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Canada and The Korean War - Fifty Years On
Canada and The Korean War - Fifty Years On
2000
Recommended Citation
Stairs, Denis "Canada and the Korean War: Fifty Years On." Canadian Military History 9, 3 (2000)
This Canadian War Museum Feature is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It
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Stairs: Canada and the Korean War: Fifty Years On
Denis Stairs
J n S e p te m b e r 1998, th e C a n a d ia n
W ar M u s e u m in itia te d a v is itin g
sp e a k e r series to m a k e available to the
d uring th e a n n iv e r s a r y w e e k e n d o f
J u n e 24-25, updating its Korean War
p e r m a n e n t ga llery, a n d m o u n tin g a
g e n e r a l p u b lic th e la te s t re se a rc h , travelling exhibit o f contem porary w ar
d e b a te a n d opinion on C anadian a n d p h o to g r a p h s , th e M u s e u m in v ite d
international military history. Like the D alhousie U niversity p ro fe sso r D enis
M u seu m 's highly popular film series, S ta ir s to c o m m e n t o n C a n a d a 's
the ta lks w ere u su a lly held on w e e k diplom atic role in the crisis fr o m the
nights a n d carried no a d m issio n fe e . p ersp ective o f 50 years. This, in effect,
T hey h a ve proven highly su ccessfu l, both w ith a m o u n t e d to a r e c o n s id e r a tio n o f th e
M u se u m visito rs a n d in v ite d s p e a k e r s . The arg u m en ts f ir s t p re se n te d in Professor Stairs'
la tt e r h a v e in c lu d e d e m i n e n t C a n a d ia n se m in a l work, T he D iplom acy of C o n strain t,
historians like Terry Copp, D avid B ercuson a n d w hich, tw en ty-five yea rs after its publication,
Bill M cAndrew , a n d international scholars like r e m a in s th e s t a n d a r d w o r k in th e f i e l d .
J o h n K eegan, P aul Gough, a n d C hristopher S p e a k in g on S u n d a y , 25 J u n e 2000, f i f t y years
P ugsley. In the a u tu m n o f 2000, the M useum to th e d a y a fte r N o rth K o re a n f o r c e s f i r s t
will w elcom e w orld-renow ned First World War c r o s s e d th e 3 8 t h p a r a lle l to in v a d e th e
scholar J a y W inter a n d Pulitzer Prize w inner A m erican-supported R epublic o f Korea in the
J a m e s M cPherson. south, the text o f his a d d re ss fo llo w s. Like the
m onograph on w hich it com m ents, the article
The M useum sta g e d one o f th e se e v e n ts to c o n stitu te s a critical com ponent o f C an a d a 's
c o in c id e w ith th e 5 0 th a n n iv e r s a r y o f th e Korean War literature, a tour d e fo r c e by one
o u tb re a k o f th e K orean War. In a d d itio n to o f C anada's m o st g ifted scholars.
hosting several h u n d red Korean War veterans
of them on th is high se a of th e G atineau Hills — global conflagration betw een the com m unist and
h e r arrival alongside n o t being reg a rd e d by th e a n ti- c o m m u n is t p o w e rs. In th e m e a n tim e ,
A ctin g U n d e r - S e c r e ta r y a s a p a r t i c u l a r l y however, th ere w as no need to h u rry b a c k to
welcome intrusion at a tim e of family conviviality. O ttaw a, sin ce th ere w as n o th in g of s u b s ta n c e
Having no telephone in h is co u n try hom e, a n d t h a t C a n a d a a t t h is p o in t c o u ld d o. T h e
having no desire either to re tu rn to O ttaw a before Departm ent of External Affairs — or th a t very
th e evening, Reid b ro u g h t th e g en iu s of th e sm all p a rt of it, a t a n y ra te , th a t w as now alert
dip lo m at to th e ta s k of resolving th e conflict to th e a ctio n on th e w eekend cables — w ould
betw een his du ty to th e sta te a n d his d u ty to his keep a b re a s t of developm ents well enough un til
son. M acdonald, it w as soon agreed, w ould drive M onday m orning.
