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Editor
Rajendra K. Jain

India and Central Europe

Perceptions, Perspectives, Prospects
1st ed. 2021
Editor
Rajendra K. Jain
Centre for European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi,
India

ISBN 978-981-16-2849-8 e-ISBN 978-981-16-2850-4

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2850-4

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive

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Dedicated to
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Abbreviations
AAI Airports Authority of India
AI Artificial Intelligence
AJT Advance Jet Trainer
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations
BBC British Broadcast Corporation
BEML Bharat Earth Movers Ltd. (BEML)
BHEL Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. (BHEL)
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party
BPO Business Process Outsourcing
BRI Belt and Road Initiative
CBI Central Bureau of Investigation
CEECs Central and East European countries
CEIF Central Europe India Forum
CFE Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CIH Central Institute of Hindi
CII Confederation of Indian Industry
CMEA Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
COP Conference of Parties
CPI Communist Party of India (CPI)
CPI-M Communist Party of India-Marxist
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DRDO Defence Research and Development Organization
EU European Union
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FICCI Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry
FOCs Foreign Office Consultations
FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
FTA Free Trade Agreement
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GSQR General Staff Qualitative Requirements
HICC Hungarian Information and Cultural Centre
HZDS Movement for a Democratic Slovakia
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
ICCR Indian Council for Cultural Relations
ICEBF India-Central Europe Business Forum
ICSC International Commissions of Supervision and Control
ICT Information and Communication Technology
ICWA Indian Council of World Affairs
IDEB International Defence Exhibition Bratislava
INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
INSTC International North-South Transport Corridor
ISIS Indian School of International Studies
ITEC Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation
JDC Joint Defence Committee
JEC Joint Economic Committee
JNU Jawaharlal Nehru University
JWG Joint Working Group
LSD Lok Sabha Debates
MEA Ministry of External Affairs
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOA Memorandum of Association
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
MP Member of Parliament
MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime
MW Mega Watt
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty
NRI Non-Resident Indian
NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group
OCI Overseas Citizenship of India
OECD Organisation of Cooperation and Development
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer
PIO Persons of Indian Origin
PNE Peaceful Nuclear Explosion
PPP Purchasing Power Parity
PSP Praja Socialist Party
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SMEs Small and Medium Enterprises
SS Second Series
SWJN Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru
TCS Tata Consultancy Services
TOI Times of India
TSI Three Seas Initiative
UN United Nations
UNCTAD United Nations Conference of Trade and Development
V4 Visegrad 4
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO World Trade Organization
Contents
1 Introduction
Rajendra K. Jain
2 India and Central Europe:​From the Margins to the Centre in
Three Stages
Pramit Pal Chaudhuri
3 Indian Perceptions of Central Europe
Rajendra K. Jain
4 India and the Czech Republic
Rajendra K. Jain
5 India and Hungary
Rajendra K. Jain
6 India and Poland
Rajendra K. Jain
7 India and Slovakia
Rajendra K. Jain
8 India’s Trade and Economic Relations with the V4 Countries
Karina Jędrzejowska and Anna Wró bel
9 Indian Foreign Direct Investment in Central Europe
Karina Jędrzejowska and Anna Wró bel
10 Indian Diaspora in Central Europe
Patryk Kugiel and Konrad Pędziwiatr
11 India and Central Europe:​A Road More Travelled?​
Patryk Kugiel
Appendix A:​India-Czechoslovakia Visits, 1947–1992
Appendix B:​India-Czech Republic Visits, 1993–2020
Appendix C:​India-Czechoslovakia Agreements, 1949–1991
Appendix D:​India-Czech Republic Agreements, 1993–2018
Appendix E:​India-Hungary Visits, 1948–2021
Appendix F:​India-Hungary Agreements, 1949–2019
Appendix G:​India-Poland Visits, 1951–2020
Appendix H:​India-Poland Agreements, 1949–2019
Appendix I:​India-Slovakia Visits, 1992–2020
Appendix J:​India-Slovakia Agreements, 1993–2019
Appendix K:​India-Central Europe Agreements, Comparative Chart
Appendix L:​Foreign Direct Investment in India, April 2000–March
2020
Index
List of Figures
Graph 9.​1 Outward Indian FDI in V4 Countries, 2006–2018

Graph 9.​2 V4 FDI in India, 2006–2018

Graph 10.​1 Indian Citizens residing legally in V4 countries, 2010–2018

Graph 10.​2 Foreigners Residing Legally in Poland with Valid Residence

Permits, 2010–2018

Graph 10.​3 Growth of the Indian Community in Poland, 2010–2019

Graph 10.​4 Immigrants in Czechia, 2009–2019

Graph 10.​5 Citizens of India Residing in the Czech Republic, 2008–2018

Graph 10.​6 Foreign Citizens Residing in Hungary (without asylum

seekers), 2009–2019

Graph 10.​7 Number of Valid Residence Permits for Third Country

Nationals in Slovakia, 2009–2019

Graph 10.​8 Indian Citizens in Slovakia, 2009–2019

Map 10.1 Indian Citizens in Poland in 2014 (Green) and 2019 (Red)
List of Tables
Table 3.​1 India’s Trade with Central Europe

Table 4.​1 Export of Czech military equipment to India, 2003–2017

Table 5.​1 Hungarian export of arms and military equipment to India,

1992–2018

Table 6.​1 Export of Polish military equipment to India, 2008–2017

Table 7.​1 India–Slovakia Trade, 2000–2019

Table 7.​2 Export of military material by Slovakia to India, 2004–2017

Table 8.​1 India–V4 trade in Goods:​Exports, 1996–1997 to 2018–2019

Table 8.​2 India–V4 Trade in Goods:​Imports, 1996–1997 to 2018–2019

Table 8.​3 India–V4 Trade in Services:​Exports, 1996–2017

Table 8.​4 India–V4 Trade in Services:​Imports, 1996–2017

Table 9.​1 Outward Indian FDI in V4 countries, 2006–2018 (in million

US dollars)
Table 9.​2 V4 FDI in India, 2006–2018
Notes on Contributors
Rajendra K. Jain was formerly Professor and Chairperson at the
Centre for European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
He has been Director, Europe Area Studies Programme, JNU, and the
first Jean Monnet Chair in India (2010–2015). He has also been Adjunct
Research Professor, Monash European and EU Studies Centre, Monash
University, Melbourne (2010–2015). He was formerly Visiting
Professor, Asia-Europe Institute, University of Malaya (2010), and
Visiting International Fellow, Monash Europe and EU Centre,
Melbourne (2009). He was Alexander von Humboldt Foundation Fellow
at the University of Constance (1992–1993, 1994) and Visiting Fellow
at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of
London (1993) and the Foundation for Science and Politics (1995),
Ebenhausen, Germany. He has been Visiting Humboldt Foundation
Professor at Freiburg, Leipzig and Tuebingen universities and at the
Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, Paris (2005, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2013).
He has also been Visiting Professor at the universities of Sofia, Warsaw
and UPFM Barcelona. He was Indian Council of Cultural Relations
(ICCR) Professor of Contemporary India, Leuven University (2015). He
is the author/editor of over 35 books and has written over 150
articles/book chapters. He has travelled extensively in Asia, Europe and
North America and has lived in the United States (5 years) and
Germany (3 years). He has most recently edited Changing Indian Images
of the European Union: Perception and Misperception (Palgrave, 2019),
India and the European Union in a Turbulent World (Palgrave, 2020) and
India, Europe and Asia: Convergence and Divergence (Palgrave, 2021).

Karina Jędrzejowska is Assistant Professor, Department of Regional

and Global Studies, Faculty of Political Science and International
Studies, University of Warsaw. She is a graduate of the University of
Manchester (M.Sc. Globalization and Development, 2008), Warsaw
School of Economics (M.A. in Finance and Banking, 2007), and an M.A.
in International Relations from the Institute of International Relations,
Warsaw University 2005. Since April 2017, she is a Governing Board
Member and Treasurer of the World International Studies Committee
(WISC). She is co-editor of The Future of Global Economic Governance:
Challenges and Prospects in an Age of Uncertainty (2020).

Patryk Kugiel is the Head of the International Economic Relations

and Global Issues Programme at the Polish Institute of International
Affairs (PISM), Warsaw. He is a specialist on South Asia and
international development cooperation. His research in PISM focuses
on the foreign policy of India and Pakistan, the security situation in
South Asia, United States and EU policies towards the region,
implications of India’s rise on the global order as well as the
development cooperation policy of Poland and the EU. He is the co-
editor of India-Poland Relations in the 21st Century: Vistas for Future
Cooperation (Vij Books, 2014) and India’s Soft Power: A New Foreign
Policy Strategy (Routledge, 2017).

Pramit Pal Chaudhuri is a Distinguished Fellow and Head, Strategic

Affairs at Ananta Aspen Centre and the Foreign Editor of the Hindustan
Times. He writes on political, security and economic issues. He was a
member of National Security Advisory Board of the Government of
India (2011–2015) and is a member of the Asia Society Global Council
and the Aspen Institute Italia, the International Institute of Strategic
Studies and the Mont Pelerin Society.

Konrad Pędziwiatr is Senior Researcher at the Centre for Advanced

Studies of Population and Religion at the Cracow University of
Economics and in the Centre for Migration Research at the University of
Warsaw. His publications include Transformation of Islamism in Egypt
and Tunisia in the Shadow of the Arab Spring (2019), Polish Migration
Policy—In Search of New Model (2015), The New Muslim Elites in
European Cities (2010) and From Islam of Immigrants to Islam of
Citizens (2007).

