of our example. Mr. A imagines
 1 On Freedom 11

a few options of what he could do, he takes stock of these scenarios, and
then he decides to make a cup of tea. He may say, “This option is the best
in this situation, and I do not need any other alternatives” (Dennett
1984, 133; Wolf 1990, 55).
How can people think so differently concerning the idea of free choice?
As a matter of fact, there is some evidence that the controversy between
compatibilist and incompatibilist intuitions has psychological roots. One
study, for example, has found the link between individual differences and
a free will intuition (Feltz and Cokely 2009). Those subjects who pos-
sessed a strong extraversion trait were inclined to select compatibilist
answers to questions about free will, whilst those low on extraversion
preferred incompatibilist answers. One implication of this research is that
it may be natural for people to produce different intuitions about free
will. Extending these findings to our discussion, it may be natural for
people to have different perspectives on the nature of free choice. The
results of this research suggest that, if true, the controversies around the
free will debate could be always intractable. The cause is simply
psychological.
That said, as the debate is often set up, there are at least two common
options on how to define free will. Free will requires either (a) to have the
ability to do otherwise or (b) to be the source of one’s actions. Yet, it
remains hotly disputed in what sense it would be sufficient to have either
the ability to choose otherwise or to be the source of one’s actions.
Compatibilists and incompatibilists promote different types of analyses.

1.5 The Ability to Do Otherwise

Representatives of classical compatibilism (also known as dispositional-
ists) suggested that we should consider the agent’s ability to do otherwise
in a conditional or hypothetical sense (Ayer 1954; Hume 1740). This
means that if the agent had wanted (attempted, willed, or decided) to do
otherwise at that time, then he would have done otherwise. Thus, one’s
ability to do otherwise is based on some counterfactual scenario. The
proposal is that free will requires having only this conditional power.
Notice that free will would be compatible with determinism in this case.
12 V. Beliavsky

While determinism entails that what one willed is determined and one’s
choice is inevitable given the past and laws of nature, determinism allows
one to have a counterfactual thinking of agency: indeed, it may be true
that one would have done otherwise had one willed to do otherwise.
It was pointed out, however, that conditional statements could lead to
false conclusions (Chisholm 1964; Lehrer 1966). Consider the cases of
phobia as an example. Imagine that Frank has extreme stage fright: to
such an extent that performing in front of the audience is psychologically
impossible for him. Even talking about public speaking makes Frank
have a panic attack. Naturally, Frank decides to stay away from the stage.
The question is “Was Frank able to decide otherwise and choose to per-
form?” The conditional analysis suggests “yes”. If Frank had decided
(willed, tried or desired) to do otherwise, then he would have done oth-
erwise. Yet, this ignores Frank’s actual ability. Given Frank’s psychological
condition, he was unable to want or try to go on stage, that is, to do
otherwise. The conditional analysis of “could do otherwise”, thus, fails, as
it involves implausible implications. We can, of course, imagine a world
in which Frank desires to speak to the audience, and so he does. But, in
this case, Frank would not suffer from the phobia, which stops him in his
tracks and impairs his ability to perform in front of others.
The new dispositionalists keep making attempts to rehabilitate the
conditional ability to do otherwise, furnishing new analyses (Fara 2008;
Vihvelin 2013). One goal of these attempts is to show how some deter-
mined agents have the conditional ability to do otherwise, while other
agents (e.g., phobics) are deprived of this ability.
Incompatibilists argue, meanwhile, that “the ability to do otherwise”
should be understood only in categorical terms. This means that the agent
can do otherwise if the agent can do anything other than he does at time
T, while all conditions remain the same up to the moment of choice.
There should be no “ifs” as compared to the conditional analysis. The
point is that the agent can choose either A (to do something) or B (to
refrain from doing A or to do C) at one particular moment. It should be
noted, however, that such an ability would be incompatible with deter-
minism. If determinism is true, then the past remains fixed and the pre-
ceding events necessitate only one course of action: that there is only one
 1 On Freedom 13

possible present and only one possible future. In other words, the agent
is inclined to choose only one certain alternative and cannot do otherwise.
Free will skeptics (e.g., hard determinists) often refer to the “conse-
quence argument” in this discussion outlined by Van Inwagen (1983).
The argument suggests three propositions (ibid):

1. If determinism is true, then our actions are the necessary consequences

of the laws of nature and events that happened in the distant past;
2. Yet, it is not up to us what the laws of nature are or what events hap-
pened in the distant past before we were born;
3. If our present actions are the necessary consequences of the things
which are not up to us, then our present actions are not up to us.

Further:

1. People act out of free will (or are morally responsible) only if they
could have done otherwise;
2. If determinism is true, people could have never done otherwise (do
not have the ability to act otherwise);
3. Ergo, if determinism is true, people do not act out of free will (or are
not morally responsible for their actions).

The consequence argument suggests that people do not have the cate-
gorical ability to do otherwise. If determinism is true, then the future is
closed to alternatives; the future is fixed by the past, that is, the future is
a natural consequence of the past. Equally, human choices and actions are
also the natural consequence of the past, which ultimately are not up to
us. People—while being a determined part of the world—are powerless
to swerve away from this predetermined flow and introduce an alterna-
tive scenario.
Libertarians, on the other hand, agree that people cannot have the
categorical ability to do otherwise under determinism, but they point out
to the existence of indeterminism. Some form of indeterminism (e.g.,
non-causal, event-causal, agent-causal) may take place in human agency
and thus break the deterministic chains (Brembs 2011; Kane 1996).
14 V. Beliavsky

Hence, indeterminism may render the categorical ability to do otherwise

possible.
The plausibility of this argument, however, remains under debate.
Currently, there is little or no evidence that biological organisms, for
example, accommodate any form of indeterminism. Another worry is
that indeterminism can undermine human control over behavior and
thus sabotage free will. The argument can be put as follows:

1. If indeterminism is true, events happen merely by chance and not

under the control of people.
2. If what happens is not under the control of people, then people are
not in full control of their behavior, choices, and what follows.
3. If indeterminism is true, people do not have free will (and are not
morally responsible for their choices).

Imagine that Mr. A deliberates what to drink: tea or coffee. He thinks

it over and decides that tea would go down well. But instead of ordering
what he decided, he orders coffee all of a sudden. So, there is a specific
decision but absolutely contrary behavior. This definitely seems a bit arbi-
trary or weak-willed.
But again, the debate continues, as libertarians keep elaborating
sophisticated ideas of how indeterminism might work nicely in human
behavior (Kane 2011).
I provide more details about the categorical ability to do otherwise in
Chap. 9, in which I discuss the possible mechanisms of this ability and
the implications for psychotherapy in case people do not have this ability.

1.6 The Sourcehood of Agency

A growing number of philosophers argue, however, that free will (or
moral responsibility) does not require the ability to do otherwise at all
and that we need to sidestep the consequence argument (Frankfurt 1969;
Wolf 1990). Allegedly, people can act out of free will even if they cannot
choose differently. Equally, people can be morally responsible for their
actions even if they could not have done otherwise.
 1 On Freedom 15

An alternative point of view is that free will requires an appropriate

sourcehood of one’s actions. What truly matters either for free will or for
moral responsibility is not whether people could do otherwise but how
the action is brought about.
As you might anticipate, incompatibilists and compatibilists hold dif-
ferent perspectives on what kind of sourcehood would be sufficient for
free will (or moral responsibility).
Incompatibilists argue, however, that free will requires to be the ulti-
mate source of one’s actions. It means that the agent is the only source of
his or her actions. The action should not be influenced by any prior or
external cause outside the agent’s control. But if determinism is true,
people cannot not be the ultimate sources of their actions. The causal
chain does not stop with a human being, but it passes through. Simply
put, people are influenced by causes that took place long before they were
even born: the wedding of parents, genes of grandparents, civilizational
development, wars, migration, climate change, evolution, sun dust, and
ultimately the causes that trace back to the Big Bang.
The argument can be put as follows:

1. If determinism is true, then human behavior is caused by some prior

events in the past that had happened even before the agent was born;
2. If human behavior is caused by some prior events in the past that had
happened even before they were born, people cannot be the ultimate
sources of their actions.

Further:

1. Free will (or moral responsibility) requires being the ultimate source
of one’s actions;
2. If determinism is true, people are not the ultimate sources of their actions;
3. If determinism is true, then people do not have free will (or are not
morally responsible for their actions).

