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I N T E R N A T I O N A L LABOR,
DIPLOMACY, AND PEACE
INTERNATIONAL LABOR,
DIPLOMACY, A N D PEACE
1 9 1 4 - 1 9 1 9
By
AUSTIN V A N DER SLICE

Assistant Professor
Economics and Sociology
University of Arkansas
PHILADELPHIA
U N I V E R S I T Y OF P E N N S Y L V A N I A PRESS
LONDON: HUMPHREY MILFORD: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
I94I
Copyright 1941
U N I V E R S I T Y OF P E N N S Y L V A N I A PRESS
Manufactured in the United States of America

by the Haddon Craftsmen, Inc.
TO
MY MOTHER
CONTENTS
Chapter Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ix
I INTRODUCTION I
II A REALISTIC SETTING FOR THE WAR AIMS 4
III THE WAR AIMS OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR 20
IV THE WAR AIMS OF FRENCH LABOR 63
ν THE WAR AIMS OF BRITISH LABOR 96
VI THE WAR AIMS OF AMERICAN LABOR 141
VII LABOR'S PEACE DIPLOMACY 163
VIII POPULAR FRONT ORGANIZATIONS AIDING
LABOR'S PEACE PROGRAM 192
IX THE LABOR MOVEMENT AND PRESIDENT
WILSON 208
χ THE GOVERNMENTS AND LABOR 258
XI LABOR ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE PEACE 290
XII THE BERNE CONFERENCE AND ITS AFTER-
MATH 309
XIII LABOR'S LOBBYING AT PARIS 343
BIBLIOGRAPHY 376
APPENDIX: NOTES ON THE LABOR PRESS,
1914-19 398
INDEX 405
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
THE author wishes to express his appreciation to the librarians and
staffs of the libraries he was privileged to use. The Library of the
University of Pennsylvania, those of Michigan, Harvard, and
Columbia, as well as the Library of Congress and that of the
Carnegie Foundation in Washington, D . C., proved useful. The
New York Public Library was found to be the best single source
of material on the subject. Valuable labor sources were found in the
library of the Rand School of Social Science in New York.
In Great Britain the writer wishes to thank the staff of the Brit-
ish Library of Political and Economic Science at the London
School of Economics and Political Science, that of the Institute of
Historical Research, that of the Royal Institute of International
Affairs, and the Librarian of the Imperial W a r Museum. The
British Museum Library, along with its Newspaper branch at
Hendon, was of invaluable aid in the collection of data for this
study. The Transport House Library of the Labour Party and the
Trades Union Congress was open to the author through the
courtesy of Mr. William Gillies, International Secretary of the
Labour Party.
In France the writer is indebted to the director of the American
University Union, Dr. Horatio S. Krans, for his aid in obtaining
reading privileges at the Bibliothèque de la Dotation Carnégie, the
Bibliothèque Nationale, and the Bibliothèque de Documentation
Internationale Contemporaine. The Bibliothèque Nationale and
the Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine
were of especial value with regard to the French labor movement.
T h e files of most of the French labor press were available at the
former.
In Switzerland the libraries of the International Labor Office
and of the League of Nations were made available through the
kindness of Mr. C. Wilfred Jenks of the Legal Department at the
International Labor Office.
In Belgium the library of the Socialist International was made
ix
χ ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
available through the kindness of the Secretary, Mr. Felix Adler.
Material on the socialist movement unavailable elsewhere was
found here and the staff was most helpful.
The author is indebted to Professor William E . Lingelbach of
the University of Pennsylvania, for suggestions and encouragement
during the preparation of this study. H e is likewise grateful to
Professor C. K. Webster, under whom he studied at the London
School of Economics during the fall and winter of 1936-37.
Through Professor Webster new sources of information were dis-
covered, and his intimate reminiscences of the Peace Conference
were appreciated. Dr. Fritz Epstein, formerly of the University
of Hamburg, now at Tufts College, was also helpful.
Through the kindness of Dr. Harry L . Laidler of the League
for Industrial Democracy, and Mr. Clarence Senior, then Secretary
of the Socialist Party of the United States, letters of introduction
were given to a number of European labor leaders. Mr. William
Gillies, International Secretary of the British Labour Party, a man
who actively participated in all the international activity of the
Labour Party during the war and the Peace Conference, granted
an interview. Mr. Gillies was helpful in suggesting sources of in-
formation and in giving his perspective of the whole situation. At
Paris, the late Jean Longuet, an outstanding Socialist leader of
France, received the author. Mr. Longuet, the grandson of Karl
Marx, was the leader of the minority of the French Socialist Party
during the war. His conversation helped to lend perspective to
the whole problem and clarified the part played by the French
movement. In Belgium the writer interviewed the late Emile
Vandervelde, retired Socialist minister of state. Vandervelde, dur-
ing the war, was President of the Socialist International as well
as a member of the Belgian war cabinet. He was the only Socialist
plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace Conference, and as such was
able to throw new light on the Socialist activity there. Nor, in this
connection, should the author overlook the help and encouragement
granted by Bjarne Braatoy, Norwegian Social Democratic news-
paper correspondent located in London and author of Labour and
War.
Much of the drudgery has been lightened by my wife, Hope
Kingsbury Van der Slice, who worked at my side in the transcrip-
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xi
tion of the data and who took charge of the clerical work in the
preparation of the manuscript.
Finally, I wish to thank the following publishing houses for
permission to use quotations: Columbia University Press, Double-
day, Doran and Company, E. P. Dutton and Company, Little,
Brown and Company, The Macmillan Company.
A. V. d. S.
I
INTRODUCTION
THE failure of labor to enforce its demands at the Paris Peace

Conference has tended to obscure the true importance of its rôle
there. Yet, just as the defeat of Wilsonian idealism cannot alter
the historical importance of the position he assumed as the first
American, or indeed the first extra-European political leader, to
acquire so high a place in European councils, so labor's failure
cannot hide the fact that this was the first peace conference at
which labor demanded a place. And while the labor clauses of the
treaty are the most obvious evidence of labor's influence, never-
theless it is the political program which labor failed to put across
that historically will loom as the most important.
It was a far cry from the pleadings of Robert Owen, philan-
thropist and idealist, before the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in
1 8 1 8 , to labor's demands at Paris in 1 9 1 9 . A century had elapsed
which had witnessed the birth of the organized working class. In
1848 the Communist Manifesto had given a unity and a destiny
to this emergent class. T h e early years of the twentieth century
had seen it rise to a position of power. T h e motif of the socialist
phase of this movement at least had been "Workers of the world
unite." A political class organization reaching out openly across
national boundaries was a new phenomenon in the modern world.
It was this unprecedented situation that faced the statesmen of
the world in 1 9 1 4 .
The much-heralded plans of international socialism to prevent
a general European war did not prove strong enough in the July-
August 1 9 1 4 crisis. Its efforts to hold an international conference
at Stockholm to pave the way for a negotiated peace on a socialist
basis were thwarted by the Allied and Associated Powers. Never-
theless nationally and internationally labor did carry out an active
peace program during the war and at the Paris Conference. T o
I
2 INTERNATIONAL LABOR DIPLOMACY
trace the development of this program is the object of the present

study.
As the war progressed, the organized labor movement as a
whole developed a policy and a program which were quite inde-
pendent of the policy and program of its governments. It was in
the labor movement that the war administrations found their
firmest political opposition. While this was true generally in Eu-
rope, the United States presented a quite different picture. Here
the bulk of the labor movement was strongly pro-administration.
This was due not only to the fact that President Wilson's program
closely paralleled that of international labor, but also to the fact
that American labor, because of the late entry of the United States
into the war, was still fresh. Furthermore its leadership and tra-
dition differed sharply from that of the European movement.
T w o features of labor's war-time peace program stand out dis-
tinctly. The first is that the organized labor movement drew up
a statement of the terms upon which the coming peace should
rest which anticipated the Fourteen Points of President Wilson.
T h e second is that the policy of public diplomacy which Wilson,
as the President of a belligerent Power, inaugurated with his
January 8, 1918, address and brought to a successful conclusion
with the signing of the armistice in November, had already be-
come the policy of the organized labor movement. This similarity
between the peace policy of European labor and the Wilson ad-
ministration is not hard to understand. Both were expert in issuing
rousing and idealistic appeals to the masses. Both were free from
the commitments and obligations of European diplomacy and
could thus offer an ideal program for the coming peace. T h e one,
by virtue of the geographical location of his nation, and the other,
by the interests and philosophy of its class, had nothing to gain
by an imperialistic peace. In this way then out of a common world
situation Wilson and the labor movement formulated policies that
were strikingly parallel.
The present study will confine its investigation to the labor
movements of France, Great Britain, and the United States during
the period of the war and the peace. A detailed account of the
development of German labor's peace program would have added
little to the story. T h e fortunes of war saw to that. Moreover
INTRODUCTION 3
even in the international working-class movement German social-
ists and trade unionists had been superseded in their leadership
by their British and French comrades. Just as in the case of Russia,
the influence of the German workers appeared to lie in the threat
of a revolutionary outbreak rather than in the presentation of a
political program for popular acceptance. T h e Socialist and Trade
Union Internationals in so far as they contributed to the devel-
opment of labor's peace program will be included. It is the neg-
lected phase of this story, labor's peace program during the war
and at the Paris Conference, which will be portrayed.
In a study of this kind the time element and the close inter-
relationship between events and opinion are factors of the utmost
importance. A brief summary of the official policy of the govern-
ments will thus be useful as a background for labor's activities.
Then will come a detailed account of the development of the
war aims of organized labor internationally and in France, Great
Britain, and the United States. T h e parliamentary and extra-
parliamentary action of labor in trying to make its peace policy
effective, labor's methods of arousing popular support for its pro-
gram, its unreserved support of the peace program of President
Wilson, and the means by which the governments kept the labor
movement within bounds, will complete the war time account.
Finally, the rôle of labor at the Paris Conference, its plans for
influencing the peace, its actual lobbying activities and the general
effect it had on the governments' policies will, for the first time,
be consistently explored.
I I
A REALISTIC SETTING FOR THE

WAR AIMS
THE method by which labor advanced her peace policy during

the war was largely that of influencing public opinion. N o r was
this medium in any sense an open domain. T h e officiai views of
the problems of the war and the peace were drummed into the
minds of the belligerent publics with a weariless repetition. T h e
vast machinery of governmental propaganda for the first time
so f u l l y marshaled was intent upon keeping all elements of the
public in line. It is little wonder then that for the most part
labor was slow in assuming an independent attitude.
A French left-wing socialist, Amedée Dunois, pointed out at
the time what he considered to be a new feature in war propaganda
—the idealization of war by the idealization of its ends. T h u s the
war of 1 9 1 4 became a war of justice, a war of right, the last war,
a war for the liberation of peoples, a struggle of democracy against
dictatorship. A l l of these slogans, he pointed out, adapted them-
selves remarkably to the struggles of the international proletariat. 1
This much at least can be said in this regard, increased emphasis
was put on war aims, on the terms of peace to be expected, on
the successful conclusion of the war. Moreover a great deal of
the government propaganda for internal consumption was con-
sciously directed toward working-class opinion.
T h e world has become so propaganda conscious since 1 9 1 4 that
it is necessary to offer a few cautions before proceeding with any
study bordering on war-time public opinion. T h e dividing line
between policy and propaganda is oftentimes blurred. T h e term
" w a r a i m " is open to a number of different interpretations. It
may mean a basic goal in the foreign policy of a belligerent, and
as such is more often than not unknown to the general public
1
Pofulaire, April 28, 1918. All translations in this study were made by the
author.
4
A REALISTIC SETTING 5
at the time. It may mean an effective type of propaganda by
which the public at home and the belligerent, neutral, and Allied
publics are influenced in their attitude and actions. It may mean
certain ideals toward which nations strive and for which they
can call upon their peoples to sacrifice. In most instances more
than one of these characteristics are present in the war aim.
Certain examples of the multiple function of many of the
announced war aims of the Allies may clarify the discussion. T h e
restoration of Belgium in order to maintain faith in international
law not only represented a legitimate claim acknowledged by all
belligerents but formed an excellent shibboleth with which to
strengthen the morale of the Allied peoples. It was this cry that
played so large a part in rallying the British public to participa-
tion in the war in August 1914. It was the supreme example that
allowed the Allies to place such emphasis on the ideal of uphold-
ing international morality and law. T h e rape of Belgium and
the ravages of submarine warfare were so dramatically heralded
as instancing brazen disregard for international law that the illegal
interference with neutral shipping, the violation of Greek neutral-
ity, and the starvation blockade imposed upon Germany left the
Allied and neutral publics little moved.
T h e principle of the self-determination of peoples, implicit as
it was in the pre-war European situation, served the Allied cause
well. It justified not only the demand of France for the return
of Alsace Lorraine, but Italy's quest for her unredeemed territory
and the break up of Austria-Hungary and Turkey. It could at
the same time represent an idealized plan for European stability
and an incendiary call for revolt among the peoples of the Central
Powers. As a matter of fact, in their first joint pronouncement
on war aims the Allies had inserted an ambiguous statement in
regard to the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian empire into
its component nationalities at the request of the Czechoslovak
council of Paris. 2
Moreover, war aims grew out of concrete situations.3 In this
2 Renouvin, Pierre, La Crise Européenne et la Grande Guerre, 1904-1918,
P· 379·
3 Webster, C . K . , The League of Nations in Theory and Practice, London, i g j 3 ,
ch. II. Webster stresses this in the case of the League of Nations.
connection it is important to remember that the principle of the