Anna Wróbel is Assistant Professor, Department of Regional and

Global Studies, Faculty of Political Science and International Studies,
University of Warsaw. She holds a Ph.D. on the policy of liberalization of
international trade in services. A Member of the Polish Association of
International Studies, she is also the co-editor of The Dragon and the
(Evening) Stars: Essays on the Determinants of EU-China Relations (in
Polish) (2013) and The Future of Global Economic Governance:
Challenges and Prospects in an Age of Uncertainty (2020).
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021
R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Central Europe
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2850-4_1

1. Introduction
Rajendra K. Jain1
(1) Centre for European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New
Delhi, India

From the mid-1950s till the end of the Cold War, India’s relations with
the Central and East European Countries (CEECs) were an adjunct of
Indo-Soviet relations. Having been let down by the West, India turned
to the Soviet Union in 1955 as a partner in economic and industrial
cooperation. The CEECs followed suit after Moscow offered economic,
financial and technical assistance for large public sector projects. There
was no serious conflict of interest and almost identical views on most
international issues. The CEECs also did not have any colonial
hangovers and were indifferent to some of the issues that troubled
West European lobbies when dealing with India such as human rights,
Kashmir, treatment of minorities and so on (Sibal, 2019: 78).
Central Europe figured in parliamentary debates only on critical
issues which received wide publicity. During the relatively well-
informed debates on the Hungarian uprising (1956) and the
Czechoslovak crisis (1968), the Nehru and Indira Gandhi’s government
faced substantial criticism. No debates on Central Europe took place
subsequently in the Indian Parliament though references to individual
countries did resurface periodically. The West usually gave no credit
either to the Indian Parliament or to Indian leaders for ‘speaking
plainly, though in guarded language, on Hungary or Czechoslovakia. The
restraint was dictated by the need to be helpful’, but it was not
‘appreciated by either side’ (Damodaran, 2000: 114–115).
 In the post-Cold War era, India and the CEECs viewed each other
from opposite directions: the Visegrad 4 looked towards the European
Union and India focused on its key partners in Western Europe. As
Central Europeans aligned their foreign policy with those of the EU,
India and the CEECs began to have divergent worldviews and
differences on how they perceived the world and the challenges that
confronted it. There was little that brought them together. Indian
foreign policy took time to adjust to the changing realities in Central
and Eastern Europe. Mutual indifference led to slim political interaction
and meagre people-to-people ties. For nearly a decade-and-a-half
(1990–2004), Central European countries concentrated on
gaining admission in the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. Their preoccupation with a ‘return to Europe’ and
transatlantic relations left them little time or interest in India. New
Delhi too showed little economic and strategic interest in the region
given the radical transformation of the socio-economic and geopolitical
milieu in Central Europe. Mutual neglect for nearly two decades led to a
sharp decline in political contacts as well as people-to-people ties. The
communist glue had withered away though some observers felt that
clichés about post-communist societies in the older generation still
persisted in India.
The CEECs began to rediscover India after they gained membership
of the European Union in 2004 and more consciously after the 2008
financial crisis. India also took time to recalibrate its policies. Today,
India and Central Europe have a convergence of views on issues like
terrorism, reform of the United Nations and non-proliferation. There
were however differences over Western interventions in Iraq (2003),
Libya (2011), crises in Syria and Ukraine in which India had no
geopolitical interest or stake.

Outline of Chapters
India’s postwar relationship with Central Europe, argues Pramit Pal
Chaudhuri in the second chapter, has undergone three distinct phases.
The first phase, during the communist period, was a subset of India’s
relations with the Soviet Union. The collapse of communism left New
Delhi with almost no points of engagement with the newly democratic
Central Europe. This was compounded by the fact both India and
Central Europe began a process of reforming their socialist-oriented
economies that continued through the 1990s. The early 2000s saw the
beginnings of a new economic relationship with a few Indian firms
beginning to invest in countries like Poland. Today, Indian firms and
their European subsidiaries are both large investors and have a
footprint in almost all Central European states. The combination of
Brexit, the rise of China and India’s expanding geoeconomic interests
have led the Narendra Modi government to contemplate relations with
Central Europe through a more strategic lens though New Delhi is doing
what it can in terms of its capabilities.
Chapter 3 examines Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s interwar
and postwar perceptions of Central Europe. It describes how the
geographical scope of the Central Europe Division of the Ministry of
External Affairs gradually expanded to comprise thirty countries at
present. It goes on to examine Indian perceptions of Central Europe in
the early 1990s and discusses how Central Europe figured in
parliamentary debates. It assesses the changing perspectives of the
region by India’s two leading corporate chambers. The chapter
provides a succinct overview of Indian scholarly literature on economic
and political relations as well as the evolution and current state of
teaching of contemporary Central Europe at Indian universities. In
conclusion, the chapter examines New Delhi’s proactive re-engagement
with Central Europe with greater vigour and the Indian commentariat’s
perceptions of Chinese inroads in Central Europe.
Chapter 4 discusses political relations between India and
Czechoslovakia from 1947 to 1992. It outlines how the Czech Republic’s
preoccupation with securing membership of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and the European Union left it with little time or political
interest for nearly a decade in cultivating relations with India. It goes
on to examine renewed efforts by the Czech Republic to reach out to
Asia in order to enhance trade and foreign direct investment and the
broad contours of the relationship in the 2000s. It discusses how
Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic figured in Lok Sabha)
debates/questions from 1947 to 2019 since the agitated debates over
the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. After making a detailed
examination of defence cooperation, the chapter discusses how
Czechoslovakia has been perceived by Indian scholars and the
commentariat, Czech perceptions of India as well as cultural relations
between the two countries.
Chapter 5 examines the vicissitudes of political and economic
relations between India and Hungary during the Cold War. It critically
assesses the changes in the relationship since the early 1990s and the
upswing in relations with Hungary’s ‘Eastern Opening Strategy’ (2011).
It examines parliamentary (Lok Sabha) debates since Independence
and highlights how Hungary figured in parliamentary questions and
debates over the years. It discusses Indian perceptions of Hungary in
one of the leading English national dailies as well as Indian scholarly
literature. It makes a detailed study of defence cooperation as well as
cultural relations between India and Hungary. In conclusion, the
chapter assesses prospects for the future.
The next chapter examines the initial Indian perceptions of Poland
during the 1930s and the 1950s and goes on to discuss the vicissitudes
of political relations during the Cold War and the perceptions of Poland
in Indian scholarly literature. The chapter assesses the transformation
of the relationship in the post-Cold War era. It discusses Polish efforts
to reach out to Asia at the turn of the millennium and the motivations
and impact of the Polish Strategy towards Non-European Developing
Countries (2004). It goes on to examine the relationship in the 2000s
and how Poland figured in the Modi government’s renewed re-
engagement with Central and Eastern Europe. The chapter examines
Lok Sabha debates from 1947 to 2019 to highlight how Poland figured
in parliamentary questions and debates since the Polish uprising of
1956. It critically examines the nature, problems and prospects of
defence cooperation between India and Poland. After evaluating Polish
and Indian perceptions of each other, the chapter discusses prospects
for the future.
Chapter 7 examines Indian perceptions of the Velvet Divorce, which
led to the establishment of two separate states of the Czech Republic
and Slovakia. Politically, Slovakia has remained largely peripheral to
Indian foreign policy concerns because of its small size, low volumes of
trade with visits being confined to Deputy Ministers. It discusses the
slow evolution of the relationship in the 2000s and during the Modi
years (2014–2020) and presents a brief overview of economic and
trade relations as well as FDI whose high point is a £1 billion
investment by the Tata Group’s UK subsidiary in the ‘Detroit’ of the
region. It examines Lok Sabha debates to illustrate now marginally
Slovakia figured in the parliamentary deliberations since 1993. It
discusses defence cooperation as well as cultural relations between
India and Slovakia.
After a brief historical review of economic relations between India
and Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, Karina Jędrzejowska and
Anna Wró bel examine the legal framework for current cooperation and
assess the salient features of their economic and trade relations over
the past decade. The lack of a more coherent Indian strategy, they
argue, has enabled China to surpass India in the region. In conclusion,
the chapter identifies potential areas for enhanced trade.
Given its population of over 60 million, highly developed human
capital with relatively cheap cost of labour, and its strategic location,
Central Europe presents itself as an attractive location for Asian
investments. In Chapter 9, Karina Jędrzejowska and Anna Wró bel
provide an overview of Indian foreign direct investment in the four
Central European countries as well as Central European FDI India. It
discusses the rationale for Indian economic engagement in the region
and identifies the key challenges faced by Indian investors and looks at
prospects for the future.
Based on the analysis of the secondary sources as well as new
statistical information, big data and qualitative research (including
participant observations, in-depth interviews and a survey), Patryk
Kugiel and Konrad Pędziwiatr analyse the origins and growth of Indian
communities in Central Europe and provide a detailed overview of the
key features of the Indian diaspora in each of the Visegrad 4 countries.
They explore their role in their new ‘homes’, assess their impact on
India-Central Europe relations and look at future trends and
significance in India’s relations with the region.
In the concluding chapter, Patryk Kugiel makes a case for greater
Visegrad 4-India engagement. As India’s global ambitions grow, he
argues, it requires more trusted partners in Europe to promote its
interests in relation to the European Union, the United States or in
multilateral fora like the United Nations Security Council or the Nuclear
Suppliers Group. Unlike many developed Western nations, the V4, he
adds, have similar views to those of India on a number of international
challenges from climate change to terrorism. New Delhi, Patryk argues,
should take greater cognizance of the fact that the V4 send 106 MEPs
(out of a total of 751) to the European Parliament as well as one non-
permanent member to the UN Security Council. With growing
recognition of India’s importance by the EU and the V4’s desire to
develop a more balanced approach towards Asia, he maintains,
prospects for improved India-Central Europe relations have improved.
The chapters are followed by a dozen appendices, which have been
painstakingly collected from diverse sources. These would be of
immense value to scholars, students and policy-makers as a ready
reference. The lists of bilateral visits (cultural, economic, political and
military) as well as agreements owe their present form to a determined
scouring of diverse sources, including periodicals, newspapers, official
publications, journals of India and the Central European countries as
well as reports and publications of governmental ministries,
Departments and agencies concerned. I have sought to ensure the
correctness of the details by cross-checking them carefully with those
appearing in official sources and have retained only those that I have
found reasonably accurate.

