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Inclusive Trade in Africa

Providing the first book-length analysis of the African Continental Free Trade
Area (AfCFTA), this volume asks how can it be ensured that the AfCFTA is
effectively implemented to deliver inclusive trade in Africa.
The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) will cover an African
market of 1.2 billion people and GDP of over $2.5 trillion, across all 55 member
States of the African Union. Yet, trade policy increasingly appreciates that free
trade is not enough; trade must also be inclusive to deliver developmental benefits.
With contributions from leading trade policy authors across Africa and beyond,
this book offers insights into the development and implementation of the AfCFTA
and serves as a reference for stakeholders interested in trade in Africa more
broadly. The contributors assess what important lessons can be drawn from the
experiences of regional integration in and beyond Africa, including from success
stories like ASEAN as well as from failures like the Free Trade Agreement of the
Americas.
An important new work for researchers and policymakers focusing on African
trade and economic policy, and trade policy more generally.

David Luke is Coordinator of the African Trade Policy Centre at the United
Nations Economic Commission for Africa.

Jamie MacLeod is a Trade Policy Expert in the African Trade Policy Centre at
the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.
The International Political Economy of New Regionalisms Series
Series Editor: Timothy M. Shaw

The International Political Economy of New Regionalisms Series presents innova-

tive analyses of a range of novel regional relations and institutions. Going beyond
established, formal, interstate economic organizations, this essential series pro-
vides informed interdisciplinary and international research and debate about myr-
iad heterogeneous intermediate-level interactions. Reflective of its cosmopolitan
and creative orientation, this series is developed by an international editorial team
of established and emerging scholars in both the South and North. It reinforces
ongoing networks of analysts in both academia and think-tanks as well as inter-
national agencies concerned with micro-, meso- and macro-level regionalisms.

The Relevance of Regions in a Globalized World

Bridging the Social Sciences-Humanities Gap
Edited by Galia Press-Barnathan, Ruth Fine and Arie Kacowicz

Expanding Perspectives on Human Rights in Africa

Edited by M. Raymond Izarali, Oliver Masakure and Bonny Ibhawoh

The International Political Economy of the BRICS

Edited by Li Xing

Structural Change in Africa

Misperceptions, New Narratives and Development in the 21st Century
Carlos Lopes and George Kararach

Multipolarization, South-South Cooperation, and the Rise of Post-

Hegemonic Governance
Efe Can Gürcan

Inclusive Trade in Africa

The African Continental Free Trade Area in Comparative Perspective
Edited by David Luke and Jamie MacLeod

For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/

ASHSER-1146
Inclusive Trade in Africa
The African Continental Free Trade
Area in Comparative Perspective

Edited by David Luke and

Jamie MacLeod
First published 2019
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2019 selection and editorial matter, David Luke and Jamie MacLeod;
individual chapters, the contributors
The right of David Luke and Jamie MacLeod to be identified as the
authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual
chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in
any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing
from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation
without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
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ISBN: 978-1-138-39452-0 (hbk)
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Typeset in Times New Roman
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Contents

List of figures vii

List of tables ix
List of contributors x
List of acronyms xii
Foreword xvi

Introduction: bringing about inclusive trade in Africa with

the African Continental Free Trade Area 1
D AV I D L U K E A ND JAMI E MACL E OD

1 Making the case for the African Continental Free Trade Area 5
D AV I D L U K E

PART I
Lessons learned from regional integration in Africa
and beyond 13

2 The AfCFTA as yet another experiment towards continental

integration: retrospect and prospect 15
G U I L L A U M E GÉ ROUT, JAMI E MACL E OD AND MELA K U D ESTA

3 The failure of the Free Trade Area of the Americas: a

cautionary tale for the African Continental Free Trade Area 35
S E B A S T I A N H E RRE ROS

4 ASEAN at 50 and beyond 49

M I A M I K I C A N D WE I RAN S HANG
vi Contents
PART II
Implementing a “win-win” AfCFTA 67

5 How important is special and differential treatment for

an inclusive AfCFTA? 69
L I LY S O M M ER AND JAMI E MACL E OD

6 AfCFTA, value chains and overlapping origin regimes:

a complementarity assessment along a segment of the
copper value chain in Africa 87
G U I L L A U M E GÉ ROUT AND HARRI S ON ADDO- O BIRI

7 Governance for an effective AfCFTA 120

B A B A J I D E S ODI P O

8 The AfCFTA in a changing trade landscape: rise of the

emerging market economies and the persistence of
African export dependency 134
J A M I E M A C L E OD

9 Regional Aid for Trade in Africa: a catalyst for economic

integration and development 147
F R A N S L A MME RS E N, RAF FAE L A MUOI O AND MICH A EL RO B ERTS

PART III
Preparing for the AfCFTA phase II negotiations 165

10 Approaching competition policy in the AfCFTA 167

E L I Z A B E T H GACHUI RI

11 A principled approach to intellectual property rights and

innovation in the African Continental Free Trade Agreement 177
C A R O L I N E N CUBE , TOBI AS S CHONWE T T E R, JER EMY D E B EER
A N D C H I D I OGUAMANAM

Index 195
Figures

1.1 African Continental Free Trade Area: key features 6

1.2 Composition of Africa’s exports to outside and within Africa 7
1.3 Share of Africa’s exports destined for Africa (percentage) 7
1.4 Intra-African trade comprises less extractive exports 8
2.1 Organogram of envisaged continental integration, 2012
Boosting Intra-African Trade Action Plan 25
3.1 Structure of Latin American merchandise exports to the world
by technology intensity, 2016 36
3.2 Share of China and the United States in Latin America and the
Caribbean’s total merchandise trade, 2000–2017 43
4.1 Share of tariff lines at 0% in the ASEAN Free Trade Area
(ATIGA) tariff schedule 52
4.2 Increase in Non-Tariff Measures in ASEAN 53
4.3 Transition from AEC 2015 to AEC 2025 54
4.4 ASEAN’s total merchandise trade and each major trading
partner’s share 56
5.1 African countries as a sub-set of all countries, by GNI per
capita (2017) 74
6.1 Spaghetti bowl of RTAs across Africa 88
6.2 Overview of the upstream and downstream linkages to the
copper cathode segment of the value chain 93
6.3 Africa’s participation in world copper trade 94
6.4 Existing and potential trade 95
6.5 Baseline scenario: preferences used by DRC and Zambia in
trade in copper products 98
6.6 Alternative scenario 1: preferences used in trade flowing
between and from COMESA and SADC FTA countries 101
6.7 Alternative scenario 2: copper trade flowing between and
from COMESA, SADC and Agadir countries 104
8.1 Africa’s trade profile and its dependency on extractive
resources, 2000 to 2016, real 2016 US$ 135
8.2 Extractive commodity prices, 2000 to 2016 136
8.3 Contribution to world GDP, by analytic groupings 137
viii Figures
8.4 Constituent economies of the EME group, arranged by
2016 GDP 138
8.5 Destination share of Africa’s exports, percentages 138
8.6 Origin share of Africa’s imports, percentages 139
8.7 Evolution of Africa’s exports, by destination, 2016$ 139
8.8 Evolution of Africa’s imports, by source, 2016$ 140
8.9 Composition of Africa’s exports to the emerging market
economies, 2000–2016 141
8.10 Composition of Africa’s exports to the Global North,
2000–2016 142
8.11 Composition of intra-African trade, 2000–2016 142
8.12 Africa’s declining industrial share of GDP and EME trade
(imports plus exports) 144
9.1 Development finance flows by DAC and IFIs: share per GNI
per capita 150
9.2 Aid for Trade disbursements by region and sector 152
9.3 Share of regional and subregional Aid for Trade 153
9.4 Regional and subregional Aid for Trade disbursements by
region and sector 154
9.5 Regional Aid for Trade to Africa, disbursements by sector 155
9.6 Average GVC participation index by region 1996–2011 160
10.1 The map of situation in Africa in terms of competition law 169
Tables

3.1 Main regional economic integration blocs and free trade agreements
in the Western Hemisphere, 1994 38
4.1 Selected indicators showing development gaps 60
5.1 African country groupings by GNI per capita (2017) and LDC
and SVE status (2018) 73
5.2 Typology of African countries 75
5.3 Flexibilities and Technical Assistance in the Agreement and
Protocols of the AfCFTA 80
5.4 Level of ambition and modalities for tariff liberalization 81
6.1 Overlaps in intra-African RTAs 89
6.2 Overlaps in cross-regional FTAs 90
6.3 Overlapping origin requirements, preferences granted to DRC
and Zambia on copper products 99
6.4 Overlapping origin requirements, SADC and COMESA 103
6.5 Change in tariff heading vs. maximum non-originating material
content requirement 106
6.6 Tariffs faced by DRC, Zambia and Egypt in export market along
the copper value chain 107
6.7 Intra-African overlapping origin regimes 114
6.8 Cross-regional overlapping origin regimes 115
6.9 All overlapping origin regimes 117
8.1 List of emerging market economies 137
8.2 Volatility of exports, by market, 2000–2016 140
8.3 Composition of Africa’s ‘non-extractive’ exports to destination
markets, 3-year average 2014–2016 143
8.4 Composition of Africa’s imports, by analytic groupings, 3-year
average 2014–2016 143
Contributors

The editors
David Luke is Coordinator of the African Trade Policy Centre at the United
Nations Economic Commission for Africa. He is responsible for leading the
UN Economic Commission for Africa’s (ECA) research, policy advisory ser-
vices, training and capacity development on inclusive trade policies and in
particular the boosting intra-African trade and the African Continental Free
Trade Area initiatives. His portfolio also includes WTO, EPAs, Brexit, AGOA,
Africa’s trade with emerging economies and trade and cross-cutting policy
areas such as trade, industrialization and structural transformation, trade and
gender, trade and public health and trade and climate change. Prior to joining
ECA in 2014, he served as UNDP trade policy adviser in Southern Africa and
Geneva and also as Senior Economist and Chief of Trade at the Organization
for African Unity/African Union Commission, and as an Associate Professor
at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Canada. He holds a B.Sc. and M.Sc. from
the London School of Economics and a Ph.D from the School of Oriental and
African Studies, London.
Jamie MacLeod is a Trade Policy Expert of the Africa Trade Policy Centre at
the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa, Ethio-
pia. He has consulted broadly on trade policy issues, including with the World
Bank, the European Commission and the Danish International Development
Agency, and was formerly a Trade Economist at the Ghanaian Ministry of
Trade and Industry. He holds an M.Sc. in Economics for Development from
the University of Oxford, where he was awarded the Snell Scholarship, and an
M.A. in Economics from the University of Glasgow.

The contributors
Harrison Addo-Obiri is an individual trade policy consultant
Jeremy de Beer is Full Professor at the Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa
and Senior Research Associate, Intellectual Property Unit, University of Cape
Town
 Contributors xi
Melaku Desta is the Principal Regional Advisor at the United Nations Economic
Commission for Africa
Elizabeth Gachuiri is an Economic Affairs Officer at the United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development
Guillaume Gérout is a Trade Policy Expert at the United Nations Economic
Commission for Africa
Sebastian Herreros is an Economic Affairs Officer at the International Trade and
Integration Division of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean
Frans Lammersen is Principal Administrator in the Development Cooperation
directorate of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
Mia Mikic is Director of the Trade, Investment, and Innovation Division of the
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
Raffaela Muoio is a Research Associate at the International Development Organ-
isation BRAC
Caroline Ncube is Full Professor and the DST/NRF/Nedbank SARChI Research
Chair in Intellectual Property, Innovation and Development in the Commercial
Law Department, Faculty of Law, University of Cape Town
Chidi Oguamanam is Full Professor at the Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa
Michael Roberts is Head of the Aid for Trade Unit in the Development Division
of the World Trade Organization
Tobias Schonwetter is Associate Professor in the Commercial Law Department
and Director, Intellectual Property Unit, University of Cape Town
Weiran Shang is an Intern/Research Assistant in the Office of Director of Trade,
Investment and Innovation Division at the United Nations
Babajide Sodipo is a Senior Trade Advisor at the African Union Commission
Lily Sommer is a Trade Policy Expert at the United Nations Economic Commis-
sion for Africa
Acronyms

ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific

ACTA Counterfeiting and Trade Agreement
ADB Asian Development Bank
AEC African Economic Community or ASEAN Economic
Community
AFAS ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services
AFCAC African Civil Aviation Commission
AfCFTA African Continental Free Trade Area
AfDB African Development Bank
AfT Aid for Trade
AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Area
AGOA African Growth and Opportunity Act
AIDA Accelerated Industrial Development of Africa
ALALC Latin American Free Trade Association
ALBA Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America
AMOT African Ministers of Trade
AMS ASEAN Member States
AMU Arab Maghreb Union
APRM African Peer Review Mechanism
APTA ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangement
ARIA Assessing Regional Integration in Africa
ARIPO African Regional Intellectual Property Organisation
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ATIGA ASEAN Agreement on Trade in Goods
ATISA ASEAN Trade in Services Agreement
AU African Union
AUC African Union Commission
BEC Broad Economic Categories
BIAT Boosting Intra-African Trade
BITs bilateral investment treaties
CAK Competition Authority of Kenya
CARICOM Caribbean Community
CEMAC Central African Economic and Monetary Community
 Acronyms xiii
CEN-SAD Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CEPT Common External Preferential Tariff
CETA Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
CLMV Cambodia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, and Viet Nam
COMAI Conference of African Ministers in charge of Integration
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPTPP Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership
CTH change in tariff heading
CTSH change in tariff sub-heading
CUTS Consumer Unity and Trust Society
DAC Development Assistance Committee
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAC East African Community
EAI Enterprise for the Americas Initiative
ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States
ECLAC United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and
the Caribbean
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EFTA European Free Trade Association
EME Emerging Market Economies
EPA Economic Partnership Agreement
ESCAP United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and
the Pacific
EU European Union
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FTA Free Trade Agreement
FTAA Free Trade Agreement of the Americas
GATS General Agreements on Services
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCI Global Competitiveness Index
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GNI Gross National Income
GSP Generalised System of Preferences
GVCs Global Value Chains
HDI Human Development Index
HS Harmonised System
ICA Infrastructure Consortium for Africa
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ICT information communications and technology
IDB Inter-American Development Bank
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGADD Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
IOC Indian Ocean Commission
IP Intellectual Property
xiv Acronyms
IPR Intellectual Property Rights
ISI import-substituting industrialization
ITC International Trade Centre
LDCs Less Developed Countries
LLDCs landlocked developing countries
LMICs lower middle-income countries
LPA Lagos Plan of Action
MERCOSUR Common Market of the South
MRAs Mutual Recognition Agreements
MRTAs Mega-regional trade agreements
MSMEs Micro, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
MULPOC Multinational Programming and Operational Centres
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NC change in heading
NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NSBs National Standards Bureaus
NTMs Non-Tariff Barriers
OAPI Organisation Africaine de la Propriété Intellectuelle
OAU Organization of African Unity
ODA Official Development Assistance
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PAFTA Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement
PAIPO Pan African Intellectual Property Organisation
PAP Pan-African Parliament
PIPA Protect IP Act
PPP Purchasing Power Parity
PRC Permanent Representatives Council
PSC Peace and Security Council
PTA Preferential Trade Area of Eastern and Southern Africa
PTAs Preferential Trade Agreements
RCEP Regional and Comprehensive Economic Partnership
REC Regional Economic Community
RoO Rules of Origin
RPP UNCTAD Research Platform
RTA Regional Trade Agreement
S&D Special and Differential Treatment
SACU Southern African Customs Union
SADC Southern African Development Community
SADCC Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SCP Special Compliance Program
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
SMEs Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
SOPA Stop Online Piracy Act
SPS sanitary and phytosanitary
SVEs small, vulnerable economies
 Acronyms xv
TACB technical assistance and capacity building
TBT Technical barriers to trade
TFA Trade Facilitation Agreement
TFTA Tripartite Free Trade Area
TK Traditional Knowledge
TMEA TradeMark East Africa
TMSA TradeMark Southern Africa
TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership
TRALAC Trade Law Centre
TRIMS Trade-Related Investment Measures
TRIPs Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
TTCA-NC Northern Corridor Transit and Transport Coordination Authority
UDEAC Union Douaniere et Economique de l’Afrique Centrale
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UEMOA Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine
UMICs upper middle-income countries
UN United Nations
UNASUR Union of South American Nations
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNGCP UN Guidelines on Consumer Protection
VA value addition
VNOM value of non-originating materials
WAEMU West African Economic and Monetary Union
WAMZ West African Monetary Zone
WIPO World Intellectual Property Organisation
WTO World Trade Organization
Foreword

A world-class team of policy analysts, practitioners and researchers has collabo-

rated to produce this book of analysis on inclusive trade in the African Conti-
nental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). In doing so, the contributors have cast their
perspectives wide, drawing from comparable efforts in the Free Trade Area of
the Americas and the Association of South East Asian Nations. They have also
probed deeply into the heart of the AfCFTA, with coverage of key institutional,
policy and program issues, including the important and sensitive question of dis-
tribution of benefits as they relate to the African Continental Free Trade Area, the
book is most welcome and timely. It will certainly provide clarity on this land-
mark achievement in the development trajectory of Africa.
African countries gained independence as a collection of small and fragmented
economies virtually isolated from each other. The African Continental Free Trade
Area changes that by creating a large and integrated economy benefiting from
economies of scale and, in the process, attracting substantial and long-term invest-
ments from within and outside Africa. With a large and integrated market that is
committed to progressively removing tariff and non-tariff barriers, Africa now
has a real opportunity to embark on industrialization and structural transforma-
tion that should in turn contribute towards a prosperous, resilient and competitive
economy. The chapter on value chains sheds additional light on this historically
challenging issue for Africa. The enlarged AfCFTA market also has the potential
to promote public-private partnerships in the development of trade-related infra-
structure across Africa, thereby physically and electronically connecting African
economies to each other.
The African Union Heads of State and Government are fully committed to
making the African Continental Free Trade Area work. Only six countries, at the
time of writing, are yet to sign the Agreement Establishing the African Continen-
tal Free Trade Area. However, it is our expectation that they will do so during
2019. Ratifications are also progressing very well. Twelve out of the minimum
twenty-two ratifications that are required to make the Agreement enter into force
have so far been received. Equally important, preparatory work on the remain-
ing operative parts of the Agreement, including rules of origin and schedules of
concessions and commitments for trade in goods and trade in services, are in
advanced stages, all making it possible to start operating the market as soon as the
Agreement enters into force.
 Foreword xvii
Africa is, however, committed to going beyond the minimum of ratifications
required to bring the AfCFTA into effect. The African Continental Free Trade
Area phase II negotiations addressed in the book as well as the Single African
Air Transport Market and the Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Eco-
nomic Community Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence
and Right of Establishment all point to an evolving program of creating, in the
not-too-distant future, the African Economic Community envisaged in the Abuja
Treaty.
Staff of the Department of Trade and Industry of the African Union Commis-
sion and I have worked with most of the authors of the various chapters of this
book. I am very happy that they have now collaborated to come up with this
book, the first in what promises to be an extensive area of focus among research-
ers, writers and policymakers from both within and outside Africa. I would like
to thank them for the collaborative effort which also underlies the fact that the
African Continental Free Trade Area project is itself a collaborative effort among
African Union member states.
I highly recommend the book to all readers interested in the progress of Africa
as it provides useful insights in this regard.
Albert Muchanga
Commissioner for Trade and Industry
African Union Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
1 December 2018
Introduction
Bringing about inclusive trade in Africa
with the African Continental Free Trade
Area1
David Luke and Jamie MacLeod

Inclusive trade with the AfCFTA

The launch and signature of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)
Agreement by 44 African countries in an extraordinary summit of the African
Union in Kigali, Rwanda, on 21 March 2018, marks a momentous milestone for
economic integration in Africa. By November 2018, a further five African coun-
tries had signed the Agreement while another three had instead signed the Kigali
Agreement – a non-binding political declaration reaffirming commitment to the
AfCFTA.
The significance of this achievement is not to be underestimated. The vision of
African continental integration to which the AfCFTA contributes is over 50 years
old. It originates in an appreciation that the political independence achieved with
decolonization would be ineffective in realizing a better life for the peoples of
Africa unless consummated with economic independence (Nkrumah, 1957). As
with political independence, this ‘economic decolonisation’ was thought to be
best leveraged through a regional approach (Adedeji, 1984). Since then, the vision
of economic integration has persisted. Though its expression has evolved, and the
methods towards its attainment have developed, it has held fast as an instrument
for Africa’s economic prosperity. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the economic
rationale for the AfCFTA while Chapter 2 chronicles the evolution of the vision
of African continental economic integration, explaining the more than 50-year
process which culminated in its negotiation.
Africa is not the only regional entity to have appreciated the potential of
economic integration. The European Union provides perhaps the world’s most
comprehensive and deep example of integration. Yet it encompasses countries
considerably more developed than those in Africa. More comparable contexts –
and comparators for integration – include the failed attempt at the integration of
the Americas with the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas project, which is the
topic of Chapter 3. After a decade of negotiations, this particular project failed;
it neglected to account for the diversity of its constituent countries, aggressively
pushed complex regulatory topics, and was perceived as being pursued primarily
in the interests of its most advanced member country, the United States. Central to
this failure was an approach that did not ensure inclusive gains to all its countries,
ultimately resulting in its unraveling.
2 David Luke and Jamie MacLeod
Successful integration projects can also provide lessons for Africa. The ASEAN
experience does exactly this. It similarly involves a diverse collection of develop-
ing and least developed countries, yet shows how, with an incremental and inter-
active approach, integration can succeed. The ‘ASEAN Way’ involved a form of
integration that developed regional linkages without building a fortress to the out-
side world. It therefore reinforced regional integration with greater global integra-
tion, helping to promote the competitiveness of its economies. Chapter 4 provides
an overview of the development of ASEAN, helping to draw lessons from its suc-
cesses and stumbling blocks for the African context. Of particular note is the way
in which ASEAN provided greater flexibilities and support for its less developed
CLMV countries (Cambodia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, and Viet Nam). Yet challenges
in these areas remain, and going forward responsible trade and investment poli-
cies for inclusivity and sustainable development remain a focus of ASEAN.
AfCFTA negotiators surpassed expectations with the pace with which the
negotiations were accomplished. Launched on 15 June 2015, at the 25th Ordi-
nary Summit of the African Union Heads of State and Government, the texts of
the AfCFTA Agreement and its Protocols on Trade in Goods, Trade in Services
and on Rules and Procedures on the Settlement of Disputes, were concluded in
less than three years. By the June 2018 Summit of the African Union Assembly,
further instruments had been negotiated and added to the Agreement, including
Annexes on Customs Co-operation and Mutual Administrative Assistance, Trade
Facilitation, Non-Tariff Barriers, Technical Barriers to Trade, Sanitary and Phy-
tosanitary Measures, Transit, and Trade Remedies. As such, the AfCFTA amounts
to a comprehensive and deep free trade area.
This represents a remarkably short amount of time for a subject area in which
negotiations have a reputation for typically being drawn-out and time-consuming
affairs. Free trade area negotiations between the European Union and the United
States have been being negotiated for over five years without conclusion. Those
between a number of Asian countries in the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership have been ongoing for over seven years. At the multilateral level, the
Doha Development Round negotiations at the WTO have been ongoing without
conclusion for 17 years. Even in Africa, the Economic Partnership Agreement
negotiations, between regional groupings of African countries and the European
Union, have lasted for more than 16 years and have only begun implementation
in Southern Africa.
What is all the more impressive is the collection of countries being brought
together in the African context under the AfCFTA. African countries range in
economic size with Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ranging from less than $1 bil-
lion, in the case of Sao Tome and Principe, to more than $350 billion, in the case
of Nigeria and South Africa, in 2018. GDP per capita ranges from under $250, in
the case of South Sudan, to over $20,000 in Equatorial Guinea. There are 15 land-
locked countries and six Small Island Developing Economies in Africa (ECA,
AUC & AfDB, 2017). Several have sizeable manufacturing sectors, while many
have largely undiversified economies, focusing on a small number of agricultural,
mineral, or fuel commodities (ECA, AUC & AfDB, 2017). Most economies in
 Introduction 3
Africa are poor relative to the rest of the world; almost 70 percent of the world’s
LDCs are located in Africa. Yet, despite capacity constraints African negotiators
have worked swiftly.
The particular range of countries in Africa has necessitated a smart approach
to special and differential treatment provisions to ensure an inclusive AfCFTA.
Special and differential treatment is a mechanism used to provide flexibilities and
longer implementation periods for countries within a trade agreement, typically
used to help support less developed countries. While divergent in their economic
structures and sizes, most African countries face economic challenges in vari-
ous ways. Moreover, while they range in their level of development, all African
countries are developing. As such, the approach to S&D in the AfCFTA had to be
different. Chapter 5 assesses the case for special and differential treatment in the
AfCFTA, and evaluates the particular provisions provided for in the AfCFTA.
Another critical issue required to support an effectively inclusive AfCFTA is
rules of origin. Good rules of origin ensure that necessary inputs can be imported
from outside of a trading area, to be incorporated into products that are then sold
within that area. At best they are easy for businesses to use and customs authori-
ties to assess. However, traders in Africa currently face a complex web of over-
lapping rules of origin regimes needed to trade between the various sub-regional
African free trade areas. Chapter 6 uses a novel methodology to assess the impli-
cations of overlapping origin requirements in Africa.
Good AfCFTA provisions must be complemented with good governance insti-
tutions if the AfCFTA is to be an effective free trade area. Chapter 7 provides a
review of the AfCFTA oversight institutions, including the role of the regional
economic communities in those institutions and their alignment with the broader
African Union system. It explains how the institutions have been designed, the
alternative options considered in the negotiations, and how they are envisaged to
work once up and running.
The AfCFTA is not being negotiated in a static world. The products on sale in
the marketplaces across Africa have changed considerably over the last decade,
reflecting an increasing amount of imports of consumer products from the emerg-
ing market economies, and in particular China. At the same time, Africa’s tradi-
tional export pattern of selling commodities to the advanced European economies
and the United States has also changed, with many of these products channeled
increasingly to the emerging markets. Chapter 8 provides an overview of the
changing trade landscape in which the AfCFTA has been negotiated, focusing in
particular on Africa’s persistent export dependencies.
Regional aid for trade provides a catalyst for the AfCFTA. It helps both with
the implementation of the AfCFTA, such as through support for regional infra-
structure or mechanisms to identify and remove non-tariff barriers, as well as with
direct country support to develop pre-requisite productive capacities. The least
developed countries in Africa, with less scope for considerable domestic resource
mobilization, can in particular benefit from aid for trade. Chapter 9 evaluates
regional aid for trade in Africa, noting its importance for ensuring inclusive ben-
efits from the AfCFTA.
4 David Luke and Jamie MacLeod
When the African Union Assembly launched the AfCFTA negotiations in 2015,
it envisaged a second phase of negotiations to cover the topics of competition,
investment, and intellectual property rights. At the time of writing, negotiations
on these topics are expected to commence in early 2019. The book concludes with
two chapters that look ahead to these issues, reflecting on appropriate approaches
to these advanced negotiating issues that can be beneficial to the African context.
The AfCFTA will enter into force only after 22 member States of the African
Union have deposited their instruments of AfCFTA ratification with the Chairper-
son of the African Union Commission. By November 2018, 11 such instruments
of ratification had been, or were in the process of being, deposited. These included
ratifications by Rwanda, Niger, Ghana, Kenya, Chad, Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire,
eSwatini, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and South Africa. At its July meeting in 2018,
the African Union Assembly anticipated that the AfCFTA would enter into force
by July 2019.2 At the time of writing, that goal looks achievable. With its entry
into force, the AfCFTA will cement a tremendous step forward in the economic
integration of the African continent.

