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Global Criminal Law
Postnational
Criminal Justice in
the Twenty-First Century
Adán Nieto Martín

Global Criminal Law
Adán Nieto Martín
Global Criminal Law

Postnational Criminal Justice in the
Twenty-First Century
Adán Nieto Martín
School of Law and Social Sciences
University of Castilla-La Mancha
Ciudad Real, Spain
ISBN 978-3-030-84830-9 ISBN 978-3-030-84831-6 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84831-6
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in
any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic
adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or here-
after developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
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This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Contents
1 On the Way to Stateless Criminal Law 1

1 Introduction 1
2 The Forces of Change 3
2.1 Relational Sovereignty 3
2.2 Security 7
Bibliography 12
2 The Ius Puniendi of International Organizations 17

1 The Criminal Policy of Transgovernmental Networks 17
2 International Organizations 22
2.1 The Increase of Regulatory Capacity 24
United Nations and the Security Council 25
Effectiveness Strategy 26
2.2 Supranational Sanctions 33
EU administrative Sanctions 33
UN Blacklisting 35
World Bank Sanctions Systems 37
Bibliography 45
3 Private Ius Puniendi 49

1 Non-State Actors 49
1.1 Multinational Corporations 50
1.2 Collective Actions 54
1.3 NGOs 58
v
vi Contents
1.4 Standardization Bodies and Other Non-State

Regulators 59
2 Global Ius Puniendi of Sports Federations and Associations 62
Bibliography 65
4 Territories, Sovereigns, and Ius Puniendi 69

1 The Spatial Application of Criminal Law and Judicial
Cooperation 69
1.1 The Iron Triangle 69
2 Post-Westphalian Paradigm of Judicial Cooperation 72
3 The Criminal Law of Territories with No Sovereign 76
Bibliography 82
5 Legitimacy and Safeguards 85

1 Criminal Justice Outside of States? 85
2 Legitimacy of Post-State Ius Puniendi 87
2.1 Strengthening National Legislatures 88
2.2 Deliberative Democracy 89
2.3 The Principle of Subsidiarity 91
3 Global Criminal Law: Which Fundamental Rights? 92
4 The New Rules of Global Cooperation 95
4.1 The Importance of Data Protection Law 95
4.2 Conflicts of Jurisdiction and International
Ne Bis in Idem 99
Bibliography106
Index 109
CHAPTER 1
On the Way to Stateless Criminal Law
1 Introduction
Global law is more an all-encompassing concept than a legal reality. There
are very diverse issues under the umbrella of global law. The link that ties
them together is the state’s diminished role as a regulator.1 A multilevel
governance2 system has filled the gap left by national or domestic law.
More specifically, there is a form of post-national regulation involving the
interaction among states, international organizations or institutions, gov-
ernment networks, and other private stakeholders, such as multinational
corporations (also known as multinational enterprises or companies), stan-
dardization bodies, and NGOs. The scenario for this new form of regula-
tion is globalization, where several problems have arisen that are hard to
solve through individual state action. Criminal policy experts often include
all of these issues under the notion of transnational or cross-border crime.3
By making it into the wording of Article 83 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), this concept has traveled
from international criminal justice policy and criminology to written posi-
tive (statutory) law.
Public law scholars have been discussing global law for a long time.
However, there has been no such debate within criminal justice (a few
exceptions are Sieber 2010; Meyer 2012). The last frontier for criminal
law scholars is treaty law, which is still founded on state consent and thus
on state sovereignty. States “own” the conventions, and international
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2022
A. Nieto Martín, Global Criminal Law,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84831-6_1
2 A. NIETO MARTÍN
organizations are mere instruments to serve their projects and interests.

Regarding the International Criminal Court (ICC) this is mostly4 true
(Ambos 2013), since it depends on the consent of States Parties to the
Rome Statute. The main purpose of this work is to describe how and to
what extent criminal policy and criminal justice no longer fall within the
exclusive scope of states and national law. This work intends to map this
new “global punitive law,” which would cover all the stages of the state’s
right to punish or ius puniendi: defining criminal offences, investigating
criminal behavior, seizures or confiscations, and other measures or proce-
dures or even the actual sentencing. Most shockingly, this mapping reveals
the appearance of global or supranational sanctions systems often in the
hands of private entities. Also, the “maps” include many more “regions”
than expected.
A stateless ius puniendi or a form of ius puniendi where states act as
mere additional regulators on an equal footing with others can be surpris-
ing either way. For centuries, the right to punish has been exclusively held
by states. Therefore, many consider that the very notion of “stateless ius
puniendi” is an oxymoron.5 Also, noticing that this has become true can,
and should, be worrying. The main criticism to the global law debate
relates to the word “law.” Using “law” to designate rules stemming from
private actors or supranational entities with scarcely transparent and non-
participatory rulemaking procedures (such as the G20, G7, the
International Monetary Fund, or the World Bank) simply legitimizes what
is otherwise illegitimate (Darnaculleta 2016, p. 111 et seq). We the experts
on these topics would therefore turn into accessories to the neoliberal
driving forces of globalization.
This criticism is largely correct. Networked regulation, with states in
the background, raises major concerns in terms of legitimacy, transpar-
ency, guarantees, and accountability. Accordingly, the main purpose of
global law should be to assess the legitimacy of these new regulatory
approaches and to enhance individual rights by reshaping, importing, and
applying the rule of law guarantees. This is what some label as global
administrative law or, more graphically, global constitutionalism (Krisch
2010). Secondly, this work also aims at providing the safeguards and guar-
antees of global criminal law. By doing so, we contribute to the global
constitutionalism debate from the perspective of criminal law. One thing
is clear: there is no turning back.6 The criminal law issues resulting from
globalization can only be solved through a ius puniendi that is not state-
oriented, with different regulatory and enforcement mechanisms based on
1 ON THE WAY TO STATELESS CRIMINAL LAW 3
the cooperation and joint action of several public and private actors: a
polycentric or networked criminal justice system (regulation by networks).
Note that this new global ius puniendi coexists and sometimes interacts
with more conventional or treaty-based dimensions of international crimi-
nal law or even quasi-federal criminal frameworks, such as that in place
among European Union (EU) member states. The situation of transna-
tional and supranational criminal law can be pictured as a set of three legal
frameworks, each of them with distinct features and elements and yet with
large overlaps: (i) classic international criminal law; (ii) European criminal
law, and (iii) global criminal law. It makes no sense to argue about whether
a given framework falls within the scope of another. Alongside these legal
frameworks, criminal justice systems of the strongest countries, namely
that of the United States, can also play a key role. US criminal law has a
clear extraterritorial vocation, and it exerts a strong influence on other
criminal law frameworks, hence the so-called Americanization process.7
This work focuses on global criminal law. There will not be a detailed
analysis of the other two frameworks or the most influential national legal
orders; occasionally, we will discuss them for comparative purposes only.
2 The Forces of Change

The emergence of post-state criminal law, whose patterns differ from those
of classic international law, results from two main transformative elements
that can be found in the various dimensions discussed below. First, there
is relational sovereignty, a new concept of sovereignty downplaying the
importance of the state-territory binomial and bringing new actors on the
international relations stage. Second, there is a renewed concept of secu-
rity; it legitimizes the appearance of new actors on stage while providing
grounds to justify further control and prohibitions.
2.1 Relational Sovereignty
The first driver of transformation is the metamorphosis of the ever elusive
concept of sovereignty. The prevailing conception of sovereignty stems
from the Peace of Westphalia. Westphalian sovereignty departs from feu-
dalism and from the first state-building approaches. From then onward,
power and authority became tied to a “spatial extension”: the territory
(Badie 1995, Ruggie 1993). Within their borders, sovereign rulers exer-
cise their power without any external meddling or interference from other
4 A. NIETO MARTÍN
rulers or from papal or imperial power (potestas legibus solutus). Westphalian

sovereignty is the right to be left alone, to exclude, to be free from any
external meddling or interference within each sovereign ruler’s spatial
extension (Slaughter 2004).
According to this classic conception of sovereignty, when a sovereign
state engages in relations with other states it does so on an equal footing
with any others (sovereign equality), being an autonomous agent in the
international community (Kelsen 1944). International treaties and con-
ventions, the paramount source of international law, comply with this
paradigm. International conventions become legitimate, come into force,
and thus are incorporated into domestic law, upon ratification by national
parliaments, who are entitled to make reservations or to withdraw from
treaties (treaty denunciation) if they see fit. This model of international
law barely interferes with state sovereignty. Under this paradigm, interna-
tional law theory shares some aspects with contract law (pacta sunt ser-
vanda, the principle of good faith…), and international law standards are
based on a principle that resembles free will: “The rules of law binding
upon States therefore emanate from their own free will” (Lotus, PCIJ, Ser.
A, no. 10, 18; Caeiro 2010).
International organizations also rely on the principle of sovereign
equality, and their activity is based on fully respecting states and their ter-
ritory. An expression of this respectful relationship is that international
organizations address their decisions to member states, yet these decisions
do not directly affect individuals. There is no doubt that states “own”
international organizations. Traditional international institutions do not
get involved in state-citizen relations; these are handled exclusively by sov-
ereign authorities.
This approach to international relations implies that states interact with
each other and with international organizations through a very specific
branch: diplomatic missions. The remaining state bodies and officials are
not empowered to engage in interstate relations or, let alone, to enter into
agreements or strategic alliances. In the international arena, countries act
as unitary states, meaning that their bodies, authorities, or internal depart-
ments have no international presence. As discussed in detail below, this
remains the prevailing conception regarding international cooperation.
When asked for assistance, judges, public prosecutors, and law enforce-
ment authorities help each other, but they do not cooperate directly. In its
most traditional version, judicial cooperation or assistance must be imple-
mented by diplomatic officials. The same applies to legislatures: they are
not involved in any treaty negotiations. National legislatures simply ratify

conventions or, at best, they give advice to diplomatic authorities, but they
do not negotiate.
After World War II, following a steady process beginning with the
Treaty of Versailles and the creation of the League of Nations, there was a
paradigm shift in international law. A new version of classic international
law appears, the so-called progressive Grotian tradition, which is now the
prevailing paradigm. State sovereignty, that is, sovereignty of authorities
over their citizens within their borders, will no longer be absolute. Post-
World War II human rights conventions entail that human rights limit
sovereign authorities’ scope of action within the territory (Ferrajoli 1998).
Now, public international law is mostly concerned about individuals. The
Nuremberg trials embody this new paradigm leading to countries’ loss of
power. States, and thus individuals acting on their behalf, are no longer
invisible for international law, and they can now be held liable subject to
international law provisions.8 International law currently assumes the abil-
ity to intervene and to set aside the right to be left alone where states (i)
violate human rights on their territory or (ii) are unable either to prevent
human rights abuses or to ensure compliance with human rights inside
their borders (Slaughter 2004 p. 284; Ferrajoli 1998 p. 177). Alongside
this first paradigm shift in international law, there is a second transforma-
tion accounting for the rise of global law. As shown below, states no longer
have a major role in rulemaking or regarding coercive enforcement. This
transformation led to a new concept of sovereignty. There has been a tran-
sition from Westphalian sovereignty to a post-Westphalian or relational
sovereignty (Chayes and Chayes 1995).
Some problems are no longer solved by the states’ ability to exercise
their authority freely and in isolation within their borders. Exercising the
ius puniendi based on their exclusive jurisdiction over their territory does
not guarantee that states will be able to effectively tackle transnational
crime, environmental protection issues, or financial market stability. In a
globalized world, citizens face problems that are cross-border in nature. In
order to solve these problems, states must be able (i) to enter into rela-
tions with other states, organizations, and companies as well as to (ii) cre-
ate areas of joint government. The greater a state’s ability to set up
networks with public or private actors, to cooperate with other states, or
to impose its views in international institutions, the greater the state’s
sovereignty or power. Within this new context, political scientists refer to
soft power as the means to achieve certain objectives. Soft power
6 A. NIETO MARTÍN
prioritizes dialogue over coercion, by exchanging ideas in international