Economic Engagement
The low levels of trade and investment present an opportunity for both
India and the Visegrad Four to widen and deepen economic ties. The
V4 tend to be viewed by many Indian companies as a bridgehead for
investments in the much larger West European economies. Indian IT
software majors have been ramping up their operations in the region to
tap the intellectual calibre and language skill-sets of the engineering
talent of the region to tap West European markets. Indian
entrepreneurs tend to look to bigger markets in Western Europe and
recognize that there are structural limits to what is possible in Central
Europe. As the storehouse of niche technologies, Central European
technologies are more attuned to Indian conditions. As repositories of
frontier technologies and expertise in clean technology, skill
development and education, the Visegrad 4 are complementary
partners for many flagship programmes of the Modi government. To a
certain extent, the challenge is of overcoming lack of information and
simply making the connection.
The first India-Central Europe Business Forum (ICEBF) (now India-
Europe29) has not led to a structured business dialogue and continues
to face the perennial problem of lack of adequate follow-up. While the
idea is inherently good, it is too large a body bringing together 30
countries under the geographical scope of the Ministry of External
Affairs’ Central Europe Division with diverse interests from very
different regions and with different expertise.

Civil Society Linkages

Since the early 1990s, historical narratives have ceased to be relevant in
India-Central Europe relations because for modern young Indians, the
Cold War is largely forgotten. Traditional postwar linkages between
India and the Visegrad Four have long withered away; traditional
sensitivities of history with India are no longer evident. The problem of
direct connectivity between V4 and India has been overcome to a
certain extent with the introduction of direct LOT Warsaw-Delhi flights
in September 2019. Greater civil society linkages will contribute to
removing traditional clichés and stereotypes of post-communist
societies of Central Europe and foster positive images of a rapidly
growing region.
Bollywood is being actively wooed. ‘All it needs is one film and that
can change the dynamics’ as the film ‘Kick’ did in the case of Poland.
Some years ago, one Central European embassy even had ‘a three-page
rate card’ for technical experts, camera hire, etc.1 A further fillip to
tourism can be expected since Bollywood films have now been shot in
all V4 countries.

India-V4+ Engagement
Central Europe has not figured prominently in Indian foreign policy
priorities for decades even though it has become politically stable and
economically prosperous due to mutual indifference and neglect. As a
political grouping, the Visegrad countries have lost their earlier
distinctiveness and failed to get enough political attention in the capital.
All of them except perhaps Poland are political lightweights within the
European Union. New Delhi tends to perceive them as having little
impact on EU foreign policy and of being of marginal importance in
India-EU relations since they tend to get submerged in EU structures.
Observers caution that the shared direction of the V4 within the EU is
not ‘stable or permanent’ and that ‘separate interests and issues
disrupt the coherence of the group and weaken it in terms of unified
promotion of these interests in the EU’ (Bauerova, 2018: 134).
The Slovak Presidency of the Visegrad Group in 2014 proposed a
new V4+1 format for India’s engagement with the region. This led to
the first-ever engagement at the Joint Secretary level with the V4 in
Bratislava on 25 February 2015. This interaction was envisaged as a
supplementary feature of bilateral and India-EU interactions. From the
outset, it was obvious that the periodicity of such an interaction was
not likely to be institutionalized, though there were many areas of
mutual benefit (Chhabra, 2015: 7). This format was not in response to
the 16+1 (later 17+1) promoted by the Chinese. The two were
‘independent processes’, with India seeking to do what it could in terms
of its capabilities.2 The initial V4+1 meeting was followed up in 2015
when the Minister of State for External Affairs V.K. Singh met the V4
Foreign Ministers on the sidelines of the eleventh GLOBESEC Security
Forum in April 2016. No meetings in the V4+ India format have been
held thereafter.

A Prime Ministerial Visit

Central Europeans have often referred to the deficit in reciprocal visits
from New Delhi. A long-standing, genuine complaint of the CEECs has
been that there has not been a prime ministerial visit to the region for
33 years, i.e. ever since Rajiv Gandhi visited Hungary in 1988. Prime
ministerial visits abroad are undoubtedly of much consequence for the
projection of foreign policy. High-level visits do make a difference and
create much momentum in focusing attention on a country and/or
region. They also create institutional pressures to line up deliverables
for the visit. In the past, a prime ministerial visit to the region was
constantly pushed back apparently because of the inherent lack of
substantial economic linkages and the absence of any political
imperatives. A prime ministerial visit, MEA mandarins generally
argued, generally takes place when a relationship has reached ‘a
particular level; one has to wait for it to mature’. In fact, a prime
ministerial visit is ‘the culmination of a relationship; a PM does not go
there to merely cut the ribbon’.3
The Ministry of External Affairs has only recently taken cognizance
of Central Europe as ‘a strong voice’ and the Visegrad Group as ‘a robust
force’ within the European Union (India, MEA 2020a: 25; 2021: 20).
There is growing realization in New Delhi that a prime ministerial visit
to the region is long overdue. There was considerable expectation that a
prime ministerial visit to Central Europe would take place in the second
half of 2020, but the COVID-19 pandemic has pushed it to late 2021 or
even later. Alternately, a prime ministerial meeting with V4
counterparts can also take place on the sidelines of the UN General
Assembly in the near future though a visit to the region would send
across a better message. A V4+ India summit at the prime ministerial
level would undoubtedly give the relationship a special focus and
highlight the region’s importance.

Towards a Strategic Partnership?

India does not presently have a strategic partnership with any Central
European country. After the conclusion of a strategic partnership with
China (December 2011), Poland had proposed a strategic partnership
with India. The MEA however felt that relations ‘had not yet reached
that level’. After all, a strategic partnership is ‘the last mile’, which is
often ‘the most difficult’.4 There was the problem of justifying a
strategic partnership to higher authorities as it usually gave rise to
questions of prioritization, human resource constraints, bureaucratic
overload and the quantum of trade.
For the first time, India recently concluded the fifth strategic
partnership in Europe with Denmark. Called a ‘Green Strategic
Partnership’, it has been described as ‘a mutually beneficial
arrangement to advance political cooperation, expand economic
relations and green growth, create jobs and strengthen cooperation on
addressing global challenges and opportunities’ (India, MEA 2020b).
This functional strategic partnership, with an Action Plan yet to be
worked out, envisages cooperation through relevant Ministries,
institutions and stakeholders is illustrative of New Delhi’s efforts to
make strategic partnerships more result-oriented.
India has also begun recently to explore new geographical spaces
and configurations. The MEA and the Confederation of Indian Industry
recently organized the first India-Nordic-Baltic Conclave (5 November
2020) with ministerial participation from Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
Iceland and Latvia on renewable energy and clean technologies and the
factories of the future, on Artificial Intelligence and blockchain-led
transformation, on supply chain and logistics, on fintech (Jaishankar,
2020). This innovative engagement tends to improve prospects of a
strategic partnership currently under discussion with the Czech
Republic and possibly Poland provided the right synergies and mutual
benefits can be identified with Warsaw.

Modi’s Re-engagement
India’s re-engagement of Central Europe by the Narendra Modi
government in recent years reflects how the region is slowly being
gradually recognized as a region of promise and potential. In view of a
proactive Chinese overdrive around the world, New Delhi has sought to
show its flag in a kind of competitive diplomatic engagement in
consonance with its resources and capabilities to reach out to various
countries where few ministers or senior officials had travelled for
decades. Between 2014 and 2020, there nearly a dozen visits by senior
Indian dignitaries, including the President and the Vice-President, to
Central and Eastern Europe took place. These were not merely
goodwill/ceremonial visits. They required a certain degree of
preparation and led to tangible results. The robust engagement with
the region could also have possibly been the result of the fact that for
the first time since Independence, S. Jaishankar is the first Foreign
Secretary/Foreign Minister to have spent two cycles in Central and
Eastern Europe—in Budapest (1990–1993) and as Ambassador to
Prague (2001–2004).
Central Europe is an important constituency for the reform of the
United Nations Security Council and support of the Indian candidature.
With the Visegrad 4 being members of all four export control regimes,
their support has been crucial to secure membership since decisions in
them are by consensus and a single negative vote can stop any move in
favour of India. While the V4 do not often form a unified bloc or vote in
unision in the EU or other global forums, they can be of interest in
raising India’s profile (Kugiel & Upadhyay, 2018: 138).
In the future, the primary focus will continue to be on economy and
trade. Different Visegrad Group countries will develop their
relationships with India at different speeds, with varying levels of
engagement and commitment, and with different trajectories and
results.