the 16 m iles it w ould ta k e to get to th e P e a rso n
cottage, and inform the M inister. And so sh e did. S u c h w as the initial resp o n se of th o se in
P e a r s o n h a v in g n o te le p h o n e e ith e r , s h e O ttaw a ’s h ig h e st places to th e o u tb re a k of the
tra n s p o rte d him yet a n o th e r two m iles to the w ar in Korea. Their rea c tio n even th e n gave
n e a re s t p ublic booth, in Larrim ac, w here he testim o n y to two e n d u rin g c h a ra c te ristic s of
c a lled th e D e p a rtm e n t. In th e lig h t of th e C a n a d a ’s d iplom acy in th e p o litic o -se c u rity
intelligence he th en received, h e p u t th ro u g h a co n tex t — th e first of th em a m an ifestatio n of
second call, this time to the Prime Minister, Louis geopolitical reality, th e second a n expression of
St. L a u ren t, in St. P atrice. The two m en agreed stra te g ic practice. T he geopolitical reality w as
th a t the resp o n se to th e invasion w ould depend th a t in the context of any truly significant security
entirely on the A m ericans, since in the w e stern con fro n tatio n , the m o st c en tral d e te rm in a n t of
w orld of 1950 only th e U n ite d S ta te s h a d th e C a n a d ia n re s p o n s e w a s th e A m e ric a n
s ig n if ic a n t m ilita ry fo rc e s a t its d is p o s a l. resp o n se. The definition of th e C an a d ian policy
C ertainly th e UN itself h a d n o n e to deploy. B ut p ro b le m , in o th e r w o rd s, w a s u ltim a te ly a
in the u nlikely event th a t a m ilitary resp o n se fu n c tio n of how , in re a c tin g to c ris is , th e
did en su e, they hoped it w ould be u n d e r U nited A m ericans decided to behave. The ex pression
N ations a u sp ic e s. O therw ise, th ere w as a risk of strategic practice w as the desire to ensure th a t
th a t a local conflict in Korea w ould t u r n into a the substantive Am erican reaction, if substantive
rea c tio n th ere w as to be, w ould be c o n d u c te d
u n d e r m u ltila te ral a u sp ic e s — a u sp ic e s th a t
w ould give o th er players (C anada am ong them )
an entitlem ent to join in the policy-m aking game.
A m ericans doing it w ith o th ers were m ore likely
to be sen sib le th a n A m ericans doing it alone.
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Stairs: Canada and the Korean War: Fifty Years On
y core a rg u m e n t w en t som ething like this: From the C a n a d ian point of view, this m ight
M C a n a d ia n forces osten sib ly fought in the
K orean War u n d e r th e a u sp ic e s of th e U nited
n o t have m a tte re d very m u ch . H appy, after all,
is th e c o u n try th a t c a n identify its se cu rity a t
N ations, a n d in fulfilm ent of th e p rinciple of hom e w ith a peaceful order in the world a t large.
collective secu rity . After all, one s ta te ac to r S uch a circum stance allows the cosm etic politics
(N o rth K o re a ), a lt h o u g h n o t u n iv e r s a ll y of form a n d th e p ra c tic a l politics of action to be
recognized as a legitim ate sovereign power, h a d conveniently aligned. B u t in th is p a rtic u la r case
w ith o u t w a rn in g la u n c h e d a c o n v e n tio n a l th e a lig n m en t cam e w ith a cost a n d a risk. The
m ilitary invasion of its neighbour. The neighbour cost w as th e obligation to c o n trib u te to th e
being u n ab le to m o u n t a successful defence, the c o n d u c t of th e h o stilities — a n obligation th a t
m a tte r h a d been b ro u g h t before the UN S ecurity W ashington su ccessfu lly triggered a s soon as it
Council. The Council h a d im m ediately called for w en t to th e UN for su p p o rt. The risk w as th a t
th e re sto ra tio n of peace a n d th e w ith d raw al of th e A m ericans, as th e leading ch am p io n s of the
th e invading forces. W hen th e in v ad ers refused w e ste rn c a u se in th e cold w ar context, w ould
to comply, a n in ternational posse w as called out, becom e excessively excited a n d overplay th eir
a n d th e U nited S ta te s w as a sk e d to lead it. h a n d . T here w as a need, therefore, to keep a
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Stairs: Canada and the Korean War: Fifty Years On
re ta in in g h is m u c h larger role as
co m m an d er of A m erican forces in
th e e n tire P acific a re a . At one
p o in t it w as even su g g e ste d th a t
th e field of UN o p e r a tio n s be
defined in the proposed resolution
by p re c is e g e o g ra p h ic a l
coordinates, the principal pu rp o se
of w h ich w ould be to e s ta b lis h
v e ry e x p lic itly t h a t m il it a r y
o p e r a tio n s a r i s in g o u t of th e
C h in a p ro b le m w ould n o t be a
p a rt of th e UN m an d a te. O n th is
one, H um e W rong actually balked,
believing th e initiative w ould not
fly, a n d th in k in g in any case th a t
it w as too in tric a te a p ro p o sal to
be ad vanced a t so late a stag e in
th e gam e.
