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Fundamental Rights in the EU Area
of Freedom, Security and Justice
The development of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice has

transformed the European Union and placed fundamental rights at
the core of EU integration and its principles of mutual recognition
and trust. The impact of the AFSJ in the development of an EU
standard of fundamental rights, which has come to the fore since
the Treaty of Lisbon, is a topic of great theoretical and practical
importance. This is a uniquely comprehensive academic study of the
AFSJ and its implications from the point of view of fundamental
rights. The contributions to this collection examine the normative
and jurisprudential development of the AFSJ in order to assess its
effects on the overall construction of the scope and standards of
protection of EU fundamental rights in this particularly complex and
sensitive field of integration. The expert contributors systematically
map and critically assess this area of EU law, together with the
relevant case law.
Sara Iglesias Sánchez (PhD Universidad Complutense Madrid;

LLM Yale Law School) holds the position of Legal Secretary at
the Court of Justice of the European Union. She was previously
a lecturer at the University of Cádiz, a doctoral researcher at the
Universidad Complutense and a visiting researcher at several
academic institutions. She has widely published on EU migration
law, citizenship and fundamental rights.
Maribel González Pascual is Associate Professor at Pompeu Fabra
University, Barcelona, and a member of the Cabinet of the Spanish
Ministry on Regional Policies. She was previously a post-doctoral
researcher at the Max Planck Institute in Heidelberg, a doctoral
researcher at the Universidad de Salamanca and at the INAP
(Madrid), and a visiting researcher at several academic institutions.
She has widely published on fundamental rights protection in
Europe and on federalism.
Fundamental Rights in
the EU Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice
Edited by
Sara Iglesias Sánchez

Court of Justice of the European Union
Maribel González Pascual

Pompeu Fabra University
University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom
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education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence.
www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108488136
DOI: 10.1017/9781108769006
© Cambridge University Press 2021
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without the written
permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 2021
Printed in the United Kingdom by TJ International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Iglesias, Sara (Editor on civil rights in EU), editor. | González Pascual, Maribel, editor.
Title: Fundamental rights in the EU area of freedom, security, and justice / edited by Sara Iglesias,
Court of Justice of the European Union; Maribel Pascual, University Pompeu Fabra of Barcelona.
Other titles: Fundamental rights in the European Union area of freedom, security, and justice
Description: Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2020. |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2020027993 (print) | LCCN 2020027994 (ebook) | ISBN 9781108488136
(hardback) | ISBN 9781108769006 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Civil rights – European Union countries. | Asylum, Right of – European
Union countries. | Emigration and immigration law – European Union countries. |
Double jeopardy – European Union countries. | Due process of law – European Union countries. |
Justice, Administrationof – European Union countries.
Classification: LCC KJE5132 .F8595 2020 (print) | LCC KJE5132 (ebook) | DDC 341.4/8094–dc23
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ISBN 978-1-108-48813-6 Hardback
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of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication
and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain,
accurate or appropriate.
A nuestras hijas, Margarita, Irene y Julia
Hasta la luna, ida y vuelta
Contents
List of Contributors x
Foreword xiii
Koen Lenaerts
Preface xvii
List of Common Abbreviations xviii
Introduction Fundamental Rights at the Core of the EU AFSJ 1

Sara Iglesias Sánchez and Maribel González Pascual
Part I The General Framework for Fundamental Rights Protection

in the AFSJ 19
1 The Scope of EU Fundamental Rights in the Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice 21
Sara Iglesias Sánchez
2 A European Standard of Human Rights Protection? 39
Maribel González Pascual
3 The Protection of Fundamental Rights within the AFSJ: Through
or Against Mutual Trust and Mutual Recognition? 57
François-Xavier Millet
Part II Asylum, Migration and Borders 75

4 Mutual (Dis-)Trust in EU Migration and Asylum Law:
The ‘Exceptionalisation’ of Fundamental Rights 77
Violeta Moreno-Lax
5 The Right to Liberty in the Field of Migration, Asylum and Borders 100
Justine N Stefanelli and Elspeth Guild
6 Family Life and the Best Interests of the Child in the Field
of Migration 119
Ciara M Smyth
7 The EU Fundamental Right to Asylum: In Search of Its Legal
Meaning and Effects 139
Madalina Moraru
viii Contents
8 Effective Remedies and Defence Rights in the Field of

Asylum, Migration and Borders 159
Nathan Cambien
Part III Judicial Cooperation in Civil Matters 177

9 Mutual Recognition in Civil and Commercial Matters:
On Certified Mutual Trust 179
Magdalena Ličková and Crístian Oró Martínez
10 The Rights of the Child and the Right to Respect for
Family Life in the Revised Brussels II bis Regulation 192
Vesna Lazić
11 Effective Remedies and Fair Trial in Civil Matters: How to
Enhance Civil Justice within the Confines of EU Powers 211
Dominik Düsterhaus
12 Procedural Rights (and Obligations) of Parties to Civil
Proceedings 231
Agnieszka Fra˛ckowiak-Adamska
Part IV Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters and

Police Cooperation 251
13 Mutual Recognition and Fundamental Rights in
EU Criminal Law 253
Valsamis Mitsilegas
14 The Right to Liberty and Security in EU Criminal Law 272
Leandro Mancano
15 Defence Rights and Effective Remedies in EU Criminal Law 289
Coral Arangüena Fanego
16 Victims of Crime in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 312
Luca Lupária and Jacopo Della Torre
17 The Principle of Legality in the Area of Freedom,
Christina Peristeridou
18 The Interpretation and Application of the Ne Bis In Idem
Principle in the EU Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 354
Bas van Bockel
Contents ix
Part V Cross-Cutting Issues of Fundamental Rights in the AFSJ 371

19 Private Life and Data Protection in the Area of Freedom,
Evelien Brouwer
20 Citizenship and Non-Discrimination Rights in the Area
of Freedom, Security and Justice 394
Annette Schrauwen
21 Vulnerability and Fundamental Rights in the Area of
Freedom, Security and Justice 413
Francesca Ippolito
22 Epilogue: Of Judges and Trust 433
Michal Bobek
Index 446
Contributors
Coral Arangüena Fanego, Professor of Procedural Law, University of Valladolid,

Spain
Michal Bobek, Advocate General, Court of Justice of the European Union
Bas van Bockel, Senior Specialist Advisor (EU law), Netherlands Council of State
Evelien Brouwer, Senior Researcher/Lecturer, Amsterdam Centre for Migration
and Refugee Law, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Nathan Cambien, Legal Secretary, Court of Justice of the European Union;
Associate Professor, University of Antwerp
Jacopo Della Torre, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, University of Trieste
Dominik Düsterhaus, Legal Secretary, Court of Justice of the European Union
Agnieszka Fra˛ckowiak-Adamska, Associate Professor, University of Wrocław,
Poland
Elspeth Guild, Jean Monnet Professor ad personam, Queen Mary University
of London; Emeritus Professor, Radboud University, Netherlands; Visiting
Professor, College of Europe, Bruges; Partner, Kingsley Napley, London
Francesca Ippolito, Associate Professor in International Law, University of
Cagliari, Italy
Vesna Lazić, Senior Researcher, TMC Asser Institute, The Hague; Associate
Professor, Utrecht University, Netherlands
Magdalena Ličková, Legal Secretary, Court of the European Union
Luca Lupária, Professor of Criminal Procedure, Roma Tre University, Rome
Leandro Mancano, Senior Lecturer in EU Law, Edinburgh Law School
François-Xavier Millet, Professor of Public Law, University of the French Antilles
(on leave), currently serving as Legal Secretary, Court of Justice of the European
Union
Valsamis Mitsilegas, Professor of European Criminal Law and Global Security,
Queen Mary University of London
Madalina Moraru, Senior Research Fellow, Law Faculty, Masaryk University, Brno,
Czech Republic; Research Fellow, Centre for Judicial Cooperation, European
University Institute, Florence, Italy
Violeta Moreno-Lax, Reader in Law, Queen Mary University of London, and
Visiting Professor, College of Europe
Crístian Oró Martínez, Lawyer, Research and Documentation Directorate, Court of
Justice of the European Union
List of Contributors xi
Christina Peristeridou, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law and Procedure,

Maastricht University
Annette Schrauwen, Professor of European Integration, Amsterdam Centre for
European Law and Governance (ACELG), Law Faculty, University of Amsterdam
Ciara M Smyth, School of Law and Irish Centre for Human Rights, National
University of Ireland, Galway
Justine N Stefanelli, Director of Publications and Research, American Society of
International Law, Washington, DC
Foreword
KOEN LENAERTS *
When the European integration project was first conceived, it was quite clear in
the minds of Europe’s founding fathers that the new pan-European body envis-
aged was to be – initially at least – an economic grouping. As Jean Monnet put
it, as early as 1943, ‘[t]he countries of Europe are not strong enough individu-
ally to be able to guarantee prosperity and social development for their peoples.
The States of Europe must therefore form a federation or a European entity that
would make them into a common economic unit.’ Thus, when such a unit was
first established, initially as the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952,
soon followed by the European Economic Community and EURATOM in 1957,
economic integration was the focus of the treaties that governed the operation of
those Communities.
Today, the European Union has moved well beyond that purely economic
paradigm and the internal market, important though it continues to be, has
become just one of the building blocks on which European integration is based.
Since 1 December 2009 – the date when the Lisbon Treaty entered into force – the
European Union has been operating on the basis of new constitutional founda-
tions. Those foundations are the Treaty on European Union, as modified by the
Lisbon Treaty; the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; and the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which is now fully bind-
ing and enjoys the same efficacy and force as those treaties. These are the texts
that determine the competences and govern the functioning of the Union and that
define the fundamental rights enjoyed by the Union’s citizens and other subjects
of Union law.
Through the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, the Union has established a
shared European space governed by common values such as respect for democracy,
fundamental rights and the rule of law. In that European space without internal
borders, citizens of the Union may move freely and safely, integrate into the
society of the Member State of their choice and fulfil their ambitions free from all
discrimination.
However, in an area without internal frontiers, the exercise of free movement
should not undermine the jurisdiction of national courts and the effectiveness
of national law operating on a territorial basis. The ‘long arm of the law’ should
*
President of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Professor of European Union Law,
Leuven University. All views expressed are personal to the author.
xiv Foreword
therefore acquire a transnational dimension, so that, for example, criminals are

prevented from relying on free movement as a means of pursuing their activ-
ities with impunity. Accordingly, the authors of the EU Treaties reasoned that the
free movement of persons should be accompanied by the free movement of judi-
cial decisions. By virtue of the principle of mutual recognition, judicial decisions
adopted in the Member State of origin are to be recognised and enforced in the
Member State of enforcement as if they were its own.
In order for that principle to operate properly, national courts must trust that
courts in other Member States are equally committed to upholding the values on
which the EU is founded and, in particular, to protecting the fundamental rights
of the persons concerned. Thus, in the light of the principle of mutual trust, ‘each
of [the Member] States, save in exceptional circumstances, [is] to consider all the
other Member States to be complying with EU law and particularly with the fun-
damental rights recognised by EU law’.1 This shows that, whilst the principle of
mutual trust is of paramount importance for the creation and maintenance of the
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, mutual trust is not to be confused with
blind trust.
As my friend and colleague Advocate General Michal Bobek points out in his
excellent epilogue to this book, mutual trust is not the only reason why judges
in the Member States give effect to EU law instruments that require the mutual
recognition of judicial decisions, but it is nevertheless essential. As the Advocate
General shrewdly observes, it is somewhat contradictory to regard law as being
based on trust, since modern legal systems have to a large extent supplanted trust-
based systems in ensuring respect for societal norms. I therefore agree with him
that it is preferable to say rather, not least in the present context, that trust among
judges must be based on law. That is why the role played by the Court of Justice
through the preliminary ruling procedure provided for in Article 267 TFEU is so
central in making mutual trust possible, and thus in making mutual recognition
work. National judges know that where doubts arise as to the interpretation or
validity of the EU norms that are applicable within the Area of Freedom, Security
and Justice, the Court is there to act as an impartial, supranational arbiter in order
to provide a definitive ruling on such questions, which, moreover, will be binding
throughout the European Union.
In addition to describing in detail the operation of that system of mutual recog-
nition and the Court of Justice’s case law on the subject of mutual trust, the present
work provides a comprehensive guide to the ways in which fundamental rights,
particularly those enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, have been
given concrete expression, and indeed practical application, within the framework
1
CJEU, Opinion 2/13 (Accession of the European Union to the ECHR) of 18 December 2014,
EU:C:2014:2454, para 192.
Foreword xv
of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, both in civil and criminal law con-
texts. As such, it is a valuable collection for professionals and researchers alike,
focused on an important and fast-developing area of Union law, and I highly rec-
ommend it to those who are active within fields covered by the Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice, as well as to those with an academic interest in those fields.
Preface
This book is the result of a passion shared by the editors, who have eagerly fol-
lowed and discussed over the last decade the developments in the EU Area of
Freedom, Security and Justice and in the field of EU fundamental rights. The idea
of putting together such a collection of essays became urgent when, several years
after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the body of case law and legislation
in this field had grown to such an extent that it started fuelling heated debates
about the essential role, the scope and the standards of EU fundamental rights in
the fields covered by the AFSJ.
The editors had the chance to discuss the project underlying this book at a
workshop at Pompeu Fabra University (Barcelona) in February 2017. This meeting
enabled the authors to agree on the theoretical approach, to ensure the coherence
of the volume and to include additional topics. Several authors joined the project
afterwards, including a number from the Court of Justice of the European Union,
greatly enriching the scientific team. We are extremely grateful for their support
and openness and for all the valuable exchanges that took place during the prep-
aration of the book.
Both the kick-start workshop and the book itself received the support of the
Research Group on Constitutional European law and on Supranational Integration
(2017 SGR 549). In particular, the editors are indebted to the head of this research
group, Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz, for the invaluable support he has given to the pro-
ject, and to Michal Bobek for always enriching our discussions (and for sharing
with us a part of the brains of his team).
Common Abbreviations
AFSJ Area of Freedom, Security and Justice