networks, training foreign public officials, and giving advice (Nye 1990).
In contrast with traditional sovereignty, relational sovereignty entails
sharing sovereignty and power with other states, with international orga-
nizations, and even with private stakeholders. The most remarkable play-
ers are the so-called government networks, which focus on very specific
and highly specialized global matters such as banking supervision and
regulation, the environment, as well as antitrust and securities law. These
networks are the main rulemakers in global governance. As discussed
below, there is a myriad of these informal organizations. Nation-based
hierarchies and diplomatic missions do no longer meet. Depending on the
network, the meeting participants are, inter alia, senior officials from stock
market supervisory bodies, from antitrust authorities, banking supervi-
sors, judges, or law enforcement authorities. Traditionally, states used to
act en bloc, as a unit. However, under the new paradigm of international
law, states are extremely disaggregated, fragmented, and represented by
bodies and officials that freely and directly enter into relations with their
foreign counterparts (Slaughter 2004; De Bellis 2020).
Relational sovereignty has also given rise to cooperation jargon terms
like “public-private partnership” (Donahue and Zeckhauser 2006; regard-
ing corruption Klitgaard 2012). In these partnerships, public and private
actors engage in primarily horizontal relations and work together to tackle
certain issues such as corruption. NGOs and multinational corporations
are the leading actors in global governance. They participate both in rule-
making and in enforcement. Due to their flexible nature, the aforesaid
government networks encourage the presence of these players. Therefore,
NGOs and multinational corporations sometimes operate in these net-
works, but they also get involved in rulemaking procedures within the
most traditional international institutions for the sake of deliberative
democracy. On top of this, in rulemaking there is a trend toward self-
regulation in all states, encouraged as a form of global governance. This
trend has not yet been connected with a metamorphosis of the concept of
sovereignty. However, self-regulation is clearly a national strategy to seek
or require cooperation in rulemaking and enforcement. In other words,
self-regulation shows states’ will to call upon other actors and to enter into
relations therewith to devolve or delegate powers that used to be exclu-
sively held by state authorities (Bamberger 2006).
Ultimately, relational sovereignty has brought along a more sociologi-
cal and less formal explanation of the validity and effectiveness of
international law (Raustiala 2002; Slaughter 2014a, b). Compliance in

international law is based on the ability to establish support networks for
pieces of legislation ensuring the provision’s (i) technical legitimacy, along
with (ii) a strong support in terms of shared values or opinions, as well as
(iii) reputational and economic costs in case of infringement. Thus con-
strued, the success of legal provisions shows the importance of soft law,
guidelines, private standards, or self-regulation, which is intertwined with
the previous aspects (see Chap. 2, section “Effectiveness Strategy”).
2.2 Security
Security is the second driver of global criminal justice. Although the term
has a broad meaning, we will focus on the binomial internal-external secu-
rity. For centuries, any security threats faced by a country came from
abroad, mostly from foreign countries. This context gave rise to a new
group of public services and officials: intelligence agencies. They were
tasked with obtaining information and subsequently analyzing it in intel-
ligence reports, in order to guide political decisions aimed at protecting
national or homeland security (Gonzalez Coussac 2019; Gaonzález
Coussac and Fernández Flores 2017). Nowadays, the concept of external
security has changed completely.9 From the mid-1960s, but particularly
following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, terror-
ism, organized crime, or cybercrime have become global security threats.
Currently, the notion of security covers environmental and stock market
threats (financial security).10 This new conception has impacted on inter-
national organizations’ roadmaps, particularly on the United Nations
(UN) agenda. Note that the UN’s central mission is “the maintenance of
international peace and security.” This redefinition of security has pro-
vided grounds for further empowering certain bodies, such as the UN
Security Council, and it has also enabled many international institutions
that used to be unrelated to criminal law to include crimes in their agendas
on the basis that they threaten market performance (Felsen and Kalaitzidis
2005; Naylor 1995; Mitsilegas et al. 2003).
Global criminal law is, at least partially, the law of global security.11The
notion of security and its interpretation is also connected with transna-
tional crime (Boister 2003, Fouchard 2013). For a while, scholars have
been making efforts to provide the concept of transnational crime with
normative content. The term “transnational crime” was coined by the
United Nations in the mid-1970s (Bassiouni 2006; Bassiouni and Vetere
8 A. NIETO MARTÍN
1998) with the aim of launching a new legislative agenda. After, this con-
cept has been extensively used by criminologists and later, at a third stage
of the concept’s development, there was an attempt to turn it into a nor-
mative or legislative term, largely because the equivalent notion “cross-
border” crime was inserted in Article 83 TFEU (Mitsilegas 2016 p. 58).
Additionally, most of these efforts focus on giving substance to the notion
of “transnational” or “cross-border” crime vis-à-vis the category of inter-
national crimes, which encompasses the “core crimes” set out in the Rome
Statute along with other crimes against humanity like torture. Actually,
these are all terms of the same discourse or legal narrative. However,
although this is a semantic debate about terminology, and thus irrelevant,
the notion of security connected with the idea of global law seems more
comprehensive. Transnational crime has a more classic meaning. This con-
cept is tied to several international conventions and it does not sufficiently
highlight the rise of a new global governance of crime, which is the focus
of this study. Furthermore, as shown below, the notion of security did not
only give rise to a criminal policy agenda, but it has also provided a new
methodology to fight crime revolving around punitive or repressive mech-
anisms along with (and here comes the innovation) preventive instruments.
Aside from this first legitimizing function, the notion of security has a
somewhat concealed purpose that often goes unnoticed. This other pur-
pose is methodological in nature, and it entails transferring intelligence
service practices and lines of action to criminal justice policy for the pre-
vention and investigation of crimes. Global criminal law has advanced a
strategy to control crime based on the classic instruments of intelligence
services: collection and analysis of information (Bachmaier 2012; Vervaele
2012). Indeed, a preventive or deterrence-based strategy shared in many
global law sectors is to require public or private actors and bodies to col-
lect and store information. These obligations often come along with the
requirement to share, disclose, or make available this information. The
ultimate purpose of these requirements is to analyze the information using
profiling and risk assessment methods. The recent development of artifi-
cial intelligence techniques, such as big data or data mining, are also help-
ful (Maroto Calatayud and Nieto Martin 2010; Romeo and Casabona
2018; Miró 2020).
A risk assessment-oriented concept of security, where risk assessment
revolves around data analysis, has brought back notions like “dangerous-
ness” or “hazard” in criminal law, although with a different disguise.
Obviously, this new concept of security has also brought along new
penalties. They have been renamed with new modern names but their
purpose is very similar to that of the old criminal security or safety mea-
sures. The “smart” sanctions implemented by the United Nations against
terrorism (see Chap. 2, Sect. 2.2), discussed in detail later, are the para-
mount example of this new security law penalty system. Additionally, this
model (information + risk assessment + control measures) is an inspiration
for money laundering and terrorism financing regulations, providing for
information storage and analysis, as well as for the implementation of con-
trol measures limiting the rights of suspects in criminal cases. A parallel
approach to the implementation of these security measures would be the
provision of new endangerment crimes, which are applied to terrorism
offences, and they criminalize dangerous or hazardous conducts—indoc-
trination and training (Article 575 of the Spanish Criminal Code, Código
Penal or SCC) or financing (Article 576 SCC). The almost only way to
discover these conducts is by collecting and analyzing information.
Starting from an allocation of powers based on this new approach to secu-
rity, as discussed later on, these crimes have been inserted in criminal codes
partly because of the UN Security Council resolutions. This set of alterna-
tive criminal law measures also includes the confiscation regime, providing
for mechanisms such as “non-conviction based confiscation” (forfeiture)
or “extended confiscation.” Also regarding the advancement of these
instruments, the UN’s role has been critical.
Notes
1. See an overall discussion of global law in Darnaculleta i Gardella
M. M. (2016, 2019). From the perspective of international law, see Ortega
Carcelén M. (2014, 2019); from the perspective of theory of law and legal
history, see Grossi P. (2006) and; Teubner G. (1997); from a constitu-
tional law standpoint, see Krisch (2010).
2. The meaning of governance as the opposite of government means exactly
that state or domestic law’s diminished role or loss of importance as the
only source of legal provisions governing social interaction: “Governance
is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private,
manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which
conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative
action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empow-
ered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people
and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest,”
see Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbourhood: The
10 A. NIETO MARTÍN
Report of the Commission on Global Governance, Oxford, 1995. (http://

www.gdrc.org/u-gov/global-neighbourhood/, last visited 25.6.2021).
3. There are many works showing the various globalized crime scenarios, the
most official version being that of the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime (UNODC) (2010); a descriptive analysis in Reichel P. (ed.) (2005),
specially Felsen and Kalaitzidis (2005); Karstedt S. and Nelken D. (2013);
in the field of economic offences, see Zagaris B. (2015); a more crimino-
logical approach can be found in Smith C. et al. (2011). For a critical
perspective See Mitsilegas V. et al. ed. (2015) and specially Andreas P.’s
contribution in this book.
4. We purposefully say “mostly” because, as discussed below, a leading actor
in global law such as the UN Security Council can play a significant role in
the ICC’s regulation. However, it must be admitted that this is an ius
puniendi exercised by the international community and not by individual
states, Ambos K. (2013).
5. See a more detailed analysis in Chap. 5, Sect. 1). Aside from stateless supra-
national ius puniendi, the debate about whether there is room for a non-
state criminal law framework can also be held within a legal system. For
instance, over the last few years, there has been extensive discussion about
the privatization of ius puniendi. See a comprehensive review in García de
la Galana, B. (2019). The so-called restorative justice and penal abolition-
ism from the 1970s are also de-statalizing or state-free trends wishing to
put the conflict back in the hands of society. Indigenous justice is also an
example of stateless criminal justice. See a historical analysis of this matter
(with additional examples) in Caeiro P (2010).
6. Some call it the globalization paradox: we need more centralized power
although we fear the risks for democracy and freedom of centralizing
decision-making power and coercive authority. The existence of various
actors, a polycentric governance, ensures that a system of checks and bal-
ances is in place to some extent. On this paradox, see Slaughter (2014a, b,
p. 8 et seq).
7. Within the context of economic criminal law, I dealt with this issue in
Nieto Martín (2007). On this topic, see the remarkable works by Raustiala
(2002) and Slaughter A. M. (2014a, b). These works provide an overview
of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s strategy regarding stock
market law, Environmental Protection Agency’s approach in environmen-
tal matters, or the Department of Justice’s stance on antitrust law to
expand US law worldwide. Another interesting work is Nye (1990). This
work elaborates on the concept of soft power as one of the main instru-
ments implemented by the United States to expand its regulatory models.
Soft power means, inter alia (i) taking advantage of training officials from
other countries; (ii) providing technical assistance; (iii) establishing coordi-
nating bodies, and (iv) exchanging best practices.
8. In this struggle, it is worth highlighting the works of the great interna-

tional law expert Lauterpacht H. (1946, p. 20 et seq). Unsurprisingly,
Lauterpacht brought the works of Grotius to the foreground in this new
era of international law. Grotius’ great treatise, De jure belli ac pacis, was
written two decades before the Peace of Westphalia, and it questions state
sovereignty over their territory. Relying on the concept totiushumani
generis societas, Grotius puts forward a pre-Westphalian idea, according to
which part of international law should not focus on states but on individu-
als. The law of nations underlying this approach is common to humanity as
a whole, beyond states, which entails that state sovereignty must be subject
to the rule of law. The construct of the crime of aggression and thus the
possibility of considering that a war can be unlawful departs precisely from
this “international rule of law” claim. See also, Domingo (2010), who
provided ius gentium as the foundations of global law.
See Sands (2017) an extraordinary novel-like history of the life and
works of Hersch Lauterpacht and his influence on Nuremberg. However,
the author of this book questions that this school of international law has
ties with Grotius’ works. See Parry (2014). She claims that Lauterpacht
invoked Grotius to legitimize this new school of international law that was
going to play a role in the Nuremberg trials and to be enshrined in the
Charter of Fundamental Rights.
9. On the evolution of the concept of security, see Laboire(2011, p. 3 et
seq).Redefining security as a global problem provides an additional reason
to strengthen interstate cooperation using innovative approaches as the
ones pointed out in the previous section. Indeed, there are frequently used
terms such as “cooperative security” or “common security” to refer to this
new form of cooperation. See Abad Quintanal G. (2015, p. 41 et seq).As
also noted by Abad Quintanal, from this perspective we also refer to food
safety, energy security, or even human security or public safety, which ulti-
mately relates to the protection of individuals against widely spread crimi-
nality, such as high homicide and crime rates in certain countries. Below,
we examine how the UN intervenes in failed states to ensure public safety
in case of purely domestic threats, such as increasing crime rates.
10. Cf. Felsen D and Kalaitzides (2005 p. 13). These scholars claim that the
concept of security began to be redefined after the Cold War in the United
States. Thereafter, law enforcement authorities started to be concerned
about international crime. This shift is aptly exemplified by a document
stemming from a conference held in Washington in 1994. There were
police officers, intelligent service agents, and so on. See Raine and
Cilluffo (1994).
11. See, above all, the analysis by Sieber (2018). This study suggests the fol-
lowing as alternative control mechanisms of security law: supranational
12 A. NIETO MARTÍN
administrative fines, the blacklisting system, anti-money laundering

regimes, compliance programs, or confiscation proceedings. Self-evidently,
Sieber’s mapping, designated as “security law” largely matches what we call
“global law.” The first attempt to grasp the importance of security in crimi-
nal law was made by Pérez Cepeda (2007). However, she focused on
“criminal law of the enemy” or Feindstrafrecht as well as on the “militariza-
tion of criminal justice.” She suggested to take globalization claims for
enhanced security to the International Criminal Court or to subject them
to classic international law. This analysis focuses on the extension of crimi-
nal law and its severity. However, we emphasize the emergence of a more
prevention-oriented global security law that has given rise to control mea-
sures than run parallel to criminal law.
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CHAPTER 2
The Ius Puniendi of International