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Stairs: Canada and the Korean War: Fifty Years On
U ltim a te ly it d e a lt w ith th is p r o b le m by w o u ld r e q u i r e . W h e n h e w a s r e a d y , h e
a n n o u n c in g on A u g u st 7 the re c ru itm e n t of a la u n c h e d a tw o-pronged a s s a u lt a g a in st h is
C a n a d ia n A rm y S p e c ia l F o rc e fo r s e rv ic e N orth K orean a d v e rsa rie s — b rea k in g directly
overseas. T h a t service m ight well be in Korea, th ro u g h th e P u s a n pe rim ete r in th e so u th e a s t,
b u t if the fighting w as over by th e tim e th e Force while sim u ltaneously lau n ch in g a n am phibious
w as read y to go, th e troops w ould be s e n t to a tta c k b e h in d enem y lines a t th e p o rt of Inchon
E u ro p e instead. in th e n o rth w est. T his m anoeuvre — a classic
of its k in d — w as a n a s to u n d in g su c c e ss, a n d
From the point of view of m y ow n argum ent, in 11 days it led to th e d e stru c tio n a n d c a p tu re
th e m o st in te re stin g fea tu re of all th is w as th a t of th e b u lk of th e N orth K orean arm y. The
th e decision w as ta k e n so m ew h at relu ctan tly , c a p ita l city, S eoul, w as in th e h a n d s of UN
a n d very largely u n d e r p re s s u re from th e UN forces by the end of Septem ber, a n d very shortly
S ecretary-G eneral, Trygve Lie, w ho in tu r n w as th e re a fte r th e re m n a n ts of th e N orth K orean
reactin g to th e q u ite u n d e rs ta n d a b le A m erican arm y — less th a n 10 p e rc e n t of th e original
view th a t it w as high tim e th e allies s ta rte d to ta l — w ere d riv e n b a c k a c ro s s th e 3 8 th
p u ttin g up. They were not, after all, sh u ttin g up! p a ra lle l (w hich h a d b e e n th e d iv id in g line
B u t in paying th e ir d u es, th e C a n a d ia n s once b etw een th e two K oreas in th e first place).
a g a in s o u g h t to u s e th e c u rr e n c y of th e ir
c o n trib u tio n as a source of diplom atic leverage. T his m ilitary victory w as th e im m ed iate
In p a rtic u la r , P e a rs o n in s is te d , firs t, t h a t s o u r c e of a p o lic y p r o b le m . O n a s t r i c t
C a n a d ia n troops n o t be com m itted to th e front i n te r p r e ta t io n of th e o rig in a l i n te n t, a n d
u n til th e ir own officers th o u g h t th em read y for consistent w ith a m inim alist view of the collective
com bat, an d second, th a t they w ould n o t in any s e c u rity principle, it could be a rg u e d th a t the
c irc u m sta n c e s be a ssig n e d to th e defence of UN’s m ission h a d b een successfully com pleted.