AG Advocate General of the CJEU
CEAS Common European Asylum System
CDE Cahiers de Droit Européen
CFR Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
CISA Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union
CMLRev Common Market Law Review
EAW European arrest warrant
EC European Community
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights
EJML European Journal of Migration and Law
ELJ European Law Journal
ELRev European Law Review
EP European Parliament
EU European Union
EuConst European Constitutional Law Review
EYB European Yearbook
FD Framework Decision
FRA European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights
GDPR General Data Protection Regulation
IACtHR Inter-American Court of Human Rights
LTR long-term residents
MJ Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law
OJ Official Journal of the European Union
SIS Schengen Information System
TCN third-country national
TEC Treaty establishing the European Community
TEEC Treaty establishing the European Economic Community
TEU Treaty on European Union
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UN United Nations
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
YEL Yearbook of European Law
Introduction
Fundamental Rights at the Core of the EU
AFSJ
SARA IGLESIAS SÁNCHEZ AND MARIBEL GONZÁLEZ PASCUAL
The normative consolidation of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ)
and the entry into force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (the
Charter) has transformed the Union as we know it.
It is common knowledge that the AFSJ has undergone impressive normative
and jurisprudential developments in recent times. An abundance of new instru-
ments were adopted in the years following the entry into force of the Treaty of
Lisbon, joining the already vast body of pre-Lisbon secondary law in the vari-
ous fields covered by the AFSJ: civil and criminal judicial cooperation, as well
as matters related to borders, migration and asylum. National authorities and
courts have now become, or at least are becoming, well acquainted with the AFSJ
acquis, which is shown by the impressive increase in the number of preliminary
references made by national courts. It is today beyond doubt that the AFSJ has
become one of the most prolific areas of litigation before the Court of Justice of
the European Union (CJEU).1
This development has gone hand in hand with the entry into force of the
Charter as a legally binding instrument by virtue of the Treaty of Lisbon. EU fun-
damental rights have been codified and granted the same rank as the Treaty on
European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU) (the Treaties). The increased visibility they acquired quickly led to a rise
in direct actions and preliminary references to the CJEU concerning fundamental
rights. Fundamental rights litigation is today not only extremely frequent but also
increasingly central to the debate about the EU’s constitutional structure and that
structure’s relationship with national law and European human rights law.
The combined effect of the two aforementioned trends is a qualitative change
in the shape and content of European integration. Fundamental rights lie at the
heart of the AFSJ.2 It was only a matter of time (and of eliminating pre-existing
1
CJEU, Annual Report 2018: Judicial Activity, mentioning eighty new requests for a preliminary
ruling and seventy-four cases completed in the AFSJ that year.
2
For some general theoretical approaches to the subject, see D Leczykiewicz, ‘Human Rights
and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ in E Fletcher, E Herin-Karnell and C Matera
(eds), The European Union as an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (Routledge 2017); S
2 Sara Iglesias Sánchez and Maribel González Pascual
limitations on the jurisdiction of the CJEU), before the AFSJ became the most
dynamic area of interpretative development of EU fundamental rights. Fundamental
rights do not only constitute the basic pre-requisite for the proper functioning of
the various rules that constitute the AFSJ acquis; they serve as the bedrock on
which the principles of mutual recognition and mutual trust rest. As a result, fun-
damental rights have progressively unveiled their core function as prerequisites
and, ultimately, limits to the principles of mutual recognition and mutual trust.
Furthermore, the progressive normative development of the AFSJ has confirmed
the need to buttress mutual trust and recognition through harmonisation and
normative development. This has led to the adoption of various instruments of
secondary law in the blocks of asylum, migration and borders, civil judicial coop-
eration and cooperation in criminal matters. Those harmonising rules are based
on, but go well beyond, the inter-state dynamics of mutual recognition and trust
and the promotion of free movement. They establish new common standards that
not only make judicial and administrative cooperation possible but also contribute
to creating a common and solid ground of shared (although often minimal) EU
protection standards.
Now that the Charter has reached its critical tenth anniversary as a binding
instrument, this book looks at the intersection of these two constellations – the
AFSJ and EU fundamental rights – within the constitutional framework erected
by the Treaty of Lisbon.
The AFSJ and Constitutionalising the EU
It hardly needs saying that the EU has gone beyond a predominantly economic
approach to integration. At a symbolic level, this process has led to the evolution
of conceptual labels. Described initially as a common market and later as an
internal market, the EU is today referred to as an Area of Freedom, Security and
Douglas-Scott, ‘The EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: A Lack of Fundamental Rights,
Mutual Trust and Democracy?’ (2009) 11 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 53;
V Bazzocchi, ‘The European Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Area of Freedom, Security
and Justice’ in G Di Federico (ed), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: From Declaration to
Binding Instrument (Springer 2011); FJ Donaire Villa, ‘Los Derechos en el Espacio de Libertad,
Seguridad y Justicia’ in J Goizueta and M Cienfuegos (eds), La Eficacia de los Derechos
Fundamentales de la UE (Thomson Reuters Aranzadi 2014); M Heikkilä and others, ‘Report
Critically Assessing Human Rights Integration in AFSJ Policies’ (FRAME Deliverable 11.2, 2015),
https://doi.org/20.500.11825/107; JI Ugartemendia and H Labayle (eds), La Tutela Judicial de
los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea en el Espacio de Libertad, Seguridad y Justicia,
Curso de Verano UPV/EHU, IVAP/CDRE (Oñate European Inklings 8, 2016).
Introduction: Fundamental Rights at the Core of the AFSJ 3
Justice (alongside the pre-existing labels). This notion abandons the market as
the reference point and signals a territorial conception of the Union as an area.3
The triad of freedom, security and justice amplifies and extends the old market
objective of freedom, embodied from the outset in the four fundamental free-
doms. It evokes the wider substantive scope of integration, which now extends
to the basic functions of security and justice in both civil and criminal matters.
In short, the AFSJ entails a significant constitutional reconfiguration of the inte-
gration project.4
Since the entry into force of the TFEU, EU competences framed under the AFSJ
can no longer be conceived as spin-offs or mere complements to the internal mar-
ket. Pursuant to Article 3(2) TEU, the AFSJ has become an objective of the Union
in its own right. Moreover, the fragmented approach to justice and home affairs
inherited from the Treaty of Maastricht has finally been superseded. Title V of
the TFEU now brings together the formerly separate blocks of migration, asylum
and borders; judicial cooperation in civil matters; judicial cooperation in criminal
matters; and police cooperation.
The Treaty of Lisbon has therefore culminated in the ‘constitutionalisation’ of
the AFSJ. As a result, the general decision-making procedures now largely apply
to this area of law. The fragmented typology of acts brought about by the special
instruments of the third pillar has been consolidated, with the entire AFSJ now
being developed through normal EU legal acts. The previous limits on the jurisdic-
tion of the CJEU in this field have been eliminated.
However, the specificity of the AFSJ has not completely vanished. The unique-
ness of the former third pillar remains in place to a certain extent. Certain rules
concerning decision-making procedures still affect judicial cooperation in crim-
inal matters.5 Transitional rules govern the effects of acts adopted under the
3
H Lindahl, ‘Inside and Outside the EU’s “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”: Reflexive
Identity and the Unity of Legal Space’ (2004) 90 Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social
Philosophy 478.
4
See eg M Fichera, ‘Sketches of a Theory of Europe as an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’
in E Fletcher, E Herin-Karnell and C Matera (eds), The European Union as an Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice (Routledge 2017).
5
See eg arts 82(3) and 83(3) TFEU establishing the so-called emergency break mechanisms.
Recourse to a special legislative procedure is provided for passports, IDs and residence permits
(art 77(3) TFEU); sudden inflows of third-country nationals (art 78(3) TFEU); family law matters
with cross-border implications (art 81(3) TFEU); the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (art 86
TFEU); and operational police cooperation (art 87(3) TFEU). See generally S Peers, ‘Finally “Fit
for Purpose”: The Treaty of Lisbon and the End of the Third Pillar Legal Order’ (2008) 27 YEL
47; C Ladenburger, ‘Police and Criminal Law in the Treaty of Lisbon: A New Dimension for the
Community Method’ (2008) 4 European Constitutional Law Review 20.
previous treaty framework.6 The phenomenon of géométrie variable continues to

afflict the AFSJ. The regime of opt-outs that were already in place has been fur-
ther complicated in the context of Brexit.7 The AFSJ therefore remains a singular
and particularly complex area of EU law.
The diversity of the substantive topics gathered under the AFSJ umbrella add
to this structural complexity. Indeed, it is arguably easier to account for the dif-
ferences between the AFSJ blocks than it is to explain their similarities. And
yet, the AFSJ is marked by a conceptual unity. This is not merely the product of
historical coincidence and progressive convergence through treaty reform. More
importantly for this book, it reflects a common trend running through the matters
covered by the AFSJ – namely, the creeping of EU law into tasks traditionally
preserved for the Member States in a way that does not necessarily flow from the
dynamics of market integration.
Moreover, in the spheres covered by the AFSJ, EU law affects individual rights
with particular intensity.8 EU action in this field may strongly affect the bal-
ance between fundamental rights and general interests. Such factors have led to
additional safeguards not only in the decision-making procedure but also in the
mechanism of cooperation between national courts and the CJEU. For example,
an urgent preliminary ruling procedure available only for AFSJ matters has been
established, and restrictions have been placed on the review of the proportionality
of law enforcement measures undertaken as part of judicial and police coopera-
tion in criminal matters.
All in all, the AFSJ is the sphere of integration that currently takes centre stage
in academic and jurisprudential debates at national, supranational and interna-
tional levels. The AFSJ revamps the integration project, redefines the territorial
space of the Union, reformulates the relationship between the law and citizens,
and raises unique challenges for the multilayered protective system of funda-
mental rights. For the latter, the AFSJ challenges the traditional role of national
6
Protocol 36 on transitional provisions concerning acts adopted on the basis of titles V and VI of
the former version of the TEU prior the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. H Satzger, ‘Legal
Effects of Directives Amending or Repealing Pre-Lisbon Framework Decisions’ (2015) 6 New
Journal of Criminal Law 528; V Mitsilegas, S Carrera and K Eisele, The End of the Transitional
Period for Police and Criminal Justice Measures Adopted Before the Lisbon Treaty: Who Monitors
Trust in the European Criminal Justice Area? (CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe
74, 2014), www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/end-transitional-period-police-and-criminal-justice-
measures-adopted-lisbon-treaty-who/.
7
See D Curtin ‘Brexit and the EU Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Bespoke Bits and Pieces’
in Federico Fabbrini (ed), The Law & Politics of Brexit (OUP 2017).
8
See K Lenaerts, ‘The Contribution of the European Court of Justice to the Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice’ (2010) 59 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 255.
jurisdictions as guardians of personal rights, turning them into key components in

a multinational system of judicial cooperation based on mutual trust.9
These transformations have led to a situation where considerations of fun-
damental rights in the AFSJ have a systematic impact on policy developments
that may shape the future of political integration. The fact that the Union is now
an AFSJ has encouraged EU institutions to adopt a broader and more robust
approach to the rule of law in the Member States. Mutual trust and recognition
might otherwise be at risk. Indeed, the intrinsic link between mutual trust and the
substratum of fundamental rights presumed to be shared by Member States makes
any failure to secure the rule of law at national level a threat to the functioning
of the EU as an AFSJ.10
The Central Place of Fundamental Rights in the AFSJ
The distinct subject matters covered by the different blocks of the AFSJ – EU rules
on judicial cooperation (civil and criminal) and migration, asylum and borders –
are intrinsically intertwined with fundamental rights in a particularly intense
fashion. Integrating the AFSJ has become crucial to the most pressing challenges
of our time, such as international terrorism or the refugee crisis. When EU law
is adopted, transposed and implemented in these and other fields of the AFSJ,
fundamental rights issues are liable to arise at every step. Moreover, the overall
guarantee of EU fundamental rights has become dependent on the progress of
integration in the AFSJ. Indeed, the Charter itself affirms the importance of the
AFSJ in its preamble: together with Union citizenship, this field of integration
ensures that the individual is at the heart of the activities of the Union.
Against this background, EU law in the areas covered by the AFSJ has proved
problematic from the point of view of fundamental rights standards. This is
because, firstly, the whole area relies on mutual trust and mutual recognition in
the (initial) absence of harmonisation. Maintaining mutual recognition and trust
across the EU, regarded as a unified area for the application of the law, relies on a
presumption of equivalent protection among Member States. Whether innocent or
not, this fiction challenges the traditional understanding of the protective respon-
sibilities of national administrative and judicial authorities. Secondly, harmoni-
sation in the different spheres of the AFSJ is often defined in terms of required
minimums or is realised only to a limited extent. This leads to additional hurdles
9
See Chapter 22.
10
See Commission, ‘A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law’ (Communication)
COM/2014/0158 final; case C-216/18 PPU LM EU:C:2018:586 (deficiencies in the system of justice).
when assessing the scope of national discretion and interaction with EU funda-
mental rights standards. Indeed, it is in this field that national differences and
entrenched, competing legal traditions can be very sensitive, as the issues con-
nected with the AFSJ often pertain to the treasured core of sovereignty. Indeed,
the AFSJ is symbolically linked to the affective foundations of national constitu-
tional identity. Third, the matters covered by the AFSJ are, by their very nature,
more susceptible to fundamental rights violations.
In this framework, the fundamental rights obligations placed on Member States
by their constitutions and the ECHR are put under particular pressure in the AFSJ.
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and national constitutional and
supreme courts are crucial components of the European fundamental rights space,
and they all keep a watchful eye on the protection standards provided by EU law
in the AFSJ. In particular, this makes the AFSJ the best case study for determining
whether the current EU fundamental rights system has adjusted to the specificities
of integration in particularly sensitive areas, and whether the progressive con-
struction of the AFSJ meets the standards of the ECHR.
At the core of the challenges are the principles of mutual trust and mutual
recognition, portrayed as the constitutional principles underpinning the AFSJ.11
The proper construction of the AFSJ – and particularly the smooth operation of
the instruments based on mutual recognition – depends on the solidity of its archi-
tecture of rights. Mutual trust has become a principle of ‘fundamental importance
in EU law’.12 The centrality of this principle is intrinsically connected to mutual
trust among Member States as the articulating element of the AFSJ – and as a core
component of the Union’s uniqueness. This uniqueness was one of the key argu-
ments put forward by the CJEU when finding the draft agreement on accession to
the ECHR to be incompatible with EU primary law.13 According to Opinion 2/13
of the CJEU, mutual trust requires each of the Member States, ‘save in exceptional
circumstances, to consider all the other Member States to be complying with EU
law and particularly with the fundamental rights recognised by EU law’.14
Despite the potential for conflict,15 in the pre-accession status quo the ECtHR
confirmed its position of deference (the Bosphorus presumption of equivalent
11
K Lenaerts ‘The Principle of Mutual Recognition in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’
[2015] Il Diritto dell’Unione Europea 530; E Herlin-Karnell, ‘Constitutional Principles in the
EU Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ in D Acosta and C Murphy (eds), EU Security and
Justice Law (Hart 2014).
12
Opinion 2/13 (Accession of the European Union to the ECHR) EU:C:2014:2454 (18 December
2014) para 191.
13
ibid. 14
ibid (emphasis added).
15
A Kornezov, ‘The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in Light of the EU Accession to the
ECHR: Is the Break-Up Inevitable?’ (2012) 15 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies
227; E Brouwer, ‘Mutual Trust and Human Rights in the AFSJ: In Search of Guidelines for
National Courts’ (2016) 1 European Papers 893.
protection)16 to the level of protection granted by the EU in the specific field of