Organizations
1 The Criminal Policy

of Transgovernmental Networks
A typical product of relational sovereignty are the so-called transgovern-
mental networks or inter-governmental networks which amount to an
essential element of global governance (De Bellis 2020; Raustiala 2002;
Slaughter 2014). There are some paramount examples of these networks:
the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO),
including stock market authorities; the International Competition
Network (ICN), bringing together antitrust authorities worldwide; the
Basel Committee and International Association of Insurance Supervisors;
and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), whose mem-
bers are central banks and banking supervisors. Actually, there are trans-
governmental networks in almost every industry, so it is quite difficult to
list them all. Transgovernmental networks supplement the activity of
international organizations and states. Therefore, they do not represent a
different model but a complement or an accessory. In fact, states and
international organizations create transgovernmental networks. All of
these networks focus on training, exchange of information, and best
practices, but they also play a central role in rulemaking. They are con-
stantly issuing standards, guidelines, or recommendations that subse-
quently have a major influence on lawmakers. Even more remarkably,
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 17

Switzerland AG 2022
A. Nieto Martín, Global Criminal Law,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84831-6_2
18 A. NIETO MARTÍN
transgovernmental networks are involved in the implementation of many

of these rules and regulations.
The defining feature of transgovernmental networks is their composi-
tion. They are made up of government officials from various bodies and
agencies, including the police, judges, and members of national legisla-
tures. As noted above, under the Westphalian paradigm of sovereignty,
only diplomatic authorities were entitled to negotiate and represent the
state internationally. It was unthinkable that any other government offi-
cials or public servants could officially interact, and let alone that they
entered into agreements, issued joint guidelines, or reached common
positions that could be binding on their respective states. Transgovernmental
networks should be construed as a parallel diplomacy, comprising well-
trained officials with expertise that participate therein autonomously; they
do not follow instructions from governments or legislatures (Slaughter
2014). They are usually appointed by hierarchical superiors. Nevertheless,
these networks are open. In addition to state officials, transgovernmental
networks often include international organizations, companies, private
entities, and NGOs. Self-evidently, they are a flexible and open meeting
point for all the actors involved in global regulation.
Transgovernmental networks have a tremendous influence on national
lawmaking, and they have harmonizing effects resembling those of inter-
national conventions. This influence is due to several factors. First, the
guidelines issued by these networks have a high technical legitimacy
(Muñoz de Morales 2011) because they are bodies of high-ranking offi-
cials or public servants, who are knowledgeable and have extensive exper-
tise on the relevant matters; these high-level officials are often assisted by
other experts or companies. Second, transgovernmental network mem-
bers are close to the executive branch of government and they can have
considerable influence on bills or draft legislation.
However, the key to their success is the strategy implemented by inter-
national regulation. This strategy revolves around teamwork: a given
international network’s guidelines underpin a treaty or vice versa, or the
soft law provisions enacted by international institutions supplement the
guidelines issued by transgovernmental networks (Sieber 2009, p. 514).
The effectiveness of transnational network recommendations largely relies
on the network’s ability to avoid reputational costs. See, for instance, the
Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) blacklist of countries that are “non-
cooperative” in the global fight against money laundering and offshore
financial centers (tax havens). Reputation and relational sovereignty are
2 THE IUS PUNIENDI OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 19
closely intertwined. A state’s bad reputation for not complying with these
networks’ guidelines will lessen its ability to build partnerships and alli-
ances, thereby reducing its power, influence, and sovereignty.
As shown above, the success of transgovernmental networks revolves
around the notions of relational sovereignty and soft power. The more
support from various actors, the more effective the provisions. Also, a
state’s presence in these international fora and its capacity to round up
support will largely depend on the state’s international reputation. Being
blacklisted, getting a bad evaluation, or not fulfilling the expectations gen-
erated in other parties by being part of these networks entails reputation
costs for countries that undermine their sovereignty. Since sovereignty is
measured by how states interact with other states and stakeholders, having
a good or bad reputation is a decisive factor (Slaughter 2014, p. 196, 203
et seq). In addition to their instruments, transgovernmental networks also
rely on soft power to disseminate their regulatory proposals and legislative
initiatives: they build mutual trust by (i) exchanging information and
experiences and (ii) offering technical assistance, professional socializa-
tion, and training to members from “less developed” nations (Slaughter
2014, p. 290 et seq.; Zagaris 2015, p. 10 et seq).
Even within the scope of criminal law alone, it is complicated to count
how many networks there are. For the sake of simplicity, note that there is
a trend toward regionalization and specialization. Some global networks
like G20 have certain working groups focusing on corruption. These
groups overlap with the networks established by long-standing organiza-
tions. For instance, they overlap with The Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative
(StAR) (Prieto del Pino 2019, p. 507 et seq), resulting from a partnership
between the World Bank and the United Nations, which deals with the
recovery of corrupt assets.
The greatest concentration of criminal justice networks, or at least the
most visible ones, tend to focus on money laundering, financing of terror-
ism, and confiscations. The most famous one is the Financial Action Task
Force (FATF), an inter-governmental body dedicated to advancing legis-
lative initiatives on this matter.1 The 40+9 Recommendations have become
the basis for pieces of legislation on money laundering and terrorism
financing worldwide. The FATF interacts with international organiza-
tions, mostly the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), which can participate in its working groups and task forces, as well
as with the EU, the UN, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), and G20. FATF 40+9 Recommendations have
20 A. NIETO MARTÍN
been so successful partly because UN Security Council Resolution 1617

strongly urged states to implement them and the Action Plan on terrorism
expressly invoked them. The FATF also interacts with other transgovern-
mental networks such as Wolfsberg Group (an association of the leading
central banks) or the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS).
These networks issue specific standards for the banking sector supple-
menting those of FATF.2 Effectiveness is based on this “chain of referrals”
involving standards and mutual support.
The networks fighting money laundering and working on the confisca-
tion of criminal assets are not only rulemakers. Networks with a focus on
standardization often give rise to internal sub-networks made up of police
officers and other government agency officials. The purpose of these sub-
networks is to improve the enforcement of a given regulation. The
exchange of information that takes place amounts to a true form of police-
judicial cooperation,3 that has sometimes resulted in another independent
network. This is the case, for instance, of Egmont Group, established in
1995 by the FATF. This regulatory enforcement network is a body of
state-created intelligence units that share and exchange financial intelli-
gence on transactions suspicious of money laundering. There are similar
networks: the EU Asset Recovery Offices or Eurojust’s Financial and
Economic Crime Team (FEC) (Prieto del Pino 2019).
As if they were involved in a cell division process, transgovernmental
networks undergo mitosis. As a result of their mitotic phase, they steadily
break down into smaller and increasingly more specialized cells/networks
replicating and keeping the original DNA. For example, the Egmont
Group works in tandem with the Camden Assets Recovery Inter-Agency
Network (CARIN), providing a rather operational assistance in the field of
asset tracing, freezing, seizure, and confiscation. CARIN has 54 member
states, and its permanent Secretariat is taken care of by Eurojust and
Europol. Similar networks have emerged in Africa, Asia, and South
America (Prieto del Pino 2019).
Market abuse is a traditional area for these networks, although they
usually have a much more centralized structure (Raustiala 2002, p. 28
et seq). Whereas regarding money laundering and asset recovery there is a
myriad of bodies and organizations, there is only one actor concerned
with market abuse: the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO), an international body that brings together securi-
ties regulators worldwide.4 IOSCO is essential as both a standard setter
and an enforcer, and it also plays a significant role in the investigation of
irregularities in securities markets. The Objectives and Principles of Security

Regulation and the Methodology for Assessing Implementation of the IOSCO
Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation lay the foundations for
securities or stock market regulation. For instance, these documents pro-
vide in detail the powers or competences of authorities and the standards
of conduct for market intermediaries and issuers. From a regulatory
enforcement perspective, IOSCO’s main contribution is cooperation
through the Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) created in 2002
resembling those that had already been entered into by the United States
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) with many countries. These
agreements are signed by administrative authorities, and they can be mul-
tilateral or bilateral; they actually entail the establishment of an ad hoc
cooperation mechanism based on exchanging and sharing information
among securities market authorities.5 In order to render cooperation more
effective, the memoranda required to file any documents recording stock
market transactions. Although the point was to set up a cooperation sys-
tem allowing to exchange information among administrative authorities,
it does not prevent judges or prosecutors from benefitting of the shared
information to investigate insider trading or market abuse.6
The strategy underlying the expansion of competition or antitrust law
is similar to that implemented for financial markets. The United States also
led the way in this field by expanding its regulatory model, assisted by
long-standing organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO)
and the OECD (Raustiala 2002, p. 35 et seq), as well as of the ICN,
bringing together almost all antitrust authorities in the world. The wide
spread of leniency programs in competition law infringements has a lot to
do with the ICN’s activity,7 as well as the guidelines to impose effec-
tive fines.8
There is another transgovernmental network in the field of environ-
mental law: the International Network for Environmental Compliance
and Enforcement (INECE).9 In contrast with the aforesaid bodies, this
network is not exclusively made up of supervisors. It has a more pluralist
composition; it is a partnership of regulators, researchers, prosecutors,
judges, police officers, scholars, NGOs, and companies. Its work is based
on exchanges and training, among other activities, but INECE is not as
focused on standardization and harmonization. Particularly regarding
criminal law, the purpose of INECE is to share and exchange knowledge
and to provide training to better prosecute environmental crimes.
22 A. NIETO MARTÍN
Transgovernmental networks also have a central role in the fight against

tax evasion and corruption. Through their aforesaid mitosis, slowly but
surely, the FATF10 and G2011 have extended their scope of power to cover
tax fraud and corruption. However, regarding tax evasion, a more formal-
ized body such as the OECD plays the leading role through hard law
(Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters) and soft
law instruments (Harmful Tax Practices and Tax Transparency reports)
encouraging the exchange of information on potentially harmful tax prac-
tices. As for corruption, classic organizations lead the way, along with pri-
vate entities and NGOs.
Some G7 summits have dealt with organized crime, addressing matters
such as human trafficking and forged documents. The World Economic
Forum, which hosts an annual summit in Davos, has published two docu-
ments regarding these issues: the Global Agenda Council on Illicit Trade
and the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.12
There are specific transgovernmental networks, like the Australian Group,
dealing with weapon trafficking. The Australian Group is an informal
forum of industrialized countries that provides a platform to exchange
information regarding the trade and development of biological and nuclear
weapons. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) have similar purposes. There are other
initiatives of the kind focusing on the traffic of small arms and light weap-
ons, which are more closely related to organized crime (García 2006).
2 International Organizations