freedom of the seas was first officially voiced by the United States,
fresh from its unhappy experience as a neutral trader. It was
revolutionary Russia and the United States who gave official sup-
port to the ideal of open diplomacy, unencumbered as they were
by secret commitments. Germany proclaimed the independence of
Poland in the hope of raising troops for the Central Powers.
One hundred years before, a conflict involving the whole of
Europe had turned men's minds from the balance of power to
the Concert of Europe as a means of achieving security. It was
the operation of similar forces during the period of 1 9 1 4 1 0 1 9 1 9
which gave such impetus to the League of Nations idea.
Still another characteristic of war aims should be noted. They
had a marked tendency to vary with the fortunes of battle. This
was admitted by the statesmen of all nations.4 Ludendorf remarked
in his memoirs that only the outcome of the war would have a
decisive effect on the peace. Ribot on June 2, 1 9 1 7 , declared that
it was victory which would determine the war aims of France.
Lloyd George expressed this conviction before the Imperial War
Cabinet. While discussing the fate of the German Colonies, he
said:
T h e extent to which we can establish p e r m a n e n t l y our dominion in

these colonies must depend v e r y largely upon the m e a s u r e of success
w e achieve in the w a r , because if the success w e r e p a r t i a l we could
not expect our Allies to b e a r their share of the sacrifice whilst w e
w e r e e n j o y i n g practically the whole a d v a n t a g e . 5
Even in the case of the United States the shift in its position in
regard to the peoples of Austria-Hungary is significant. On
January 8, 1 9 1 8 , President Wilson apparently stood for the
autonomy of peoples within the empire, but by September 3,
1 9 1 8 , due to the course of events, the American State Depart-
ment had recognized the Czech National Council as the de facto
government over a part of Austrian territory.
* Crafouillot, May 1933, p. 7. The issue is devoted to the Histoire de la Paix
by Jean Galtier Boissière.
5
Lloyd George, David, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, Little, Brown &
Co., Boston, 1933-37, v °l- IV» p. 1776.
Y e t , in spite of these cautions, one must recognize a constructive
purpose which these war aims served. A f t e r all, the armistice was
signed on the understanding that the Fourteen Points of President
Wilson, with two stated modifications, should serve as the basis
of peace. T h e war aims did form the framework for a constructive
peace program. Indeed their very statement was a victory for
those who wished to substitute a peace of justice for the old peace
by duress.
In order to place Allied labor's war aims in their proper per-
spective, it will be helpful to outline in brief order the official
war aims of the Entente. Upon entrance into the war the foreign
policies of the governments were turned toward strengthening
their alliances, obtaining new allies, and preventing the enemy
from acquiring new supporters. T h e first outstanding action on
the part of the Allies was the signing of the Pact of London on
September 4, 1 9 1 4 , in which Great Britain, France, and Russia,
later followed by Italy, pledged themselves not to conclude peace
separately and not to state terms of peace without previous agree-
ment. 0 Then came a period of active but secret diplomatic negotia-
tion to win new allies, to satisfy the old ones, and to divide the
anticipated spoils of war. One statesman of the period called
these secret agreements "convulsive gestures of self-preserva-
tion." 7
Turkey having agreed with Germany to enter the war on the
side of the Central Powers, the way was left open for a dis-
memberment of that empire. In March 1 9 1 5 Great Britain and
France agreed that Russia should annex Constantinople. T h e
British Government was allowed to extend its influence in Persia,
and most of Asia Minor was reserved for future disposal by
the British and the French. 8 Further division of Turkish terri-
β
The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1783-1919, vol. I l l , p.
509 ff.
7
Churchill, The Rt. Hon. Winston S., The World Crisis: The Aftermath, Lon-
don, 1929, p. 129 ff.
8
de Martens, George Friedrich, Nouveaux Recueils Générales de Traités,
Leipzig, 192 ι, Tome X , Deuxième Livraison, pp. 347 ff.; Cocks, F. Seymour, The
Secret Treaties and Understandings, London, 1 9 1 8 , p. 2 2 ; Anon., The Secret
Agreements (with a Preface by C. R. Buxton, National Labour Press, February
1 9 1 S ) , section V ; Documents Diplomatiques Secrets Russes, 191^-ιγ, Paris, 1928,
pp. 249 ff.
tory was decided upon by the Sazonov-Paléologue agreement of

April 26, 1 9 1 6 , by which France promised Russia a great portion
of Turkish Armenia, and by the Sykes-Picot agreement of M a y
16, 1 9 1 6 , in which French and British sovereignty in Asia Minor
was divided. 9 T h e secret treaty of London, April 26, 1 9 1 5 , had
assigned part of Anatolia to Italy, and when the Italians learned
of the Russo-Franco-British negotiations of the spring of 1 9 1 6
they made new demands. At St. Jean de Maurienne in April
1 9 1 7 , the southern third of Anatolia and a sphere of influence
north of Smyrna was assigned to Italy. 1 0 By this series of negotia-
tions, the age-old desire of Russia for a warm-water port was
gratified, and the conflicting interests of the Allies themselves in
Asia Minor were resolved through compromise.
It was the treaty of London of April 26, 1 9 1 5 , which set the
conditions of Italian entry into the war on the side of the Allies. 1 1
At the peace, Italy was to receive among other things the Trentino,
southern T y r o l , Trieste, most of Istria, and the Dodecanese
Islands. On J u l y 3, 1 9 1 6 , Russia and Japan came to an agreement
as to their mutual interests in China. 12 And on August 18, 1 9 1 6 ,
the treaty was signed which brought Rumania into the war. That
country was to obtain the Banat, Transylvania up to the Theiss,
and Bukovina to the Pruth. 1 3
On March 1 1 , 1 9 1 7 , France and Russia negotiated a treaty
which in fact left the latter free to determine her western boundary
and favored the claim of France to the L e f t Bank and to the iron
districts of Lorraine, the coal of the Saar, and the restoration of
Alsace-Lorraine. 14 At this same time Great Britain, France, Russia,
and Japan, unknown to China, decided on the disposition of Kiao-
Chau and the German islands of the Pacific. 15 At some time during
9
de Martens, of. cit., pp. 3 5 0 - j î .
10
Cocks, of. cit., p. 48.
11
de Martens, of. cit., pp. 328 ff.
12
de Martens, of. cit., p. 382.
18
de Martens, of. cit., pp. 342 ff.
" d e Martens, o f . cit., pp. 370 ff.
15
Langsam, Walter Consuelo, The World Since 1Ç14, New York, 1 9 3 3 , p.
599; Nicolson, Hon. Harold G., Peacemaking, 79/9, London, 1 9 3 3 , Book I,
pp. 144-7·
the war France and Great Britain came to an agreement on the
division of the German colonies of Togoland and the Cameroons. 16
T h e s e secret commitments then formed the framework of the
real war aims of the Allied Powers, and any peace terms that
they could support or in fact countenance must be consistent with
these claims. A particularly striking instance of the force of these
secret agreements is seen in the silence with which the Allies, and
particularly France, treated the question of Poland in spite of the
capital German Government propaganda was making out of its
declaration of Polish independence. T h e most serious consequence
of these commitments was the reluctance with which the govern-
ments involved viewed any opportunity for a negotiated peace
which did not assure them the victor's right of dictating terms.
Besides these secret negotiations each government formulated
in private the peace terms it wished to see achieved. A n excellent
example of this is found in the discussions of peace terms by
L l o y d George at the first session of the Imperial W a r Cabinet
on March 20, 1917. As the British Prime Minister stated at the
time, such a discussion would have been impossible in public and
not then possible even with their allies. In urging the necessity
for such a "free, sincere, candid discussion" among themselves,
L l o y d George pointed out that they could not really measure the
effort they must put forth until they had a clear comprehension
of what they considered to be essential to any satisfactory peace.
H e then laid down certain minimum objectives. Germany must
evacuate and restore all territories occupied by her. Poland must
be restored. General geographical adjustment of the map of
Europe on the basis of recognizing national rights would be
desirable. T h e idea must be implanted that wars of aggression
are impossible enterprises. In addition he listed five further aims.
Europe should be democratized; the Turkish Empire must be
disrupted and never in the future be allowed to misgovern Meso-
potamia, Palestine, Syria, or Armenia; the economic and indus-
trial reconstruction of Great Britain should be assured; a greater
solidarity of aim and action as far as the British Empire was
concerned must be achieved; and while it would be desirable to
1 9 Miller, David Hunter, My Diary at the Conference of Paris, New Y o r k , 1924,

vol. X I V , p. 36.
IO INTERNATIONAL LABOR DIPLOMACY
establish British rule in the conquered German colonies, success

there would depend upon the fortunes of war. In all cases these
latter should be treated from the point of view of the whole
empire and not from that of any part of it.
L l o y d George concluded his remarks by pointing out that
Great Britain was the backbone of the alliance.
T o be ready for 1918 means victory, and it is a victory in which

the British Empire will lead. It will easily be the first power in
the world. And I rejoice in that not merely for selfish reasons but
because, with all its faults, the British Empire is the truest representa-
tive of freedom—in the spirit even more than the letter, of its insti-
tutions. 17
A t the second meeting of the newly formed Imperial W a r

Cabinet two subcommittees were formed to formulate desirable
peace terms. T h e territorial committee was under the chairman-
ship of L o r d Curzon. T h e committee dealing with non-territorial
questions sat under L o r d Milner. T h e report of the territorial
subcommittee called f o r the retention of all German colonies and
Turkish territory held by the British. Both Dominion and British
delegates had concurred in this attitude. T h e Imperial W a r Cabinet
accepted this as a statement of what Britain should work for at
the Peace Conference, subject to Allied approval. H o w e v e r , Arthur
Henderson would not concur and stated the Labour Party would
never acquiesce in a policy of annexations. 18
L o r d Milner's subcommittee on non-territorial questions raised
an extended and interesting discussion at two meetings of the
Imperial W a r Cabinet on April 26 and M a y 1 , 1 9 1 7 . T h e pro-
visions of the Paris Economic Conference were regarded as no
longer applicable, but the most-favored-nation treatment was not
to be extended to the enemy at the end of the war. Indemnities
were to include losses to British shipping. T h e L e a g u e of Na-
tions was to be merely an agreement entered into by the signatories
of the treaty that they should not resort to arms against one
another until they had submitted their dispute to a conference
of the powers. L o r d Cecil, upon reading Sir E y r e Crowe's mem-
17
War Memoirs of David. Lloyd. George, vol. I V , pp. 1 7 7 6 - 8 4 .
18
Ibid., pp. 1749-51·
A REALISTIC SETTING
o r a n d u m on disarmament, changed his mind in regard to its de-

sirability as one of the peace demands. 1 9
T h i s then was the program of the British Imperial G o v e r n m e n t
in the spring of 1 9 1 7 . But these demands, like those of the secret
treaty, were not known to Parliament or people. T h e French
G o v e r n m e n t likewise had charted its course. In the winter of
1 9 1 6 the French Foreign Office formulated its terms. 20 I n d e e d ,
speaking of the official w a r aims in the first months of 1917,
Pierre R e n o u v i n has written:
With the two belligerent groups, it is then the same spirit which
dominates; the idea of a "white peace" is admitted officially by no
one, both camps are annexationist. 21
Y e t the admission of such aims would have been so d a m a g i n g

to the morale of their own peoples and so disastrous to their
relations with neutrals and indeed with some of their allies that
the g o v e r n m e n t s guarded their secrets w e l l . T h u s f r o m the v e r y
beginning of the war there existed a duality of aims a m o n g the
g o v e r n m e n t s of the warring nations. O n the one hand there were
the public declarations of purpose and on the other were the
secret objectives of treaties and agreements. H o w e v e r , the A l l i e d
nations could not simply observe a policy of silence in regard to
their war aims. Some attempt must be made to clothe the naked-
ness of the struggle with the garments of righteousness.
T h e British public, won to the support of the war by their
indignation over the invasion of B e l g i u m and the direct threat
that this offered to their own national security, received their
first comprehensive statement of the government's war aims in
the G u i l d h a l l speech of P r i m e Minister Asquith on N o v e m b e r 9,
1914. " W e shall never sheath the sword, which w e have not
l i g h t l y d r a w n , " said Asquith, "until B e l g i u m recovers in full
measure all, and more than all, that she has sacrificed, until
France is adequately secured against the menace of aggression,
until the rights of smaller nationalities of E u r o p e are placed upon
an unassailable foundation, and until the military domination of
19 Ibid., pp. 1750-54, 1798-1800.