mutual recognition in the AFSJ.17 However, the ECtHR laid down the groundwork
for a more exhaustive analysis in Avotinš v Latvia. In this case, which concerned
judicial civil cooperation, the ECtHR examined the merits while recognising that
the state in question had not been afforded any margin of appreciation. It may be
no coincidence that this development followed hard on the heels of Opinion 2/13.
Indeed, the ECtHR issued an explicit warning:
[I]f a serious and substantiated complaint is raised before [the Member States] to the
effect that the protection of a Convention right has been manifestly deficient and that
this situation cannot be remedied by European Union law, they cannot refrain from
examining that complaint on the sole ground that they are applying EU law.18
National constitutional and supreme courts have continued to underline the ‘hard
limits’ of trust19 and have progressively engaged in judicial dialogue with the
CJEU in order to dispel pertinent doubts over the congruent functioning of the
interlocking levels of protection.20
In this context, the CJEU has been progressively building on the idea that
mutual trust is not equivalent to ‘blind trust’.21 The CJEU is designing system
safeguards to deal with ‘exceptional circumstances’ that justify departing from the
quasi-automaticity of mutual recognition. Case law has been gradually determin-
ing the role that fundamental rights imperatives play in the operation of EU legal
acts based on mutual recognition and mutual trust and specifying the conditions
under which they do so. Starting with the NS case concerning asylum within the
so-called Dublin system22 following a strong message by the ECtHR,23 the jurispru-
dential consolidation of fundamental rights as potential limits to mutual trust is
today also firmly embedded in the field of judicial cooperation in criminal matters
after the seminal judgments in Aranyosi and Căldăraru, ML and LM.24
16
See Bosphorus Airways v Ireland (ECtHR, 30 June 2005).
17
See Povse v Austria (ECtHR, 18 January 2011).
18
Avotin‚š v Latvia (ECtHR, 23 May 2016) para 116.
19
See German Constitutional Court, BVerfG, Order of the Second Senate of 15 December 2015, 2
BvR 2735/14.
20
See eg Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld EU:C:2007:261; Case C-399/11 Melloni
EU:C:2013:107; Case C-168/13 PPU F EU:C:2013:358.
21
See K Lenaerts, ‘La Vie après l’Avis: Exploring the Principle of Mutual (Yet Not Blind) Trust’
(2017) 54 CMLRev 805.
22
See Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 NS and Others EU:C:2011:865; Case C-394/12 Abdullahi
EU:C:2013:813.
23
MSS v Belgium and Greece, App no 30696/0921.
24
Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Aranyosi and Căldăraru EU:C:2016:198; Case
C-220/18 PPU ML EU:C:2018:589 (conditions of detention in Hungary); LM (n 10).
It is true that the courts’ case law according to which fundamental rights con-
stitute sufficient and practical grounds for limiting mutual trust and recognition
continues to be debated and needs to be developed.25 This is a necessary con-
sequence of the incremental and casuistic nature of case law. However, it has
become clear that the role of fundamental rights in limiting mutual trust cannot
be automatically restricted to instances of systemic deficiencies, as made clear by
the CJEU in CK and Others26 (again in the asylum field and after a strong message
from the ECtHR).27
Furthermore, derogations from mutual recognition and trust are justified not
only by violations of absolute or non-derogable fundamental rights, such as the
prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatments in Article 4 of the
Charter.28 The Court has also confirmed without hesitation the essential role played
by the right to effective judicial protection and the rule of law – which is funda-
mental to mutual trust – in the field of judicial cooperation. Breaches of the funda-
mental right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter which result from
systemic or generalised deficiencies affecting the independence of the judiciary
may also justify refusing execution of a European arrest warrant.29 That said, case
law never produces a neat classification grid with mathematical clarity. However,
more developments are to be expected along the lines of the general criteria that
have already begun to emerge.30 It would appear that the assessment carried out by
executing judicial authorities must not disregard the specific risk, severity and con-
sequences of a violation, the nature of the fundamental right at stake – its absolute
nature or its connection to the rule of law or other fundamental EU values – or the
specific level of harmonisation and safeguards embedded in the EU act at issue.
Despite the practical challenges that the application of the new developments
will undoubtedly raise, the fundamental rights exceptions are buttressing pillars
rather than ‘cracks’ in the wall of mutual trust.31 Recent jurisprudential develop-
ments in the Strasbourg Court show that a coherent approach to mutual trust that
25
On this debate see E Xanthopoulou, ‘Mutual Trust and Rights in the EU Criminal and Asylum
Law: Three Phases of Evolution and the Uncharted Territory beyond Blind Trust’ (2018) 55
CMLRev 489.
26
Case C-578/16 PPU CK and Others EU:C:2017:127. See S. Montaldo, ‘On a Collision Course!
Mutual Recognition, Mutual Trust and the Protection of Fundamental Rights in the Recent Case-
Law of the Court of Justice’ (2016) 1 European Papers 965; S Prechal, ‘Mutual Trust Before the
Court of Justice of the European Union’ (2017) 2 European Papers 75.
27
Tarakhel v Switzerland (4 November 2014) CE:ECHR:2014:1104JUD 002921712.
28
See I Canor, ‘My Brother’s Keeper? Horizontal Solange: “An Ever Closer Distrust Among the
Peoples of Europe”’ (2013) 50 CMLRev 383, 403.
29
LM (n 10). 30
See eg Case C-128/18 Dorobantu EU:2019:857.
31
On the intensity of the executing judicial authority’s review of the EAW, see C-128/18 Dorobantu
EU:C:2019:334, Opinion of AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona.
safeguards fundamental rights can satisfy the requirements of the ECtHR.32 At

the same time, EU law has furthered positive harmonisation in the AFSJ. This is,
to a certain extent, a by-product of the need to build mutual trust. Fundamental
rights have transformed the dynamics of integration in the AFSJ: if mutual rec-
ognition based on mutual trust was initially a means of enabling cooperation
despite reticence to harmonisation, the need to bolster this trust and safeguard the
effectiveness of mutual recognition has in turn increased the need for substantive
harmonisation. The adoption, transposition and implementation of both positive
(harmonising) and negative (mutual-recognition-based) EU legislation requires
constant monitoring of fundamental rights protection. Through this intensive nor-
mative action and its interpretation in case law, the EU is progressively defining
its conception of rights through constant interchange with the ECHR and the var-
ious national constitutional traditions.
With regard to national constitutional systems, the autonomy of EU fundamen-
tal rights presents unique challenges to the multilevel system of rights protection
in Europe. EU legal rules in the fields covered by the AFSJ pose challenges both
for EU institutions and for Member States. New areas of competence have been
opened for interaction between EU law and national law. The operation of the
principles that govern the interaction between EU and national law – primacy,
direct effect, conform interpretation – have reappeared, posing new challenges in
areas previously unexplored by EU law.33 Not all the challenges are new, however,
as EU law already deployed outside the AFSJ has important effects in criminal and
migration law through internal market rules, as well as in civil judicial coopera-
tion through international conventions. However, the intensity and breadth of the
normative action of the Union at the current stage of development of the AFSJ has
brought many latent or at least relatively unexplored issues to the fore.
Fundamental Rights in the AFSJ: The Structure of This Book

and Its Chapters
The essays in this compilation examine the normative and jurisprudential devel-
opment of the AFSJ with a view to assessing its effect on the overall scope and
standards of EU fundamental rights protection in this particularly complex and
sensitive field of integration.
32
With respect to the EAW, see Romero Castaño v Belgium (ECtHR, 9 July 2019)
CE:ECHR:2019:0709JUD000835117.
33
See Case C-105/03 Pupino EU:C:2005:386; Case C-439/16 PPU Milev EU:C:2016:818; Case
C-573/17 Popławski EU:C:2019:530. In relation to criminal sanctions concerning TVA, see Case
C-105/14 Taricco and Others EU:C:2015:555; Case C-42/17 MAS and MB EU:C:2017:936.
The General Approach

The chapters of this book analyse EU legislation (primary and secondary) and
case law from the point of view of their impact on the standard and scope of
fundamental rights protection in the AFSJ. The emphasis is on the role of funda-
mental rights as a yardstick for judicial review of both EU legal acts and national
legislation (which falls within the scope of EU law), as well as their importance as
interpretative guides. What impact has EU secondary law had on the construction
of an EU standard in respect of particular fundamental rights? How have the chal-
lenges linked to harmonisation and mutual recognition shaped the interpretation
of specific fundamental rights in the different fields of the AFSJ? How is EU action
in the AFSJ shaping the jurisprudential construction of an autonomous standard
of protection for specific fundamental rights? How do these developments interact
with national standards and ECHR standards?
This book does not include a separate examination of ECtHR case law or
national constitutional law. The role of the ECHR and ECtHR case law is examined
as part of the system of EU fundamental rights within each chapter. Rather than
taking a conflictual approach, the book seeks to offer an account of current trends
and potential solutions to the identified areas of tension at EU level. Furthermore,
the book does not seek to provide an exhaustive description of instruments of
secondary law or a systematisation of legislative developments in the AFSJ. The
various instruments of secondary law are studied in relation to each chapter’s
centre of gravity, which is determined by the content of the fundamental rights in
question. Hence, fundamental rights that are central to the development of each
of the blocks of the AFSJ have been selected as the elements around which the
book is structured.
The Structure of the Book

The book is divided into five parts. Part I deals with general structural elements:
the scope of fundamental rights in the AFSJ; the standard of protection; and
the principles of mutual trust and mutual recognition as core components of the
AFSJ. Parts II, III and IV are each devoted to one of the three main blocks of the
AFSJ: migration, asylum and borders; judicial cooperation in civil matters; and
cooperation in criminal matters. Finally, Part V consists of three horizontal studies
of specific fundamental rights that traverse all three blocks: data protection; citi-
zenship and non-discrimination; and the protection of vulnerable groups.
This book readily acknowledges the distinct structure, content and fundamental
rights implications of the different blocks of the AFSJ. Indeed, the factors driv-
ing harmonisation and mutual recognition are not identical across the blocks.
However, the constitutional sense of unity that the Treaties lend to the AFSJ, the
shared challenges in terms of fundamental rights, and the perception of this field
of EU law as the most relevant non-economic pillar of EU integration make it

