Calma, Metaphysics As A Way of Life

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rium
brill.com/viv
Metaphysics as a Way of Life:

Heymericus de Campo on Universals and the
“Inner Man”
Dragos Calma
University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland
dragos.calma@ucd.ie
Abstract
Pierre Hadot famously claimed that, between Antiquity and German Idealism,
Western philosophy had lost its practical role of guiding the life of the practitioner.
Scholars who challenged this view focused on two medieval models. This article argues
that the overlooked work Colliget principiorum iuris naturalis, divini et humani philo-
sophice doctrinalium by Heymericus de Campo postulates a third model. On the basis
of St. Paul’s teaching about the “inner man,” Heymericus reconsiders the Aristotelian
doctrines of abstraction and of being as such in relation to the Neoplatonic model of
intellectual progression and interior conversion. In a realist conceptual framework,
he holds that only metaphysics reflects the true nature of the human being inasmuch
as it presupposes a way of life that assumes both the interaction with and withdrawal
from the sensible world. However, Heymericus’ theory is neither limited to nor condi-
tioned by Christian principles, but by Peripatetic philosophy (understood in the broad,
Albertinian tradition).
Keywords
universals – Albert the Great – Aristotle – Neoplatonism – the Book of Causes
…
Dedicated to Zenon Kałuża
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1 Introduction
Heymericus de Campo (c.1395-1460) probably wrote the Colliget principiorum

iuris naturalis, divini et humani philosophice doctrinalium in 1434, at Basel, dur-
ing Heymericus’ participation at the Council. It presents Albert the Great as a
pinnacle of the Aristotelian tradition, itself the noblest school in the history of
philosophy. This article unfolds and examines some of the major topics of the
Colliget principiorum, arguing that, in an elaborate discussion on universals,
Heymericus describes an original position on metaphysics as a way of life. The
Colliget’s theoretically dense and axiomatic prose requires a close reading fol-
lowing the order of the text. Heymericus’ thinking and writing progress like a
spiral, with numerous and constant (often tacit) references to previous chap-
ters or sections.
2 Yet Again on Pierre Hadot’s Narrative
Pierre Hadot’s seminal reconstruction of the history of rationality presents

philosophy between Late Antiquity and German Idealism as solely abstract
and the handmaiden of theology.1 According to Hadot, scholastic philosophy
meant dialectical exercises and subordination to Christian theology. As a con-
sequence, during the Middle Ages, Western philosophy had lost its most es-
sential role of changing or guiding the life of the practitioner. Echoes of this
narrative still reverberate despite the solid objections put forth by historians
of philosophy.2 The majority of the numerous studies challenging Hadot’s view
1 P. Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life. Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault (Oxford
1995), 107-108 and 270-271. See also P. Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy? (Cambridge, MA,
2002).
2 J.M. Cooper, Pursuits of Wisdom: Six Ways of Life in Ancient Philosophy from Socrates to Plotinus
(Princeton, 2012); Philosophy as a Way of Life: Ancients and Moderns – Essays in Honor of Pierre
Hadot, ed. M. Chase, S.R.L. Clark, and M. McGhee (Hoboken, NJ, 2013). Discussing Hadot’s
narrative directly or indirectly: J.A. Aertsen, “Mittelalterliche Philosophie: ein unmögliches
Project? Zur Wende des Philosophieverständnisses im 13. Jahrhundert,” in Was ist Philosophie
im Mittelalter? Qu’est-ce que la philosophie au moyen âge? What is Philosophy in the Middle
Ages?, ed. J.A. Aertsen and A. Speer (Berlin, 1998), 12-28; L. Bianchi “La felicità intellettuale
come professione nella Parigi del Duecento,” Rivista di filosofia 78 (1987), 181-199; L. Bianchi,
“Filosofi, uomini e bruti. Note per la storia di un’antropologia ‘averroista’,” Rinascimento 32
(1992), 185-201; L. Bianchi, “Felicità terrena e beatitudine ultraterrena. Boezio di Dacia e
l’articolo 157 censurato da Tempier,” in Chemins de la pensée médiévale. Études offertes à Zénon
Kaluza, ed. P.J.J.M. Bakker with E. Faye and C. Grellard (Turnhout, 2002), 335-350; L. Bianchi,
“Felicità intellettuale, ‘ascetismo’ e ‘arabismo’. Nota sul De summon bono di Boezio di Dacia,” in
Le felicità nel Medioevo, ed. M. Bettetini and F.D. Paparella (Turnhout, 2005), 13-34; O. Boulnois,
“Le chiasme: La philosophie selon les théologiens et la théologie selon les artiens, de 1267
Vivarium 58 (2020) 305-334

Metaphysics as a Way of Life 307
focus on two models, each summarized by well-crafted expressions: on the

one hand, so-called “intellectual felicity” and, on the other, so-called “Christian
philosophy.”
“Intellectual felicity” evokes and extends the concept of felicità mentale in-
troduced by Maria Corti in her book on Dante and Cavalcanti.3 In the past
decades, it was adopted, criticized, rejected, and revivified again. It is used
to summarize the Scholastic appropriation of Averroes’ interpretation of
Aristotle’s account in the Nicomachean Ethics concerning philosophy as the
supreme good and source of happiness. According to some key figures of the
thirteenth and fourteenth century (such as Boethius of Dacia and Siger of
Brabant), philosophy was an autonomous discipline, with its own set of rules,
methods, and objects of knowledge, and the study of philosophy represented
the highest form of living. It claims that those among us who do not practice
philosophy should be counted among the beasts because they do not live ac-
cording their true intellectual nature. Some scholars call this radical view “ethi-
cal Averroism.”4
The expression “Christian philosophy,” forged by Augustine, has been either
accepted or criticized by scholars since Émile Bréhier and Étienne Gilson pop-
ularized it in the first half of the twentieth century. Those accepting it claim
that during the Middle Ages there was no rigorous distinction between theo-
logians and philosophers.5 The philosophical dimension of canonical figures,
à 1300,” in Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?, ed. Aertsen and Speer, 595-607; A. de Libera,
Albert le Grand et la philosophie (Paris 1990), 215-266; A. de Libera, “Averroïsme éthique et phi-
losophie mystique. De la félicité intellectuelle à la vie bienheureuse,” in Filosofia e Teologia
nel Trecento. Studi in ricordo di Eugenio Randi, ed. L. Bianchi (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1994), 33-
56; A. de Libera, “Philosophie et censure. Remarques sur la crise universitaire de 1270-77,” in
Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?, ed. Aertsen and Speer, 71-89; J. Domanski, La philosophie,
théorie ou manière de vivre? Les controversies de l’Antiquité à la Renaissance (Fribourg – Paris,
1996); G. Fioravanti, “Desiderio di sapere e vita filosofica nelle Questioni sulla Metafisica del
ms. 1386 Universitätsbibliothek Leipzig,” in Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevi, ed. B. Mojsisch
and O. Pluta (Amsterdam, 1991), 271-283; G. Fioravanti, “La felicità intellettuale: storiografia
e precisazioni,” in Le Felicità nel medioevo, ed. Bettetini and Paparella, 1-12; R. Imbach, “La
philosophie comme exercice spirituel,” Critique 41, no. 454 (March 1985), 275-283; R. Imbach,
“Autonomie des philosophischen Denkens? Zur historischen Bedigtheit der mittelalterlichen
Philosophie,” in Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?, ed. Aertsen and Speer, 125-137; A. Speer,
“Philosophie als Lebensform? Zum Verhältnis von Philosophie und Weisheit im Mittelalter,”
in Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 62.1 (2000), 3-25; C. Steel, “Medieval Philosophy: An Impossible
Project? Thomas Aquinas and the ‘Averroistic’ Ideal of Happiness,” in Was ist Philosophie im
Mittelalter?, ed. Aertsen and Speer, 152-174.
3 M. Corti, La felicità mentale. Nuove prospettive per Cavalcanti e Dante (Turin, 1983).
4 Libera, “Averroisme éthique”; Libera, Penser au Moyen Âge (Paris, 1991), 223-224.
5 E. Bréhier, “Y a-t-il une philosophie chrétienne?,” Révue de métaphysique et de morale 38.2
(1931), 133-162; É. Gilson, Christianisme et philosophie (Paris, 1936); É. Gilson, L’Ésprit de la
philosophie médiévale (Paris, 19692); É. Gilson, Introduction à la philosophie chrétienne (Paris,
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308 Calma
such as Albert the Great, Bonaventure, Aquinas and Meister Eckhart, cannot
be denied. Some of them, especially Aquinas, elaborated from Christian teach-
ing a theory of philosophy as praxis enabling it to become an organizing prin-
ciple for the human life.6
Heymericus de Campo describes a different model, which he presents no-
tably, but not only, in his Colliget principiorum iuris naturalis, divini et humani
philosophice doctrinalium, preserved in a single manuscript and now partially
edited.7 It has to be said at the outset that the relationship between philosophy
and human life is not the main goal of the Colliget, which focuses on the search
for a metaphysical theory that would explain the principles of divine, natural,
and human law. Thus, the reader will not find a list of norms or a detailed pro-
gram about how to acquire or live a nobler life. Nevertheless, his project does
have a normative dimension, based around the Pauline teaching on the ‘inner
man.’ In turn, Heymericus’ metaphysics of the inner man assumes a specific
model of intellectual progress and acquisition of the only true philosophical
principles, that is, those of the Peripatetic tradition broadly conceived, i.e., in-
cluding Neoplatonic authors and following Albert the Great.
Heymericus’ view on metaphysics as expression of a way of life and a
modality of reaching the inner man recalls a rich tradition attested both in
Byzantium and the Latin West.8 Both Aristotle’s authentic and falsely attributed
texts (such as the Book of Causes) offered Heymericus numerous occasions
20072); O. Boulnois, “Philosophia christiana. Une étape dans l’histoire de la rationalité

théologique,” in Augustin philosophe et prédicateur. Hommage à Goulven Madec. Actes du col-
loque international organisé à Paris les 8 et 9 septembre 2011, ed I. Bochet (Turnhout, 2012),
349-369; T. Kobusch, Christliche Philosophie. Die Entdeckung der Subjektivität (Darmstadt,
2006); R. Imbach, “La philosophie médiévale,” Quodlibeta. Ausgewählte Artikel / Articles choi-
sis, ed. Idem and F. Chevenal (Freiburg, 1996), 17-34; R. Imbach, “Paul Vignaux et la philoso-
phie chrétienne,” in Paul Vignaux, citoyen et philosophe (1904-1987), Paul Vignaux, citoyen et
philosophe (1904-1987), ed. J.-R. Armogathe and O. Boulnois (Turnhout, 2013), 129-140.
6 R.G. Colton, “Pursuing Wisdom: Thomistic Thoughts on Philosophy as a Way of Life,” Logos:
A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture 18.4 (2015), 32-58; W.J. Hankey, “Philosophy as
Way of Life for Christians? Iamblichan and Porphyrian Reflections on Religion, Virtue, and
Philosophy in Thomas Aquinas,” Laval théologique et philosophique 59.2 (2003), 193-224.
7 For a description of the manuscript Bernkastel-Kues, Bibliothek des St. Nikolaus-Hospitals,
Cod. Cusanus 106 and the partial edition, see D. Calma and R. Imbach, “Heymeric de Campo,
auteur d’un traité de métaphysique. Étude et édition partielle du Colliget principiorum,”
Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age 80 (2013), 277-412 [= Colliget prin-
cipiorum]. I always cite this edition, unless otherwise indicated.
8 Cf. Augustinus, Epistula 238, c. 12 (ed. A. Goldbacher, CSEL 59, Vienna – Leipzig, 1911, 541-
542); Kobusch, Christliche Philosophie, 138-151. See also O. Boulnois, Métaphysiques rebelles.
Genèse et structures d’une science au Moyen Âge (Paris, 2013), 35-62; W. Beierwaltes, “Das Eine
als Norm des Lebens. Zum metaphysichen Grund neuplatonischer Lebensform,” in Idem,
Procliana. Spätantikes Denken und seine Spuren (Frankfurt a.M., 2007), 25-60.
Vivarium 58 (2020) 305-334