It would be wrong to say that international institutions or organizations
are a new actor within international criminal law. Following World War I,
interstate cooperation in the field of criminal justice has mostly taken place
within the cooperation frameworks provided by international organiza-
tions. In practice, ever since the League of Nations, states have refused to
draw up international conventions leaving out international organizations,
except for extradition treaties or agreements (Joutsen 2011, p. 122 et seq).
There are several factors that define the international organizations’
involvement in international criminal policy. These factors have also trans-
formed organizations’ role; they now have their own salient position, not
necessarily tied to states’ will. Indeed, states have little room for maneuver
in terms of criminal policy when it comes to adopting some of the major
treaties or conventions. Disregarding international criminal policy in mat-

ters like drug trafficking or organized crime is simply not possible.
It is hard to define the notion of “international organization.” In fact,
according to some of the extremely broad definitions, international orga-
nizations could also qualify as transgovernmental networks, although hav-
ing a low level of formalization, like the G20 (on the definition of
international organizations Álvarez 2005, p. 139 et seq). This section
exclusively examines traditional organizations like the UN, the OECD,
the World Bank, or the IMF; these are characterized by their formal
decision-making processes, based on member states’ votes, and by their
scope of powers or competences, which is carefully provided in these orga-
nizations’ founding charters.
International organizations came into being and operated based on
delegation of powers and consent. Sovereign states used to seek coopera-
tion within a given area, specified in the organizations’ founding charters.
International organizations would operate as tools for foreign action in
that area, surrendering to states’ will. Given this framework, there was
never any problem regarding international conventions. As for criminal
law, this framework conformed to the principle of legality (rule of law).
Member states negotiated the agreements on an equal footing, on the
basis of “horizontal multilateralism,” and decision-making was based on
consensus and unanimous vote (Ortega Carcelén 2014, p. 139 et seq).
State representatives, who had to be duly empowered or authorized to
give their consent, were in charge of the negotiations. Within the treaty-
making process, following adoption, international conventions often
require national parliamentary approval, ratification, and publication in
the official gazette in order to become effective. If the convention lays
down criminal law obligations: (i) the specific domestic criminal law provi-
sions must be enacted, and (ii) the criminal law obligations must be trans-
posed into national law (an organic act, in Spain). Reservations allow for
“tailor-made treaties,” enabling states to exclude any provisions that they
are not willing to accept.
International organizations were strictly precluded from adopting any
acts or decisions that could directly (without previously enacting any
domestic provisions) restrict citizens’ rights. Therefore, international
organizations did not have their own directly enforceable criminal law.
This traditional approach to international institutions has shifted in the
last few decades. The roles have been reversed, and these international
organizations are no longer international law instruments subject to the
24 A. NIETO MARTÍN
states. They have gone from being mere tools to having their own agenda.
In fact, international organizations often set the legislative agendas of gov-
ernments and legislatures (Kwakwa 2011). Furthermore, the principle of
state equality is more myth than reality. Many countries are unable to have
an actual influence on their provisions. International bureaucracies and
organizations’ governing bodies are far from well-balanced. Most coun-
tries do not really have a choice when it comes to adopting international
conventions. If they decided not to enter into an international treaty,
many states would bear almost unbearable reputational costs and they
would be excluded from development aid and international assistance.13
Aside from this aspect, there are three diverse phenomena that truly
define the current international situation and touch on the global law
debate. First, decision-making bodies of international organizations are
steadily moving apart from the assemblies and hence from states’ will. In
parallel, the various committees and bodies that are being created allow
NGOs and transgovernmental and multinational networks to get involved
in the setting of objectives and the issuance of recommendations, thereby
allowing these NGOs and networks to play a more significant role and
exert greater influence in international organizations’ rulemaking proce-
dures. Second, international organizations have slowly expanded their
original scope of action, which is particularly important when it comes to
explaining their involvement in global law, such as that of the OECD. Third,
the use of new regulatory instruments, such as soft law, applied alterna-
tively or jointly with international conventions, have allowed the aforesaid
actors to increase their influence. The negotiation of international treaties
is sometimes slow, burdensome, and uncertain due to certain states’ oppo-
sition. In contrast, soft law, guidelines, and recommendations are smoother
and lead to similar outcomes (Ortega Carcelén 2014; Álvarez 2011).
Sometimes, these guidelines apply jointly with the conventions, framing
these treaty provisions, and thus making the regulation of these guidelines
even more necessary.
2.1 The Increase of Regulatory Capacity

International organizations have become independent legislative actors.
They tend to have their own agendas, separate from states’ agendas, which
often exceed the powers or competences originally vested in the relevant
international institution. Surprisingly, for instance, whereas development
banks were conceived to support infrastructure construction projects,
their scope of powers now covers the fight against corruption and money
laundering. The same applies to the OECD, a global leader in interna-
tional criminal justice policy regarding the fight against corruption, money
laundering, and tax fraud. This extended scope of competences can be
explained on the basis of the so-called doctrine of implied powers, but is
also based on the emergence of cross-cutting matters within international
policy. For example, concerns about good governance connects their
activities (inter alia, the provision of financing or economic aid) with cor-
ruption. Financial market integrity, human rights, or the need to generate
legal certainty for foreign investments are usually good reasons to expand
their agendas.
nited Nations and the Security Council

U
We must focus on the United Nations. Obviously, the only organization
with a general or sweeping scope in the world can include in its agenda
criminal justice issues, mainly within the framework of the UN Economic
and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime (UNODC).14 Both bodies have worked hard, although their
work has long gone unnoticed. They cover many areas of traditional, and
unrelated to globalization, criminal justice policy. There was a turning
point in the late 1980s. Three major UN conventions on criminal matters
(corruption, organized crime, and drugs) were adopted, and they brought
about a revolution, not as much regarding prosecution but more so in the
area of judicial cooperation.15
However, the most remarkable United Nations development involves
the Security Council steadily taking on more power at the turn of the cen-
tury.16 First, the Rome Statute empowered the Security Council in con-
nection with the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Council can
enable the Court to rule on facts that occurred in non-signatory countries.
Within the context of the aforesaid evolution of international law, this
development can be traced to the progressive Grotian tradition stemming
from the end of World War II. The assumption of powers by the Security
Council is directly linked to Nuremberg’s legacy. This is why we focus on
the extended scope of powers resulting from the reinterpretation of “the
maintenance of international peace and security” under Article 39 of the
UN Charter, which has allowed the Security Council to encompass within
this notion areas such as terrorism or piracy (Macke 2010; Therani 2014;
Meyer 2012, p. 165 et seq; Mitsilegas 2016, p. 204; Talmon 2005a, b).
26 A. NIETO MARTÍN
This is probably the point where the extension of the concept of security
discussed above has been most important.
The Security Council resolutions on terrorism have altered the sources
of international law (Therani 2014, p. 60). Some of these resolutions have
had similar effects to those of EU Directives, actually requiring states to
define and provide for new crimes (i.e., to criminalize new conducts) in
their criminal legislation.17 Other resolutions have gone even farther,
establishing a true supranational ius puniendi, such as the blacklisting sys-
tem in terrorism discussed in detail below. Self-evidently, this ius puniendi
or right to punish in the hands of the Security Council has been severely
criticized. On the one hand, the drafting and rulemaking procedure is not
as transparent as in international conventions; indeed, resolutions circum-
vent the paramount instrument for international cooperation, that is, the
treaties. On the other, resolutions are adopted by the few states that make
up the Security Council (Krisch 2010, p. 154 et seq).
Effectiveness Strategy
Aside from the distinct Security Council’s ius puniendi, the new strategy
implemented by international institutions, aimed at ensuring the effective-
ness of the relevant provisions, has allowed for their increased regulatory
capacity. Internal rules or norms under the Kelsenian model are effective
because they (i) are enacted in accordance with the established procedure,
and (ii) abide by each legal order’s rules of recognition. The only interna-
tional rules provided in classic models or approaches, such as that of Article
1 of the Spanish Civil Code, are international conventions. As noted
above, these conventions fit this effectiveness framework perfectly: through
ratification, publication, and transposition, if appropriate.
Currently, achieving the effectiveness of international law is much more
complex; it depends on three main factors.18 First, the organizational
capacity to seek an internal and external support network, not only during
the rulemaking and approval procedures, but also throughout the entire
life of the provision (including the transposition and enforcement
thereof).19 States that intend to turn a given rule into an international
provision, that is, wishing to “internationalize” a legal provision, through
an international organization, must also seek this support network.
Second, technical legitimacy must be achieved through groups of experts,
task forces, subcommittees, or transgovernmental networks.20 Third, there
are costs and burdens for not complying with international provisions.
Assessing international organizations’ degree of compliance is an essential
strategy to ensure the effectiveness of international law provisions. The

“assessment-reputational cost” binomial (which, as discussed above,
applies regarding transgovernmental network guidelines or recommenda-
tions) is also applicable with regard to international conventions. Costs are
not only reputational but also economic, and often unbearable by states.
Non-compliance with a given convention or treaty can entail that the state
in breach be left out of international funding schemes (Kingsbury 1998,
p. 599 et seq). To some extent, these three factors allow to use soft and
hard law instruments interchangeably. Hard law and soft law provisions
are often interchangeable or alternative, but they can also support or
underpin each other and be complementary. The same is true of transgov-
ernmental network standards and rules stemming from self-regulation or
corporate standardization.
Generally, international organizations that wish to launch a new regula-
tion must create a favorable environment by holding meetings and gather-
ing experts, as well as by publishing works that put forward the topic. It is
important that other international institutions join the project, which
must also include transgovernmental networks and private stakeholders.
The point is to “manufacture consensus” so that a given international
provision seems totally necessary and nobody questions its timing.
Consensus manufacturing is aptly exemplified by the not implemented
international notion of identity theft (Nieto Martin, 2010). It all began
with the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL). Soon after these first steps, the General Assembly adopted
a Resolution, and a group of experts was created to draft a report. In paral-
lel, there were many reports, projects, and recommendations from other
international organizations, including the OECD, the IMF, the EU, or
the Council of Europe. Expectedly, the private actors concerned (software
companies or banks, inter alia) rushed to attend the meetings and quickly
started to issue standards. Even in the absence of draft legislation, the
documents issued by these organizations amounted to a new kind of
scholarly or scientific literature, including cross references and repeated
arguments that gave rise to an official discourse and many figures and sta-
tistics on the harm or profit resulting from unlawful activities or miscon-
duct (this is what Slaughter calls “governance by information,” 2014,
p. 177 et seq).
As shown above, the passing of regulation requires joint action, which
can be traced back to the notion of relational sovereignty. Organizations
and states put a similar effort into the creation and advancement of the
28 A. NIETO MARTÍN
network. This is a similar phenomenon to that of transgovernmental net-

works. When talking about specific countries, there is no doubt that the
United States has played the most prominent role.21 Corruption in inter-
national trade provides the best-known example of US leadership. It all
began with an express decision of the Clinton administration. The United
States picked an international organization, the OECD, because Clinton
administration officials thought it would be easier to adopt a convention
within this international institution. In contrast with the United Nations,
where political tensions between developed and developing countries
make it harder to carry out certain initiatives, the OECD is not as politi-
cized, since (i) it is made up of the most economically developed coun-
tries, and (ii) its internal rulemaking procedures are extremely flexible;
they have little in common with the UN’s quasi-parliamentary system
(Meyer 2012, p. 497).
International corruption aptly exemplifies how states enjoy room for
maneuver to submit their proposals to the friendliest institutions (forum
shopping). When no institution seems to be friendly, states can rely on
bilateral instruments, such as the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(ACTA). The adoption of this agreement would have considerably
increased the punishment of intellectual and industrial property crimes.
Rulemaking procedures within international organizations provide a mini-
mum level of transparency, which nonetheless disappears altogether within
the framework of multilaterally negotiated agreements. Self-evidently, the
lesser the transparency, the greater the lobbying.
States tend to internationalize lines of criminal justice policy, there
being various reasons for their behavior. Usually they seek to expand an
internal (domestic) regulation looking out for their own interests in inter-
national trade. However, sometimes there are purely internal (domestic)
reasons, as in the so-called legislative offside or policy laundering: a well-
known phenomenon in European criminal policy. If they expect some
trouble adopting a given regulation internally, states try to get an interna-
tional institution to embrace their initiative. Once their initiative has gar-
nered international support, domestic obstacles tend to fade away (Muñoz
de Morales 2011).
Civil society can also play a major role when the international institu-
tions’ legislative machinery is set in motion. The role of certain NGOs in
anti-torture treaties or anti-personnel mine ban conventions is also note-
worthy, as is the impact of trade unions within the International Labour
Organization (ILO). Civil society did have influence on the adoption of
the Rome Statute (Lelieur 2009). The media also played a decisive role in
the area of human trafficking. Certain activists or scholars can play an
important part too. Although their role is far from that of states in terms
of initiative, their involvement can increase technical or knowledge-based
legitimacy. This is the case for experts who exert a major influence by
advising international organizations (Sieber 2009).
The private sector’s presence in these legislative or rulemaking pro-
cesses differs from civil society’s, since civil society organizations (theoreti-
cally, at least) aim to protect collective or group interests. International
corporations or some specific lobbies can have a decisive influence during
both the setting in motion and transposition of international pieces of
legislation. For instance, in the field of money laundering, the banking
sector played a central part when launching the regulations. Regarding
corruption, companies have been essential in the enforcement of anti-
corruption rules through regulatory compliance and by accepting a crimi-
nal policy based on private enforcement.
It could use a pentagon to illustrate these networked stakeholders that
interrelate with each other to produce international provisions within
international institutions or organizations. Not all the actors have equal
weight, and the “balance of power” changes depending on the regulation
at hand. Sometimes, certain actors hardly play a role. For example, private
stakeholders and civil society are barely involved in criminal justice policy-
making concerning drugs, organized crime, or terrorism. Lately, interna-
tional organizations have been playing an increasingly prominent role in
various fields, having their own legislative agenda. Going back to the pen-
tagon metaphor, note that the efforts and influence can never be depicted
using a regular polygon, that is, not all the sides and angles—the driving
forces of internationalization—are equal. In fact, the sides of the pentagon
could even be unaligned; they could not come together and push in oppo-
site directions instead. Think of a country’s specific interests pushing that
particular country to oppose a given international provision (Sieber 2009,
p. 504, 497).
Moreover, looking at our pentagon under the microscope, we would
see that some of the pentagon’s sides break down into smaller segments.
This is the case for the national side, where the “legislative offside” shows
the prevalence of the executive branch. Indeed, it is the executive who
kicks the ball out of the domestic parliamentary or legislative arena to the
international ground. All this kicking impairs the legislature’s ability to get
involved and play a role; it is in offside. This also occurs within
30 A. NIETO MARTÍN
international organizations. We assumed that harmonization mostly