20 T e r r a i l , Gabriel ( M e r m e i x ) , Les Combats des Trois. Paris, 1922, pp. 191-3.
21 Renouvin, of. cit., p. 387.
Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed." A year and a half later

Asquith had nothing to add save to demand reparation for Serbia
on the same terms as for Belgium. W h e n asked to be more
definite he exclaimed, " H o w can I make it more intelligible?" 22
T h e French people in the face of actual invasion needed only to
be told that it was a war of aggression on the part of imperialist
Germany.
Poincaré noted on September 20, 1914, "that the ministers
without exception have declared that the Government of the Re-
public could engage itself to end the war the day the national
territory, including Alsace-Lorraine, was evacuated by the enemy
and that it would show itself as resolute as Russia in putting an
end to Prussian Militarism." 2 3
Suffice it to say that the early war aims of the governments
were of a vague and general nature. It was necessarily so because
of the secret agreements and the uncertainty as to the course of
the battle.
In fact the situation was such that President Wilson could
justly say in his note of December 18, 1916, which requested the
belligerents to state their war aims:
T h e leaders of the several belligerents have, as has b e e n said,

stated those objects in general terms. B u t , stated in general terms,
they seem to be the same on both sides. N e v e r y e t h a v e the authori-
tative spokesmen of either side a v o w e d the precise objects, which
would, if attained, satisfy t h e m and their people that the w a r had
been fought out. T h e world has been left to conjecture w h a t definite
results, w h a t actual exchanges of guarantees, w h a t political o r terri-
torial changes or readjustments, w h a t stage of military success even
would bring the w a r to an end. 2 4
T h e Allied governments had, however, made one definite

public statement of policy when they met at the Paris Economic
Conference, June 14 to 17, 1916. O n March 1 Germany had
begun unrestricted submarine warfare, and to meet and counter
22 Great Britain, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, F i f t h Series, vol.
L X X X , p. 736.
23 Crafouillot, M a y 1933, p. 9.
24 Scott, James Brown, President Wilson's Foreign Policy, New York, 1918,
P· 237·
this threat the Paris Conference was held. The Germans, already
familiar with the power of the Allied blockade, were faced with
a permanent economic encirclement more portentous even than
a diplomatic one. At Paris the Allies decided that during the
war the restriction on commerce with the enemy, or enemy sub-
jects and sympathizers, would be made much more rigid. During
the reconstruction period following the war, trade with the
enemy would be restricted for a definite number of years and
the Allies would have first claim upon raw materials, industrial
and agricultural equipment, and the like. As a permanent measure
the Allies would forthwith begin to take steps that would render
them independent of the enemy country in regard to raw ma-
terials and manufactured articles necessary to the normal develop-
ment of their economic activities. These measures would include
not only those affecting sources of supply but financial, com-
mercial, and maritime organization. Immediate steps were out-
lined to put this program into effect. 25
It was in response to the request President Wilson addressed
to all belligerents that the Allies made public their first compre-
hensive statement of war aims on January 10, 1917· 2 6 After stating
that they believed it impossible at that moment to attain a peace
which would assure them reparation, restitution, and the guaran-
tees to which they were entitled by the aggression of the Central
Powers, they stated their demands. They were: the restoration
and indemnification of Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro; the
evacuation of the invaded territories of France, Russia, and
Rumania with just reparation; the reorganization of Europe,
guaranteed by a stable régime and founded as much upon respect
of nationalities and full security and liberty for the economic de-
velopment of great and small nations as upon territorial con-
ventions and international agreements to guarantee territorial
and maritime frontiers against unjustified attacks; the restitution
of territories wrested in the past from the Allies by force or
against the will of their populations; the liberation of Italians,
of Slavs, of Rumanians, and of Czechoslovaks from foreign domina-
25
de Martens, op. cit., pp. 624 ff.
26
Official Statement of War Aims and Peace Proposals, Washington, D . C.,
' 9 2 I i PP· 3 5 - 3 8 .
tion; the enfranchisement of the peoples subject to the Turks; a
Polish nation along the lines outlined by the Czar.
T w o days later the German Government replied to the En-
tente's answer in an able and convincing diplomatic dispatch to
President Wilson. 27 On January 13 the British Government added
a supplement to the Allied note defending the Allies' plan for
the dismemberment of Turkey and declaring no peace could be
durable unless it were based on an Allied victory. 28 On January
22, 1 9 1 7 , President Wilson addressed his famous "Peace With-
out Victory" message to the Senate.29
Events were moving at a tremendous tempo. On January 31
Germany again declared unrestricted submarine warfare. On March
15 the Czar of Russia abdicated. On April 6 the United States
declared war on Germany. It was the Russian revolution rather
than the entry of the United States into the war that at first
influenced the development of Allied war aims the most. In spite
of his past record as a neutral, in trying to get a clear definition
of war aims, President Wilson, once a principal in the struggle,
left such considerations aside as he concentrated on swinging the
whole force of the American nation into the balance against the
Central Powers. For the time at least an Allied victory was more
important than the program of a future peace. Victory alone
must fix the terms.
From its first declaration, April 9, 1 9 1 7 , the Russian Provisional
Government had evinced a determination "to establish a durable
peace letting people govern themselves." 30 Later in the month
they had requested the Allies to examine their war aims on the
basis of that declaration. 31 The Kerensky Government had urged
the Allies to redefine their war aims, and an Allied conference
had been planned for this purpose to meet in November 1917. 3 2
In October 1 9 1 7 delegates to this conference were instructed by
the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets to stand for the
27
Ibid., p. 40.
28
Ibid., pp. 45-49-
29
Ibid., pp. 49-55·
80
Ibid., pp. 95-96) see also Kerenski, Alexandre, La Révolution Russe, 1917,
Paris, 1928, p. 1 3 7 .
31
Kerenski, of. cit., p. 138.
32
Kerensky, Alexander, The Crucifixion of Liberty, New York, 1934, p. 345.
following war aims: the evacuation by the German troops of
Russia, and autonomy of Poland, Lithuania, and the Lettish
provinces; autonomy of Turkish Armenia; solution of the question
of Alsace-Lorraine by plebiscite in conditions of absolute liberty;
restoration of Belgium to her ancient frontiers and compensating
her losses by an international f u n d ; restoration of Serbia and
Montenegro with compensation from an international f u n d —
Serbia to receive access to the Adriatic, and Bosnia and Herzegovina
to be autonomous; Rumania to be restored within her old frontiers
and in return to give a promise to grant autonomy to the Dobrudja
and put into immediate execution article 3 of the T r e a t y of Berlin
dealing with the equality of rights of J e w s ; autonomy for Italian
provinces of Austria followed by a plebiscite; restoration to Ger-
many of all her colonies; reëstablishment of Greece and Persia;
neutralization of all tracts leading to inner seas as well as of
the Suez and Panama canals, freedom of navigation f o r merchant
vessels and the abolition of the right to torpedo merchant vessels
in time of war; all the belligerents to renounce war contributions
or indemnities in any f o r m ; treaties of commerce not to be the
basis of peace, all countries to renounce economic blockade after
the war and not to conclude separate customs understandings;
conditions of peace to be laid down at a peace congress by delegates
chosen by national representative bodies and confirmed by Parlia-
ment, undertakings to be given not to conclude secret treaties—
which are declared to be in contravention to international law,
and consequently null; general disarmament on land and sea
to be accompanied by the creation of a system of militia. 33 T h i s
program carrying the imprint of socialist thought was in most
essentials in complete accord with the Manifesto of Neutral So-
cialists in Stockholm in 1 9 1 7 .
On November 2 1 , 1 9 1 7 , Trotsky sent " a formal offer of an
immediate armistice on all fronts and the immediate opening of
peace negotiations." 34 T w o days later Lenin and K r y l e n k o issued
an armistice proclamation. T h e Germans accepted the armistice
offer on November 28, 1 9 1 7 , and on November 3 0 Trotsky in-
33
Times (London), October 22, 1 9 1 7 , p. 7.
34
Fischer, Louis, Les Soviets dans les affaires mondiales, Paris, n. d. (Deuxième
Edition), p. 12.
formed the Allies that fighting had ceased between Germany and
Russia and invited them to join in the negotiations.
Allied socialist envoys who had been sent to Russia in the spring
and summer of 1 9 1 7 had come home to demand new statements
of war aims from the Allied governments in order to reassure
Russian public opinion. From the Socialist International in a new
lease of life had come the plan for the Stockholm Conference.
The call had been issued jointly with the Russian socialists. In
all the Allied countries both the internal and the diplomatic situa-
tion called for a new statement of war aims. That could be the
least that the governments must do to fortify morale at home
and give fresh hope to a faltering ally.
As has been seen, during 1 9 1 7 the pressure on the governments
to state their war aims in precise terms increased steadily. Russian
morale was at a low ebb and the Russian Government called for
a statement of Allied war aims. The international socialist move-
ment had burst into new life and threatened to lead the way in
an irresistible movement toward a negotiated peace. War weariness,
after years of fighting with little prospect of gaining a decisive
victory, played its part. Then in the face of the Russian armistice
with Germany and practically forced by the demands of the
British Trade Unionists, Lloyd George broke the silence and on
January 5, 1 9 1 8 , presented a British peace program. H e stated
at the outset that Great Britain was not fighting a war of aggres-
sion against the German people but a war of self-defense against
the violated public law of Europe. H e insisted that they did not
fight to destroy Austria-Hungary or to deprive Turkey of its
capital or its rich lands in Asia Minor. T h e following terms of
peace must, however, be fulfilled. Belgium must be restored to
its independence and indemnified. Serbia, Montenegro, and the
occupied parts of France, Rumania, and Italy must be restored.
Britain would stand by France on the matter of Alsace-Lorraine.
An independent Poland was necessary to the stability of western
Europe. The nationalities of Austria-Hungary must in the interests
of peace be granted genuine self-government on true democratic
principles. T h e legitimate claims of Italians for reunion with those
of their own race and tongue is similarly necessary. The same
situation exists in the case of Rumania. As to Turkey, the Straits
should be internationalized and neutralized. Arabia, Armenia,

Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine should be recognized as separate
nationalities, whose exact status would be determined later. T h e
German colonies would be held at the disposal of a conference
whose decisions must have primary regard to the wishes and
interests of the native inhabitants. Finally there must be established
some international organization, and alternative to war as a means
of settling international disputes. In summation L l o y d George
declared:
If, then, we are asked w h a t w e are fighting for, we reply, as w e

have often replied. W e are fighting for a just and lasting peace, and
we believe that before permanent peace can be hoped for three con-
ditions must be fulfilled: First, the sanctity of treaties must be
secured; second, a territorial settlement must be secured, based on
the right of self-determination or the consent of the governed, and
lastly, we must seek b y the creation of some international organiza-
tion, to limit the burden of armaments and diminish the probability
of war. O n those conditions its people are prepared to m a k e even
greater sacrifices than those they have y e t endured. 3 6
This grudging action of L l o y d George was followed three days

later by the enunciation of the famous Fourteen Points of Wood-
row Wilson.3® Wilson too had been constrained by the affairs
in Russia to make his declaration at this juncture. It was Wilson's
program rather than that of L l o y d George that became the plat-
form of liberals and socialists in all lands, however. It is true
that on nine of the fourteen points the two Allied statements seemed
to be in substantial agreement. But Wilson had called for a new
diplomacy of open covenants, the removal of economic barriers,
the evacuation of Russian territories, freedom of the seas, a solu-
tion of the Balkan problem. These were matters ignored by the
British spokesman. Wilson strengthened the demand for a League
of Nations and for disarmament. H i s solution for the colonial
problem was less evasive.
Furthermore Wilson did not leave to the vagaries of a future
i5 United States, D e p a r t m e n t o f State, Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs of the
United States, 1918. Supplement I, v o l . I, pp. 4.-17.
m Scott, op. cit., pp. 359 ff.
conference the disposition of the Turkish territory in the Near