F orm osa, an en te rp rise th a t w as n o t p a rt of the The ag g ressio n h a d b e e n repelled, th e victim
UN C o m m an d ’s m a n d a te in th e field. T hese lib e r a te d , a n d th e s ta tu s quo a n te b e llu m
g u a ra n te e s w ere forthcom ing, a n d th e first of resto re d . B u t if th e a p p e tite s of th e ag g resso rs
th em eventually proved very u sefu l to C anadian h a d b e e n dulled, th e a p p e tite s of th e defenders
forces in Korea itself, w h en the ord ers reflecting — Am erican a n d S o u th Korean alike — h a d been
t h e m h a d to b e u s e d by th e C a n a d i a n sh arp en ed . The UN h a d been on record for som e
com m ander to fend off th e b lan d ish m e n ts of his tim e a s favouring th e peaceful reu n ificatio n of
A m erican su p e rio rs, w ho w a n te d to deploy his K orea u n d e r dem ocratic au sp ices. The m ilitary
tro o p s to th e fro n t th e m o m en t th ey arrived in cap acity of th e N orth w as now in d isa rra y . The
th e th e a tre , a n d b efo re th e ir tra in in g w as S o u th K oreans a n d th e UN C om m and w ere in
complete. The preoccupation w ith separating the the ascendant, or could easily become so. In such
K orean a n d F o rm o sa n iss u e s w as, of course, c irc u m sta n c e s, it w as h a rd ly s u rp risin g th a t
re c u rre n t, a lth o u g h in th e e n d it w as to be S y n g m a n R hee a n d G eneral M acA rthur (the
o v erru n by o th er events. la tte r w ith s u p p o r t from W ash in g to n ) w ere
u n ite d in w an tin g to drive th e victory hom e by
Before then, however, th ere were to be other tak in g th eir forces acro ss the 3 8 th parallel. This
dip lo m atic e n g a g e m e n ts of relev an ce to my w o u ld allow th e m to c o m p le te th e t a s k of
in te r p r e ta t io n of th e ta le . T h e s e c a m e In u n ific atio n w hile th e ir own iron w as hot, a n d
Septem ber-O ctober 1950, w hen there w as heavy w hile th e ir enem y’s w as cold.
A m erican p re s s u re on th e UN to ex p an d the
scope of th e K orean operation. T his p re s s u re At firs t, th e r e w a s so m e s u g g e s tio n in
cam e n o t from m ilitary failure, b u t from m ilitary W ashington th a t the phraseology of th e J u n e 27
success. S outh K orean a n d A m erican forces h ad a n d J u ly 5 re so lu tio n s of th e S ecu rity C ouncil
m an ag ed d u rin g th e sum m er, a n d a t great cost, w as sufficiently loose to w a rra n t their proceeding
to b rin g the N orth K orean advance to a h a lt a t a in th is w ay w ith o u t fu rth e r au th o rity . N orth
defensive p e rim ete r a ro u n d th e p o rt of P u sa n . Korea, after all, could be said to be “in th e a re a ”
T his sta b iliz atio n of th e fro n t w as a cru cial (although P earson’s own view h a d b een th a t “the
development, because it gave General M acA rthur a re a ” in q u e stio n sh o u ld be ta k e n to en d a t the
th e tim e he needed to m a rsh a l th e su p p lies an d 4 0 th p a ra lle l — t h a t is, no m ore th a n 120
reinforcem ents th a t a n effective counter-offensive n a u tic a l m iles n o r th of th e p r e - h o s tilitie s
border). O th er m em b ers of th e UN, however, it w as com pletely a t odds w ith the G en eral’s
C anada included, took the view th a t crossing the own in te n t, a s h is s u b s e q u e n t advance to th e
parallel in order to unify Korea by forces of a rm s Yalu River a n d the b o rd er w ith C hina readily
w ould a m o u n t to a co n sid erab le e sca latio n of d e m o n stra ted .
purpose, a n d could lead to a dangerous response
from th e Soviet Union, a n d p e rh a p s also from As we all know , th is la s t offensive — th e so-
C h in a . T h is w a s p r e c i s e l y th e s o r t of called “Hom e by C h ristm a s ” offensive — w as to
developm ent th a t the C anadians h a d feared from be ru d ely in te rru p te d by th e C hinese, w ho h a d
th e very b e g in n in g , a n d som e of P e a rs o n ’s show n u p in th e th e a tre h ere a n d th ere a s early
colleagues u rg ed h im to o p p o se it. B u t th e as th e en d of O ctober, b u t who now in terv en ed
A m ericans were su c c e ssfu l in p e rs u a d in g th e in m assive n u m b ers a t the end of November. This
B ritish a n d o thers to su p p o rt th eir position, a n d m ade it all too evident th a t u n itin g Korea u n d e r
th is m ade c o n tin u e d oppo sitio n b o th difficult w estern auspices was not a n objective th a t could
a n d p o in tle s s . P e a rso n did su g g e st t h a t a n be reconciled w ith Peking’s view of w hat C h in a’s
a tte m p t be m ad e before th e re s o lu tio n w as se cu rity req u ired — a s th e C hinese a n d th e
actu ally p u t to a vote to op en u p n eg o tiatio n s In d ian s h a d tried repeatedly to m ake clear over
w ith th e N orth K orean regim e, sin ce it w as the p reced in g m o n th s, a n d a s th e C a n a d ian s,
conceivable th a t Pyongyang w ould a c ce p t th e a m o n g o th e rs, h a d h a lf-su s p e c te d from th e
defeat an d reconcile itself to a peaceful resolution beginning. As a C a n a d ia n h isto ria n observed
of the underlying political problem . B ut th e idea som e 53 y e a rs ago, C h in a w as “as unw illing to
fell on d e a f e a rs. V ario u s o th e r d ip lo m atic adm it s u c h a p lan for Korea as the United S tates
initiatives were sim ilarly a tte m p te d — som e of m ight have b een if United N ations forces, m ostly
th e m a im e d a t r e d u c i n g th e f re e d o m of Chinese, h a d been about to arrange for a people’s
m an o eu v re th a t India, in p a rticu la r, feared th e dem ocracy of M exico.”6
A m ericans w ere giving to th e ir irre p re ssib le
th e a tre com m ander. The L illiputians, in sh o rt, The C a n a d ia n a n d A m erican re sp o n se s to
were still w orking h a rd to co n tain th eir Gulliver. th e C hinese in terv en tio n w ere s ta rk ly a t odds.