worthwhile analysing those differences in parallel and through structured com-
parisons. The reader may therefore find it of interest to jump from one part of the
book to another, so as to compare the approaches taken to the same fundamental
rights in the three different thematic blocks of the AFSJ.
The general studies comprising Part I of the book begin with a transversal
examination of the scope of EU fundamental rights in the AFSJ by Sara Iglesias
Sánchez. The chapter focuses on the controversial issue of the application of EU
fundamental rights in Member States. The general difficulties raised by the test of
the Charter’s applicability to Member States are amplified by both the nature of
the subjects covered by the AFSJ and legislative action in this area. Some of the
harmonising measures in the AFSJ regulate or develop the content of fundamental
rights (as is clearly the case with the family reunification and the procedural crim-
inal law directives). Other acts rely on the dynamic of mutual recognition of judi-
cial decisions or are based on mutual trust in public or administrative systems in
which many different factors may influence the protection of fundamental rights
up- and downstream. These particularities have made it difficult to determine the
extent to which Member States are implementing EU law.
In Chapter 2, Maribel González Pascual explores the coexistence of several lay-
ers of fundamental rights, which is all the more complex as certain aspects of the
AFSJ are particularly sensitive to fundamental rights. Furthermore, the princi-
ple of mutual recognition implies that decisions taken in one Member State are
recognised and executed in any other Member State based on the assumption
that all Members States have a sufficient level of fundamental rights protection.
Hence, it is of paramount importance to (1) ascertain whether the fundamental
rights protection guaranteed by the AFSJ is sufficient, (2) determine its core ele-
ments, and (3) identify the problems raised by its operation in practice. Within this
framework, the chapter seeks to discover whether the CJEU is building a European
standard of fundamental rights in the AFSJ.
Chapter 3 by François-Xavier Millet offers a general conceptual analysis of the
principles of mutual recognition and mutual trust. Millet shows how the principle
of mutual trust, initially designed to buttress mutual recognition, has progressively
grown. In practice, these principles entail not only the recognition of particular
decisions but also mutual recognition of national institutions acting in the AFSJ,
such as judicial and penitentiary systems. Although the CJEU and the EU legislator
may have bolstered mutual recognition by flanking it with the new ‘principle’ of
mutual trust, a recent turn to realism has acknowledged that there may be grounds
for ‘deactivating’ mutual recognition in exceptional circumstances related to a
Member State’s failure to respect fundamental rights. While this development may
spell tension between the protection of fundamental rights and the principles of
mutual recognition and mutual trust, the chapter concludes that a high level of
fundamental rights protection calls for a rethinking of the function and content
of mutual trust.
The principles of mutual recognition and mutual trust have challenged tra-
ditional conceptions of fundamental rights protection in Member States. Three
chapters analyse those challenges prefiguring the subsequent parts of the book
devoted to the three thematic blocks of the AFSJ.
Chapter 4 by Violeta Moreno-Lax explores how mutual trust is becoming an
organising principle that underpins the mechanisms of (implicit) mutual rec-
ognition in the fields of migration and asylum within the AFSJ. By classifying
measures as either rights-conferring or rights-restricting, the chapter unveils a
contradictory dynamic: whereas mutual recognition of rights-restricting measures
is close to automatic and practically unconditional, the mutual recognition of
rights-conferring measures is virtually non-existent. The author explains that the
most plausible reason for this paradox lies in the interplay between presumed
(abstract) trust, as required by the case law of the CJEU, and real (practical) distrust,
manifested horizontally and vertically in the day-to-day exercise of EU migration
and asylum governance. The negative effects of this interplay on third-country
nationals are considerable, particularly in the case of asylum seekers, and leads to
the ‘exceptionalisation’ of their fundamental rights.
Chapter 9, written by Magdalena Ličková and Crístian Oró Martínez, examines
the principles of mutual trust and mutual recognition in the field of civil judicial
cooperation. The nature and operation of judicial recognition and enforcement
within the Union is based on mutual trust in other Member States’ judicial systems.
Under this framework, recognition and enforcement operate quasi-automatically.
The chapter outlines the major phases in the development and shaping of the Union’s
system of judicial recognition and enforcement system. In addition, the chapter
examines developments in case law concerning the substantive and formal require-
ments that condition, albeit minimally, the free circulation of judgments within
the Union. It concludes with some remarks inspired by the recent move to make
judicial independence one of the fundamental prerequisites for the mutual trust
upon which the very functioning of judicial cooperation within the Union relies.
Chapter 13 by Valsamis Mitsilegas analyses the extent to which the harmoni-
sation of fundamental rights in EU secondary law provides a basis for enhanced
mutual trust and thus facilitates the operation of mutual recognition in criminal
matters. The evolution of CJEU case law, particularly with regard to the EAW, and
the development of EU harmonising legislation facilitating mutual recognition
in respect of defence rights signal a move towards effective and real compliance
with fundamental rights. This evolution represents a progressive shift from blind
to earned trust in Europe’s area of criminal justice. The chapter also identifies
practical problems and unresolved questions concerning the operation of this new
approach to mutual recognition and trust.
Following the introductory chapters on mutual recognition and trust, Parts II,
III and IV of the book are devoted to an analysis of normative and jurisprudential
developments in the AFSJ. The chapters in these three parts focus on the effects
of these developments on particular fundamental rights or a bundle of interlinked
fundamental rights. As already mentioned, the book does not provide a commen-
tary of Charter rights article by article. The chapters concentrate instead on the
most salient fundamental rights issues in each block of the AFSJ. This structuring
of the analysis around particular fundamental rights is better suited to scrutinising
the impact of EU secondary law and case law on the standard of protection in EU
law, taking the Charter as its point of reference. It also makes it possible to explore
parallel developments in the three blocks and identify points of convergence and
divergence in legislative development and case law.
Particular attention is given to procedural rights, with the analyses reflecting
the complexities inherent in each of the AFSJ’s three blocks.
As explained by Nathan Cambien in Chapter 8, procedural rights have had
a very strong influence in the field of immigration, asylum and borders. They
play a crucial role in establishing fundamental guarantees for substantive rights.
In particular, the right to an effective remedy and the right to be heard have
acquired greater importance in the case law of the CJEU and in EU secondary
legislation, raising the standard of protection in this field. Other fundamental pro-
cedural rights, such as the right to access records, the right to legal assistance and
representation and the right to legal aid, remain in a comparatively embryonic stage,
but they could prove extremely relevant to future developments in the EU acquis.
Two chapters are devoted to the protection of procedural rights in the field
of civil judicial cooperation. In Chapter 11, Dominik Düsterhaus focuses on the
implementation and scrutiny of fair trial guarantees under EU law in civil mat-
ters. Düsterhaus argues that both normatively and institutionally the framework
of civil judicial cooperation is structurally deficient insofar as domestic courts’
assessments of whether proceedings are fair remains largely exempt from EU
oversight. This deficiency is attributed to the limited scope of CJEU jurisdiction
over fundamental rights. It is nevertheless suggested that the CJEU’s use of the
second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU as a benchmark for judicial organisa-
tion may eventually lead to a tightening of the Court’s grip.
Chapter 12 by Agnieszka Fra˛ckowiak-Adamska takes the analysis further by
considering whether the EU’s legislators and judiciary strike the right balance
between two fundamental procedural rights stemming from the right to a fair
trial – right of access to the court and right of defence – in the field of judicial
cooperation in civil matters. The analysis focuses on secondary law and case law,
with particular regard to the obligation of the defendant to exhaust all remedies
available in the state of origin and the importance of introducing EU-wide stand-
ards in civil cases.
It is noteworthy that in the field of criminal law, in stark contrast to the situ-
ation in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters, procedural rights have
been the subject of a major operation of harmonisation through EU secondary leg-
islation. As shown by Coral Arangüena in Chapter 15, this minimal approach has
strengthened basic elements for mutual recognition. Six directives on procedural
rights have been enacted, providing a point of reference for procedural guarantees.
Incorporated in the EU legal order through secondary legislation, those guarantees
should be regarded as an integral part of the protection afforded by Article 48(2)
of the Charter. The chapter offers an overview of the procedural directives, high-
lighting shortcomings that have come to light during the implementation process
as well as difficulties encountered in their application by judicial authorities.
Although procedural rights seem omnipresent in the cases discussed, other fun-
damental rights also feature prominently in certain fields of the AFSJ. Such is the
case of the right to family life, which is of great relevance to the fields of migra-
tion and asylum law in addition to civil judicial cooperation. Such is also the case
of the right to liberty and security, which occupy centre stage not only in the
fields of immigration and asylum law but also in the field of judicial cooperation
in criminal matters.
The right to family life is of paramount importance in asylum and migration
law and in civil judicial cooperation. In Chapter 6, Ciara M Smyth offers a thor-
ough and critical assessment of jurisprudential developments concerning the fam-
ily reunification directive, the key piece of secondary legislation regulating the
right to family life in the field of immigration – a field she describes as ‘differen-
tiated and fragmented’. She analyses whether and to what extent the CJEU relies
on fundamental rights in giving shape and meaning to the directive, focusing on
the Court’s ambiguous position regarding the role that fundamental rights should
play in this controversial policy area.
In Chapter 10, Vesna Lazić analyses the right to family life and the best inter-
ests of the child in judicial cooperation in civil matters. Her contribution provides
insight into how certain rights of the child – definition of the child, best interests
and hearing of the child – have been incorporated in the recently revised Brussels
II bis Regulation. The focus is on the ‘overriding mechanism’ in child abduction
cases. The chapter points out major flaws in the current regulation’s scheme, as
illustrated in relevant CJEU case law. It looks at how the recast regulation addresses
the weaknesses of the current framework and assesses the appropriateness and
effectiveness of the amendments, – critically examining whether the revised regu-
lation is likely to overcome the difficulties that have been encountered.
Several EU instruments in the field of EU immigration and asylum law, and
some in the field of EU criminal law, allow for, or even presuppose, the possibility
of Member States adopting measures entailing deprivation of liberty. Hence, two
chapters examine how the right to liberty and security operates in the fields of
immigration and asylum on the one hand and criminal law on the other.
Chapter 5 by Justine N Stefanelli and Elspeth Guild analyses how the CJEU
has dealt with the competing interests of the right to liberty and an effective sys-
tem for immigration, asylum and borders in the EU in the context of the Return
Directive, the Reception Conditions Directive and the Dublin III Regulation. Where
explicit rules governing detention exist, the authors point out that the standard of
protection guaranteed by EU law goes beyond the standard offered by the ECHR.
Moreover, the case law relating to the Return Directive has relied on effective-
ness in a way that has enhanced the right to liberty. However, it is not clear how
solid this ‘liberty enhancing’ effect is, as the case law of the CJEU interpreting
the Return Directive does not rely on fundamental rights arguments. The chapter
concludes that, although the CJEU has in many cases aligned its approach with
that of the ECtHR, distinct, EU-specific jurisprudence on the right to liberty is
beginning to emerge.
In the field of criminal law, while the European arrest warrant was initially the
principal subject of debate, discussions on the impact of EU criminal law on the
right to liberty have since broadened in scope. Chapter 14 by Leandro Mancano
addresses this development and the role of the right to liberty in three scenarios:
EU measures triggering cases of continued detention through mutual recogni-
tion; EU measures safeguarding the right to liberty; and EU measures facilitating
alternatives to detention. The chapter argues that, while progress has undoubtedly
been made, much remains to be done for the liberty of persons in criminal pro-
ceedings and judicial cooperation procedures to be adequately protected.
Some fundamental rights have a particular imprint in specific areas, or a scope
of application that is limited to specific thematic issues. This is the case of the
right of asylum, whose unique role and development within the EU fundamental
rights system is analysed by Madalina Moraru in Chapter 7. Moraru’s discussion of
the scope and effects of the EU fundamental right to asylum delves chiefly into the
scope of Article 18 of the Charter as compared to the principle of non-refoulement
guaranteed by the 1951 Refugee Convention. It also covers the extraterritorial
application of the EU fundamental right to asylum and its content, and the actors
who contribute to the normative clarification of the right to asylum. The chapter
demonstrates the added value of the EU fundamental right to asylum as reflected
in the various functions it plays at EU and national levels.
Criminal law merits special attention with regard to several charter rights,
including the principle of legality, the ne bis in idem principle and the rights of
the victims.
The role of the principle of legality as a fundamental right in criminal law is
examined by Christina Peristeridou in Chapter 17. Peristeridou identifies several
inconsistencies and shortcomings in the application of this principle in the area

of EU criminal law. The principle’s application to mutual recognition is effec-
tively excluded, and the same goes for rules on jurisdiction. These two lacunae
result in uncertainty in the cross-border application of criminal law. Moreover,
the CJEU has sought to restrict the application of the legality principle to limita-
tion rules using contradictory reasoning. The chapter highlights three significant
challenges: multilevel criminal justice created by the institutional arrangements of
the European legal order; the everlasting conflict between due process and crime
control observed in European criminal policy; and the lack of defined theoretical
rationales and values justifying the principle of legality.
Bas van Bockel offers an in-depth examination of the application of the ne bis
in idem principle in Chapter 18. After offering a general account of the sources
and components of that principle, the author traces its spectacular development in
the AFSJ over the past two decades. Van Bockel emphasises the productiveness of
the judicial dialectic that the Van Esbroeck/Zolotukhin line of case law prompted
between the CJEU and the ECtHR. He nonetheless points out that the case law on
the application of the principle to the interaction between administrative, criminal
and tax law still raises questions linked to the fundamental relationship between
criminal and (punitive) administrative law.
The rights of victims are examined by Luca Lupária and Jacopo Della Torre in
Chapter 16. The authors provide an overview of the complex and vast legal frame-
work that the EU has adopted in recent decades to protect victims of crime in the
AFSJ, especially from the point of view of procedural rights. They draw particu-
lar attention to both the relevant case law of the CJEU and the stance taken by
national legal systems when implementing EU minimum standards. The chapter
also analyses the impact of the Charter on the standard and scope of the rights of
victims and offers thoughts for the future by looking at developments that, in the
years to come, may compensate for the lack of effectiveness that, in many cases,
still characterises the rights of victims within the AFSJ.
The last part of the book examines transversal fundamental rights issues that
cut across all the subjects covered by the AFSJ: the right to data protection; citi-
zenship and non-discrimination; and the protection of vulnerable groups.
In Chapter 19, Evelien Brouwer analyses the normative and institutional devel-
opments in the AFSJ that are likely to have a strong impact on the fundamental
right to data protection. Brouwer offers an overview of the different mechanisms
have been set up to collect, store and exchange personal data for the purpose of
law enforcement and border and immigration control. These instruments provide
for the exchange of information between judicial and law enforcement authori-
ties, transfer of data to third states, and the creation of large-scale databases such
as the Schengen Information System, Eurodac and the Visa Information System.
The chapter analyses the use of these instruments, the involvement of third parties
and the principle of interoperability from the perspective of the right to privacy
and data protection.
In Chapter 20, Annette Schrauwen examines the impact of AFSJ policies on
the fundamental rights linked to EU citizenship and on the non-discrimination
principle. Indeed, the AFSJ was said to have been created to foster free move-
ment. The chapter discusses that claim by highlighting the interaction between
the traditional rights of free movement and non-discrimination of EU citizens on
the one hand and the specific AFSJ measures on immigration and criminal and
civil matters on the other. The author shows that the law has not evolved unidi-
rectionally and that it is difficult to predict how the objectives of the AFSJ will be
interpreted when the rights of free movement and non-discrimination are taken
as points of reference.
The consideration and protection of vulnerable groups in the three blocks of the
AFSJ are addressed by Francesca Ippolito in Chapter 21. She explains that we are
witnessing a process of progressive ‘vulnerabilisation’ in EU law. After explaining
this notion, she examines the normative effects of vulnerability within the frame
of fundamental rights protection in the AFSJ. The chapter claims that the notion
of vulnerability could enhance the effectiveness of fundamental rights protection
and raise the profile of the justice aspect of the AFSJ, since it requires the devel-
opment of a more sophisticated ethic of Member State duties.
In his epilogue in Chapter 22, Michal Bobek reflects on the difficulties and
challenges that the notion of trust presents for judges. Through a historical excur-
sion, he demonstrates how basing the operation of an area of law on trust is likely
to clash with a rich and powerful bundle of ideas and historical experience at
national level. Capturing the essence of the overall conclusion that may be drawn
from this volume, he eloquently invites us to consider a change of paradigm from
law based on trust to trust based on law: ‘[T]rust is not a pre-requisite for the law,
but rather something that the law and social interaction generate. Trust becomes
the end destination, not the starting point.’
PART I
The General Framework for
Fundamental Rights Protection
in the AFSJ
1 The Scope of EU Fundamental Rights in
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
SARA IGLESIAS SÁNCHEZ
1.1 Introduction
After ten years of application, heated debates continue to question the boundaries
of fundamental rights as determined by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
EU (the Charter). This instrument has brought fundamental rights to the fore in
EU law. The number of fundamental rights cases brought before the CJEU began
to multiply as soon as the Charter became part of mainstream EU legal language.1
Therein lies the challenge: in a union of law based on the principle of attributed
competences, the scope of application of these rights is limited, which in turn
limits the jurisdiction of the CJEU.
As might be expected, the general debate over the scope of EU fundamental
rights is accentuated in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). This
area of EU law thus represents a particularly apt testing ground for gauging the
implications of expanding the scope of EU fundamental rights. Even though it is
now clear that fundamental rights can be affected in any field of EU law, the legal
spheres covered by the AFSJ – civil and criminal law, plus border, migration and
asylum policies – all, by their very nature, touch directly on especially funda-
mental-rights-sensitive matters. This deep connection is already apparent in the
Charter’s preamble, which emphasises that the Union ‘places the individual at the
heart of its activities … by creating an area of freedom, security and justice’. Here,
we have a vivid illustration of the key impact that the development and consolida-
tion of EU fundamental rights through the Charter, combined with their applica-
tion in a fully communitarised AFSJ, has on the process EU constitutionalisation.2
A great many EU fundamental rights are affected, if not exclusively then pre-
dominantly, by the thematic content of the AFSJ. Examples are the right to liberty
All the opinions expressed in this chapter are personal to the author.
1
See, generally, G De Burca, ‘After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Court of Justice as a
Human Rights Adjudicator?’ (2013) 20 MJ 2168.
2
On the CJEU’s role in the AFSJ as part of this constitutionalisation process, see E Herlin-Karnell,
‘The European Court of Justice as a Game-Changer’ in A Ripoll and F Trauner (eds), The Routledge
Handbook of Justice and Home Affairs Research (2017).
22 Sara Iglesias Sánchez
and security, the right to asylum and the non-refoulement principle. Other funda-
mental rights, such as the procedural guarantees enshrined in Articles 47 to 50 of
the Charter, or the right to family life in Article 7 of the Charter, are also central
to the AFSJ. One could therefore say that the Charter’s relevance is enhanced in
the AFSJ, for it is there that many provisions of the Charter that would otherwise
remain dormant or scarcely used in practice come into play.
Furthermore, the AFSJ broadens EU law by bringing within its scope not only
new fields of material law but also new dynamics of interaction between EU
law and national law. Indeed, the common migration and asylum policy directly
regulates rights and personal status regardless of EU free movement rules.
Similarly, rules on judicial cooperation in the civil and criminal fields introduce
EU procedural law into areas whose substantive content is not harmonised. Lastly,
mutual recognition of decisions both in the civil and criminal fields, as well as the
application of the principle of mutual trust in the fields of migration and asylum,
have a direct and intense effect on individual rights and raise new questions con-
cerning the protective responsibilities of two (or more) Member States engaged in
judicial or administrative cooperation. The AFSJ therefore opens up new avenues
of interaction between national and EU law which challenge the traditional under-
standing of the scope of EU fundamental righthood. Moreover, the approach to the
scope of EU fundamental rights in this field has key implications for the allocation
of the power of review and the application of competing standards in national
fundamental rights systems.3
Against this background, the purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, keeping
in mind the variety and complexity of the themes covered by this compilation,
it seeks to show how the competences and rules in the AFSJ expand the scope
of EU fundamental rights. Second, this chapter seeks to identify the particular-
ities of the AFSJ that are relevant to delineating the scope of the Charter. For
these purposes, Section 1.2 will outline the regime governing the application of
the Charter pursuant to its Article 51(1) and describe how this regime plays out
in the AFSJ. Section 1.3 will then clarify the role of other criteria traditionally
used to determine scope of application, such as territorial, personal and temporal
considerations. After that, Section 1.4 will focus on some of the particularities
affecting the determination of the scope of the Charter in the AFSJ. In Section
1.5, by way of conclusion, I suggest that the AFSJ is more than just an interest-
ing field for testing the general limits of EU fundamental rights; it represents a
specific area of law that has moved the Charter into a more central position in EU
case law, thereby consolidating the role and identity of the CJEU as a guardian
of fundamental rights.
3
At greater length, see Chapter 2.
The Scope of EU Fundamental Rights in the AFSJ 23
1.2 Originality of Scope: Article 51(1) of the Charter as an

