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In the years 1950-1953,1Canadian forces seemingly fought in the Korean War under the guidance of the

United Nations, upholding the principle of collective security. North Korea's sudden military invasion of its
neighbor prompted Canada to dispatch nearly 27,000 troops under the UN banner, operating under
American command.2 But the real politics of the mission seemed to have less to do with "collective
security" than with "containment".3 While many Canadians may view Canada's participation as
wholehearted support for the mission, I believe Lester B. Pearson's decision to actively oppose the war
was justified. This assertion stems from the ambiguity surrounding America’s true intentions behind the
war, its contradiction with Canada's diplomatic principles, and the disregard for Canadian dissenting
voices.

First off, the real intentions behind intervening in the Korean war was very unclear. Cold war assumptions
governed that the North Korean Attack was perceived by America as an aggression ordered by the Soviet
Union.4 President Truman's response was influenced by the failure of appeasement at Munich, thus
military response was launched,5 and support from the Security Council was pursued to garner backing
from countries opposed to acts of military aggression.6 The advantage to the Americans of working
through the UN was that it forced countries like Canada to match their rhetoric with action. However, the
disadvantage was granting supporters some decision-making power that Washington would have
preferred to retain.7 President Truman's address 8 about military action in Korea further fueled skepticism
about the war's motivations. The decision to intervene in the Formosa Strait, effectively turning Formosa
into a "U.S. protectorate," seemed disconnected from the purported goals of collective security and
restoring peace. This decision added unnecessary complications to an already volatile situation.
Furthermore before the Korean war, the US had no vital interests in Korea and was largely indifferent to
its fate.9

1
Herd, Alex. “Korean War.” The Canadian Encyclopedia, March 22, 2007.
https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/korean-war.
2
Belshaw, John Douglas. “9.4 the Cold War.” BCcampus Open , May 17, 2016.
https://opentextbc.ca/postconfederation/chapter/9-4-the-cold-war/.
3
Stairs, Denis. “Canada and the Korean War: Fifty Years On.” Canadian Military History, March 27, 2000.
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1293&context=cmh.
4
Matray, James I. “The Korean War 101: Causes, Course, and Conclusion of the Conflict.” Association
for Asian Studies, June 16, 2012.
https://www.asianstudies.org/publications/eaa/archives/the-korean-war-101-causes-course-and-c
onclusion-of-the-conflict/
5
Truman, Harry S. Years of trial and hope: 1946-1952, Memoirs. II. New York, New York: The New
American Library, 1965.
6
Stairs, Denis. “Canada and the Korean War: Fifty Years On.” Canadian Military History, March 27, 2000.
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1293&context=cmh.
7
Kennan, George F. George Kennan Memoirs 1925-1950. Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Browns, 1967.
8
Truman, Harry S. “Statement by the President on the Situation in Korea.” The American Presidency
Project, June 27, 1950.
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-the-president-the-situation-korea.
9
Matray, James I. “The Korean War 101: Causes, Course, and Conclusion of the Conflict.” Association
for Asian Studies, June 16, 2012.
https://www.asianstudies.org/publications/eaa/archives/the-korean-war-101-causes-course-and-c
onclusion-of-the-conflict/

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