For the A m ericans — still b ru ised by the success
E ventually, however, P e a rso n h im se lf gave of M ao’s revolution, deeply influenced by the
way, a lth o u g h only after se c u rin g w h a t h e took sw ay of the C hina Lobby, convinced in an y case
to be a n inform al A m erican co m m itm en t n o t to th a t c o m m u n ism w as b o th a m onolithic a n d a
allow UN tro o p s to advance beyond th e n a rro w darkly m enacing th reat to their security an d their
w aist of th e K orean p e n in s u la , a b o u t half-w ay c iv iliz a tio n , a n d n o w s u ffe rin g s ig n ific a n t
betw een the 3 8 th parallel a n d the Yalu River. The c a su a ltie s a t th e h a n d s of a Red Army — th ere
u p sh o t w as th a t yet a n o th e r resolution (this one was only one possibility. An illicit an d oppressive
in the G eneral Assembly, since the Soviet Union Chinese regime h a d come to th e aid of a n equally
h a d re tu rn e d in A ugust to th e S ecu rity C ouncil illicit a n d oppressive aggressor in the com m unity
a n d h a d g ro u n d its b u s in e s s to a h alt) w as of n ations. T h at m ade the governm ent in Peking
p a s s e d w ith C a n a d a ’s r e lu c ta n t s u p p o rt on a n a g g re s s o r, too, a n d it left n o ro o m for
O c to b e r 7. In e ffe c t, it a u th o r i z e d a UN accom m odation. It h a d to be labelled for w h at it
C o m m a n d a d v a n c e in to N o rth K orea a s a w as, a n d su b je c te d to a h a rd m ilitary lesson.
p relu d e to th e e s ta b lis h m e n t of a unified a n d No w e a k n e ss could be show n. C ertain ly no
dem ocratically elected g o vernm ent th ro u g h o u t rew ard could be given. A tough line was required.
the p en in su la.
For th e C an ad ian s, by c o n tra st, there w as a
The A m erican u n d e rta k in g n o t to ad v an ce n a tu ra l ten dency to conclude th a t the course of
b eyond th e p e n in s u la ’s n a rro w w a ist — a n events h a d proven th e ir h e s ita tio n s rig h t all
u n d e rta k in g ren d ered by th e S ecretary of State, along. E x p a n d in g th e o b jectiv es of th e UN
D ean A cheson, a t a tim e w hen h e w as u n a w a re C om m and to in clu d e th e forcible u n ificatio n of
of certain co n trary developm ents in W ashington Korea h a d b een a m istak e. The C hinese m ight
— w as only p a rtly a t o d d s w ith P re s id e n t be m isbehaving, b u t th e ir m isbehaviour, in the
T ru m a n ’s a c tu a l in s tru c tio n s to M acA rthur, circum stances, w as easily understood. The need
w hich enjoined him n o t to allow UN forces to now w as to lim it the dam age — in effect, to
p e n e trate K orea’s n o rth e rn m o st provinces. B u t co n tain th e hostilities by de-escalating them .
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Stairs: Canada and the Korean War: Fifty Years On
Photo by Paul E.