Further Research
For decades, India-Central Europe relations has been an under-
researched and neglected area of research. There are many gaps in
existing scholarly research. There is a glaring lack of archival research
on India-Central Europe relations. The National Archives of India
contain recently declassified MEA documents, which primarily
comprise monthly reports from Indian Embassies, diplomatic cables,
transcript of conversations involving foreign leaders or interlocuters as
well as policy memoranda by officials based in Delhi and overseas
embassies. No research has yet been done on the archives of the
Ministry of External Affairs, which have been recently digitized, but
access continues to be problematic. Similarly, archives of the Central
European countries have yet to be fully explored to provide insights
into V4 perceptions and approaches towards India.
Secondly, there is hardly any research on the making of India’s
foreign policy towards Central Europe and vice versa, including the role
of various ministries as well as the dynamics and constraints of inter-
ministerial interaction and coordination.
Thirdly, apart from a few studies of Indian perceptions of Poland
(Kugiel, 2019), there are no meaningful studies of how mainstream
Indian newspapers, electronic media and elites perceive Central Europe
and vice versa.
Fourthly, scholars continue to be seriously hampered by the lack of
primary source material on the subject. A comprehensive documentary
study on India-Central Europe relations would undeniably encourage
further research.
The editor and the contributors hope that this pioneering volume
would foster greater scholarly research of India’s relations with Central
Europe, which has been an orphaned subject for far too long.

References
Bauerova, H. (2018). The V4 and European integration. Politics in Central Europe,
14(2), 121–139.
[Crossref]

Chhabra, R. (2015, March 3). Keynote Address by Joint Secretary (Central Europe),
Ministry of External Affairs, at a seminar on ‘India and Central Europe’ organized by
the Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru
University, New Delhi.

Damodaran, A. K. (2000). Beyond autonomy, India’s foreign policy. Somaiya

Publications.

India, MEA. (2020a). Annual report 2019–2020. New Delhi.

India, MEA. (2020b, September 28). Joint statement for India-Denmark green strategic
partnership. Retrieved 12 May 2021 from https://​mea.​gov.​in/​bilateral-documents.​
htm?​dtl/​33069/​j oint+statement+​for+indiadenmark​+green+strategic​+partnership.

India, MEA. (2021). Annual report 2020–2021. New Delhi.

Jaishankar, S. (2020, November 5). Remarks by foreign Minister at the India-Nordic-

Baltic CII Enclave. Retrieved 12 May 2021 from https://​mea.​gov.​in/​Speeches-
Statements.​htm?​dtl/​33165/​eams+remarks+at+​the+india++nordi​c ++baltic+cii+co​
nclave.

Kugiel, P. (2019). Indian perceptions of Poland. In R. K. Jain (Ed.), Changing Indian

images of the European Union: Perception and misperception (pp. 151–154). Palgrave
Macmillan.

Kugiel, P., & Upadhyay, D. K. (2018). India and Central Europe: Post-cold war
engagement. International Studies, 54(1–4), 127–143.

Sibal, K. (2019). India and the European Union: Perceptions and misperceptions. In R.
K. Jain (Ed.), Changing Indian images of the European Union: Perception and
misperception (pp. 61–78). Palgrave Macmillan.
[Crossref]

Footnotes
1 Conversation with a former Joint Secretary (Central Europe), MEA.

2 Private conversation with a former Joint Secretary (Central Europe), MEA.

3 Private conversation with a former Joint Secretary (Central Europe), MEA.

4 Private conversation with a former Joint Secretary (Central Europe), MEA.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021
R. K. Jain (ed.), India and Central Europe
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2850-4_2

2. India and Central Europe: From the

Margins to the Centre in Three Stages
Pramit Pal Chaudhuri1, 2
(1) Head, Strategic Affairs at Ananta Aspen Centre, New Delhi, India
(2) Foreign Editor, New Delhi, India

Independent India’s relationship with Central Europe has undergone

three distinct phases. The first phase, during the communist period,
was a subset of India’s relations with the Soviet Union. The second
phase was a political and economic vacuum. It followed the collapse of
the Soviet bloc. New Delhi had almost no engagement with the newly
democratic Central European states. Both India and Central Europe
began a process of reforming their socialist-oriented economies at this
point that continued through the 1990s but gave them minimal ability
to engage with each other. The early 2000s saw the beginnings of a
third phase centred around a new economic relationship with a few
Indian firms investing in countries like Poland. Today, Indian firms and
their European subsidiaries are both large investors and have a
footprint in almost all the major Central European states. The
combination of Brexit, the rise of China and India’s expanding geo-
economic interests in Europe are leading the Narendra Modi
government to contemplate relations with Central Europe through a
more strategic lens. If these fructify, it could mark a fourth phase in
India-Central European relations.

The Soviet Era, 1947–1989

India’s Central European policy under its first prime minister,
Jawaharlal Nehru, was strongly coloured by his perspective of the
Soviet Union. For a number years, Nehru also looked to the Yugoslav
ruler, Josip Broz Tito, for insights on the region (Dixit, 1998: 324). In his
first decade in office, Nehru had a relatively benign view of communism
and a suspicion of the United States which skewed his understanding of
the nature of Soviet control over the Central European states. All of
these contributed to his weak response to the Hungarian uprising of
1956. His daughter and later prime minister, Indira Gandhi, responded
equally ambivalently to the crushing of the Prague Spring of 1968 but
by then the geopolitical bond between New Delhi and Moscow had
become much stronger and overrode any other consideration. Overall,
however, Central Europe barely figured in India’s foreign policy
calculations while the communist governments of the region expressed
much rhetorical support for India as an echo of what was being said by
their superiors in the Kremlin.
Nehru’s Autobiography, Glimpses of World History and letters all
indicate that he saw the Russian Revolution of 1917 that led to
communist rule as a point in a spectrum that went back to the French
Revolution. In one letter, he wrote that the popular demand for freedom
in the French and Russian Revolutions were an inspiration for India’s
own slogan of ‘Inqilab zindabad!’ (Long live the revolution!) against
British colonial rule. In the late 1940s and the early 1950s, he often
expressed his admiration for communist ideology and theory of history,
though over time he began to separate this from the practice of Soviet
communism per se. Nehru was to become increasingly concerned about
the fault lines that kept erupting within the international communist
system and their impact on the Indian communist movement and the
political stability of India as a whole. But his theoretical admiration for
communism meant he was initially unconcerned about the Soviet
occupation of Central Europe and did not see it as an example of the
colonialism that he had spent his life opposing. After all, he argued,
other countries recognized the Central European communist regimes
and small countries being dominated by a larger power was common in
other parts of the world (Nayudu, 2018).
Hungarian Uprising of 1956
Nehru’s uncertainty about the nature of Soviet rule in Central Europe
was reflected in his response to the popular revolt in Hungary against
Soviet occupation. This was the high watermark of nonalignment and
Nehru, if anything, still seeing much of the world in terms of the
colonial era and hence wary of Western views and actions. When the
uprising began, Nehru declined to support any initiative taken by the
United States making India the only democratic government not to
criticize the Soviet Union’s brutal suppression of the uprising. US
President Dwight D. Eisenhower privately said Nehru was ‘falling for
the Moscow line—buying their entire bill of good’ (Nayudu, 2015).
The Indian prime minister was hampered by the illness of
Ambassador K. P. S. Menon, who was based in Moscow and
concurrently accredited to Budapest, and delays in the arrival of
Embassy reports about what was taking place. Nehru expressed
concerns that the uprising represented ‘fascistic elements’, worried that
Moscow was being internationally isolated, and corresponded mostly
with Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin and Yugoslavia’s President Tito.
Bulganin obviously gave the Soviet line on what was happening. The
United States fretted that Nehru was so much under the premier’s
influence that they referred to the Indian prime minister’s
‘Bulganinisation’. Having kept his country out of the Warsaw Pact and
free of Soviet control, Tito initially expressed support for the
Hungarians but later worried the unrest would spread and undermine
his own one-party system (Nayudu, 2017).
As Nehru became more familiar with what was happening in
Hungary, his position shifted. New Delhi became more critical of the
Soviet Union but declined to align directly with the statements and
actions of the United States. Thanks in part to telegrams from the
Indian embassy sent by the Charge d’Affaires M. M. Rahman, Nehru
came to accept that the Hungarian protestors were ‘nationalists’ rather
than reactionaries. Indian diplomats were allowed to join the
international chorus demanding that the United Nations be allowed to
send observer teams to Hungary, along with humanitarian supplies. But
Nehru decided that nonalignment meant he should avoid
condemnation of the Soviet Union. India would be best served by
‘leaving the door open’ to Moscow even while taking a principled stand.
It could be said that India’s response to the 1956 uprising was to
provide a template for Indian foreign policy reactions to other Cold War
eruptions in the decades to come (Nayudu, 2019). But the aftermath of
the Hungarian uprising did make Nehru more sceptical of the Soviet
Union.

Prague Spring of 1968

Indira Gandhi was prime minister at the time of the Soviet Union’s
military intervention against the reformist Alexander Dubcek
Government in Czechoslovakia. The prime minister was public in her
criticism of the intervention at home, declaring in the lower house of
parliament, ‘The right of nations to live peacefully and without outside
interference should not be denied in the name of religion or ideology’.
At the UN and diplomatically, however, India held back from attacking
the Soviet Union, abstaining from a UN vote against the military action.
Indira Gandhi was influenced by a number of factors. Unlike Nehru’s
confusion about events in Hungary, she does not seem to have any
doubts as to the nature of Moscow’s actions. Indira Gandhi was more
influenced by hard-nosed interests. One, India had a five-year defence
cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union to develop the country’s
military capacity following the defeat of the 1962 border war with
China. Two, Washington was mired in its war in Vietnam and signalled
a broad disengagement from South Asia by allowing Moscow to take
the lead in mediating the 1966 Tashkent Agreement between India and
Pakistan. Three, Indira Gandhi had shifted the country leftward both
politically and economically. She increasingly saw the Indian left parties
as political allies—though not all Indian communists were necessarily
supportive of the suppression of the Prague Spring (Nayudu, 2017).
In the coming decades, until the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1989, India’s foreign and military closeness to Moscow only increased.
This, in turn, meant New Delhi came to see its Central European policy
as little more than a subset of its relationship with the Soviet Union.
Economic relations with the Soviet-led Council of Mutual Economic
Assistance, better known as COMECON, were frugal with minimal trade
and negligible investment, especially if the Soviet component was
removed. As COMECON members set artificial government-determined
export and import targets rather than basing their trade on demand
and competitiveness and payments were done through rupee-rouble
exchange, the economic engagement was wholly driven by government
diktats. An example of this was East Germany’s secret police, the Stasi,
getting involved in the promotion of trade with India (Tatke, 2017). The
collapse of the Soviet bloc wiped out the rupee-rouble payments
system and took the entire state-driven economic relationship between
India and Central Europe with it.