Let’s return to Mr. A who decides to have a cup of tea (in a determin-
istic world). Was his choice free? Both leeway incompatibilists and source-
hood incompatibilists would say “no”, and both would concede that Mr.
16 V. Beliavsky

A does not have sufficient control over his behavior. But they would also
argue for different reasons. Leeway incompatibilists would point out that
Mr. A could not have done otherwise (e.g., to refrain or to have a cup of
coffee). By contrast, sourcehood incompatibilists would argue that Mr.
A’s desire for tea was brought about by factors that are ultimately beyond
his control (e.g., that he was conditioned by his family to have tea in the
morning) and thus it was inevitable that he decided to have a cup of tea
at this moment.
Compatibilists argue, however, that the condition of being the ulti-
mate source of one’s actions is too demanding. It would be enough that
the action issues from an appropriate source within the agent’s character.
The first compatibilist option is a reason-responsive theory (Fischer
and Ravizza 1998; McKenna 2013; Sartorio 2016; Wolf 1990). The
reason-­responsive theories lay stress on the agent’s cognitive capacities. To
be the source of one’s actions, the agent should have a reason-responsive
mechanism. The general idea is: the agent acts out of free will if the agent
remains responsive to a sufficient range of reasons (e.g., rational consid-
erations, moral reasons) at the moment of choice. The available reasons
can either support or oppose a certain decision. What matters is that the
agent can understand these reasons and respond to them by adjusting
their behavior if necessary. This also involves some counterfactual sce-
narios. The agent does A out of free will only if, in at least one hypotheti-
cal scenario, the agent had reasons not to do A, then he would not do it.
The agents who are not sensitive to the reasons available to them are
bereft of free will. Consider our previous example of Frank who suffers
from a phobia. The reason-responsive view suggests that Frank does not
act out of his free will when he decides to stay away from the stage. The
reason is that Frank’s reason-responsive mechanism is impaired: even if he
was given a convincing reason to go on stage, he would never respond to it.
The second compatibilist option is an identification theory (also
known as self-determination, mesh, or hierarchical theory) (Bratman
2000; Frankfurt 1971; Watson 1975). Identification views place empha-
sis on the motivation of action. To be the source of one’s actions, the
agent ought to be able to identify with a certain motive. The general
premise is: the agent acts out of free will if they act on the motives with
which they are identified. The human mind is home to various urges,
 1 On Freedom 17

conflicting desires, values, goals, and so on. All of them give some incen-
tive for action. But we do not identify with all of them, that is, we would
not consider all of them as appropriate, desirable, or acceptable in our
behavior. Basically, the agent acts out of free will only if the agent reflects
critically on their motives, identifies the best one, resists the others, and
realizes it in their behavior. Free will is gummed up if the agent is moved
by a motive treated as undesirable or alien. Consider again Frank who
suffers from the phobia. Frank may, in fact, want to perform on stage,
that is, he identifies himself with this incentive. But he is not able to act
on it and eventually feels the compulsion to refrain. Since Frank cannot
realize his true will in his behavior, we can judge that he is robbed of
free will.
Incompatibilists, however, find the compatibilist concepts unsatisfac-
tory. One usually refers to the manipulation arguments for objection.
One example of the manipulation argument is the Zygote Argument by
Mele (2006).
Imagine that there is a goddess Diana who has supernatural powers
and foreknowledge. Diana wants to create Ernie who will at some point
carry out a particular act intentionally: to murder Jones, for example.
Suppose Diana creates a zygote Z and puts it into Mary (in a determinis-
tic world), knowing that it will eventually develop into Ernie, and that,
given his character and all events that have already happened and will
happen, Ernie will inevitably murder Jones willingly 30 years later (as a
result of his own reason-responsive mechanism and identifying with his
own motivation).
Suppose that Ernie does murder Jones. Did Ernie act out of free will?
Is Ernie morally responsible for his action? Notice that the compatibilist
conditions for free will are satisfied in this scenario: Ernie is reason-­
responsive and identifies himself with a certain motivation. Nonetheless,
Ernie does not seem to be either free or responsible.
Incompatibilists go further and suggest that there is no substantial dif-
ference between the Diana example and a normal deterministic life. In
both cases, it can be said that people are manipulated to live a certain life
by forces beyond their understanding and control.
There are a few reply options for compatibilists. One line of the argu-
ment is to point out that manipulation does not always represent a threat
18 V. Beliavsky

to freedom (McKenna 2008, 2014). If a manipulator (nature, a god, or

an evil scientist) only creates an agent but does not interfere further into
the agent’s life or development, the agent can eventually become free. It
is especially plausible if the world contains both deterministic and inde-
terministic forces, as it would be impossible to fully predict or control the
behavior of the agent because of indeterminism.
Speaking of therapy, I will argue that counseling schools—in particu-
lar, Freud and Rogers—tend to promote the sourcehood compatibilist
account of free will. Chapters 2 and 3 will deal with Freud’s and Rogers’s
perspectives. And in Chap. 4, we will discuss what sourcehood theory
may be appropriate for integrative psychotherapy.

1.7 The Belief in Free Will

It has been repeatedly shown that attenuating the belief in free will leads
to various negative outcomes, such as undermined sense of agency (being
in control of one’s actions) (Lynn et al. 2014), self-alienation (Seto and
Hicks 2016), decrease in counterfactual thinking (Alquist et al. 2014),
decrease in perceived meaningfulness of life (Crescioni et al. 2015), cor-
ruption of helpfulness and increase in aggression (Baumeister et al. 2009),
weakening of the feeling of gratitude (MacKenzie et al. 2014), and reduc-
tion of cooperative behavior (Protzko et al. 2016). The belief in free will
is also associated with better academic performance (Feldman et al.
2016), stronger sense of self-efficacy, life satisfaction, meaning in life,
gratitude, greater commitment in relationships (Crescioni et al. 2015),
learning from emotional experiences (Stillman and Baumeister 2010),
and beliefs in morality (Bergner and Ramon 2013).
One widely cited study, for example, displays that it is possible to
manipulate the belief in free will and that diminishing the belief in free
will can lead to antisocial behavior (Vohs and Schooler 2008). Participants
were instructed to read a text supporting a belief in determinism, namely,
that human behavior is the natural result of inherited and environmental
forces, or to read a neutral text. Participants who were primed with deter-
ministic texts eventually showed an increase in cheating on a problem-­
solving task.
 1 On Freedom 19

Another research reveals that the belief in free will correlates with tak-
ing autonomous actions (Alquist et al. 2013). Participants completed the
conformity scale (responding to questions, such as “I tend to rely on oth-
ers when it comes to important decisions”) and the FAD-Plus scale to
measure the belief in free will (responding to questions such as “People
have complete free will”). The study reveals that disbelievers in free will
were significantly more apt to conform, while those who espoused free
will belief were inclined toward autonomy. Researchers conclude that a
disbelief in free will discourage people to think for themselves, which
results in mindless going along with the group. In contrast, the belief in
free will elevates the motivation for autonomous contemplation. Free will
believers were willing to exert mental effort, be creative, and thus depart
from the norms and opinions of others.
Such findings, taken together, appear to indicate that undermining the
belief in free will might lead to dire consequences for people and society
overall.
Free will skeptics, however, are less wary of these forecasts. Some
research, for example, must be interpreted with caution. Some studies
might be flawed, as researchers in some experiments appear not only to
undermine the belief in free will but also to induce the belief in fatalism
in their participants (Miles 2013). It is important to distinguish between
determinism and fatalism. Fatalism implies that a certain event will hap-
pen anyway, no matter what a person does. Human choices, essentially,
make no difference, as the outcome will be the same. Determinism, on
the other hand, posits that events are caused by preceding events. The
future is the natural outcome of the specific sequence of events that hap-
pened earlier. This suggests that human choices do make the difference
under determinism, as each choice will lead to a unique outcome.
But even so, it remains an open question whether any of the above-­
mentioned negative outcomes would have any long-term effect. It might
be that these negative effects are temporary, and they may eventually fade
away. People might get used to the new reality over time, learning more
about what skepticism entails, and adjust their behavior.
Lastly, it is pointed out that the belief in skepticism can generate not
only negative but also positive outcomes. Some studies indicate, for
example, that participants exposed to deterministic messages or those
20 V. Beliavsky

who are weaker in free will belief demonstrated less vindictive and retrib-
utive attitudes toward others (Caspar et al. 2017; Shariff et al. 2014).
When it comes to psychotherapy, there are at least three points that are
worth bearing in mind. First, it is good to be aware of the negative con-
sequences that may follow from weakening the belief in free will. For this
reason, therapists may find it useful to know how to amplify the belief in
free will during psychotherapy (Young 2016).
In my experience, I happened to observe the negative side-effects of the
disbelief in free will (low mood) for a couple of months. Though the agent
was continuously exposed to the literature on free will skepticism, it was to
no avail: he did not experience any sign of improvement or habituation.
I suspect, however, that the side-effects of the disbelief in free will may
not be uniform. Much may depend on the character or personality of the
individual. For example, people with external locus of control might
accept and endure the disbelief in free will much easier than people with
internal locus of control.1 But this conjecture demands verification.
Second, it is good to keep in mind how we frame the belief itself.
Notice that the belief in free will can be different: it can be a compatibil-
ist, a libertarian, or a revisionist. In addition, many individuals have a
very vague understanding of what free will is at all. One of the goals of
the therapy, therefore, would be to conceptualize the belief in free will in
the first place.
Third, it appears possible to maintain the belief in free will and a moder-
ate attitude toward others. For example, a person may uphold a belief in
free will but also remain skeptical concerning contemporary retributive
practices, believing that they require reform (as many free will skep-
tics believe). I don’t find this as a paradox. Apparently, it is possible to
believe that people have sufficient control over their behavior to be the
participants of moral relations and also maintain a compassionate attitude
toward others, believing that people can have bad luck and are in no way
infallible creatures. Humans can trip up, misjudge, and do a lot of harm as
a result, but they can also grow and change under favorable conditions.
In concluding this section, I want to pose a question that may be of
interest to both psychologists and philosophers. Why does challenging
the belief in free will lead to such dire consequences for human agency?
Notice that disbelief in free will affects so many spheres: meaning in life,
 1 On Freedom 21