Notes
1 The views expressed throughout this book are those of the authors and may not reflect
those of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.
2 Assembly Decision Assembly/AU /Dec.692(XXXI).

References
Adedeji, A. (1984, November 2–4). The Monrovia Strategy and the Lagos Plan of Action
for African Development: Five Years After. Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada.
ECA, AUC & AfDB. (2017). Assessing Regional Integration in Africa VIII: Bringing
the AfCFTA About. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: United Nations Economic Commission for
Africa, African Union and African Development.
Nkrumah, K. (1957). Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah. Edinburgh: Thomas
Nelson.
1 Making the case for the African
Continental Free Trade Area
David Luke

The case for the AfCFTA

Making the case for the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is a no
brainer. The main arguments concern population, market potential and dynamism,
economies of scale and scope. These are strong impetuses for trade-led diversifi-
cation away from Africa’s commodity dependence and towards industrial devel-
opment and structural economic change. The fact that the AfCFTA is win-win for
all African countries, good for Africa’s women and the attainment of the sustain-
able development goals (SDGs) makes the case for the AfCFTA unassailable.
The AfCFTA will cover a market of 1.3 billion people and a gross domestic
product (GDP) of $2.5 trillion, across the 55 member states of the African Union.1
In terms of the number of participating countries, the AfCFTA will be the world’s
largest trade agreement since the formation of the World Trade Organization. Fig-
ure 1.1 provides an overview of the scope of the Agreement.
The African market is also highly dynamic. The population of Africa is pro-
jected to reach 2.5 billion by 2050, at which point it will comprise 26 per cent of
what is projected to be the world’s working-age population, with an economy that
is estimated to grow twice as rapidly as that of the developed world.2
With average tariffs of 6.1 per cent, businesses currently face higher tariffs
when they export within Africa than when they export outside it. The AfCFTA
will over a period of 15 years after entry into force progressively eliminate tariffs
on intra-African trade, making it easier for African businesses to trade within the
continent and cater to and benefit from the growing African market.
Consolidating this continent into one trade area provides great opportunities
for trading enterprises, businesses and consumers across Africa and the chance
to support sustainable development in the world’s least-developed region. The
UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) estimates that the AfCFTA has the
potential both to boost intra-African trade by 52.3 per cent by eliminating import
duties, and to double this trade if non-tariff barriers are also reduced (Karingi and
Mevel, 2012). Economic modelling at the Commission shows that the AfCFTA
is a win-win proposition for all African countries in terms of intra-African export
growth and overall welfare or GDP (ECA, 2018).
6 David Luke

Eliminaon of dues and quantave restricons on

imports

Imports shall be treated no less favourably than domesc

products

Eliminaon of non-tariff

Rules of Origin
Protocol on Trade
in Goods Cooperaon of customs authories

Trade facilitaon and transit

Trade remedies, protecons for infant industries and

general excepons

Cooperation over product standards and regulaons

Agreement
Technical assistance, capacity-building and cooperaon
establishing
the African Transparency of service regulaons
Connental
Mutual recognion of standards, licensing and
Free Trade
cerficaon of services suppliers
Area
Protocol on Trade
Progressive liberalizaon of services sectors
in Services
Service suppliers shall be treated no less favourably than
domesc suppliers in liberalized sectors

Provision for general and security excepons

Protocol on Rules and Procedures for Selement of Disputes within

Dispute Selement the African Connental Free Trade Area

Intellectual property rights

Investment
Phase 2
negoaons Compeon policies

E-Commerce (E-commerce is under consideraon for

inclusion in phase 2)

Figure 1.1 African Continental Free Trade Area: key features

Source: Agreement Establishing the AfCFTA

Diversification and industrial development

Africa’s industrial exports are forecast to benefit most from the AfCFTA. This
is important for diversifying Africa’s trade and encouraging a move away from
extractive commodities, such as oil and minerals, which have traditionally
accounted for most of Africa’s exports, towards a more balanced and sustainable
 Making the case for the AfCFTA 7
export base. Over 70 per cent of Africa’s exports outside the continent were
extractives from 2014 to 2016, while less than 40 per cent of intra-African trade
were extractives in the same period. See Figures 1.2 and 1.3.
The great risk with products like oil and minerals is their volatility. The fiscal
and economic fate of too many African countries relies on the vicissitudes of these
product prices. Using the AfCFTA to pivot away from extractive exports will help

Exports to outside Africa Exports to within Africa

Extracve exports
Non-extracve exports

Figure 1.2 Composition of Africa’s exports to outside and within Africa

Source: CEPII-BACI International Trade Database3

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 1.3 Share of Africa’s exports destined for Africa (percentage)

Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics
8 David Luke
to secure more sustainable and inclusive trade that is less dependent on the fluc-
tuations of commodity prices.
Perhaps most importantly, the AfCFTA will also produce more jobs for Africa’s
bulging youth population. This is because extractive exports, on which Africa’s
trade is currently based, are less labour-intensive than the manufactures and agri-
cultural goods that will benefit most from AfCFTA. By promoting more labour-
intensive trade, the AfCFTA creates more employment. See Figure 1.4a, b, c.

a) Intra-African Extracve Exports

(Real 2010$)

100bn
90bn
80bn
70bn
60bn
50bn
40bn
30bn
20bn
10bn
bn
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Non-Extracve Exports Extracve Exports

b) Extracve commodity prices

140

120

100

80

60

40
Crude oil, $/bbl
20
Metals & minerals, 2000=100

0 Precious metals, 2010=100

2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016

Figure 1.4 Intra-African trade comprises less extractive exports

Source: CEPII-BACI trade dataset and World Bank commodities market data
 Making the case for the AfCFTA 9

c) Extacve Exports, RoW

(Real 2010$)

700bn
Non-Extracve Exports Extracve Exports
600bn

500bn

400bn

300bn

200bn

100bn

bn
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Figure 1.4 (Continued)

Economies of scale and scope

Small and medium-sized enterprises are key to growth in Africa. They account for
around 80 per cent of the region’s businesses. These businesses usually struggle
to penetrate more advanced overseas markets. But in a consolidated continental
market, they are well positioned to exploit scale economies, tap into continental
export destinations and use the continental market as a stepping stone for expand-
ing into overseas markets including through continental supply chains as well
as global value chains. For example, before exporting cars overseas, large auto-
mobile manufacturers in South Africa source inputs, including leather for seats
from Botswana and fabrics from Lesotho, under the preferential Southern African
Customs Union trading regime.

The AfCFTA is good for Africa’s women

Analyses of the impact of the AfCFTA at the household level suggest that the
effect between male- and female-headed households is broadly quite balanced;
both gain by differing degrees in different countries (Chauvin et al., 2016). How-
ever, women in particular can benefit from improvements to the challenges they
face as informal cross-border traders.
Women are estimated to account for around 70 per cent of informal cross-border
traders in Africa. When engaged in such an activity, women are particularly vul-
nerable to harassment, violence, confiscation of goods and even imprisonment.
By reducing tariffs, the AfCFTA makes it more affordable for informal traders
to operate through formal channels, which offer more protection. This can be
further enhanced by simplified trading regimes for small traders, such as the
10 David Luke
Simplified Trade Regime in the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA), which provides a simplified clearing procedure alongside reduced
import duties that provide particular help to small-scale traders.

The AfCFTA is win-win for all African countries

African countries have a diversity of economic configurations and will be affected
in different ways by the AfCFTA. Nevertheless, the benefits from the AfCFTA are
widespread.
While African countries that are relatively more industrialized are well placed
to take advantage of the opportunities for manufactured goods, less-industrialized
countries can benefit from linking into regional value chains. Regional value
chains involve larger industries sourcing their supplies from smaller industries
across borders. The AfCFTA makes the formation of regional value chains easier
by reducing trade costs and facilitating investment.
Agricultural countries can gain from satisfying Africa’s growing food security
requirements. The perishable nature of many agricultural food products means that
they are particularly responsive to improvements in customs clearance times and
logistics that are expected of the AfCFTA. Across the continent, the Consolidated
African Agricultural Development Plan (CAADP) provides an essential frame-
work for boosting agricultural productivity and ushering in a green revolution.
The majority of African countries are classified as resource rich. Tariffs on raw
materials are already low and so the AfCFTA can do little to further promote these
exports. However, by lowering intra-African tariffs on intermediates and final
goods, the AfCFTA will create additional opportunities for adding value to natural
resources and for diversifying into new business areas.
The cost of being landlocked includes higher costs of freight and unpredictable
transit times. The AfCFTA provides particular benefits to these countries: in addi-
tion to reducing tariffs, the AfCFTA is set to include provisions on trade facilita-
tion, transit and customs cooperation.
It will nevertheless be vital that the AfCFTA is supported with accompanying
measures and policies.
Less-industrialized countries can benefit from the implementation of the pro-
gramme for the Accelerated Industrial Development of Africa; domestic invest-
ments in education and training can ensure the necessary complementary skills.
Implementation of the Africa Mining Vision can complement the AfCFTA,
by helping resource-based economies to strategically diversify their exports into
other African markets.
The Boosting Intra-African Trade (BIAT) Action Plan, an African Union pro-
gramme, is the principal accompanying measure for the AfCFTA. It outlines the
areas in which investments are required, such as trade information and access to
finance, to ensure that all African countries can benefit from the AfCFTA.
These continental policy frameworks will require country-level customization
as the basis for a coherent AfCFTA national strategy.
 Making the case for the AfCFTA 11
The AfCFTA is good for the SDGs
The AfCFTA is a flagship project of Africa’s Agenda 2063. It was approved by the
African Union Summit as an urgent initiative whose immediate implementation
would provide quick wins, impact on socio-economic development and enhance con-
fidence and the commitment of Africans as the owners and drivers of Agenda 2063.
The cumulative effect of the AfCFTA is to contribute to the achievement of the
2030 Agenda, in particular, to the Sustainable Development Goals, from targets for
decent work and economic growth (Goal 8) and the promotion of industry (Goal 9),
to food security (Goal 2) and affordable access to health services (Goal 3).
By supporting African industrialization and economic development, the AfCFTA
can also help to reduce the continent’s reliance on external resources. This would
allow Africa to better finance its own development, which is recognized under
Goal 17.
Of utmost importance, however, is Goal 1 and keeping the pledge that “no one
will be left behind . . . starting with the furthest behind first”. For this, it is crucial
that governments across Africa implement measures to accompany the AfCFTA,
such as the African Union’s Boosting Intra-African Trade Action Plan, but also
that the African private sector step up to invest in, and take advantage of, the
opportunities arising from AfCFTA.