Reform Era, 1989–2001

The breaking of the Berlin Wall, subsequent end of the Soviet-backed
regimes in Central Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union
also ended India’s engagement with Central Europe. When Yugoslavia
came apart at the seams from 1989 to 1992, New Delhi was only
further isolated from the region. Having had little in the way of people-
to-people relations or economic ties with this region, India would have
to rediscover and rebuild relations with the swathe of countries ranging
from Latvia to Bulgaria almost from scratch.
But India and Central Europe shared a common economic
experience during this time. Namely, they both began the painful and
difficult process of shedding the socialist economic policies they had
followed since the 1950s and 1960s and sought to become more
externally oriented and market driven. However, this meant the two
sides had even less capacity to invest in a set of relationships that were
not seen as central to the wrenching economic and diplomatic efforts
being undertaken. The former members of the Soviet bloc were single-
mindedly driven by a desire to join Western organizations like North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union and a
plethora of new bodies created to ease the post-Soviet transition of
Europe. The government of Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao was
consumed by the need to open up the crisis-ridden Indian economy and
find a new foreign policy path with the end of the Cold War. Central
Europe was not seen as contributory to either of these goals.
Prime Minister Rao’s foreign policy had two pillars. One was to
attract foreign investors to put a bet on the struggling Indian economy.
The other was to find interlocutors who could help India to foster a
new, post-Cold War relationship with the United States. The first goal
led him to visit Germany, his first overseas trip as prime minister, and
then later shift to Southeast Asia and South Korea in what was to
become labelled India’s Act East policy. The second goal led him to
upgrade India’s relationship with Israel, a country he believed would be
best suited to facilitate the development of a new post-Cold War
relationship with the United States. ‘Prime Minister Rao realised that
the road to Washington DC ran through Tel Aviv’, writes his biographer
(Sitapati, 2015). Israeli diplomats say he was also interested in Israel as
an alternative source of weapons as Russia slipped into disarray.1
Central Europe was simply not part of this worldview. India was quick
to recognize the newly democratized regimes of the Central European
countries but had no vision beyond this. Rao even visited two Central
Asian countries en route to Russia for a state visit to kick-off a new era
of relations with these ex-Soviet republics but gave Moscow’s European
satellite countries a miss.
Central Europe, for its part, was in the throes of its own economic
restructuring as it sought to purge itself of Soviet era planning and state
dominance. Most of the former Soviet satellites were completely
focussed on bringing their economies, security arrangements and
political systems in line with the standards set by the EU under the
Charter of Paris for a New Europe, membership in the Organization of
Security and Cooperation in Europe and the requirements for adopting
the Euro (European Commission, 2014). India and much of the world
barely registered in all this. The economic restructuring that many of
these countries had to undergo—the term ‘shock therapy’ was used to
describe some of the more drastic versions—was far more painful than
the dislocation India endured from its own economic reforms (see
Blanchard, 1991). The collapse of Yugoslavia and the ethnic wars that
followed were another distraction. Much of the Central European
membership, including many of the spinoff nations born out of the
former Yugoslavia, left the Nonaligned Movement to join NATO. It says
something about how distracted India was that this barely registered.
Normal diplomatic relations began to be restored from about 1992
onwards. Indian diplomats who served or dealt with Central Europe say
there was minimal ill-will over New Delhi’s support for Moscow. It was
largely understood India had been a marginal player in that part of the
world. When Lech Walesa, leader of the Solidarity movement which
helped overthrow Poland’s communist regime, came to India in 1994
on a five-day presidential visit he bluntly asked the then Minister of
State for External Affairs, K. Natwar Singh, ‘Tell me where was India all
these 10 years?’ Singh responded by saying, ‘I want to talk to you about
the future, not the past’. Singh admitted India no longer had any
contacts in the region and had been caught unawares by what
happened (Rasgotra, 1998: 154). However, Walesa made it a point to
visit Jodhpur to see the palace murals in Umaid Bhavan painted by
Stefan Norblin, a Polish artist who fled to India during the Second
World War and stayed there for a number of years rather than live
under Stalinist rule (Marek, 2017; Hamilton, 2019).
Similar acts of support by individual Indians are still remembered.
For example, M. N. Rahman, the Indian Charge d’Affaires during the
Hungarian uprising took the initiative to intervene with Moscow to save
the life of one of the participants of the uprising, the intellectual Arpad
Goncz. Goncz was imprisoned for six years, but survived and later
served as Hungary’s president from 1990 to 2000. Goncz later
expressed the view he was saved by India’s diplomatic intervention and
made it a point to have a delegation to India personally meet Rahman,
by then retired (Mohan, 2013). Similarly, H. P. Singh, a second secretary
at the Indian Embassy in Prague resigned in protest against the
weakness of Indira Gandhi’s response to the Soviet repression and
achieved minor folk hero status.2

Investment Era, 2001 to the Present

India’s minimal trade relationship with the communist governments of
Central Europe more or less collapsed with the fall of the Berlin Wall.
The end of the rupee-rouble trade was the primary reason as well as
the economic disruption experienced by all the countries concerned at
the time. Local political upheavals such as the breakup of
Czechoslovakia, India’s main trading partner in the region during the
Soviet era, and the disintegration of Yugoslavia added to the economic
malaise.
 In the early 2000s, two companies with Indian connections arrived
in Poland with investments on their mind. One was ArcelorMittal, the
largest European steel maker but with an indirect Indian link through
the Calcutta origins of its owner, Lakshmi Mittal. ArcelorMittal bought
the newly privatized Polskie Huty Stali steel company in 2004 and
today owns about 70% of the country’s entire steel sector. The other
firm was Infosys, one of the largest Indian software firms, which set up
a business process outsourcing and information technology
outsourcing centre in Lodz in 2007. By the time it celebrated its first
decade in Poland, Infosys had 2,700 employees and was being praised
by Lodz business leaders for having established their city’s reputation
as a centre for business services (infosysbm.com, 2017). The two firms
served as trailblazers for the third and most recent phase in India’s
relationship with Central Europe, one that revolves around investment.
In the decade before the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the
subsequent global financial crisis, there was a surge in Indian overseas
corporate investment. Indian firms, buoyed by double-digit growth at
home and hefty profits, began expanding overseas. The EU, India’s
single largest trading partner, was an obvious point of interest. Indian
manufacturing industries and information technology service
companies, looking to invest in countries that gave them access to the
EU market but also offered low taxes and low labour costs, began
looking at Central Europe (Pradhan, 2008).
The Czech Republic was the largest investment hub for India in
Central Europe, in part because of corporate relationships that went
back to the communist era and when Czechoslovakia existed. One well-
known Czech firm, the shoe firm Bata, has had a commercial presence
in India since the British Raj. Czech strength in machinery, engineering
and automobile components and its close integration with German
industry have been major attractions for Indian firms. Indian
investment to the Czech Republic largely reflect this competitive edge
and now include a number of major Indian heavy industrial
manufacturers. Today, Indian firms like Motherson Sumi Systems, Lloyd
Electric and Engineering, and Ashok Leyland have plants there. Indian
FDI totalled $4.1 billion in 2017, up from $1.67 billion in 2012
(UNCTAD, 2020; India, Embassy in Czech Republic, 2020).
 In Poland, thanks perhaps to Infosys’s success there, has seen a
more diversified portfolio of investment with a substantial portion in
the service sector including other IT service firms like Wipro. In
manufacturing, Indian investment includes firms like Videocon, Escorts,
Strides Arcolab, Reliance Industries, Essel Propack, Zensar
Technologies and Berger Paints. Indian FDI into Poland is in the region
of $3 billion (India, Embassy in Poland, 2020a).
The second chapter in the investment story was the spread of
Indian firms into Hungary, Slovakia and to a lesser extent Romania,
Bulgaria and Croatia. Hungary has been a remarkable investment story
for Indian firms with Indian FDI rising from $9 million in 2012 to $1.5
billion in 2018. In 2014, India was the largest greenfield investor in the
country. Hungary has seen the entry of a large number of Indian IT
service companies and specialized industrial acquisitions by Indian
firms. Indian IT firms who have set up in Hungary include Tata
Consultancy Services (TCS), Tech Mahindra, Genpact and Cognizant.
The industrial investors include Crompton Greaves, Apollo Tyres, SRF
and Bakony Wipers. There have been other, smaller stories of success
including Indian small-scale agricultural investments in Bulgaria and
two-way pharmaceutical investments with Croatia (India, Embassy in
Hungary, 2020; Business Standard, 2019; India, Embassy in Slovakia,
2020).
One set of Indian firms that have developed a footprint throughout
Central Europe were the pharmaceutical companies, many of which had
a presence dating back to the Soviet era. All of the major Central
European countries have Indian pharmaceutical investments with Sun
Pharma/Ranbaxy and Glenmark Pharmaceuticals having the largest
presence.
The most recent accelerator for Indian investment has been the
Brexit referendum, the 2016 vote by the British public in favour of
having their country leave the EU. Britain has traditionally been
overwhelmingly the favourite destination of Indian corporate
investment to Europe. Before the Brexit referendum, Indian firms
invested more in Britain than they invested in the rest of Europe
combined. This was despite trade relations between India and Britain
being relatively weak. Indian firms used Britain as their gateway to the
rest of the EU, a role threatened by the Brexit vote and the uncertainty
about the future trade relationship between Britain and the EU. Many
new Indian investors began to consider relocating to the European
continent. At the very least, the larger Indian firms began adopting a
‘Britain plus one’ strategy: even if they retained their offices or factories
in Britain they would set up alternative centres of economic activity in
another EU member-state. The most prominent consequence has been
the decision of Jaguar Land Rover to build its newest factory in
Slovakia, reflecting the country’s emergence as a major automobile
manufacturing hub. The $1.6 billion factory opened up in Slovakia in
2018. As it is carried out by the British firm, the investment is tabulated
as British FDI into Slovakia even though Jaguar Land Rover is a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Tata Motors (Deutsche Welle, 2019).
There has been some Central European investment in India as well,
albeit on a smaller scale than the flow of investments in the other
direction. Much of this has been by Czech firms, reflecting its advanced
industrial sector. Skoda Auto and Skoda Power have high brand
recognition in India. Vitkovice Machinery Group, ZKL Bearings,
Bonatrans and Tatra are among the other prominent Czech firms that
have invested in India. A variety of Polish firms, representing about
$600 million in investment, operate in India (India, Embassy in Poland,
2020b).
Two decades after the communist era, Central European
governments now see India primarily as a major source of investment
and, to a lesser extent, trade in their countries. The larger more
advanced countries of the region, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Slovakia, have become aggressive about wooing Indian companies
and developing people-to-people exchanges. The largest Indian
chambers of commerce have released studies about the potential of
business in Central Europe (FICCI, 2015; Deloitte-CII, 2014).
Indian students, businessmen and tourists are actively wooed and a
number of airlines now have direct flights between Central Europe and
India. Ambassadors from countries like Poland and Hungary which
have seen the rise of nativist, right-wing governments privately stress
that none of the anti-immigrant sentiment in their countries has ever
been directed against Indians. Some of these countries have also seen a
minor resurgence in the study of Indian culture and language, an echo
of the strong academic tradition of Indology that has existed in Central
Europe for centuries.