prosocial behavior, sense of agency, autonomous behavior, life satisfac-

tion, to name just a few.
I put forth that one of the probable reasons can be connected to the
need for autonomy. The need for autonomy refers to the psychological
and universal need of people to feel ownership of their actions. Simply
put, in general, people want to be the authors of their behavior, self-­
regulate and freely choose their actions. Numerous experiments show
that the satisfaction of the need for autonomy is associated with enhanced
vitality and better task performance, while the frustration of this need
predicts various negative outcomes for agency and mental health (Ryan
and Deci 2017, 67). My conjecture is that by undermining the belief in
free will, researchers are likely to frustrate the psychological need for
autonomy of their participants. It seems very easy to do so if someone
reports to you that “You know, you never act freely and, as a matter of
fact, you are skillfully manipulated to do what you do.” In addition, given
the fact that disbelief in free will yields a considerable fallout with effects
in numerous areas, it is plausible to assume that we encounter here the
case of frustrated need.
If true, I argue that it is essential to preserve the belief in free will (e.g.,
a revisionist one), as it would be a matter of taking care of the psychologi-
cal well-being of billions of people worldwide. Whether it is good or not,
we cannot switch off the need for autonomy. It is an inherited and psy-
chological given of our nature. We can either frustrate it or take steps to
gratify it. The latter option seems to be the only reasonable choice.
I will say more about the need for autonomy in Chap. 6, about the
belief in free will in therapy in Chap. 5, and I will talk about the non-­
judgmental attitude in Chap. 10.

1.8 The Sense of Free Will

Having mentioned the belief in free will, it seems appropriate to say a few
words about the experience of freedom. The phenomenology of free will
is relatively a new area of research (Holton 2009; Horgan and Timmons
2011; Nahmias et al. 2004).
22 V. Beliavsky

People seem to be able to quickly and easily discern two subjective

states: when they act freely and when they act unfreely. Therefore, it is
tempting to say that there are two distinct phenomenologies: the phe-
nomenology of freedom and the phenomenology of unfreedom. In this
field, researchers pose a set of intricate philosophical questions: Is there a
distinct sense of free will or not? How do we come to believe that an act
is free? Is the sense of free will important?
Let it be noted in passing that phenomenology sometimes sets the
foundation for the theories of free will. Quite often, philosophers report
their own experiences as a fact to scaffold and vindicate the existence of
free will. As John Searle notes, “It is this experience which is the founda-
tion stone of our belief in the freedom of the will” (1984, 95).
It should be noted, however, that philosophers ordinarily do not main-
tain that the experience of free will can sufficiently indicate the existence
of free will in reality. As Lehrer puts it, “I agree that the question of
whether it follows from the fact that some of our actions are in our power
that the thesis of determinism is false cannot be settled by introspection
but only by logical analysis” (1960, 157). After all, experiences are not
always veridical and can be misleading. The sense of freedom may delude
a person concerning the abilities they might have or not. An example
would be an individual who believes that they have initiated some actions
consciously, while, in fact, the action was triggered off by some uncon-
scious mechanisms preceding conscious awareness (Libet 1999).
Philosophers also ask one important question: “What is the experience
of freedom?” Currently, there is no general agreement concerning what
the experience of free will (or the sense of freedom) consists of.
There are two distinct groups of views concerning the phenomenology
of freedom. The attribute view posits that the sense of free will contains a
certain extra positive experience (Nahmias et al. 2004; Paglieri 2013).
This extra experience notifies an agent of an act being free, while the
absence of such experience signals of unfree action. There are four candi-
dates for a phenomenological token or “attribute” of free will. These are
(1) the sense of alternate possibilities (aka that there are options how to
act), (2) the sense of causation (aka authorship of action), (3) the sense of
agency (aka control of action), and (4) the sense of choice.
 1 On Freedom 23

The default view objects that the experience of free will contains any
extra distinguishing component (Paglieri 2013). It is suggested that there
are two distinct phenomenologies: the experience of freedom and the
experience of coercion (i.e., unfreedom). Importantly, the extra senses,
like certain negative emotions, take place only in the experience of coer-
cion. The experience of freedom, on the flip side, does not contain any
extra or special ingredient. Therefore, it is suggested that the experience
of freedom contains far less than the sense of coercion. Since there is
nothing special in the content of the experience of freedom, it is virtually
impossible to determine any distinct or unambiguous freedom attribute.
In the final analysis, the default view contends that the experience of
freedom consists of a normal cluster of senses unless there is a sense of
coercion. In other words, to feel free, the agent just should not experience
coercion. The view implies that people feel free continuously unless the
sense of coercion crops up.
There are two important points when it comes to therapy. First of all,
it appears that psychotherapy inevitably facilitates the experience of free-
dom. We still do not know what the experience of freedom consists of, as
the overview above shows. But notice that good therapy contributes to all
conditions that are allegedly associated with the experience of freedom.
On the one hand, it removes the external coercion or internal compul-
sions that a client may feel (the default view). On the other hand, the
therapy tends to facilitate the sense of choice, the sense of agency (con-
trol), the sense of causation, and the sense of having alternatives (the
attribute view). This assumption is consistent with Rogers’s own clinical
observation. Rogers notes that as the therapy progresses, service users
gradually move from feeling controlled toward feeling free (Kirschenbaum
1989, 83).
Second, there are reasons to believe that the sense of freedom can pre-
dict positive outcomes (similarly to the belief in free will). If the belief in
free will is associated with various positive outcomes, it seems natural to
expect that the experience of freedom can predict some positive outcomes
as well. However, I cannot bear out the assumption that the sense of free-
dom has a considerable impact, as, today, there is a modicum of studies
that investigate the experience of freedom per se.
24 V. Beliavsky

Intuitively, it looks like that not only do many people want to act
freely in their societies, but many also want to be able to say that they feel
free. Rogers also made a lot of statements on the value of the experience
of freedom in his therapeutic practice. As he puts it, “I would be at a loss
to explain the positive change which can occur in psychotherapy if I had
to omit the importance of a sense of free and responsible choice on the
part of my clients. I believe that the experience of freedom to choose is
one of the deepest elements underlying change” (1964, 62). And else-
where, he continues: “[T]he freedom that I am talking about is essentially
an inner thing… [W]e are first of all speaking of something phenomeno-
logical rather than objective, but nonetheless to be prized” (1964, 63).
That said, I hear an echo of Wallwork’s remark that if psychotherapy
induces only the feeling of freedom, it does not provide any real free will;
this could be a highly cynical attitude toward the client (1991, 70). Very
simply, we should not focus just on our experiences, even if it feels good.

1.9 Freedom of Action

It makes sense to draw the line between free will and freedom of action
(positive and negative freedoms). The discussion of positive and negative
freedom can be traced back to Kant (1785), but it received careful exami-
nation by Berlin (1969).
Negative freedom is often described as “freedom from” or “passive free-
dom”. It means the absence of constraints, impediments, compulsions,
pressure from outside, or manipulation. Negative freedom can be pro-
vided by other individuals (parents, teachers, counselors, government),
nature (laws of nature), circumstances (situation), and so on. To a certain
degree, the negative freedom of every person is limited, for every person
inevitably faces a number of constraints produced by social rules or vari-
ous laws. It is forbidden, for example, to drive on footways.
Positive freedom is often characterized as “freedom to”. It means hav-
ing the resources or the means to perform a certain action. Simply put, it
is the ability to do something or the ability to achieve a certain goal.
Positive freedom may involve any type of resource: mental capacities,
time, knowledge, material goods, money, tools, and so on.
 1 On Freedom 25