Conclusion: the AfCFTA Agreement and its broad implications

This is the water-tight case for the AfCFTA. It should therefore come as no sur-
prise that 44 of the AU’s 55 member states signed the AfCFTA Agreement at the
conclusion of the negotiations in Kigali, in March 2018. An additional four mem-
ber states have since signed, bringing the total number of signatories to 49. There
is strong momentum behind the Agreement. Twenty-two ratifications are required
for its entry into force. By December 2018, 14 countries had ratified with the rati-
fication process having progressed to an advanced stage in another 16 countries.
With such strong tail winds, and under the guidance of the conference of Afri-
can Trade Ministers, the African Union Commission and its technical partners
including the ECA are actively preparing for a second phase of AfCFTA negotia-
tions. This will cover investment, intellectual property rights, competition policy
and possibly e-commerce. With liberalization of trade in services already a part
of the AfCFTA Agreement, these “behind the border” arrangements will take the
AfCFTA beyond a traditional FTA in goods. The African market is in effect being
transformed into a single market for trade in goods and services with common
rules and policy frameworks across the phase 2 issues. This will also provide trade
policy coherence in the way Africa as a continental market engages with its trad-
ing partners. Indeed, trade agreements between Africa as a continental entity and
third parties are now already envisaged.
In its Dispute Settlement Mechanism modelled after the WTO, and an inter-
governmental trade governance system also drawing inspiration from the institutional
12 David Luke
arrangements for secretarial support and oversight at the WTO, the AfCFTA will
usher in a new era of certainty, predictability and rule of law for the conduct of
trade on the African continent. With the AfCFTA, trade governance in Africa has
entered the 21st century.

Note
1 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017)
and IMF GDP estimate for Africa 2019 (IMF, 2018).
2 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017).
3 Extractive exports are defined as comprising petroleum oils, gas, non-ferrous metals,
metalliferous ores and metal scrap, crude fertilizers and minerals, coal, coke and bri-
quettes, and the remaining precious metals in HS 71, uranium and the basic iron prod-
ucts of HS7201–HS7206.

References
Chauvin, D., N. Ramos, and G. Porto 2016. “Trade, Growth, and Welfare Impacts of the
CFTA in Africa”. https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_
name=CSAE2017&paper_id=749.
ECA (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa). 2018. “An Empirical Assessment
of the African Continental Free Trade Area Modalities on Goods”. Accessed 26 Decem-
ber 2018. www.uneca.org/publications/empirical-assessment-afcfta-modalities-goods.
IMF 2018. World Economic Outlook, October. https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/
datasets/WEO
Karingi, S., and S. Mevel 2012. “Deepening Regional Integration in Africa: A Computable
General Equilibrium Assessment of the Establishment of a Continental Free Trade Area
Followed by a Continental Customs Union”. Paper for presentation at the 15th Global
Trade Analysis Project Conference, Geneva, 27–29 June.
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division 2017.
World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, DVD Edition. https://population.
un.org/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/.
Part I

Lessons learned from regional

integration in Africa and
beyond
2 The AfCFTA as yet another experiment
towards continental integration
Retrospect and prospect
Guillaume Gérout, Jamie MacLeod and
Melaku Desta

Introduction
This chapter discerns five periods of African economic integration in which dis-
tinct approaches to integration were experimented with. In doing so, it charts the
historical narrative through which the vision of integration in Africa has been
refined.
The initial experiments in African economic integration were small-scale, sub-
regional, and incidental to the political agenda that dominated the Pan-African
movement. The formation of the Organization of African Unity in 1963 provided
an institutional platform at continental level to such experiments. In their early
form, experiments at continental economic integration involved political declara-
tions and resolutions, and were never founded in a binding legal treaty. In this
early stage, economic cooperation was perceived mostly as a means for achieving
mainly political ends, rather than as an end in itself.
The 1979 Monrovia Summit and the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action mark the sec-
ond phase of continental economic integration. They laid out the first systematic
political programme for integration and envisaged a binding continental treaty to
realize that vision. At this point, the defining features of the continental integra-
tion processes were: (i) the prominence of politics, as opposed to law, and (ii) the
increasing appreciation of the need for sub-regional integration as a precursor to
continental integration. Here the economic rationale for integration centred on
ideas of African economic self-reliance and self-sustainment. Integration dur-
ing this period would ultimately collapse under a plague of economic crises that
Africa faced in the 1980s.
The third phase of African continental economic integration starts with the
adoption of the Abuja Treaty on 3 June 1991. A milestone in the process of Afri-
can integration, it laid down a detailed 34-year programme of integration in
uncharacteristically mandatory and legalistic language, complete with an institu-
tional mechanism, including a court, to see to it that those commitments were imple-
mented. The two defining features this time then became: (i) the prominence of
law over politics to ensure the agreed programme was implemented, and (ii) the
affirmation of closer progressive integration at subregional level as a prerequisite
for continental integration and the determination to establish the latter using the
former as its building blocks. However, legalism aside, the Abuja programme of
16 Guillaume Gérout et al.
subregion-based continental economic integration did not deliver on its promises
either. Instead of conducting themselves as they had promised under the Treaty,
countries prevaricated, created more RECs than necessary, and joined more than
one REC at the same time, all of which combined to effectively derail Abuja’s
carefully laid out integration agenda.
In the fourth phase, out of a sense of frustration with these developments but
also driven by a desire to further accelerate the integration process, the Boost-
ing Intra-African Trade (BIAT) decision in 2012 envisaged the building of an
African Continental Free Trade Area through the consolidation of the existing
RECs into two super-RECs – one each for the eastern and the western halves of
the Continent – before combining these grand RECs, and any remaining coun-
tries, into a continental free trade area. The one for the eastern half of the conti-
nent was to come in the form of the tripartite free trade agreement combining the
East African Community (EAC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa (COMESA) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC),
while the other half would be formed by all non-Tripartite RECs through parallel
arrangements similar to the Tripartite Initiative. The two defining features of this
time were: (i) a renewed focus on further rationalizing the multiplicity of over-
lapping RECs, and (ii) a re-envisaging of the first step of the integration process
from a continental customs union that was meant to be formed out of subregional
customs unions, to a free trade area that would be formed by regional economic
communities merging their free trade zones together.
The final phase of African continental economic integration commences with
the launch of negotiations for the AfCFTA Agreement in 2015. The AfCFTA
became the legal manifestation of the experiment envisaged in the BIAT Action
Plan, attempting to cast a single free trade area over the African continent,
rather than merge REC customs unions or super-REC free trade areas. This final
phase retains, and deepens, the place of law in the endeavour, and takes a bold,
if incomplete, step towards finally rationalizing the multiplicity of overlapping
REC trading regimes in Africa. In this latter formulation the vision of integra-
tion has evolved from one centred on ideas of self-reliance, self-sustainment and
economic independence, into one that sees economic integration as a tool for
economic development. Rather than substituting a dependence on external mar-
kets for Africa’s commodities, the vision is to advance away from an economic
dependence on commodities altogether, towards African industrialization.
Though it has evolved to reflect developments in economic theory, the vision
of African integration has retained much. At its core remains the enduring idea
that integration enhances competitiveness within the continent, helping to drive
efficiency and therein competitiveness within African and global markets. There
remains also the notion that Africa can achieve more if it will “speak with one voice
and act collectively to promote our common interests and positions in the interna-
tional arena” (AUC, 2015, p. 10).
African continental integration is therefore a vision that has persisted for over
50 years. Though its expression has evolved, and the methods towards its attain-
ment have changed over time, it has held fast as an instrument for Africa’s eco-
nomic prosperity.
 AfCFTA as experiment towards integration 17
1889–1979: Refining a vision – attempts at building
subregional trading blocks
African economic integration at the continental level was preceded by a long
history of smaller-scale economic and political integration initiatives at bilateral
and subregional levels. As early as 1889, the British Colony of Cape of Good
Hope and the Orange Free State Boer Republic had begun cooperating through
a customs union convention, which was extended in 1910 to the Union of South
Africa and the British High Commission Territories1 under the title of the South-
ern African Customs Union (SACU) Agreement (SACU, 2018).2 In 1917, a cus-
toms union was established between Kenya and Uganda, then enlarged to include
Tanganyika3 in 1927 (EAC, 2017). In Western Africa, in 1958, two independent
West African countries decided to enhance political cooperation by forming the
Ghana-Guinea union, which Mali acceded to in 1961. In 1959, Ghana, Guinea
and Liberia signed a friendship convention on navigation and trade while Ghana
and the Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) initiated the Ghana–Upper Volta Trade
Agreement in 1962 (Yansane, 1977, pp. 44–45) (UNECA, 2004). In Central Africa,
the Equatorial Customs Union, the predecessor to the Customs Union of Central
African States, brought together Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad,
Congo and Gabon in 1962 (UNECA, 2004).
Many of the cooperation and integration initiatives in Africa preceding the
formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 were driven by
politics, rather than economics. In the early 1960s, a number of former French
colonies – called the Brazzaville group – signed a pact to support the idea of Afri-
can mediation to diffuse the crises on the continent due to independence struggles,
while maintaining good relationships with France (Boukari-Yabara, 2014, pp.
215–216). On the other hand, an informal grouping, referred to as the Casablanca
group, composed of the three-country union of Algeria, Egypt and Libya, emerged
with a radical vision of deep integration leading ultimately to a political federa-
tion of African States. This grouping, in debate with another informal grouping of
African countries with alternative views on African cooperation, called the Mon-
rovia group, contributed to the shaping of the vision for an integrated Africa.
At its launch, the expressed objectives of the OAU were mainly political, focused
on eradicating the remnants of colonization and safeguarding the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of its member States;4 but they also included broader concepts
such as promoting the unity and solidarity of the African States and cooperating to
achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa.5 Economic cooperation was called
for merely as one of the means of achieving these objectives.6
Nevertheless, in expanding upon the idea of “economic cooperation” the inau-
gural OAU Summit notably appointed,

a preparatory economic committee to study [ . . . ] inter alia: (a) the possibility

of establishing a free trade area between the various African countries; (b) the
establishment of a common external tariff to protect the emergent industries
and the setting up of a raw material price stabilization fund; (c) the restruc-
turalization of international trade.7
18 Guillaume Gérout et al.
This subsequently gave way to a number of decisions and resolutions that clari-
fied a vision of continental economic integration. Notable among these was the
3rd OAU Summit resolution, in 1966, on social and economic cooperation which,
in its preambular provision, read: “Fully aware of the constructive contribution
made by various multi-national African experiments in economic and social
co-operation to the continental integration called for by the Charter”.8 Hence,
by 1966 the idea that subregional initiatives could positively contribute to a Pan-
African integration project had been established. The idea of an African conti-
nental free trade area, and even of a customs union, was thus sown from the very
beginning of the OAU.
In line with this, regional groupings continued to cultivate integration initiatives
that could contribute towards advancing the Pan-African vision. In Western Africa,
for example, the Mano River Union initiative was created in 1973 between Liberia
and Sierra Leone with a view to “expand trade by the elimination of all barriers to
mutual trade”,9 through “the liberalization of mutual trade in goods of local origin,
through the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to such trade”.10 Created
in 1975, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) recalled
the principles of the OAU, underscored that subregional integration should not
frustrate the broad continental cooperation agenda11 and adopted a set of objectives
that constituted steps towards the creation of an economic union.
In Central Africa, too, in 1976 Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic
of the Congo12 established the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Region
with the aim to “promote and intensify trade and the movement of persons and
goods”,13 amongst other objectives. The founders were further convinced that
“the establishment of regional economic groups constitutes an objective approach
and a realistic basis for African unity”.
In Southern Africa, political struggles in the late 1970s led to the signing of
the Lusaka Declaration – “Towards Economic Liberation” – in 1980, leading
to the creation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference
(SADCC). The coordinating conference was transformed into a Development
Community (SADC) on 17 August 1992 when the SADC Declaration and Treaty
was signed in Windhoek, Namibia (SADC, 2018).14
However, the proliferation of initiatives at subregional level during this period
did not have much impact on thinking at the continental level. Between 1966
and 1976, the few instruments adopted in relation to economic integration at the
continental level include: (i) the Assembly resolutions and declarations of Algiers
in September 1968, and of Addis Ababa in August 1970 and in May 1973;15 and
(ii) the ministerial decision taken in Libreville in July 1977 endorsing the Kin-
shasa Declaration adopted by the Council of Ministers in December 1976 con-
cerning the establishment of an African Economic Community.16 Up until this
point, the idea of continental economic integration had been articulated in only a
limited number of political declarations and resolutions, devoid of legally bind-
ing content. The Libreville decision paved the way towards the 1979 Monrovia
Declaration on the African Economic Community (AEC), which in turn laid the
foundation for a legally founded integration process. Notable too, by this point,
 AfCFTA as experiment towards integration 19
was the growing number of subregional economic integration experiments initi-
ated across Africa, several of which would – later on – rationalize their mandates
to fit into the AEC architecture.