Strategic Era?
Indian foreign policy under Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made a
deliberate attempt to reach out to parts of the world that have
traditionally received little attention from the Indian Government. This
outreach has included part of the Indian Ocean littoral region, the
Pacific islands, segments of Africa and the smaller countries of
continental Europe. This reflected the Modi government’s view that
India’s interests had reached the point the country needed to engage
beyond the same 20 or so countries that dominated New Delhi’s
worldview.
The Brexit vote and Britain’s imminent departure from the EU has
also led to a re-evaluation of India’s overall European policy. Until the
Brexit vote, India was satisfied in having Britain serve as its primary
interlocutor in Europe with subsidiary relationships with France and
Germany. London having removed itself from the picture, New Delhi
began to contemplate a European policy in which it maintained several
points of engagement. Modi signalled as much, and India officials
confirmed that this was the intent, when he visited France, Germany,
Spain and Brussels during his first major European tour.3 He also held a
Nordic summit that incorporated the three Scandinavian countries,
Finland and Iceland.
The evidence points to Modi planning a similar regional outreach
for Central Europe, probably built around the four Visegrad countries
plus a few other Southeast European countries. India had started
moving up the diplomatic escalator towards that goal with
simultaneous state visits by Indian President Ram Nath Kovind in 2018
to Bulgaria and the Czech Republic and Vice-President Venkaiah Naidu
to Serbia and Romania, followed by Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar
visiting Hungary and Poland in August 2019 (Roy Chaudhury, 2018).
The joint communique issued after Jaishankar’s visit to Poland
stated that ‘he conveyed India's readiness to engage more actively in
the region of Central Europe, which should have a positive impact on
the overall EU-India cooperation. He also expressed India’s desire to
engage with Poland in the Visegrad format’ (India, Ministry of External
Affairs, 2019). The COVID-19 pandemic that broke out in early 2020
put a hold on any further movement in this direction and it remains to
be seen whether the pandemic’s economic and political consequences
will allow the Modi government to pick up the baton again.
There has been considerable commentary on Indian interest in
countering China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the Balkans and
Central Europe in general. While the Modi government has been active
in opposing the BRI and other Chinese strategic moves in the economic
and technological space, India has preferred to concentrate on
providing alternatives to BRI projects in the Indian Ocean and parts of
the Maritime Silk Road, the seaborne element of the BRI. It has
announced plans for joint infrastructure projects with Japan, for
example, in the Bay of Bengal area, Africa and the Indian Ocean island
states. But India has treated the BRI in Central Asia and Europe as
beyond its scope of activity and best left to other countries to handle.
India may eventually carry out investments that thwart the ability of
China to expand its influence in Central Europe and the Balkans, but
this will be a secondary goal of any such activity in that region
(Jaishankar, 2018; Roy Chaudhury, 2018).
Any Indian interest in working with a Visegrad plus formula in
Central Europe would be primarily driven by its desire to develop new
points of influence in Europe and within the EU. The Polish Foreign
Minister, Jacek Czaputowicz, made this implicit in the 2019 joint
communique where he ‘affirmed Poland`s commitment to actively
shape the EU-India agenda to the benefit of both parties’ (India,
Ministry of External Affairs,2019). A secondary interest would be to
garner support for some of its multilateral goals including a permanent
seat in the UN Security Council and expanding its climate-oriented
programmes like the International Solar Alliance and the ‘One Sun, One
World, One Grid’ proposal.
The Modi government’s strongest advocate for a more strategic
approach to Central Europe is believed to be Foreign Minister
Jaishankar, a person who began his diplomatic career in Hungary and
Czechoslovakia, is fluent in Russian and has a working knowledge of
Hungarian. India will also remain unwilling to adjust its strong, if
waning, relationship with Russia because of Central European
concerns. New Delhi’s response to the Russian occupation of Crimea4
had echoes of its response to the Hungarian uprising. Nonetheless, the
Modi government represents the first attempt by New Delhi to conceive
of a larger relationship with Central Europe that treats the region as an
autonomous element within India’s foreign policy rather than a
footnote of its relations with other great powers.

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Footnotes
1 Private conversation with senior Israeli diplomat, New Delhi, December 2006.
Another random document with
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 LETTER XXXIX.
Mrs. D—— to William.

You are a comfort to me, my son, and Annette deserves my tender

affection, she is so tractable and good. Your letters improve and
please her; she requests me to read them twenty times over, that she
may remember them. The tears were in her eyes when I read what
you had written concerning the canary-bird. Poor Emilia, said she,
how I do pity her. It gives me pleasure, replied I, that you participate
in your friend’s grief; it is a sign that you have a good heart, and
deserve the sympathy of others: mutual affection is necessary, it
softens affliction. Indeed I have experienced it, mamma, answered
she, that is, I have never been so much vexed at any thing, when I
saw somebody pitied me, as when they laughed at me.—And I love
those people who have compassion, they look so good-natured.
But, William, I must give you a caution. The beginning of your
letter was too alarming, it startled me; I thought at least that Emilia
had been dreadfully hurt; if she had lost an eye or a limb it could not
have shocked me more. You might have expressed your pity, as she
was grieved, but not in such terms; what other words could you have
used, had she lost her mother? Learn in future, when a thing of the
same kind occurs, to be more cautious how you write, and do not
confound proper feelings; nor even the expressions, which should
convey to others a notion of what passes in your mind.
I send you by this opportunity, some pocket-money, I wish I could
afford to send you more, as you deserve it; for Lady Grandison
informs me, that you are very careful, and try to make your clothes
last long. In you this attention is a virtue, as you do it not only to
spare your mother, whose circumstances are confined, but to have
money to give to the poor. The œconomy and self-denial, which flows
from such motives, is so laudable, that I hope the foolish sneers of
thoughtless young people, will never make you think yourself mean-
spirited, as they will call you: those only can be called mean, in the
true sense of the word, who save to gratify their appetites. Write
often, your conversations please me, and I mentioned before, that
they improved Annette.