Sometimes, the agent may lack one of the types of freedom. Suppose
Anna wants to bake a cake. She has a lot of negative freedom since nobody
or nothing stands in her way to cook. But she lacks positive freedom, as
she does not know the recipe, which would instruct her how to cook.
Another example would be a liberal wanting to participate in the political
life of a totalitarian state. The man has a great deal of positive freedom, as
he has the necessary knowledge, education, and time to do politics. But
the man does not have any negative freedom, as the totalitarian state
prohibits citizens to express and propagate liberal beliefs.
It should be noted, however, that negative and positive freedoms do
not designate free will. These are relatively distinct concepts. One may
have negative freedom (e.g., be free of external threat), but it does not
mean that one also has free will (e.g., ability to choose differently).
Indeed, negative and positive freedom may be considered as necessary
elements of free will. The negative element of free will refers to the absence
of external obstacles and internal compulsions. The positive element of
free will means that the agent has a certain ability to act freely (e.g., the
ability to choose). However, more frequently, the negative and positive
freedom appear outside the context of free will. They tend to occur in the
discussion of politics, economics, democracy, human rights, and justice
(Bavetta et al. 2014; Pettit 2014). Negative freedom is associated with the
liberation from dominance, rule, oppression, customs, traditions, or
delusions. Positive freedom relates to the access to economic, social, and
political resources to pursue one’s goals.
There is no doubt that psychotherapy can and should facilitate both
negative and positive freedoms in case there is a need. A client can become
free from their obsessions, fears, neurotic symptoms, and adverse patterns
of behavior. Equally, one can obtain mental resources to achieve one’s
objectives and lead a desired way of life. In a way, any mental disorder can
be regarded as a certain loss of freedom, whereas psychotherapy can be a
tool to regain it.
It can be noticed that Rogers refers to negative freedom in his thera-
peutic work. In talking of the therapeutic relationship, Rogers mentions
that a counselor should give the client “the freedom to experience his own
feelings and those of others without being threatened in doing so” (Rogers
26 V. Beliavsky

et al. 1989, 181). To put it differently, service users should not face any
constraints to experience their complex feelings during the therapy.
Rogers also mentions negative freedom when he talks about the condi-
tions which could foster creativity in people. As he says, “When a teacher,
parent, therapist, or other facilitating person permits the individual a
complete freedom of symbolic expression, creativity is fostered. The per-
missiveness gives the individual complete freedom to think, to feel, to be,
whatever is most inward within himself ” (1961, 358). Again, in these
sentences, freedom is understood as freedom from some external
restraints. Rogers argues that creativity can be nourished only if the indi-
vidual does not face any external barriers and thus is free to move in any
direction they want.

1.10 Autonomy
Lastly, it is worth making a distinction between free will and autonomy.
Personal autonomy is usually linked to the idea of self-governance or self-­
rule. Self-governance basically means to be one’s own person, namely, to
live according to one’s own desires, values, reasons, and choices. If people
proclaim their will for autonomy in some country, they virtually deny the
rule or authority of the central government and demand the right to gov-
ern themselves: to pass their own laws, to determine their priorities, and
so on. If a person fights for autonomy, it means that the agent rejects the
control of others over his life and decides to live according to his own
will. A person is autonomous if he goes his own way: makes his own
choices, thinks for himself, follows his own desires.
Free will is generally a metaphysical question: it examines the nature of
reality. Can people freely choose their actions? Autonomy, on the other
hand, relates primarily to political theory: How should a political system
work? Should people have the right to self-rule? Yet, autonomy can also
be framed as a metaphysical question, enquiring about human agency.
Do people have the power to self-rule at all?
Both free will and autonomy can be associated with moral responsibil-
ity. Free will researchers may ask: Do people have enough control (free
will) to be morally responsible for their actions? Does moral responsibility
 1 On Freedom 27

require free will at all? There is virtually the same story with autonomy.
Does autonomy lead to moral responsibility? Some will be willing to argue
that autonomy and responsibility are distinct things that do not cross. A
person ostensibly can govern themselves while being morally deaf. Think
of children who can do what they want while not being aware of right and
wrong. Or think of animals who self-rule in the wild, and yet we do not
blame them for their behavior. Nonetheless, some would argue that moral
responsibility and autonomy are interconnected. It seems a little odd to
attribute blame or praise to people, while also believing that people do not
self-rule themselves or are not the authors of their actions.
Ordinarily, those who believe in free will tend to believe in autonomy.
But it is not a rule. It is absolutely possible to believe in free will but not
to endorse autonomy or vice versa. Take a look at Table 1.2.
It is important to note that autonomy has its own place in the thera-
peutic enterprise. Usually all indirect psychotherapies—for example,
client-­ centered, narrative, existential therapies—support the idea of
autonomy, believing that the client knows better. A therapist encourages
a client to listen to their gut and actively orchestrate the process of ther-
apy. Directive types of psychotherapy—cognitive, behavioral therapies—
on the other hand, either diminish or remove the idea of autonomy
completely. A therapist plays the role of an expert who knows what will
work best and how to achieve change quickly. A client is expected only to
listen and follow a clear plan of action.

Table 1.2 The table explains four views that depend on whether one believes in
free will and autonomy or not
Free will No free will
Autonomy People have complete control People do not have complete
over their behavior, therefore, control over their behavior
society should give people (e.g., their choices are not up
political liberties to make their to them), but they still should
own decisions and self-govern be given an opportunity to
(democracy). live as they want to.
No People have the ability to choose People lack the ability to
autonomy freely, but they often make choose freely, therefore, it
wrong choices, therefore, the would be wrong to give
government should limit them liberties and the right
individuals’ liberties for their of self-governance.
own good (paternalism).
28 V. Beliavsky

A useful example of the controversy on this matter is the debate

between Rogers and Skinner. While Rogers advocated the concept of free
will/autonomy (see Table 1.2), Skinner was an adamant proponent of the
opposite standpoint: no free will/no autonomy.
Skinner’s central idea was that human behavior was completely deter-
mined by the environment. The author points out that every society, in
fact, consistently applies various techniques of control to determine the
behavior of its citizens (Rogers and Skinner 1956). If a person behaves in
a desirable manner for the community, the group responds to this behav-
ior with positive reinforcement. This can be praise, admiration, fame,
money, scholarship, love, interviews, awards, and so on. These positive
reinforcements, in turn, increase the likelihood that the person will con-
tinue behaving in the same fashion. But if the person behaves in an unac-
ceptable way to the community, the group responds to this behavior with
negative reinforcement. This can include criticism, blame, indignation,
sanctions, censorship, bullying, punishment, or imprisonment. The aim
of these actions is to reduce the occurrence of certain undesirable behav-
ior in the future. The techniques of social control are very subtle. Because
of this, people often fail to see the extent to which they are controlled and
manipulated. Skinner concludes that the idea of free will is an illusion, as
people, in fact, make choices that have been determined by their rein-
forcement history.
When it comes down to autonomy, Skinner suggests giving up the idea
of self-rule as ineffective. The point is that since every society resorts to the
controlling techniques anyway, it would be more favorable for society if
scientists took an active part in the control of human behavior. Nowadays,
there is a sort of laissez-faire attitude to this question without any deliberate
planning. But it would be far more effective to approach this question con-
sciously and intelligently if we are to build a more thriving society. By way
of an example, Skinner proposes the model of effective social engineering
in the work “Walden Two” (1948, 279). The author describes a utopian
community that applies behaviorist techniques of control for individual
and social thriving (1948, 279). The community is organized basically at
two levels. At one level, there are people who engineer the community
called “Planners”. They make policies which include the behavioral tech-
niques of control. Planners determine the conduct of inhabitants so that
 1 On Freedom 29

the latter could be highly effective, upright, and generally happy. At another
level, there is a population of the community itself that leads an ordinary
life (“Managers”, “Workers”, “Scientists”). Inhabitants have the possibility
to act how they want to. As Skinner puts it, “Their behavior is determined,
yet they’re free” (1948, 279).2
To understand Skinner’s argument better, we need to throw some light
on what control really stands for. Rogers makes a helpful distinction
between the three types or extents of control:

(I) The setting of conditions by B for A, A having no voice in the matter,

such that certain predictable behaviors then occur in A. I refer to this as
external control.
(II) The setting of conditions by B for A, A giving some degree of con-
sent to these conditions, such that certain predictable behaviors then occur
in A. I refer to this as the influence of B on A.
(III) The setting of conditions by A such that certain predictable behav-
iors then occur in himself. I refer to this as internal control” (Rogers and
Skinner 1956, 1061).