1979–1991: Towards a legally binding treaty for

continental economic integration
The 1979 Monrovia Summit constitutes a watershed moment at which the
OAU decided to accelerate the process of continental economic integration. The
OAU Summit announced its intention to create an “intra-African base for self-
sustaining, self-reliant development and economic growth”17 by “integrat[ing] the
African economies”18 to “pave the way for the eventual establishment of an Afri-
can Common Market leading to an African Economic Community”.19
This decision was materialized one year later, during the Second Extraordi-
nary OAU Summit, held in Lagos, Nigeria, with the Lagos Plan of Action for
the Economic Development of Africa 1980–2000 (LPA), a 20-year action plan
aimed at establishing the AEC by the year 2000. Annexed to the LPA were the
Final Act of Lagos and two resolutions on the adoption of the LPA, which aimed
at implementing the strategy embedded in the Monrovia declaration20 and on the
participation of Africa in international negotiations, calling inter alia for African
solidarity in such negotiations.21
The economic rationale for integration at this point centred on ideas of “self-
reliance” and “self-sustainment”. Through regionalism, Africa could substitute its
dependence on external sources of inputs and markets for the continent’s primary
commodities with African interdependence (Currie-Alder, 2014). It was argued
that although Africa embodied a wealth of resources and human potential its mar-
kets were weak, small and fragmented, and that combined they could better drive
“self-reliance” and “self-sustainment” (Adedeji, 1984, p. 17).
The first step of the Lagos Action Plan involved the preparation of a treaty
establishing the AEC, which aimed at casting “the economic, social and cultural
integration of [the] continent” (OAU, 1980, p. 99) into a binding legal instru-
ment. Furthermore, the LPA provided for implementation stages that would sub-
sequently constitute the basic architecture of the modalities adopted under the
treaty establishing the AEC (AUC, 2009, p. 9). For all these reasons, the Lagos
Extraordinary Summit remains a milestone in this second period of the history of
continental integration. From 1980, the OAU Summit regularly adopted decisions
to monitor the state of implementation of the LPA.
A significant aspect of the LPA was the modalities laid down under its first
decade. These modalities provided for the “strengthen[ing of] the existing regional
economic communities and establish[ment of] other economic groupings in the
other regions of Africa, so as to cover the continent as a whole (Central Africa,
Eastern Africa, Southern Africa, Northern Africa)” (OAU, 1980, p. 99). Nota-
bly, it envisaged such regional economic groupings as developing through nego-
tiations within the framework of the UNECA Multinational Programming and
Operational Centres (MULPOCs) (OAU, 1980, p. 65). Thereafter, interregional
20 Guillaume Gérout et al.
preferential arrangements were to be negotiated, “with a view to progressively
reducing and eventually eliminating inter-sub-regional trade barriers” (OAU,
1980, p. 65). Scope was also accorded for the further deepening of “existing eco-
nomic integration groupings which [had] advanced beyond the level of preferen-
tial trade area arrangements” (OAU, 1980, p. 65).
The years that followed saw the creation of a number of regional economic
communities as envisaged by the LPA. In particular, in Central Africa the Eco-
nomic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) was formed in 1983 with
the object of contributing subregional structures necessary for “the gradual and
progressive establishment of an African common market as a prelude to an Afri-
can economic community”.22 While within the context of the Eastern and South-
ern African MULPOC, the Preferential Trade Area of Eastern and Southern Africa
(PTA) was formed in 1981 (GIGA, 1989; COMESA, 2018). In 1989, the Arab
Maghreb Union (AMU) was established covering most of the countries of the
North African MULPOC (AMU, 1989).
Additional regional groupings – beyond those called for by the LPA – were
also created. In 1984, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles decided to reinforce
their cooperation, highlighting the need to take due consideration of the existing
ties between the countries of the South-Western Indian Ocean region, and created
the Indian Ocean Commission, with the objective, inter alia, of enhancing trade
and economic cooperation.23 And in 1986 the Intergovernmental Authority on
Drought and Development (IGADD) was created to respond to the environmental
urgencies caused by recurrent droughts in the region (IGAD, 2018).
In response to such efforts made at the regional level, the 19th Ordinary OAU
Summit, held in 1983, notably welcomed the formation of the PTA24 and expressed
satisfaction at the achievement of Central Africa in establishing a regional eco-
nomic community of its own.25
However, by the 23rd Ordinary OAU Summit in 1987, the Summit had begun
to recognize some of the challenges of the multiple and overlapping subregional
organizations. While calling on the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to
participate in the activities of the LPA, the OAU Summit called on the “subre-
gional and regional groupings, particularly ECOWAS, PTA, SADCC and E[CC]
AS to take the necessary steps to ensure coordination, harmonization and finaliza-
tion of the activities, projects and programmes of all on African intergovernmen-
tal cooperation and integration organizations in their respective regions in order to
avert overlaps, power conflicts and wastage of efforts and resources”.26 The 25th
Ordinary OAU Summit, held in 1989, repeated the warning.27
By 1990, a decade after adoption, much of the Lagos Plan of Action remained
unimplemented. The LPA left it to national governments to incorporate its objec-
tives into their development planning, yet governments did not do so (ECA, 1991).
One contributory technical failure here was the lack of an effective monitoring
and follow-up mechanism. Nor was there any legal basis to hold governments
accountable for their commitments. Also significant was that, by this point, the
LPA had yet to be cast into a binding legal instrument, instead remaining merely
a politically endorsed plan.
 AfCFTA as experiment towards integration 21
However, arguably the greatest obstacle to its implementation during this
period was the spread of economic crises across Africa in the 1980s. Largely
out of the control of African policymakers, declining commodity prices exac-
erbated Africa’s mostly undiversified economies leading to spiralling debt and
economic stagnation.28 The Cold War further divided African countries on the
basis of alignment in foreign affairs. Burdened by economic crises, African coun-
tries were more focused on immediate survival than long-term transformation
(Adedeji, 1985). Or, as remarked by Adedeji (2002), in lamenting the 1980s col-
lapse of African economic cooperation, “When a state finds itself in a crisis, it
does not see beyond its nose”.

1991–2006: The subregional approach to establishing the

African Economic Community
The 1990s began with renewed impetus for continental economic integration. The
adoption of the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community in 1991 in
Abuja, Nigeria, during the 27th OAU Summit, usually referred to as the “Abuja
Treaty”, constituted the major milestone of the period. The Abuja Treaty refined
the vision for African continental economic integration as follows:29

In order to promote the attainment of the objectives of the Community as set

out [in] this Treaty, the Community shall, by stages, ensure [inter alia]:
(a) The strengthening of existing regional economic communities and the
establishment of other communities where they do not exist; [ . . . ]
(d) The liberalisation of trade through the abolition, among Member States,
of Customs Duties levied on imports and exports and the abolition,
among Member States of Non-Tariff Barriers in order to establish a free
trade area at the level of each regional economic community; [ . . . ]
(f) The adoption of a common trade policy vis-à-vis third States;
(g) The establishment and maintenance of a common external tariff;
(h) The establishment of a common market;
(i) The gradual removal, among Member States, of obstacles to the free
movement of persons, goods, services and capital and the right of resi-
dence and establishment.

The principal significance of the Abuja Treaty was in transforming the frequently
articulated political visions and plans of continental economic integration into
a legally binding treaty. The Abuja Treaty established a rules-based integration
programme. It retained the “building block” approach to integration, previously
envisaged within the LPA, wherein regional economic groupings would first
“strengthen” into customs unions before subsequently consolidating into a con-
tinental customs union. Notably, such an approach did not actually envisage a
continental free trade area, which combined with a common external tariff would
constitute a continental customs union, but instead foresaw customs unions at the
22 Guillaume Gérout et al.
subregional level amalgamating into a customs union at the continental level. It
also amounted to the deepest and most ambitious forms of integration, encom-
passing economic, political and monetary integration, as well as with elements of
coordinated external policy.
After 1991, every OAU Summit – with the exception of the 32nd Summit in
199930 and the 38th Summit in 2002 – dedicated a resolution to the monitor-
ing of implementation of the Abuja Treaty. Memorably, the 30th OAU Summit
acknowledged the entry into force of the Treaty, in 1994. Moreover, as from the
33rd OAU Summit, the Organization also began to call itself the AEC, and from
the 34th OAU Summit, referred to the OAU Summit as the AEC Summit, making the
34th OAU Summit also the 2nd AEC Summit. This was maintained until 2001,
with the 31st OAU Ordinary Summit/5th AEC Ordinary Summit. Only by 2002,
at the 38th OAU Summit which marked the creation of the African Union (AU),
was the reference to the AEC dropped. The Constitutive Act of the AU reaffirms
the principles of the AEC and the need to accelerate its implementation, but the
operative part of the Constitutive Act makes reference to the AEC only in terms
of the institutional relationship between the AEC and the AU.31
This third period in the history of African continental economic integration
involved considerable developments at the subregional level. During this period,
six preexisting subregional organizations showed significant evolution while two
new ones were created. As noted earlier, the political organization of SADCC
transformed itself into an economic community in 1992, with the objective to,
amongst others, “enhance the standard and quality of life of Southern Africa and
support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration”.32 It notably
used language recalling the OAU initial aspirations to, “promote self-sustaining
development on the basis of collective self-reliance and the interdependence of
Member States”.33 The Treaty was completed in 1996 by a protocol on trade. This
protocol noted the provisions of the Abuja Treaty calling for establishment of
regional and subregional economic groupings as building blocks of the African
Economic Community34 and aimed at establishing a free trade agreement in the
SADC region.35
In 1993, the principles laid down under the 1975 ECOWAS Treaty were amended,
clarifying the stages of integration and explicitly providing for the establishment
of a common market36 with the Abuja Treaty in mind.37 In this light, the Com-
munity was conferred with supranational powers to ensure compliance with the
objectives of the Abuja Treaty (Chambas, 2007). The same year, the PTA coun-
tries signed a treaty for the establishment of the Common Market for Eastern and
Southern Africa (COMESA), to supersede the PTA. One of the objectives of the
new COMESA treaty was “to contribute towards the establishment, progress and
the realisation of the objectives of the African Economic Community”.38
In 1994, the Union Douaniere et Economique de l’Afrique Centrale (UDEAC)
countries of Central Africa decided to transform the Union into a monetary
Community – the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC).
In the spirit of continental integration, CEMAC was structured in such a way that
any African country was deemed eligible to accede to it.39 The CEMAC treaty
 AfCFTA as experiment towards integration 23
was subsequently amended in 2008, when it reaffirmed the principle of eligibility
for accession by any African country, while a principle of variable geometry was
added and provisions allowing sectoral cooperation between CEMAC with any
other desirous African country were also introduced.40
In 1996, it was the turn of the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and
Development (IGADD) to reform itself to become the Intergovernmental Author-
ity on Development (IGAD), with the objective of “[p]romot[ing] and realiz[ing]
the objectives of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)
and the African Economic Community”.41
In 1998, the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) was created with
a view to the “[e]stablishment of a comprehensive Economic Union” (UNECA,
2018), and with the ambition to fulfil the objectives of the Abuja Treaty.42
In 1999, the East African Community (EAC) Treaty provided that its member
states “regard the Community as a step towards the achievement of the objectives
of the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community”.43
In 2000, the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) was created as a second
zone of monetary integration covering the anglophone countries within ECOWAS,
alongside the preexisting francophone Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest
Africaine (UEMOA) (WAMZ, 2000).
The aforementioned changes in the REC landscape show the regional com-
munities moving towards fulfilling the objectives of the AEC, as well as the
influence of the Abuja Treaty on the REC mandates. Nevertheless, it was increas-
ingly recognized during this time that the activities of RECs needed to be better
streamlined in accordance with the objectives of the AEC. In this regard, the OAU
adopted a protocol – signed by the OAU Chairperson and REC Chairpersons, on
behalf of respective Member States44 – on the relations between the AEC and
the RECs, emphasizing “the need for the co-ordination and the harmonization of
the policies, measures, programmes and activities of the regional economic com-
munities”,45 in line with “the responsibility placed on both the African Economic
Community and the regional economic communities by the provisions of para-
graph 2 (a) through (d) of Article 6 of the [Abuja] Treaty”.46 The protocol gave
oversight powers to the OAU organs, in the following terms:

The Assembly and the Council shall give directives to any regional economic
community whose policies, measures and programmes are at odds with the
objectives of the Treaty or whose implementation of its policies, measures,
programmes and activities lags behind the time limit set out in Article 6 of
the Treaty.47

Nevertheless, after 2002, implementation of the trade aspects of those programmes

progressed at divergent paces at both the REC and continental levels. Indeed, since
the creation of the AU, the economic integration project has not had a prominent
place in the AU Assembly agenda; tellingly, the AEC has not been made the sub-
ject of any AU Assembly decision since 2002, while the AfCFTA came to the atten-
tion of the AU Assembly only at its 18th Ordinary Summit, in 2012.
24 Guillaume Gérout et al.
By the end of this third period of the history of African continental economic
integration, the multiplicity of overlapping regional economic configurations was
beginning to be recognized as problematic. In 2004, Africa counted 14 RECs,
seven of them considered as building blocks of the AEC,48 with seven others con-
stituting “subsets” of the former.49 Moreover, 11 of them50 aimed at establishing a
customs union or a deeper form of economic integration, while two of the remain-
ing three aimed at establishing some preferential trade schemes51 (UNECA, 2004,
pp. 27–30). Furthermore, “[h]aving multiple groups adds to the work of harmo-
nization and coordination and complicates the eventual fusion of regional eco-
nomic communities into the African Union. This prompted calls to ‘rationalize
integration’” (UNECA, 2004, p. 34). Overlapping membership entails the costly
and cumbersome duplication of rules and disciplines, including complications for
traders. The fundamental problem, as expressed by the later 2012 SADC audit
in the context of SADC’s overlapping memberships, was that “countries cannot
implement two sets of rules” (Southern Africa Trade Hub, 2012).

2006–2015: Attempts to rationalize the African economic

integration landscape with the BIAT
Conscious of the implementation challenges of overlapping REC commitments,
in 2006 the African Union Commission (AUC) and UNECA devoted an entire
joint report to the issue of the “rationalization” of the RECs (AUC & UNECA,
2006). The report aimed at drawing attention to the fact that “the multiple mem-
berships by African countries appear to be slowing integration, reducing the
regional economic communities’ effectiveness, and stretching thin limited finan-
cial resources” and recommended the adoption of a shared “vision that aligns
the regional economic communities with the African Union” (AUC & UNECA,
2006, pp. xv–xvi). The report informed the meetings of the Conference of African
Ministers in charge of Integration (COMAI) I. That meeting, after reviewing the
state of integration in African regions, recommended a halt to recognition of new
RECs.
Later that year, the AU Assembly took major decisions, partly deriving from
the recommendations of the COMAI I, including: (i) limiting the number of AU-
recognized RECs to eight (AU, 2006a);52 (ii) institutionalizing the COMAI (AU,
2006b); and (iii) strengthening the AUC-UNECA-AfDB technical partnership
(AU, 2006c). The process of rationalization was also taken to its logical next
step when, in 2007, a protocol was adopted on the relationship between the AU
and the RECs (AU, 2007a, 2007b), with particular attention being given to “the
need to define the role of the Union and that of the RECs taking into account the
principle of subsidiarity and thereby allowing the RECs to advance the integration
agenda”.53 To this extent, the protocol aimed at establishing a coordination and
harmonization mechanism for the implementation of programmes and activities,54
establishing a framework for the coordination of REC activities in pursuit of the
objectives of the Abuja Treaty,55 and for the monitoring of the general and specific
benchmarks for the establishment of an African Common Market.56
 AfCFTA as experiment towards integration 25
During this time, the idea of a grand new free trade area consolidating the east-
ern and southern parts of the continent was developed. Dating back to the work of
a taskforce initiated in the early 2000s, a COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Sum-
mit of Heads of State and Government decided in 2008 to adopt “the expeditious
establishment of a Free Trade Area (FTA) encompassing the member/partner
States of the three RECs with the ultimate goal of establishing a single Customs
Union”.57 This Tripartite Summit further noted that the FTA would constitute “a
crucial building bloc [sic] towards achieving the African Economic Community
as outlined by the Treaty of Abuja”.58
The year 2010 also gave way to a recommendation of the 6th Ordinary meeting of
the AU Ministers for Trade to fast-track the establishment of an African continental
free trade area, drawing from the promises borne by the interregional integration
project of the COMESA, SADC and EAC to create a tripartite FTA (TFTA) (AUC,
UNECA, & AfDB, 2012, p. 1). This ministerial recommendation likely contributed
to the adoption, in 2011, of the theme for the 18th Ordinary Summit, “Boosting Intra-
African Trade” (AU, 2011), which culminated in the important decision to adopt the
2012 Boosting Intra-African Trade (BIAT) Action Plan (AU & ECA, 2012).
The BIAT Action Plan intended to address the problem of Africa’s overlapping
regional communities by consolidating the TFTA on the one hand, and similar
convergences through “parallel arrangement[s]” in the rest of Africa (AU & ECA,
2012). These, and any remaining countries outside the regional FTAs, would then
all be merged into a continental FTA (AU, 2012) (COMESA-EAC-SADC, 2011)
(Figure 2.1).

CFTA established by 2017

Consolidation of the Regional FTA Processes into

the CFTA 2015–2016

Other AU Member
COMESA-EAC-
Other RECs States outside the
SADC Tripartite
establish their FTAs FTAs of the 8
FTA established by
by 2014 recognized RECs join
2014
CFTA by 2017

Figure 2.1 Organogram of envisaged continental integration, 2012 Boosting Intra-African

Trade Action Plan
Source: (AU & ECA, 2012)
26 Guillaume Gérout et al.
This approach was formally endorsed in the January 2012 African Union Assem-
bly decision on the framework, road map and architecture for fast-tracking the
establishment of the AfCFTA (then known as the CFTA), as laid down in the Action
Plan for Boosting Intra-African Trade (BIAT) (AU, 2012). Notably, the decision
cited, among others, the following objective:

Resolve the challenges of multiple and overlapping memberships and expe-

dite the regional and continental integration processes.
(AU & ECA, 2012, p. 64)

Two points are especially worth highlighting at this stage. Firstly, “multiple and
overlapping” REC membership is explicitly recognized as a fundamental chal-
lenge to be resolved by the AfCFTA at this point. Secondly, under the “road map”
detailing how these objectives were to be realized, it was indicated that because
the AfCFTA aimed – at this point – at building inter alia on the TFTA, the AfCFTA
should “reserve the acquis” of the REC FTAs, including the TFTA. It was clarified
that, “[t]his implies that the [Af]CFTA should take as its starting point, the current
levels of tariff liberalization in the RECs. Thus, it will build on the progress made
by the RECs” (AU & ECA, 2012, p. 49).
The REC acquis concept was previously incorporated into the TFTA in 2011
and then given, in 2012, a slightly divergent clarification in the TFTA negotiating
principles as meaning that, “tariff negotiations and the exchange of tariff conces-
sions would be among Member/Partner States of the Tripartite FTA that have no
preferential arrangements in place between them” (Erasmus, 2013).59 This con-
stituted a marked redirection in objective that would ultimately undermine the
ability of the TFTA to consolidate its three underlying RECs. The TFTA would
only achieve new preferences between countries that had none and in doing so
would result in entirely preserving the existing REC FTAs, and would no longer
consolidate them into a common regime (Erasmus, 2013).
This redirection was also evident in the shifting objectives of the TFTA. After
a process formally undertaken in 2008, with negotiations initiated in 2011 and the
TFTA launched in 2015, the TFTA was stripped of one of its original objectives
of “[r]esolv[ing] the challenges of multiple and overlapping memberships”.60
Moreover, the TFTA not only abandoned – besides a mere reference to it in the
preamble – this objective, but also failed to substantively address the question of
its relationship with subregional FTAs, which would now co-exist with the TFTA
after it enters into effect (Desta & Gérout, 2018). Observers noted that “[t]his state
of affairs will only change if, at some future date, COMESA, the EAC and SADC
will merge into one new FTA” (Erasmus, 2015, p. 7). In this context, “[o]verlap-
ping membership complications are bound to increase once the TFTA Agreement
is in force and is implemented” (Erasmus, 2015, p. 7). The result of this process
led to the finding that “the TFTA has not lived up to expectations and it has not
delivered on its objectives of establishing a single integrated Free Trade Area”
(Fundira, 2016, p. 3).
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
The Project Gutenberg eBook of Kadonnut
prinssi
This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States
and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no
restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it
under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this
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you are located before using this eBook.

Title: Kadonnut prinssi

Historiallinen seikkailuromaani

Author: Edgar Rice Burroughs

Translator: Alpo Kupiainen

Release date: May 3, 2024 [eBook #73529]

Language: Finnish

Original publication: Hämeenlinna: Arvi A. Karisto Oy, 1928

Credits: Juhani Kärkkäinen and Tapio Riikonen

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK KADONNUT

PRINSSI ***
KADONNUT PRINSSI

Historiallinen seikkailuromaani

Kirj.

EDGAR RICE BURROUGHS

Englanninkielestä [The Outlaw of Torn] suomentanut

Alpo Kupiainen

Kariston nuorisonkirjoja 84.

Hämeenlinnassa, Arvi A. Karisto Osakeyhtiö, 1928.

ENSIMMÄINEN LUKU

Tämä tarina on ollut salassa seitsemänsataa vuotta. Aluksi sen esti

pääsemästä julkisuuteen eräs Englannin plantagenetilainen
kuningas. Sitten se unohdettiin. Minä osuin kaivamaan sen käsiini
sattumalta. Sattuma oli se, että vaimoni serkku on sukua erään hyvin
vanhan eurooppalaisen luostarin esimiehelle.

Viimemainittu salli minun penkoa homehtuneita ja ummehtuneita

käsikirjoituksia, ja käsiini osui tämä. Se on hyvin kiinnostava —
osittain sentähden, että se on kappale tähän saakka julkaisematonta
historiaa, mutta etupäässä sen vuoksi, että siinä kerrotaan tarina
perin merkillisestä kostosta ja sen viattoman uhrin — Rikhardin,
kadonneen englantilaisen kuninkaanpojan — seikkailuelämästä.

Sitä kertoessani olen jättänyt pois enimmät historialliset seikat.

Minun mieltäni kiinnitti se ainutlaatuinen henkilö, jonka ympärille
tarina on punoutunut — se ratsastaja, joka piti kypärinsilmikkonsa
ummessa ja joka — mutta malttakaamme, kunnes ehdimme häneen
saakka.

Se kaikki tapahtui kolmannellatoista vuosisadalla, ja aikanaan se

järkytti Englantia pohjoisesta etelään, idästä länteen saakka; ja
ulottuipa järkytyksen vaikutus Kanaalinkin ylitse, häiriten Ranskaa.
Se sai suoranaisen alkunsa Henrik kolmannen palatsissa Lontoossa
ja oli seuraus kuninkaan ja hänen mahtavan lankonsa, Leicesterin
kreivin Simon de Montfortin, välisestä riidasta.

Riita jääköön silleen, se on historiallinen piirre, ja tarkan

selostuksen siitä voi kukin lukea sopivana aikana. Mutta tänä
kesäkuun päivänä Herramme vuonna 1243 Henrik unohti itsensä
siinä määrin, että tuiki aiheettomasti syytti de Montfortia
valtiopetoksesta useiden kuninkaan hoviin kuuluvien herrasmiesten
kuullen.

De Montfort kalpeni. Hän oli kookas, komea mies, ja kun hän

oikaisi vartalonsa täyteen mittaansa ja käänsi harmaat silmänsä
suuttumuksensa esineeseen, kuten hän teki sinä päivänä, teki hän
sangen valtavan vaikutuksen. Hän oli Englannissa valtatekijä, joka
jäi jäljelle ainoastaan kuninkaasta, rohkea kuin leijona, ja vastasi
kuninkaalle niin, ettei ainoakaan muu ihminen koko Englannissa olisi
uskaltanut sillä tavoin vastata.

