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Japan and the Shaping of
Post-Vietnam War Southeast Asia
The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978 and the consequent outbreak of

the Cambodian conflict brought Southeast Asia into instability and deteriorated
relations between Vietnam and the subsequently established Vietnam-backed
government in Cambodia on the one hand and the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries on the other. As a result of the conflict, the
Soviet Union established a foothold in Southeast Asia while China, through its
support of the anti-Vietnam Cambodian resistance, improved relations with
Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand. Japan’s Fukuda Doctrine – its
declared priorities of promoting cooperative and friendly relations between
Communist Indochinese nations and non-Communist ASEAN countries –
became increasingly at odds with Japan’s role as a member of the Free World in
the broader Cold War confrontation. Tokyo had to steer a path between Wash-
ington’s hard-line policy of isolating Vietnam and its own desire to prevent
regional destabilization.
Against this background, this book addresses the following questions: what
was Japan’s response to the challenges to its objectives and interests in South-
east Asia and to the Fukuda Doctrine? What role did Japan play for the settle-
ment of the conflict in Cambodia? How did Japan’s diplomacy on the
Cambodian problem affect the Japanese role in the region? It argues that Japan’s
contribution was more active than has widely been recognized.
Andrea Pressello is Assistant Professor at the National Graduate Institute for

Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan.
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Edited by Jason Lim and Terence Lee Japan and the Shaping of
Post-Vietnam War Southeast Asia
Political Survival and Yasukuni in Japanese Diplomacy and the
Japan’s Relations with China Cambodian Conflict, 1978–1993
Mong Cheung Andrea Pressello
Japan and the Shaping of
Post-Vietnam War
Southeast Asia
Japanese Diplomacy and the
Cambodian Conflict, 1978–1993
Andrea Pressello
First published 2018
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
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Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2018 Andrea Pressello
The right of Andrea Pressello to be identified as author of this work has
been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
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any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing
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Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
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without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Names: Pressello, Andrea, author.
Title: Japan and the shaping of post-Vietnam War Southeast Asia :
Japanese
diplomacy and the Cambodian conflict, 1978–1993 / Andrea Pressello.
Description: New York : Routledge, 2018. | Series: Politics in Asia series |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2017011433| ISBN 9781138200234 (hardback) |
ISBN 9781315514932 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Japan–Foreign relations–Southeast Asia. | Southeast
Asia–Foreign relations–Japan. | Cambodian-Vietnamese Conflict,
1977–1991–Peace.
Classification: LCC DS525.9.J3 P74 2018 | DDC 959.604/2–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017011433
ISBN: 978-1-138-20023-4 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-315-51493-2 (ebk)
Typeset in Galliard
by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear
Contents
Acknowledgments vi
Introduction: regional conflict, Cold War, and Japan’s

Southeast Asia policy 1
1 Southeast Asia in Japan’s postwar foreign policy,

1950s–1960s 8
2 US “exit” and Japanese “entry”: post-Vietnam War

Southeast Asia and the Fukuda Doctrine, 1969–1977 44
3 The Cambodian conflict and the polarization of

Southeast Asia: Japan’s response, 1978–1980 91
4 New Cold War and Japan’s pursuit of its regional agenda,

1981–1982 131
5 The unfolding of Japan’s “twin-track” diplomacy in

Southeast Asia, 1983–1984 157
6 Changing Cold War environment and the intensification

of Japan’s peace diplomacy, 1985–1988 183
7 The Cambodian peace process and the shaping of

post-Cold War Southeast Asia: Japan’s role, 1989–1993 215
Conclusion 245
Index 255
Acknowledgments
This book draws largely from the research I carried out as a doctoral student in
the Security and International Studies Program at the National Graduate Insti-
tute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Tokyo. I am highly grateful to Professors
Iwama Yoko, Michishita Narushige, Miyagi Taizō, and Nobori Amiko for their
valuable guidance and comments on my research. My gratitude goes also to the
anonymous reviewers for their useful inputs and suggestions. Professor Sudō
Sueo’s comments on part of my research at the 2011 Annual Convention of the
Japan Association of International Relations have also been important for the
realization of this work. Finally, I am indebted to the several diplomats, officials,
politicians, and scholars who, both in Japan and overseas, have patiently
answered my questions and shared their experiences and inspiring insights
with me. I am solely responsible for the analyses and any factual errors of this
book.
This book is derived in part from articles published in Japanese Studies on
March 31, 2014 (available online: www.tandfonline.com/ http://dx.doi.org/
10.1080/10371397.2014.886506), in Japan Forum on July 1, 2013 (available
online: www.tandfonline.com/ http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09555803.2013.8
02368), and in Asian Studies Review on March 5, 2013 (available online: www.
tandfonline.com/ http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2012.760531).
In this book, Japanese names are written according to the Japanese system of
first indicating the last name and then the given name. The only exceptions are
in the footnotes. The sources in Japanese language used in this book have been
translated in English by the author.
Introduction
Regional conflict, Cold War, and Japan’s
Southeast Asia policy
The objective of this book is to clarify Japan’s role in the shaping of the post-
Vietnam War order in Southeast Asia by examining its diplomacy on the Cam-
bodian conflict (1978–1993), the main source of regional instability in those
years. In the period after World War II, the Japanese considered Southeast Asia1
to be important in the process of rebuilding their economy and international
role. The fact that Japan did not have diplomatic relations with the People’s
Republic of China until the early 1970s and had a difficult relationship with the
Korean Peninsula increased the importance of Southeast Asian countries for the
Japanese. This region’s natural resources and markets were deemed attractive in
Japan. When Tokyo began to provide official development assistance (ODA), a
large part of it – as well as increasingly of Japanese trade and investments – went
to Southeast Asia. During the 1970s, a growingly confident Japan, whose
economy had by then become the second largest in the Free World, looked at
Southeast Asia also as instrumental to enhance its international role by acting as
a sort of “representative” of this region in the developed world. The fact that
vital sea routes, through which oil from the Middle East was shipped to
resource-scant Japan, were located in proximity of Southeast Asian waters
further increased the strategic importance of this region, especially in the after-
math of the first oil shock of 1973. Realizing peace and stability in Southeast
Asia became, therefore, one of the important issues for Japan’s foreign policy.
However, the fluid regional environment during the 1970s complicated the
realization of such an objective. The end of the war in Vietnam brought signi-
ficant changes in Southeast Asia. A division was consolidated between the non-
communist countries of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) on
the one hand – which, during the 1970s, included Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand – and, on the other, the Indochinese com-
munist regimes of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. After the rather traumatic
experience of its participation in the Vietnamese conflict, the United States
reduced its involvement and military presence in the region. This created room
for the Soviet Union and China to increase their influence in Southeast Asia, a
scenario that the Japanese expected to have adverse implications for Southeast
Asia’s stability and for Tokyo’s interests in that region. With one of the driving
forces being the objective of stopping such a scenario from materializing, Japan
2 Introduction
intensified efforts to promote development in Southeast Asia and cooperative
and friendly relations between Indochinese and ASEAN countries; this was
expected to strengthen their resilience and make them less vulnerable to exter-
nal sources of destabilization. These objectives were central in the policy toward
Southeast Asia that Japan formulated during the 1970s. One of its major articu-
lations was contained in the speech that Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo delivered
in Manila in August 1977, which became known as the Fukuda Doctrine. He
made clear that Japan had no ambition to become a military power, and that it
desired positive relations with Southeast Asian nations based on mutual trust
and understanding. The third pillar of the speech enunciated Japan’s commit-
ment to help realize peace and prosperity in Southeast Asia by supporting the
development of the ASEAN countries and the establishment of peaceful and
cooperative relations between them and the communist states of Indochina.
The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978 and the consequent outbreak
of the Cambodian conflict brought Southeast Asia back into instability and
deteriorated relations between Vietnam (and the newly established Vietnam-
backed government in Cambodia) and ASEAN countries. As a result of the con-
flict, the Soviet Union established a foothold in Southeast Asia by obtaining
access to Vietnamese military bases. China supported the communist Khmer
Rouge (the largest among the anti-Vietnam Cambodian resistance groups) and
their leader, Pol Pot. It especially improved relations with Thailand, the country
most exposed to the effects of the Cambodian conflict and through whose ter-
ritory Chinese aid was allegedly provided to the Khmer Rouge. The Soviet
Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 significantly heightened the Cold War
tension, marking the beginning of the so-called New Cold War. In Southeast
Asia, the result was the deepening of divisions between, on the one hand, coun-
tries that opposed the Soviet-backed Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia – includ-
ing the United States, China, and the ASEAN nations – and, on the other hand,
the Soviet Union and Vietnam. The Cambodian conflict and the invasion of
Afghanistan complicated Japan’s implementation of the Fukuda Doctrine in that
they enlarged the division between ASEAN and Indochinese countries – espe-
cially Vietnam – and, at the same time, created an incongruity between the doc-
trine’s third pillar and Japan’s role as a member of the Free World in the broader
Cold War confrontation. Against this background, this book addresses the fol-
lowing questions: what was Japan’s response to these challenges to its objectives
and interests in Southeast Asia and to the Fukuda Doctrine? What role did
Japan play for the settlement of the conflict in Cambodia? How did Japan’s
diplomacy on the Cambodian problem affect the Japanese role in the region?
A case of passive diplomacy?