D.
 LETTER XL.
William to his Mother.

I must give you another proof of the virtue and wisdom of my

friend Charles. Yesterday, when we had done our lessons, for we
never neglect them, we went to the wood, to take our pleasure, and
found it very pleasant; but the thickness of the trees prevented our
seeing a heavy storm that was approaching, till a violent peal of
thunder made us jump. Emilia is very much afraid of thunder.
EMILIA.
Brother, it thunders—what shall I do?
CHARLES.
Do not terrify yourself, there is no cause for fear; it is only the
natural consequence of great heat, and the weather lately has been
very warm. We will return home, it is right to leave the trees, they
attract the lightning.
EMILIA.
I dare not stir—O if I was but in the house, in the cellar!
CHARLES.
And what would you do in the cellar, is it not God who directs the
storm?
EMILIA.
Yes.
CHARLES.
Then he can preserve you every where; here, in the house, or the
cellar, it is all the same; but still we are to exercise our reason while
we trust in God: let us then leave the trees, they are dangerous.
EMILIA.
But who can tell that God will preserve me?
CHARLES.
Does he not give you daily proofs of his favour? You would be
miserable if he did not guard you. Where would you be safe? There is
no need of a storm to destroy us, we are every moment in danger, if
we lose his protection. A chimney, or only a tile may fall on us from a
house:—there are a thousand things which we have reason to be
afraid of, if we fear any. Dr. Bartlett says, he only fears offending
God.
EDWARD.
You are a foolish girl, to be afraid of thunder. Come let us play and
sing, then the noise will not reach us.
CHARLES.
No, we can play and sing, when the storm is over. It is not now the
time when God lets us see such an astonishing token of his almighty
Power—let us view the tempest with reverence.
EMILIA.
Oh, what a loud clap of thunder! May not that be a sign that God is
angry with us?
CHARLES.
No surely. This stormy weather is a blessing; it is of use to purify
the air: the heat of the summer would, without these concussions,
occasion a great many contagious disorders. Emilia, be easy, God
loves us, we every day receive proofs of it; let us trust in him, as we
trust our parents;—we cannot doubt their love, and have we less
reliance on our heavenly Father?
EMILIA.
Come, let us hasten into the house; my father said once, it was
dangerous to look at the lightning.
CHARLES.
 Except an extraordinary flash, it has much the same effect as when
you look at the sun, the sight is immediately dimmed.
EDWARD.
Do not go home, how can you be so foolish?
CHARLES.
Though I do not fear the storm myself, I would not be so ill-
natured as to oblige Emilia to stand trembling here. I would avoid,
without despising her weakness. It is weak to be afraid, but impious
to mock the storm.

We then hastened home; and soon after the sky cleared up, and I
quickly saw that the thunder had been of use; the air was cool, and
every herb and flower revived, the garden was more fragrant than
usual.
I thank you, dear mother, for the money you have sent me. You say
it is little, but I think it much. My thanks are due to you, for I am
certain you scarcely allow yourself necessaries, to enable me to
appear properly in this family; I feel your goodness, and will do my
utmost to improve by the opportunity, and always remember the
sacrifice my mother has made, and the affection she has ever shewn
me. Dr. Bartlett frequently mentions this circumstance, when we are
alone; but my memory does not need refreshing—I love my mother,
and long to tell her that I am her grateful and dutiful son.

WILLIAM.
 LETTER XLI.
William to his Mother.

Judge of the good heart of Emilia; an accident yesterday made it

appear to advantage. She was in the parlour with Edward, playing on
the harpsicord; after she had finished the tune, she went to look for a
china flower-pot in a china-closet near the parlour. She found what
she wanted; but still loitered, looking at the china; and one jar she
would reach from a high shelf, though Edward cautioned her: the
consequence was, it fell out of her hand, and was dashed to pieces.
She trembled, well knowing it was a jar of great value.
EDWARD.
Mighty well, you would look at the china.
EMILIA.
Do not scold me, I am so sorry; rather give me your advice.
EDWARD.
I can give you no advice; if you sought every where you could not
find such another jar to match the one which is left. Why did you
touch it? you must always be meddling, you are so curious.
EMILIA.
I will never be curious again, I assure you. I know I have done
wrong.
EDWARD.
Now hear me, do not cry; I will tell you what you may do. Nobody
has heard it, we will take the pieces and put them together behind a
dish; and to-morrow, all of a sudden, you may say you have heard
something fall in the closet; then go and look, and Lady Grandison
will think the cat threw it down, or some other accident made it fall.
EMILIA.
No, Edward,—that I will never do; it would be much worse than
breaking it through idle curiosity.
EDWARD.
What will you do then? your mother will be displeased.
EMILIA.
I would sooner bear her displeasure a week, than tell such a
falsehood. Hear me, I will go to her, confess my fault; and indeed I
shall be more careful for the future.

She then ran trembling to her mother; but how was she
astonished, when the good Lady spoke kindly to her. If you had
broken all my china by accident, my child, I should not have chid
you; your foolish curiosity was blameable; but your attention to truth
has more than atoned for it: I find I can rely on your veracity. She
kissed her mother’s hand, and returned to tell us what had
happened. Edward looked ashamed, and said, he would never advise
such an artifice again, he should not like to deceive such a kind Lady,
or lose her good opinion. Charles could not help saying, when we tell
a lie we offer an affront to God. Dr. Bartlett often observes, he is ever
present, and abhors a liar.

WILLIAM.
 LETTER XLII.
William to his Mother.

Oh! my dear mother, we are all here full of anxiety; Charles, who
went very early this morning on horseback, with one of the servants,
to pay Mr. Friendly a visit, and promised to return early, is not yet
come home; and it is past nine o’clock. He was always punctual—
some misfortune must have befallen him.—I do not know what to
think, or fear. The night is very dark, and the weather stormy. Sir
Charles has just sent off a servant to obtain some information:—how
we all long for his return!
Eleven o’clock. The servant is come back; but no intelligence of
Charles. He left Mr. Friendly’s soon after dinner, about four o’clock.
Dear mother, where can he be? Drowned, I fear:—perhaps—perhaps
what? I am afraid even to write the strange thoughts and conjectures
which come into my head—I never seemed so much alive before, my
soul feels as if it would fly out of my body to search for Charles—dear
Charles! Lady Grandison sits silent; Emilia does nothing but cry; and
Edward runs through the house quite frantic: Sir Charles endeavours
to comfort his Lady, and has need of comfort himself. He has sent
several servants different ways, and waits impatiently for day-break,
when he intends going himself.—O that he would take me with him!
One o’clock, and no news of Charles. We are none of us in bed—
and indeed who could sleep! My eyes feel as if they would never close
again—I cannot cry.
Half after four. Thank Heaven—Charles is safe. The servant, who
attended him, is just arrived. It was not his fault, that we had so
much uneasiness; no pleasure—no company detained him.—But Sir
Charles insists on it, that we go to bed for a few hours. I cannot sleep,
though I must go to bed.—I do not want sleep, Charles is safe. Why
does my joy make me cry? I did not weep when I thought I should
never, O never see him more.—Well, I must go to this same bed.—
Good morning to you, Madam. I declare the birds are beginning to
sing—how can I sleep?

WILLIAM.
 LETTER XLIII.
William to his Mother.

Now you shall hear the servant’s account—I long to tell you all
about an affair, which is to clear my friend;—for a moment you must
not think ill of him.
Charles set out from Mr. Friendly’s soon after dinner, Harry, his
man, of course attended him. The weather had been all day lowering;
they quickened their pace; but such a thick mist arose gradually, they
could scarcely see two yards before them. Charles, though he is very
courageous, shewed some signs of fear, and they then rode slowly,
observing every step, when they saw at some little distance, a man
lying in the middle of the road. What is that? said Charles, holding-in
his horse. A man who has drank more than he ought, I suppose,
answered Harry. Pray, Sir, ride a little quicker, it grows late. No,
replied Charles, for if the man is drunk, we must endeavour to help
him out of the highway, or he may be rode over in the dark. Saying
so, he jumped off his horse: but how terrifying was the sight!—He
saw an old officer lying weltering in his blood. He spoke to him; but
received no answer. The gentleman is dead, cried Harry. No, no,
interrupted Charles, he has only fainted through loss of blood. What
shall we do? What can we do? replied Harry. Let us gallop on to the
first village to procure assistance. What, and leave the man bleeding,
said Charles, with warmth; he would die before we could even reach
the village.—Do you not see how he bleeds? Tie our horses fast to
that tree, and make haste to assist me, I must not let a man die
without doing my best to save him. He then pulled off his clothes,
and tore his shirt; and finding that the wound was in the head, he
wiped away the gore, and bound the linen round it; he did it several
times before he could stop the effusion. After the operation, they
lifted him cautiously, and laid him on the grass, near the road side.
Good heavens, said Harry, it begins to be quite dark, and the mist is
so thick, we shall never be able to find our way; and how uneasy they
will all be at home. O that is true, said Charles; come, let us go.—And
he advanced a step or two; but turning his eyes on the poor officer,
they filled with tears, and he stood thinking half a moment—and
then burst out.—No, I cannot, will not leave you in this condition; I
do not occasion the uneasiness my parents will feel to gratify myself;
I ought not to deliberate a moment: ride on directly to the next
village, or to the first cottage you spy, and prevail on some man to
return with you; and all together we may carry this poor man to a
shelter, and procure further help.
HARRY.
I dare not leave you here alone, your father would never forgive
me.
CHARLES.
Heaven will preserve me; and as to the blame, I will take care it
shall not fall on you. I tell you, if you will not go, I will go myself.