Autonomous Scope-Defining Rule
Unlike other human and fundamental rights documents (be they international or
constitutional in nature) that are designed for general application, the Charter is
limited in its scope ratione materiae. The determination of whether a situation
falls within the scope of the Charter is governed, almost exclusively, by Article
51(1). According to that provision, the scope of EU fundamental rights is defined
in an autonomous way, on the basis of two related criteria: first, it is necessary
to ascertain whether the authority involved belongs to the Union or to a Member
State (institutional criterion); second, the connection between the situation or rule
at issue and EU law must be identified (functional criterion). The regime applicable
according to the second criterion will depend on the answer to the first criterion:
whereas EU institutions, bodies and agencies are subject to the Charter with no
functional limitation (Section 1.2.1), EU Member States are bound by it only when
implementing EU law (Section 1.2.2).
As a result of the combination of those criteria, the material scope of the Charter
is dependent on the entity or entities involved and the normative connection
between the situation or rule in question and EU law. Therefore, the material scope
of the Charter is linked not only to competences or specific areas of law covered
by the EU but also to the strength of the connection between a given norma-
tive situation and EU law. This set-up is a corollary of the way competences are
divided between the EU and its Member States and is consistent with the CJEU’s
past treatment of fundamental rights as general principles of law.4
1.2.1 Application of the Charter to EU Public Powers in the AFSJ

The Charter is directed primarily at EU public powers, referred to in Article 51(1)
as ‘EU institutions, bodies and agencies’. Bearing in mind that Member States were
already subject to their own constitutional fundamental rights charters, as well as
to the ECHR, the added value of the Charter lies above all in its codification of EU
fundamental rights and explicit application to EU public powers. Previously, these
public powers were bound only by a vague system of fundamental rights that were
to be progressively applied and developed as general principles through judicial
decisions. This preeminent focus on EU public powers is apparent from the very
4
This chapter uses ‘EU fundamental rights’ and ‘Charter rights’ interchangeably, it being assumed
that, on the whole, the scope of application of the rights of the Charter corresponds to that of
fundamental rights as EU general principles of law. That said, some general principles differ in
scope from the Charter. On the principle of effective judicial protection in art 19(2) TEU, see Case
C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses EU:C:2018:117, paras 29, 37, 40.
content of the Charter. The scope of several Charter rights is limited to EU insti-
tutions, bodies, offices and agencies. This is notably the case with the citizenship
rights set forth in Articles 41 to 44 of the Charter.5
The Charter’s focus on EU public powers is also demonstrated by Article 51(1),
which does not make the application of the Charter to those powers conditional on
any functional criterion, as is the case with Member States, whose action comes
within the scope of the Charter ‘only when they are implementing EU law’. EU
public powers, by contrast, are always bound by the Charter. Regardless of the
capacity in which they act and irrespective of whether they act within the limits
of their attributed competences, their nature as EU public powers automatically
brings them within the scope of the Charter. This is so even if they are serving
as surrogates for other organisations or for Member States, or acting outside the
powers that EU law bestows on them. As confirmed by the CJEU, ‘the Charter
is addressed to EU institutions, including … when they act outside the EU legal
framework’.6 As a consequence, even when EU institutions adopt acts outside the
legal framework of the EU, which may place them beyond the Court’s jurisdiction
in annulment proceedings,7 the measures taken by EU powers are always justicia-
ble in an action for compensation for damages.8
The Charter has often been applied in the AFSJ as a parameter for assessing
the validity and interpretation of acts of EU public powers. Significantly, it was
in an AFSJ case that the Court first mentioned the Charter, at a time when it was
not even in force. In Parliament v Council,9 the European Parliament initiated an
annulment action contesting (unsuccessfully, as it happened) the compatibility
of several aspects of the Family Reunification Directive10 with the right to family
life. The Charter has also been used as a parameter for determining the legality of
draft EU international agreements in the AFSJ, as when the Court found the draft
agreement between Canada and the EU on the transfer and processing of passen-
ger name record data to be incompatible with several Charter provisions.11
5
It is still unclear to what extent those rights can be extended to Member States via general
principles. The right to good administration (art 41), or at least some aspects of it, have been
extrapolated to the Member States. On this debate, see Case C-298/16 Ispas EU:C:2017:650,
Opinion of AG Bobek, paras 77–91.
6
In relation to acts adopted under the European Stability Mechanism, see Joined Cases C-8/15 P
to C-10/15 P Ledra Advertising and Others v Commission and ECB EU:C:2016:701, para 67.
7
Joined Cases C-105/15 P to C-109/15 P, Mallis and Others v Commission and ECB,
EU:C:2016:702.
8
Under TFEU arts 268 and 340. See Joined Cases C-8/15 P to C-10/15 P Ledra Advertising (n 6)
para 55.
9
Case C-540/03 Parliament v Council EU:C:2006:429.
10
Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification [2003]
OJ L251/12.
11
Opinion 1/15 (EU-Canada PNR Agreement) EU:C:2017:592.
The Scope of EU Fundamental Rights in the AFSJ 25
It is notable, however, that most of the annulment procedures in the AFSJ have
concerned the inter-institutional allocation of powers and the legal basis of related
issues,12 as was already the case before the Charter’s entry into force.13 That said,
some of those institutional cases involved an underlying layer of constitutional
considerations concerning the appropriateness of the measures introduced by the
democratic legislator given their impact on fundamental rights.14 Furthermore,
the growing relevance of fundamental rights to annulment proceedings is also
reflected in cases where Member States have attacked the validity of EU acts. In
particular, the Charter has featured prominently in cases concerning the system of
asylum quotas, where it has been relied on to uphold the validity of EU acts in the
face of Member States’ arguments for their dismissal.15
In this context, national courts have uncontestably played a leading role in
policing the conformity of EU acts with fundamental rights in the AFSJ. Through
requests for preliminary rulings on the validity of EU acts, they have questioned
the legality of legislative provisions such as those regulating the detention of for-
eign nationals in asylum laws;16 the conditions for revoking refugee status in light
of Article 18 of the Charter;17 the compatibility of the European Arrest Warrant
Framework Decision with the legality principle18 and with rules concerning pro-
cedures in absentia;19 and the obligation to take fingerprints of persons applying
for passports.20 Although the cases mentioned did not result in any declaration of
invalidity, the CJEU’s interpretation of the acts at issue have often been strongly
worded in relation to fundamental rights, which suggests that the validity of those
acts could be ‘saved’ only if they were interpreted in a manner that conformed
with the Charter.
The application of the Charter to EU public powers in the AFSJ has not, how-
ever, been free of controversy. First, the action of EU institutions and bodies in
12
See eg Joined Cases C-317/13 and C-679/13 Parliament v Council EU:C:2015:223; Case C-43/12
Commission v Parliament and Council EU:C:2014:298; Case C-88/14 Commission v Parliament
and Council EU:C:2015:499; Case C-595/14 Parliament v Council EU:C:2015:847.
13
See eg Case C-176/03 Commission v Council EU:C:2005:542; C-257/01 Commission v Council
EU:C:2005:25; Case C-133/06 Parliament v Council, EU:C:2008:257.
14
See esp Case C-355/10 Parliament v Council EU:C:2012:516, paras 76, 77, regarding the
provisions conferring powers of public authority on border guards. On the establishment of
secondary legal bases for adopting a list of safe third countries in connection with EU asylum
rules, see Case C-133/06 Parliament v Council EU:C:2008:257.
15
See Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15 Slovakia and Hungary v Council EU:C:2017:631, para
305.
16
See Cases C-18/16 K EU:C:2017:680; C-601/15 PPU N EU:C:2016:84.
17
See Joined Cases C-391/16, C-77/17 and C-78/17 M and Others EU:C:2019:403.
18
See Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld EU:C:2007:261.
19
See Case C-399/11 Melloni EU:C:2013:107.
20
See Case C-291/12 Schwarz EU:C:2013:670.
the AFSJ consists not only of law- and decision-making but also direct admin-
istration. A great number of EU agencies operate in the AFSJ.21 The allocation of
responsibility between Member States and agencies is a much-debated question,
particularly given the fact that agencies often act in coordination with or in sup-
port of actions of Member States. However uncertain this allocation may therefore
be, Article 51(1) of the Charter nonetheless confirms in no uncertain terms that EU
agencies have an obligation to abide by the Charter, no matter in what capacity
they may be acting. This obligation has been given concrete expression in specific
fundamental rights compliance mechanisms, particularly in the case of Frontex,
an agency that requires heightened scrutiny due to the nature of its tasks, which
include operational involvement in interceptions at sea.22
Second, the practice of outsourcing certain administrative tasks to private
actors, in particular in the context of the common visa policy, further complicates
the challenges of ensuring fundamental rights accountability.23
Third, given the political sensitivity of the action of Member States and EU insti-
tutions in the AFSJ, that action is susceptible to fall back on intergovernmental
dynamics which could blur the legal nature of the acts and the fundamental rights
responsibilities of EU and Member State public powers. This risk has materialised
in the wrongly named ‘EU-Turkey’ deal concerning the agreement to resettle one
Syrian refugee in a Member State for every person readmitted by Turkey under the
terms of the agreement. Although the agreement was made public in an EU press
release and it included references to the EU and members of the European Council,
the General Court found that the authors of the statement were the heads of state
and government, not the EU institutions. For that reason, the agreement did not
involve an EU legal act and, as a result, escaped the jurisdiction of the Court in
annulment proceedings.24
21
See the report to the EP’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affaires (LIBE): E Guild
and others, ‘Implementation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and its Impact on EU
Home Affairs Agencies: Frontex, Europol and the European Asylum Support Office’ (EP 2011) 43.
22
The agency can be held liable and the CJEU has jurisdiction under art 60(4) of Regulation
(EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the
European Border and Coast Guard [2016] OJ L251/1. There is a specific fundamental rights
complaint mechanism in art 72. On this problematic topic, see eg M Fink, Frontex and Human
Rights (OUP 2018).
23
See F Mc Namara, ‘Externalised and Privatised Procedures of EU Migration Control and Border
Management: A Study of EU Member State Control and Legal Responsibility’ (LLD thesis,
European University Institute 2017).
24
See Orders T-192/16 NF v European Council EU:T:2017:128; T-193/16 NG v European Council
EU:T:2017:129; T-257/16 NM v European Council EU:T:2017:130; T-834/16 QC v European
Council EU:T:2018:984. See Order in Joined Cases C-208/17 P to C-210/17 P, NF and Others v
European Council EU:C:2018:705, dismissing the related appeals.
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lisäsi nuorukainen auttaessaan sydämensä valittua ylös. Samalla
onnistui hän painamaan suukkosen tyttönsä valkoiselle kaulalle.
»Rezsö, tiedäthän, että olen kieltänyt sinua suutelemasta minua»,

sanoi tyttö nyrpeästi.
»Senvuoksi juuri haluankin suudella sinua, kultaseni.

Suuteleminen ei olisi ollenkaan hauskaa, jos tytöt suostuisivat
siihen».
»En tanssi csárdásta kanssasi, jos vain vielä suutelet minua».
»En suutelekaan sinua äitisi nähden», kuiskasi poika, »mutta ehkä

sitten jälkeenpäin».
»Hsh!» sanoi tyttö punastuen. »Tuolta tulevat kreivin vaunut.