results from international conventions and hard law provisions, but human
rights courts, that is, the international organizations’ “judiciary,” also play
a major part.
The pentagon metaphor can help to examine the presence of the differ-
ent driving forces over the life of the rule or provision. The effectiveness
of international organizations’ provisions depends on having a support
network not only at an initial stage, but also throughout the life of the
provision at its transposition and enforcement stages. Some sides of the
pentagon can be short when the regulation is proposed, but they might
grow during implementation and enforcement.
The passing of international provisions and their subsequent effective-

ness not only requires a network of actors, but also a regulatory support
network. Soft law provisions and transgovernmental network guidelines
and recommendations can be very relevant in this regard. UN conventions
followed by General Assembly or Security Council recommendations are a
good example of intra-organization regulatory support.22 Recommen
dations embody the consensus and can be helpful to interpret conven-
tions.23 Instead of recommendations or guidelines, organizations some-
times adopt model rules, another type of soft law instrument aimed at
assisting states in fulfilling their obligations.24 The OECD has another
strategy: it flanks its conventions with supporting soft law, like it did with
the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions (the Anti-Bribery Convention). Along
with this Anti-Bribery Convention, the OECD published several guide-
lines for companies as well as the highly influential Good Practice Guidance
on Internal Controls, Ethics and Compliance and a semi-official
interpretation of the said convention (Nieto Martin, 2012). Regulatory

support is not always intra-organization. Sometimes, other international
organizations or transgovernmental networks adopt supporting soft law
provisions. This symbiotic relationship allows to clarify or complete the
convention and makes it more legitimate.
It is worth noting that soft law is not always subordinate to hard law. In
fact, soft law and hard law provisions can be interchangeable and there is
communication or interoperability between them. What really matters is
not the type of provision, but the support it garners. Regarding prison law,
the Council of Europe has prioritized soft law over hard law. The Council
of Europe could have very well adopted conventions, but its set of recom-
mendations in the field has been as effective as would have been adopting
a convention (Rodríguez Yagüe 2019). There are four factors accounting
for this, which provide a practical example to explain soft law’s legitimacy
and effectiveness.
First, there is a regulatory support network including other soft law
instruments, namely UN recommendations. Second, it is worth highlight-
ing how recommendations have entered the legal order and particularly
how they have become enshrined in written positive (statutory) law, by
being adopted by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) as
interpretation standards for the convention.25 The use of soft law by courts
of justice is just one of the gateways taken by soft law provisions to enter
the legal order, but there are other gateways or access points.
Recommendations can be used to enshrine or state an international custom
or to declare that we are in the face of ius cogens or peremptory rules.26
Third, recommendations are successful due to their high technical
legitimacy. In order to fully understand the effectiveness of recommenda-
tions, it is worth referring to the role of the inter-governmental Council of
Europe Conferences of Directors of Prison and Probation Services
(CDPPS), including judges, probation officers, and so on. The conclu-
sions of the CDPPS provide the basis for subsequent recommendations.
Finally, the fourth factor is the evaluation system. The European
Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (the Committee for the Prevention of Torture
or CPT) shall assess country compliance with the recommendations.
Member states of the Council of Europe must report periodically to the
CPT. Also, the CPT may organize visits to places of detention and make
public statements, which is an instrument that entails high reputational
costs for the countries concerned.
32 A. NIETO MARTÍN
The Council of Europe increases technical legitimacy through special-

ized knowledgeable bodies, but this is not exclusive to the Council of
Europe. Other international organizations do it too, particularly the
United Nations. Yet again, as noted when discussing transgovernmental
networks, these specialized bodies are created through mitosis. As a result,
there is no debate on prospective international provisions in the Assembly,
where states are represented. Rather, debate takes place within these tech-
nical, specialized, and knowledge-based subcommittees. This mitotic
trend is particularly remarkable in the UN. Although there is already a
subcommittee specialized in criminal justice, like UNODC, the United
Nations constantly creates new specific bodies for every area: terrorism,
weapon trafficking, and so on (Álvarez 2005, p. 334).
Assessments or evaluations are performed jointly by the network of
actors and provisions. Also, the provisions’ technical legitimacy, an addi-
tional factor in the adoption and effectiveness of international regulation,
relates to both hard law and soft law. Every “new generation” treaty pro-
vides for an assessment or evaluation system, despite of the system’s desig-
nation or the evaluation methodology applied. Sometimes (regarding
corruption within the OECD framework, for instance) states must con-
duct a peer review monitoring system. Some other times, a specific com-
mittee may be created, like the Council of Europe’s Group of States
against Corruption (GRECO) or the CPT. The UN prefers the specific
committee approach, as evidenced by the United Nations Security Council
Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC). This body is tasked with assessing
how member states implement Security Council resolutions providing for
blacklists.27 These committees can be the same technical or knowledge-
based body established at the developing stage of the convention, so the
roles are interchangeable. The pre-regulatory and evaluation stages are
interconnected, as shown by how the evaluations conducted by the CPT
give rise to new recommendations (Nieto Martin 2016).
The UN has several transgovernmental or inter-governmental commit-
tees that do not quite evaluate member states, but rather monitor compli-
ance with the treaties. The conclusions of these groups or committees
often turn into recommendations. Regarding corruption, this is the case
of the Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group on the Prevention
of Corruption. As for organized crime, there is the Global Programme
against Money-Laundering, Proceeds of Crime and the Financing of
Terrorism (GPML). The GPML is tasked with drafting model legislation
to assist countries in fulfilling their obligations with regard to money laun-

dering and terrorism financing.
As noted above, getting a bad report or a negative evaluation gives rise
to costs in terms of relational sovereignty, and it also affects the states’ reli-
ability and ability to be part of networks. However, there can be even
greater costs. For example, as a result of negative evaluations, states can be
denied development loans or judicial cooperation can be hindered, as is
the case under European standards. There might also be implications for
commercial transactions and trade relations. A negative anti-corruption
evaluation forces companies that want to do business in the country to
conduct a more thorough due diligence process.28
2.2 Supranational Sanctions
One of the most salient features of international organizations’ ius puni-
endi is the creation of sanctions systems falling within the scope of criminal
law (on the concept of sanction Donini and Foffani 2018; Maugeri 2018).
Under these systems, sanctions are directly applicable to individuals and
companies. Usually, states only get involved at the enforcement stage, in
order to enforce the sanctions or penalties imposed by the relevant institu-
tion. These administrative sanctions or penalties are a paramount example
of global administrative law, aimed at setting out a common guarantee
framework for these sanctions proceedings (Mitsilegas 2016, p. 236 et seq;
Krisch 2010, p. 153 et seq).
U administrative Sanctions
E
The EU has the most notorious supranational punitive law system. Since
its inception, this system allowed to impose administrative sanctions or
penalties. Everyone knows about the European Commission (EC) fines
for infringements of competition law. However, over the last few years,
these punitive powers have increased and they now cover the financial
market. As a result of the 2008 economic crisis, the EU centralized its
monitoring and punitive powers regarding both the banking sector and
the financial market. This “supranationalization” is closely tied to the
weakening of national supervisory authorities vis-à-vis a global financial
system. The monitoring powers of national central banks, a pivotal ele-
ment of Westphalian sovereignty, are also in a critical moment. In fact, the
substantive provisions on which this supervision is founded do not arise
from any national legislature. Rather, they stem from a transgovernmental
34 A. NIETO MARTÍN
network: the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), whose

members are central banks and banking supervisors. The applicable regu-
latory framework is what is known as Basel III. As for financial markets, we
already discussed the importance of the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and G20’s task force: the Financial
Stability Board (Brodowski 2019; Leñero Bohorquez 2014; Leñero
Bohórquez and Darnaculleta i Gardella 2015).
Within the banking system, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)
empowers the European Central Bank (ECB) to oversee all significant
banks in the participating countries through direct supervision. The ECB
has the power to impose sanctions, but also to conduct on-site inspec-
tions, interview bank executives, impose production orders, and so on.29
Securities market regulation is also subject to a centralized structure,
although with its own specificities. The European Securities and Markets
Authority (ESMA), the EU’s securities markets regulator, also has sanc-
tioning powers over credit rating agencies. However, the authority to
punish market abuse remains with national securities agencies and, ulti-
mately, within the scope of domestic criminal law. Regardless, ESMA’s
role is tremendously significant. The Market Abuse Regulation (MAR)
clearly suggests that ESMA retains the ability to oversee the sanctioning
powers of national agencies.30
EU administrative punitive law (or, better said, the set of EU’s sanc-
tions regimes) is not a completely homogeneous package, and it could
have some shortcomings in terms of safeguards or guarantees. For instance,
it does not totally fulfill the nemo tenetur se ipsum accusare principle, since
companies under investigation are threatened with sanctions if they do not
produce documents that can sometimes be self-incriminating (Blumenberg
and Nieto Martín 2010). The new administrative sanctions imposed by
the ECB (classified as “administrative penalties” by Art. 18(1) of the
Single Supervisory Mechanism Regulation) have consolidated new due
process rights. For instance, the investigating bodies and the sanctioning
or decision-making bodies must now be different. However, it is also wor-
rying that rights of defense seem under-regulated. Shockingly, the well-
established acquis in terms of rights of defense within competition law has
not been embraced by the EU regulations governing new sanctions. A
distinct feature of EU punitive law is that it chooses not to be applicable
to natural persons, although in the banking sector the ECB can request
national competent authorities to impose sanctions on natural persons
(Allegrezza and Voordeckeers 2015; Allegrezza 2020).
The EU powers or competences and their specific status within interna-

tional institutions are a different issue altogether. Since its inception, the
EU has been empowered to adopt legal provisions and decisions with a
direct impact on citizens. This is precisely what makes it different from the
remaining international organizations. It is also the reason why the emer-
gence of a supranational sanctions regime in the hands of the UN Security
Council in such a specifically criminal area like terrorism has stirred so
much debate.
UN Blacklisting
Since the 1990s, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter,
that is, seeking to maintain international peace and security, the UN
Security Council has been implementing the so-called targeted or smart
sanctions (an overview in Subsidiary Organs of the United Nations Security
Council, Fact Sheets, 2019). The purpose thereof was to prevent the col-
lateral damage inflicted to civilian populations as a result of economic
embargoes on certain countries whose governments were considered a
threat to security. These new sanctions include confiscations, movement
restrictions (like travel bans), and other restrictions such as being denied
access to weapons. Although there are roughly 14 sanctions regimes
affecting more than 1000 natural persons, the most prominent ones are
those targeting Islamic terrorism. Currently, there are 300 “blacklisted”
persons for having ties to Al-Qaida, Bin Laden, or Daesh.
At first, the rationale of “smart” sanctions was for them to be addressed
to state officials to exert political pressure on certain countries. This is why
the UN relied on diplomatic protection to provide the relevant safeguards
and guarantees to individuals. However, terrorism blacklists are slowly
departing from this model. By means of the so-called Taliban Resolutions
(UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1333), the Security Council
imposed sanctions on natural persons that did not qualify as state officials
for the first time. In 2001, a few days after 9/11, Resolutions 1373 (2001)
and 1390 (2002) extended the blacklisting system to people with ties to
Al-Qaida, Bin Laden, or Daesh. It is a milestone regarding the construc-
tion of a global punitive law, since persons no longer need to have links
with governments or states in order to be sanctioned; it suffices to be
linked to a terrorist organization.
Blacklisting thus became a concealed punitive law system. It departs
from a criminalized behavior, that is, having ties with terrorist groups; this
behavior leads to a decision: that the person or entity be blacklisted; also,
36 A. NIETO MARTÍN
being blacklisted triggers a set of sanctions, namely the freezing of assets,