East. H e was not bound as was Lloyd George to promise addi-
tional territory to Rumania. Nor did he call for reparations for
British seamen. On the whole the Fourteen Points were well
received by the people of France and Great Britain. Italian opin-
ion was critical, and their effect in Germany was impaired by
other recent speeches of Wilson and by the fact that L l o y d George
was saying practically the same things but apparently in quite a
different spirit. Moreover Germany believed the Wilson program
to be an attempt to wean Russia from the peace conversations
and back into the war. 37 Despite the lack of criticism in the press
the Allied governments did not accept the Wilson program until
the time of the armistice negotiations.
In addition to these official statements of war aims on the part
of the Allied governments, certain other governmental declara-
tions should be mentioned to complete the picture.
On February 14, 1 9 1 6 , the Entente ministers at Havre de-
clared that Belgium would be represented at the Peace Conference
and that no peace would be concluded without the restoration
and indemnification of Belgium. 38
On November 9, 1 9 1 7 , Balfour of Great Britain submitted to
L o r d Rothschild the following declaration on the part of His
Majesty's Government:
H i s M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t v i e w with f a v o r the e s t a b l i s h m e n t in
P a l e s t i n e of a national h o m e f o r the J e w i s h people, a n d will use their
best e n d e a v o u r s to facilitate the a c h i e v e m e n t of this object, it being
clearly u n d e r s t o o d that nothing shall be done which m a y prejudice
the civil a n d religious rights of n o n - J e w i s h c o m m u n i t i e s in P a l e s t i n e
and the rights a n d political status e n j o y e d b y J e w s in a n y other
country.39
June ι , 1 9 1 8 , the Prime Ministers of France, Great Britain,

and Italy associated themselves with the Secretary of State of
the United States in an expression of earnest sympathy for the
nationalistic aspirations toward freedom of the Czecho-Slovak and
37
United States, Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Affain of
the U. S., ιç 18. Sufflement /, vol. I, pp. 1 8 - 3 3 .
ss
de Martens, o f . cit., p. 3 5 5 .
3D
Times (London), November 9, 19 17, p. 7.
Yugo-Slav peoples. T h e y likewise declared that the constitution
of a united and independent Polish state with free access to the
sea constituted one of the conditions of a solid and just peace and
of the rule of right in Europe. 4 0
On J u n e 29, 1 9 1 8 , Pichón confirmed Clemenceau's words of
April by recognizing the Czech Government. 4 1 August 9, 1 9 1 8 ,
Great Britain formally recognized the Czechs as a nation and their
forces in France, Italy, and Russia as an Allied army. 4 2 Septem-
ber 2, 1 9 1 8 , the United States Government recognized the Czecho-
slovaks as associates in the war against Germany and Austria-
H u n g a r y , and their National Council with headquarters in
Washington as a de facto government. 4 3
On October 2, 1 9 1 8 , the Allied governments formally recog-
nized the belligerent status of the Arab forces fighting as aux-
iliaries of the Allies and against the common enemy in Palestine
and Syria. 44
B y November 1 1 , 1 9 1 8 , the Fourteen Points, except for two
amendments, had become the accepted basis for the peace. In
addition the Allied and Associated Powers had made public declara-
tions on other specific matters. Great Britain had pledged itself to
support the establishment of a homeland for the J e w s in Palestine.
T h e Czech National Council had been recognized by the Powers
as a de facto government. Public sympathy and encouragement had
been extended by the Allies to the nationalistic aspirations of the
Yugo-Slavs, although no commitments had been made. Finally
the belligerent status of the Arab forces fighting in Palestine and
Syria had been recognized. T o be reconciled with these public
declarations stood the secret commitments of the war period and
the undeclared programs of the various governments.
It is, then, against this background of Allied secret commit-
ments and public declarations that the war aims of the British,
French, American, and international labor movements must be
studied.
40
Benes, Eduard, My War Memoirs, New Y o r k , 1928, p. 379.
"Ibid., p. 383.
Ibid., p. 407.
43
Ibid., p. 4 1 6 ; Official Statement of War Aims and Peace Pro fosáis, pp.
379-80.
" T i m e s (London), October 3, 1 9 1 8 , p. 8.
III
THE WAR AIMS OF INTERNATIONAL

LABOR
ORGANIZED labor was potentially the most powerful of all peace
movements at the outbreak of the World War. It remained so
during the conflict and came out of the war in 1 9 1 8 as the world's
greatest body of pacifically organized public opinion. Nationally
and internationally it was the only organized political group with
a clear-cut peace program—a program having its roots in a con-
sidered international philosophy developed over a period of several
decades.
The story of labor's past achievements in the statesmanship of
peace, rimmed with apparent futility and defeat as it was, is one
well worth the telling, not alone for the light it may throw on
a somewhat neglected phase of the world war and the peace con-
ference, but also to establish the labor movement's position as a
constructive peace force.
Much stress has been laid on the failure of labor to prevent the
war, on the breakdown of the Socialist International, and on the
divisions in the labor movement culminating in the formation
of the Third International. But little has been written on the
positive contributions towards peace that organized labor did make.
There has been no attempt to outline the development of labor's
peace program through the war years. Scant notice has been given
to the peace diplomacy labor initiated. Only the briefest allusions
have been made to labor's unprecedented demands for a share in
the peace-making.
There is no more appropriate place to start the account of
labor's peace activities than with the Socialist International. By
the autumn of 1 9 1 4 the Second International had won a place
for itself not only as a successful organization of international
labor, but as an international, social, and political influence of the
20
WAR AIMS OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR 21
first order. 1 Dating from the Paris Conference of 1889, it first

reached maturity in the Amsterdam Conference of 1904. The
Conferences of Stuttgart and Copenhagen brought increased pres-
tige and power. Organized on a permanent basis by the Paris Con-
ference of 1900, it established an International Socialist Bureau
then, 2 and a Socialist Interparliamentary Commission was set up
in 1904. 3
Through these years of increasing imperialist rivalry and ten-
sion, the International Socialist Bureau and the Congresses, aside
from the internal problems of the labor movement, gave more
and more attention to international affairs. International labor
legislation, disarmament, arbitration of international disputes,
secret diplomacy, and colonial imperialism came under their con-
sideration.
T h e International Congress of Paris in 1889 called on the
workers to oppose standing armies and to favor the development
of the militia system of an armed citizenry. It warned that war
would not finally disappear until capitalism itself went.4 Two
years later at Brussels it was reiterated that only with the creation
of a socialist order would definitive peace be assured. On this
ground it called upon all who were against war to join the So-
cialist Party. 5 At Zurich in 1893 the above declaration was en-
dorsed and labor representatives in Parliament were called upon
to vote against military credits, protest against standing armies,
and demand disarmament. Every Socialist Party should lend its
aid to all associations having for an aim universal peace.® It was
at the London Congress in 1896, a year before the Hague Con-
ference, that the first comprehensive peace resolution was passed.
T h e proletariat alone could have the serious desire and the power
to realize the peace of the world, it stated. It demanded: 1. The
simultaneous suppression of standing armies and the organization
1
T h e First International, established in 1864., had been dissolved in 1 8 7 6 . See
L o r w i n , Lewis L., Labor and Internationalism, New Y o r k , 1 9 2 9 , pp. 29-59.
2
Cinquième Congrès Socialiste International, Paris, 1900, Comfte Rendu
Analytique (Paris, 1 9 0 1 ) , p. 1 0 1 .
3
Commission Interparlementaire, Invitation à la réunion de Stuttgart, p. 1 4 .
4
Les Congrès Socialistes Internationaux, Ordres du Jour et Résolutions, Gand,
1 9 0 2 , pp. 77, and 7 5 - 7 6 .
s
Ibid., pp. 8-9, and 77.
6
Ibid., pp. 1 0 and 78.
of the armed nation ; 2. T h e institution of arbitral tribunals charged

with peacefully regulating conflicts between nations; 3. T h e f u l l
decision on the question of war or peace should be left directly
to the people in the case when the governments w o u l d not accept
the arbitral sentence. T h e Congress protested against the system
of secret treaties. 7
A t Paris in 1900 where the Second International was f o r m a l l y
organized, the socialist parties were called upon to redouble the
fight against militarism. A n alliance of the proletariat was to be
opposed to the alliance of the bourgeoisie and imperialist govern-
ments. T h e youth were to be organized and educated to combat
militarism. Socialist deputies in all countries were to engage them-
selves to vote against all military expenses and all expenses for
the fleet and for military colonial expeditions. F u r t h e r m o r e , in
all cases of international importance, a Permanent International
Socialist Commission was to be charged with initiating and guiding
a movement of protest and of uniform anti-militarist agitation. 8
A t A m s t e r d a m in 1904 where 444 delegates represented twenty-
five nations, no war resolution was passed but a comprehensive
statement against colonial imperialism was drawn up. 9 A t Stuttgart
in 1907, 884 delegates f r o m twenty-five nations laid down the
policy of international socialism in face of war. T h e conference
confirmed the past resolutions and stressed capitalism as a cause
of war. T h e working class, it said, was the natural adversary of
war. It was the duty of labor representatives in Parliaments
vigorously to combat armaments on land and sea, to refuse to
vote credits for this policy, but on the other hand to educate
youth in the ideas of the fraternity of peoples and of class con-
sciousness. It favored the democratic organization of the militia
and the abolition of standing armies. U n d e r the pressure of the
proletariat the serious practice of international arbitration w o u l d
be substituted for war in all international disputes, it declared.
T h e International could not in advance lay down steps to be taken
to prevent war, but it should intensify and coordinate the activity
7 Ibid., pp. 11 and 80.

8 Cinquième Congrès Socialiste International, pp. 101-6.
9 Sixième Congrès Socialiste International, Amsterdam, rçoj. Compte Rendu
Analytique, Bruxelles, 1904, pp. 41 ff.
W A R AIMS OF I N T E R N A T I O N A L LABOR 23
of the parties. T h e n came its much-quoted statement on action

to be taken in case of a threat of war or its actual outbreak.
I f a w a r threatens to break out it is the d u t y of the w o r k i n g class
in the countries concerned and of their p a r l i a m e n t a r y representatives
with the aid of the International Socialist B u r e a u to do all in their
p o w e r to p r e v e n t w a r b y all means which seem to them appropriate
a n d which n a t u r a l l y v a r y according to the sharpness of the class
struggle a n d the general political situation. Should w a r , none the
less, b r e a k out, it is their d u t y to cooperate to bring it p r o m p t l y to a
close, a n d to utilize the economic and political crisis created b y the
w a r to a r o u s e the masses of the people and to precipitate the d o w n f a l l
of C a p i t a l i s t d o m i n a t i o n . 1 0
It is upon the basis of this last resolution that socialist action

against war between 1 9 1 4 and 1 9 1 8 must be considered.
T h e Copenhagen Congress in 1 9 1 0 , still larger and more in-
fluential, confirmed the above Stuttgart resolution on war and went
on to lay down a basic peace program for the parliamentary rep-
resentatives of labor. In addition to spreading light on the causes
of war, educating youth in the spirit of the brotherhood of the
peoples, fighting armaments with all their power, even to the
extent of refusing credits, the parliamentary representatives, aided
by the International Socialist Bureau, must:
ι . Demand the compulsory solution of all conflicts between
states by recourse to international arbitration.
2. Renew constantly propositions toward general disarma-
ment, and first and foremost the propositions of conclud-
ing some conventions limiting maritime armaments and
abolishing the right of maritime seizure.
3. Demand the abolition of secret diplomacy and the pub-
lication of all existing and future treaties between govern-
ments.
4. Demand with insistence the autonomy of all peoples, and
defend them against all bellicose attacks and against all
oppression. 11
10
VIIe Congrès Socialiste International, Stuttgart, IÇOJ. Compte Rendu Ana-
lytique, Bruxelles, 1 9 0 8 , p. 4 2 3 .
11
Huitième Congrès Socialiste International, Copenhague, içio. Compte Rendu
Analytique, Gand, 1 9 1 1 , p. 4.73.
This outline of a new international order formed the basis for