»Herrani ja kuninkaani», huudahti hän, »ainoastaan se, että olet

herrani ja kuninkaani, estää Simon de Montfortia vaatimasta
hyvitystä niin karkeasta loukkauksesta. Se, että käytät hyväksesi
kuninkaanasemaasi sanoaksesi sellaista, mitä et ikinä uskaltaisi
sanoa, jollet olisi kuningas, ei leimaa minua kavaltajaksi, vaikka se
kyllä leimaa sinut raukaksi.»

Pieni ylimys- ja hovimiesseurue joutui jännittyneen hiljaisuuden

valtaan, kun nämä hallitsijalle osoitetut, kauheat sanat kirposivat
alamaisen huulilta. Kuulijat kauhistuivat, sillä de Montfortin rohkea
uhmailu hipoi heidän mielestään pyhyyden häväistystä.
 Henrik punehtui nöyryytyksestä ja kiukusta, nousi pystyyn ja
astahti de Montfortia kohti, mutta muisti äkkiä, mitä valtaa hän
edusti, ajatteli tarkemmin aiettaan, mikä se lieneekään ollut, naurahti
ylpeästi ja kääntyi hovilaistensa puoleen.

»Tulkaa, hyvät herrat», virkkoi hän, »meidänhän kai piti harjoitella

miekkailua tänä aamuna. Alkaa jo käydä myöhäiseksi. Tulkaa, de
Fulm! Tulkaa, Leybourn!» Ja kuningas poistui huoneesta jäljessään
herrasmiehet, jotka kaikki olivat loitonneet kauemmaksi Leicesterin
kreivistä, kun kävi selville, että kuninkaan epäsuosio oli voimakkaasti
kohdistunut häneen. Kun oviverho sulkeutui poistuneen kuninkaan
jälkeen, kohautti de Montfort leveitä hartioitaan, pyörähti ympäri ja
lähti huoneesta toisen oven kautta.

Kun kuningas ylimyksineen saapui asesaliin, vihloi hänen

mieltänsä vieläkin de Montfortin moitteiden aiheuttama nöyryytys, ja
kun hän laski syrjään päällysnuttunsa ja töyhtöhattunsa ryhtyäkseen
mittelemään miekkoja de Fulmin kanssa, osui hänen katseensa
miekkailunopettajaan, sir Jules de Vaciin, joka lähestyi tuoden
kuninkaan säilää ja harjoituskypäriä. Henrikiä ei lainkaan nyt
haluttanut miekkailla de Fulmin kanssa, joka samoin kuin kaikki
hallitsijaa ympäröivät liehittelijät aina salli kuninkaan helposti voittaa
jokaisessa ottelussa.

Hän tiesi, että de Vac oli liian arka miekkailumaineestaan

salliakseen minkään muun kuin vastustajan etevämmyyden voittaa
itsensä, ja tänään tunsi Henrik pystyvänsä voittamaan itse
paholaisenkin.

Asesali oli tilava huone palatsin pohjakerroksessa vahtihuoneen

vieressä. Se oli sijoitettu linnan pieneen siipirakennukseen, joten se
sai valoa kolmelta suunnalta. Sen hoitajana oli lailla, harmaantunut,
pergamentti-ihoinen sir Jules de Vac, ja juuri hänet Henrik komensi
kanssansa miekkasille, sillä kuningas tahtoi ankarasti löylyttää
jotakuta purkaukseen hillittyä raivoaan.

Niinpä hän antoi de Vacin sielunsa silmissä omaksua vihatun de

Montfortin hahmon, ja seurauksena oli, että kuninkaan äkillinen ja
taitava hyökkäys oli vähällä yllättää de Vacin ja hänelle nopeasti
tuottaa nöyryyttävän tappion.

Henrik kolmatta oli aina pidetty hyvänä miekkailijana, mutta tänään

hän osoittautui vieläkin etevämmäksi kuin tavallisesti ja kuvitteli
mielessään survaisevansa miekan vale Montfortin sydämeen
katsojien huimasti ilmaistessa suosiotaan. Tässä verenhimoisessa
tarkoituksessa hän oli pakottanut hämmästyneen de Vacin
perääntymään kahdesti salin ympäri, mutta sitten miekkailumestari
teki ovelan valehyökkäyksen, astahti askelen taaksepäin, sai
kuninkaan haluamaansa asentoon, kiersi salamannopeasti hiukan
säiläänsä ja sinkautti Henrikin aseen kalisten yli asesalin lattian.

Hetkisen kuningas seisoi jäykkänä ja kalpeana, ikäänkuin

kuoleman koura olisi tarttunut hänen sydämeensä jäisillä sormillaan.
Tämä välikohtaus merkitsi hänelle enemmän kuin sitä, että hänet oli
voittanut Englannin paras miekkailija — sillä se ei totisesti ollut
mikään häpeä — Henrikistä se tuntui ennustavan tulevan taistelun
lopullista tulosta, kun hän olisi vastakkain oikean de Montfortin
kanssa; ja sitten Henrik oivalsi, että de Vac oli ainoastaan olento,
jota hän mielikuvituksessaan oli pitänyt mahtavana lankonaan, ja teki
de Vacille tempun, jonka hän mielellään olisi tehnyt oikealle
Leicesterille. Hän kiskaisi miekkailukintaan kädestään ja meni ihan
likelle de Vacia.
 »Koira!» sähähti hän, sivalsi kirpeän iskun miekkailumestarin
kasvoihin ja sylki hänen päällensä. Sitten hän pyörähti ympäri
korollaan ja marssi pois asesalista.

De Vac oli vanhentunut Englannin kuninkaiden palveluksessa,

mutta hän vihasi kaikkea englantilaista ja kaikkia englantilaisia.
Edellistä kuningasta, Juhana-vainajaa, jota kaikki muut olivat
vihanneet, hän oli kuitenkin rakastanut, mutta samalla kun
kuningasvainajan luut oli myöskin de Vaoin uskollisuus sitä sukua
kohtaan, jota hän palveli, haudattu Worcesterin tuomiokirkkoon.

Niinä vuosina, joina hän oli ollut miekkailunopettajana Englannin

hovissa, olivat kuningassuvun pojat oppineet pistämään, väistämään
ja iskemään niin kuin ainoastaan de Vac osasi opettaa; ja hän oli
yhtä omantunnontarkasti täyttänyt velvollisuutensa kuin
järkähtämättömästi vihannut ja halveksinut oppilaitaan.

Ja nyt Englannin kuningas oli loukannut häntä niin pahasti, että se

voitiin sovittaa ainoastaan verellä.

Iskun saatuaan jäntevä ranskalainen kalautti kantapäänsä yhteen,

viskasi säilänsä lattialle ja seisoi isäntänsä edessä suorana ja
jäykkänä kuin marmoripatsas. Hänen pingoittuneet, vääntyneet
kasvonsa olivat valkean ja sinertävän kirjavat, mutta hän ei virkkanut
sanaakaan.

Hän olisi saattanut lyödä kuningasta, mutta silloin hänellä ei enää

olisi ollut muuta mahdollisuutta kuin kuolema omasta kädestä, sillä
kuninkaan ei sovi taistella alemman kuolevaisen kanssa, eikä
sellainen, joka lyö kuningasta, saa elää — kuninkaan kunniantunto
täytyy tyydyttää.
 Jos de Vacia olisi sivaltanut Ranskan kuningas, olisi hän saattanut
iskeä takaisin ja ylpeillä kohtalostaan, joka salli hänen kuolla
Ranskan kunnian tähden. Mutta Englannin kuningas — pyh! —
koira, ja kukapa mielellään kuolisi koiran vuoksi! Ei, de Vac keksisi
toisenlaisia keinoja tyydyttääkseen loukattua ylpeyttään; hän ihan
hekumoisi kostaessaan tälle miehelle, jota kohtaan hän ei tuntenut
uskollisuutta. Jos se olisi mahdollista, vahingoittaisi hän koko
Englantia, mutta hän odottaisi aikaansa. Hänen kannattaisi odottaa
sopivaa tilaisuutta, jos hän odottamalla saisi kostonsa hirveämmäksi.

De Vac oli syntynyt Pariisissa ja oli Ranskan parhaana

miekankäyttäjänä pidetyn ranskalaisen upseerin poika. Poika oli
edistynyt ihan isänsä kinterillä ja saattoi isänsä kuoltua helposti
vaatia itselleen isän kunnianimeä. Se, miten hän oli poistunut
Ranskasta ja astunut Englannin kuninkaan Juhanan palvelukseen, ei
kuulu tähän kertomukseen. Koko Jules de Vacin elämälle antaa
tähän kertomukseen nähden merkityksen ainoastaan kaksi hänen
useista ominaisuuksistaan — hänen ihmeteltävä miekkailutaitonsa ja
hänen peloittava vihansa toista isänmaatansa kohtaan.
TOINEN LUKU

Westminster-palatsin eteläpuolella on puutarha, ja kolmantena

päivänä sen jälkeen, kun kuningas oli loukannut de Vacia, nähtiin
siellä mustatukkainen nainen, jonka sinipunaisessa viitassa oli upeita
kultakirjailuja kaula-aukon ympärillä ja väljäsuisten, melkein viitan
alaliepeen samalla tavalla koristettuun reunukseen ulottuvien hihojen
alaosissa. Komeatekoinen, jalokivillä somistettu nahkavyö, jota piti
paikallaan iso, kaiverruksilla kaunistettu, kultainen solki, kiinnitti
viitan hänen uumentensa ympärille, niin että sen yläosa ulkoili
puseron tavoin vyön ylitse. Vyössä oli pitkä, kaunistekoinen tikari.
Hänen jalassaan oli sievät jalkineet, ja sinipunainen, kultaripsujen
reunustama silkkihuntu verhosi hauskasti hänen päätänsä ja
hartioitaan.

Hänen vierellään asteli kaunis, noin kolmen vuoden ikäinen poika,

joka oli puettu samoin kuin kumppaninsakin hilpeäväriseen asuun.
Hänen pienessä, tulipunaisesta sametista valmistetussa
päällysnutussaan oli runsaasti korukirjailuja, ja sen alla oli
ruumiinmukainen, valkeasilkkinen takki. Hänen ihokkaansa oli
tulipunainen, ja hänen pitkät, valkeat housunsa olivat ristikkäin
käyvillä, tulipunaisilla nauhoilla sidotut tiukalle pienistä kengistä
polviin saakka. Hänen ruskeakiharaisen päänsä takaraivolla oli
leveälierinen, pyöreäkupuinen hattu, jossa yksi ainoa valkea sulka
heilui ja nuokkui uljaasti pienen, ylvään pään jokaisesta liikkeestä.

Lapsen piirteet olivat hyvin muodostuneet, ja hänen avoimet,

kirkkaat silmänsä antoivat poikamaisen hyväsydämisyyden ilmeen
hänen kasvoilleen, jotka muutoin olisivat olleet liian röyhkeät ja
kopeat niin nuoren lapsen kasvoiksi. Kun hän puheli kumppaninsa
kanssa, saivat vähäiset käskevän arvokkuuden välähdykset, jotka
tekivät omituisen vaikutuksen niin pienessä pojassa, nuoren naisen
silloin tällöin kääntämään päänsä toisaalle, jotta poika ei olisi nähnyt
hymyilyä, jota hän tuskin jaksoi pidättää.

Äkkiä poika otti pallon takkinsa povelta, osoitti heidän lähellään

kasvavaa pientä pensasta ja käski: »Seisokaa te tuolla, lady Maud,
luon pensaan luona! Tahtoisin heitellä palloa.»

Nuori nainen totteli, ja hänen sijoituttuaan paikalleen ja

käännyttyään poikaan päin viskasi viimemainittu pallon hänelle. Niin
he leikkivät asesalin ikkunoiden alla; poika juoksi aina vilkkaasti
noutamassa pallon, milloin ei saanut sitä ilmassa käsiinsä, ja nauroi
ja huuteli hilpeän rattoisesti saatuaan pallon siepatuksi erikoisen
hyvin.

Eräässä asesalin puistonpuolisessa ikkunassa seisoi tuikea,

harmaapäinen, vanha mies, nojaten ristissä oleviin käsivarsiinsa,
kulmakarvat tiukattuina pahanilkiseen rypistykseen, suupielet
jäykistyneinä tuimaksi, kylmäksi juovaksi. Hän katsoi puutarhaan,
siellä leikkivään lapseen ja viehkeään naiseen päin, mutta hänen
silmänsä eivät nähneet, sillä de Vac mietti suurta tehtävää, koko
elämänsä suurinta.
 Kolme päivää oli tämä iäkäs mies hautonut harmiaan, koettaen
keksiä jotakin keinoa kostaakseen Henrik-kuninkaalle hänen
osakseen tulleen loukkauksen. Hänen älykkäissä, ovelissa
aivoissaan oli syntynyt useita suunnitelmia, mutta tähän saakka oli
ne kaikki hylätty, koska ne eivät luvanneet sitä hirveätä tyydytystä,
jota hänen loukattu ylpeytensä vaati.