Minun on kiiruhdettava sisään, sillä muuten en saa hyvää paikkaa».
»Ja tuoltahan tuo Keményn Andráskin vihdoin tulee»! kuultiin

muutamien miesten iloisesti sanovan.
Profeetta oli ennustanut oikein. András oli luottanut Csillagiin, että

se kuljettaa hänet rapaisia teitä kirkkoon, ja Etelkakin saapui
ratsastaen poikansa tallista otetulla varmajalkaisella hevosella.
Nuorta talonpoikaa tervehdittiin monilla »Isten hozta»-huudoilla ja

parikymmentä palvelusintoista käsivartta ojentautui auttamaan
Etelkaa satulasta. Andráksen sitoessa Csillagia ja sen toveria
puuhun kiinni saapuivat Bideskuty’n neljän mustan hevosen vetämät
vaunut kirkon portille. Hevosilla oli messinkiheloin koristetut
tulipunaiset valjaat. Talonpojat siirtyivät kunnioittavasti syrjään, kun
kreivitär astui vaunuista kahisevassa silkkipuvussaan, kauniiseen
musliinipukuun pukeutuneen llonkan seurassa.
Kreivitär Irma oli hyvin kalpea ja riutuneen näköinen. Noissa
vieläkin kauniissa kasvoissa oli uusia syviä ryppyjä ja tuon ylpeän
ylenkatseellisen suunkin ympärille oli niitä vuoden kuluessa
keräytynyt yhä useampia. Hän käveli talonpoikien ohi vastaten
heidän kunnioittaviin tervehdyksiinsä kuin kuningatar alamaistensa
kumarruksiin. Ilonka, joka oli yhtä reipas ja iloinen kuin ennenkin,
hymyili kaikille kuin iloinen lapsi. Hänellä ei nähtävästi ollut vielä
mitään huolia, sillä mitä hänen vanhempansa olivat kärsineetkään
tuon kahdeksan kuukautta sitten tapahtuneen onnettomuuden
vuoksi, eivät he olleet antaneet tyttärensä sitä huomata, ja niin ollen
oli tämän elämä vielä paljasta auringonpaistetta.
András seisoi kirkon oven vieressä pitäen äitiään kädestä kiinni.

Kun kreivitär nousi portaille, astuivat he syrjään, ja Etelka tunsi
nopeasti, että hänen kädessään lepäävä Andráksen käsi vapisi kuin
haavan lehti. Hän katsoi poikaansa ja huomasi tämän silmissä, jotka
olivat kiintyneet vieressä oleviin ylhäisiin naisiin, niin toivovan hellän
ilmeen, mutta kumminkin niin kaipaavan, että hänen äidin
sydämensä tunsi tuskaa tämän poikansa puolesta, jonka huolia hän
tuskin ymmärsi.
Kreivitär Irma oli myöskin huomannut Andráksen ja vastannut

tämän tervehdykseen, mutta kun hän saapui aivan Andráksen
kohdalle, pysähtyi hän hetkiseksi. Näytti siltä kuin hän sisimmässään
olisi taistellut jotakin kovaa taistelua pääsemättä oikein voitolle.
Sitten näytti hän tekevän nopean päätöksen ja käännyttyään nuoren
talonpojan puoleen sanoi hän:
»Bideskuty’n kreivi pyysi minua sanomaan teille, että hän haluaa

keskustella kanssanne, jos haluatte kunnioittaa häntä tulemalla
päivälliselle luoksemme tänään jumalanpalveluksen jälkeen».
Ilonka oli pysähtynyt äitinsä rinnalle, ja hänen suuret siniset
silmänsä olivat kiintyneet uteliaasti kauniiseen nuoreen talonpoikaan,
joka näytti niin mahtavalta runsaasti koruompeluksin koristellussa
viitassaan, hopeasolkisessa vyössään, takissaan ja pitkässä
riippuvassa haikaran sulassaan, joka koristi hänen lakkiaan, jonka
hän otti kunnioittavasti päästään vastatessaan kreivittären kutsuun.
»Tulen tervehtimään kreiviä», sanoi hän kumartaen.
Seuraavassa silmänräpäyksessä katosivat kreivitär ja Ilonka

kirkon porstuaan.
Nyt näkyi isä Ambrosiuskin tulevan. Hän oli kohottanut

kauhtanansa hyvin korkealle laihojen nilkkojensa yläpuolelle
suojellakseen sitä ravalta. Kaikki menivät nyt kirkkoon, naiset
oikealle ja miehet vasemmalle puolelle. Kun ensin oli katsahdettu
uteliaasti jalosukuisiin naisiin, painettiin päät kunnioittavasti penkkien
laitoihin ja odotettiin, että isä Ambrosius aloittaisi
jumalanpalveluksen. Vaatimattomaan iän kuluttamaan messupukuun
pukeutunut vanha pappi oli tullut kirkkoon kantaen pyhiä astioita, ja
jokainen polvistui messun alussa kuunnellakseen uskontunnustusta.
Nuoremmat seurasivat latinankielisistä rukouskirjoistaan lukemista,
mutta useimmat vanhukset, joille kaikki painettu oli vielä hyvin
salaperäistä, lausuivat tyynesti rukouksiaan mumisevin äänin, joka
muodosti omituisen säestyksen isä Ambrosiuksen hiljaa lausutuille
sanoille.
Tuo hurskas, yksinkertainen kansa kuunteli kunnioittavasti

vaitiollen kirkon määräämiä sanoja ymmärtämättä niiden merkitystä,
mutta uskoen kumminkin varmasti niiden ilahduttavan Jumalaa,
koska isä Ambrosius ne luki, joka oli niin hyvä ja niin oppinut, ja
koska heidän isänsä ja iso-isänsä ja monet sukupolvet ennen heitä
olivat kunnioittaneet Jumalaa tässä samassa kirkossa tähän samaan
tapaan. Silloin tällöin äänekkäästi laulettu »Per omnia saecula
saeculorum», katkaisi toimituksen rauhallisen hiljaisuuden. Opettajan
pieni rämisevä harmooni vastasi siihen ja sen soittajan värisevin
kimein äänin laulettu »Amen» lopetti sen aina. Muuten oli kaikki
kunnioittavan hiljaista. Auringon kalpeat säteet tunkeutuivat joskus
pienistä ikkunoista valaisemaan vaatimattomia sanankuulijoita, ja
etäisyydestä kuului virran surullinen kohina lakkaamatta ja synkästi
kuin kaukainen tukahdutettu jyrinä.
Silloin ilmoitti suntion soittama pieni kello Jumalan ruumiillisen

tulon kylän pieneen kirkkoon. Kaikki polvistuivat kunnioittavasti ja
taivuttivat nöyrästi päänsä palvellakseen Vapahtajaa, joka isä
Ambrosiuksen sanojen mukaan oli poistunut ihanasta taivaastaan
yhtyäkseen tuohon valkoiseen öylättiin, jota hän piti hyppysissään.
Hetkisen vallitsi kirkossa täynnä uskonnollista pelkoa oleva
hiljaisuus, ja kun tuo pieni kello lakkasi soimasta, uskalsivat vain
muutamat katsoa alttariin, jolla olevalla valtaistuimella Jumala nyt
todellakin istui.
Jumalanpalveluksen kuluessa katsoi Etelka usein poikaansa, joka

oli polvistunut erään vasemmalla puolella olevan kivipilarin viereen,
ja huomasi, että tämä huolimatta jumalallisesta toimituksesta oli
kiinnittänyt tummat silmänsä uneksivasti aivan muualle kuin alttariin.
Hän oli ristinyt käsivartensa lujaan rinnalleen, ja kerran, kun kalpea
auringonsäde tunkeutui pienestä ikkunasta ja valaisi erään
kultakiharaisen pään, joka oli kumartunut kunnioittavasti rukouskirjan
yli, ilmestyi kyynel hänen silmäänsä ja valui hitaasti hänen ruskealle
poskelleen. Etelka näki, ettei hän rukoillut, vaan ainoastaan katsoi
tuohon yhteen suuntaan niin kaihoisasti ja ikävöiden, että Etelkakin
tunsi silmänsä täyttyvän kyynelillä. Isä Ambrosius oli alkanut laulaa
»Ite! Missa est!» Pieni seurakunta alkoi vähitellen poistua,
kokoutuakseen kirkon edustalle, johon suuren akasiapuun juurelle oli
asetettu lumivalkoisella liinalla peitetty pöytä. Sille oli ladottu vasta
teurastettujen lampaiden reisiä, munia, voita, juustoja ja savustettuja
liikkiöitä odottamaan isän siunausta.
Osa tuosta tämän hedelmällisen maan tuottamasta runsaudesta

oli aiottu hyvälle isä Ambrosiukselle ja osa taasen köyhille ja
vaivaisille, jotka eivät enää kyenneet tekemään työtä. Ylpeästi
vertasi jokainen toimelias talonemäntä omia pääsiäismuniaan
naapurien tuomiin ja totesi juustonsa valkoisuuden ja voinsa
kermarikkauden.
Pöydän keskellä olevassa suuressa hopeamaljassa oli kokonainen

paistettu karitsa, jonka kreivi oli lähettänyt siunattavaksi.
Vaatimattomampien talojen värjätyt munat ja muut pienemmät
tuotteet oli asetettu yksinkertaisille savilautasille tahi kaislakoreihin.
Seurakuntalaiset kokoutuivat pieneen kirkkotarhaan ja välittämättä

liasta ja tomusta polvistuivat he kuuntelemaan noita liikuttavia
rukouksia Jumalan siunauksen hankkimiseksi maan ensimmäisille
hedelmille. Tarhan keskelle oli levitetty matto kreivittärelle ja
llonkalle, ja heidän ympärilleen polvistuivat maalauksellisiin ryhmiin
kaikki kauniit talonpoikaistytöt ja päivettyneet nuorukaiset.
Isä Ambrosius seisoi pöydän takana levitetyin käsivarsin ja

kunnioittavasti taivaaseen päin luoduin katsein rukoillen siunausta.
Aivan hänen vieressään heilutteli pieni suntio suitsutusastiaa, josta
levisi suloista ja läpitunkevaa myrhan tuoksua ilmaan. Aurinko oli nyt
saavuttanut täydellisen valovoimansa ja sen keskipäivän säteet
panivat märän maan kovasti höyryämään ja muuttivat jokaisen
ruohokossa piilevän sadepisaran kirkkaaksi timantiksi. Kaukaa
kuuluva joen kumea kohina säesti surullisesti isä Ambrosiuksen
kuiskaten lausuttuja rukouksia.
Levitettyään kätensä kaikkien edessään olevien tavaroiden yli

pyysi kunnioitettava isä Jumalaa siunaamaan nämä maan
ensimmäiset hedelmät, ja kun hän oli lopettanut, pirskoitti hän pyhää
vettä jokaiseen munakoriin ja jokaiseen karitsanpaistiin heiluttaen
samalla suitsutusastiaa niiden yläpuolella. Hänen vanhat ystävälliset
kasvonsa loistivat kunnioituksesta ja syvästi kiitollisena ylisti hän
Luojaa tämän onnellisen maan runsaista hedelmistä. Kun viimeinen
rukous oli lausuttu ja kaikki olivat toistaneet »Amen», sanoi pappi
lopuksi seurakuntalaisilleen:
»Lapseni, nyt kun olemme kiittäneet Jumalaa kaikista hänen

antamistaan hyvistä lahjoista, ja rukoilleet hänen siunaustaan
kevään ensimmäisille hedelmille, pyydän teitä yhtymään kanssani
lämpimään rukoukseen, että taivaallinen isämme armossaan
tukahduttaisi vihansa rakastamaamme Heven maakuntaa kohtaan ja
pakottaisi Tarnan veden palaamaan uomaansa takaisin jälleen.
Meidän on rukoiltava Jumalaa, että hän hyvittäisi onnettomuuden,
joka aiheuttaa niin paljon huolta Bideskuty’n, Kisfalun ja Zárdan
herralle, jolla oli jo niin paljon vaikeuksia viime vuonna, jolloin tuo
kauhea tulipalo hävitti hänen satonsa. Sanokaamme kaikki
sydämestämme 'Isämme' ja sitten kolmasti 'Kuule meitä Maria', niin
silloin pyhä neitsyt rupeaa jumalallisille poikineen toimimaan jalon
kreivin hyväksi».
Nämä yksinkertaiset rukoukset toistettiin kunnioittavasti, kuten isä

Ambrosius oli tahtonutkin, sillä kaikki olivat todellakin suruissaan
nähdessään tulvan hävittävän tätä kaunista maata; ja nuo molemmat
jalosukuiset naiset olivat näyttäneet niin surullisilta
jumalanpalveluksen kestäessä, että heidän kärsimisensä
tyhmyyksien tähden, joille he eivät voineet mitään, tuntui kovalta.
Kuultuaan isä Ambrosiuksen kehoituksen oli kreivitär synkistynyt.