the socialist peace demands during the war. A s such it is im-
portant to note that its planks date further back than 1910. T h e
demand for arbitration was made before the days of the Second
International. W e can trace it at least to the International Congress
at London in 1888 which called for recognition of the principle
of arbitration. 12 In 1896 the London Congress called for it, and
Stuttgart in 1907 stressed the importance of arbitration. 13
Disarmament had been a regular feature of socialist peace pro-
grams since the Congress of Zurich in 1893 and had usually been
connected with a demand for the replacing of the standing army
with a democratically organized militia system. 14 But at Copen-
hagen the new principle of abolishing the right of maritime seizure
came to be a part of the international socialist platform. 1 5 This was
probably due to recent stress laid on the problem by the Hague
Conference.
T h e demand for the abolition of all secret diplomacy and the
publication of all existing and future treaties between governments
had arisen quite naturally out of socialist experience with the im-
perialist diplomacy of the era. It was first voiced at the London
Congress in ι896. 1β
And as to their insistence on the autonomy of all peoples, this
recognition of nationality although formulated for the first time at
Copenhagen as a plank in the international socialist peace program
had its roots in the experience of the International. 17 W h e n the
Second International was formed in 1889, Poland, although not a
state, was accorded separate representation. Australia since 1893,
Bohemia since 1896, Ireland in 1900, Canada in 1904, Armenia in
1904 and 1910, and Finland since 1907 had attended the Interna-
tional Congresses as separate delegations. In fact one of the weak-
nesses of the International was that it did not sufficiently define the
12 Bulletin Périodique du Bureau Socialiste International, 3 e Année. No. 9.
Premier Supplément. " T h e Resolutions of the L a b o r International A g a i n s t W a r ,
1867-1910."
13 Ibid.
14 Les Congrès Socialistes Internationaux, Ordres du jour et Résolutions, pp.
79 ff. F o r Congresses since 1900 see the Proceedings cited above.
15 Huitième Congrès Socialiste International, p. 4.73.
16 Les Congrès Socialistes Internationaux, Ordres du jour et Résolutions, p. 80.
17 Huitième Congrès Socialiste International, p. 80.
apparent anomaly between recognition of nationalities and the ideal

of a federation. 18
By the time of the World War, then, the Second International
had become the recognized leader of socialist thought the world
over. Through the prestige of its leadership and the powerful po-
litical influence of its delegations it became a factor in world affairs,
and a constantly growing public looked forward with interest and
satisfaction to its pronouncements on world issues. In the years
immediately preceding 1 9 1 4 it was considered by many as a bulwark
against war.
At the outbreak of the World W a r international socialism had
424 deputies in the various parliaments, a membership of over
three millions, and had polled in recent elections almost twelve
million votes. 19 T o be sure, the socialists had not attained majority
control in any country, but the rapidity with which they had grown
together with their unique international organization and the strik-
ing if somewhat idealistic solutions they offered for puzzling world
problems fired the imagination of potential followers and incited
fears in the minds of their opponents, thus giving the international
socialist movement an appearance of power beyond its real im-
portance.
Moreover, the International was not a closely knit homogeneous
organization. T h e constituent parties differed greatly in ideology
and tactics.20 There was a struggle between Marxian revolutionary
socialism and revisionism led in Germany by Kautsky and Bern-
stein, in France by Guesde and Jaurès, and in Russia by Lenin
and Plekhánov. It was continued in the debates of the International.
There were Socialist Parties cooperating closely with trade unions
such as those of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Switzerland, Italy,
Belgium, and the Scandinavian countries. These were united with
parties who were less successful in gaining trade union support as
was the case in Great Britain, France, and the United States.
Colonial nations were represented along with colonizing ones;
18
See Les Congrès Socialistes Internationaux, Ordres du jour et Résolutions and
Proceedings of Congresses cited above.
19
Various estimates have been made. See Fainsod, Merle, International Socialism
and the World War, Cambridge, 1 9 3 5 ; Humphrey, A. W., International Socialism
and the War, London, 1 9 1 5 , p. 20; The American Socialist, January 16, 1 9 1 5 .
20
For a discussion of this see Lorwin, of. cit., pp. 73-96.
democracies with kingdoms and empires; countries of immigration

and emigration; those rich in raw materials and poverty-stricken
ones; industrial and agricultural lands. A l l of the divisions of the
larger world were reproduced in the International. It was not to
be wondered at that all of the problems were not settled by clear-
cut solutions. T h e right of nationalities to self-determination was
early recognized but not entirely reconciled with favor shown
larger political units. T h e resolutions on war were ambiguous. T h e
thorny problem of opposition to war was blurred by the confusing
distinction between defensive and offensive wars, tacitly recognized.
This failure to take a clear-cut stand represented one of the major
weaknesses in the socialist peace policy.
T h e International had had experience in war crises before the
fateful days of J u l y and August 1 9 1 4 . In the crises of Agadir,
Tripoli, the Balkan wars it had taken united action. 21 At the out-
break of the Balkan W a r in 1 9 1 2 the Belgian and French socialists
demanded a special International Socialist Conference. 2 2 A t that
time it was feared that the Balkan W a r would draw in Russia and
Austria and bring about a general European war. It was under
these circumstances that the Basle Conference met on November 24,
1 9 1 2 . It was the greatest manifestation against war yet undertaken
by the proletariat, and its 555 delegates held the center of world
attention. On November 25 the Congress passed a resolution recall-
ing the resolutions of former Congresses and stating that the time
had come for the proletariat to give all possible vigor to its con-
certed action. E v e r y w h e r e the working class arose against im-
perialism. Each section of the International had opposed to the
government of its country the resistance of the proletariat, and
organized the public opinion of its nation against warlike fantasies.
T h e fear by the governing classes of a proletarian revolution which
would follow a universal war had been a guarantee of peace. T h e
Congress demanded of the Socialist Parties to continue vigorously
their action by all means which appeared to them to be appropriate.
F o r this common action it assigned to each Socialist Party its par-
ticular task. In turn the motion laid down the duties of the Socialist
21
Bulletin Périodique du Bureau Socialiste International. 3 e Année. No. g
(Against W a r ) , -passim.
22
Louis, Paul, Histoire du Socialisme en France, Paris, 1 9 3 6 , p. 3 3 5 .
Parties of the Balkans, Austria-Hungary, and of Russia. Then it de-

nounced Czarist imperialism and its dark intrigues in Eastern
Europe. But the resolution reserved for the workers of Germany,
France, and E n g l a n d the essential rôle.
The workers of Germany and of France do not admit that secret

treaties can ever oblige them to enter into a conflict in the Balkans.
The governments know that in the present state of Europe and in
the disposition and spirit of the working class, they could not with-
out peril to themselves unloose a war.
T h e Congress charged the International Socialist Bureau to follow

the events with redoubled attention and to maintain, whatever hap-
pened, communications and bonds with the proletarian parties of
all nations.
Thus the International Socialist Bureau had before the W o r l d
W a r set its peace machinery to work. W h i l e it could not prevent
the Balkan wars from continuing, it maintained unity of thought
among the socialists, and inasmuch as a general war did not break
out it remained in the eyes of a growing public a bulwark against
the threat of war.
T h e day after the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, on J u l y 25,
1 9 1 4 , the Executive Committee of the International Socialist
Bureau decided to take counsel whether it was necessary to summon
the Bureau. 2 3 On J u l y 26 the Executive called for a full meeting of
the International Socialist Bureau f o r J u l y 29, 1 9 1 4 . At this
memorable meeting it was agreed to strengthen socialist action
against the war and support the proposition for the submission of
the Austro-Serbian dispute to arbitration. T h e French returned to
Paris to urge their government to restrain Russia 5 the Germans
were to insist at Berlin that the Austrian demands be reasonable. 24
T h e International Socialist Congress scheduled for Vienna the last
of August was transferred to Paris and the date set as August 9,
1914. 2 5 On the evening of J u l y 29 at Brussels there was an im-
mense international demonstration against war addressed by socialist
leaders from many countries. 28 It was through the International
23
Huysmans, Camille, The Policy of the International, London, 1 9 1 6 , p. 15.
21
Ibid.
25
Louis, of. cit., p. 345.
26
Walling, W. F.., The Socialists and the War, New York, 1 9 1 5 , ch. I X .
Socialist Bureau that Muller of the German Social Democrats got

in touch with the French party in the final attempt at united socialist
action to prevent the war. 27
As socialist leaders realized only too well at the time, the Interna-
tional and its affiliates were not able to prevent war in 1914. 2 8
Nevertheless the Executive Committee of the International So-
cialist Bureau stayed by its post and maintained relationship be-
tween the parties of the belligerent and neutral nations. When Brus-
sels was captured in October 1 9 1 4 the Executive of the Bureau
moved to the Hague, and to the Belgian personnel it added a
Dutch delegation with equal power. 29 T h e importance of the loyal
and impartial leadership of Camille Huysmans, secretary of the
International Socialist Bureau, can not be overemphasized. 30
T h e position taken by the Executive of the International Socialist
Bureau was that there could be no general meeting until all of the
important parties agreed to it and participated. 31 As such a meeting
proved impossible, the Bureau carried out the following program:
1. T o secure separate and successive deliberation of the Socialist
Parties of the neutral countries, of the Entente countries, and of
the Central Powers, upon the four points which constitute the
basis of all our resolutions relating to militarism and peace.
2. T o call separately at the H a g u e the various delegations with the
object of elucidating and making concrete these four points. 3 2
In line with the first part of this program, the Neutral socialists
met at Copenhagen in January, the socialists of the Entente at
London in February, and those of the Central Powers at Vienna in
April 1 9 1 5 . Although complete agreement was not reached, the
three separate conferences did subscribe to the four points of the
Copenhagen program of 1 9 1 0 .
Socialist representatives of Holland, Sweden, Norway, and Den-
27
A good account of this is found in Fainsod, of. cit., ch. II.
28
Daily Citizen, July 30, 1 9 1 4 . See article by Bruce Glasier, "The International
Socialist Bureau at Work"; also see Huysmans, of. cit., p. 1 1 .
2B
Huysmans, of. cit., p. 20.
30
Postgate, R . W., The Workers' International, New York, 1920, pp. 93 ff.
31
Petit Parisien, March 25, 1916, "An Interview with Huysmans" in Huys-
mans, of. cit.
*2 Labour Leader, February 10, 1 9 1 6 . "Report of Huysmans' speech before
Dutch Socialist Party."
33
mark met at Copenhagen January 17 and 18, 1 9 1 5 . This con-
ference stated that capitalism, in the imperialistic form, expressed
by the constantly increasing armaments and by arrogant politics
of aggrandizement, supported by the secret and irresponsible diplo-
macy of the Great Powers, had led the world to the predicted
catastrophe. The peoples represented at the conference gave ex-
pression to the firm and strong will for peace existing within their
nations. They addressed themselves to the democratic workmen of
the belligerent countries especially in order to strengthen and
unite their wills. T h e Parliamentary representatives of Social De-
mocracy, the Conference declared, were bound to work toward the
realization of the principles expressed by the Copenhagen Con-
ference of 1 9 1 0 :
(a) International compulsory arbitration.