Hänen ajatuksensa olivat enimmäkseen pyörineet Henrikin

hallituskauden epävakaisissa poliittisissa oloissa, sillä niiden nojalla
hän tunsi ehkä saavansa tilaisuuden, jota hän saattaisi käyttää omiin
mieskohtaisiin tarkoituksiinsa ja kuninkaan vahingoksi, mahdollisesti
tuhoksi.

Palatsin monivuotisena asukkaana, joka oli usein ollut

kuuntelemassa asesalissa kuninkaan harjoitellessa miekkailua
ystäviensä ja suosikkiensa kanssa, de Vac oli kuullut paljon Henrik
kolmannen ja hänen läheistensä kesken lausuttuja sanoja, jotka
taitava ja keinokas vihamies varsin hyvin saattaisi kääntää
kuninkaan vahingoksi.

Hän samoin kuin koko Englanti tiesi, kuinka äärimmäisen

halveksivasti Henrik käsitteli Magna Chartan määräyksiä, joita hän
sangen usein rikkoi siitä huolimatta, että hän oli kuninkaanvalallaan
sitoutunut niitä noudattamaan. Mutta asesalissa sattuneiden
keskustelujen sirpaleista oli de Vac saanut vihiä sellaisesta, mitä
koko Englanti ei tietänyt, nimittäin siitä, että Henrik parhaillaankin
neuvotteli ulkomaalaisten palkkasoturipäälliköiden ja Ranskan
kuninkaan Ludvig yhdeksännen kanssa, aikoen pestata
palvelukseensa kyllin suuren joukon ritareita ja sotilaita aloittaakseen
hellittämättömän sodan omia suurylimyksiään vastaan ja siten
tehokkaasti estääkseen heidät tulevaisuudessa sekaantumasta
rajoittamaan Plantagenet-suvun kuninkaallista etuoikeutta hallita
huonosti Englantia.

Kunpa hän vain saisi tietoonsa tämän suunnitelman

yksityiskohdat, mietti de Vac, sen sataman, jossa ulkomaiset joukot
aiottiin laskea maihin, niiden lukumäärän, ja sen, mihin ensimmäinen
hyökkäys kohdistettaisiin. Oi, kuinka suloinen kosto se olisikaan, jos
hänen onnistuisi tehdä tyhjäksi tämä yritys, joka oli niin likellä
kuninkaan sydäntä!

Kun hän vain lausuisi sanan de Clarelle tai de Montfortille,

rientäisivät suurylimykset nelikymmentuhantisena armeijana
nujertamaan kuninkaan sotajoukot.

Ja hän saattaisi kuninkaan tietoon, ketä ja mitä hän saisi kiittää

tappiostaan ja masennuksestaan. Mahdollisesti ylimykset syöksisivät
Henrikin pois valtaistuimelta, ja silloin de Vac pilkkoisi Plantagenetia
vasten kasvoja. Totisesti suloinen, mieluinen, riemullinen kosto! Ja
vanhus lipaisi kielellään ohuita huuliaan ikäänkuin vielä viimeisen
kerran muistaakseen jonkun herkullisen makupalan hivelevää jälkeä.

Ja silloin sattuma kiidätti pienen, nahkaisen pallon sen ikkunan

alle, jonka ääressä vanhus seisoi; ja kun lapsi nauraen juoksi sitä
noutamaan, osui de Vacin katse poikaan, ja hänen äskeinen
kostonsuunnitelmansa häipyi, kuten sumu haihtuu keskipäiväisen
auringon hajoittamalla; ja sen sijaan hänen mieleensä välähti koko
hirvittävän koston kauhea suunnitelma yhtä selvästi kuin se olisi,
ollut kirjoitettu hänen eteensä aukaistun ison kirjan lehdille. Eikä hän
seuraavien kahdenkymmenen vuoden aikana, mikäli hän itse
pystyisi määräämään, rahtuakaan muuttanut silloin elävästi
käsittämänsä hornamaisen mestarillisen juonen yksityiskohtia.
 Pikku poika, joka niin viattomasti leikki kuninkaallisen isänsä
puutarhassa, oli prinssi Rikhard, Englannin kuninkaan Henrik
kolmannen kolmivuotias poika. Ainoassakaan julkaistussa
historiallisessa teoksessa ei tätä pientä, kadonnutta prinssiä mainita;
ainoastaan Englannin kuninkaiden salaiset arkistot kertovat tarinan
hänen kummallisesta seikkailuelämästään. Hänen nimensä on
pyyhitty pois ihmisten aikakirjoista, ja de Vacin kosto on häipynyt
maailman näkyvistä; mutta hänen aikanaan se oli todellinen,
englantilaisten sydäntä kauhistuttava asia.
KOLMAS LUKU

Lähes kuukauden päivät vanhus liikuskeli palatsissa ja tarkkaili

puutarhassa pikku prinssiä, kunnes hän tunsi pojan hoitajattarien ja
opettajattarien parissa vietetyn suppean elämän jokapäiväisen
juoksun.

Hän näki, että kun lady Maud oli prinssin seurassa, heidän oli
tapana loitota palatsialueen äärimmäisille liepeille ja että neito siellä
päästi pienestä syrjäportista sisälle erään kaartinupseerin, jolta
kuningatar oli kieltänyt etuoikeuden päästä hoviin.

Siellä, syrjäisessä lehtimajassa, rakastuneet kuiskivat toiveitaan ja

suunnitelmiaan muistamatta kuninkaallista holhottia, joka kenenkään
hoivaamatta leikki puutarhan kukkien ja pensaiden seassa.

Heinäkuun keskivaiheilla oli de Vac kypsyttänyt aikeensa hyvin.

Hänen oli onnistunut houkutella Brus-vanhus, puutarhuri,
luovuttamaan hänelle pienen takaportin avain selittämällä, että hän
mieli antautua keskiöiseen seikkailuun, ja leveästi viittailemalla
kaunottareen, jonka piti olla siinä toisena sekä, — mikä parhaiten
tehosi Brusiin — samalla kertaa sujauttamalla pari kultasekiiniä
puutarhurin kämmenelle.
 Brus samoin kuin muutkin palatsin palvelijat piti de Vacia
Plantagenet-suvun vilpittömänä kannattajana. Mitä muita kepposia
de Vacin mielessä saattoikaan olla, siitä Brus oli ihan varma, että
kuninkaaseen nähden takaportin avain oli de Vacin käsissä yhtä
varmassa tallessa kuin se olisi ollut Henrikillä itsellään.

Vanhus ihmetteli hieman sitä, että iäkäs, jörö miekkailunopettaja

antautui niin vanhana kevytmielisiin seikkailuihin, jotka paremmin
sopivat ylimystön nuoremmille vesoille, mutta mitäpä se häneen
kuului? Eikö hänellä ollut kylliksi ajattelemista pitäessään puutarhaa
sellaisessa kunnossa, että hänen kuninkaallinen isäntänsä ja
emäntänsä nauttisivat varjoisista teistä, hyvin hoidetusta nurmikosta,
upeista lehvistä ja kukkapenkeistä, joita hän niin ihmeen
täsmällisesti laitteli säännöllisesti järjestettyyn puutarhaan.

Lisäksi ei kahta kultasekiiniä usein saatu näin helposti; ja jos rakas

Herra Jeesus katsoi äärettömässä viisaudessaan sopivaksi käyttää
tällaista keinoa palkitakseen palvelija-poloistaan, niin huonosti olisi
sellaisen madon kuin hänen sopinut vieroksua tätä jumalallista
suosionosoitusta. Niinpä Brus otti kultasekiinit, de Vac otti avaimen,
pikku prinssi leikki onnellisena kuninkaallisen isänsä puutarhan
kukkien keskellä, ja kaikki olivat tyytyväisiä, mikä oli niinkuin pitikin.

Samana iltana de Vac vei avaimen Lontoon kaukaisella laidalla

asuvalle lukkosepälle, sellaiselle, joka ei mitenkään voinut tuntea
häntä eikä tietää avaimen olevan palatsin avaimia.

Tällä sepällä hän teetti toisen samanlaisen avaimen, varroten

kärsimättömästi ukon muovatessa sitä sen ajan alkeellisilla
työvälineillä.
 Tästä pienestä pajasta lähdettyään de Vac asteli muinaisen
Lontoon lokaisilla kaduilla ja kujilla, joita siellä täällä, pitkien
välimatkojen päässä toisistaan palavat, savuavat lyhdyt valaisivat, ja
saapui vihdoin vain vähän matkan päässä palatsista sijaitsevalle,
likaiselle hökkelille.

Rakennuksen ohitse vievä kapea kuja päättyi äkkiä Thamesin

rannassa lahoavaan, puiseen telakkaan, jonka alla joen nokimustat
laineet nousivat ja laskivat, loiskuen rapistuvia vaajoja vasten ja
kohisten syvällä laiturisillan alla etäisille, linnoituksille, isojen, hurjien
satamarottien ja vielä hurjempien, rottamaisten ihmisten tyyssijoille
saakka.

Useita kertoja de Vac asteli päästä päähän edestakaisin tällä

sysipimeällä kujalla etsiessään sen talon pientä ovea, johon hän
pyrki. Vihdoin hän osui sen kohdalle, ja hänen monesti kolkutettuani!
miekkansa nupilla sen avasi vanha, siivoton ämmänkuvatus.

»Mitä haluatte säädylliseltä naiselta näin jumalattomaan aikaan?»

ärisi hän. »Ahaa, tekö se olettekin, armollinen herra?» ehätti hän
lisäämään, kun hänen kädessään olevan kynttilän lepattava liekki
valaisi de Vacin kasvoja. »Olkaa tervetullut, armollinen herra,
kolminkertaisesti tervetullut! Paholaisen tytär lausuu tervetulleeksi
veljensä.»

»Ole hiljaa, vanha noita!» kivahti de Vac. »Eikö se riitä, että kiskot
minulta kelpo kolikoita kylliksi paljon voidaksesi koko loppuikäsi
käyttää pehmeitä vaippoja ja mässätä, syöden sämpylöitä ja juoden
malvasiaviiniä, vai pitääkö sinun vielä vaivata minua katalan kielesi
tuskastuttavalla jaarittelulla?
 »Onko sinulla vaatteet valmiina mytyssä ja myöskin avain tähän
kadotuksen porttiin? Entä huone, oletko sijoittanut paikalleen tänne
lähettämäni huonekalut ja lakaissut lattialta ja laipiopalkeista
vuosisatojen aikana kasaantuneen lian ja lukinverkot? Niin,
ilmassakin oli niiden roomalais-vainajien löyhkä, jotka rakensivat
Lontoon kaksitoista vuosisataa siten. Hajusta päättäen arvelenkin,
että tässä pahnassa on täytynyt asua roomalaisia sikopaimenia
laumoineen, ja uskallanpa väittää, ettet sinä, vanha imisä, ole
kajonnutkaan luudalla tähän paikkaan, peläten sotkevasi sukulaistesi
ikivanhoja jätteitä.»

»Heretkää lörpöttämästä, herra saatana!» tiuskaisi akka.

»Kuuntelen rahojenne puhetta mieluummin kuin teidän omaanne,
sillä vaikka ne tulevat kirottuina ja tahrattuina veijarinkädestänne,
puhuvat ne kuitenkin yhtä suloisella ja käskevällä äänellä kuin jos ne
olisivat ihan äsken lähteneet pyhän kirkon aarrearkuista.

»Mytty on valmis», jatkoi hän sulkien oven nyt sisälle astuneen de

Vacin jälkeen, »ja tässä on avain; mutta ensin maksu! En tiedä,
millaista rumaa puuhaa suunnittelette, mutta ruma se on, siitä olen
varma, koska vaaditte minua pitämään sen niin salassa, ja varmasti
joku maksaisi minulle paljon, jos saisi tietää, missä ovat vanha
nainen ja lapsi — sisareksenne ja hänen pojakseen te heitä väitätte
— jotka niin kiihkeästi haluatte piilottaa Til-muorin ylisille. Sentähden
on teidän parasta, hyvä herra, maksaa Til-vanhukselle hyvästi ja
lisätä muutamia kultakolikkoja siitä, että hänen kielensä pysyy hiljaa,
jos haluatte vankienne saavan rauhaa Til-vanhuksen talossa.»

»Nouda käärö, akka!» vastasi de Vac. »Kultaa saat, kun asia

lopullisesti järjestetään; ja saat jopa enemmänkin kuin sovimme, jos
kaikki käy hyvin ja sinä pidät kurissa riivatun kielesi.»