being prevented access to any other country or the supply of weapons.
Sanctions are imposed on the motion of UN member states by administra-
tive bodies that report to the Security Council, that is, the Sanctions
Committee. Sanctions have a global scope. All states are bound by black-
listing, regardless of where the facts occurred or the party’s nationality or
place of residence.
At least when it was first created, the design of this blacklisting system
had several shortcomings in respect of the rule of law. The behavior lead-
ing to the inclusion in a blacklist was defined vaguely and there was no real
chance of defense, neither before nor after the sanction was imposed. The
party concerned had no access to any evidence produced by states to
request the party’s inclusion in a blacklist. On top of that, the most impor-
tant information for a listing request is usually secret information from
intelligence services. At its inception, the blacklisting system did not allow
for review by the decision-making body or any other. A core element of
due process like judicial review was nowhere to be found.
The UN blacklisting system suffered a serious setback as a result of the
ECtHR ruling in Kadi. The Court found that the blacklisting system was
contrary to the fundamental rights of the European Union, which had
embraced UN provisions through a regulation (Mitsilegas 2016, p. 245
et seq; Krisch 2010, p. 160 et seq; Nieto Martin 2008; Cameron 2008).
Based on this judgment, the Security Council modified its sanctions
regime in order to make it more compatible with the rule of law, thereby
improving the definition of criminal behaviors giving rise to sanctions. For
instance, Resolution 1617 tries to fulfill the principle of determination by
providing a more accurate definition of what being “associated with”
Al-Qaida really means. The UN Security Council had already established
certain limits in order for persons with frozen assets to have a minimum
amount of funds to fulfill their vital needs.
Additionally, the “procedural” framework was enhanced. On the one
hand, the ombudsperson was created (although not for all smart or tar-
geted sanctions). The UN also provided for the “Focal Point for
De-listing,” an independent authority under the Sanctions Committee,
thus reporting to the Security Council, who receives petitioners’ de-listing
requests. However, its recommendations are still non-binding. Ultimately,
only the Sanctions Committee has listing and de-listing powers. The
Sanctions Committee must briefly state the reasons for blacklisting a given
person or entity. In spite of these efforts, the process lacks in transparency
and is far from fully respecting the rights of defense and abiding by due
process standards. If states consider that their decision must be kept con-
fidential for security reasons, there is no way to verify or otherwise assess
the information they used. The Security Council can even refuse to dis-
close which countries are proposing names for a blacklist.
The legal nature of these sanctions is open for debate. Some might
argue that their purposes are more deterrence-oriented than punitive.
These targeted sanctions involve preventive confiscation of property if
there is a risk that it be used to finance terrorist organizations. In terms of
guarantees or safeguards, there is no doubt that these sanctions fall within
the scope of criminal law in its broadest sense. Therefore, the competent
bodies must comply with the rights of defense, and there must be a high
standard of proof leaving no room for reasonable doubt as to the person’s
or entity’s connection with terrorist groups. On that basis, as in the non-
conviction based confiscation, we could admit a presumption that these
assets are dangerous insofar as they could be used for terrorism financing
(Therani 2014; Sieber and Vogel 2015).
orld Bank Sanctions Systems

W
The World Bank’s blacklisting system can be even more shocking than that
of the UN Security Council. The World Bank’s sanctions system falls
within one of last decade’s most significant approaches to criminal justice
policy: criminal liability of legal entities and compliance in areas like cor-
ruption (Selvaggi 2015; Manacorda and Grasso 2018).
The World Bank’s sanctioning powers stem from the Articles of
Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD). Article I(i) provides that one of the IBRD’s goals is to facilitate
the investment of capital for productive purposes. The IBRD provides
finance (loans), managed by the World Bank (WB), to governments and
publicly owned companies for infrastructure projects. These funds come
from member state contributions as well as from bonds issued by the WB
as public debt that are traded in the capital market. Accordingly, the WB
is subject to the principle of sound administration regarding the funds
made available thereto (Art. 5(III), Section 5(b)). According to the WB,
this fiduciary duty (i) provides the foundations of the sanctions system,
which is ultimately aimed at ensuring that the funds contributed by donors
be used efficiently and fairly, and (ii) accounts for the sanctions system’s
scope of application: any companies participating in World Bank-funded
projects.
38 A. NIETO MARTÍN
The World Bank’s sanctions system was set in motion in 2001. Since
then, it has been improving and embracing criminal justice safeguards and
guarantees (Boisson de Chazournes and Fromageau 2012; Leroy and
Fariello 2012). The so-called Thornburgh Report was essential in this sys-
tem’s development. The Thornburgh Report results from a key event: the
2012 agreement between all development banks to establish a mutual rec-
ognition system under which the sanction imposed by a bank is immedi-
ately acknowledged by the rest (“cheat and steal from one, get punished
by all”). Along the lines of the EU’s rationale, mutual recognition called
for common and uniform guarantees, thereby harmonizing the various
development banks’ sanctions systems. Mutual recognition further
increases the general deterrence purpose of sanctions, since it entails being
excluded from all ongoing public works and projects worldwide financed
by development banks.
In a nutshell, the World Bank’s system is as follows. There are four
standardized definitions of what qualifies as a “sanctionable practice,” bet-
ter determined and more accurately defined than the Security Council’s
blacklist criminalization of conducts, namely: corrupt practice, fraudulent
practice, collusive practice, and coercive practice. The WB’s quasi-judicial
administrative process for sanctioning companies and individuals has one
salient feature: the division between (i) the authority who conducts the
investigation and, if it finds sufficient evidence, launches a sanctions case
by submitting a Statement of Accusations and Evidence (SAE)—the
Bank’s Integrity Vice Presidency—and (ii) the authority that actually
imposes the sanctions. The Evaluation and Suspension Officers act like
some sort of first instance court, confirming or dismissing the charges and
sanctions case submitted by the Integrity Vice Presidency. If the sanc-
tioned party (designated as the “Respondent”) wants to challenge the
decision, it may bring an appeal before the Sanctions Board, made up of
three Bank staff and four non-Bank staff members, and chaired by one of
the independent members. The firms are subject to the following sanc-
tions: (i) restitution, borderline between civil liability and confiscation; (ii)
a letter of reprimand, regarding minor misconduct, can be aimed at certi-
fying that the sanctioned party has been involved in a corruption case.
However, debarment is the most serious and famous sanction. Being
blacklisted, either permanently or temporarily, prevents companies from
participating in World Bank-financed projects.
Currently, in line with recent developments in the sanctions systems
against legal entities, the “baseline” sanction of debarment is now subject
to probation or, as the WB puts it, there is a sanction of “debarment with

conditional release.” The sanctioned party may be released (or the sanc-
tion suspended) if the party fulfills a set of conditions imposed by the WB,
usually including the improvement of the company’s compliance program.
The WB has also created an Integrity Compliance Office, tasked with
monitoring whether the improvements are effective. The Bank has also
established a Voluntary Disclosure Programme, that is, it has opened the
door to a “self-reporting” and leniency system. Prior to being investi-
gated, companies may report their own sanctionable practices to the Bank.
If a company is eligible for this program, the Bank does not sanction the
company, which shall generally be required solely to improve its compli-
ance program. For these procedures, a supervisor is also appointed.
The World Bank’s sanctions system is much more in line with the prin-
ciples of punitive law than UN’s blacklisting system. It is considerably
more transparent. It is possible to check the Bank’s website for the sanc-
tioned companies. On top of that, the sanctioning decisions are published
as some sort of case law collection. The main shortcoming in this regard is
the lack of transparency regarding the settlements between the Integrity
Vice Presidency and the companies when the sanctions proceedings get
suspended.
In fact, the main issues posed by this supranational system relate to its
connection with the state-based ius puniendi and its blatant disregard for
bribery and corruption of public servants and state officials (Soreide et al.
2015). Surprisingly, sanctions are exclusively focused on one of corrup-
tion’s main actors (companies or corporations) and the sanctions system
seems oblivious to governments and their justice systems. The World
Bank’s sanctions systems could have entailed reporting the sanctionable
practices to national authorities. Indeed, the WB discloses its investiga-
tions to national law enforcement authorities in case they want to initiate
criminal proceedings.
Nevertheless, the WB’s strategy is both reasonable and consistent with
the so-called privatization of the fight against corruption. Focusing on
legal entities entails siding with a widespread criminal justice approach.
This approach comes hand in hand with the extension of criminal liability
to legal entities, and it is particularly present in the area of anti-corruption:
taking advantage of companies’ self-regulation for the prevention and
detection of crimes committed within those companies (Nieto
Martin 2013).
40 A. NIETO MARTÍN
The WB must remain politically neutral, and holding companies liable

prevents collateral damage. Self-evidently, the most straightforward way to
avoid corruption would be excluding from the aid regime (i) any states
whose officials have been involved in corruption-related cases; or (ii) any
countries that fail to implement the necessary reforms in order to establish
an acceptable judicial system. This approach, however, could inflict col-
lateral damage to civilian populations just like the UN embargoes.
In sum, there is a shared concern underlying these two supranational
sanctions systems that has triggered an unexpected shift in international
law: holding states liable altogether or sanctioning them, as was standard
practice under the Westphalian paradigm, causes unwanted damage to
civilian populations, so it is better to move on to a sanctions system target-
ing private actors engaging in misconduct.
Notes
1. In FATF’s own words (http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/): “The Financial
Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body established in
1989 by the Ministers of its Member juris- dictions. The objectives of the
FATF are to set standards and promote effective implementation of legal,
regulatory, and operational measures for combating money laundering,
terrorism financing, and other related threats to the integrity of the inter-
national financial system. The FATF is therefore a ‘policy-making body’
which works to generate the necessary political will to bring about national
legislative and regulatory reforms in these areas.”
2. In 2017, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published the
guidelines entitled Sound management of risks related to money laundering
and financing of terrorism, which are fully in line with FATF recommenda-
tions (https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d405.pdf). The Wolfsberg Group
has the Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering Principles for Private Banking
(2012), accompanied by a self-assessment questionnaire published on a
yearly basis to be filled out by the compliance departments of the Group’s
members.
3. Within the field of traditional cooperation law, there is no doubt that coop-
eration between police and judicial authorities raised concerns. However,
one of the advantages of informal networks is that they allow for direct
contact. To further elaborate on the boundaries between police and judi-
cial authorities in the classic cooperation approach, and the implications
thereof see Zurkinden N. 2013, p. 105 et seq.
4. Cf. Zagaris B. (2015, p. 283 et seq) Nevertheless, there is no question that
the United States Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) truly leads the
Another random document with
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There I first met Mr. Frederick E. Sickels, the inventor of the trip
cut-off; that immortal man who conceived the idea of tripping the
valve mechanism of a steam-engine at any point in its opening
movement, thus releasing the valve and permitting it to be suddenly
closed. He had come over to exhibit his steam steering gear, which
is now used throughout the world. It was astonishing how little
attention it attracted. He had it connected and showed it in operation.
While he turned the wheel precisely as the steersman did, the steam
did all the work of moving the rudder and holding it in any position.
Nobody seemed to take the slightest interest in it. I attributed this
largely to his mistake in showing a very rough affair, the very thing
which he thought would add to its effect. He had an apparatus that
had been used on a coasting steamer which was captured by the
Confederates and employed by them as a blockade-runner, and
afterwards captured by our cruisers, taken into New York and
condemned. He bought this gear out of it at auction and sent it to the
exhibition just as it was. He believed that the more evidences of
neglect and rough usage it showed, the greater admiration its perfect
action would inspire. He learned better. Polished iron and brass and
mahogany would have led people to believe that he himself thought
it was worth showing properly.
The picture gallery in the second story of the main building of this
exhibition was really wonderful. Its most prominent feature was a
collection of paintings representing the progress of British art from
the days of Hogarth. All Europe was represented. I was told that the
entire wall surface was seven eighths of a mile long.
We also had a gallery of American art, consisting of a number of
remarkable large photographs of the Yosemite Valley, California, and
one painting. Mr. J. F. Cropsey, an American landscape artist of
considerable celebrity at home, had formed a scheme for
establishing himself in London. He took with him a number of his
works. His pièce de résistance was “Autumn on the Hudson,” which
was greatly admired and for which he was offered a large price, but
he preferred to show it in London. He had sent it to the National
Gallery, and, to his consternation, it was refused, the committee
declaring that there were no such colors in nature. It also offended
the English taste, by which our autumnal tints are regarded as “very
gaudy,” so he hung it in Mr. Holmes’ office at the exhibition. He and I
had each a lot to learn about the way things look to our cousins.
CHAPTER VIII
Sale of Governors. Visit from Mr. Allen. Operation of the Engine Sold to Easton,
Amos & Sons. Manufacture of the Indicator. Application on Locomotives.
he governor seemed to please every one. In