(b) Restriction of the preparations of war ending in final
disarmament.
(c) Abolition of secret diplomacy and Parliamentary respon-
sibility as to foreign politics.
(d) Recognition of the right of self-determination of the na-
tions, of counteracting violent suppression and politics
of war.
T h e Conference considered it the duty of all Socialist Parties to
take active measures to make possible an early conclusion of peace,
and to work energetically in favor of such conditions of peace as
might form a basis for international disarmament and for the
democratization of foreign policy. It protested against the violation
of Belgium and expressed the hope that Socialists in every country
would oppose every violent annexation at variance with the rights
of the self-determination of peoples. Finally the Conference urged
the International Socialist Bureau to convoke the Social Democratic
parties to a joint deliberation at a time not later than the beginning
of the negotiations for peace. It deemed it absolutely necessary that
the conditions of peace should not be determined without the
collaboration of the working men and women, and it summoned the
33
Labour Leader, January zi, 1 9 1 5 . " T h e Socialist Peace Conference"; Daily
Citizen, January 20, 1 9 1 5 5 Humanité, January 17, 18 and 3 1 , 1 9 1 5 ; New York
Call, January 20, 1 9 1 5 .
working class to concentrate its efforts in order to realize permanent

peace throughout the world. 3 4
O n February 14, 1 9 1 5 , at the call of the British Section of the
International, representative Socialists f r o m France, B e l g i u m , and
Russia met with the British at L o n d o n . 3 5 T h e French delegation
contained representation of the C o n f é d é r a t i o n G é n é r a l e du T r a v a i l .
Division of opinion had already shown itself in the ranks of A l l i e d
socialism, and the peace resolution drawn up by the Conference
was one of compromise. 3 6 R e c o g n i z i n g that the profound causes of
the war were capitalistic, the A l l i e d Conference resolution neverthe-
less declared that a victory for G e r m a n imperialism w o u l d be the
destruction and defeat of democracy and liberty in E u r o p e . T h e
A l l i e d socialists, it stated, did not pursue the political and economic
crushing of G e r m a n y . T h e y were not at w a r with the G e r m a n and
Austrian people but only with the governments which oppressed
them. B e l g i u m must be liberated and compensated. T h e y desired
that the status of P o l a n d should be settled in accordance with the
wishes of the Polish people, either in the sense of autonomy within
a state, or in that of complete independence. T h e y wished that
throughout E u r o p e — f r o m Alsace-Lorraine to the Balkans—those
populations that had been annexed by force should receive the right
freely to dispose of themselves. W h i l e inflexibly resolved to fight
until victory should be achieved in order to accomplish the task of
liberation, they were resolved to resist any attempt to transform
that defensive war into one of conquest. T h e victory of the A l l i e d
P o w e r s must be a victory for popular liberty, for unity, inde-
pendence, and autonomy of the nations in the peaceful federation
of the U n i t e d States of E u r o p e and the W o r l d . O n the conclusion
of the war the countries must unite in the International to suppress
secret diplomacy, put an end to the interests of militarism and those
of the armament makers, and establish some international authority
to settle points of difference a m o n g the nations by compulsory
conciliation and arbitration and to compel all nations to maintain
peace. 37
34 Independent Labour Party, Report of Norwich Conference, pp. 119-20.
¡bid., p. 1 2 ; Daily Citizen, February 15, 1 9 1 5 .
35
38 Independent Labour Party, Report of the Norwich Conference, pp. 51 ff¡

Forward, February 27, 1915.
37 Labour Party, Report of the Fifteenth Annual Conference, p. 31.
W A R AIMS OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR 31
T w o months later, representatives of the socialists of the Central

Powers met to make their contribution to the socialist peace pro-
gram. On April 12 and 1 3 at Vienna, representatives of the Social
Democracy of G e r m a n y and Austria reaffirmed the four points of
the International and declared that the peace should guarantee
durable collaboration and involve no humiliation of any people. 38
T h e first part of the program of the International Socialist Bu-
reau had been accomplished, and the principles of the Copenhagen
Conference had been accepted by all socialists, belligerent and
neutral. T o complete their action it was important to determine
precisely the different points on which socialists were agreed in
theory. T o come to practical results the Executive Committee of
the International Socialist Bureau invited the various socialist
parties to appoint delegations to come separately to the H a g u e dur-
ing January and February 1 9 1 5 . T h e Executive Committee could
thus discuss with each delegation the general situation and the par-
ticular position of each one. German socialists came twice, Belgian
socialists sent an official delegation, but the French refused, declaring
that such action would be tantamount to meeting with the German
socialists. 39 T h e British Section announced that it would come, but
later reconsidered. In March 1 9 1 6 representatives of the Interna-
tional went to London on the invitation of the British socialists,
and although the Labour Party refused to make a statement on
peace terms, the Fabian Society and the Independent Labour Party
made significant declarations during the late summer of 1 9 1 6 .
Camille Huysmans could report to the Social Democratic Party of
H o l l a n d at its extraordinary Congress of January 9, 1 9 1 6 , that
encouraging progress had been made toward the goal of a united
socialist peace program.
Thus, by maintaining contact with all the socialist parties and
obtaining from them a confirmation of the four principles of the
Copenhagen Conference, the International Socialist Bureau had
taken the first step in its peace program. B y conferring indi-
vidually with most of the sections and receiving reports on ac-
ceptable peace terms from others, the Bureau was continuing toward
3S
Bulletin du Bureau Socialiste International, N o . ι , 1 9 1 7 , section I I I .
39
H u y s m a n s , op. cit., p. 2 5 .
its goal of a socialist peace program acceptable to all sections of the

International.
The next important action of the International Socialist Bureau
was the convocation of a Conference of the Socialist Parties of
Neutral States at the Hague. T h e Conference met J u l y 31 to August
2, 1 9 1 6 , and was attended by representatives of the United States,
Holland, and Sweden. 40 T h e resolution passed by the Congress,
declaring that the responsibility for the world war rested primarily
upon the economic and political system of capitalism, called for a
renewed fight against capitalism and for the conquest of political
power. It predicted that the war probably would end in a deadlock
and urged that the present time was suitable for the beginning of
peace negotiations. It called upon the socialist parties to declare
themselves ready for an entente on the basis of the four points of
the socialist peace program, in order that the historic moment favor-
able to the realization of these demands might not pass and so that
peace should not be dictated by the imperialist groups.
The Conference considered the «establishment of Belgium in its
independence as a condition preliminary to all peace negotiation.
It demanded equally the «establishment of Serbia and the au-
tonomy of Poland. It expressed the hope that the German Social
Democratic Party would be ready to negotiate with the French
Socialist Party on the subject of Alsace-Lorraine. It declared that
the autonomy of nations would be realized best under a demo-
cratic and decentralized constitution which would respond com-
pletely to the needs of the diverse national cultures. In order to
bring this about, the socialists must demand parliamentary repre-
sentation and, through this, socialist representation at the peace con-
ference. It would not suffice for the socialist parties to request this
of their governments. They must use all the influence they had
with the people to the end that it should take a direct part in the
peace negotiations.
The resolution then went on to express their confidence in and
approval of the International Socialist Bureau for its action. It de-
nounced attacks against it and attempts to stigmatize the action of
certain parties and thus lead to schisms and the creation of new
international organizations. Finally the conference invited the
40
Justice, August io, 1 9 1 6 ; Ne<u> York Call, August 2, 1 9 1 6 .
Executive Committee to continue its efforts to reestablish interna-

tional relations, and declared itself favorable to the convocation of
a full meeting of the International Socialist Bureau.
In a second resolution the Hague Conference condemned the
policy of economic warfare and called for an international policy
founded on integral free exchange for all countries, their colonies
and protectorates, and on the freedom of the seas. Finally the Con-
ference declared that only absolute free trade was of a nature to
facilitate the preparation of a system of world production based
on the socialist conception. 41
On January 10, 1917, the Executive Committee of the Interna-
tional Socialist Bureau took a new line of action when it decided to
send a telegram to all affiliated parties demanding that they ex-
amine the possibility and opportunity of aiding the initiative of
President Wilson in his December 18, 1916, request for a statement
of war aims from each of the belligerents. T h e Danish, Swedish,
Norwegian, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, Italian, Austrian, Bo-
hemian, Hungarian, Croatian, Argentinian, Uruguayan, and French
Sections of the International responded favorably. 42
It was inevitable that a large section of the International should
find the above action too slow. Minority groups in various nations
had objected to the easy acceptance of the war on the part of
the Majorities. T h e y had opposed cooperation with the bourgeois
governments, they had demanded that their governments through
diplomatic action bring an early end to the conflict, they had called
repeatedly for the full resumption of international socialist rela-
tions. Their point of view was supported by the parties in neutral
countries and by left-wing parties such as those in Italy, Switzerland,
the United States, and Russia. T h e Socialist Party of the United
States was the first, on September 24, 1914, to call for a full meeting
of the International. Similar suggestions followed from Italy, Den-
mark, Norway, Switzerland, South Africa, Canada, Australia, Ru-
mania, Portugal, Russia, and the Independent Labour Party and
the British Socialist Party of Great Britain. 43
41 Bulletin du Bureau Socialiste International, No. i , 1 9 1 7 , section I V .