It is argued in the literature that, as a result of the Cambodian conflict and of
the New Cold War, Japan – in line with its being a member of the Free World –
gave up the pursuit of the Fukuda Doctrine and of bridging efforts between the
ASEAN countries and Indochina. Therefore, the argument goes, Japan put on
Introduction 3
hold its active diplomacy and its search for a larger political role in the region
until the late 1980s, when the waning of the Cold War created the conditions
for a Japanese involvement in the Cambodian peace process after 1989. In his
important work, Wakatsuki Hidekazu argues that after the Soviets invaded
Afghanistan, Japan abandoned its Southeast Asia policy based on the Fukuda
Doctrine, which had become inoperable following the outbreak of the Cambo-
dian conflict.2 With Foreign Minister Sonoda Sunao leaving office in late 1979,
with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and with the Iran hostage crisis, Prime
Minister Ōhira Masayoshi’s policy toward Vietnam changed and became firmer.3
Despite initial attempts to maintain in existence the Fukuda Doctrine, the argu-
ment goes, during 1980, Japan eventually took a firm stance as “a member of
the West,” especially under Prime Minister Ōhira and Foreign Minister Itō. In
this context, the third principle of the Fukuda Doctrine became inoperable, and
the age of Japan’s omnidirectional foreign policy ended.4 Hence, Wakatsuki
points out that, from that moment, Japan concentrated on its status as a
“member of the West” and, especially under Foreign Minister Itō, actively
backed ASEAN and China’s hostile stance against Vietnam, leading to the dete-
rioration of Tokyo’s Southeast Asia policy and to the shelving of the Fukuda
Doctrine’s third principle.5 Consequently, Japan abandoned the policy of main-
taining a “dialogue pipe” with Vietnam, strongly criticized Hanoi, and sup-
ported the Khmer Rouge’s hold on the Cambodian seat at the United Nations
(UN).6 Thus, by shifting to a firm posture as a “member of the West,” Japan
gave up attempts to pursue an independent political role based on preserving a
free hand in its diplomacy.7 In the words of international relations scholar Sudō
Sueo, by 1980, “Japan’s Southeast Asian policy, which had been centered on
aid to Vietnam, had lost its direction,” as the outbreak of the Cambodian con-
flict “resulted in the termination of Tokyo’s pursuit of a political role” and in
the failure of “the policy of urging coexistence.”8 Under Prime Minister Ōhira
and Foreign Minister Itō, Japan shifted toward a foreign policy as a “member of
the West,” thereby abandoning its independent diplomacy and dialogue with
Vietnam.9 Sudō claims that, despite Foreign Ministers Sonoda Sunao and Abe
Shintarō’s proposals on the Cambodian problem, respectively, in 1981 and
1984, Japan supported the ASEAN’s anti-Vietnam stance by suspending aid and
aligning with “a policy of isolating Vietnam in every possible way [which] has
been formulated as an implicit ‘consensus’ among ASEAN, China, the United
States and Japan.” Hence, “politically, Japan’s role in promoting a solution to
the Kampuchean issue has been minimal, going little beyond the promise of
aiding the post-settlement reconstruction of the Indochinese states.”10
As a result of the tendency in the literature to consider Japan’s pursuit of the
Fukuda Doctrine as having ended by around 1980 and, accordingly, to regard
the Japanese diplomacy on the Cambodian problem as passive, previous studies
claim that Japan’s active contribution to peace efforts in Cambodia began only
several years later, when Japan restarted actively pursuing the Fukuda Doctrine
and playing a political role to stabilize and integrate Southeast Asia. Indeed,
Japan’s initial involvement in efforts to settle the Cambodian conflict has been
4 Introduction
traced to the late 1980s,11 when Japan departed from the passive diplomacy
efforts12 with respect to Cambodia that it had followed since the conflict began
and that were limited to supporting the ASEAN stance.13 On this, Tomoda Seki
argues that, between 1979 and 1988, “Japan pursued no independent peace
initiatives, simply conforming to the Cambodian policy of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations.”14 It was only in the period 1988–1990 that “Japan
began to formulate its own peace initiative toward Cambodia,” abandoning its
line of “strict conformity” with ASEAN’s stance. In particular, the Cambodian
peace process from the late 1980s “was the first occasion on which Japan clearly
and deliberately attempted to play a political role in Asian affairs.”15 For
Tomoda, facilitated by international political changes that created more favor-
able conditions for a settlement of the conflict, beginning in 1988, “Japan aban-
doned its policy of rigid conformity to the ASEAN position and began to search
for an independent solution.” This marked one response to international pres-
sure on Japan to shoulder more of the burden of world affairs.16 Other scholars
contend that “[t]he initial Japanese interest in the Cambodian settlement was
made public in August 1988 when the Japanese government invited Prince Sih-
anouk to Tokyo and at the Paris International Conference in the summer of
1989.”17 Along similar lines, Hirata Keiko maintains that the Fukuda Doctrine
“withered in the 1980s due to US pressure on Japan to curtail contacts with
Vietnam in the midst of heightened Cold War tension.” Therefore, it was only
in August 1988 when it invited Sihanouk to Tokyo that Japan first indicated its
interest in the Cambodian peace process.18 Takeda Yasuhiro claims that it was
after Prime Minister Takeshita’s announcement in May 1988 of the Inter-
national Cooperation Initiative (which proclaimed Japan’s willingness to con-
tribute more to the world including to conflict resolution) that “Japan
embarked on direct engagement in the Cambodian peace process […].”19 To
sum up, a recurrent argument in the literature is that Japan’s active involvement
in efforts to end the Cambodian conflict and, thereby, to play a political role in
the region, only began in the late 1980s when the peace process eventually
materialized.
Reinterpreting Japan’s Southeast Asia diplomacy after the

Vietnam War
Drawing from declassified documents (including newly released ones), inter-
views, and other primary sources, this book suggests a different interpretation of
historical facts and argues that, despite the heightening of regional and global
tension after 1979, Japan continued to pursue its agenda in Southeast Asia. It
did so even though some aspects of its diplomacy were at odds with the US
stance, hence showing determination to pursue a more independent foreign
policy in the region. On the one hand, Japan acted as a member of the Free
World by applying sanctions against the Soviet Union for its intervention in
Afghanistan, providing strategic economic aid, and condemning the Vietnamese
invasion of Cambodia. On the other hand, the Japanese continued to engage
Introduction 5
with Soviet-backed Vietnam in an effort to reduce the distance between ASEAN
countries and Hanoi on the Cambodian conflict and, ultimately, to resume
regional peace and stability. In other words, the Japanese strove to pursue their
regional policy within the framework of the Fukuda Doctrine rather than by
adopting a diplomacy merely aligned to the US Cold War strategy. By shedding
light on these aspects of Japanese diplomacy especially in the period of the New
Cold War – on which little has been previously written considering that, when
discussing Japan’s role on the Cambodian problem, the recurrent focus in the
literature is on Tokyo’s role in the peace process after 1989 – this book also
suggests a new interpretation of Japan’s diplomatic role in the Cambodian
problem. In contrast to claims in the literature that Japan became involved in
efforts to settle the Cambodian conflict only when the peace process began
in the late 1980s, this book demonstrates that Japan’s role to resume peace in
Cambodia and stability in the whole of Southeast Asia actually began when the
conflict broke out at the end of the 1970s. In fact, one of the central arguments
of this book is that Japan’s active involvement in the peace process after 1989
represented the culmination of a decade-long diplomatic endeavor rather than
simply the result of a reaction to external circumstances such as, for example,
the more favorable international environment.
Sources and structure