to strengthen these links. Indeed, in the Metaphysics (XII, c. 7: 1072b22-30),

Aristotle stresses that the unmoved mover’s constant, essential, and unique ac-
tivity is self-reflexive; it is the perfect form of life, that we ourselves are equally
capable of living, yet only sporadically. We reach this activity through abstrac-
tion, unlike the unmoved mover who accomplishes it by reason of the identity
between its essence and its object of intellection. Self-knowledge produces
supreme felicity, the noblest and the highest activity, undertaken by the di-
vine intellect, which is the highest part of our soul (Nicomachean Ethics X, c. 7:
1177a 12-20; On the Soul I, c. 4: 408b 29 and III, c. 7: 431b 17).9 In the Eudemian
Ethics (VIII, c. 2: 1248a 24-29), Aristotle argues that god is in the human soul
inasmuch as he is everywhere in the universe. The divine elements in us are
science or knowledge and the intellect. Heymericus’ distinctive contribution
to these traditions consists in bridging the Christian and Neoplatonic theo-
ries of conversion to the inner self with Aristotelian/Peripatetic epistemology
(the theory of abstraction) and metaphysics (the study of the being as such).
Heymericus describes an ascent that is at once intellectual and spiritual. Long
and laborious, this progression is nevertheless accessible to everyone, and ul-
timately Heymericus’ message is beyond doubt: we are all called to become
metaphysicians.
3 Universals and the History of Philosophy
Unlike some of his contemporaries,10 Heymericus does not seem to be ac-

quainted with nor interested in the truthfulness of his description of the
ancient schools of philosophy. He has a philosophical, not doxographical, un-
derstanding of the history of philosophy as the history of universals. From this
point of view, the Stoics and Epicureans described by Heymericus have little, if
anything, in common with the Stoics and Epicureans analysed by Pierre Hadot.
For Heymericus, the modality of a philosopher’s interaction with the world can
be discerned from their conception about the origin of sensible things. The way
9 Numerous fifteenth-century commentaries on the De anima, notably in Central and

Eastern European universities, discuss this topic of the divine in our soul. Cf. Z. Kuksewicz,
“Le prolongement des polémiques entre les albertistes et les thomistes vu à travers le
commentaire du De anima de Jean de Glogow,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 44
(1962), 151-171.
10 For example, Heymericus wrote the Colliget principiorum three years after the publication
of Valla’s De voluptate (in Pavia in 1431), which he revised three times before the final ver-
sion entitled De vero falsoque bono (between 1444 and 1449). In this text, Valla contrasted
the Stoics and Epicureans with historical accuracy, and openly defended Epicurus.

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of life of these ancient philosophers is reflected in their doctrine on universals,

and only one school is in accordance with the true nature of the world and of
human beings: the Peripatetics. According to Heymericus, philosophical ideas
may be corrected if the intellect is guided by a strong will through a laborious
progression from science to science and daily exercises of detachment from
the world of sensible objects.11 The purpose of both metaphysics and theology
is the contemplation of the divine within the self.12 The intellection of truth
within the self opens the possibility of knowledge beyond the (immediate)
self. This is precisely the meaning of the Augustinian expression in interiore
homine habitat veritas – which, in reality, combines two clauses from two dif-
ferent sentences from St. Paul’s letter to the Ephesians (Eph. 3:16-17).13
In the first chapters of the Colliget, Heymericus discusses a well-known
scholastic adage stating that the principles of being and knowing are the
same (eadem sunt principia essendi et cognoscendi). There are three key philo-
sophical positions on the principles of being, all of them already analysed by
three different schools or sects (sectae) from Antiquity: Peripatetics, Stoics,
Epicureans.14 The appeal to the Greek schools of philosophy, although not
uncommon in the fifteenth century, as Zénon Kaluza showed,15 seemed for
Heymericus the most adequate solution to situate contemporary debates in the
history of thought. At the same time, it is a singular attempt to situate his own
thought in a philosophical genealogy originating in Aristotle and constituting
11 The idea that philosophy requires a voluntary and continuous progression is shared by
numerous medieval authors. See, for example, Albertus Magnus (who cites Averroes,
Alfarabi and Avempace), De anima III, tr. 3, c. 11 (ed. C. Stroick, Opera omnia, ed. Colon.
VII/1, Münster, 1968, 221.73-86).
12 Heymericus de Campo, Colliget principiorum, tr. I, d. 4, c. 1 (ed. Calma – Imbach, 351.7-11):
“Cui concordat theologorum sententia, que dicit, quod theologia consistens in contem-
platione Dei et visibilium divinorum est affectiva scientia.” For scientia affectiva see also
Albertus Magnus, Super I Sententiarum, d. 1, a. 3 (ed. M. Burger, Opera omnia, ed. Colon.
XXIX/1, Münster, 2015, 14.22-40, 56-60).
13 Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 65-66.
14 Heymericus de Campo, Colliget principiorum, tr. I, d. 1. c. 1 (ed. Calma – Imbach, 291.1-
292.11).
15 Z. Kaluza, “Le De universali reali, de Jean de Maisonneuve et les epicuri litterales,” Frei
burger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 33 (1986), 469-516; Z. Kaluza, Les querelles
doctrinales à Paris. Nominalistes et réalistes aux confins du XIVe et du XVe siècles (Bergamo,
1988), 16-20; D. Calma, “Réalisme et tradition philosophique chez Heymeric de Campo
(†1460),” in Regards sur les traditions philosophiques (XIIe-XVIe siècles), ed. D. Calma and
Z. Kaluza (Leuven, 2017), 249-297. See also M. Meliadò, “La teologia delle scuole filoso-
fiche antiche: Eimerico di Campo e la dossografia del Centheologicon,” in L’antichità clas-
sica nel pensiero medievale, ed. A. Palazzo (Porto – Turnhout, 2011), 385-412.
Vivarium 58 (2020) 305-334

a “Peripatetic” tradition in fundamental harmony with and even incorporating

Neoplatonic authors.
The Stoics described by Heymericus hold that formal ideas emanate from
the giver of forms (dator formarum) as models (exemplaria) that are im-
pressed in singulars like the image of the seal flows ( fluit) and is impressed
into the wax.16 Elsewhere, this theory of universals as seals subsisting auto
nomously outside God’s mind (extra mentem divinam) is attributed to Plato.17
Epicureans, on the other hand, maintain that the principles of being are solely
material, most probably an allusion to their atomist theories. As such, they are
philosophers of the sensible world, interested only in pleasures, incapable of
lifting their eyes away from singulars.18 Heymericus is interested to explain the
views of Stoics (or Plato) on universals, and pays little attention to the so-called
Epicureans. Indeed, it is not clear from his description whether Epicureans
accept universals post rem. One can imagine a negative answer, insofar as
Epicureans consider images (on which abstraction is built) superfluous and
worthless.19
The Stoics and the Epicureans represent extreme opposite philosophical
schools: one turned only toward separate and universal forms, the other turned
solely toward material singulars. Unlike these two sects, the Peripatetics re-
ceive a comprehensive analysis in the Colliget. Their philosophy is the middle
way (via media) between the Stoics, with their philosophy divina et superhu-
mana, and the Epicureans, with their philosophy sensualis et subhumana.
Aristotle’s philosophy is humana and perfectly corresponds to the essence
of human nature. The human being is, by its nature, located between purely
spiritual creatures (such as God and the angels) and beasts: with the former,
the human has in common the use of the intellect, with the latter, the use of
senses.20 If one desires to live fully according to one’s essence, one needs to live
according to Peripatetic philosophy, neither ignoring immaterial substances
16 Heymericus de Campo, Colliget principiorum, tr. I, d. 1, c. 1 (ed. Calma – Imbach, 291.3-

292.4); c. 5 (296.70-72).
23). Cf. also c. 2 (329.52-330.55).
18 Heymericus de Campo, Colliget principiorum, tr. I, d. 1, c. 1 (ed. Calma – Imbach, 292.5-7);
c. 5 (296.72-73).
19 Heymericus de Campo, Colliget principiorum, tr. I, d. 2, c. 8 (ed. Calma – Imbach,
321.213-214).
114). Cf. Albertus Magnus, Metaphysica IV, tr. 3, c. 9 (ed. B. Geyer, Opera omnia, ed. Colon.
XVI/1, Münster, 1960, 199.37-44); Albertus Magnus, De intellectu et intelligibili II, c. 2 (ed.
A. Borgnet, Opera omnia IX, Paris, 1890, 493A).

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nor disregarding the sensible world. It is not merely one intellectual choice
among others, but rather the only way to fulfil what is proper to human na-
ture. The Peripatetic view on the principle of beings, both material and formal
(partim formalia, partim materialia) corresponds to the nature of things (con-
formant nature rei).21
Heymericus’ remarks in the opening chapters give an existentialist dimen-
sion to the classic Wegestreit, anticipating his core argument on metaphysics.
However, the Colliget does not have the characteristic features of his other
polemical works, such as the Tractatus problematicus (c.1423).22 Indeed, there
are not enough elements that would allow us to affirm with certainty that
Heymericus always refers to Nominalists when talking about Epicureans, or
to extreme Realists (rather than Scotists) when talking about Stoics/Platonists.
In the Colliget, Epicureans seem to disregard universals post rem; hence, they
can hardly be assimilated to Nominalists. Moreover, Heymericus explicitly
uses for both Realists and Nominalists the sobriquet Epicurei tam realium
quam nominalium in a manner that remains difficult to explain.23 Similarly, it
is not easy to see the figures of Jan Hus or Jerome of Prague under the traits of
Stoics/Platonists of the Colliget, even though this possibility cannot be totally
excluded.24
4 Three Levels of Abstraction
Heymericus cites in the second chapter of the Colliget two of the axioms that
support many realist theories (including Albert the Great’s25): “the principles
of being and knowing are the same” – which, as already mentioned, is the
21 Heymericus de Campo, Colliget principiorum, tr. I, d. 1, c. 1 (ed. Calma – Imbach, 292.5-11).