42 Ibid., p. 12.
43 Comité Organisateur de la Conférence Socialiste Internationale de Stock-
holm, Stockholm (Introduction by C a m i l l e H u y s m a n s ) , p. v.
Another random document with
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wicking, affords an excellent material for removing fluid by osmosis.
The thinner the fluid the more perfectly it serves this purpose. The
gauze must be changed frequently, as these lesions may become
filled with coagulated material, in which case it would act merely as a
plug. The so-called cigarette drain consists of folds of gauze, or a
small roll of it, surrounded by sterilized oiled silk or gutta-percha
tissue, in which are cut numerous holes. The same purpose may be
achieved, but often not so well, by a piece of rubber tubing split
down one side. The gauze drains by osmosis, and the rubber
prevents any adhesion to the wound margins and any pain in the
removal of the drain; while a certain amount of fluid may escape
around and outside the smoother surface.
When the fluids to be removed are more dense—e. g., pus—
tubular drains should be provided. These vary in size from that of a
lead-pencil to that of the finger. A tube which is too small becomes
easily plugged. They are perforated with numerous openings for the
ready entrance of fluid save in those cases, like the gall-bladder or
the pelvis, where it is desirable to drain only the depths of a cavity.
These tubes are usually made of rubber, the purer forms of gum
being preferable. For some purposes, especially in the pelvis, tubes
of glass or aluminum are used; these are non-collapsible. They may
be emptied by a capillary drain, or by the frequent use of a small
syringe with a long nozzle, by which they are pumped out at regular
intervals. Metal and glass tubes can be resterilized and used again.
All other drainage material should be burned as soon as removed.
There are occasions when it is well to use a dressed drain—i. e., a
tube surrounded by absorbent gauze, and this again by rubber tissue
or oiled silk. In many instances it is well to prevent the loss of a
drainage tube by passing through its outer end a safety pin, or by
stitching it to the margin of the skin wound. Tubes have been lost,
especially within the thoracic cavity after operating for empyema,
more often than is perhaps generally known, and for a lack of
precaution in this respect.
Tubes of decalcified chicken bone have been used and are
occasionally serviceable. They are made by cleaning the cooked
bones of the fowl, soaking them in 20 per cent. hydrochloric acid
solution until decalcified, trimming the ends, cleaning the interior, and
are then sterilized by boiling in a saturated solution of ammonium
sulphate. They are then washed in sterile water and preserved in
alcohol. They correspond to catgut, and will ordinarily last in the
tissues for about eight days. They may be chromicized, as is catgut,
in which case they endure considerably longer.
C H A P T E R X X V.
PREPARATION OF PATIENTS FOR OPERATION
AND THEIR AFTER-TREATMENT.
At the risk of some repetition it is proposed to epitomize here a few
directions on a subject of great importance, to which, as well in
theory as in practice, too little attention is often paid. For present
purposes patients may be divided into two classes: those who have
sustained accidents or sudden surgical diseases, where no time is
afforded for preparation; and those who, having chronic conditions,
are subjected to surgical measures which are, however, sometimes
made abrupt by sudden decision. In the former case the surgeon is
compelled to work hastily; for the latter, time for preparation should
be always afforded. Experience teaches that a few days, sometimes
even a few weeks, may be well spent in preparing a patient for a
surgical operation.
In emergency cases, aside from the usual scrubbing and shaving,
there may be several matters to which it is well to give attention. The
stomach should be washed out just before the administration of the
anesthetic, or soon afterward. If there be time the rectum should be
emptied, and the bladder always; too much care cannot be given to
these performances. The degree of shock should be estimated and
appropriate treatment given, according to principles stated in the
chapter on Shock.
Foresight will often dictate the preparation of some part of the
body not directly involved in the field of injury; for example, in any
gunshot or stab wound of the abdomen or in a case of acute
pancreatitis the back should be scrubbed and cleansed and the
patient laid upon sterilized material, so that should posterior drainage
be required it may be promptly made without waste of time required
for preparation. In head injuries, if the scalp or cortex of the skull be
involved, the entire head should be shaved. In preparation of
patients for operation upon the mouth, tonsils, or stomach an
antiseptic mouth-wash should be used in order to avoid, so far as
possible, contamination from these germ-laden regions. It Is
especially in cases undertaken for the chronic pathological
conditions that time can be afforded for careful preparation. It may
be assumed that every patient suffering from a chronic surgical
malady has been so disabled, in at least some function, that
elimination has been interfered with. The emunctories of the body
comprise essentially the skin, the lungs, the intestines, and the
kidneys. Every one of these should be made to perform its work
more fully.
The skin should be stimulated by hot-air baths, for which purpose
patients may be sent daily to the Turkish baths, while others should
take their sweats in cabinets or in bed. If it be possible after the skin
has been made to perspire profusely the patient should be put into a
hot bath and the skin thoroughly scrubbed.
The lungs may be stimulated partly by improving the heart’s
action, partly by certain exercises, and by getting the patient out into
the open. The intestines should be made to perform their work,
preferably by the mildest measures that may prove effective.
Mercurials are agents of great value, as they not only stimulate
secretions but are antiseptic in their effects. Sodium phosphate is
useful when something stronger is not required.
Many patients who are found in this class will have impaired
digestion, for which a regulated diet should be supplied; and such
cases may call for lavage, as well as for a careful examination of
stomach contents, in order that appropriate aids to digestion may be
given. Most patients suffer from intestinal torpor, especially of the
large intestine, and the daily administration of a high-up colon wash,
with the patient in the knee-chest position, will give gratifying results.
It has been suggested that in all operations upon the upper
alimentary canal it would be of great advantage to feed the patient
during the previous forty-eight hours upon sterilized food.
A careful study of the urine should be made, both quantitative and
qualitative. The gross measurement of the amount excreted in
twenty-four hours is of importance. It is necessary to know what
amount of solids is being daily excreted, as well as the amount of
fluid. Renal insufficiency is one of the difficulties with which the
surgeon has often to deal, and caution should be used when
operating upon a patient suffering from this condition. Extra work is
thereby imposed upon other emunctories. A depraved blood
circulation through the brain will often impair its function and lead to
delirium in mild or serious form. The heart’s action will be impaired
and septic infection is made more possible, in spite of every
precaution included in antiseptic technique. In the chapter on
Infection it was stated that certain cases of surgical sepsis
commence as infections from within, due to failure in unloading the
body of its content of disease germs.
Hyperacidity should be also corrected. In order that this may be
properly done, the urine should be tested by a more accurate
method than by litmus paper. The restlessness and consequent
wound disturbances which may ensue after operation may be due to
failure in the elimination of uric acid and the oxalates; alkaline
diuretics, therefore, are an important feature in the preparation of
many surgical patients.
The blood and circulation should not be neglected in these cases.
These patients are frequently anemic. A high degree of anemia is
recognized by methods described in the chapter on the Blood. Much
may be done, even in a short time, to improve the quantity and the
quality of the blood, by attention to nutrition and elimination. By these
same measures the heart’s action will be also greatly strengthened,
but much can be accomplished in this direction by the use of
digitalis, cactus, or other of the heart stimulants, and by the
administration, preferably subcutaneously, of strychnine. This is
usually given in too small doses. Two hypodermic injections of ¹⁄₃₀
Gr. (0.002) a day will have a pronounced effect. While the heart is
thus fortified as against shock before the ordeal, adrenalin will prove
the most effective agent during it and after it is passed.
Intestinal fermentation or decomposition is a prominent feature of
many of these cases. If it be possible to select a drug which has
antiseptic properties that may be effective in the intestine and in the
kidneys, it will come near to being the ideal in this respect. The
attendant has here to choose from many remedies, and his choice
will depend largely on his personal experience. It is better to use a
few remedies and use them well than to be indiscriminate.
Salol, benzosol, betanaphthol, sodium sulphocarbolate, and the
salts of mercury and arsenic will furnish sufficient compounds from
which to select. When the urine is alkaline, as it often is in certain
kidney and bladder diseases, urotropin may be advantageously
combined with one of the others.
In the way of general preparation of those patients who have to
undergo operations upon the mouth, the nasopharynx, the
esophagus, trachea or larynx, and upper alimentary canal, they
should be sent to the dentist in order that their teeth may be put in
good condition and accumulations of tartar removed, and then use
an antiseptic mouth-wash, or, when necessary, a nasal spray, in
order that there may be avoidance of infection from the bacteria
which abound in these parts. Patients often have diseased and
carious teeth, and, in hospital patients especially, the mouth is often
in a dirty condition. So long as any wound surface is so situated as
to be in danger of contamination from these sources, this should be
minimized as far as possible.
Prevention of Peritonitis.—Experiments have been made by
Mikulicz with regard to the value of
nuclein in producing an artificial and protective leukocytosis before
abdominal operations, hoping thereby to accomplish more or less in
the way of prevention of peritonitis. The procedure is based upon the
well-known property of nucleinic acid, or nuclein, to produce a
prompt but transitory increase in the number of leukocytes. To take
advantage of this, 3 to 5 Cc. of nuclein solution is administered
beneath the skin, say twelve hours and again six hours previous to
the operation. Should any septic agent be introduced or liberated
during its performance, the leukocytes will be present in additional
numbers to act as phagocytes and exert their active protective
powers.
AFTER-TREATMENT.
The care of patients after operation is a factor in a surgeon’s
success and calls for discrimination and judgment. The fact that the
odor of chloroform or ether persists about the patient and in his
breath for hours after their administration shows to what extent they
have been dissolved and are circulating in the blood. If elimination
have already been attended to, and so far improved as to permit the
emunctories of the body to do work up to their capacity, these
anesthetics may be promptly eliminated. The longer they circulate in
the blood the greater the disturbance to other functions and the more
difficult it is to get normal function equalized.
The things especially to be guarded against, so far as one may
prevent them, are nausea, vomiting, extreme restlessness, pain,
inactivity of the bowels, insufficiency of the kidneys, and the toxic
action of any antiseptics or drugs which may have been used, e. g.,
iodoform.
Nausea and vomiting after operations are due not so much to
mere reflex activity as to the elimination of the anesthetic by the
stomach and its irritant action. No matter how produced, such
vomiting is of itself most depressing, mentally and physiologically,
and is injurious in a large proportion of cases, and efforts should be
made to prevent it. So long as it was regarded simply as a reflex act
drugs were theoretically sufficient for its treatment, but with the
appreciation of its actual causation it will be seen that the irritating
material should be removed. This may be done with the minimum of
discomfort and the maximum of advantage by means of the stomach
tube. Lavage, therefore, constitutes the most rational and effective
treatment in cases of postoperative vomiting.
That the anesthetic reaches the stomach by way of the circulation
and is excreted by the gastric mucosa has been proved by the
studies of Türck. He showed that the same is also true of morphine.
He showed, moreover, that the stronger anesthetics disturb the
metabolism of the cells and that toxic products are thereby produced
which, being reabsorbed, cause an auto-intoxication reducing vital
resistance of the blood serum and the tissues. Thus during
anesthesia there occurs an atony of the stomach walls with the
escape of the anesthetic into the stomach, which, acting as an
irritant, leads to an increased amount of toxin production. The
discoloration of the gastric mucosa and the capillary hemorrhage
which take place, as shown postmortem in cases where persistent
vomiting is a feature, illustrate the disturbing effect of the stronger
anesthetics upon the stomach itself. This furnishes, then, the reason
for washing out the stomach immediately after stopping the
anesthetic and before the patient leaves the operating table. It
cannot be said that by this measure postoperative vomiting will be
abolished, but its frequency will be materially lessened.
Lavage may also be practised to great advantage not merely
immediately after the operation, but during the ensuing twenty-four
hours, or later should vomiting recur or come on late. On the other
hand, where time has not been afforded in which to suitably prepare
a patient for operation, it is advantageous to wash out the stomach
before administering the anesthetic as well as after. This is
recommended as a general measure, and without special reference
to those cases where operation is directed to the stomach itself or to
the intestinal tract, where it has become an established part of the
preparation to carefully cleanse these viscera.
Several points in the performance of lavage will be of great service
to patient and operator. It should be performed quickly in order to
reduce the length of the discomfort, and the water used should be
warm, at least 110° F. If the throat be previously sprayed with weak
cocaine solution (2 per cent.), or if a cocaine lozenge be dissolved in
the mouth, the tube can be introduced with less gagging and
difficulty. The lubricant should be flavored with wintergreen or some
other aromatic.
Where vomiting continues in spite of lavage it is advantageous to
give a full dose of chloral with a little starch-water in the rectum; 2 or
3 Gm. of chloral, with as much sodium bromide, to which, in case of
severe pain, a little opiate may be added, may be profitably used in
cases where the patient is restless and where sleep is fitful or
perhaps impossible. This will be more beneficial than drugs
administered by the mouth. It is seldom rejected, and is very
soothing.
Extreme restlessness is undesirable from every point of view. In
some cases when it comes on early it is an evidence of insufficient
oxygenation and may be combated by the administration of oxygen
gas. It frequently accompanies shock and constitutes one of its most
disturbing features. It may be combated by a subcutaneous dose of
morphine or heroine, or chloral in doses of 2 Gm., with as much
sodium bromide, thrown into the rectum with salt solution. The effect
may not be as prompt, but it is often much better. Restlessness is
not always a symptom of pain, but is occasionally an uncontrollable
reflex nervous phenomenon.
After operations physiological rest of the operated part is
necessary for the process of prompt repair. After abdominal
operations, especially when restlessness and vomiting are
combined, much harm may be done if the patient cannot keep the
parts quiet.
Pain will often accompany restlessness, and frequently accentuate
it, especially when patients have not yet fully returned to
consciousness. It may be relieved by warm or cold applications. In
some cases an ice-bag may be used as soon as the patient is
placed in bed—for example, after breaking up an ankylosis. In mild
cases the use of chloral in the rectum, as above, with an opiate
added, may be sufficient. When pain is severe hypodermics of
morphine or heroine should be given. Secretion should not be
disturbed by such drugs as these, yet as between them or permitting
patients to suffer intensely, my opinion is that opium should be given
judiciously, providing it prove sufficient. In extreme cases morphine
seems to be the only medicament upon which complete reliance can
be placed. When the opiates seem to produce nausea the difficulties
are heightened. It may be decided in some cases to push the opiate
to the point of narcotism, preferring to keep the patient in this
semistupefied condition for two or three days and until the series of
early dangers have been passed. Opiates should be given with great
discretion lest the opium habit be encouraged if not formed.
Lately there has come into use a remedy which has little or no
unpleasant after-effects, and upon which a good deal of reliance can
be placed, namely, aspirin, which may be given in 1 Gm. doses,
repeated as necessary. If it be combined with phenacetin, in doses
of half that amount, the combination will be more effective than either
alone. This will often prove a serviceable substitute for opiates in any
form.
After operation upon the lower bowel, or in any part of the pelvis,
patients may complain of pain, sometimes severe, referred to the
rectum. Relief may be obtained by throwing into the rectum, through
a flexible tube, one-half to one pint of warm linseed oil. This will often
take the place of an anodyne or a suppository.
The next question is one of catharsis. If the alimentary canal have
been properly emptied, as it should have been before the operation,
the bowels may be allowed to rest for the ensuing forty-eight hours.
At the expiration of that time the lower bowel should be emptied.
Whether this be done with laxatives administered by the mouth or by
enema will depend on the character of the case and the reliability of
the stomach. When vomiting is distressing little can be accomplished
from above. In most cases the first effort is to be made by the
administration of a thorough colon wash, or by the use of an enema,
which may perhaps best consist of ox-gall, glycerin, and a saturated
solution of Epsom salt. If this be thrown up high, and retained a
while, it will in all probability be effective. Should the operation have
been one upon the rectum extra care will be needed for the patient’s
comfort, and just preceding the stool a small amount olive oil should
be administered through a tube. Many patients will complain of
gaseous distention or other discomfort, due apparently to
fermentation, and partly perhaps to the air which they have
swallowed during the act of vomiting, or because of nausea. No
matter how produced it will afford relief to get rid of this gas, and
while this may be partly accomplished by an enema, it will be more
thoroughly effected by a mercurial, given by the mouth, to be
followed by a saline laxative. In order that flatus may escape without
effort, a rectal tube may be inserted, which later may be utilized for
the administration of an enema. Save in rare instances it is a mistake
to allow accumulation of fecal matter, as the stercoremia thus
favored may easily lead into a more profound form of poisoning by
its interference with elimination and vital resistance.
Attention should be also given to the bladder and to the urine.
Renal insufficiency is one of the great dangers pertaining to the use
of anesthetics. This may be combated by 2 Gr. doses of sparteine
sulphate every three hours (McGuire).
Many patients are unable to void urine after operations,
particularly after those upon the female genitalia, and the use of a
catheter is often necessary. This should be used with antiseptic
precautions, both as to the patient, the instrument, and the
operator’s hands. Much of this difficulty can be avoided by injecting
20 Cc. of a 2 per cent. sterilized boroglycerin solution through a
catheter in the evening after the operation. Its action is usually
prompt, and in five to ten minutes the patient spontaneously empties
the bladder without unpleasant after-effects.
After abdominal and pelvic operations the patient should not be
allowed to urinate, but should be systematically catheterized. The
bladder should never be allowed to become distended. The amount
and character of urine passed should be carefully noted. In serious
cases the amount of solids eliminated should be estimated, in order
that it may be kept up to the necessary standard. In fact, efficient
and sufficient elimination is more necessary after the prolonged
administration of an anesthetic than after almost any other event.
When sufficient fluid to keep up the standard cannot be administered
by the stomach, it should be introduced into the rectum or given
beneath the skin. Two or three enemas of salt solution should be
administered each day, and in urgent cases the normal solution
should be thrown beneath the skin, and this should be repeated as
often and as long as may be necessary. When the patient begins to
show evidence of what is vaguely described as uremia, i. e., the
toxemia of renal insufficiency, not only should warm water be used in
these ways, but hot-air bed baths should be given twice a day if
necessary, in order that some of the work of the kidneys may be
assumed by the skin. Hot-air baths stimulate the kidneys as well,
and these measures will prove more effective than most of the
diuretics, although digitalis and pilocarpine by the skin may be of
assistance.
Patients frequently complain of excessive dryness in the mouth.
This may be relieved by occasionally dropping beneath the tongue
one-half of an ordinary hypodermic tablet of ¹⁄₁₀ Gr. pilocarpine; also
by mouth-washes which contain a little glycerin, and by keeping the
lips moistened with glycerin. Excessive sweating can sometimes be
relieved by giving a hot-air bed bath or a hot mustard foot bath, as
the extra action of the skin thus induced checks the spontaneous
drain.
Delirium and acute mania occasionally supervene after operations.
It should first be made clear that these are not due to any antiseptic
or drug. Iodoform is less frequently used than formerly. Children and
aged people become delirious with less provocation than do those in
middle life. Such delirium is generally an expression of a toxemia,
and, in addition to such other measures as may be necessary, calls
for control and restraint and more active elimination, as in so-called
uremia. In proportion to the degree of mania must be the restraint
prescribed. A restraining sheet or a strait-jacket may be sometimes
needed. When these conditions arise in surgical patients more harm
will come from the violation of the principle of physiological rest than
from the drugs which may be needed to secure it. The milder
measures should be first used, abstaining as far as possible from
opiates, which are probably the least desirable of all, but which may
be occasionally demanded. Chloral, the bromides, cannabis indica,
alone or in combination, may be made to render more valuable
service. Hyoscine, in doses of ¹⁄₁₀₀ to ¹⁄₅₀ Gr. beneath the skin, will
often control when other remedies fail; it may prove invaluable.
When delirium tremens complicates a case it may be treated as
suggested in the chapter on Various Intoxications.
P a r t V.
SURGICAL AFFECTIONS OF THE TISSUES
AND TISSUE SYSTEMS.
CHAPTER XXVI.
CYSTS AND TUMORS.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.
A tumor is a new formation, not of inflammatory origin,
characterized by more or less histological conformity to the tissue in
which it has originated, and having no physiological function.
By the above definition it is intended to separate the new-growths
from a distinctive class of neoplasms which are of inflammatory (i. e.,
of infectious) origin, to which the generic term of infectious
granulomas has been given. (See Part II.)
Exceedingly vague notions have prevailed concerning the nature
and origin of tumors, and, while the clinical observations of writers in
the past will never lose their value, the ideas which have prevailed
concerning their pathology constitute interesting reading in a
historical sense, but are now of small value. Accurate notions
scarcely prevailed until Virchow demonstrated that tumor cells
nowise differ from cell types which are met either in embryonic or in
adult tissues. Tumors, like all other parts of the body, are built up of
cells, and the points concerning which we need most light regard the
influences which determine cell overproduction in these
characteristic forms. Concerning the views that have prevailed, this
is scarcely the place in which to offer an epitome. I shall therefore
take up but few of the explanations which have been offered to
account for tumor growth, and will emphasize that, according to our
present light, there is no explanation sufficient to cover all cases, but
that it is now one cause and now another which may determine this
peculiar form of cell activity.
Irritation and Trauma.—The effort is often made to explain the
presence of tumors upon the hypothesis or
the known fact of some previous injury. Frequently tumors appear in
sites where there have been previous traumatisms, but this
sequence of events by no means proves a definite relation of cause
and effect. On the other hand, there are forms of irritation which are
often followed by tumor formations. Probably no woman escapes
without one or more bumps or bruises upon the breast, yet they do
not produce tumors in more than a trifling proportion of cases. Per
contra, upon the lower lip of inveterate clay-pipe smokers and the
scrotum of chimney-sweepers there develop certain forms of
malignant ulcer (epithelioma) which so often and so significantly
follow upon the irritation thus produced that it is impossible to avoid
conviction that one is the cause of the other. Should events prove
the parasitic nature of any of these growths they will also prove that
the irritation causes surface lesions through which infection easily
occurs. In regard to the relative frequency with which cancer in some
form follows trauma we should not forget the well-known fact that
traumatism usually diminishes tissue resistance. If cancer be an
expression of infection, as many (including the writer) believe, the
possible relation between trauma and malignant disease may be
better appreciated.
Inflammation.—This refers to inflammation in the sense in which
it has been used in the past, implying a variable
condition, sometimes including and sometimes excluding infection,
the term covering a confused mixture of irritation, hyperemia, and
infection. In so far as it concerns inflammation as considered in the
present work it should not be here included, since inflammation (i. e.,
infection) produces neoplasms of a class considered in Part II and is
distinctly ruled out from present consideration (i. e., the infectious
granulomas).
If inflammation in the former sense be more than hyperemia it may
be regarded as predisposing to cell activity, but not necessarily to
tumor formation as distinguished from hypertrophy of a given part or
tissue. If it refer to irritation, this has been acknowledged as a factor
in the etiology of tumors, but as an uncertain one. Cancer of the gall-
bladder or liver, which occasionally results from the irritation of a
gallstone, or the cancer of the breast that follows eczema of the
nipple, may be regarded in this light as additional illustrations if it is
preferred to interpret them in this way. If by inflammation be meant
the infectious granulomas, they have already been considered. As
the term “inflammation” can scarcely mean anything except
hyperemia, irritation, or infection, we seem to have completely ruled
it out from consideration as by itself an active cause leading to tumor
formation.
The Embryonal Hypothesis of Cohnheim.—This in its ingenuity
and in its applicability
is a fascinating explanation, which is undoubtedly sufficient for at
least a certain number of instances. According to Cohnheim, only
one causal factor for tumors exists—i. e., anomalous embryonic
arrangement. He regards them as entirely of embryonal origin, no
matter how late in life they may develop and appear. Briefly
summarizing his views, they are to the effect that in the early stages
of embryonal development there are produced more cells than are
necessary for the construction of a certain part, so that a number of
them remain superfluous. While these may remain very small, they
possess, on account of their embryonal nature, a potent proliferating
power. This superfluous cell material may be distributed uniformly, in
which case it will develop whole system arrangements, like
supernumerary fingers, etc., or it may remain by itself in one place,
and will then develop a tumor. In the latter case the tumor may
appear early or not until late in life, according to the time at which the
cell collection receives the necessary stimulus, or because of its
suppression by resistance of surrounding structures. It may be an
irritation or an injury, such as above alluded to, which shall give it this
stimulus; as, for example, it is reasonable to think that certain nevi
and other congenital conditions which develop later into cancers do
so in accordance with this view. Surgeons generally find little fault
with Cohnheim’s hypothesis, except that as yet they decline to see in
it an explanation for all cases. Nevertheless for dermoid and
teratomatous, and for all heteroblastic tumors, it seems to afford the
only tenable explanation. Thus chondromas of the parotid and of the
testicle are most easily explained in this way, and that cartilaginous
islands occur in the shafts of adult bones is well known.
Heredity.—In regard to heredity being a factor in the etiology of
neoplasms there is reason to believe that a favorable
tissue disposition may be inherited, but there is nothing to show that
it permits the actual transmission of the disease.
Parasitic Theory.—The parasitic theory of tumor formation has
only within a few years taken definite form and
shape, as a result of evolution from vague suggestions and scattered
observations. It implies that tumors, and they are mainly of the
malignant type, are due to irritation produced by extrinsic agencies,
parasites of some kind, which, introduced from without, act as do
bacteria in the now well-known infectious granulomas. While this
theory, perhaps, does not afford an absolutely satisfactory
explanation of all the phenomena of malignancy, it nevertheless
comes nearer to it than does any other hypothesis now before the
profession, the arguments in favor of it being scientific and positive,
and those against consisting mainly of mere negations. Summed up
these arguments may be stated as follows:
1. Comparative Pathology.—The argument from comparative
pathology begins with the lower forms of life. Tumors in trees and
plants are well known to vegetable pathologists and botanists as of
frequent occurrence. They vary in size from the most trifling galls to
those large woody masses known as xylomas, which are essentially
tree cancers, since they tend to the destruction of the tree. These
are known to be invariably due to extrinsic agencies, such as
insects, fungi, etc. As water freezing in the bark of a tree may crack it
open and thus leave opportunity for subsequent infection, so may
injuries upon the body surface make trifling lesions which predispose
to subsequent infection and cancer in man and animals. Exclude
parasites from such traumatic lesions on plants and there will be no
xylomas.
PLATE XIV
Adenocarcinoma with Young Parasites. (Parasites