As mentioned above, this book, in which events are examined with an historical
approach, is based mainly on primary sources. Among them, declassified docu-
ments (including from Japanese, American, and Australian archives) have largely
been used. Other primary sources, such as oral histories, memoirs, speeches,
statements, and other official documents, as well as interviews conducted by the
author with relevant individuals involved in the matters discussed in this volume,
have also been used. In addition to sources related to Japanese prime ministers
and other decision-makers and actors in Japan and abroad, particular attention
has been given to archival materials from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(hereafter MOFA) – several of which have been obtained by the author through
the Information Disclosure Law. This reflects the central role played by MOFA –
and, within it, particularly by the traditionally independent-minded Asia Affairs
Bureau (hereafter Asia Bureau) and its various sections such as the First South-
east Asia Division, the Regional Policy Division, etc. – in Japanese policymaking
on Southeast Asia in the period under examination. The large role played by
MOFA can be explained also by considering that, for large parts of the period
discussed in this book, the interest of the Japanese political community in the
Southeast Asian developments remained relatively limited.20 Such interest
increased with Japan’s involvement in the Cambodian peace process from the
late 1980s and, in particular, with the participation of the Japanese Self-Defense
Forces in the UN peacekeeping operation in Cambodia in 1992–1993.
The volume is organized in a chronological way. The first chapter provides
an overview of Japan’s policy toward Southeast Asia in the 1950s and 1960s.
6 Introduction
This is a necessary background to have a better understanding of the origins of
Japan’s approach, objectives, and issues in relation to this region. The second
chapter discusses the process that, during the 1970s, led to the formulation of
Japan’s new approach toward the region and to the Fukuda Doctrine. Chapters
3, 4, and 5 examine how, between the late 1970s and the first half of the 1980s,
Japan responded to the challenges to Southeast Asia’s stability brought by the
Cambodian conflict and the heightening of Cold War tension. The significant
changes to the international environment stimulated by the new Soviet course
under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev and their impact on the Southeast
Asia situations and on Japan’s regional diplomacy are discussed in Chapter 6.
Finally, the period between 1989 and the early 1990s, characterized by the end
of the Cold War and the materialization of the Cambodian peace process, is
examined in the last chapter, followed by a section with concluding remarks.
Notes
1 In this study, the term Southeast Asia refers to the region including what are the
current member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
namely, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Sin-
gapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
2 Hidekazu Wakatsuki, “Zenhōi Gaikō” no jidai: reisen henyōki no Nihon to Ajia
1971–80nen (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyōronsha, 2006), 296, 305, 307. See also: Yoshi-
hide Soeya, “Vietnam in Japan’s Regional Policy,” in Vietnam Joins the World, James W.
Morley and Masashi Nishihara eds., (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 181–182.
3 Wakatsuki, “Zenhōi Gaikō” no jidai, 283.
4 Ibid., 307.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., 334. On similar lines, Soeya Yoshihide pointed out that, with the Vietnamese
invasion of Cambodia and the Chinese attack against Vietnam in 1979, “the founda-
tions of Japan’s omnidirectional diplomacy and the Fukuda Doctrine were destroyed.”
Following the invasion of Afghanistan, “the Fukuda Doctrine became inoperable”
because the international opposition to the Moscow–Hanoi alliance became “unequi-
vocal.” Soeya, “Vietnam in Japan’s Regional Policy,” 181–182.
7 Wakatsuki, “Zenhōi Gaikō” no jidai, 339.
8 Sueo Sudō, “The road to becoming a regional leader: Japanese attempts in Southeast
Asia, 1975–1980,” Pacific Affairs, 61:1 (Spring 1988): 27, 46, 49. See also: Sueo
Sudō, The Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN: New Dimensions in Japanese Foreign Policy
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992), 205.
9 Wakatsuki, “Zenhōi Gaikō” no jidai, 334, 338–339.
10 Sueo Sudō, “From Fukuda to Takeshita. A decade of Japan–ASEAN relations,” Con-
temporary Southeast Asia 10(2), (September 1988): 119, 137.
11 Seki Tomoda, “Japan’s search for a political role in Asia: the Cambodian peace settle-
ment,” Japan Review of International Affairs (Spring, 1992): 46–47; Soeya,
“Vietnam in Japan’s Regional Policy,” 187; Yasuhiro Takeda, “Japan’s role in the
Cambodian peace process: diplomacy, manpower, and finance,” Asian Survey, 38(6)
(1998): 554.
12 Yukio Imagawa, Cambodia and Japan, trans. S. M. Mahiwo, ed. M. R. Espinas
(Quezon City: ReadySet Corporation, 2008), 63.
13 Tomoda, “Japan’s search for a political role,” 44, 46; Masaharu Kōno, Heiwa kōsaku:
Tai Kanbojia gaikō no shōgen (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1999), 24.
14 Tomoda, “Japan’s search for a political role,” 44.
Introduction 7
15 Ibid., 43.
16 Ibid., 46.
17 Soeya, “Vietnam in Japan’s Regional Policy,” 187.
18 Keiko Hirata, “Reaction and action: analyzing Japan’s relations with the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam,” in Japan and East Asian regionalism, Javed S. Maswood, ed.
(London, New York: Routledge, 2001), 107–108, 113.
19 Takeda, “Japan’s role in the Cambodian peace process,” 554.
20 A research conducted by the author on the number of sessions in the Japanese Diet
(Lower House, Upper House, and joint sessions) in which, between 1979 and 1993,
the Cambodian situation was discussed, has revealed that, in the three years between
1979 and 1981 (corresponding to the initial phases of the conflict and of the refugee
crisis) there were respectively 44, 62, and 64 sessions in which the Cambodian
problem was discussed. After that, the number halved. From 1988, the number
started to grow again, with 45 sessions, and the peak was in 1993 (the year in which
two Japanese citizens involved in the UN peacekeeping operation in Cambodia were
killed and in which the first post-conflict free elections were held in Cambodia), when
the number of sessions reached 192. The research has been carried out through the
database of the National Diet Library of Japan available at http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp.
1 Southeast Asia in Japan’s
postwar foreign policy,
1950s–1960s
Japan’s postwar economic recovery and Southeast Asia: the