22 The most solid arguments about the chronology of the Tractatus problematicus are given
by P. Rutten, “Verantwoording van de editie”: https://sites.google.com/site/tractatus
problematicus/editions/about-editions, consulted on 05.04.2020. See also P. Rutten,
“Contra occanicam discoliam modernorum: The So-Called De universali reali and the
Dissemination of Albertist Polemics against via moderna,” Bulletin de philosophie
médiévale 45 (2003), 131-166, at 160. He also provides a partial edition of some chapters
at: https://sites.google.com/site/tractatusproblematicus/editions/about-editions (= ed.
Rutten).
321.209-214).
24 Cf. Calma, “Réalisme et tradition philosophique,” p. 281.
25 Albert the Great uses this sentence in various texts, but for the purpose of the comparison
with Heymericus, see notably Albertus Magnus, Metaphysica III, tr. 2, c. 4 (ed. Geyer, 119-
120), where he discusses universals and explicitly mentions Epicureans and Stoics.
Vivarium 58 (2020) 305-334

very axiom opening the treatise, and “the universal is grasped while things are
being understood, the singular while they are being sensed.”26
Universals exist in the light of God’s intellect and are communicated (com-
municabiles) to or instantiated in singulars before and independently of our
process of abstraction.27 Heymericus explains that the singular needs to be
freed, liberated from its individuality (ab individuatione absolvitur) before be-
coming intelligible.28 The singular is de-singularized by abstraction. As such,
concepts are neither innate nor produced by our intellect independently from
external reality, but received within us according to the mode of being of the
recipient, i.e. according to the mode of being of the intellect.29 Abstraction is
the immaterial and universal likeness (similitudo) of the particular object at
the level of concepts.30
According to Heymericus, there are three stages of abstraction.31 In the first
stage (= universale post rem 1 or UPR1), the intellect goes out from itself and
extends to what the senses put at its disposal. Hence, it grasps the intelligi-
ble form with its accidents, such as the intelligible form of stones with their
colours.32 In the second stage of abstraction (= UPR2), the intellect operates
on the intelligible form of the first stage of abstraction. It is now denuded from
the previous accidents (e.g. colours), but to a certain extent it is limited in its
quidditative content, inasmuch as it still preserves quantifiable features.33
In the third and ultimate stage of abstraction (= UPR3), the same intellect
(idem intellectus) turns from the second stage of abstraction (deposited in the
26 Heymericus de Campo, Colliget principiorum, tr. I, d. 1, c. 2 (ed. Calma – Imbach, 292.15-16);

c. 4 (295.62-69). Cf. Albertus Magnus, De intellectu et intelligibili I, tr. 2, c. 1 (ed. Borgnet,
490A).
40). Elsewhere, Heymericus describes the divine operation as influere communicabiliter
(Colliget principiorum, tr. I, d. 3, c. 5 [336.183]) and equally speaks about it as communi-
cabilis fontana (c. 1 [329.36]; tr. I, pars 2, d. 2, c. 11 [389.372, 380]). In the De intellectu et
intelligibili I, tr. 2, c. 2 (ed. Borgnet, 493B), Albert seems to hold that communicabilitas is
a feature provided to the universal by the human intellect after abstraction (i.e. universal
post rem). Yet in the Metaphysics V, tr. 6, c. 5 (ed. Geyer, 285.87-92), Albert presents, with-
out criticizing it, an opinion (quidam) according to which the universal is communicated
to multiple objects (i.e. universale in re) before the process of abstraction (i.e. universale
post rem).
27). Cf. Albertus Magnus, De intellectu et intelligbili I, tr. 2, c. 1 (ed. Borgnet, 490A) (nuda-
tum ab individuantibus).
30 Heymericus de Campo, Colliget principiorum, tr. I, d. 1, c. 2 (ed. Calma – Imbach, 293.18);
c. 7 (298.129); c. 8 (299.146); d. 3, c. 15 (349.515), etc.

314 Calma
memory) toward the intelligible species, which represents nothing but the
naked quiddity (nuda quiditas) of the substantial truth of the thing. It is more
abstract than the imaginable quantity and the sensible quality of the intel-
ligible nature of stone. By accomplishing this third movement, the intellect
converts entirely in and toward itself, completely departing from the senses
and the imagination.34
Heymericus claims that the universal in each of the three stages of abstrac-
tion in the human intellect matches, in reverse order, the universal in its three
stages of procession from God’s intellect to the singular. He argues, on the basis
of the fourth proposition of the Book of Causes,35 that the first created being,
also called ens inquantum ens, is an intelligible being. This first created being
is the light of God’s intellect through which universals are instantiated, and
universals ante rem are the rays (radii) of this being, and as such they penetrate
all layers of reality. Universals are the quiddities of particular objects, images or
similitudes of the divine uncreated essence.36

88): “… secundum quod est nuda quiditas sue veritatis substantialis, tam quantitatem
ymaginabilem quam etiam qualitatem sensibilem natura et causalitate eo modo, quo
substantia precedit accidens, prevenientem; quod fit per aversionem sui luminis intel-
ligibilis a sensu et ymaginatione, et per conversionem seu collationem eiusdem in se ipso
et ad se ipsum …” Cf. Albertus Magnus, Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus, c. 4 (ed.
P. Simon, Opera omnia, ed. Colon. XXXVII/1, Münster, 1972, 202.78): “… oportet quod re-
tracta ab omnibus exterioribus infigat oculum mentis in se …”
35 One may find remote echoes here of Albert’s interpretation of the fourth proposition
of De causis. Albertus Magnus, De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa II, tr. 1,
cc. 17-18 (ed. W. Fauser, Opera omnia, ed. Colon. XVII/2, Münster, 1993, 80-83). See also
P. Porro, “The University of Paris in the Thirteenth Century: Proclus and the Liber de cau-
sis,” in Interpreting Proclus. From Antiquity to the Renaissance, ed. S. Gersh (Cambridge,
2014), 264-299.
36 Cf. Heymericus de Campo, Colliget principiorum, tr. I, d. 3, c. 1 (ed. Calma – Imbach, 327.5-
328.19); pars 2, d. 1, c. 11 (389.360-380); tr. I, d. 3, c. 1 (329.40-45). See also Colliget prin-
cipiorum, tr. III, d. 4, c. 9 (Bernkastel-Kues, Bibliothek des St. Nikolaus-Hospitals, Cod.
Cusanus 106, f. 226r): “… de tertia, scilicet creatione formali, intelligitur illud auctoris
Libri causarum: Prima rerum creatarum est esse et ante ipsum non est creatum aliud,
que vocatur a philosophis ‘creatio secundum rationem’ eo, quod est simplex generatio
ipsius esse formalis et quiditativi, quod, ut prevenit ordinem nature et causalitatis for-
malis, ipsum esse existentie terminans creationem passivam non est aliud quam purum
lumen prime cause, inquantum hoc modo loquendi Peripateticorum dicitur intellectus
seu intelligentia universaliter agens et ita universaliter causando per hoc, quod est essen-
tia pure formalis seu forma tantum immaterialiter in se subsistens, suam similitudinem
formalem et intelligibilem in esse universali ante rem effundens.” Cf. Albertus Magnus,
Metaphysica V, tr. 6, c. 6 (ed. Geyer, 286.34-38).
Vivarium 58 (2020) 305-334

On the basis of these assumptions, the adage eadem sunt principia essendi
et cognoscendi reveals its full epistemological and metaphysical depth. The re-
verse order of correspondence between universals is supported by Aristotelian
principles (Aristotle, Physics I, cc. 5-6; Posterior Analytics I, c. 2: 72a 1-5) ac-
cording to which what is posterior by abstraction is prior by nature. Using the
same example of the stone, Heymericus argues that the first stage of the uni-
versal ante rem (= UAR1) is an essential form constituted through creation in
an intelligible being that is absolute and substantial (in esse pure substantiali et
simpliciter), without any imaginable or sensible determination. It corresponds
to the object of metaphysics, the universal known in the third stage of abstrac-
tion (= UPR3). The second stage of abstraction (= UPR2) of the intelligible form
of the stone, with its quantifiable features, corresponds to the second degree
of the universal ante rem (= UAR2) in the light of God’s intellect acting by the
intermediary of the heavenly spheres. The first stage of abstraction (= UPR1)
of the intelligible form corresponds to the third degree of the universal ante
rem (= UAR3), which consists in God’s intellect acting by the intermediary of
the lowest levels of the hierarchy, such as minerals in the case of the stone,
to instantiate it as an individual pertaining to a species.37 One and the same
individual object can be known at three different levels, each more abstract
and more universal than the other, ultimately with the third level unveiling the
object’s pure quiddity.38 Each stage of intelligibility pertains to one of the three
real sciences (scientie reales): the first level of abstraction pertains to physics,
the second to mathematics, and the third to metaphysics. Heymericus’ argu-
ment comprises a tripartite structure of matching layers:
UPR1 = UAR3 ⇒ physics

UPR2 = UAR2 ⇒ mathematics
UPR3 = UAR1 ⇒ metaphysics

297.101): “… propter hoc, quod natura lapidis, sicut cuiuslibet alterius rei materialis, est
essentia formalis fluens in lumine intelligibili sui universalis agentis, scilicet Dei con-
stituentis eam per creationem in esse pure substantiali et simpliciter, sine concretione
ymaginabili vel sensibili, intelligibile [ed.: ymaginabili, sensibili vel intelligibili]; item, Dei
agentis per ministerium celestis constellationis huiusmodi lapidem universaliter figuran-
tis; item, Dei agentis per ministerium virtutis mineralis huiusmodi lapidem in certa spe-
cie nature ponentis.”
297.101-104).

