(1) If there were an abstract idea of existence, then one could conceive of sensible objects existing

distinct from being perceived. (2) But, it is not possible for sensible objects to exist distinct from their
being perceived. (This is the esse is percipt principle). (3) If it is not possible for two things to exist
separately in reality, then one cannot separate those things in thought (in idea) or conceive them
separately. (the general principle) (4) Therefore, one cannot separate in thought (in idea) sensible
objects from their being perceived, or conceive sensible objects separately from their being perceived.
(from 2 and 3) (5) Therefore, there could be no abstract idea of existence. (from 1 and 4) This is
admittedly a reconstructed argument. Only some of its elements are clearly in the text of Principles 5
(steps 2, 3 and 4), while the first premise is just barely suggested by Berkeley’s comments. He does not
actually talk of an abstract idea of existence in this passage; instead, he speaks of distinguishing the
existence of sensible objects from being perceived and achieving this by abstraction. What is unstated is
that in making this distinction one would be entertaining an abstract idea of existence. Still, it is not
unreasonable to read the passage this way, i.e., as committing Berkeley to premise (1). However, there
are two good reasons fo believe that this is not Berkeley’s argument against the abstract idea of
existence. The first is that premise (1) will not suffice as it stands, because its antecedent is incomplete.
To accomplish the relevant conception, one would need both the abstract idea of existence and the
abstract idea of some sensible object, e.g., a chair. This means that the premise needs to be understood
as, (1a) If there were an abstract idea of existence and abstract ideas of sensible objects, then one could
conceive of sensible objects existing unperceived. However, with this change in the first premise, the
conclusion of the argument must likewise change to, (5a) There could not be both an abstract idea of
existence and abstract ideas of sensible objects. Of course, this conclusion only allows us to infer that
either there are no abstract ideas of sensible objects, or there is no abstract idea of existence. It does
not tell us which we are entitled to reject. Another independent reason to think we have not uncovered
the argument against the abstract idea of existence is that it would come close to yielding
straightforward circularity when coupled with what Berkeley tells us in the so-called master argument.
We can see the point here by just noting one crucial element of the master argument, reserving a fuller
dis- Abstract Ideas 67 cussion until chapter 5. Berkeley presents the master argument in the form of a
challenge. In the Principles it is put this way: ... lam content to put the whole upon this issue; if you can
but conceive it possible for one extended moveable substance, or in general, for any one idea or any
thing like an idea, to exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it, I shall readily give up the cause. He
goes on to note that one cannot succeed in meeting this challenge. In trying to do this one has some
ideas of objects, but Berkeley notes, in Principles 22-23. it only shows you have the power of imagining
or forming ideas in your mind; but it doth not show that you can conceive it possible, the objects of your
thought may exist without the mind: to make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing
unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy. (Berkeley 1948-57, 2:50) A similar
challenge is put in the Three Dialogues: But (to pass by all that hath been hitherto said, and reckon it for
nothing, if you will have it so) Iam content to put the whole upon this issue. If you can conceive it
possible for any mixture or combination of qualities, or any sensible object whatever, to exist without
the mind, then I will grant it actually to be so. Hylas rises to this challenge and tries to engage in this very
conceiving, to which Philonous responds, Is it not...a contradiction to talk of conceiving a thing which is
unconceived? (Berkeley 1948-57, 2:200) In both of these passages, Berkeley is saying that if one can
conceive sensible objects existing without the mind, then he is willing to concede that the esse is percipi
thesis is false. It is this action that he says one cannot perform. The important point is this: if there were
abstract ideas of sensible objects, and also an abstract idea of existence, then one could successfully
carry out this conceiving. This is precisely what premise (1a) asserts. Hence, in the master argument
itself, Berkeley must be assuming that there are no abstract ideas of either existence or of sensible
objects. If in the master argument he were assuming that there is no abstract idea of existence, then
circularity would be patent when the master argument is put 68 Berkeley’s Thought along side the
supposed argument against the abstract idea of existence we have located in Principles 5. Now the
absence of either the abstract idea of existence, or abstract ideas of sensible objects, would be enough
to block being able to conceive a sensible object existing unperceived. So, in the master argument
Berkeley does not need to assume that neither sort of abstract idea exists, only that one or the other
does not. We cannot decide which he is assuming not to exist when he gives the master argument,
because he does not tell us. What we can say is that if Berkeley assumes, in the master argument, that
there is no abstract idea of existence, as he well might be doing, then circularity will arise if he also
argues against such an abstract idea by using the esse is percipi thesis as an assumed premise. It is
possible, of course, that Berkeley has no argument against the abstract idea of existence at all. Perhaps
he simply takes it for granted that an idea like that does not exist, and maybe he supposes this is
obvious. This would be atypical of Berkeley, since on important points he generally has one or more
arguments that he provides in favor of his position. | think Berkeley has an argument against this
abstract idea, but one he does not highlight. This argument, to be discussed more fully in the next
chapter, can be briefly indicated here. It takes its start from Philosophical Commentaries 670 and 671:
Strange it is that Men should be at a loss to find their Idea of Existence since that (if such there be
distinct from Perception) it is brought into the mind by all the Ways of Sensation & Reflection; methi