Yoshida administration
In November 1954, Yoshida Shigeru, who served as Japanese prime minister
from 1946 to 1947 and again from 1948 to 1954, wrote that “Japan’s own
existence […] depends on the economic development of, and the maintenance
of stability in, the Southeast Asian countries.”1 Why did the Japanese prime
minister put so much emphasis on the importance of this region for Japan?
Before this question is addressed in the following sections, it is necessary to
briefly mention the role of Japan in Southeast Asia during the Pacific War. One
of the factors that escalated tension between Japan and the United States and
that led to the outbreak of war between them in December 1941, was Japan’s
decision to move southward in order to ensure access to oil reserves in the
Dutch East Indies (today’s Indonesia). After Japan’s occupation of the whole of
French Indochina in the summer of 1941, the United States, which was the
main supplier of oil to Japan, joined hands with Britain and the Netherlands to
impose a total oil embargo on Japan. Gaining access to Southeast Asian oil and
raw materials, which were crucial for the continuation of Japan’s industrial pro-
duction in support of the Japanese war effort, became a main and vital goal for
Imperial Japan. However, an expansion into Southeast Asia meant war, in the
first place, with the United States and Britain. As the Japanese carried out the
Pearl Harbor attack on the United States on December 7, 1941, they rapidly
took control of Southeast Asian territories. Two observations can be made
about Japan’s military invasion of this region during the Pacific War. First, it
shows the strategic value that Southeast Asia had for Japan. Second, the legacy
of the suffering and damages provoked in this region by the Japanese military
was to affect Japan’s postwar relations with Southeast Asia as well as Tokyo’s
diplomatic posture and policies, resulting in the Japanese adoption of an often-
cautious approach when dealing with the region. After the end of the Pacific
War, Southeast Asia re-emerged in Japanese and American planning for Japan’s
recovery. The victory of Maoist forces in China led, in 1949, to the formation
of the People’s Republic of China. In the context of the intensification of the
Cold War confrontation in Asia, the establishment of a communist regime in
Japan’s Southeast Asia policy, 1950s–1960s 9
China complicated the future of Japanese relations with that country. In fact,
under pressure from the United States, in April 1952, Japan signed a treaty of
peace with the nationalist government of the Republic of China. This move pre-
cluded the establishment of relations between Japan and the People’s Republic
of China. It also meant that Japan lost access to mainland China’s markets and
natural resources from which it had benefited until the end of war.
It is in this context that, after the end of the war, the importance of South-
east Asia for Japan once again grew and this region was identified as a replace-
ment for Chinese markets and natural resources. Prime Minister Yoshida
Shigeru had a clear idea of how Southeast Asia fitted in Japan’s postwar
recovery. In a speech he gave in November 1954 in Washington, he pointed
out that Japan largely linked its economic recovery to the development of
cooperative relations with Asia – and in particular with Southeast Asia. He
explained that, “[a]s an island nation, entirely dependent on trade, Japan knows
she cannot survive unless the free nations of the Asian community also survive,
and unless there is free trade and friendly cooperation among us.” However,
because of the unavailability of trade with China, “in order to be self-supporting,
Japan must develop its trade with Southeast Asia.”2 He later elaborated on this
point asserting that “[w]e had lost through the war our sources of raw materials
in Manchuria, Korea and elsewhere, and it was my wish to see the loss replaced
by closer economic relations with the countries of Southeast Asia.” Indeed, as
Yoshida made clear, “[i]t has been my conviction that the economic future of
Japan lies in the expansion of trade with the countries of Southeast Asia.”3
The Japanese MOFA shared Yoshida’s views. In May 1954, MOFA made the
point that considering the scarcity of natural resources in Japan, the country had
no choice but to import raw materials and food; finding markets for Japanese
products was also imperative for the survival of the country. However, as
observed by MOFA, Japan had lost “her once tight hold on China” and was
“no longer in a position to import Chinese resources as she wishes or to monop-
olize China as her export market.” Moreover, the gradual industrialization of
China was “turning her steadily into Japan’s competitor.” In contrast, the
nations of Southeast Asia were “not likely to become Japan’s competitor in the
near future and promise to remain complementary to Japan.” According to
MOFA, this factor, combined with the geographical proximity of the region to
Japan, indicated “the need and wisdom for Japan to make all-out efforts in the
direction of tighter economic relations with the Southeast Asian countries.”4
However, there were doubts about the extent to which Southeast Asia could
be a valid replacement for China. The doubts stemmed from the small size of
the Southeast Asian countries’ economies. Therefore, Japanese policymakers
considered it necessary to increase those nations’ capacity “to sell and buy.” For
that purpose, support had to be given to development projects in mining, agri-
culture, hydroelectric power, and transportation infrastructure which “would
make their [Southeast Asian] products more accessible, increase their income
and thereby their purchasing power and raise their standards of living.”5 In
other words, as Yoshida put it, developing Southeast Asia was “a vital issue to
10 Japan’s Southeast Asia policy, 1950s–1960s
Japan” if Japan wanted to make it a substitute of China for the provision of
food and raw materials.6
Japan and the threat of communism in the region

The idea of Southeast Asia as critical for Japan’s economic recovery was linked
to another key objective of the Yoshida administration’s policy toward this
region: to prevent the loss of Southeast Asia to communist forces. This region’s
political instability and economic difficulties worried the Japanese. MOFA
warned that as long as such a situation continued, “there always exists a danger
that they [Southeast Asian countries] may fall an easy prey to communist infil-
tration.”7 If such an outcome materialized, Yoshida believed that “Japan would
find it impossible to stand alone.”8 For the Japanese, Indochina was the most
problematic area in Southeast Asia in consideration of the fact that it “stands
astride our line of trade with Southeast Asia upon which our economy depends
to no small extent […].”9 In May 1954, MOFA’s Asia Affairs Bureau (hereafter
Asia Bureau), which within MOFA was the main section in charge of Japan’s
relations with Asia, indicated that not only Vietnam but also Cambodia and
Laos were at risk of ending up under communist influence. Moreover, although
Southeast Asia was not considered to be under immediate threat from domestic
communist movements, things could change in the longer term. The Asia
Bureau linked this possible outcome to Southeast Asian countries’ weak capacity
to resist communist influence, which created a fertile soil for a possible emer-
gence of communist guerrilla. In order to enhance those countries’ capacity to
resist communist influence, MOFA indicated that, in addition to strengthening
their military capabilities, it was necessary to promote their economic develop-
ment and avoid that nationalist sentiments became combined with com-
munism.10 At that time, when talking about the communist threat to Southeast
Asia, Japan’s main concern was the People’s Republic of China. There were
indications that Southeast Asian people were “impressed in no small measure by
the rapid development of Soviet Russia and the quick rise of Communist
China.”11 Several Japanese saw a link between the possible expansion of com-
munist influence in Southeast Asia and Japan’s own security. In May 1954,
MOFA stressed that,
[t]he setting up of communist rule in China has already brought to Japan

serious disadvantages, economic as well as political. Even her very existence
may be menaced unless any further spread of communism in Asia is fore-
stalled with might. The economic development of Southeast Asia is thus a
question of vital importance for Japan.12
The Japanese concerns about Southeast Asia were largely shared in Washington.
For the Americans, on the one hand, a link existed between the role of South-
east Asia to support the economic recovery of Japan and, on the other, the need
to avoid that this region ended up under communist influence. In January
1951, John Foster Dulles, then special advisor to US Secretary of State Dean
Acheson, made clear that,
if Japan is to be on the side of the free world, it will be necessary to assure

that its industry can keep running and that it will receive sufficient quant-
ities of the necessary raw materials, particularly coking coal and iron ore.
Therefore, Dulles stated that, “if the US were to use all of these materials for its
own industry and not be willing to make reasonable quantities available to the
Japanese, it would be futile to expect the Japanese to keep away from Com-
munism.” Dulles warned that,
should the Soviets obtain the industrial power of Germany and Japan, it
would place them in such a position of strength that it would be necessary
for the US to spend more and produce more to offset this difference, so
that it really was to the interest of the US to make it possible for Japan to
stay on our side.13
It was Southeast Asia that was to provide those raw materials to Japan. Dulles
explained that “Japan formerly had obtained large quantities of iron ore from
Malaya and the Philippines and that these sources could possibly be re-activated
so that the burden on the US would be lessened.”14 The following year, a
“statement of policy” by the US National Security Council on the American
objectives in Southeast Asia warned that “[t]he loss of any of the countries of
Southeast Asia to communist control as a consequence of overt or covert
Chinese Communist aggression” would have serious consequences, including
on Japan. In fact, the document noted, Southeast Asia – and within it Malaya
and Indonesia in particular – was “the principal world source of natural rubber
and tin, and a producer of petroleum and other strategically important com-
modities.” Moreover, the exports of Burmese and Thai rice was of “consider-
able significance” to Japan. Therefore, the National Security Council indicated
that “[t]he loss of Southeast Asia, especially of Malaya and Indonesia, could
result in such economic and political pressures in Japan as to make it extremely
difficult to prevent Japan’s eventual accommodation to communism.” The
United States had therefore to “encourage and support closer cooperation
among countries of Southeast Asia, and between those countries and countries
of the Free World, including Japan.”15
The growing American concern about developments in Southeast Asia, par-
ticularly in Indochina, emerged from US President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s
famous statement to the press of April 7, 1954. Answering a question about
Indochina’s strategic importance, Eisenhower spoke of a “falling domino” to
describe the possible loss, one by one in a sequence, of countries of the region
to communism. After emphasizing that about 450 million Asians had already
been lost to communism, the president raised the question of what the con-
sequences would be – for the people of the region as well as in terms of loss of
sources of raw materials – if Indochina, Burma, Thailand, the Korean Peninsula,
and Indonesia were also lost to communism. Eisenhower also reflected on the
impact of such a scenario on Japan: he pointed out that the spread of com-
munism in those countries would take away “in its economic aspects, that
region that Japan must have as a trading area or Japan, in turn, will have only
one place in the world to go – that is, toward the Communist areas – in order
to live.”16 Therefore, Southeast Asia became integrated in the US strategy of
speeding up the recovery of Japan as a resilient Cold War ally.
The Yoshida administration’s initiative for the development of