316 Calma
On the basis of this correspondences between reality and knowledge, one

gathers that:
(1) Universals ante rem are not separate from particulars; they do not exist
beyond or independently of individual things. Universals ante rem exist as part
of the dynamic process of flowing that runs from God through His intellectual
light to individuals.
(2) For sciences about universals post rem to be possible and for them to cor-
respond with universals ante rem, demonstrations propter quid, fundamental
for science, must be based on universals as principles of being.
(3) Universals are equally (i) principles of being (principia essendi) inas-
much as, through instantiation (ante rem) of quiddities, they enable the com-
ing into being of particular objects, and (ii) principles of knowledge (principia
cognoscendi / sciendi) inasmuch as, through abstraction (post rem), they reflect
at the level of intelligibility the quiddity of the same particular objects.
(4) These parallels between universals ante rem / post rem must be un-
derstood together with one fundamental difference: universals post rem are
not identical to universals ante rem.39 In God’s intellectual light, universals
are principles of being, whereas in our intellect they are principles of know-
ing. Being as such is not a concept deduced by our reasoning, but rather it
is first created by God. Epistemology and metaphysics are closely linked in
Heymericus’ thinking, yet they need to be understood in the light of the doc-
trine of creation, and notably with reference to the doctrines of the Book of
Causes.40
Heymericus describes a model of metaphysical knowledge (i.e. based on
demonstrations propter quid) that encompasses apparent tensions. We live in
a world of singulars that we do not know in their contingent individuality as
such. However, our immediate interaction with the world is not at the level of
rationality, but at the level of senses. We see, touch, smell individual objects
and yet we ignore what they really are as such. In agreement with Aristotle
(Metaphysics XIII, c. 10: 1086b 33-37 and Posterior Analytics I, c. 8), there can-
not be knowledge or science about universals in re. The error of the Epicureans
described by Heymericus is now even more obvious, inasmuch they pretend
to acquire abstract knowledge about singulars. As soon as we intend to know
singulars, they are liberated from their singularity, and they become universals

306.304-308).
40 On demonstration propter quid, see Heymericus de Campo, Colliget principiorum, tr. I,
d. 1, c. 4 (ed. Calma – Imbach, 294.48-295.57). On the relationship between universals and
particulars (i.e. humanitas and homo) see d. 3, cc. (2-3 329.49-332.98). On individuation
see d. 3, c. 5 (335.155-337.209). On creation see d. 3, c. 1 (327.1-329.48).
Vivarium 58 (2020) 305-334

post rem.41 However, we cannot have any knowledge or science of universals

if, like Stoics, we neglect singulars. Although particulars remain unknown as
such, they are the prerequisite condition of knowing universals. Individuals
are known as instantiations of universals, and this knowledge presupposes an
intellectual progression.
Moreover, when we acquire knowledge about singulars, we acquire knowl-
edge about the divine being inasmuch as it is reflected immateriale et effici-
enter in the immaterial things and it is reflected vestigiliater in all material
things. Obviously, the being of God is most perfectly reflected in the universal
ante rem, which is being without any determination of genus or relation to
matter. Being as such (ens simpliciter), studied in its transcendentality, with-
out any kind of determination, common to God and to all created things, is
the proper object of metaphysics, which is also theology.42 Thus, Heymericus
uses interchangeably theologia gentilium, theologia philosophorum and meta-
physica, and eventually claims that the principles of knowledge postulated by
the Peripatetics are in conformity with the teaching of theology (i.e. Christian
theology).43
Metaphysics, however, unlike theology, equally studies everything that is
related to this being: non-being as such (non ens simpliciter), and hence the
principle of non-contradiction; the transcendentals, because as they are both
convertible with and different from being as such; all that comes before and
after this first created being, e.g. the causes, the principles, the nature, the
41 The vocabulary chosen to explain the process of abstraction is worth noticing that
alongside the classical separare and denudare, Heymericus uses absolvere, evestire, tri-
plex independentia, nuda quiditas, aversio a sensu et ymaginatione, liberare a materia. Cf.
Heymericus de Campo, Colliget principiorum, tr. I, d. 1, c. 5 (ed. Calma – Imbach, 296.76-
87); d. 3, c. 15 (349.515). On knowing the particular, see also d. 4, c. 5 (358.221-360.269).
205): “Ergo metaphisica est philosophia divina, speculans veritates universorum entium,
secundum quod in eis relucet esse divinum, quod in eo est immateriale et efficienter, ex-
emplariter atque finaliter causale, in causatis vero est vestigialiter tale. ⟨Hoc⟩ manifestum
est, quia metaphisica habet pro proprio obiecto ens inquantum ens, eo quod omne quod
est, aut est ens creatum aut increatum, id est Deus aut creatura, quibus nichil invenitur
commune quam ens simpliciter in sua transcendentia extra omne genus determinatum
consideratum.” See also c. 15 (305.290), c. 18 (308.336-344), and c. 20 (310.380-394).
180); c. 16 (306.298); d. 3, c. 1 (329.36-37); d. 4, c. 1 (351.9-11); d. 4, c. 5 (358.224-225). See
also Iohannes de Nova Domo’s opinion: “doctrina realium conformior est doctrine fidei et
sacre scripture quam doctrina aliorum.” Cited by M.J.F.M. Hoenen, “Via Antiqua and Via
Moderna in the Fifteenth Century: Doctrinal, Institutional, and Church Political Factors
in the Wegestreit,” in The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal
Theory, 1400-1700, ed. R.L. Friedman and L.O. Nielsen (Dordrecht, 2003), 9-36, at 16.

318 Calma
universal, the singular, the accident.44 Metaphysics is a complete science

(omniscia),45 encompassing all possible knowledge and, as such, it represents
the foundation of all sciences. It is a science given by God and turned toward
God, a science common to God and us, but possessed only by God (sapientia
divine possessionis, Deo et homini communis).46
Heymericus claims that all these fundamental theses can be deduced from
Aristotle’s Metaphysics and the Book of Causes, upon which one needs to train
one intellect (in theoriis veritatum metaphisicalium predoceri) if one intends
to study metaphysics. It is beyond the scope of this article to analyse them in
detail, but it is important to mention them:
Deus est principium causans esse in omnibus (= Metaphysics I, c. 2:

983a8-10).
Forma est causa essendi in rebus (= Metaphysics VII, c. 17: 1041b27-28).
Actus simpliciter precedit potentiam (= Metaphysics IX, c. 8: 1049b4-5).
Substantia ⟨simpliciter precedit⟩ accidens (= Metaphysics VII, c. 1:
1028a30-31).
Cum in ordine causarum et causatorum non sit procedere in infinitum
(= Metaphysics II, c. 2: 994b), est dare primum ens quod est actus
purus, simplex, a quo dependet celum …; in quo consistit bonum uni-
versum …; ad quod omnia ordinantur …; vivens vita contemplativa …;
ex quo speculatio est optimum et delectabilissimum; quod appelamus
Deus.47
The first cause as first being and giver of forms is a Neoplatonic thesis, shared by
Ammonius (according to Asclepius’ testimony), Syrianus and by the commen-
tary on the Parmenides attributed to Porphyry.48 In the Latin West, however,
it was popularized by the Book of Causes, notably by proposition XVII(XVIII).

302.201-216).
45 Heymericus de Campo, Colliget principiorum, tr. I, d. 1, c. 16 (ed. Calma – Imbach, 305.286)
and c. 18 (308.328-350). See also Heymericus de Campo, Alphabetum doctrinale, §26 (ed.
J. Korolec, in Heymericus de Campo Opera selecta, ed. R. Imbach and P. Ladner, Freiburg
2001, 218-219).
303.230-235). Cf. Albertus Magnus, Metaphysica I, tr. 2, c. 8 (ed. Geyer, 25-26); Aristoteles,
Metaphysica I, c. 2: 982b-983a.
301.182-302.200).
48 For a concise description of this tradition, see Boulnois, Métaphysiques rebelles, 27-29
and 69.
Vivarium 58 (2020) 305-334

The latter, together with proposition IV of the same Book of Causes, represents
the keystone of Heymericus’ thinking.
5 Metaphysics and the Ascesis from Images
Metaphysics is a science of self-reflexivity because being as such is known in

us. In new, more paradoxical terms, Heymericus argues that the more we want
to understand the world, the more we need to detach from it and turn to our-
selves. It is not in the world that we find the most perfect knowledge about
it, but in us. The return to the self presupposes a preliminary, necessary voy-
age outside the self. The intelligible species upon which the intellect builds its
knowledge are not the product of purely fictional operations, but the stock of
concepts gathered by the intellect and preserved in memory after regularly in-
teracting with the real world.49 Departing from senses means passing beyond
the senses. When the intellect converts to itself, it turns away from images and
the sensible world and accomplishes (in Olivier Boulnois’ words) “an ascesis
from images.”50 This idea of intellectual retreat as self-knowledge is common
among the Neoplatonists.51 Heymericus describes it as part of a process of ab-
straction, proper to the Aristotelian tradition. He describes, however, the third
level of abstraction in Neoplatonic terms: the words conversio and collatio re-
call the Book of Causes (prop. XIV(XV)) and the Elements of Theology (prop. 15,
16, 17). Moreover, he claims that this ultimate form of intellection is similar to
the intellection performed by the separate substances.52
The intellectual odyssey from the senses to the self ultimately addresses
three broader and complementary questions. How does one interact with
the sensible world without being trapped by it (like the Epicureans)? How
does one detach the intellect from the sensible world without disregarding it
(like the Stoics)? In other words: how does one acquire an adequate (i.e. true)
knowledge about the world (like the Peripatetics)? Heymericus provides one
clear answer for all three questions: metaphysics requires a progression that
presupposes the preparation of both the intellect and the will (which recalls
the Greek askesis).
49 See below, notes 92 and 93.

50 Boulnois, Métaphysiques rebelles, 53. See Heymericus de Campo, Colliget principiorum,
tr. I, d. 1, c. 5 (ed. Calma – Imbach, 296.86-88) (cited above n. 34; see also n. 75).
51 See the rich (and diverse) dossier analysed in P. Courcelle, Connais-toi toi-même. De
Socrate à Saint-Bernard, 3 vols. (Paris, 1974).
52 Heymericus de Campo, Colliget principiorum, tr. I, d. 1, c. 14, (ed. Calma – Imbach,
304.268-269).

320 Calma
This progression from one stage of knowledge to another reflects the pyra-
mid of disciplines that comprises, in an ascending order, rational, moral and
real philosophy. Metaphysics is both queen (regina) and founder ( fondatrix)
of all sciences.53 It is also the noblest science of the philosophy of the real
(philosophia realis), taught, as already mentioned, only by Peripatetics. Their
prince (princeps), guide, arch-doctor (archidoctor), arch-master (archimagis-
ter) and even arch-father (archipater) is Aristotle. His most faithful reader in
the West is Albert the Great and Heymericus is his pupil.54 Despite this privi-
leged genealogy of philosophy, Heymericus does not restrict metaphysics to an
elite group on the basis of natural (intellectual disposition, gender etc.) or so-
cial (religion, class etc.) prerequisites, and in this aspect he breaks with, among
others, Maimonides, Thomas Aquinas and Dante.55 The only criterion for the
scarcity of metaphysicians consists in the difficulty of the conversion to the
self. It has to be underlined that unlike some thirteenth-century philosophers,
Heymericus does not advocate for a reclusive or solitary life, without moral,
political or familial obligations.56 He explicitly emphasizes that any zealous
philosopher (studiosus philosophus) can do metaphysics, as long as they are
eager not to live the life of a carnal man (homo carnalis) and willing to train
their intellect in a certain number of metaphysical claims (gathered, as previ-
ously mentioned, from Aristotle and the Book of Causes).57 Indeed, no one is