Tomelin, NAC PA
Sherman tanks of “B” Squadron, Lord Strathcona’s Horse,
115496 completing a tour ojfront-line duty in Korea, 16 July 1952.
m a k in g a n y s u c h c o n c e ssio n . Som e of th e S tu e c k , on th e b a s is of h is a n a ly s is of th e
p la y e rs involved, in c lu d in g th e C a n a d ia n s , p e rtin e n t diplom atic files in a wide a rra y of
th o u g h t th ere w as still room for m anoeuvre, b u t n a tio n a l archives, a n d p u b lish e d in 1995 by
in the end the United S ta te s in sisted on bringing P rin c e to n U n iv e rsity P re s s , it offers in its
f o rw a r d its c o n d e m n in g r e s o l u ti o n . T h e in tro d u c tio n th e following observation:
C a n a d ian s, fearing th a t c o n tin u e d opposition
w ould a lie n ate th e A m ericans en tirely while A s e c o n d th e m e [of th is book] c e n te rs o n th e
role of th e U n ite d N atio n s, w h ic h o th e r sc h o la rs
disrupting the all-im portant unity of the w estern
h a v e w ritte n off a s little m ore th a n a n in s tru m e n t
alliance, a t th a t poin t th re w in th e towel. While o f U .S. policy. To b e s u r e , th e in te rn a tio n a l
describ in g th e reso lu tio n a s “p re m a tu re a n d o rg a n iz a tio n o fte n p la y e d t h a t ro le, b u t j u s t a s
unw ise,” they nonetheless voted in its favour, an d often it p ro v id ed th e se ttin g for allied a n d n e u tra l
the reso lu tio n w as p a sse d on F e b ru ary 1, 1951. p r e s s u r e o n th e U n ite d S ta te s , a n in s titu tio n a l
It b ro u g h t to a n end an y im m ediate p ro sp e c t of fra m e w o rk w ith in w h ic h w e a k e r n a tio n s c o u ld
c o o rd in a te th e ir effo rts to in flu e n c e th e w o rld 's
a negotiated ce ssa tio n of hostilities.
g r e a t e s t p o w e r. S u c h e ff o rts f r e q u e n tly
s u c c e e d e d , in p a r t b e c a u s e m a n y of th o s e
There were other diplom atic engagem ents of n a tio n s h a d c o n trib u te d fo rces to K orea. T he UN
a sim ila r sort, som e of th e m ore im p o rta n t of role in th e K o rean W ar m e rits a tte n tio n n o t only
th e m c e n tr in g on a c o n tr o v e rs y o v e r th e a s a n a g e n c y o f c o lle c tiv e s e c u r ity a g a in s t
rep atriation of Chinese a n d N orth Korean POWs “a g g re s s io n ,” b u t a s a c h a n n e l of r e s tr a in t o n a
s u p e r p o w e r t h a t o c c a s i o n a ll y f lir te d w ith
in th e final p h a s e s of th e war. B u t th e gen eral
ex cessiv ely ris k y e n d e a v o rs .7
p a tte rn by th en h a d been firmly established. The
C a n a d ia n s w ere c e rta in ly s u p p o rtiv e of th e I could h a rd ly have said it b e tte r myself!
w estern cause, an d were d eterm ined to n u rtu re
the u n ity of th e w e stern play ers. At th e sam e B u t of course I ca n n o t get aw ay so lightly as
tim e, th ey w orked q u ite h a rd to c o n s tra in th e all th a t, a n d a t th e m o st gen eral level it is n o t
b e h a v io u r of A m erican policy-m akers, w hich difficult to m o u n t a counter-interpretation, m uch
th e y r e g a r d e d a s o c c a s i o n a l l y g iv e n to less flattering (some m ight feel) to th e C an ad ian
counterproductive extrem es. T heir strategy w as position. For a s ta rt, it is a b so lu te ly clear th a t
to act as m uch as possible in diplom atic coalition all th e m ajo r decisions on th e “UN” side in th e
w ith o th e r m em b ers of th e U nited N ations, a K o rean W ar w ere u ltim a te ly m ad e by, a n d
s tr a te g y t h a t u ltim a te ly d e p e n d e d o n th e dep en d en t u pon, the U nited S tates. Even w here
w illin g n e ss of th e A m e ric a n a u th o r itie s to the A m ericans were actively opposed by th e ir
o p e ra te u n d e r UN a u s p ic e s . U ltim ately , of allies, th ey alm o st alw ays w on th e day in the
course, C a n a d a ’s diplom atic capabilities, like end. C a n a d a h a d no influence over the J u n e 25
those of th e o th er c o n trib u to rs to th e war, were d e c is io n c a llin g on th e N o rth K o re a n s to