It can help to think about who actually makes a choice. If a person

makes a choice on their own, without the interference of others, we can
judge that the agent exercises internal control or self-rule over their behav-
ior. But if the person allows someone else to make a choice for them, then
the agent allows external control over them exercised by the will of others.
We can see that Skinner noticeably gravitates toward the concept of
external control (paternalism). All major decisions about life in Walden
Two are made by Planners with the help of Scientists, while all other
ordinary people have to conform to the externally imposed agenda, tak-
ing it for granted.
Rogers’s therapy, on the other hand, is clearly committed to the con-
cept of self-rule: when clients are given the freedom to think for them-
selves, to draw their own conclusions, and to make personal choices
about what to do next. Rogers reports, for example, that one of the trends
in his therapy is the shift of the locus of power from outside to inside the
self. As he puts it, “Another trend which is evident [in a person emerging
from therapy] relates to the source or locus of choices and decisions, or
evaluative judgments. The individual increasingly comes to feel that this
30 V. Beliavsky

locus of evaluation lies within himself… He recognizes that it rests within

himself to choose” (1961, 119). Nonetheless, Rogers does not seem to
oppose the possibility and value of influence. Hardly it is possible to
escape the impact of other people while living in society overall or the
impact of the counselor while undergoing therapy.
As an advocate of the integrative tradition, I find it important to point
out that there is a third option. We can think more flexibly and do not
consider autonomy as an all-or-nothing deal. A therapist might find it
useful to alternate between the techniques of external control (when it is
important to give clear instructions to tackle a certain issue) and self-­
governance (when a client wants to work on self-analysis). In fact, much
depends on the client’s request: self-governance, for example, might work
better to reconnect with some feelings and needs, while doing home
assignments may be a better option to learn to cope with cognitive distor-
tions. Another important factor is the mental condition of a client. The
work with psychotic disorders appears to require external control tech-
niques, such as taking medication. Think of children as a relevant exam-
ple. External control appears to be the only reasonable option when you
take care of toddlers: you feed them, cure them, and hold them when
walking on the street. With full autonomy given in childhood, people
simply would not survive. But as children grow up and mature, a prudent
parent allows them to have more freedom and self-governance to become
self-sufficient individuals.
I will return to the discussion of autonomy in Chap. 6, in which I
discuss the pros and cons of choosing for mental health.

1.11 Conclusion
I hope that the reader has now a good handle on what free will debate is
all about and how different freedom-related topics relate to therapy.
Now back to Freud and Rogers. One of the crucial problems is that
neither psychoanalysis nor client-centered theory has a coherent or articu-
late view on free will. One of the tasks of this research will be to fill this gap
(see Chaps. 2 and 3). I will first show that two authors are compatibilists,
that is, psychoanalysis and client-centered theory maintain that free will
and determinism are compatible (see Sect. 1.3). I will also point out that
 1 On Freedom 31

two theories speak against the ability to do otherwise (see Sect. 1.5) and
grope toward the sourcehood account of free will (see Sect. 1.6).
In Chap. 4, I will argue that we can leverage Watson’s theory (1975), an
identification theory, in order to account both for Freud’s and Rogers’s per-
spectives separately and jointly (see Chap. 4). What is more, Watson’s the-
ory may serve as a point of integration for a number of therapeutic schools,
such as psychoanalysis, humanism, cognitivism, and existentialism.
In Chap. 5, I will focus on the place of free will in the therapeutic
process. And in Chap. 6, we will discuss with you the link between the
provision of choice and mental well-being, building on numerous empir-
ical studies.

Notes
1. Locus of control describes the extent to which an individual believes that
they exercise control over their life (Rotter 1966). People with an internal
locus of control believe that they have a firm grip on their own lives and
determine the outcomes of events. By contrast, people with an external
locus of control believe that some external forces control their lives and
determine the future outcomes.
2. There have been a few attempts to build Walden Two in reality (Kuhlman
2005). Some real-life and existing examples include the Twin Oaks
Community in Virginia, US, and Loc Horcones in Hermosillo, Mexico,
though they turned away from some of Skinner’s original ideas.

References
Alquist, Jessica L., Sarah E. Ainsworth, and Roy F. Baumeister. 2013. Determined
to Conform: Disbelief in Free Will Increases Conformity. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology 49 (1): 80–86. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
jesp.2012.08.015.
Alquist, Jessica L., Sarah E. Ainsworth, Roy F. Baumeister, Michael Daly,
and Tyler F. Stillman. 2014, December. The Making of Might-Have-
Beens Effects of Free Will Belief on Counterfactual Thinking. Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 0146167214563673. https://doi.org/
10.1177/0146167214563673.
32 V. Beliavsky

Ayer, A.J. 1954. Freedom and Necessity. In Philosophical Essays, 271–284.

London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Balaguer, Mark. 2012. Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem. Cambridge:
MIT Press.
Baumeister, Roy F. 2008. Free Will in Scientific Psychology. Perspectives on
Psychological Science 3 (1): 14–19. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6916.
2008.00057.x.
Baumeister, Roy F., E.J. Masicampo, and C. Nathan DeWall. 2009. Prosocial
Benefits of Feeling Free: Disbelief in Free Will Increases Aggression and
Reduces Helpfulness. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 35 (2):
260–268. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167208327217.
Bavetta, Sebastiano, Pietro Navarra, and Dario Maimone. 2014. Freedom and
the Pursuit of Happiness: An Economic and Political Perspective. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Begelman, D.A. 1978. Skinner’s Determinism. Behaviorism 6 (1): 13–25.
Bergner, Raymond Michael, and Abby Ramon. 2013. Some Implications of Beliefs
in Altruism, Free Will, and Nonreductionism. The Journal of Social Psychology
153 (5): 598–618. https://doi.org/10.1080/00224545.2013.798249.
Berlin, Isaiah. 1969. Two Concepts of Liberty. In Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford
University Press.
Bratman, Michael E. 2000. Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended
Agency. The Philosophical Review 109 (1): 35–61. https://doi.org/
10.2307/2693554.
Brembs, Björn. 2011. Towards a Scientific Concept of Free Will as a Biological
Trait: Spontaneous Actions and Decision-Making in Invertebrates. Proceedings
of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences 278 (1707): 930–939.
https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2010.2325.
Caspar, Emilie A., Laurène Vuillaume, Pedro A. Magalhães De Saldanha da
Gama, and Axel Cleeremans. 2017, January. The Influence of (Dis)Belief in
Free Will on Immoral Behavior. Frontiers in Psychology 8: 20. https://doi.
org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00020.
Chisholm, Roderick M. 1964. Human Freedom and the Self. Kansas: University
of Kansas.
Crescioni, A. Will, Roy F. Baumeister, Sarah E. Ainsworth, Michael Ent, and
Nathaniel M. Lambert. 2015, January. Subjective Correlates and
Consequences of Belief in Free Will. ResearchGate, 1–23. https://doi.org/1
0.1080/09515089.2014.996285.
 1 On Freedom 33

Dennett, Daniel C. 1984. Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting.
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Doyle, Robert O. 2010. Jamesian Free Will, The Two-Stage Model Of William
James. William James Studies 5: 1–28.
Fara, Michael. 2008. Masked Abilities and Compatibilism. Mind 117
(468): 843–865.
Feldman, Gilad, Roy F. Baumeister, and Kin Fai Ellick Wong. 2014, November.
Free Will Is About Choosing: The Link Between Choice and the Belief in
Free Will. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 55: 239–245. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.jesp.2014.07.012.
Feldman, Gilad, Subramanya Prasad Chandrashekar, and Kin Fai Ellick Wong.
2016. The Freedom to Excel: Belief in Free Will Predicts Better Academic
Performance. Personality and Individual Differences 90: 377–383. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.paid.2015.11.043.
Feltz, Adam, and Edward T. Cokely. 2009. Do Judgments About Freedom and
Responsibility Depend on Who You Are? Personality Differences in Intuitions
About Compatibilism and Incompatibilism. Consciousness and Cognition 18
(1): 342–350.
Fischer, John Martin. 2002. Frankfurt-Type Examples and Semi-Compatibilism.
In The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, ed. Robert H. Kane. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Fischer, John Martin, and Mark Ravizza. 1998. Responsibility and Control: A
Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Frankfurt, Harry G. 1969. Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.
Journal of Philosophy 66 (3): 829–839.
———. 1971. Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person. Journal of
Philosophy 68 (1): 5–20.
Grünbaum, Adolf. 2013. Collected Works, Volume I: Scientific Rationality, the
Human Condition, and 20th Century Cosmologies. 1st ed. Oxford, New York:
Oxford University Press.
Hoefer, Carl. 2016. Causal Determinism. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Spring 2016. Metaphysics Research Lab,
Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/
determinism-causal/.
Holton, Richard. 2009. Determinism, Self-Efficacy, and the Phenomenology of
Free Will. Inquiry 52 (4): 412–428.
Honderich, Ted. 2002. How Free Are You?: The Determinism Problem. 2nd ed.
Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
 “By me business is good,” Slivowitz went on, with a fat chuckle.
“I’m a business man, Mr. Sloane, first and last, and nobody don’t
never put nothing over by me.”
Knowing something of his employer’s business methods, Sloane
could have amplified. What he said was: “Thanks to your royal
purple, Mr. Slivowitz. You’ve about cornered the trade.”
“They can’t none of ’em touch it, that purple; posi-tive-ly,” agreed
the dyer, with much satisfaction. “But”—and he became confidential
—“between me and you strictly, this here now Domestic Dye Works,
they got it a mauve what gives me a pain.”
He hitched his chair closer and laid a pudgy hand on Sloane’s
knee. “I’m going to fire you,” he repeated, with a wink. “I want you
should go by the Domestic Dye Works and get it a job. Find out
about the formula for their mauve—you understand me—and come
back mit it, and you get back your job and a hundred or seventy-five
dollars.”
Sloane started. For a moment he stared at his employer, his face
going red and pale again; then he rose to his feet.
“Sorry, Mr. Slivowitz, but I can’t consider it,” he said.
“Oh, come now, Mr. Sloane!” protested the dyer, with a laugh,
leaning back in his chair. He produced a thick cigar and bit off the
end. “These here scruples does you credit, Mr. Sloane, but business
is business; and, take it from me, Mr. Sloane, you can’t mix business
up mit ethics. Them things is all right, but you gotta skin the other
guy before he skins you first, ain’t it?”
“That may be——” began the secretary, as he moved toward the
door.
“May be? Ain’t I just told you it is?” Slivowitz paused in the act of
striking a match to glare. “You needn’t to be scared they’ll find it out
where you come from and fire you, neither, Mr. Sloane,” he added,
more quietly and with a cunning expression. “I got brains, I have. A
little thing like recommends to a smart man like me——” The match
broke. He flung it into the cuspidor and selected another.
Sloane paused with his hand on the doorknob. “Mr. Slivowitz——”
he began again.
 “Of course,” continued his employer, “I could make it—well, a
hundred fifteen, Mr. Sloane. But, believe me, not a cent more, posi-
tive-ly.”
The secretary shook his head decidedly.
“What?” roared Slivowitz. “Y’ mean to tell me y’ ain’t goin’ to do it?
All right; you’re fired anyhow, you understand me.” Then with an evil
glitter in his eyes, “And if you don’t bring by me that formula, you get
fired from the Domestic Dye Works; and you don’t get it no job
nowheres else, too! Now, you take your choice.” This time the match
lighted successfully.
Sloane smiled. “Quite impossible,” he said. “I was going to resign
in a day or two, anyway.”
“Eh?” exclaimed the head of the firm, his jaw dropping and his
florid face paling a little. In the face of a number of possibilities he
forgot the match in his fingers.
“Yes. You see—you’ll know it sooner or later—the Domestic Dye
Works sent me here to learn the formula for your royal purple.”
And the door slammed shut behind A. Slivowitz’s private
secretary.
 NORTH OF FIFTY-THREE
By Mary Woodbury Caswell