300.176); c. 15 (305.272).
54 Cf. Heymericus de Campo, Colliget principiorum, tr. I, d. 1, c. 6 (ed. Calma – Imbach,
297.105-114) d. 2, c. 4 (and 316.76); Tractatus problematicus, Contra modernos, Prooemium
(ed. Rutten, 1); ibid., Problema VII (ed. Rutten, 3); Ars demonstrativa, §9 (ed. J.-D. Cavigioli,
in Heymericus de Campo Opera selecta, ed. Imbach and Ladner, 141); Invectiva (ed.
G. Meersseman), Geschichte des Albertismus, Heft 2. Die ersten Kölner Kontroversen, Rome,
1935, 113.22: “Anno domini, sicut putatur, millesimo quadringentesimo vigesimo tertio,
quidam [= Heymericus himself] studiosus philosophiae Aristotelis iuxta interpretatio-
nem peripateticam venerabilis Alberti magni declarate discipulus, de universitate studii
Parisiensis mediante studio Diestensi ad studium Coloniense animo ibidem in eadem
philosophia certatim profeciendi productus …”
55 Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles I, c. 4; Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed I,
c. 34; Dante, Convivio I, c. 1. See also Albertus Magnus, Metaphysica II, cc. 12-13. They refer
to Aristoteles, Metaphysica I, c. 2: 928a 21-25.
56 See Bianchi, “Felicità intellettuale, ‘ascetismo’ e ‘arabismo’,” 13-34.
285): “Qui ergo habet aures audiendi, audiat, quid hec scientiarum et artium fundatrix,
doctrix et regina suis loquitur discipulis, ipsa scilicet metaphisica, quam Aristoteles non
immerito vocat theologiam, quia ipsa est scientia a Deo proxime data et de Deo, in Deo et
ad Deum veritatum spiritualium contemplativa. Et ideo, quia carnalis homo non sapit ea,
que Dei sunt, ut dicit Apostolus, nimirum pauci sunt homines huius sapientie capessende
proportionati discipuli seu auditores idonei, siquidem homines sunt plerumque carnales
Vivarium 58 (2020) 305-334

nor can be called a true and resolute philosopher unless he is learned in first
philosophy, metaphysics or the theology of the gentiles.58
Intellectual progression is necessary because we do not and cannot
have an immediate access to being as such. According to a commonly held
Aristotelian view, the intellect is in the body in the mode of pure potentiality,
like a blank slate (tabula rasa) on which knowledge is impressed. By way of
constant interactions with the material world through the senses, the intellect
undertakes a gradual progression (progressum) both in terms of a departure
from potentiality to actuality and in terms of an advance toward ultimate re-
flexive knowledge.59
The first level of progression consists in grasping information from the sens-
es, and structuring it according to likenesses and differences. Rational philoso-
phy (i.e. grammar, logic and rhetoric) provides the intellect with the necessary
tools. Yet, the intellect’s freedom may deform (pervertere) its reasoning about
reality by distracting it and may produce false argumentation, such as when
differences are considered indistinctly or likenesses are separated. In order
to prevent these errors, the intellect needs a guiding disposition (habitus)
through which reason is kept in the domain of truth.60 Hence, a strong will is
required, which must be trained by moral philosophy (i.e. monastica, economi
ca, politica); this is the second level of progression.61 The highest level of pro-
gression is acquired through philosophia realis, which is solely speculative and
comprises the sciences corresponding, as previously mentioned, to the three
levels of abstraction: physics, mathematics and metaphysics. Only Peripatetic
philosophy can truly teach the latter, inasmuch as it is the only one reflecting
magis ymaginibus et passionibus materie sensibilis convicti ⟨quam⟩ vite spiritualis dediti.
[…] Attamen quia, teste Boetio: ‘diligentia cuiuslibet operis obtusitas permollitur’, non
erit cuiquam philosopho studioso impossibile, quin poterit huiusmodi sapientiam, sicut
subditur, compendiose collectam et resolutam aliqualiter apprehendere et per eandem
supra scibilia quarumlibet scientiarum et artium aliarum diffundere seu doctrinaliter
extendere.”
180): “nemo potest esse aut dici verus et resolutus philosophus, nisi fuerit in philosophia
prima, metaphisica seu theologia gentilium eruditus.”
132); the entire c. 7 is relevant for this topic.
141). One can be tempted to see in this passage an echo of Augustine’s text describing
the need of ethics to purify the soul from its degrading passions and to prepare it for the
contemplation of superior causes. Cf. Augustinus, De civitate Dei VIII, c. 3.
298.133-141).

322 Calma
reality as it is, i.e. through intelligible species.62 Heymericus often uses a vo-
cabulary pertaining to optics (lucere, relucere, radium incidens, radium refrac-
tus). He explains that philosophia realis is a speculative science (speculativa)
inasmuch as intelligible species (species intelligibiles) are like notions reflect-
ing (notiones speculares) reality, in the same manner as a mirror (speculum)
reflects or receives the reflection of visible objects.63 Concepts mirror reality
and metaphysics mirrors life.
The third level of abstraction requires both the completion of this intel-
lectual journey (from grammar to metaphysics) and the capacity to elevate
the intellect above images (supra phantasmata). However, only the latter is
a distinctive feature: the relationship with the sensible world is the criterion
that distinguishes between philosophical schools and indicates the true one.
Indeed, Epicurean, Stoic and Peripatetic philosophy reflect different ways of
life, each in its own manner.64 For example, Epicureans, who discredit the
role of images, and thus the role of abstraction, do not lift their mind above
sensible objects. Philosophers immersed only in the senses cannot imagine
the existence of God, angels and other immaterial beings, because they are
not used to looking beyond the particulars. Thus, they are even less inclined
to understand being as such and they examine fewer speculative topics than
the Peripatetics. Their philosophy, described as subhumana, mirrors their way
of life.65 Stoics are at the opposite extreme; focused exclusively on universals
ante rem, they propose a philosophy, described as superhumana, ignoring the
role of particular objects and the knowledge produced through imagination
and senses.66 Ultimately, both Epicureans and Stoics misjudge, but for totally
different reasons, the role of the sensible world in the production of adequate
knowledge about being.
62 Heymericus de Campo, Colliget principiorum, tr. I, d. 1, cc. 8-10 (ed. Calma – Imbach,
299-300).
299.144-147).
64 Albert the Great equally claims, Super Ethica I, lec. IV (ed. W. Kübel, Opera omnia, ed.
Colon. XIV/2, Münster, 1987, 20.66-21.5), that there are ways of living: one accord-
ing to Epicureans, another according to Stoics or Platonists, and another according to
Peripatetics. Yet, unlike Heymericus, Albert explains these differences on the basis of
their ethical, not metaphysical principles.
214); and also c. 4 (315.66-67): “Nam cum primi [i.e. Epicurei] sint sensuales philosophi,
non accipiunt quepiam discerni realiter, nisi, que experiuntur testimonio sensuali, a se
distant materialiter.” And also d. 1, c. 1 (292.5-7); d. 1, c.5 (296.72-73); d. 1, c. 14 (304.250-256).
316.75). For philosophia superhumana, see Colliget principiorum, d. 1, c. 6 (297.105-106).
Vivarium 58 (2020) 305-334

In order to acquire the capacity of imagining God or other separate sub-

stances, and the capacity of understanding the quiddity of objects, one needs
to live a spiritual life (vita spiritualis). Metaphysics reveals spiritual truths
(veritates spirituales) linked to the being of God. These spiritual truths can be
perceived by spiritual men (homines spirituales) and remain inaccessible to
carnal men (homines carnales).67 Only Peripatetic philosophy contains the
truth: together with Epicureans, it is based on sensory experience, and to-
gether with Stoics, it values intellective knowledge.68 As such, it reflects the
nature of the human being (philosophia humana). When directing his intellect
toward the being of God, the metaphysician knows that His being is traceable
or reflected in the sensible world; hence, unlike Stoics, he does not exceed his
human condition. And when he turns his intellect to the sensible world, the
metaphysician knows how and when to detach his mind from it; hence, unlike
Epicureans, the metaphysician does not lower his human condition. On the
contrary: metaphysics allows the philosopher to discover and fulfil the speci-
ficity of human nature, both in intellectual (by unveiling the truth about being
as such) and spiritual terms (by reaching the inner man).
Heymericus unfolds this idea using, once again, paradoxical terms:
Peripatetic philosophy is tailored to the nature of the human being, and yet
metaphysics, as the pinnacle of this philosophy, is neither human (non est pro-
prie scientia humana) nor accessible to everyone (without the necessary intel-
lectual and spiritual preparation). It is not properly a human science, because
it instructs the most noble part of our intellect, the divine intellect, detached
from senses.69 These apparent tensions are solved by significant references to
St. Paul; metaphysics is reserved for those who are not attached to the sensible
world. It lifts the intellect to the divine, to the being of God. Hence, the choice
of Peripatetic philosophy may even lead to a nobler end than a knowledge
about being: love for this object of study may ultimately lead to God’s king-
dom. Through their interest in divine objects, their effort to scrutinize beyond
images and through the conversion to the self which results in the discovery of

285) (cited in n. 57); see also the texts cited in n. 76 and 93. See also Tractatus de philo-
sophica interpretatione sacrae scripturae, Lectiones I (ed. M.C. Rusconi and K. Reinhardt,
Turnhout 2018, 13, §30): “In primo [i.e.: in primo celo intellectuali] suscipiunt homines
spirituales intellectum exercitatum in methaphisica habentes, qualiter sine contradiccio-
nis implicacione anima racionalis sicut quelibet forma substancialis est tota in tota sua
materia etc.”
68 For experientia sensibilis, see Heymericus de Campo, Colliget principiorum, tr. I, d. 2, c. 4
(ed. Calma – Imbach, 316.76-81).
303.229-237).

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the “inner man,” Peripatetics are more disposed to salvation than Epicureans,
who examine these elements from a greater distance.70 The way of doing phi-
losophy impacts the salvation of the soul. Salvation may arise as a result of
the practice of metaphysics inasmuch as it enables the philosopher to love
God and to strive to reach the inner self. However, it has to be stressed that
Heymericus never claims that metaphysics (and the way of life it requires) is a
necessary (much less a sufficient) condition for salvation, nor that salvation is
the purpose of metaphysics.
6 Metaphysics of the Inner Man
Heymericus refers on several occasions to the distinction introduced by

St. Paul (II Cor. 4:16-18; Eph. 3:16-17; Rom. 7:22-23) between the inner or spiri-
tual man (intus or interior homo) and the exterior man ( foris homo or homo
carnalis). Metaphysics is only for spiritual men (homines spirituales), for those
who have liberated both their mind and their life from the weight of matter.
In the Tractatus de philosophica interpretatione sacrae scripturae, Heymericus
talks again about the three levels or kinds of self-reflexivity but in relation to
the three higher theologies, and again in relation to St. Paul’s doctrine of the
inner man; theologia mistica and theologia simbolica are proper to the interior
man (hominis interioris), whereas theologia philosophica addresses the ratio-
nal, discursive intellect.71 More often in the Tractatus problematicus than in the
Colliget principiorum, Heymericus stresses the difference between the exterior
world, the world of senses, and the interior world, the inner world of the intel-
lect. From experience, we know that movement toward the exterior prevents
and even excludes conversion to the self, and that the withdrawal of the intel-
lect from the senses enhances the return to itself, where it can discover being
as such.72