anticipation of a demand for them, I had shipped a
number to London, which met a ready sale. The most
appreciative persons as a class were the linen-
manufacturers of Belfast. One of them early took a
license to sell them there. The first one I sold in
London was to my friends Easton, Amos & Sons. As soon as they
saw it in operation it struck them as the very thing they needed. In
connection with their engineering works they carried on the
manufacture of lead pipe by hydraulic pressure. The engine which
drove a large section of their machine tools also drove the hydraulic
pumps for this manufacture. It was a very trying service. The
resistance was very heavy and came on and off the engine instantly.
The action of the common governor was not prompt enough to
control it, and they had to employ a man handling a disk valve with a
very short motion. He had to keep his eye fixed on a column of
mercury. When this rose he must open the valve, and when it
dropped he must shut it. It had been found that this was a poor
reliance for the instantaneous action required. They got a governor
from me at once. I received a message from them the next day. The
governor would not answer at all; would I come down and see about
it? I happened first to meet an old man, foreman of the turners.
“What is the matter?” “Matter! The governor won’t work, that’s what’s
the matter.” I was rather an impulsive young man and replied, “It will
work, or I’ll eat it.” He sharply responded, “If it does work I’ll eat it,
and I haven’t a tooth in my head.” Foolish old man! he was more
rash than I. I saw at a glance that the governor went through but half
its action. There was evidently some resistance in the valve, a
common fly-throttle. After they shut down at night I had the valve
pulled out, and found that the chamber was larger than the pipe and
that the wings of the valve were long and their points caught on the
ends of the pipe. The wings of the valve were soon shortened and
rebedded in the chamber, and when started again the governor
controlled the motion of the engine perfectly, to the great gratification
of everybody, and the delight of the boys, who had heard the old
man promise to eat it. The valve had been put in for my governor to
work, and the fitters had put up a job on me. The old man was not in
the secret. So the laugh was on him instead of on me.
Directly after this triumph I received an order from Mr. John Penn
for a governor to regulate the engine driving his marine-engine works
at Greenwich. This was the first and only engine I ever saw of the
grasshopper class, quite common, I learned, in earlier days. The
superintendent of his works afterwards told me, laughingly, that he
had a large account against me for loss of time; that he had become
so fascinated with the governor action that he had stood watching it
sometimes for twenty minutes. He knew by the position of the
governor every large tool that was running and what it was doing, if
light or heavy work, and especially every time a planer was reversed.
One day a gentleman asked me if I thought the governor could
regulate his engine. He was a manufacturer of the metal thread used
in making gold lace. A bar of silver, 2 inches in diameter and 2 or 3
feet long, was covered with three or four thicknesses of dentists’ gold
leaf, and then drawn down to exceedingly fine threads, and the gold
surface was never broken. I have often wondered how thick that gold
covering finally was. The heavy drawing of the cold bars required a
great deal of power, and when they shot out the engine would run
away and the fine threads would be broken. No governor nor heavy
fly-wheel would help the matter, and they had to do their heavy
drawing in the night. My governor maintained the motion absolutely.
Not only were the finest threads not broken by the sudden changes
in the heavy drawing, but the occasional breakages that they had
been accustomed to nearly ceased.
In this connection I cannot refrain from telling a good story on Mr.
Ramsbottom and Mr. Webb, although the incident happened the next
year. I received an order for a governor for the engine driving the
shops of the London & Northwestern Railway at Crewe. Soon after
its shipment there came a line from the office there that the governor
was behaving badly and I would have to go and see about it. I found
that the engine consisted of a pair of locomotive cylinders set upright
on the floor and directly connected above, the cranks at right angles
with each other, to the line-shaft, a plan which I have always
admired, as a capital way of avoiding belts or gearing. They were
running at 120 revolutions per minute, and were connected in the
middle of the shaft, which was about 400 feet long. The governor
was flying up and down quite wildly. I had never seen such an action
before, and was at a loss what to make of it. I saw no fly-wheel, but it
did not seem that its absence could account for this irregularity.
Indeed, with coupled engines running at this speed, and only trifling
changes of load, and a governor requiring no time to act, a fly-wheel
seemed superfluous. Pretty soon it came out that the want of fly-
wheel could not cause the trouble, for they had two. Where were
they? There was one at each end of the shaft, close to the end walls
of the building, where wall boxes afforded excellent supports. Fly-
wheels at the ends of 2-inch shafts and 200 feet from the engine! I
fairly shouted with laughter, told them to take off their fly-wheels, and
came home. The fly-wheels were taken off, and there was no further
trouble. Well, what should railway engineers, absorbed in locomotive
designs and everything pertaining to railroading, be expected to
know about fly-wheel inertia and shaft torsion?
About midsummer I had the pleasant surprise of a visit from Mr.
Allen, whose gratification at the show I had made was unbounded.
We saw much of the exhibition together. Perhaps the most
interesting exhibits in the machinery department, to us both, were
the working models shown by the marine-engine builders. There
were a large number of these, generally not much over one foot in
any dimension, but complete to every bolt and nut, superbly finished,
and shown in motion. They had evidently been made regardless of
cost. In the progress of engineering science, everything represented
by these elegant toys has long since vanished. We were much
impressed by a cylinder casting, 120 inches in diameter, shown by
Mr. Penn, one of a pair made for a horizontal engine for a British
warship, to work steam at 25 pounds pressure. Everything there
shown pertaining to steam engineering, except our own engine, was
about to disappear forever. How long before that also shall follow?
Soon after Mr. Allen’s return he sent me a drawing of his four-
opening equilibrium valve with adjustable pressure-plate. I realized
the great value of this most original invention, now so well known,
but its adoption required a rescheming of the valve-gear, and that
had to be postponed for some years.
In setting up the engine in the works of Easton, Amos & Sons, I
had a curious example of English pertinacity. Old Mr. Amos said to
me, “Porter, where is your pump?” “The engine has no pump.” “No
pump!” “No, sir; we consider a feed-pump as an adjunct to the boiler,
never put it on the engine, and generally employ independent feed-
pumps which can be adjusted to the proper speed. Besides, a feed-
pump could not be run satisfactorily at the speed of this engine.” He
heard me through, and then, with a look of utter disgust, exclaimed:
“If a man should sell me a musket and tell me it had no stock, lock,
or barrel, these were all extra, I should think it just about as
sensible.” Nothing would do but that this engine must have a pump. I
had intended to cut off the projecting end of the shaft, but Mr. Amos
ordered this to be left, and had an eccentric fitted on it, and set a
vertical pump on the floor to be driven by this eccentric, at 225
double strokes per minute. Also the feed-pipe had to be over 50 feet
long, with three elbows.
Of course, as the boys say, we had a circus. A mechanic had a
daily job, mornings, when the engine was not running, securing that
pump on its foundation. The trembling and pounding in the feed-pipe
were fearful. I suggested an air-chamber. They sent word to me that
they had put on an air-chamber, but it did no good. I went to look at
it, and found a very small air-chamber in the middle of the length of
the pipe, where it seemed to me more likely to do harm. At my
suggestion they got one of suitable size and attached it to the pump
outlet, when the noise and trembling mostly disappeared, as well as
the disposition of the pump to break loose. It did fairly well after that,
and they made it answer, although I do not suppose it ever one
quarter filled.
Mr. Amos was the consulting engineer of the Royal Agricultural
Society. At this exhibition American reapers made an invasion of
England. Mr. Amos set his face against them, and in reply to my
question, what objection he made to them, he said, “We prefer to get
our grain into the barn, instead of strewing it over the field.” And yet
this man, the engineering head of this firm, was the only man in
England, so far as I knew, advanced enough to take up the Wolff
system of compounding, and who had bought my engine to run at
225 revolutions per minute, which it continued to do with complete
satisfaction until some years later, when these works were removed
to a location on the Thames, east of London, when I lost sight of
them.
During the latter part of the exhibition I learned that the McNaught
and the Hopkinson indicators were in common use in England; that
one or both of these were to be found in the engine-rooms of most
mills and manufacturing establishments, and that if the Richards
indicator were properly put on the market there would probably be
some demand for it, although at existing engine speeds the
indicators in use appeared to be satisfactory. A special field for its
employment would doubtless be found, however, in indicating
locomotives. I felt sufficiently encouraged to set about the task of
standardizing the indicator, and during the winter of 1862-3 made a
contract with the firm of Elliott Brothers, the well-known
manufacturers of philosophical apparatus and engineering and
drawing instruments, to manufacture them according to my plans.
This was my first attempt to organize the manufacture of an
instrument of any kind, and I set about it under a deep sense of
responsibility for the production of an indicator that should command
the confidence of engineers in its invariable truth. I found that the
opportunity I had enjoyed for studying the subject had been most
important. The daily use of the indicator which I had brought to the
exhibition was an invaluable preparation for this work.
I decided, first, to increase the multiplication of the piston motion,
by means of the lever, from three times to four times, thus reducing
by one quarter the movement of the piston required to give the same
vertical movement to the pencil, and, second, to increase the
cylinder area from one quarter to one half of a square inch. The latter
was necessary in order to afford sufficient room for springs of proper
size, and correct reliable strength in their connections.
The first problem that presented itself was how to produce
cylinders of the exact diameter required, .7979 of an inch, and to
make an error in this dimension impossible. This problem I solved in
the following manner: At my request Elliott Brothers obtained from
the Whitworth Company a hardened steel mandrel about 20 inches
in length, ground parallel to this exact size and certified by them.
Brass tubes of slightly larger size and carefully cleaned were drawn
down on this mandrel. These when pressed off presented a perfect
surface and needed only to be sawed up in lengths of about 2 inches
for each cylinder. Through the whole history of the manufacture that
removed all trouble or concern on this account.
The pistons were made as light as possible, and were turned to a
gauge that permitted them to leak a little. The windage was not
sufficient to affect their accuracy; a thickness of silk paper on one
side would hold the pistons tight; but they had a frictionless action,
and the cover of the spring case having two holes opening to the
atmosphere, there could be no pressure above the piston except that
of the atmosphere.
SPRING-TESTING INSTRUMENT.
USED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF THE RICHARDS INDICATOR.
Designed by Charles T. Porter.
LONGITUDINAL SECTION.
SCALE, HALF SIZE.
END VIEW
The second problem was to insure the accuracy of the springs.

This was more serious than the first one. The brass heads of the
springs were provided with three wings instead of two, which mine
had. The spring, after being coiled and tempered, was brazed into
the grooves in the first two wings, and the third wing was hammered
firmly to it. This prevented the stress on the spring from reaching the
brazed joints, and these heads never worked loose. One head was
made fast at once; the other was left free to be screwed backward or
forward until the proper length of the spring was found. To insure
freedom from friction, I determined to adjust and test the springs in
the open air, quite apart from the instrument. For this purpose I had a
stout cast-iron plate made, with a bracket cast on it, in which the
slides were held in a vertical groove, and bolted this plate on the
bench, where it was carefully leveled. The surface of the plate had
been planed, a small hole drilled through it at the proper point, and a
corresponding hole was bored through the bench. A seating for the
scales also was planed in the bracket, normal to the surface of the
block. The spring to be tested, in its heads as above described, was
set on the block, and a rod which was a sliding fit in the hole was put
up through the bench, block, and spring. This rod had a head at the
lower end, and was threaded at the upper end. Under the bench a
sealed weight, equal to one half the extreme pressure on the square
inch to be indicated by the spring, was placed on the rod.
Between the spring and the scale I employed a lever, representing
that used in the indicator, but differing from it in two respects. It was
of twice its length, for greater convenience of observation, and it was
a lever of the first order, so that the weight acting downward should
represent the steam pressure in the indicator acting upward.
The weight was carried by a steel nut screwed on the end of the
rod and resting on the upper head of the spring to be tested. This nut
carried above it a hardened stirrup, with a sharp inner edge, which
intersected the axis of the rod, produced. A delicate steel lever was
pivoted to turn about a point at one fifth of the distance from the axis
of the rod to the farther side of the scale seat. The upper edge of this
lever was a straight line intersecting the axis of its trunnions. The
short arm of the lever passed through the stirrup, in which it slid as
the spring was compressed, while the long arm swung upward in
front of the scale. The latter was graduated on its farther side, and
the reading was taken at the point of intersection of the upper edge
of the lever with this edge of the scale.
The free head on the spring was turned until the reading showed it
to be a trifle too strong. It was then secured, and afterwards brought
to the exact strength required by running it rapidly in a lathe and
rubbing its surface over its entire length with fine emery cloth. This
reduced the strength of each coil equally. This was a delicate
operation, requiring great care to reduce the strength enough and
not too much. A great many springs had to be made, several being
generally required, often a full set of ten, with each indicator. This
testing apparatus was convenient and reliable, and the workmen
became very expert in its use.
The spring when in use was always exposed to steam of
atmospheric pressure. At this temperature of 212° we found by
careful experiment that all the springs were weakened equally,
namely, one pound in forty pounds. So the springs were made to
show, when cold, 39 pounds instead of 40 pounds, and in this ratio
for all strengths.
This system of manufacture and testing was examined in
operation by every engineer who ordered an indicator, the shop on
St. Martin’s Lane being very convenient. They generally required that
the indicator should be tested by the mercurial column. The Elliotts,
being large makers of barometers, had plenty of pure mercury, so
this requirement was readily complied with, and the springs were
invariably found to be absolutely correct. We never used the
mercurial column in manufacturing, but were glad to apply it for the
satisfaction of customers.
I employed the following test for friction. The indicator when
finished was set on a firm bracket in the shop. The spring was
pressed down as far as it could be, and then allowed to return to its
position of rest very slowly, the motion at the end becoming almost
insensible. Then a fine line was drawn with a sharp-pointed brass
wire on metallic paper placed on the drum. The spring was then
pulled up as far as possible and allowed to return to its position of
rest in the same careful manner. The point must then absolutely
retrace this line. No indicator was allowed to go out without satisfying
this test. The workmanship was so excellent that they always did so
as a matter of course.
Mr. Henry R. Worthington once told me, long after, that on the test
of an installation of his pump in Philadelphia, after he had indicated it
at both steam and water ends, the examining board asked him to
permit them to make a test with their own indicator, which they did
the next day. They brought another indicator, of Elliott’s make like his
own, but the number showed it to have been made some years later.
“Would you believe it,” said he, “the diagrams were every one of
them absolutely identical with my own!” I replied that the system of
manufacture was such that this could not have been otherwise.
Plan of Spring-testing Instrument.
I wish to acknowledge my obligation to Elliott Brothers for their