Southeast Asia and Japan’s reparations
As discussed, supporting the economic development and the improvement of
living standards of Southeast Asian countries became a priority for Tokyo’s
regional policy. “Inculcation of democracy and military assistance alone […] will
not be enough to build them [Southeast Asian countries] up into a strong
bulwark against the onrush of communism”17 was the line of thought within
MOFA. Yoshida himself made clear that “to make Southeast Asia prosperous is
the most full-fledged way to counter communism [in that region].”18 Con-
cretely, the idea Yoshida had in mind was a cooperation between the United
States and Japan on the basis of which the United States would provide capital
whereas Japan would offer technology and expertise. These efforts, to which
also other Western countries were expected to contribute, would have the effect
of developing anti-communist forces in Southeast Asia.19 Fostering Southeast
Asian countries’ development was “as important, if not more important,” to
preserving their freedom “as is a collective defense system of a military
character.”20
The concrete materialization of this idea was the Yoshida administration’s
plan for the development of Southeast Asia. The initiative consisted of Japan’s
provision, in cooperation with the United States, of “machineries and produc-
tion technology. As a payback, Japan would import at a cheap price the result-
ing industrial raw material goods.”21 The Japanese expected this plan to lead to
the achievement of a balance in Japan’s import/export and to economic self-
reliance. As the Yoshida government explained, after the termination of Japa-
nese trade with China, such a plan was an economic strategy that Japan had to
actively pursue.22 The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI) was supportive of expanding Japanese economic relations with South-
east Asia. MITI wanted to decrease Japan’s dependence on the import of natural
resources from the United States, hence it was interested in developing South-
east Asia.23 In its white paper released in July 1951, MITI emphasized that,
from that moment on, Japan had to give importance “to the export of capital
goods for the program of Southeast Asian industrialization.”24 In the summer of
1951, the Japanese began to work on this plan and, in early 1952, the govern-
ment set up a council with the task of “deciding the basic policy” on issues such
as cooperation for Southeast Asian development.25
In order to concretely support the process of Southeast Asian development,
and considering Japan’s limited resources, the Yoshida administration sought to
involve Western countries, the United States first, whose capital was essential for
implementing the Japanese plan. Obtaining such support was one of the major
objectives of Prime Minister Yoshida’s trip to Europe and North America in the
fall of 1954. In the United States, Yoshida delivered a number of speeches
through which he made his intentions public. He spoke of communist “secret
maneuvers and underground intrigues to prepare for open and armed aggres-
sion”26 and emphasized that “[i]f China’s economic progress is such that she
outstrips her neighbors substantially in the years ahead, the gravitational pull
will be too much to resist, and Southeast Asia will fall to the Communists
without a struggle.”27 According to Yoshida, poverty and nationalism created
fertile soil for the spread of communism in Asia. For this reason, he explained, it
was necessary to “increase the economic productivity of Free Asia, utilize
untapped resources, raise living conditions, and develop regional and inter-
regional trade.”28 In his speeches, Yoshida made sure to underline the link
between development and security. He stated that,
the military approach to defense is not the sole or the main answer to the
problem of peace and security in Asia. If the people of Free Asia are given a
better way of life, a better standard of living and a hope for the future, you
give real meaning and impetus to an Asian defense alliance.29
After these premises, Yoshida called on Western powers to join Japan in a

“counteroffensive” by undertaking “a vigorous and imaginative program of eco-
nomic development and cultural uplift for Asia.” In particular, he called for
American financial contribution. “Without the active and strong support of the
US, any program for the economic and social betterment of Asia would be
doomed to failure,” he stressed.30 In more concrete terms, in his speech at the
National Press Club in Washington on November 8, 1954, Yoshida proposed
an Asian version of the Marshall Plan and quantified the amount he expected
the United States to contribute yearly to such a plan: US$4 billion.31 Japan
would contribute to the plan by providing technology, managerial competence,
and skilled manpower.32
The American response to the Japanese proposal was negative. During a
meeting with Prime Minister Yoshida in Washington on November 9, Secretary
of State Dulles made clear that the United States could not provide the contri-
bution to the “Southeast Asian Marshall Plan” proposed by Yoshida. Dulles
explained that Southeast Asian countries were not able to absorb such amounts
of money. He added that, at the time of the Marshall Plan in Western Europe,
“you had a highly developed industrial society and the task was to rehabilitate a
plant which had been in being […], [i]n the case of Southeast Asia you are start-
ing, so to speak, from scratch […].” Therefore, he was not convinced “that it
would be practical to attempt to spend, on that effort […] any such figures as
would compare with the Marshall Plan figures.”33
In parallel with attempts to find capital for the development of Southeast
Asia, Japan began to pay reparations to Asian countries for the damages caused
by the Japanese military during the Pacific War. In addition to their original
motivation and to their importance for the mending of Japanese relations with
the region, reparations were also to be seen as another instrument through
which Tokyo pursued its twofold plan of developing commercial relations with
Southeast Asian nations while supporting their economic development. Indeed,
starting in 1954 – when Japan concluded its first reparation agreement with
Burma – the payment of reparations facilitated Japan’s economic access to
markets in the region. Reparations took the form of the provision by Japan of
goods and services which were to be purchased from Japanese firms, thus stimu-
lating Japanese production and the establishment of commercial relations with
the region. Indeed, Japanese companies expanded their operations in Southeast
Asia, and this process was reinvigorated when Japan began to provide official
development assistance (ODA). Yoshida explained that reparations would “help
rebuild Southeast Asia and develop wider markets there for themselves [the
Japanese] and other nations.”34 He also expected that the settlement of the
reparation problem would facilitate the normalization of relations and
the increase of trade with reparations-recipient countries. In that sense, during
his above-mentioned November 9 meeting with Dulles, Yoshida stated that
reparations could be viewed as “an investment.” They would, in fact, help raise
living standards in Southeast Asian countries and develop those countries’ ability
to buy and sell; this, in turn, would result in an increase of Japanese exports and
the strengthening of the Japanese economy. Such a process would also reduce
the margin of action for communism in the region. In other words, Yoshida
explained, reparations permitted “to catch two birds with one stone.”35 Refer-
ring specifically to Japanese reparations payments to the Philippines, Yoshida
wrote that,
all our payments in goods and services should be so channeled as to help

the economic reconstruction and industrial development of the Philippines
and to enable that country to supply us with more raw materials, such as
iron ore and lumber, as well as to buy more from us. We must see that our
reparations are applied to the purpose of expanding the economies of both
countries and of promoting also the prosperity of East Asia.36
Southeast Asia and the enhancement of Japan’s international profile

In his statements during the November 1954 visit to the United States, Yoshida
sought to draw attention to the important role that Japan, in light of its simul-
taneous being an Asian nation, a member of the Free World, and an industrial-
ized economy, could play for the promotion of regional prosperity and stability.
Yoshida pointed out that Japan, “the only highly industrialized and modern
nation in Asia,” was in a position to greatly contribute to “the economic devel-
opment of Asia and the establishment of a community of Free Asian states.” He
noted that Japan, on the one hand, shared “many of the ways and sentiments of
the Oriental world” and, on the other, was the Asian country that was politically
and economically the closest to Western nations. By virtue of these characteris-
tics, Yoshida concluded that Japan could act as “an intermediary between the
ancient East and the modern West” and was ready to play its “natural role” of
contributing to Asia’s economic and political recovery in cooperation with the
United States.37 Referring to the American aid policy toward Southeast Asian
countries, Yoshida believed that,
[u]nless she [the United States] has a thorough knowledge of the con-
ditions in that part of the world, the costly aid she gives may mean no more
than ‘throwing a piece of gold to a cat.’ The cat does not know how to
make use of the gold. What it needs is fish.
Therefore, Yoshida argued,
[i]f America earnestly desires to bring prosperity and higher living standards
to that area and to protect it from Communist infiltration, she should above
all consult with Japan who is most familiar with conditions in that region,
use Japan’s profound knowledge, and work out an aid policy in cooperation
with Japan.
In his opinion, the United States should “give more thought to the fact that
cooperation with Japan will enable her to carry out a policy adapted to reality
with less expense, and will at the same time protect her from the unjust accusa-
tion of colonialism.”38 What Yoshida was suggesting was the idea that there was
a role that Japan could play as a bridge between the Western world and Asia. At
the same time, by highlighting as he did in his November speeches in the
United States that economic aid and security in Asia were linked, Yoshida
sought to emphasize the contribution that Japan could make to the pursuit of
peace and prosperity in Asia.
The Hatoyama administration and Southeast Asia