blue. Plimmer’s method.)
This plate is introduced to illustrate the presence of parasites, whose minute and
actual character is not yet positively determined, but whose existence is
undeniable.
From Gaylord’s paper in the Third Annual Report of the New York State
Pathological Laboratory of the University of Buffalo.
PLATE XV
Rapidly Growing Carcinoma of Breast.

The parasites herein demonstrated are still subjects of careful and minute study.
It would therefore seem premature to make detailed statements concerning their
exact nature.

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International Labor Diplomacy and

Peace 1914 1919 Austin Van Der Slice

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AUSTIN V A N DER SLICE

LONDON: HUMPHREY MILFORD: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Manufactured in the United States of America

THE failure of labor to enforce its demands at the Paris Peace

trace the development of this program is the object of the present

A REALISTIC SETTING FOR THE

THE method by which labor advanced her peace policy during

connection it is important to remember that the principle of the

T h e extent to which we can establish p e r m a n e n t l y our dominion in

tory was decided upon by the Sazonov-Paléologue agreement of

1 9 Miller, David Hunter, My Diary at the Conference of Paris, New Y o r k , 1924,

establish British rule in the conquered German colonies, success

T o be ready for 1918 means victory, and it is a victory in which

A t the second meeting of the newly formed Imperial W a r

o r a n d u m on disarmament, changed his mind in regard to its de-

Y e t the admission of such aims would have been so d a m a g i n g

19 Ibid., pp. 1750-54, 1798-1800.

Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed." A year and a half later

T h e leaders of the several belligerents have, as has b e e n said,

T h e Allied governments had, however, made one definite

should be internationalized and neutralized. Arabia, Armenia,

If, then, we are asked w h a t w e are fighting for, we reply, as w e

This grudging action of L l o y d George was followed three days

conference the disposition of the Turkish territory in the Near

June ι , 1 9 1 8 , the Prime Ministers of France, Great Britain,

THE WAR AIMS OF INTERNATIONAL

first order. 1 Dating from the Paris Conference of 1889, it first

of the armed nation ; 2. T h e institution of arbitral tribunals charged

7 Ibid., pp. 11 and 80.

of the parties. T h e n came its much-quoted statement on action

It is upon the basis of this last resolution that socialist action

This outline of a new international order formed the basis for

apparent anomaly between recognition of nationalities and the ideal

democracies with kingdoms and empires; countries of immigration

Parties of the Balkans, Austria-Hungary, and of Russia. Then it de-

The workers of Germany and of France do not admit that secret

T h e Congress charged the International Socialist Bureau to follow

Socialist Bureau that Muller of the German Social Democrats got

(a) International compulsory arbitration.

working class to concentrate its efforts in order to realize permanent

38 Independent Labour Party, Report of the Norwich Conference, pp. 51 ff¡

T w o months later, representatives of the socialists of the Central

its goal of a socialist peace program acceptable to all sections of the

Executive Committee to continue its efforts to reestablish interna-

41 Bulletin du Bureau Socialiste International, No. i , 1 9 1 7 , section I V .

Adenocarcinoma with Young Parasites. (Parasites

Rapidly Growing Carcinoma of Breast.

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