Hänen ylpeytensä kapinoi tällaista heidän vuokseen lausuttua
nöyrää rukousta vastaan, semminkin, kun sen teki kansa, jota hän
suuresti halveksi. Hän ei halunnut tunnustaa Jumalallekaan, että
onnettomuus oli uskaltanut lähestyä Bideskuty’n ylimyksellistäkin
huonetta.
András yhtyi sydämestään näihin vaatimattomiin rukouksiin, sillä

hän yksinään kaikista näistä läsnäolevista ymmärsi melkein
täydellisesti sen onnettomuuden suuruuden, jonka peloittava tulva oli
aiheuttanut Bideskuty’n kreiville. Hän rukoili lujasti uskoen, ettei tämä
onnettomuus tuota minkäänlaisia vaikeuksia tuolle suloiselle
olennolle, joka oli luotu vain iloa varten.
Viimeinen »Amen» lausuttiin ja isä Ambrosius meni kirkkoon

riisumaan yltään messukaapunsa. Kaikki nousivat seisoalleen
jutellen kuiskaillen keskenään kunnioituksesta noita molempia
ylhäisiä naisia kohtaan, jotka odottivat vaunujaan. Etelka tuli
poikansa luo, sillä hän tunsi epämääräisesti olevansa hieman
levoton hänen vuokseen. Tuon salaisen kärsimyksen ilme näkyi nyt
selvemmin Andráksen kasvoissa, ja pari kertaa oli Etelka
kuulevinaan jonkunlaisen tahdottoman huokauksen, kuin hänen
sydämensä taakka olisi ollut liian raskas hänen voimilleen.
Kreivitär ei alentunut puhumaan hänelle enää. Hän nousi

vaunuihin Ilonkan kanssa ja ajoi tiehensä jättäen Andráksen omaksi
huoleksi tulla jäljessä niin hyvin kuin hän vain voi. Hänen miehensä
oli halunnut puhutella talonpoikaa, ja se oli jo tarpeeksi suuri kunnia
tälle, jalon kreivittären tarvitsematta sitä enää puheillaan lisätä.
»Et suinkaan aio jäädä sinne päivälliselle, András?» kysyi Etelka
levottomasti.
»Älä pelkää sellaista, äiti», vastasi András. »Haluan vain saada

selville, mitä hän haluaa, ja tulen kotiin, ennenkuin Sári ja Kati
saavat päivällisen valmiiksikaan. Sinun on annettava Dandárin
kävellä kotiin. Koska en tule kanssasi, on sinun siten turvallisempi
matkustaa».
Hän siveli kädellään silmiään kuin karkoittaakseen pois jonkun

itsepäisen unelman. Sitten hän suuteli äitiään ja nosti hänet
satulaan. Sári ja Kati kävelivät hevosen rinnalla kantaen punaisia
kenkiään, ja Keményn András katsoi noita kolmea naista niin kauan
kuin he hävisivät näkyvistä.
Kaikki muutkin olivat jo poistuneet kirkkotarhasta. Muutamat

kauniit tytöt katsoivat ikävöiden rikkaaseen talonpoikaan, joka oli niin
alakuloinen tänään. Vähitellen muuttuivat kirkon portaat ja sitten
kylän valtakatu autioiksi, sillä kaikki olivat menneet kotiinsa syömään
noita munia ja lihaa, jotka Jumala oli erityisesti siunannut. Isä
Ambrosiuskin kiiruhti jo tuolla kaukana pappilaan kantaen
kauhtanansa liepeitä. Jokaisesta raollaan olevasta ovesta kuului
iloista naurua, ja viipyessään kirkkotarhassa huomasi András
muutamia suutelevia parejakin. Taivaalta kuului juuri lämpimistä
maista kotiinsa palaavien haikaroiden surullisia huutoja, kun ne
hakivat viimevuotisia hylättyjä pesiään. Kaikki puhui ilosta,
kotionnesta, nuoruudesta ja rakkaudesta, ja András kääntyi huoaten
Csillagin puoleen ja suuteli tuota kaunista eläintä suurien
ystävällisten silmien väliin.
XVII
KÖYHTYNYT KREIVI.
Sykkivin sydämin astui András vielä kerran tuon talon kynnyksen

yli, jossa hänen ylpeyttään oli niin syvästi loukattu. Hän ei ollut
käynyt siellä sen jälkeen kuin nuo tytön kasvot olivat lamauttaneet
hänen kostavan kätensä, joka oli ollut valmis antamaan lyönnin
lyönnistä. Nyt hän arvaili, mitä tuolla ylpeällä kreivillä oli hänelle
sanottavaa. Oli tietysti selvää, että se oli jotakin hyvin tärkeätä, sillä
muuten ei kreivitär olisi pysähtynyt puhuttelemaan häntä. András
luuli, että kreivillä oli esitettävänä hänelle joku pyyntö, jonka hän
ylpeydessään oli lykännyt päivästä päivään, kunnes sitä ei enää
voitu siirtää.
Jánko oli odottanut Andrásta portilla, toinen palvelija oli ottanut

huostaansa Csillagin ja sitten oli tuo vanha palvelija opastanut
Andráksen tuohon samaan huoneeseen, jossa tuo viimeinen
myrskyisä keskustelu oli tapahtunut.
Kun Jánko avasi oven päästääkseen Andráksen sisään, istui

Bideskuty’n kreivi siellä tupakoiden. Talonpoika totesi kumminkin
tullessaan huoneeseen, että kreivi otti nyt kuitenkin piipun suustaan
ja sanoi: »Isten hozta»! ja viittasi samalla tuoliin.
András huomasi heti, miten suuresti Bideskuty oli muuttunut

vuodessa. Hän näytti jo kokonaan vanhentuneelta, vaikka hänen
hiuksensa eivät olleet sen harmaammat eikä hänen vartalonsa
vähemmän suora. Hänen iloisuutensa näytti kokonaan kadonneen.
Hänen silmiensä ympärillä oli huolten uurtamia ryppyjä ja pari syvää
sellaista oli ilmestynyt otsaankin. András tunsi olevansa hyvin
pahoillaan tuon miehen vuoksi, joka näytti saaneen kärsiä
äärettömästi tyhmyyksiensä tähden.
»Olitte ystävällinen, kun tulitte», aloitti Bideskuty hieman

hermostuneesti.
»Tulin tänne teidän korkeutenne käskystä. Miten voin teitä

palvella»?
»Ettekö ole jo arvannut sitä kuullessanne Tarnan kohisevan

pelloillani»?
»Tiedän teidän korkeutenne olevan menettämäisillään paljon,

kuten viime vuonnakin. En muista nähneeni näin suurta tulvaa sen
jälkeen kuin olin poika».
»Häviöni on suurempi kuin ehkä luulettekaan».
»Olen maanviljelijä, teidän korkeutenne», sanoi András

vaatimattomasti.
»Tiedän jokaisen hehtaarin arvon tasangolla».
Bideskuty luuli, että András tarkoituksellisesti kiersi seikkaa, josta

Hän olisi halunnut puhua. Hän ei ollut milloinkaan ollut näin suuressa
pulassa, miten aloittaa, sillä eihän hänen ennen milloinkaan ollut
tarvinnut pyytää keneltäkään mitään. Mutta nyt oli hänen kumminkin
pakko turvautua mieheen, joka oli hänen mielestään niin paljon
alhaissyntyisempi, mutta jota hän ei kuitenkaan jostakin syystä
voinut kohdella niinkuin juutalaista Rosensteinia.
András odotti tyynesti, kun Bideskuty kuivasi otsansa ja tupruutteli

suuria savuja piipustaan.
»Ovatko Kisfalussa kärsimänne vahingot hyvinkin suuret»? kysyi

hän vihdoin.
»Kuten teidän korkeutenne tietää, on Kisfalulle kuuluvia peltoja

sillä suunnalla hyvin vähän. Muutamat maissivainioni ovat kyllä
joutuneet tulvan valtaan, mutta mitään vakavampaa häviötä ei niistä
koidu».
»Teitä aina onnistaa», sanoi Bideskuty kateellisesti.
»Maailmassa on muitakin suruja kuin viljan menettäminen»,

vastasi
András tyynesti.
»Tuo johtuu kokonaan siitä, kuinka paljon kukin menettää», sanoi

Bideskuty jo hieman kiivaammasti. »Jos te, kuten minä, olisitte
menettänyt pari runsasta satoa omatta syyttänne niin, ettei teille olisi
jäänyt senkään vertaa, että voisitte kylvää seuraavana vuonna, niin
mitä silloin sanoisitte? Jos jokainen maakappaleenne olisi kiinnitetty
sen arvoa suuremmasta rahamäärästä, josta on maksettava paljon
suurempi korko kuin maa tuottaakaan, niin millaisiin toimenpiteihin
silloin ryhtyisitte? Jos koko talonne, jossa seitsemän vuosisadan
aikana kaikki esi-isänne ovat syntyneet ja kuolleet, alkaisi vähitellen
siirtyä vieraan käsiin, niin mitä silloin tekisitte? Silloin, Keményn
András, olisi teillä suruja, jotka olisivat kovempia kuin ihminen jaksaa
kantaa».
»Niin olisikin, teidän korkeutenne», sanoi András ystävällisesti,

»mutta eiväthän asianne, Jumalalle kiitos, ole vielä noin peloittavan
huonolla kannalla. Kukaan ei tiedä, paremmin kuin minä, miten
suurista rahamääristä maanne on kiinnitetty, mutta mieleeni ei ole
juolahtunutkaan ahdistaa teitä, niin mielelläni kuin nimittäisinkin tuota
kappaletta omakseni, jossa olen syntynyt ja kasvanut. Puhuitte
korosta», lisäsi hän vielä hyvin ystävällisesti, »mutta kuinka paljon
tahansa lienettekään kärsinyt näissä molemmissa
onnettomuuksissa, tuottaa maanne kumminkin, Jumalalle kiitos, niin
paljon, että voitte ruokkia perheenne ja kaikki palvelijanne, ja
maksaa koron saamistanne rahoista. Ja puhuaksemme näistä
rakennuksista, niin kuka niitä uhkaa? En ainakaan minä. En omista
niihin mitään kiinnitystä enkä ole suostunut ottamaan niitä
varmuudeksi lainatessani rahoja Bideskuty’n maita vastaan».
»Käytätte hyvin kauniita sanoja», sanoi Bideskuty kärsimättömästi,

»ja kumminkin sanoitte äsken tietävänne jokaisen hehtaarin arvon
tasangolla. Aiotteko valehdella saneessanne minun noista
muutamista pelloista, jotka eivät ole tulvan alla, saavan niin paljon
vehnää, että voin maksaa teille nuo vaatimanne sadat ja tuhannet
mitalliset, ja kumminkin ruokkia itseni, perheeni ja kaikki palvelijani»?
»Pelkään teidän korkeutenne laskevan huonosti, sillä teidän

vuosittain minulle maksamanne vehnämitalliset tuosta
kahdeksansadanviidenkymmenentuhannen floriinin lainasta, jonka
kaikkiaan olen teille antanut, eivät tee yhteensä kuin
parikymmentätuhatta mitallista, ja…»
»Näytätte itse olevan huono laskija, enkä minä», vastasi
Bideskuty, »sillä maksan teille enemmän kuin kymmenen kertaa tuon
määrän, lukuunottamatta noita tuhansia nautoja…»
»Teidän korkeutenne», sanoi András tyynesti, »älkäämme antako

mielikuvituksemme viedä meitä enää harhaan. Saan teidän
korkeudeltanne vuodessa rahoilleni niin paljon korkoa luonnossa,
ettei se vaihdettuna rahaksi tee muuta kuin kolme tahi neljä floriinia
sadalle. Olette itse allekirjoittanut taskussani olevat paperit, eikä
pyytämäni korko ole ollut ollenkaan suuri, vaan päinvastoin hyvin
kohtuullinen. Jos olisin kiskonut tuollaisen äärettömän koron, josta
puhuitte, olisin voinut jo aikoja sitten pakottaa teidät luopumaan
Kisfalusta, jonka omistaminen on elämäni unelma. En ymmärrä
koronkiskomista, ja senvuoksi olenkin vielä vuokraaja enkä maan
omistaja».
»Ettekö tunne koronkiskomista, mies»? sanoi Bideskuty

raivoissaan. »Oletteko juovuksissa, vai hulluko olette? Uneksinko,
vai valehteletteko te? Eikö tuo verenimijä, tuo välittäjänne
Rosenstein, vie minulta joka vuosi koroiksi melkein parisataatuhatta
mitallista vehnää, neljäsataa parhainta nautaani, tuhat lammasta ja
karitsaa, ja lihavimmat hanheni ja kanani? Sanoen toimivansa teidän
puolestanne ei hän suonut minulle lepoa eikä lykkäystä, vaan saapui
luokseni noin viikon kuluttua tuosta kauheasta tulipalosta ja vaati
minulta nuo muutamat eläimet, jotka olivat pelastuneet liekeistä, ja
uhkasi sanoa lainan irti, ellen luovuta hänelle noita muutamia vilja-
aumoja, jotka säästyivät noilta kirotuilta murhapolttajilta ja joista
olisin saanut ainoat siemeneni seuraavan vuoden kylvöön.
Luovutettuani ne pakosta, tarjosi hän ne minulle takaisin
hävyttömästä hinnasta luvaten lainata minulle rahat, joilla voin ostaa
ne vielä suunnattomampaa korkoa vastaan kuin ennen».
Tuo onneton mies vaipui hengästyneenä tuoliinsa kätkien
kasvonsa käsiinsä. Kun hän huomasi oman tyhmyytensä ja
uhkaavan vararikon, unohti hän kokonaan ylpeytensä ja
paremmuutensa. Kaikki näytti niin toivottomalta kuin hän olisi ollut
verkkoon sotkeutunut lintu, joka taistelee turhaan sitä kaikilta
suunnilta ahdistavia verkonsilmiä vastaan. András oli kalvennut
hirveästi ja kuunnellut alussa Bideskuty’n raivonpurkauksia kuin
hullun huutoja. Mutta sitten huomasi hän vähitellen miehen
katkonaisesta puheesta ja vihan, nyyhkytysten ja jonkunlaisen
vetoamisen värisyttämästä äänestä, että Bideskuty puhui vain
katkeraa totuutta. András tunsi epämääräisesti, että oli tehty joku
ennenkuulumaton vääryys, jonka uhriksi tuo herkkäuskoinen mies oli
joutunut, vääryys, joka oli suoritettu hänen — Keményn Andráksen
— nimessä, hänen, joka oli aina kunnioittanut omaa
oikeamielisyyttään kuin Jumalan puhtautta.
Vapisevin käsin haki hän taskustaan Bideskuty’n allekirjoittamat

paperit ja tutki niitä niin levottomasti kuin hän olisi toivonut niiden
voivan selittää tämän kauhean salaperäisyyden.
»Teidän korkeutenne», sanoi hän niin tyynesti kuin suinkin pitkän

väliajan jälkeen, »luullakseni emme ymmärrä vieläkään toisiamme.
Tässä kaikessa tuntuu olevan joku kauhea salaperäisyys, jonka
Rosenstein luultavasti voi selittää. Koetammeko selvittää nämä asiat
keskenämme ensin, ennenkuin käskemme häntä kertomaan,
millainen osa hänellä on tähän arvoitukseen».
Bideskuty oli onnistunut vielä kerran hillitsemään itsensä. Kun hän

katsoi velkojansa kasvoihin, jotka näyttivät niin ystävällisiltä ja
rehellisiltä, kuiskasi hänen sydämensä kerrankin hänen elämänsä
aikana, että hän luopuisi ylpeydestään ja luottaisi tuohon mieheen,
jota hän koetti halveksia; ja tehden vilpittömän liikkeen ojensi hän
kätensä hänelle.
András puristi sitä ja sanoi:
»Teidän korkeutenne on nyt ilmoitettava minulle niin selvästi kuin

suinkin, kuinka paljon luulette olevanne velkaa minulle».
»En voi sanoa teille, montako mitallista vehnää olen maksava,

mutta tiedän teidän lainanneen minulle
yhdeksänsataaviisikymmentätuhatta floriinia».
»Ei, teidän korkeutenne, vaan ainoastaan

kahdeksansataaviisikymmentätuhatta».
»Mutta niitähän on neljä lainaa».
»Vain kolme, herra kreivi».
»Kolmesataatuhatta Kisfalua, kolmesataatuhatta Bideskuty’a,

kaksisataaviisikymmentätuhatta Zárdaa ja satatuhatta tätä
rakennusta, puutarhaa, ulkohuoneita ja muita läheisyydessä olevia
rakennuksia vastaan».
»Tuossa viime lainassa en ole osallinen. Ne eivät ole minun

rahojani.
Milloin teidän korkeutenne sen otti»?
»Pari päivää tulipalon jälkeen viime syyskuussa».
»Ilmoittiko Rosenstein rahojen tulevan minulta»?
»Kun juutalaiset lainaavat rahoja, puhuvat he aina omasta

köyhyydestään ja ilmoittavat jonkun varakkaan ystävän, joka on
todellinen lainaaja. En uskonut tuota juttua ensimmäisiä lainoja
ottaessani, mutta sitten myöhemmin kuin ilmoititte rahojen tulevan
teiltä, en sitä milloinkaan enää kysellytkään».
»Ymmärrän. Teidän korkeutenne, olkaa hyvä ja jatkakaa.»
»En tiedä tarkasti, paljonko korkoa olen suostunut maksamaan.