220): “Et si per amorem Dei tenditur ad regnum celi, cum nichil ametur, nisi precognosca-
tur, ut Deus potest naturaliter in se cognosci ab homine, sed dumtaxat in suis effectibus,
sicut scriptum est ab Apostolo, quod invisibilia Dei per ea, que facta sunt, intellecta con-
spiciuntur, non est dubium, quin per cognitionem operum divinorum eo magis disponan-
tur Perypathetici ad p⟨er⟩fectionem salutis eterne quam Epicurei, quo ipsi hec discretius
rimantur quam isti.”
71 Heymericus de Campo, Tractatus de philosophica interpretatione sacrae scripturae,
Lectiones I, §§17-19 (ed. Rusconi-Reinhardt, 9-10).
72 Heymericus de Campo, Tractatus problematicus, Probl. XIII (f. H ivv): “talis autem aversio
[i.e. a sensu] est conversio sui [i.e. intellectus] ad seipsum. Ergo talis intellectio conversiva
Vivarium 58 (2020) 305-334

Heymericus describes in the Tractatus problematicus the same three lev-

els of abstraction, but he adds that we make use of two intellects: one turned
toward the senses and imagination, and the other, called intellectus divinus,
turned toward nobler objects, such as the eternal substances and God. The
former operates only with phantasms, the latter operates without phantasms.
Hence, contemplating divine natures without phantasms is a natural opera-
tion, embedded in our nature, and accomplished through the conversion to the
self of this divine intellect.73 Plato considers self-knowledge the most perfect
philosophy (perfectissima philosophia). Aristotle argues in his Ethics that the
essence of man is his intellect (homo sit maxime suus intellectus) and in his De
anima he seems to argue (quasi diceret) that knowledge of separate substances
does not require phantasms. Proclus in the Elements of Theology, Augustine,
Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and the Albertists endorse the same idea.74
From Plato to the late Albertists, there is a general consensus among philoso-
phers and theologians that the superior part of our intellect or intellectus divi-
nus accomplishes in us an intellectual operation without images, enabling a
superior form of knowledge about God and separate substances. This divine
intellect, “dormant” in us until we know how to activate it through the third
level of abstraction, is the image of the Trinity in us.75 It is this divine intellect
that St. Paul calls the “spiritual man” (homo spiritualis), and that Aristotle
est ei naturalissima. […] Minor patet per experientiam. Nam experimur quod intensus
motus exterior impedit et excludit motum interiorem.”
73 Heymericus de Campo, Tractatus problematicus, Probl. XIII (f. H ivv and H vr). On the
three levels of abstraction, see Tractatus problematicus, Probl. XIII (H ivr).
74 Heymericus de Campo, Tractatus problematicus, Probl. XIII (f. H iiir). For the references
to Plato, see Tractatus problematicus, Probl. XIII (f. H vr) (and also Heymericus de Campo,
Colliget principiorum, tr. I, pars 2, d. 2, c. 7 [ed. Calma – Imbach, 384.253-257]); for the
reference to Aristotle see below note 75, and for the references to Proclus, Augustine and
Pseudo-Dionysius, see Tractatus problematicus, Probl. XIII (f. H, iiir and ivv).
75 Heymericus de Campo, Tractatus problematicus, Probl. XIII (f. H vir-v): “Secundum patet,
quia particula divina hominis, secundum quam adveniunt ei scientie et virtutes pos-
sessionis divine puta sapientia intelligibilium separatorum et felicitas contemplativa
divinorum cum virtutibus ei intimis, est per gradum sue creationis evolans in excessu
rationis et sensus tamquam deiformis imago Trinitatis, per quam etiam anima humana a
coniugio corporis separata ad instar intellectuum celestium diudicat omnia et cognoscit
et in corpore existens per studium extatice conversionis ad seipsum et per abstractio-
nem rationalem a fantasmatibus se et quevis sincera et pura intelligibilia, iuxta modum
inferius explicandum potet intelligere. Et pro hac parte militant rationes Albertistarum.”
Albert the Great discusses the same topic, even though in different terms, in De intellectu
et intelligibili II, tr. unicus, c. 8 (ed. Borgnet, 515A). Theo Kobusch analysed several aspects
of the fortune of this idea, but does not mention Albert the Great and the Albertist tradi-
tion. See also T. Kobusch, Christliche Philosophie, 138-151.

326 Calma
mentions in his Ethics.76 It is equally this divine intellect that knows being as
such and that is disposed to do metaphysics.77
In the Tractatus, as scholars have shown,78 Heymericus deploys numer-
ous arguments in favour of the immediate intellectual knowledge (i.e. with-
out the use of images) of God and the separate substances. However, he does
not endorse this position without restrictions. Yet, as noted above, in the
Colliget, Heymericus does not mention that intellectual knowledge leads to
praising God, and he does not describe the divine intellect as image of the
Trinity in us. In the Colliget, Heymericus does stress the role of images in the
production of intellectual knowledge and highlights the necessity of an in-
tellectual progression from the senses to the inner self. Nor does the Colliget
contain any detailed discussion about the possible, agent or acquired in-
tellect.79 Despite these differences between Heymericus’ texts, one of the
most interesting features shared by both treatises is the weight of St. Paul’s
anthropology. It is the doctrine of inner man that articulates (in both trea-
tises) the relationship between epistemology and metaphysics. The inner
man is the precondition for our access to the knowledge of being as such,
which reflects the being of God.80 It is possible to ascend to this form of
76 Heymericus de Campo, Tractatus problematicus, Probl. XIII (f. I ir): “Cum dicat Paulus
quod cum corrumpitur homo exterior renovatur interior …”; Probl. XIII (f. I ir): “… verum
est quod homo est duplex secundum gradus essendi et agendi, scilicet exterior et interior,
secundum quod attestatur Apostolus, quorum primus dicitur carnalis, bestialis et ancil-
laris propter coniugationem virtutum corporearum; secundus liber ⟨et⟩ spiritualis, et est
ipsemet intellectus. Iuxta illud Philosophi X Ethicorum: homo est maxime suus intellec-
tus …” For other references to St. Paul’s anthropology, see also Tractatus problematicus,
Probl. XIII (f. Lvr-v).
77 Heymericus de Campo, Tractatus problematicus, Probl. XIII (f. H ivr), and the text cited
above, n. 75.
78 Cf. M.J.F.M. Hoenen, “Heymeric van de Velde († 1460) und die Geschichte des
Albertismus Auf der Suche nach den Quellen der albertistischen Intellektlehre des
Tractatus problematicus,” in Albertus Magnus und der Albertismus. Deutsche philoso-
phische Kultur des Mittelalters, ed. A. de Libera and M.J.F.M. Hoenen (Leiden, 1995),
303-332; M.J.F.M. Hoenen, “Metaphysik und Intellektlehre. Die aristotelische Lehre des
intellectus agens im Schnittpunkt der mittelalterlichen Diskussion um die natürliche
Gotteserkenntnis,” Theologie und Philosophie 70 (1995), 405-413; A. Saccon, “Die natürliche
Gotteserkenntnis in den Schriften der Kölner Albertisten des 15. Jahrhunderts,” Quaestio
15 (2015), 751-760.
79 Short references to these intellects, which are irrelevant for our topic, can be found in
Heymericus de Campo, Colliget principiorum, tr. I, d. 3, c. 8 (ed. Calma – Imbach, 341.296-
297); c. 12 (346.420-422); d. 4, c. 1 (351.12-23); pars 2, d. 4, c. 4 (408.84-85), etc.
80 It is tempting to note similarities with the idea of the contemplation of the One in the soul
of the Neoplatonists (e.g. Plotinus, Enn. VI, 9, 7, ed. A.H. Armstrong, vol. VII, Cambridge,
MA, 1987, 329.17-23); however, it has to be underlined once again that in the Colliget,
Vivarium 58 (2020) 305-334

knowledge only if we make use of this divine intellect. The homo carna-
lis cannot have access to the inner man without proper preparation, which
Heymericus describes in metaphysical rather than moral terms.
Learning how to do metaphysics is learning how to recognize the inner self
and how to build, in that self, a metaphysical knowledge leading to the divine.
Closing the material eyes to the sensible world, we open the intelligible eyes
to the immaterial world.81 The intellectual elevation from sensible objects
through the three stages of abstraction enables us to grasp in us, in the light of
the universal intelligence, a certain number of principles or theorems (theo-
remata). Building upon these principles, we generate metaphysical knowledge
in front of our intellectual eyes (pro foribus nostri oculi intellectualis).82 The
descent into the self is an ascent to the light of the divine intellect. Yet this
metaphysical knowledge is neither ecstatic nor mystical, but purely intellec-
tual; it does not lead us to the knowledge of God nor to his glorification, but
to an intellection of being as such (ens inquantum ens, ens metaphysicum) in
which the being of God is reflected (relucet).
7 Metaphysics and Medieval Models of Philosophy as a Way of Life
Heymericus provides an understanding of philosophy as a way of life differ-

ent from the two models previously described. However, there are certain
similarities that are worth mentioning. For example, it is likely that the Latin
Averroists, in elaborating the view of an “intellectual felicity”, have been in-
fluenced by Albert the Great’s interpretation of Book X of the Nicomachean
Ethics. Heymericus equally endorses that (Peripatetic) philosophy teaches
Heymericus does not talk about an ecstatic union of the soul with God (through prayer or
other spiritual preparation), but rather about a metaphysical knowledge, through intel-
lectual abstraction, of being as such, which reflects the being of God. Cf. W. Beierwaltes,
“Der Begriff des unum in nobis bei Proklos,” in Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter, ihr Ursprung
und ihre Bedeutung, ed. P. Wilpert and W.P. Eckert (Berlin, 1963), 255-266.
81 Cf. Proclus, Théologie platonicienne I, 25 (I, 110, 9-12, ed. H.-D. Saffrey and L.G. Westerink,
Paris, 1968-1997). See also Boulnois, Métaphysiques rebelles, 32.
82 Reading these lines, Nicolas of Cusa notes in the margins of the manuscript: “Nota quo-
modo metaphysica est de visu mentis.” Nicolas uses the same expression in some of his
texts, notably in De apice theoriae, n. 10-11, written after the death of Heymericus, in 1464.
See Heymericus de Campo, Colliget principiorum, tr. I, d. 1, c. 13 (ed. Calma – Imbach,
303.230-242). On Nicolas’ marginal note, see D. Calma and R. Imbach, “Les notes mar-
ginales de Nicolas de Cues au traité Colliget principiorum d’Heymeric de Campo,” in
Heymericus de Campo. Philosophie und Theologie im 15. Jahrhundert, ed. K. Rheinhardt
(Regensburg, 2009), 15-51, at 20.