lim ited by a t le a st one u n d e rly in g reality. The w ithdraw . Nor did it have any significant im pact
A m ericans were paying m o st of th e p ip e r’s bill. on e ith e r th e tim ing or th e s u b s ta n c e of th e
It followed th a t they w ere calling m o st of th e r e s o lu tio n of J u n e 27, w h ic h in v o k ed th e
p ip e r’s tu n e s . To sw itch th e m etap h o r, C a n a d a collective s e c u rity p rin c ip le . T he A m erican
could nibble a t th e m argins of A m erican policy, decision to intervene w ith n av al a n d a ir forces
b u t n o t a t th e core. w as m ade in W ashington a n d p u t into p ractical
effect on a u n ila te ra l b a sis. The U nited S ta te s,
moreover, w as in complete control of UN m ilitary
Countervailing Views o p erations, a n d for som e of th e m o st im p o rta n t
p h a s e s of th e w ar (including m o st p a rtic u la rly
S u c h w as th e essen ce of m y a rg u m e n t m ore
th a n a q u a rte r-c en tu ry ago, a n d self-serving
though you m ay th in k m e for saying so, it seem s
th e a d v a n c e in to N o rth K orea), “A m e ric an
co n tro l” did n o t m ea n control by th e P re sid e n t
a n d Jo in t Chiefs of Staff, b u t by the increasingly
to me to be hanging in there reasonably well even u n c o n tro lla b le th e a tre c o m m an d er, G en eral
today. So sh a m e le ss am I, in fact, th a t I c a n n o t M acA rthur. W hen the A m ericans decided th a t
re s is t q u o tin g from w h a t is p ro b ab ly th e m o st they sh o u ld seize the o pportunity to unify Korea
c o m p le te a n d s c h o l a r l y a c c o u n t o f th e b y fo rce of a rm s , th e y c e r ta in ly r a n in to
in te rn atio n a l h isto ry of th e K orean War to date. opposition. B u t th e n th ey r a n over it. C a n a d a
W ritten by th e A m erican h is to ria n , W illiam a n d som e of th e o th er pow ers were su c ce ssfu l
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol9/iss3/5 10
Stairs: Canada and the Korean War: Fifty Years On
force th a t w ould c o n tin u e long after th e m a tte r 5. G reg D onaghy, ed., D ocum ents on C a n a d ia n E xternal
R ela tio n s: Volum e 16 - 1 9 5 0 (O ttaw a: M in iste r of
in K orea h a d b een reso lv e d .9 Of th is , I w as
S u p p ly a n d S ervices C a n a d a for th e D e p a rtm e n t of
com pletely un aw are. Sim ilarly, it a p p e a rs from Foreign Affairs an d In te rn a tio n a l T rade, 1996). p p .2 2
his account, as well as from th a t of Robert Prince, 23.
t h a t w i n n i n g C a b i n e t a p p r o v a l fo r th e 6. W.E.C. H arriso n , C a n a d a in World A ffa irs, 1949-1950
(Toronto: O xford U niversity P re ss for the C a n a d ia n
recru itm en t of the C anadian Army Special Force
In s titu te of In te rn a tio n a l Affairs, 1957), p.293.
w as a far m ore difficult challenge th a n I h a d 7. W illiam S tu e c k , T he K orean War: A n In tern a tio n a l
previously u n d e rsto o d it to be. Again, Steven H istory (Princeton: P rin ceto n U niversity P ress, 1995),
H ugh Lee h a s d e m o n stra te d th a t th e te n sio n s p.4.
th a t developed w ith th e A m ericans over th e 8. R obert S. Prince, “The Lim its of C on strain t: C an ad ian -
A m erican R elatio n s a n d th e K orean War," J o u rn a l o f
reso lu tio n of th e POW re p a tria tio n issu e in th e C a n a d ia n S tu d ie s, Vol. 27, No. 4 (W inter 1992-93),
final m o n th s of th e w ar w ere far m ore volatile p. 130.
a n d com plex th a n I w as able in 1974 to re p o rt.10 9. See Greg D onaghy, “The R oad to C o n stra in t: C a n a d a
C h e ster R onning h a d a llu d ed briefly in a 1966 a n d th e K orean War, Ju n e -D e c e m b e r 1 9 5 0 ,” in J o h n
H illiker a n d May H alloran, eds., Diplomatic D ocum ents
article to C a n a d a ’s hav in g played a n im p o rta n t a n d T h e ir U s e r s ( O tta w a : H is t o r ic a l S e c ti o n ,
role in cajoling th e A m ericans into accep tin g a D ep artm en t of Foreign Affairs an d In tern atio n al Trade,
p ro p o sal th a t led to th e final se ttle m e n t of th is 1995), p p .189-212.