cordial co-operation, their excellent system of manufacture, and the
intelligent skill of their workmen, by one of whom the swiveling
connection of the levers with the piston-rod was devised.
The indicator was improved in other important respects, but I here
confine myself to the above, which most directly affected its
accuracy. This soon became established in the public confidence.
During my stay in England, about five years longer, the sale of
indicators averaged some three hundred a year, with but little
variation. The Elliotts then told me that they considered the market to
have been about supplied, and looked for a considerable falling off in
the demand, and had already reduced their orders for material. Eight
years after my return I ordered from them two indicators for use in
indicating engines exhibited at our Centennial Exhibition at
Philadelphia. The indicators had from the first been numbered in the
order of their manufacture. These came numbered over 10,000.
The indicators were put on the market in the spring of 1863, and I
sought opportunity to apply them on locomotives. In this I had the
efficient co-operation of Zerah Colburn, then editor of The Engineer.
The first application of them was on a locomotive of the London and
Southwestern Railway, and our trips, two in number, were from
London to Southampton and return. The revelations made by the
indicator were far from agreeable to Mr. Beattie, the chief engineer of
the line. Mr. Beattie had filled his boilers with tubes ⁷⁄₈ of an inch in
diameter. The diagrams showed the pressure of blast necessary to
draw the gases through these tubes to average about ten pounds
above the atmosphere, the reduction of the nozzles producing this
amount of back pressure throughout the stroke. Another revelation
was equally disagreeable. The steam showed very wet. We learned
that Mr. Beattie surrounded his cylinders with a jacket. This was a
large corrugated casting in which the cylinder was inserted as a liner.
To keep the cylinder hot the exhaust was passed through this jacket.
Mr. Colburn made both of these features the subjects of editorials in
The Engineer, written in his usual trenchant style. The last one was
entitled “Mr. Beattie’s Refrigerators,” and produced a decided
sensation.
Our next trips were made on the Great Eastern Road, one from
London to Norwich and one from London to Great Yarmouth. On
these trips we were accompanied by Mr. W. H. Maw, then head
draftsman of the Great Eastern Locomotive Drawing Office, under
Mr. Sinclair, the chief engineer, and by Mr. Pendred. These
gentlemen were afterwards, respectively, the editors of Engineering
and The Engineer.
Diagrams from English Locomotives taken with Richards Indicator.
The diagrams from the Great Eastern engines were, on the whole,
the best which were taken by us. On one of these trips I was able to
get the accompanying most interesting pair of diagrams, which were
published by me in the appendix to my treatise on the Indicator. One
of them was taken at the speed of 50 revolutions per minute, and the
other at the speed of 260 revolutions per minute, running in the
same notch with wide-open throttle. The steam pressure was higher
at the rapid speed. They afford many subjects of study, and show the
perfect action of the indicator as at first turned out, at this great
speed. I learned afterwards that the almost entire freedom from
vibration at the most rapid speed was due to the gradual manner in
which the pressure fell from the beginning of the stroke. This fall of
pressure before the cut-off I fancy was caused largely by a small
steam-pipe.
Our last diagrams were taken from a locomotive on the London
and Northwestern, by the same four operators as on the Great
Eastern trips. We ran from London to Manchester. On our return trip
Mr. Webb joined us at Crewe, and accompanied us to London. I am
sorry to say that in one respect the revelation of the indicator here
was almost inconceivably bad. Mr. Ramsbottom did not protect his
cylinders, but painted these and the steam-chests black, and in this
condition sent them rushing through the moist air of England. If the
steam cooled by “Mr. Beattie’s refrigerators” was wet, that in Mr.
Ramsbottom’s cylinders seemed to be all water. A jet of hot water
was always sent up from each of the holes in the cover of the spring
case to a height of between one and two feet. We had much trouble
to protect ourselves from it, and it nearly always drenched the
diagram. I never saw this phenomenon before or since. I have seen
the steam blow from the indicator cocks white with water when the
indicators were removed. But I never saw water spurt through the
spring-case cover, except in this instance. Truly, we said to each
other, Mr. Ramsbottom has abundant use for his trough and scoop to
keep water in his tanks. It was on this trip that I observed how
enormously the motion of a black surface increased the power of the
surrounding air to abstract heat from it. While we were running at
speed I many times laid my hand on the smoke-box door without
experiencing any sensation of warmth. I wondered at this, for I knew
that a torrent of fire issuing from the tubes was impinging against the
opposite surface of this quarter-inch iron plate. In approaching
Rugby Junction I observed that the speed had not slackened very
much when I could not touch this door, and when we stopped,
although the draft had mostly ceased, I could not come near it for the
heat. At the full velocity with which the air blew against this door the
capacity of the air to absorb heat evidently exceeded the conducting
power of the metal.
W. H. Maw
CHAPTER IX
Designs of Horizontal Engine Beds. Engine Details. Presentation of the Indicator at

the Newcastle Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of
Science.
uch of my time was now devoted to working out

improvements in the design of the engine, some of
which had occurred to me during the exhibition, and
which I was anxious to have completed before
bringing the engine to the notice of builders. The first
point which claimed my attention was the bed. The
horizontal engine bed had already passed through three stages of
development. The old form, in common use in the United States,
was a long and narrow box, open at top and bottom. The sides and
ends of this box were all alike, and their section resembled the letter
H laid on its side, thus ⌶. This on some accounts was a very
convenient form. The surface of the bed was planed, and everything
was easily lined from this surface. The cylinder was made with two
flanges on each side, which rested on the opposite surfaces of the
bed, permitting the cylinder to sink between them as desired. The
pillow-block rested on one or the other of these surfaces, according
as the engine was to be right or left hand. The guide-bars were
bolted on these opposite surfaces.
The first break in this monotony was made by Mr. Corliss, and was
remarkable for the number and the radical nature of its new ideas.
The cylinder was provided with broad feet near its ends, and was
planted on the foundation. The pillow-block was provided with similar
supports and was also secured to the foundation. The bed, so called,
was a tie-beam uniting the cylinder and pillow-block, and not
otherwise supported. It was of T section. The horizontal member was
behind the center line of the engine, and was made very deep in the
middle of its length to prevent deflection. The vertical member
extended equally above and below the former and carried the
guides, which were top and bottom V-grooves, between which the
cross-head ran and the connecting-rod vibrated. The cross-head
was provided with shoes fitting these V’s, and was adjustable
vertically between them. The connection with the cylinders was
made by a circular head supported by curved brackets. This
connection was firm on one side only. The bed was reversible to suit
right- or left-hand engines by merely turning it over.
In the bed for my engine, Mr. Richards struck out another design,
which avoided some objections to the Corliss bed. The guides were
supported from the foundation, and the connection with the cylinder
was more substantial, but the reversible feature had to be sacrificed.
Mr. Richards’ bed, shown in the illustration facing page 70, was
designed in the box form, the superior rigidity of which had been
established by Mr. Whitworth. It was a box closed at the top and
flanged internally at the bottom. It rested on the foundation through
its entire length. The main pillow-block was formed in the bed, as
were also the lower guide-bars. The cylinder was secured on its
surface in the old-fashioned way.
Engine Bed Designed by Mr. Porter. Engraving made from an Old Print.
It occurred to me that the best features of the Corliss and the
Richards designs might be combined to advantage. This idea I
worked out in the bed shown in the accompanying illustration, taken
from a circular issued by Ormerod, Grierson & Co., of Manchester,
and which was made from a photograph of an engine sent by that
firm to the Oporto International Exhibition in 1865. It will be seen that
this is Mr. Richards’ bed with the cylinder bolted to the end after Mr.
Corliss’ plan. The great strength of the bed enabled the supports
under the cylinder to be dispensed with. This left the cylinder free to
expand by heat, and made it convenient to attach the steam or
exhaust connections or both underneath. This bed has remained
without change, except in one important respect. I made the first
cylinders with a bracket which was keyed up from the base of the
bed. In the illustration a corner of this bracket appears. At the Paris
Exposition in 1867 Mr. Beyer, of the firm of Beyer & Peacock, the
Manchester locomotive-builders, when he saw it, told me I did not
need that bracket. I then left it off, but found the cylinder to wink a
little on every stroke when the heavy piston was at the back end. To
find the weak place, I tried the following experiment on an engine
built for the India Mills in Manchester. I filed two notches in the edges
of the brackets on the bed, opposite each other and about ten inches
forward of the head, and fitted a piece of wire between them. This
wire buckled very decidedly on every revolution of the engine, when
the piston was at the back end of its stroke. I then united these
brackets into a hood, and lengthened the connection with the surface
of the bed, as it is now made. This affords a perfect support for the
cylinder. Experiments tried at the Cambria Iron Works on a cylinder
of 40-inch bore and 48-inch stroke, with a piston weighing 3600
pounds and running at 100 double strokes per minute, showed the
back end of the cylinder standing absolutely motionless. This
experiment will be described hereafter.

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Global Criminal Law: Postnational

Criminal Justice In The Twenty-First

Criminal Law for Criminologists: Principles and Theory

The Law of Disclosure: A Perennial Problem in Criminal

Chess Explained The c3 Sicilian 1st Edition Sam Collins

Starting Out The c3 Sicilian 1st Edition John Emms

Terrorism Criminal Law and Politics The Decline of the

The Failure of the International Criminal Court in

Violence Against Children in the Criminal Justice

Criminal Justice Research in an Era of Mass Mobility

Adán Nieto Martín

Global Criminal Law

ISBN 978-3-030-84830-9 ISBN 978-3-030-84831-6 (eBook)

© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022

1 On the Way to Stateless Criminal Law 1

2 The Ius Puniendi of International Organizations 17

3 Private Ius Puniendi 49

1.4 Standardization Bodies and Other Non-State

4 Territories, Sovereigns, and Ius Puniendi 69

5 Legitimacy and Safeguards 85

On the Way to Stateless Criminal Law

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

organizations are mere instruments to serve their projects and interests.

2 The Forces of Change

rulers or from papal or imperial power (potestas legibus solutus). Westphalian

not involved in any treaty negotiations. National legislatures simply ratify

prioritizes dialogue over coercion, by exchanging ideas in international

international law (Raustiala 2002; Slaughter 2014a, b). Compliance in

Report of the Commission on Global Governance, Oxford, 1995. (http://

8. In this struggle, it is worth highlighting the works of the great interna-

administrative fines, the blacklisting system, anti-money laundering

Kelsen H., The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States as a Basis of International

Sieber U., Alternative Systems of Crime Control. National, Transnational, and

The Ius Puniendi of International

1 The Criminal Policy

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 17

transgovernmental networks are involved in the implementation of many

been so successful partly because UN Security Council Resolution 1617

irregularities in securities markets. The Objectives and Principles of Security

Transgovernmental networks also have a central role in the fight against

2 International Organizations

treaties or conventions. Disregarding international criminal policy in mat-

2.1 The Increase of Regulatory Capacity

 nited Nations and the Security Council

strategy to ensure the effectiveness of international law provisions. The

network. This is a similar phenomenon to that of transgovernmental net-

international organizations. We assumed that harmonization mostly

The passing of international provisions and their subsequent effective-

interpretation of the said convention (Nieto Martin, 2012). Regulatory

The Council of Europe increases technical legitimacy through special-

to assist countries in fulfilling their obligations with regard to money laun-

network: the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), whose

The EU powers or competences and their specific status within interna-

being blacklisted triggers a set of sanctions, namely the freezing of assets,

 orld Bank Sanctions Systems

to probation or, as the WB puts it, there is a sanction of “debarment with

The WB must remain politically neutral, and holding companies liable

he governor seemed to please every one. In

The second problem was to insure the accuracy of the springs.

I wish to acknowledge my obligation to Elliott Brothers for their

Designs of Horizontal Engine Beds. Engine Details. Presentation of the Indicator at

uch of my time was now devoted to working out

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1 On the Way to Stateless Criminal Law 1

2 The Ius Puniendi of International Organizations 17

3 Private Ius Puniendi 49

1.4 Standardization Bodies and Other Non-State

4 Territories, Sovereigns, and Ius Puniendi 69

5 Legitimacy and Safeguards 85

nited Nations and the Security Council

orld Bank Sanctions Systems