328 Calma
an appropriate way to live according to human nature. However, unlike the

Averroists, Heymericus does not claim that the only way to obtain felicity in
hac vita is through philosophy. He does not introduce a hierarchy between
philosophy (i.e. rationes naturales) and theology (i.e. revelation), and he does
not elaborate discriminatory anthropological or ethical views distinguishing
between philosophers and non-philosophers. Indeed, Heymericus does not
consider, like Averroes and others, that non-philosophers should be counted
among animals (cum bestiis).83 Non-philosophers as well as non-Peripatetic
philosophers – and the Epicureans mentioned by Heymericus are the best
example – do not belong to an inferior category within the human species.
Epicurean philosophy is labelled subhumana because it does not reflect the
veritable nature of the human beings, not because Epicureans would not be-
long to the human species. Epicureans are not subhumans, just as Stoics are
not superhumans even though their philosophy is labelled superhumana.
The explicit references to St. Paul’s inner man and the idea of the divine
intellect as the image of the Trinity inside us are distinctively Christian fea-
tures. In other works, such as the Centheologicon, these features are even more
salient. And yet, the Tractatus problematicus and the Colliget principiorum do
not fall under the category of “Christian philosophy”, because these texts do
not urge philosophers to adopt specific doctrines and live according to clear
moral principles. Moreover, Heymericus does not make references to a su-
perior form of knowledge acquired through revelation, either in history (e.g.
Christ’s incarnation) or given to chosen individuals. For Heymericus, abstrac-
tion and the knowledge of the inner man do not result in any kind of union
(coniunctio) with a substance, such as the separate agent intellect or the intel-
lect of or the being of the first principle (God or One). These important fea-
tures distinguish his view from the intellectualist (Arabic and Latin) tradition
and from the ecstatic or mystical (both Hellenic and Christian) tradition previ-
ously mentioned. When he agrees that philosophy is obedient (in obsequium)
to (Christian) theology and in conformity (consona) with divine, human and
natural law,84 his general aim is to attain a harmonious and universal polyph-
ony of knowledge. At the foundation of his theoretical model lies the effort to
accommodate a selection of metaphysical theses from Aristotle, Proclus and
the Book of Causes with the teaching of St. Paul. It is a generous understanding
83 Cf. Libera, Albert le Grand et la philosophie, 249, 268-269. See also Albert the Great,
Metaphysica, lib. I, tr. 2, c. 9 (ed. Geyer, 26.66-73). L. Bianchi, Il vescovo e i filosofi. La con-
danna parigina del 1277 e l’evoluzione dell’aristotelismo scolastico (Bergamo, 1990), 113;
Bianchi, “Filosofi, uomini e bruti.”
84 See the text cited below, n. 93.
Vivarium 58 (2020) 305-334

of the history of thought, in the lineage of Albert the Great, enabling him to
use concepts or ideas indistinctly shared by pagan and Christian authors (such
as retreat from the sensible world, ascent to the divine etc.).85 It is worth re-
calling that Plotinus and Proclus (and other Neoplatonic authors), in texts that
Heymericus could not know directly when he wrote the Colliget, accept the
double nature (φύσιν ἀμφίβιον) of the human being: its exterior and its interior
nature.86
Heymericus does not distinguish between Christian and non-Christian
theoretical and moral models. On the contrary: he invites the reader of the
Colliget to exercise their intellect with metaphysical themes that he gathers
from various authors, pagans as well as Christians, in the form of principles
(principia) or axioms that he collates and explains (compendiose collectam et
resolutam).87 He equally invites the reader to self-discipline and to exercise the
detachment of the intellect from the sensible world. Without the conversion
to the self, one cannot have knowledge of the divine. Paradoxically, at least for
our common understanding, this self-reflexivity, unlike for the Ancient schools
of philosophy,88 represents both a self-oblivion and a self-knowledge. It is a
self-oblivion because this conversion to the self discloses the quiddity of the
sensible world (reflected in the soul), and in it one ultimately finds the traces
of the being of God. Conversion to the self does not enable a knowledge of the
self, but a knowledge of the being of God. It enables, however, a knowledge
about the self as instantiation of a universal, as part of the world sharing a com-
mon being (ens commune) and a knowledge about the inner self. Metaphysics
is the science of self-knowledge that brings intrinsic felicity to which all are
invited.89 Indeed, living according to this way, as a metaphysician, is living ac-
cording to the very essence of the human being which is halfway between total

225); d. 3, c. 1 (329.36-37); d. 4, c. 1 (351.10-11); pars 2, d. 3, c. 3 (395.56-396.65).
86 Plotinus, Enn. IV, 8, 4 (ed. A.H. Armstrong, vol. IV, Cambridge, MA, 1984, 411.33); Proclus,
In Rem Publicam (ed. G. Kroll, vol. II, Leipzig, 1901, 85.25). Cf. Kobusch, Christlische
Philosophie, 64-71.
87 See, among other relevant passages, the text cited in n. 57.
88 On self-reflexivity in Ancient thought, see Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 90, 113 etc.
89 Heymericus de Campo, Colliget principiorum, tr. I, pars 2, d. 2, c. 7 (ed. Calma – Imbach,
384.249-257): “Unde elicitur consequenter, quod ultimata nature intellectualis in suo pro-
prio genere perfectio est completa sui ipsius cognitio, quod sentiens Plato dixit perfectam
philosophiam esse sui ipsius cognitionem, unumquemque hominem ad huiusmodi per-
fectionem velud quandam felicitatem intrinsecam his verbis invitando: ‘gnotosolites’, id
est ‘cognosce teipsum’.” The expression felicitas intrinseca appears in some commentaries
on the Ethics; see I. Costa, “La dottrina della felicità nel Commento del Vaticano all’ Etica
Nicomachea,” in Le felicità nel Medioevo, ed. Bettetini and Paparella, 325-353, at 346.

330 Calma
immersion in and total ignorance of the sensible world. Hence, according to

Heymericus, we must all become metaphysicians.
Yet Heymericus does not provide instructions, norms or precise exercises
(for example, when and how often to detach the intellect from particulars).
From this point of view, his intellectual project does not correspond to Hadot’s
description of Ancient philosophy as a way of life. The goal of the Colliget is
to show that all models of normativity (natural, divine and human laws) have
metaphysical foundations.90 The preliminary steps described above (i.e. effort
of will and intellectual progression) enable a return to the self91 and the knowl-
edge of being as such. Thus, even though Heymericus does not propose moral
norms and descriptive rules for the metaphysician, he defines a functional or
practical dimension of metaphysics.92 Indeed, he does not (intend to) explain
how to deal with everyday situations (sorrow, illness, death, anger etc.), but
how to acquire a firm apprehension of the principles (of being and knowing)
underpinning the world around us. The word principia from the title, often
used in the text, has a double meaning: it designates both major philosophical
ideas characteristic for a school of thought and the axiomatic form expressing
these ideas. The philosophical principles are expressed in concise, memorable
adages. As such, they have an essential role in the intellectual progression, and
it is necessary that all (future) metaphysicians reflect on them. The Colliget
in itself addresses this twofold purpose: (1) it collects and transmits a com-
pendium of metaphysical principles and (2) accompanies the philosopher
throughout their life.93 These principles, a real treasure (thezaurus humanus)
90 The relationship between metaphysics and law (natural, divine, human) would require a
long and detailed study, beyond the purpose of the present article.
91 According to Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 126, the “inward orientation” is a wide-
spread phenomenon of Ancient philosophy as spiritual exercise.
92 Theo Kobusch coined the expression praktische Metaphysik. Cf. T. Kobusch, “Metaphysik
als Lebensform. Zur Idee einer praktischen Metaphysik,” in Die Metaphysik und das Gute.
Aufsätze zu ihren Verhältnis in Antike und Mittelalter. Jan A. Aertsen zu Ehren, ed. W. Goris
(Leuven, 1999), 27-56; T. Kobusch, “Metaphysik als Lebensform bei Gregor von Nyssa,”
in Gregory of Nyssa: Homilies on the Beatitudes. An English Version with Commentary
and Supporting Studies. Proceedings of the Eight International Colloquium on Gregory of
Nyssa (Paderborn, 14-18 September 1998), ed. H.R. Drobner and A. Viciano (Leiden, 2000),
467-485.
93 Heymericus de Campo, Colliget principiorum, tr. III, dist. 4, c. 3 (Codex Cusanus 106,
f. 273v): “Ut ergo huic operi finis principaliter intentus imponatur […] sciens, quod inten-
tioni proposite de commemorando fundamentalia philosophie principia in obsequium
theologie, consona iuris divini, naturalis et humani colligentis iudicia aliquatenus satisfe-
ci studiosisque illius veritatis tripartite scrutatoribus ad proficiendum in via salutis eterne
occasionem obtuli […] et mihimetipsi in dies memorie vivacis retentiam perdenti quem-
dam thezaurum ad modum chaos confusi secundum multiformium ex eo formabilium
Vivarium 58 (2020) 305-334

of human knowledge, need to be recalled (commemorandum). The Colliget is

meant to be an enchiridion of the metaphysician.94
8 Coda: The Hallmark of Albert the Great?
Heymericus’ theories certainly echo Albert the Great’s vocabulary, but to a

lesser extent his doctrines. Hence it may be useful to distinguish, even very
briefly, the similarities and differences between Heymericus and Albert.95
The idea of an intellect converted to senses, to imagination and to itself is de-
veloped by Albert in several texts, though in varying ways. In the Commentary
on Isaiah, Albert mentions only two of modes of conversion (to imagina-
tion and to senses) while introducing the possibility of a superior mode of
knowledge, through divine illumination, as in the case of prophets.96 In the
Commentary on the Metaphysics, he argues in favour of a reflexive knowledge of
the intellect, but he introduces terminology and a topic absent in the Colliget:
circa scibilia spiritualia cuiuslibet legis rationalis tractatuum seminaria continentem

confeci in laudem scientiarum Domini et sine preiudicio sententie sanioris cuiuslibet me
peritioris philosophi, iuriste aut theologi sub correctione quoque horum et quorumlibet
aliorum veritatem theologicam sapienter zelantium.”
94 On the role of short sentences (apophthegmata) and memorization as part of the training
of philosophy as a way of life, see Hadot, “Philosophy as a Way of Life,” 85-86. The Colliget
has beautiful passages on memory and the role of philosophical principles. See, for ex-
ample, Heymericus de Campo, Colliget principiorum, tr. II, d. 4, c. 1 (ed. Calma-Imbach,
404.18-405.23): “Totius proprium phantasma si depingatur in memoria humana, ad quam
naturaliter reflectitur nature humane intelligentia, ut habetur III De anima, constituitur
in homine quidam doctrinalis omnium scibilium modo humano thezaurus ad intelligen-
dum veritates divinas, naturales et humanas …” And also tr. III, d. 1, hyp. 75 (f. 240v): “In
hoc autem ordine abstractionis sunt quinque differentie: (…) quintus est talia diffinita
apud animam thezaurisans et eam propter sic retenta ad prius sensata reflectens. Primus
horum modorum abstractive cognitivorum appropriatur sensui communi, secundus
ymaginationi, tertius estimationi, quartus fanthasie, quintus memorie.” Compare with
Augustinus, De Trinitate IX, c. 3, n. 3 (ed. W.J. Mountain, CCSL 50-50A, Turnhout 1968,
296): “mens ergo ipsa sicut corporearum rerum notitias per sensus corporis colligit, sic
incorporearum per semetipsam.”
95 On the influence of Albert the Great on Heymericus’ works and doctrines see also
H. Anzulewicz, “Zum Einfluss des Albertus Magnus auf Heymericus de Campo im
Compendium divinorum,” in Heymericus de Campo, ed. Rheinhardt, 83-112. On Albert’s
theories of intellect and abstraction, see H. Anzulewicz, “Entwicklung und Stellung
der Intellekttheorie im System des Albertus Magnus,” Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et
Littéraire du Moyen Âge 70 (2003/1), 165-218.
96 Cf. Albertus Magnus, De anima III, tr. 2, c. 16 (ed. Stroick, 200.56-57): “intellectum car-
nis oportet esse reflexum ad sensible.” Albertus Magnua, Super Isaiam, c. VI, 1 (ed.
F. Siepmann, Opera omnia, ed. Colon. XIX, Münster, 1952, 80-86.5).