The improvement of relations with the Soviet Union and China was high on the
foreign-policy agenda of Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichirō, who took over from
the Yoshida administration in December 1954. Nevertheless, during Hatoyama’s
term, Japan continued to pursue the creation of a scheme for the development
of Southeast Asia. On March 10, 1955, Tatsunosuke Takasaki, the director
general of the Economic Planning Agency, met with Harold E. Stassen, the dir-
ector of the US Foreign Operations Administration, and presented him with a
proposal for economic cooperation with Southeast Asia. Similar to the Yoshida
initiative, the Japanese proposal was framed in the context of the advancing
communist influence in the region. The starting point of the plan presented by
Takasaki was Southeast Asia’s difficult economic conditions and low standards
of living which represented “an ideal setting for the infiltration of communist
influence.”39 The Japanese proposal drew attention to the direct impact that this
situation had on Japan. Considering that Japanese exports to Southeast Asia
accounted for 36 percent of all Japan’s exports and that Japan was importing
food (such as rise, vegetable oil, sugar) and raw materials (including rubber, tin,
iron ore) from that region, “communist ascendency in these countries would
seriously threaten the Japanese economy.” Despite this situation, Tokyo could
“hardly afford” to provide large amounts of aid to Southeast Asian nations due
to its resources being used for the rebuilding of the Japanese economy, for
repaying prewar debts, and for paying reparations. Therefore, Japan was pre-
pared to contribute technical assistance and managerial expertise. For financial
contributions, the Japanese called for the American provision of capital by
stating that,
[i]n order to check the Communist offensive directed against this region,
[…] it is imperative that the intra-regional economic development and the
improvement of the living standards are effected before it is too late. And
this would not be impossible if the US and other free nations join their
efforts in extending positive economic assistance to this region.40
Once again, Japan’s proposal failed to obtain US support. The American posi-
tion was that,
the US cannot undertake, even in combination with other Western countries

[…], to supply all the foreign exchange resources desired by Asian countries
to carry out their development programs. […] It is clear that no such
resources are likely to be forthcoming, or such expansion achieved, without
substantially intensified internal efforts in Asian countries themselves.41
In March 1956, Takasaki slightly modified his approach and made a new
attempt with the United States. In a meeting in Tokyo with a high-level Amer
ican delegation led by Secretary Dulles, he touched upon Japan’s conclusion of
a reparation agreement with Burma and the positive prospects for signing similar
agreements with the Philippines and Indonesia. However, he noted that those
countries “did not have sufficient capital of their own to utilize the reparations
payments effectively.” Japan could not provide the necessary capital because,
Takasaki argued, if Japan were to offer it, “she would naturally be suspected of
attempting to ‘infiltrate’ and ‘dominate’ the area.” Capital from Britain and the
United States would raise similar suspicions in those countries – which had only
recently obtained their independence – “if either of these nations were to
sponsor a unilateral investment plan.” The solution was, according to Takasaki,
“a joint capital investment and loan program” in which the interested free
nations would participate, “thereby removing suspicion that any single nation
was attempting to dominate the receiving nation.”42 Prime Minister Hatoyama
raised the same issue in talks with Dulles, noting that Japan had an interest in
ensuring that its reparations to Southeast Asian countries “were put to effective
use.” For this purpose, he suggested that it was necessary to set up “[s]ome sort
of development organisation, financed by the United States, which would
enable these underdeveloped countries to put these funds to use […].”43 Dulles’
response was tepid. He observed that “by far the greater share of direct eco-
nomic aid under the American aid program went to these areas,” and added
that the possibility of coordinating American aid with Japanese reparations
should be further studied.44 Yet again, Japanese efforts were not successful.
Scholars Hatano Sumio and Satō Susumu point out the importance of
looking at the Takasaki initiative in the context of Japanese domestic politics. In
the face of the Hatoyama government’s focus on improving relations with the
communist powers, the opposition had been advocating the development of
Japan’s relations with Southeast Asia. Therefore, the Takasaki proposal was to
be viewed also in the context of the Hatoyama administration’s need for coun-
termeasures to this situation.45 As a matter of fact, the restoration of diplomatic
relations with the Soviet Union in 1956, which opened the way to Japan’s
accession to the United Nations in the same year, attracted most of the atten-
tion of Japanese foreign-policy makers. It was during the administration of
Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke – which was inaugurated in February 1957 fol-
lowing the two-month-long government of Prime Minister Ishibashi Tanzan –
that the priority of Southeast Asia on Japan’s foreign-policy agenda increased.
The meaning of Southeast Asia for Prime Minister Kishi

Kishi Nobusuke became the first postwar Japanese prime minister to visit South-
east Asia. In fact, he visited this region twice during his mandate. Fukuda
Takeo, who later became prime minister between 1976 and 1978, was close to
Kishi and revealed some aspects of Kishi’s interest in the region. For what con-
cerns the Philippines, Kishi’s involvement with this country was deepened by his
friendship with that country’s wartime president, Jose P. Laurel. After the end
of WWII, the two men developed close relations while being inmates in a Japa-
nese jail. Kishi later became the president of the Japan–Philippines Friendship
Association. He had close ties also with Indonesia and developed “very friendly”
relations with President Sukarno.46 As a matter of fact, Southeast Asia was high
on Kishi’s foreign-policy agenda. As he wrote in his memoirs, the “three pillars”
of Japanese foreign policy were “cooperation with the US, a UN-centered
diplomacy, and the promotion of [Japan’s] Southeast Asia foreign policy.”47
Similarly to the previous administrations, commercial interests in this region and
the need to prevent it from ending up under communist influence were
important factors behind Kishi’s interests in that region. Beyond this, there was
in Kishi also a marked interest in Southeast Asia as instrumental to enhance
Japan’s position both in Asia and vis-à-vis the United States. Indeed, Kishi
intentionally chose to visit the United States only after his trip to Southeast Asia
in 1957. His belief was that he had “first to visit Southeast Asia and then go to
the US so that during negotiations with the Americans Japan was to act not as
an isolated country but as the representative of Asia.” Therefore, Kishi wrote,
“before and after going to the US, I visited 15 [Asian] countries during my two
trips.”48 More specifically, he explained that through his visits to Southeast
Asian nations, he, as the leader of “Asia’s Japan,” wanted to have an under-
standing of those countries’ situation and to talk with their leaders and listen to
their demands. He believed that doing so was the appropriate way to then go
and talk with the Americans and to make his visit to the United States more
fruitful. In Kishi’s words,
building Japan’s status in Asia, namely, highlighting that Japan was the
center of Asia, would make the Japan–US relationship more equal on the
occasion of his meeting with Eisenhower and would strengthen Kishi’s
position during negotiations with the Americans.49
Such an idea of Japan as “the center of Asia” was not unrelated to Kishi’s
wartime support for the establishment of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere, which was to be Imperial Japan’s sphere of influence in Asia. In fact,
Kishi is reported to have stated in an interview that there was a link between his
postwar interest in Asia and the ideas at the basis of the Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere.50 The US ambassador in Japan, Douglas MacArthur II, noted
Kishi’s determination in pursuing Japan’s foreign policy in the region. In Febru-
ary 1958, he wrote to the Department of State that the “Kishi government
more than any in recent past is looking toward Japanese participation in SEA
[Southeast Asia] economic development as major element of Japanese foreign
policy.”51 The importance of Southeast Asia for Japan’s own economic develop-
ment was another important aspect behind the Kishi administration’s policy
toward this region. When in February 1957 the Japanese Minister of Finance
met with Benjamin F. Fairless, Chairman of the Committee of Citizen Advisors
on the Mutual Security Program, he made clear that,
Japan’s economic self-reliance depends on exports to the US, on the pro-

gress in the economic development of Southeast Asian countries, and on
trade with Communist China. If US aid for the economic development of
Southeast Asian countries is provided through Japan, this would speed up
the process of Japan achieving economic self-reliance.52
The Southeast Asia Development Fund proposal