Tuo saastainen juutalainen pakotti minut aina allekirjoittamaan
jonkun paperin, niinkuin ei unkarilaisen aatelismiehen sana olisi
tuollaisen paperin arvoinen».
»Minulla on nuo paperit täällä», sanoi András. »Onko tämä teidän

korkeutenne nimikirjoitus»?
Bideskuty katsahti papereihin, jotka Kemény ojensi hänelle.
»Kyllä tuo on kirjoitustani».
»Muistaako teidän korkeutenne varmasti koron, jonka olette

suostunut maksamaan»?
»En varmasti, mutta…»
»Oliko määrä jotensakin tällainen?» sanoi András alkaen lukea

paperista: »Olen teille velkaa kolmesataatuhatta floriinia kullassa.
Maksan siitä, kunnes suoritan sen kokonaan, korkoa joka vuosi sata
nautaa, joiden joukossa pitää olla kymmenen sonnia ja
yhdeksänkymmentä lehmää, viisituhatta mitallista vehnää ja…»
Bideskuty pudisti päätään.
»Tuosta ensimmäisestä lainasta olen maksanut nyt joka vuosi

viiden vuoden kuluessa korkoa viisikymmentätuhatta mitallista
vehnää, parisataa nautaa ja lammasta tietämättä ollenkaan, miten
paljon siipikarjaa vielä lisäksi».
»Mutta miksi, teidän korkeutenne, kun olette suostunut

maksamaan ainoastaan viisituhatta mitallista vehnää ja sata
nautaa»?
»Ilmoitan teille, että kun Rosenstein vaati tuon suunnattoman

koron ystävänsä puolesta, ystävän, jota epäilin teiksi, ei hän
luovuttanut minulle noita rahoja, ennenkuin allekirjoitin hänen kirotut
paperinsa ja lupasin maksaa tuon hävyttömän koron».
»Paperit! Oliko niitä sitten useampikin»?
»Oli. Lainatessani rahoja allekirjoitin aina kaksi paperia, En muista

oikein tarkasti…» sanoi Bideskuty toivottomasti ja epävarmasti.
»Mutta teidän armonne kai näki, mihin kirjoititte? Kai te luitte

paperit läpi ennen allekirjoittamistanne»?
»Vieköön piru kaikki sellaiset vehkeet! En katsahtanutkaan niihin,

sanon sen teille»!
»Ette katsahtanutkaan niihin»!
András oli suuresti järkytetty. Hänen huolellisesta ja toimeliaasta

talonpoikaismielestään tuntui tuollainen laiminlyönti jo rikokselliselta.
Selvästi oli juutalaisen ollut helppo saada tuo huoleton tuhlari
suostumaan mihin tahansa, joka näytti olevan niin kokonaan
tietämätön kaiken tuon arvosta, jonka hän satunnaisesti oli
luovuttanut toiselle muutamin kynän vedoin välittämättä
katsahtaakaan siihen, johon hän oli kirjoittanut nimensä.
Andráksesta tuntui se ensin niin luonnottomalta, että hän hetkisen
epäili, pelasiko Bideskuty jotakin niin ovelaa peliä, etteivät hänen
talonpoikaisaivonsa sitä kyenneet käsittämään. Mutta Bideskuty
näytti niin hämmästyneeltä itsekin, niin kiusatulta ja toivottomalta,
että András tunsi todellakin olevansa pahoillaan hänen puolestaan.
»Miksi halusi teidän korkeutenne puhutella minua tänään»?
»Pyytääkseni, teitä alentamaan hieman noita korkoja», sanoi

Bideskuty hermostuneesti. »Luulin teidän helposti voivan sen tehdä
menettämättä paljonkaan.»
»En ole milloinkaan, herra kreivi, menetellyt niin kunniattomasti,

että olisin harjoittanut tuollaista koronkiskomista teitä kohtaan»,
sanoi András hymyillen. »Silloin olisin täydellisesti ansainnut tuon
iskun päähäni kahdeksan kuukautta sitten, jonka arpi vieläkin näkyy.
Huomaan nyt selvästi, että tuo kirottu juutalainen on käyttänyt
rahojani ja nimeäni mitä rikollisinpaan koronkiskomiseen, enkä voi
olla sanomatta — teidän korkeutenne suokoon minulle sanani
anteeksi — että olette antanut ryövätä omaisuuttanne
anteeksiantamattoman välinpitämättömästi».
»Mitä voinkaan tehdä, sillä tarvitsin rahaa».
»Teidän korkeutenne tietää parhaiten, mihin sitä tarvitsitte. Noista

rahoista ei ole minkäänlaista hyötyä, ja teidän korkeutenne saa nyt
kärsiä suuresti onnettomien päähänpistojensa vuoksi».
»Teillä ei ole mitään oikeutta puhua minulle tuolla tavoin, sillä

tekojani ei tarvitse kenenkään arvostella, ei ainakaan sellaisten kuin
te…»
»Älkäämme riitautuko jälleen, jalo kreivi», sanoi András, joka tällä
kertaa oli päättänyt olla menettämättä malttiaan. »Koettakaamme
mieluummin tuumia, miten parhaiten voin auttaa teidän
korkeuttanne. Tietysti voin riistää tuolta kirotulta juutalaiselta nuo
toiset paperit, jotka olette antanut lainoista, joita ette todellisuudessa
ole saanutkaan minulta».
»Mitä aiotte tehdä niille»? kysyi Bideskuty hieman epäilevästi

vieläkin.
»Aion hävittää ne», vastasi András vaatimattomasti.

»Onnettomuudeksi en voi pakottaa Rosensteiniä luovuttamaan teille
takaisin kaikkia teiltä vaatimiaan korkoja. Voin peloittaa hänet kyllä
melkein kuoliaaksi», lisäsi hän, »mutta luullakseni ei siitä olisi mitään
hyötyä».
»Tuo ei ole kaikista pahinta», sanoi Bideskuty huoaten, »sillä

mennyt on aina mennyttä. En voi maksaa tuon viimeisen lainan
korkoja enkä lyhentääkään sitä, ja teidän ja Rosensteinin suoma
lykkäysaika loppuu tämän viikon kuluessa. Minulla ei ole enää
äyriäkään, kaikki paras maani on tulvan alla, karjani ei ole tointunut
tuon kauhean syyskuun yön jälkeen ja kaunis Bideskuty’n
päärakennus, jossa olen syntynyt ja jossa olen toivonut saavani
kuolla, joutuu vieraiden käsiin — joko teidän tahi Rosensteinin —»
lisäsi tuo mies-raukka ollen valmis jälleen menettämään toivonsa.
»Minusta on se melkein sama, karkoittaako minut kotoani juutalainen
vaiko talonpoika».
»Teidän korkeutenne ei siis muista, mitä tuossa paperissa oli,

jonka annoitte vastineeksi näistä rakennuksista».
»Sanoinhan teille jo, etten lukenut noita allekirjoittamanhan!
papereita».
»Niin, kuulin sen», sanoi András kärsimättömästi huoahtaen,

»mutta kai teillä kuitenkin on selvillä, kuinka paljon nyt olette velkaa
tuosta viime lainasta ja sen koroista»?
»Tiedän saaneeni satatuhatta floriinia, josta minun on maksettava

suunnaton korko. En ole kumminkaan maksanut siitä mitallistakaan
vehnää enkä nautaakaan, ja nyt kun koko satoni on tulvan alla, en
voi maksaa sitä milloinkaan enkä muitakaan velkojani teille».
»Velastanne minulle puhumme sitten myöhemmin kuin olemme

tyydyttäneet Rosensteinin ja vapauttaneet teidät varmasti hänen
kynsistään. Minulla ei ole rahoja mukanani tänään, mutta menen
puhuttelemaan häntä huomenna ja tarkastan samalla nuo paperit.
Voimme ainoastaan rukoilla, herra kreivi, että saan ne haltuuni
kohtuullisesta korvauksesta. En ole tehty rahasta», lisäsi András
hymyillen, »kuten teidän korkeutenne on usein sanonut, mutta
Jumalalle kiitos kumminkin, minulla on vielä sen verran, että voin
pitää teidät velallisenani ottamatta huomioon näitä rakennuksia, sen
sijaan, että olisitte velkaa juutalaiselle. Voin luvata teidän
korkeudellenne varmasti, etten milloinkaan tule kovistamaan teitä
koroista».
Bideskuty näytti tuskin uskovan korviaan kuullessaan millaisen

äärettömän palveluksen tuo nuori talonpoika näin tyynesti tarjoutui
tekemään hänelle. Viimeisten kuukausien kuluessa oli hänen tilansa
tuntunut niin toivottomalta ja hän oli ollut niin kovasti pahoillaan
välttämättömältä näyttävän vararikkonsa vuoksi, että tämä
toivonsäde, jonka tuo mies niin vaatimattomasti hänelle näytti, tuntui
liian heikolta läpäistäkseen hänen alakuloisuutensa raskaan vaipan.

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Fundamental Rights in The Eu Area of Freedom Security and Justice Sara Iglesias Sanchez Online Ebook Texxtbook Full Chapter PDF

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Fundamental Rights In The EU Area Of

Freedom Security And Justice Sara

Human Rights and Transitional Justice in Chile Rojas

The EU in Southeast Asian Security 1st Edition Ronja

Documents of Freedom A Look at the Declaration of

The Internet And Constitutional Law The Protection Of

Religious Freedom and the Universal Declaration of

Coercive Human Rights: Positive Duties to Mobilise the

The Chicago Freedom Movement Martin Luther King Jr and

Economic Freedom And Social Justice: The Classical

The development of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice has

Sara Iglesias Sánchez (PhD Universidad Complutense Madrid;

Sara Iglesias Sánchez

Maribel González Pascual

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

Introduction Fundamental Rights at the Core of the EU AFSJ 1

Part I The General Framework for Fundamental Rights Protection

Part II Asylum, Migration and Borders 75

8 Effective Remedies and Defence Rights in the Field of

Part III Judicial Cooperation in Civil Matters 177

Part IV Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters and

Part V Cross-Cutting Issues of Fundamental Rights in the AFSJ 371

Coral Arangüena Fanego, Professor of Procedural Law, University of Valladolid,

Christina Peristeridou, Assistant Professor of Criminal Law and Procedure,

therefore acquire a transnational dimension, so that, for example, criminals are

AFSJ Area of Freedom, Security and Justice

The AFSJ and Constitutionalising the EU

previous treaty framework.6 The phenomenon of géométrie variable continues to

jurisdictions as guardians of personal rights, turning them into key components in

The Central Place of Fundamental Rights in the AFSJ

protection)16 to the level of protection granted by the EU in the specific field of

safeguards fundamental rights can satisfy the requirements of the ECtHR.32 At

Fundamental Rights in the AFSJ: The Structure of This Book

The General Approach

The Structure of the Book

of EU law as the most relevant non-economic pillar of EU integration make it

inconsistencies and shortcomings in the application of this principle in the area

1.2 Originality of Scope: Article 51(1) of the Charter as an

1.2.1 Application of the Charter to EU Public Powers in the AFSJ

»Rezsö, tiedäthän, että olen kieltänyt sinua suutelemasta minua»,

»Senvuoksi juuri haluankin suudella sinua, kultaseni.

»En tanssi csárdásta kanssasi, jos vain vielä suutelet minua».

»En suutelekaan sinua äitisi nähden», kuiskasi poika, »mutta ehkä

»Hsh!» sanoi tyttö punastuen. »Tuolta tulevat kreivin vaunut.

»Ja tuoltahan tuo Keményn Andráskin vihdoin tulee»! kuultiin

Profeetta oli ennustanut oikein. András oli luottanut Csillagiin, että

Nuorta talonpoikaa tervehdittiin monilla »Isten hozta»-huudoilla ja

András seisoi kirkon oven vieressä pitäen äitiään kädestä kiinni.

Kreivitär Irma oli myöskin huomannut Andráksen ja vastannut

»Bideskuty’n kreivi pyysi minua sanomaan teille, että hän haluaa

»Tulen tervehtimään kreiviä», sanoi hän kumartaen.

Seuraavassa silmänräpäyksessä katosivat kreivitär ja Ilonka

Nyt näkyi isä Ambrosiuskin tulevan. Hän oli kohottanut

Tuo hurskas, yksinkertainen kansa kuunteli kunnioittavasti

Silloin ilmoitti suntion soittama pieni kello Jumalan ruumiillisen

Jumalanpalveluksen kuluessa katsoi Etelka usein poikaansa, joka

Osa tuosta tämän hedelmällisen maan tuottamasta runsaudesta

Pöydän keskellä olevassa suuressa hopeamaljassa oli kokonainen

Seurakuntalaiset kokoutuivat pieneen kirkkotarhaan ja välittämättä

Isä Ambrosius seisoi pöydän takana levitetyin käsivarsin ja

Levitettyään kätensä kaikkien edessään olevien tavaroiden yli

»Lapseni, nyt kun olemme kiittäneet Jumalaa kaikista hänen

Nämä yksinkertaiset rukoukset toistettiin kunnioittavasti, kuten isä