10. Steven H ugh Lee, “A Special R elationship? C anada-U .S.
i s s u e , " b u t I w a s u n a b le t h e n to o b ta in
R e la tio n s a n d th e K o rean A rm istice N eg o tiations,
ad ditional inform ation. J a n u a ry -J u ly 1 9 5 3 ,"Ibid., p p .213-228.
11. C h ester A. R onning, “C a n ad a an d th e U nited N ations,”
It goes w ith o u t saying th a t the h isto ric a l in J. King G ordon, ed., C a n a d a ’s Role a s a M iddle
record is m u ch improved as a resu lt of im portant P ow er (Toronto: C a n a d ia n In s titu te of In te rn a tio n a l
Affairs, 1966), p p .37-50. See especially p p .41-2.
studies of this kind, an d certainly those who wish
to a s s e s s th e ro le s p la y e d re s p e c tiv e ly by
particu lar individuals in the political leadership,
as well a s in th e foreign service, can n o t perform C u rren tly M cCulloch P rofessor in Political
th eir ta s k s effectively w ith o u t them . Science a t D alhousie University, Denis Stairs
is a fo rm e r P re s id e n t of th e C a n a d ia n
B u t a t a m ore general level of analysis, I still Political Science A ssociation, a n d w as th e
th in k C an ad ian policy-m akers h a d a reasonable founding D irector of D alh o u sie's C entre for
r u n a t tying G ulliver down. The fact th a t he Foreign Policy S tu d ie s from 1970 to 1975.
e v e n tu a ll y b r o k e fre e , a n d d id a lo t of He served as C hair of h is D e p a rtm en t from
u n n ecessary dam age in spite of us, simply spoke 1 9 8 0 to 1 9 8 5 , a n d a s V ic e -P r e s id e n t
th en , a s it still sp e a k s now, to th e fact th a t h e (A cadem ic a n d R e se a rc h ) from 1988 to
w as, a n d is, a trifle bigger th a n all th e o th e r 1993. A F ellow of th e R oyal S o ciety of
in h a b ita n ts of Lilliput. C an ad a, h e specializes in C a n a d ia n foreign
a n d defence policy, C an ad a-U .S . relatio n s,
a n d sim ilar su b je c ts. He w rote th e p osition
Notes p ap er on “C ontem porary Security Issu es” for
th e Special J o in t C om m ittee of the S e n a te
a n d of th e H ouse of C om m ons Reviewing
1. See H arry S. T ru m a n , M em oirs. II: Years o f Trial a n d
C a n a d ia n Foreign Policy in 1994. R ecent
H o p ei New York-. S ig n et B ooks, 1965), p p .3 7 8 -3 7 9 . p u b lic a tio n s w ith a focus on m ilitary a n d
2. George F. K ennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, se cu rity affairs include “The m edia a n d the
Brow n, 1967), p.4 9 0 . m ilitary in C anada: reflections on a tim e of
3. D enis S ta irs, T h e D iplom acy o f C onstraint: C anada,
th e K orea n War, a n d th e U n ited S ta te s (T o ro n to :
tro u b le s ,” International Journal, Vol. LIII,
U niversity ofT o ro n to P ress, 1974), p.xi. No. 3 (S um m er 1998), pp. 5 44-553, a n d
4. A m erican a n a ly s ts, too, h av e o ccasio n ally th o u g h t of “C a n a d a a n d th e s e c u r i t y p r o b le m :
th e ir c o u n try as a G ulliver c o n stra in e d by L illip u tian im p lic a tio n s a s th e m ille n n iu m t u r n s , ”
th read s. See, for exam ple, S tanley H offm ann, Gulliver’s
Troubles, Or th e Settin g o f A m erica n Foreign Policy
In te r n a tio n a l J o u r n a l, Vol. LIV, No. 3
(New York: M cGraw-Hill for T he C ouncil o n Foreign (S um m er 1999), pp. 3 86-403.
R elations, 1968).
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