Harry did not wait to expostulate any more, but did as he was
ordered; and fortunately soon reached a little farm-house, which
they might have seen from the road, had it been a clear night. He
went in and told the case to the man who lived there, and begged him
and his son immediately to go with him. The farmer at first seemed
reluctant, he was tired, and just preparing to go to bed, after a hard
day’s work; but when Harry told him he should be well recompensed,
he fetched a sort of handbarrow, and laid a mattrass on it, and
followed to the place. Before they reached it, Charles had the
satisfaction to see the officer open his eyes, and come gradually to
himself; and looking wistfully at Charles, he said, falteringly, Who
are you, young man, who thus alone, this dismal night, supports my
wounded head? Did you bind this linen round my temples? I have
been so happy, replied Charles, as to arrive in time to be of service to
you; I had a servant with me, but I have sent him for further
assistance, that you may be removed to some house. What reflection,
what fortitude! faintly cried the weak man.—Do not exhaust yourself,
Sir, interrupted Charles; I have only done my duty—indeed my heart
bled for you, I could not have left you. Harry and the men that
moment joined them; they all assisted, and laid the officer on the
handbarrow; but the fatigue was too much for him, and he fainted
again through weakness. They walked very slow, and at length
brought him into the cottage; and Charles sent the farmer for a
surgeon. And what is now your intention? asked Harry. To stay here
this night, replied Charles; I cannot think of leaving this venerable
old man with strangers, who do not seem the most humane people in
the world. Do you hasten home, and tell them what has happened,
and then I shall wait with comfort till to-morrow, and see myself that
the poor man is properly attended—I will be his nurse. Harry was not
willing to leave him; but he spoke in such a positive tone of voice,
Harry thought it vain to attempt to dissuade him; so, much against
his inclination, he rode away; and would certainly have relieved us
soon from all our anxiety, if the thick fog, and his vexation together,
had not made him lose, or mistake the short by-road, which leads
directly through the wood to the house; he wandered about till the
first peep of dawn, and then entered the parlour trembling. We had
all our eyes and mouths open, ready to catch the news—and we
began to ask so many questions in a breath, Sir Charles was obliged
to command silence, that we might hear the account. He praised the
servant, gave him a guinea, and desired him to go to bed for an hour
or two, and then come to him, before he returned to his son, to
whom he would send a message, and some money to enable him to
pay the surgeon, and supply the wants of the invalide.
But how will the tender heart of my friend suffer, when he hears
what we have endured. Lady Grandison went to bed very ill; but, I
hope, she is now better; I have not seen her this morning. I long to
know if the poor officer is alive or dead.

WILLIAM.
 LETTER XLIV.
William to his Mother.

We have Charles here again, dear mother. O how rejoiced was I to

see him! The old officer is better, and we are all happy.
We sat down cheerfully this morning to breakfast, and did not then
expect to see him. Emilia saw him first, she flew from her chair; there
is my dear brother Charles! cried she, and ran to meet him as quick
as possible. They came into the house hand in hand; but Charles let
his sister’s hand go, as he entered the room, and ran to his father.—I
will relate the conversation word for word.
CHARLES.
Can you forgive me, dear father, for having caused you so much
uneasiness?
SIR CHARLES.
Let me embrace you—you are dearer to me than ever; our
uneasiness was not your fault, you have done your duty to your
fellow-creature without forgetting your parents. How is the
gentleman you have assisted?
CHARLES.
The officer is better, but still very weak.
LADY GRANDISON.
But, my dear, is he alone in that cottage? Will they take proper
care of him?
CHARLES.
 I have not left him alone with them, his own son is now with him.
As soon as the old gentleman recovered his recollection, he
mentioned his place of abode, which was not very distant. I sent to
inform his children of the accident; and his eldest son set off
immediately, and soon arrived at the cottage. When I had committed
him into the hands of his son, I was eager to return home to my
parents.
SIR CHARLES.
You were right, your presence was not then necessary; but has the
poor man means to provide himself with what is requisite in his weak
state?
CHARLES.
Yes, I enquired, and find he is in very good circumstances. Did I do
right, Sir? I only rewarded the farmer, and gave Harry a trifle: and
now I will return the remainder of the money you sent me.
SIR CHARLES.
You may keep it, and distribute it as you please. I am now treating
you like a friend—a man; I allow you to exercise, according to the
dictates of your own heart, the noblest priviledge of our nature, that
of doing good: and do it often in secret, let the plaudit of your own
heart, be your only recompense.
LADY GRANDISON.
How did you pass the night? Did you sleep at all?
CHARLES.
Believe me, I thought little of myself, I had before me a dying old
man—I could think of nothing else. I desired some clean straw to be
laid, near the sick man’s bed, but I made no use of it. My uneasiness
on your account, and my painful anxiety for the officer, banished
sleep from my eyes.
EMILIA.
Poor Charles, to be obliged to sleep on straw.
CHARLES.
 I should have slept on that as well as in my bed, if my heart had
been at ease.
SIR CHARLES.
Charles is right; it is peace of mind and health of body which
procures that refreshing sleep so necessary to recruit our exhausted
powers. The softest bed will not afford rest to a troubled mind, or a
disordered body.
EDWARD.
Who knows, when I am in the army, how many nights I may be
obliged to sleep on the ground, without even the straw Emilia
despises.
SIR CHARLES.
That may happen; and before young people make choice of a
profession, they should arm themselves against the inconveniences,
which consequently attend it: always remembering, that every state
of life has its pains and pleasures. Every station is eligible, and will
afford us heart-felt joy, if we fill it conscientiously: it is about our
conduct, not our situation, that we should bestow most thought; and
be more anxious to avoid evil than pain.
EDWARD.
I dare say, the king himself has his cares and sorrows as well as the
meanest of his subjects.
SIR CHARLES.
Certainly. He is a man, none are exempt; God is no respecter of
persons; they please him, who do good, and attend to truth: it
matters not whether it be in a palace, or a mud hovel.

When we were alone, Charles said, I knew my father would not be

displeased with me; yet if it had been possible, I wished not only to
have spared him the anxiety my absence occasioned, but to have
asked his advice. I followed the impulse of my heart—yet I do it with
more pleasure, when his sanction assures me my feelings do not lead
my reason astray.
WILLIAM.
 LETTER XLV.
William to his Mother.

I have another proof to give you, my honoured mother, of the

goodness of heart Charles continually exhibits. A gentleman, who
visits very frequently this family, made him a present of a beautiful
spaniel; young Falkland, our neighbour, had often asked for it; but
the gentleman refused to give him it, because he treats his own dogs
cruelly. You must know, Falkland has already five dogs, besides cats,
pigeons, and a parrot. These afford him his chief employment; not to
make them happy, but to please himself. Though he has so many, he
was very much vexed that he could not get this dog. And what do you
think happened? The dog died suddenly, and we have by chance
discovered that Falkland made one of his servants poison the poor
animal.—What monsters there are in the world! Yes, he must be a
monster, I think, who deprives another of a pleasure when he
receives no benefit from it himself. But the following conversation,
when we were walking in the garden, soon after the discovery, will let
you see how Charles behaves, even when he is angry.
WILLIAM.
I cannot help grieving about the poor dog.
CHARLES.
I acknowledge I am very sorry; I did not think that the loss of a dog
would have affected me in such a manner;—but it was a very faithful
one—and then the horrid agonies it endured—I cannot forget its
groans.
EDWARD.
It was a villainous action of Falkland to destroy that poor beast in
such a manner.—If it had happened to me, I could never forgive him.
 CHARLES.
I can.—If I could not forgive him, I should be as wicked as himself.
EDWARD.
You are too good. I, for my part, hate him.
CHARLES.
I do not hate him, but I despise his vices;—and I pity him, for it is
much to be feared he will become a bad man; an envious cruel heart
seldom reforms itself, Dr. Bartlett says.
EDWARD.
Yesterday you called that treacherous fellow friend;—you see you
are sometimes mistaken.
CHARLES.
I am apt to be mistaken in this particular; it is so pleasant to love
and think well of people.
EDWARD.
But will you any longer keep up the acquaintance?
CHARLES.
No, certainly, without my father desires it; I should with difficulty
conceal my dislike—it was such a mean action.
EDWARD.
Bravo! Now you speak to my mind; and, if you like it, I will give
him a good drubbing.—Say yes, and I will make his bones ache.
CHARLES.
That would not give me back my poor dog.
EDWARD.
I will tell you what—he has five dogs, let us poison some of them;
that he deserves at least.
CHARLES.
But those poor dogs—what have they done?
 EDWARD.
I am curious to know, what my uncle will say of this pretty trick; he
has always spoken slightingly of young Falkland.
CHARLES.
That is a sign he could penetrate into his mind, and saw his bad
temper. I will, in future, pay more attention to his advice, and
observations on characters. But now I think of it, Edward, we will not
tell my father that Falkland poisoned my dog. Let us try to make him
feel ashamed, by shewing him we despise revenge—I should like to
mortify him this way.
WILLIAM.
You are very generous.
CHARLES.
Let us talk of something else—my dog is dead, I will try to make
myself easy—I wish I could forget the torments it endured.—It is a
very fine evening.
EDWARD.
Look, look! What do I see yonder in that tree?
WILLIAM.
It is a parrot.
EDWARD.
How fortunate!—It is Falkland’s parrot; it has flown away from
him, and perched itself there: it looks frightened. How vexed he will
be—he should not have that creature again for ten guineas.
CHARLES.
How the poor creature trembles.—I can climb softly up the tree
and catch it;—do not make a noise.
EDWARD.
And so you will send it to Falkland again, to please him.
CHARLES.
 No, for something else.
EDWARD.
He has killed your dog, and you will allow his favourite parrot to
live when it is in your power. I think it mean-spirited.—Can you have
a better opportunity to revenge yourself on that rascal?
CHARLES.
Yes, I can take a more noble revenge; by returning good for evil, I
shall let him see how much I am his superior: and that will highly
gratify me.

Immediately Charles mounted the tree, and caught the bird, whose
feet were entangled in the branches. He then sent it by a servant to
Falkland—and returned to us with a smiling face; I hardly ever saw
so much satisfaction in his countenance: and when Edward still
continued to laugh at him, he replied, I felt pleasure in returning
good for evil, my pride impelled me to act thus, as well as a sense of
duty; I do not pretend to any great merit in conquering one feeling to
gratify another, but I should have been inexcusable if I had
tormented an innocent helpless bird, merely to vex a being I despise.
Nay, my anger would have been mean and selfish; I should only
resent the loss of my dog, and not feel indignation on account of the
vices this loss has forced me to discover in a character I was partial
to. I shall forget my dog, long before I shall be able to drive from my
remembrance a cruel action done by a fellow-creature. Charles
looked teased, and Edward ceased to blame him,—and I tried to
amuse him.

WILLIAM.