The short winter day of Alaska was brightening as Gertrude

pushed her chair back from the breakfast table and announced that
she proposed to go at once for her constitutional. Her brother
placidly assented, but Keith interposed with a worried look.
“Hadn’t you better go with her, Bob? I suppose I’ve grown to be an
old granny, but since Jacques told us of that outlaw who threatened
to kidnap a white girl for his wife, I don’t like to have Gertrude get out
of sight.”
The girl bent over him caressingly.
“Don’t worry, dear,” she said. “Jacques had been drinking hard
when he told you of this mythical exile. Besides, I am no Helen of
Troy to be abducted for my beauty. I’d really much rather have Bob
stay with you.”
And she kissed him, put on warm wraps, took her snowshoes and
started for the daily tramp that had kept her fit ever since she had
come up on the last boat, hastily summoned by a cable from Bob
when her fiancé had his shoulder crushed, and it would be
impossible for the young men to return to the States with their stake.
She and Bob had nursed him into convalescence, but it had been a
hard winter for him, and she did not wonder that he had developed
some nervousness, though she considered his fear for her wholly
unnecessary, as, indeed, did Bob.
When she was a half-mile from the cabin and a slight rise of
ground hid it from her, she saw a dog team approaching, and smiled,
thinking that Keith would surely consider that danger was near. As it
met her the driver touched his cap, and she had a swift impression of
a very different type than she had recently met, and one that made
Jacques’s fantastic tale seem less absurd. As she involuntarily
glanced back she saw, and now with alarm, that the stranger had
turned and was coming toward her. He stopped the dogs close to her
and inquired courteously, and with a foreign accent:
“Can you tell me, mademoiselle, how near I am to some
residence?”
“Our cabin is over the hill,” she replied quietly, though with growing
terror, which was justified, as he sprang toward her, swathing her in
a blanket, so that she could neither speak nor struggle, and placing
her on the sled.
She could not have told whether it was hours or minutes before
she was lifted, carried into a cabin, and the blanket unfolded from
her, while a savage-looking husky dog growled a greeting. Her
captor shook off his heavy outer coat, removed his cap, and with
exaggerated deference said:
“Mademoiselle, pray remove your parka and permit that I relieve
you of your snowshoes. I do myself the honour, mademoiselle, to
offer you marriage.”
Resolutely conquering her fear, Gertrude looked steadily at him.
The man evidently was, or had been, a gentleman; but what must his
life have been to bring him to this! As composedly as she could she
answered:
“I must decline your offer. Pray permit me to return home.”
“Ah, no, mademoiselle. I fear I cannot allow that. As for marriage
—as you please, but in any case you must remain here.”
“Not alive,” she said.
“Ah, but, mademoiselle, how not?” he asked, in mockery of
courtesy more pronounced. “It is not so easy to die”—with a sudden
bitter sadness.
“There are many ways,” she replied. “Here is one.”
And, seizing a dog whip lying near, she struck the husky a sharp
blow and, as he furiously leaped to his feet, flung herself upon the
floor before him. He fastened his teeth in her arm as his master
grasped his throat, and the struggle shook the cabin. At last the man
broke the dog’s hold and dragged him to the door. Gertrude’s heavy
clothing had saved her arm from anything but a superficial wound,
but as he bound it up she said:
 “The dog will not forget, and if he fails me I can find another way.”
His face, which had paled, flushed a dark red as he hastily spoke.
“For God’s sake do not think—but why should you not? You are
free, mademoiselle. Such courage shows me I am not quite the brute
I fancied I had become, and also that there is one woman in the
world whose ‘no’ assuredly does not mean ‘yes.’ I will take you home
at once, on the faith of a Marovitch.”
She stared at him incredulously and said slowly:
“Is it possible—are you Count Boris Marovitch?”
“Yes”—in deep wonder—“that is my name, but how could you
know?”
“This letter should interest you,” she said. “It is from Varinka. I was
at a convent school in Paris with her.” And she watched him
excitedly as he read aloud the passage she indicated.

“Do you remember my telling you of my cousin Boris, who

was sent to Siberia for killing Prince —— in a duel? It was
supposed that he was shot while trying to escape, but the guard
has confessed that he was bribed to assist him, and he may be
living. The Czar would gladly pardon him if he would return, his
homicidal tendencies being valuable in the present war crisis.
And Olga has steadfastly refused to marry any one else, so
——”

A sharply drawn breath interrupted the reading, and the letter fell
to the floor from his shaking hands as he looked at her, his face
white and drawn.
“Mademoiselle, it is too much,” he gasped. “Your courage—your
generosity—I insult you unforgivably and you give me back honour,
love, life—I cannot say——” And he sank into a chair and covered
his face with his hands.
She went over to him and laid her hand gently on his shoulder.
“I am glad you are happy, Count,” she said, “and I am sure we
shall be very good friends. Please take me home now.”
They met Bob halfway, striding along with an anxious face, his rifle
over his shoulder. “This is my brother, Mr. Stacey,” said Gertrude.
“Bob, this is Count Marovitch, of whom Varinka wrote. He starts to-
morrow by dog train to the States on his way to Russia.”
 THE OLD THINGS
By Jessie Anderson Chase