While looking at Southeast Asia as instrumental for the enhancement of Japan’s
international political role and economic position, the Kishi administration was
well aware of the direct relation between seeking to tighten Japanese relations
with Southeast Asia on the one hand, and countering the spread of Chinese
influence in that region on the other. In February 1957, during the above-
mentioned talks with Benjamin F. Fairless and members of his delegation, Kishi
stated that,
one thing on which we have to pay attention about Communist China is its
relations with Southeast Asia. Before China completes its internal building
and makes its economic advance into Southeast Asia, measures have to be
taken to counteract to this by quickly developing Southeast Asia among the
free countries.53
Along similar lines, in December 1957, during a meeting with Australia’s

Minister for External Affairs Richard Casey, Kishi explained his proposal for a
Southeast Asia Development Fund. The Japanese prime minister linked this
initiative with the need to counter communism in Southeast Asia. He stated
that “communist forces were utilizing the strong anti-colonialist sentiment
existing among Southeast Asian countries.” In this context, it was “Japan’s
mission” to work to both restraint those Asian countries from taking a sudden
extreme direction in the name of anti-colonialism and to have harmonious rela-
tions between those Asian countries and Western Europe. As Kishi argued,
making progress in developing Asian countries’ economies “played an extremely
important role in preventing the advance of communist forces.”54
A fundamental aspect was that, in order for it to function, the Southeast Asia
Development Fund – which was to include the 18 members of the Colombo Plan
plus Taiwan – was to have the United States and Japan cooperate to provide
capital and technology to promote Southeast Asia’s development.55 An articulation
of the rationale and objective of the Japanese proposal can be found in the records
of Kishi’s talks with President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles in June
1957 in Washington. Kishi indicated that the economic, political, and social unrest
existing in Southeast Asia provided “grounds for communist infiltration.” It was,
therefore, “imperative that such Communist infiltration be prevented by the
granting of assistance to Southeast Asian development.” As Kishi added, “this
would also be to the material advantage of Japan in the opening of new markets
for Japanese exports, and in the provision of raw material sources.” However,
although Japan wanted to export to Southeast Asia, “we must first increase their
purchasing power.” The problem, the Japanese prime minister noted, was that the
region lacked the necessary capital and technology.56
It is important to point out that the Japanese proposal also reflected Kishi’s
idea of “using” Southeast Asia to establish Japan’s leadership position in Asia.
As he explained,
if this idea [the Southeast Asia Development Fund] is realized, Japan’s

leadership in Southeast Asia would be established. This means that Com-
munist China and the Soviet Union’s influence in Southeast Asia would be
eliminated and the position of the liberal camp would be strengthened.
Moreover, Kishi’s “basic way of thinking” was that the scope of the Japanese
policy toward Southeast Asia – of which the Southeast Asia Development Fund
was to be part – went beyond the borders of this region: in fact, it should be
viewed in the context of “Japan’s world policy.”57
In May 1957, Kishi departed for his first official visit to Southeast Asia, stop-
ping in Burma and Thailand. His itinerary included also stops in India, Pakistan,
Sri Lanka, and Taiwan. One of the objectives of his trip was, in addition to com-
municating his regret for the damages and suffering provoked by Imperial Japan
in the region, to listen to the reactions of those countries to his Southeast Asia
Development Fund proposal.58 As planned, just after his visit to the region the
Japanese prime minister went to the United States. Kishi presented his proposal
to his counterparts, but the American reaction was unenthusiastic, due to Wash-
ington’s unwillingness to shoulder the provision of capital for the proposed
fund. Secretary of State Dulles told Kishi that “to evolve the concept [of Kishi’s
proposal] into reality was a difficult and complicated affair. Nevertheless, the US
[…] would study with ‘sympathy as to its purpose’ the proposal to which the
Prime Minister had referred.”59 A few months later, Dulles told Japan’s Foreign
Minister, Fujiyama Aiichirō, that the Americans did not think,
that the proposed organisation [the Southeast Asia Development Fund]

with a capital of US$700 million is practical. Multiplicity of means is not
desirable; we already have the World Bank, the Export-Import Bank, our
new development loan fund, and we prefer to work through these general-
ized institutions rather than set up a new one of limited character.60
On the other hand, despite rejecting the Japanese initiatives, Washington had
an interest in the expansion of Japan’s economic relations with Southeast Asia.
As Ambassador MacArthur explained,
[i]t is in our interest to encourage participation by Japan in SEA economic

development because it will have twofold beneficial effect of furthering US
policies in SEA and in Japan. [I]t is in US interest that Japan rather than
Communist China or Soviets exercise greater economic influence in SEA.
Increasing economic activity of ChiComs [Chinese Communists] in SEA
makes this latter point of increasing importance.61
In November 1957, Kishi departed for his second trip to Southeast Asia. This
time he visited Laos, Cambodia, Malaya, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philip-
pines (where there were some protests against Kishi’s visit due to the existence
of some negative sentiments toward Japan for its acts during the war). He also
stopped in Australia and New Zealand. Kishi once again presented his pro-
posal for the Southeast Asia Development Fund, but Southeast Asian coun-
tries’ reaction was quite unenthusiastic.62 Kishi revealed that, among all the
leaders he met in his two trips to Asia during 1957, Nehru and Rahman, the
leaders of India and Malaysia respectively, had “the strongest reaction toward
the proposal. The other leaders did not oppose the proposal but did not have
a very strong reaction.” According to Kishi, the reason for such a tepid reac-
tion was that, considering that Japan at that time still did not have the ability
to provide the necessary capital for the development of the region, some of
the Southeast Asian countries might have considered the proposal to be just
an idea.63
A final observation about the Kishi administration’s Southeast Asia diplomacy
is that, among Southeast Asian nations, Japan gave particular attention to Indo-
nesia. As Kishi pointed out, considering its natural resources and large popula-
tion, among Southeast Asian nations, Indonesia was the one with the highest
potential for developing as a wealthy country.64 As a non-aligned nation, Indo-
nesia was not part of the anti-communist bloc. The risk of communist influence
in the country was an aspect to which Japanese foreign-policy makers paid par-
ticular attention. For Kishi,
with the establishment of official diplomatic relations with this country

[Indonesia], commercial relations will expand: this outcome benefits not
only Japan and Indonesia, but is also desirable for the stability and prosper-
ity of the whole Asia and of the world.65
Indeed, under him, Japan and Indonesia reached an agreement on reparations

(for a total amount of US$223 million, paid to Indonesia between 1958 and
1970) and, in 1958, signed a peace treaty.
To sum up, the Kishi administration’s initiative for the Southeast Asia
Development Fund failed to gain enough support both in the region and in
the United States. Nevertheless, on a bilateral basis, Japan succeeded in
improving relations particularly with Indonesia, a country that Japan con-
sidered critical for regional stability as well as from a commercial point of
view. Kishi’s drive to strengthen Japanese relations with Southeast Asia came
to an end in July 1960 when, after managing to conclude the tortuous revi-
sion of the Japan–US Security Treaty amid widespread domestic opposition,
he resigned.
Southeast Asia in Prime Minister Ikeda’s foreign policy