332 Calma
the acquired intellect (intellectus adeptus) has a double act, one through which
it extends to continuous and temporal objects, and another through which it
extends to separated intellects and to itself.97 Moreover, unlike Heymericus,
Albert does not consider that the conversion of the intellect to itself pertains
to metaphysics, but to mathematics.98 In the Summa theologiae, on the con-
trary, he claims that mathematics arises from the reflection of the intellect on
univocal images, i.e. detached from their diversity in matter. He argues again in
favour of a superior form of intellection, which enables the knowledge of the
divine substances through divine light.99
In his commentary on the second book of the De anima (tr. 3, c. 4), Albert
distinguishes the four degrees of abstraction necessary to grasp the intelligi-
ble. The first and most basic level is the abstraction of the form by the faculty
of apprehension (vis apprehensiva) from the senses, which does not enable a
complete separation. The second level is the abstraction of the form from in-
dividuals through imagination (potentia imaginativa). It does not represent a
complete separation from matter inasmuch as it still bears some accidents,
such as colour, form etc. The third level is the abstraction, by the estimative
faculty, of a form which, even though it comes from the senses, it is not known
to us through them, such as being sociable, friendly, or being the son of such
and such, being an animal or a human being. The fourth and last level of ab-
straction leads to the knowledge of quiddity of things denuded of all mate-
riality; this abstraction can be accomplished only through both the human’s
intellect and the intellect of separate substances.100 When commenting upon
the book III of the De anima (tr. 2, c. 16), Albert describes the operation of the
possible intellect in terms of extension and conversion. The extension of the
intellect to the senses is followed by a return to the self, in the movement rep-
resented by the process of abstraction from the sensible and the imaginable.
This dynamic (extension and return) produces a certain lassitude (lassitudo
contingit ex cogitando) in the intellect, which could be avoided only if the in-
tellect remained always firm in itself. That, however, is not possible, given the
very nature of the human intellect.101
The quiddity of things considered by Albert in the previously mentioned
Book II of the De anima, those that result from the fourth stage of abstrac-
tion, are studied by metaphysics, according to the Commentary on the Divine
97 Albertus Magnus, Metaphysica II, tr. 1, c. 9 (ed. Geyer, 473.47-55).

98 Albertus Magnus, Metaphysica I, tr. 1, c. 5, (ed. Geyer, 8.14-24).
99 Albertus Magnus, Summa theologiae, tr. III, q. 16 (ed. D. Siedler, coll. W. Kübel and
H.G. Vogels, Opera omnia, ed. Colon. XXXIV/1, Münster, 1978, 81.36-56).
100 Albertus Magnus, De anima II, tr. 3, c. 4 (ed. Stroick, 101.62-102.27).
101 Albertus Magnus, De anima III, tr. 2, c. 16 (ed. Stroick, 199-201; e.g. 67).
Vivarium 58 (2020) 305-334

Names.102 This view, which Albert does not endorse in all his texts,103 is simi-
lar to Heymericus’ claim that the third stage of the abstraction produces the
quiddity of things, in which is reflected ens inquantum ens, the subject of
metaphysics. In the Commentary on the Metaphysics, Albert argues that the
subject of metaphysics is ens inquantum ens,104 but does not offer any explana-
tion about the relationship between the latter and the quiddity of things. It is
worth mentioning that this being is the first created by the first cause, which
recalls the fourth proposition of the Book of Causes (Albert does not cite it here
explicitly).105
In the previously cited Commentary on the Divine Names, Albert argues in
favour of a necessary conversion of the intellect in order to produce a superior
form of knowledge that culminates with the knowledge of the first principle or
God. It is ultimately a circular movement of the soul, specifically of the agent
intellect, inasmuch as it proceeds from God, knows through the senses, and yet
departs from them, converts upon itself and from within the self it ascends to
God through knowledge.106
These, and probably other, general features testify to the possible influences
of Albert on Heymericus. However, it is equally important to note the differenc-
es between these authors. One aspect is the importance given by Heymericus
to the relationship between St. Paul’s anthropology and metaphysics.
One should also note that Albert argues, at least in the De intellectu et in-
telligibili, that the intelligible species are received in the human soul through
the (human) agent intellect (i.e. by abstraction from particulars) with the as-
sistance of the divine intelligence.107 This theory is endorsed by John of Nova
Domo, but not by Heymericus in the Colliget.108 Intelligible species exist in the
102 Albertus Magnus, Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus, c. 4 (ed. Simon, 134.31-36); c. 7
(344.30-33).
103 On the various interpretations of Albert’s conceptions of metaphysics see T. Noone, “Albert
on the Subject of Metaphysics,” A Companion to Albert the Great: Theology, Philosophy,
and the Sciences, ed. in I. Resnick (Leiden, 2013), 543-553; H. Anzulewicz, “Metaphysics
and its Relation to Theology in Albert’s Thought,” in A Companion to Albert the Great, ed.
Resnick, 553-561; J.A. Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought. From Philip
the Chancellor (ca. 1225) to Francisco Suárez (Leiden, 2012), 196-204.
104 Albertus Magnus, Metaphysica I, tr. 1, c. 2 (ed. Geyer, 4.51-53).
105 Albertus Magnus, Metaphysica I, tr. 1, c. 1 (ed. Geyer, 3.1-4).
106 Albertus Magnus, Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus, c. IV (ed. Simon, 202.60-203.7).
107 Albertus Magnus, De intellectu et intelligibile II, tr. unicus (ed. Borgnet, 504b). Cf. also De
intellectu et intelligibili I, tr. III, c. 3 (501b) et II, tr. unicus, c. IX (517b).
108 Iohannes Nova Domo, Tractatus universalium, in G.G. Meersseman, “Eine Schrift des
Kölner Universitätsprofessors Heymericus de Campo oder des Pariser Prof. Johannes de
Nova Domo?,” Jahrbuch des Kölnischen Geschichtsvereins 18 (1936), 144-168, at 157: “Unde
universalia sunt in anima nostra propter hoc, quod anima nostra est instrumentum

334 Calma
human intellect only by abstraction, and that is one of Heymericus’ main argu-
ments against Stoics.
Another difference between Heymericus and Albert consists in the relation-
ship between the universals post rem and the real sciences (scientie reales) that
study them. Unlike Albert, Heymericus explicitly argues that each of the three
modes of abstraction corresponds to one of the real sciences. Moreover, the
object of metaphysics is known by the intellect through a conversion to itself.
It cannot be denied that Heymericus revisits and links topics that are scat-
tered or dispersed throughout Albert’s works. But he equally offers a distinc-
tive philosophical contribution within this specific heritage. To consider
Heymericus as a mere epigone of Albert is to misjudge similarities of vocabu-
lary and themes.
Acknowledgments
This research began within the framework of a research project (NRF-

2017S1A2A2040705) of the Global Research Network program of the Ministry
of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation
of Korea. It has been finalized at the University of Bonn, thanks to the Friedrich
Wilhelm Bessel Research Award of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.
I wish to acknowledge my gratitude for the comments on previous drafts of
this article from Henryk Anzulewicz, Olivier Boulnois, Benno van Croesdijk,
Bill Duba, Evan King, Garrett Smith, and the two anonymous reviewers.
luminis primae intelligentiae, in quo prima intelligentia invehit suas formas secundum
proportiones recipientis.”
Vivarium 58 (2020) 305-334


Calma, Metaphysics As A Way of Life

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Vivarium 58 (2020) 305-334 v i va

Metaphysics as a Way of Life:

universals – Albert the Great – Aristotle – Neoplatonism – the Book of Causes

Heymericus de Campo (c.1395-1460) probably wrote the Colliget principiorum

2 Yet Again on Pierre Hadot’s Narrative

Pierre Hadot’s seminal reconstruction of the history of rationality presents

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focus on two models, each summarized by well-crafted expressions: on the

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20072); O. Boulnois, “Philosophia christiana. Une étape dans l’histoire de la rationalité

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to strengthen these links. Indeed, in the Metaphysics (XII, c. 7: 1072b22-30),

3 Universals and the History of Philosophy

Unlike some of his contemporaries,10 Heymericus does not seem to be ac-

9 Numerous fifteenth-century commentaries on the De anima, notably in Central and

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of life of these ancient philosophers is reflected in their doctrine on universals,

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a “Peripatetic” tradition in fundamental harmony with and even incorporating

16 Heymericus de Campo, Colliget principiorum, tr. I, d. 1, c. 1 (ed. Calma – Imbach, 291.3-

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4 Three Levels of Abstraction

21 Heymericus de Campo, Colliget principiorum, tr. I, d. 1, c. 1 (ed. Calma – Imbach, 292.5-11).

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26 Heymericus de Campo, Colliget principiorum, tr. I, d. 1, c. 2 (ed. Calma – Imbach, 292.15-16);

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34 Heymericus de Campo, Colliget principiorum, tr. I, d. 1, c. 5 (ed. Calma – Imbach, 296.82-

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UPR1 = UAR3 ⇒ physics

37 Heymericus de Campo, Colliget principiorum, tr. I, d. 1, c. 5 (ed. Calma – Imbach, 296.95-

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On the basis of this correspondences between reality and knowledge, one

39 Heymericus de Campo, Colliget principiorum, tr. I, d. 1, c. 16 (ed. Calma – Imbach,

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post rem.41 However, we cannot have any knowledge or science of universals

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universal, the singular, the accident.44 Metaphysics is a complete science

Deus est principium causans esse in omnibus (= Metaphysics I, c. 2:

44 Heymericus de Campo, Colliget principiorum, tr. I, d. 1, c. 12 (ed. Calma – Imbach,

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5 Metaphysics and the Ascesis from Images

Metaphysics is a science of self-reflexivity because being as such is known in

49 See below, notes 92 and 93.

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53 Heymericus de Campo, Colliget principiorum, tr. I, d. 1, c. 10 (ed. Calma – Imbach,

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In order to acquire the capacity of imagining God or other separate sub-

67 Heymericus de Campo, Colliget principiorum, tr. I, d. 1, c. 15 (ed. Calma – Imbach, 305.279-

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6 Metaphysics of the Inner Man

Heymericus refers on several occasions to the distinction introduced by

70 Heymericus de Campo, Colliget principiorum, tr. I, d. 2, c. 8 (ed. Calma – Imbach, 321.215-

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Heymericus describes in the Tractatus problematicus the same three lev-

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7 Metaphysics and Medieval Models of Philosophy as a Way of Life

Heymericus provides an understanding of philosophy as a way of life differ-

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an appropriate way to live according to human nature. However, unlike the

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