Like Sir Roger’s neighbours peering over the hedge, I had daily
observed, over my stone wall, a very old gentleman in his shirt
sleeves, who pleasantly gave me the rôle of Spectator. A New-
Englander of the elder type, with the heavy bent head of the thinker;
but, particularly, with the piercing yet so kindly humorous blue eye
that loses none of its colour with age, but seems to grow more vivid
and vital with the same years that steal from the hair its hue of life
and from the walnut cheek its glowing red.
Such an eye, to a lawyer like myself, accustomed to look for a
human document in every human face, seemed the very epitome of
eighty years: a carefree boyhood among contemporaries—in house
furnishings, in barn and pigsty, orchard and gardens; a youth that
sees already a new generation in most of these companions of his
earthly pilgrimage; a middle age, forced out of the romantic sense of
companionship on the road, into the persistent and finally triumphant
view of using environment for ends of its own; and then old age, free
to return and lavish forgotten endearments upon the “old things!”
This or the other “landmark,” dear, and familiar from life’s beginnings.
These periods, all slipping unnoticed into their successors, yet each
possessing a distinct and tangible outline and colour, had all had
their turn at my neighbour’s blue eyes. And the look that comes only
at the end, when the life has been prodigal of response and of an
unswerving fidelity in the storing up of values—that was the look that
I valued as a thing of price.
It was a day of late summer that brought me more directly face to
face with its beauty and gravity. The old gentleman appeared, in his
shirt sleeves, but with plenty of ceremony in his quiet demeanour, at
the door of my little “portable” law office, at the edge of the orchard.
 “I am told, sir,” he began, “that you are an attorney at law.”
I bowed, and offered him a chair but he continued standing.
“I have come,” he said, “to request your services in drawing up my
last will and testament—that is,” he serenely emended, “in case your
vacation time is subject to such interruption.”
While I was formulating my assent he continued:
“You have no doubt, since coming into this rather communicative
neighbourhood, been informed that my son owns the homestead.”
The kind, keen old eyes took on a look of what George Eliot
names “an enormous patience with the way of the world.”
“Everything belongs to John and Mary. But there are one or two
little old things that they don’t care about. They’re up in the lean-to.
The old mirror that, as a lad, I used to see my face in over my
mother’s shoulder, it’s still holding for me the picture of my mother
smiling up at me. And the old ladder-back chair that she used to sit
in and cuddle me; and switch, me, too—and maybe that took the
most love of all. That’s all. John and Mary don’t want them. They’re
only old things, like myself. It’s natural, perfectly natural. At their age
I most probably felt just so.”
He paused and looked through the lattice, where the reddened
vine-leaves were beginning to fall.
“The young leaf-buds pushing off the old leaves. It’s nature.”
Before sunset—for the old man was strangely impatient—I had his
“will” signed, witnessed, and sealed. The old mirror and chair were to
go to a wee, odd little old lady, called in the neighbourhood “Miss
Tabby” Titcomb because of her forty-odd cats, except for which she
lived alone.
“Little Ellen,” he called her, as he fondly spoke of their school days
together. “Mother would have been well content if we’d hit it off
together, Ellen and I. But a boy is as apt as not, when urged one
way, to fly off in another; and I was at the skittish age.
“I’ve never said this before to any man, sir, but I’d have been a
better husband to Ellen. Mary was a faithful wife, and better than I
deserved. But she was not just aware, like Ellen, of where to bear on
hard and where to go a little easy. That’s what a man needs in a
woman, sir. Ellen always knew just when and where.”
 The next morning, which was Saturday, I was riding down Bare
Hill Road—as it chanced, right past Miss Tabby’s—when my horse
shied; and that tiny old lady, with an enormous gray cat beside her,
rose up from behind the lilac bushes. Bigger people than “little Ellen”
have been frightened by Prince’s antics, but she quietly put her hand
on his restive neck as if he were only a little larger kitten, and then
spoke to me in a soft little purr of a voice:
“I’ve heard—and you’ll excuse me—that you’re a lawyer, Mr.
Alden; and I’ve a small matter I don’t wish to entrust to any one here,
being private. It’s a letter for Mr. Thomas Sewall, to be delivered
upon my demise, which I feel is about to take place.” She spoke with
a little note of relief, as if from some long strain.
I took the small envelope.
“It’s just the cats,” she was moved to confide further; “the little
ones and the smart ones will all find friends. But the two old ones!
Mr. Sewall has a notion for the old things. And”—here she hesitated
long, while I breathlessly assured her of my best care for the letter
—“there’s—somewhat in the note besides the cats,” she brought out
bravely. “You’ll make sure it doesn’t fall into John and Mary’s
hands?”
This was Saturday morning. Sunday, as I listened absent-
mindedly to the slow toll of the meeting-house bell, my houskeeper
remarked, on bringing in my coffee:
“Did you notice, sir? It was eighty-six. There’s an old man and an
old woman, both just the same age, in the village, died in the night.”
The old chair, upon which—when they were young together—the
little Tom had been spanked and comforted; and the mirror, still
treasuring the picture of the round, saucy phiz over his mother’s
shoulder, were offered at auction and bid in for a trifle by me. I would
have paid gold sovereigns for them, but not into the hands of John
and Mary! The cats, likewise, sit by the hearth, on which was burned
to ashes the letter “not entirely” about their disposal.
And the “Old Things” that cherished these earthly companions?
The minister—himself a rare “old thing”—preached a funeral sermon
for the two so strangely united by death; and his thin voice, like the
tone of an old, cracked violin, still haunts me:
 “Their youth is renewed like the eagle’s.... And they shall run and
not be weary, they shall walk and not faint.”
 THE FORCED MARCH
By Hornell Hart

Intermittently, when the snow ceased falling for a moment, Wojak

could see the regiments ahead, black against the white fields,
crawling interminably over the hilltop under the dull sky. Wojak was a
burly, bearded fellow. These winter days pleased him. He liked the
tingle that came with marching in the cold air. He liked the dull,
rhythmic “scruff” of the hundreds of feet as the regiment swung
along, welded by its months of marching into a living unity.
This was his own country they were marching through. His
homestead lay not twenty miles away, near this very road. As he
trudged along thoughts of Sophy and little Stephan kept slipping into
his mind.
At the crest of the hill the regiment came to a halt. Back from the
road, half hidden in trees that were cut sharp and black against the
snow and the sky, stood the ruin of a house.
“Just so stands my house,” thought Wojak. “Behind, among the
trees, should be the pigsty to the left, the stable to the right.”
He turned and waded through the newly fallen snow toward the
dwelling. Charred beams at one end showed where a fire had been
checked by the snowfall. In the yard beneath the fluffy new snow the
old layer had evidently been tramped. Behind the house he found
the pigsty and the stable.
“But the stable is bigger than mine,” he murmured.
He looked in. A pile of hay was in the corner, and on it lay some
rags. The stable was so dark that Wojak thought he saw a child lying
there. He went over to the corner. On the hay was a yellow head, the
round cheeks streaked with tears. The child was sleeping, but its
breath came in little sobs. With clumsy gentleness the soldier picked
the baby up.
 “Stephan had curls like that,” he whispered.
As he stepped out into the light the child awoke. A chubby arm
slipped about the burly neck, and the blue eyes looked at him with
the beginning of a smile. But in a moment the fact that this was not
father, but a strange man, came over the baby, and he began to sob,
not angrily, but with a worn anguish that gripped Wojak’s heart.
The company was falling in after the halt when he came to the
road. The curly head lay close to his bearded face, and a great
clumsy hand protected the little body.
“Where did you get that, Wojak?” growled the lieutenant, staring
blankly at the sorrowful little bundle. “Leave the kid and fall in,” he
commanded. “There’s no time for nonsense on this march.”
Wojak started to protest, but the habit of obedience was too
strong. Sullenly he stood the baby in the snow and took his place in
the ranks. The child’s sobs turned to a heartbroken wail.
“Forward, march!” commanded the officer, and the company
moved away down the road. Wojak looked back and saw the tiny
arms stretched out after him while snowflakes settled on the yellow
head. Long after the hilltop was hidden in swirling snow he seemed
to see them and to hear the wail of the orphaned baby.
· · · · · · ·
The sun was setting when the army bivouacked four miles from
Wojak’s farm. The orders were that no leaves of absence should be
granted; but he knew the sentinel on guard, and home was too near
to be left unseen for another four months.
The stars were glittering from an all but clear sky when he slipped
silently through the lines and started down the familiar roads toward
Sophy and Stephan. Four months was a terrible length of time. The
passage of armies had marked the country. The great tree by the
cottage of Ivanovicz had been shattered by a shell and had crashed
through the roof. Jablonowski’s barns had been burned. The
windows of the church at the corners were shattered and a great
hole had been shot in the steeple. Wojak walked faster, and a twinge
of anxiety came over him as he entered the lane that led up to his
barnyard. His heart stopped: the thatch of the stable had been
burned and only the walls were standing. His eyes strained for a
glimpse of the house. It was not there. A few charred beams marked
the place where his home had stood.
He ran nearer. Snow had covered everything. Beside the place
where the door had been was a white mound with a stick standing in
the earth at its head. To the stick was nailed a little shoe. Wojak
seized it with shaking hands.
“Stephan!” he choked. “My little Stephan!”
After a while he looked up. Looming above him was a man on
horseback who had ridden up unheard through the muffling snow.
“You are under arrest,” said the voice of the lieutenant.
 APPROXIMATING THE ULTIMATE WITH AUNT
SARAH
By Charles Earl Gaymon

Aunt Sarah was sixty-three years old. Uncle John was sixty-four
years old.
If you spoke to Aunt Sarah about any new fringe on the tapestry of
the intellectual loom she would say:
“Oh, yes, we ’proximated that line of thought in 1893. It is near,
but not quite the ultimate.”
If you spoke to Uncle John about Schopenhauer he would reply:
“I don’t take much stock in them new-fangled cultivators.”
Uncle John and Aunt Sarah had lived together in the old
homestead for thirty-eight years.
Aunt Sarah always had intellectual curiosity: she had left the old
Baptist church in her girlhood to join a joy cult; she had followed with
her mental telescope the scintillating trajectory of William James’s
flight through the philosophic heavens of America; she had known
about eugenics long before the newspapers had made the subject
popular knowledge, and she had played in the musty, rickety garret
of occultism at a time when the most daring minds in science were
sitting tight in the seats of the scornful. But there was a shadow in
the sunlight of Aunt Sarah’s mental advancement, an opaque spot in
the crystal of her mysticism, an unresolved seventh in the harmony
of her simple life in the Wisconsin backwoods—
She was married.
She was married to Uncle John!
At six o’clock in the evening of June 1, 1915, Aunt Sarah glanced
up from reading Bennett’s “Folk Ways and Mores” as Uncle John
entered the kitchen door. Uncle John had just come from performing
the vespertime chores.
“Pa, we shall have to get a divorce!” said Aunt Sarah, shutting
Bennett with determination. “Marriage is a worn-out convention; it is
only one of the thousand foolish folk ways that hinder the
advancement of science among the masses.”
“Very well, ma.”
“We will get a divorce.”
“I quite agree, ma.”
“Don’t attempt logic with me, John. I said that we would get a
divorce.”
Uncle John shook his head. “When will it be?” he asked.
“To-morrow.”
Uncle John smiled, dropped his armful of kindling into the wood
box behind the kitchen range, and began to lay the Brobdingnagian
bandana handkerchief that served them for a tablecloth.
Aunt Sarah finished the preparation of the bacon and onions and
set the coffee pot back when it began to boil.
After supper Uncle John read the seed catalogue and Aunt Sarah
resumed her Bennett.
The following afternoon Judge Thompson, who lived in the biggest
and best house in the little county seat, was surprised to see from
his chair in the big bay window an antiquated carriage drawn by a
retired farm horse draw up before his cast-iron negro hitching post.
In the carriage were Aunt Sarah and Uncle John.
Judge Thompson was on the porch in time to receive his guests.
“We’ve come to get a divorce,” said Aunt Sarah, with a direct
gaze; then she added, with the sang froid of one who is wise,
“What’ll it cost?”
The judge motioned them to seats in the wicker chairs on the
porch, and then replied:
“But you must have grounds——”
“Everybody knows it. Incompatibility of temperament.”
And the judge, smiling, humoured Aunt Sarah, for he knew her
and the community in which she lived. “It will cost you just ten
dollars,” he said.
 “Make out the paper,” Aunt Sarah replied.
One hour later Uncle John and Aunt Sarah left the judge’s house
together, separated for life.
Moses, their horse, looked at them out of the corner of his good
eye as they approached the carriage.
Uncle John paused, but Aunt Sarah stepped firmly into the
vehicle.
Uncle John followed her and took up the reins.
Moses knew the way home by a clairvoyant sense, and he took
that way at his own pace of prophet-like dignity.
At the door of the old homestead Uncle John handed Aunt Sarah
down from her seat in silence. Then he put Moses into his stall. And
when he returned to the house he found Aunt Sarah beaming upon
him through her gold-rimmed spectacles from her place at the table,
which was loaded with a supper such as she alone could cook.
Aunt Sarah was jubilant. She was living at last with a man to
whom she was not married; no longer was there a blot on the
scutcheon of her intellectual progress; no longer did a black beetle
mar the pellucid amber of her simple life of Advanced Ideas; no
longer could the acolytes, in off moments when they were not
engaged in trundling the spheres through the macrocosm, gaze
sternly down upon her through interstellar space and say:
“Aunt Sarah is nearly, but not quite, an intellectual.”
 THE HORSE HEAVER
By Lyman Bryson

“For why should you be tired?” demanded his wife, splashing her
arms viciously in the suds as she finished the day’s rinsing. “You’ve
nothing to do but shovel dirt all day and rest when your boss ain’t
looking.”
“Gwan, I’m a hard-working man,” said Kallaher. “And, what’s
more, I can kick about it whenever I want to without any remarks
from yourself. I’m tired. When’s supper?”
“Supper is any time when I can get my arms dry and get a good
breath.” Mrs. Kallaher began belligerently to get his supper.
Kallaher stretched his short legs out in front of him and leaned
back in his chair. “It was a hard day,” he said gently. “As if it wasn’t
enough to have me breaking my back with the shovel and all, a fool
drove his horse too close to the ditch, and the dumb beast fell in on
top of me.”
“That’s likely—now, ain’t it?—and you being here to tell about it!”
“Believe it or not, it happened.” Kallaher folded his hands across
the place where he didn’t wear a belt and sighed. “But I put him out
again and went on with my work without taking a rest or nothing.”
Mrs. Kallaher might have tried again to express her incredulity, but
just then old Mother Coogan, next-door neighbour, thrust a red
excited face through the kitchen door.
“Mary Kallaher, is your man home?”
“Why shouldn’t he be?”
Mrs. Coogan entered and stood, one hand clutching a newspaper,
the other pointing dramatically at Kallaher. “It may be so, but he don’t
look it,” she said.
Before they could question her she began reading from the paper:
“Mike Kallaher, a ditch digger on the new Twelfth Street sewer, is a
small man but a mighty. A horse, driven too near the ditch to-day, fell
in. ‘Begorra,’ said Mike, ‘can’t a man work in peace?’ He laid down
his shovel, spat on his hands, and heaved the horse back into the
street. The foreman thought he had been hurt when the horse fell in,
but he wasn’t, and he was not in the least bothered by having to
throw him back out again. He went back to his digging.”
“Let me see that paper.” Kallaher rose and took it from her hand.
Slowly he went over the story—which the reporter who wrote it had
thought exceeding clever. “Yeh,” he said finally, “that’s me, all right.”
Mrs. Coogan looked upon him with respect. “I never thought much
of you before, Mike Kallaher, but you’re the only man I know that
could pick up a horse.” She turned to his wife. “It’s no wonder you’re
a meek woman, Mary, but you ought to be proud of a man like that,
sure.”
“Are you coming on with supper now?” asked Kallaher in a mighty
voice of the speechless Mrs. Kallaher. “Be quick now, or I’ll give you
what’s needing.”
Never before had he dared make a threat as if he meant it. His
wife was struck with sudden awe. She gasped and hurried silently
with the setting on of supper. She trembled and dropped a dish.
“You poor clumsy dub!” roared her husband, towering to the height
of five-feet-two. “Are you so weak you can’t hold a pot, now?”
“Excuse me, Michael,” she murmured. “Excuse me, man. I was
excited.”
Mrs. Coogan saw with approval that Kallaher was bullying his
wife, and went down the street to tell the neighbourhood.
In Mike Kallaher’s kitchen—for it had suddenly become his own,
after belonging for fifteen years to his wife—a poor, meek, unhappy-
looking Irishwoman was obeying orders. She jumped when he yelled
at her, which he did every two minutes to see her jump, begged his
pardon, brought his pipe, and looked on in silence when he
deliberately knocked out the ashes on the newly scrubbed floor. A
man who could throw a horse out of a ditch would stop at nothing.
As the new monarch sat in his chair looking contemptuously away
from his slave, who was tentatively watching him, there was a knock
at the door. Mike’s chest had begun to get tired from being swelled
out so far, and he let out his breath with a sigh.
A suave young man was admitted. After ascertaining that Mike
Kallaher really lived in this place he asked Mike how he was feeling.
“Good,” was the truculent answer.
“No injuries from your little adventure this afternoon?”
“Injured, is it? Not a bit—not a bit.”
“I’m glad to hear that. I’m assistant manager of the Burke
Construction Company. We heard one of our horses fell on you to-
day, so I came down to help out if you were hurt. We thought we
could afford to pay a few hundred dollars on doctor bills.” The young
man smiled pleasantly. “But since you’re not hurt and are so willing
to admit it, we won’t have that pleasure. Good-bye.” He got up and
went.
Kallaher had forgotten to swell out his chest again. He sat
drooping in his chair. His wife was no longer tentative.
“Horse heaver, is it?” She advanced, menacing. “Horse heaver?
You poor mick! There goes your chance to be a cripple for life and
die rich.”
She pulled his face up by the front hair and slapped him like a
mother.
“Horse heaver, is it? Take that, now!”
And Kallaher took it.
 THE EGO OF THE METROPOLIS
By Thomas T. Hoyne

“You couldn’t get her picture?” sneered the city editor

contemptuously. “Come, Johnson, get into the game. You’re not in
Chicago or St. Louis now. This is New York.”
Johnson was eating his bread in the sweat of his brow, but he
wanted to continue eating. Therefore he said nothing, but lounged off
into the local room, empty during the dead afternoon hours.
He was lucky to be working at all. During the couple of weeks he
had been wearing out shoe leather chasing pictures for the greatest
of all metropolitan morning newspapers he had been told his good
fortune a hundred times. He, a perfect stranger in New York, had
walked right into a job.
The job should have been tempting only to the rawest cub, but
Johnson, a crackerjack reporter, snapped at it. He knew that some of
the best newspaper men in New York, crackerjack reporters, were
carrying the banner along Park Row.
The afternoon newspapers were boiling over with editions, black
type and red crying out that one hundred and sixty-eight thousand
dollars had disappeared from a vault of the soundest bank in Wall
Street and that the cashier was missing. To be assigned to this bank
story, to get the chance to show what he really could do, Johnson
would have given a finger from his right hand.
He sat on a corner of a typewriter desk, swinging one leg, while
he raged inwardly at the insolent city editor. Bread or no bread, he
could not work himself into spasms of enthusiasm over a near
society woman’s photograph for a cheap story. He was too old in the
game for such child’s play.
The noisy opening of the door between the managing editor’s
room and the office of the city editor roused him. He heard the