In light of the domestic turmoil that had characterized the last part of the Kishi
government, the administration of Ikeda Hayato, inaugurated in July 1960,
focused its attention on the growth of the Japanese economy. Ikeda’s “Income
Doubling Plan” acted as a driving force for the high-speed growth of the
Japanese economy under his administration. In 1964, the Tokyo Olympics and
Japan’s accession to the OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development), the exclusive club of the most industrialized countries, boosted
domestic moral and confidence. These achievements were seen by many as a
symbol of Japan’s recovery and of its being back into the international com-
munity. On the back of these achievements, Ikeda strove to boost the inter-
national role of Japan as one of the three pillars of the Western bloc, together
with the United States and Europe. On Southeast Asia, Ikeda, who visited this
region twice during his mandate, believed that Japan had a sort of “special posi-
tion” in this region compared to the Western powers. According to Itō Masaya,
who served as Prime Minister Ikeda’s private secretary, after returning from his
first visit to Southeast Asia in November 1961, Ikeda developed the thinking
that, in contrast with the long history of colonization of that region by Euro-
pean powers and, more recently, by the United States, Japan was “a new
country” because, compared to them, “Japan can tackle Southeast Asian prob-
lems from a freer position.”66 Indeed, at the end of his first tour of Southeast
Asia, Ikeda observed that countries of the region viewed Japan as a developed
“elder brother” and proudly stated that he had carried out his visit to the region
as the leader of “Japan as part of Asia” rather than as the prime minister of a
country that was a member of the Free World bloc.67 The Ikeda administration’s
Asia policy was noted by US Secretary of State Rusk during his visit to Japan in
November 1961. He reported to the State Department that he was “impressed
with [the] general atmosphere here of need and opportunity for Japan to play a
much more active role in Asia, a mood prompted both by political and eco-
nomic considerations.”68
Southeast Asia was also part of the vision that Ikeda developed for Asia. Ikeda’s
private secretary, Itō Masaya, revealed that, after traveling to Europe and after
observing the European Economic Community (EEC), “Ikeda became increas-
ingly convinced that an isolated country would not prosper” and that “if Asian
countries exchanged their natural resources, labor, and markets, and if their
growth policies were successful, it would be possible to establish a large prosperity
zone.” If such a zone was established, Ikeda thought, “it would become a big
force vis-à-vis Communist China.”69 His idea was that “a prosperity zone” includ-
ing Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Australia, New
Zealand, Thailand, and Malaysia, could be established and would form the basis
of an “Asian economic community,” that is, the “new EEC of Asia.”70
The Ikeda administration and China’s influence in Southeast Asia

Similarly to his mentor, Yoshida Shigeru, Ikeda’s views on Southeast Asia were
also influenced by the need to counter the spread of communist influence. His
administration judged the situation in the region to be “highly unstable,
owing to the existence of a powerful Communist China and to the weak
foundation of the newly-independent nations situated around that country.”
The Chinese were carrying out “a persistent propaganda offensive which seeks
to stir up anti-US sentiments by exploiting nationalism in the newly-
independent countries” as well as to create “distrust of the US and a neutralist
mood in Japan” and other countries. Beijing had concluded friendship treaties
with Burma, Nepal, Afghanistan, and Cambodia in 1960, and with Indonesia
in 1961, and had been trying “to win the goodwill of these countries by offer-
ing them economic cooperation.”71
What kind of threat did Communist China pose concretely? MOFA’s assess-
ment was that, “[a]t least for some time to come there seems to be little likeli-
hood that Communist China would launch any direct military operations of its
own.” Such a prediction was based on the difficult domestic economic situation
that China was experiencing, characterized by poor harvests in 1959 and 1960,
slow progress in the industrialization of the country, shortage of oil resources,
and insufficient transportation capabilities. Therefore, MOFA believed that,
Communist China has, for the moment, placed its emphasis on a policy of
subversive activities, taking advantage of the unstable conditions and
popular discontent or apathy in the neighboring Asian countries and of the
lack of unity in the policies of the countries of the free world towards these
Asian countries.71
The Soviet Union contributed to rising concerns as a result of its strong support
of North Vietnam and North Korea.72 It is, however, to be pointed out that,
despite expressing concern for the influence of Communist China in the region,
Japan had an interest in improving relations with Beijing. Although Japan had
recognized the Republic of China, Japan’s policy toward Communist China was
“to improve relations on the basis of respect for each other’s international posi-
tion and non-interference in the internal affairs of the other country.” Such a
position, MOFA explained, showed that “[t]here is some difference between
Japan and the US in their attitudes toward Communist China.” Japan’s policy,
as clarified by MOFA, was “to maintain amicable relations even with countries
whose political philosophy is different from its own on the basis of the two con-
ditions mentioned above.” Moreover, the geographical proximity between
Japan and China, and their historical ties, made the “erection of artificial bar-
riers” between the two countries “unnatural and inconsistent with popular sen-
timent in Japan.” It was on the basis of such reasoning that, according to
MOFA, Japan desired “to further contacts with Communist China by means of
trade and exchange of people and culture […].”73
One of the Southeast Asian countries that the Japanese considered to be par-
ticularly exposed to communist influence was Burma. On his way back to Japan
after his November 1961 visit to Asian countries, Prime Minister Ikeda, while
observing that “Communist China’s advance in Southeast Asia is strong and, in
the future, will further increase,” stated that the country most subject to
Chinese influence was Burma.74 As a matter of fact, in 1949, Burma had quickly
recognized the People’s Republic of China and had been supporting its admis-
sion to the United Nations. In 1960, Burma and China signed a treaty of
friendship and non-aggression as well as a border agreement. When Chinese
Prime Minister Zhou Enlai visited Burma the following year, the two countries
also signed an agreement on economic and technical cooperation.75
This background further motivated the Ikeda administration to increase
efforts to improve relations with Burma. Ikeda’s ideas on the Burmese situation
emerged in a private conversation he had with Secretary of State Rusk in Japan
in November 1961. As reported by Rusk, “Ikeda was optimistic about prospects
of bringing Burma further into [the] free world and away from Communist
China.” In particular, the Japanese prime minister, “[t]hrough close personal
friends in Burmese Government,” was “trying to work out Japanese aid to
Burma which would divert [the] latter from large ChiCom [Chinese Commu-
nist] assistance.”76 Burma was one of the countries Ikeda visited during his first
trip to Southeast Asia in the fall of 1961. On that occasion, in a November 24
meeting in Rangoon with Burmese Prime Minister U Nu, Ikeda sought to per-
suade him to improve relations with the West, hinting at the economic benefits
that Burma could gain from it. Ikeda pointed out that, “historically, both the
Soviet Union and China had a big interest in advancing south toward the Indian
Ocean,” and indeed he noted that the Chinese and Soviets were “putting efforts
toward the Northern part of Burma.” The Japanese prime minister made the
point that “the time has arrived for Burma to take a clear policy toward com-
munism,” and improve relations with the Free World. He explained that if
Burma started to be trusted by other Western countries, it could receive eco-
nomic aid from them. Ikeda added that Japan was ready to mediate in case
Burma was willing to open to cooperation with other countries of the world,
starting with the United States.77
A few months later, in February 1962, in a meeting with US Attorney
General Robert F. Kennedy, Ikeda called on the United States to consider
increasing aid to Rangoon. He emphasized that, even though the Burmese
military were anti-communist, “loans from Communist China totaling 160
million pounds exert a powerful attraction.” Ikeda informed Kennedy that Japan
would soon dispatch a mission to Burma to support the Burmese four-year eco-
nomic development plan.78 During his trip to Europe in the fall of 1962, Ikeda
spoke of “Japan’s intention to do what it can to prevent the Chinese Commu-
nists from advancing into Burma and Thailand by way of Laos.”79 In concrete
terms, under the Ikeda administration, Japan granted additional reparations to
Burma. This was the result of a request for an increase of the amount of Japa-
nese reparations that Burma had presented to Japan in April 1959, following
the signing, on November 5, 1954, of a bilateral peace treaty and agreements
on reparations and on economic cooperation. After lengthy negotiations, in
1963 Japan eventually added US$140 million to the US$200 million of repara-
tions agreed between the two countries in 1954. As a result, Japan became the
largest aid donor to Burma. According to the US State Department, this devel-
opment was to be seen in relation to Ikeda’s belief “that Japan could develop a
position of special influence in Burma.” However, even after the increase of
Japan’s financial provisions to Burma, the Americans noted that “[t]his experi-
ment has shown little results, since the Burmese seem no more responsive to
Japanese overtures than those of any other country.”80
The Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation and Japan’s diplomacy

As previously mentioned, among Southeast Asian nations, Japan paid particular
attention to Indonesia. Matsunaga Nobuo, a MOFA official who, at the time of
Ikeda’s second visit to Southeast Asia in 1963, served as private secretary to the
vice foreign minister, explained that in Japan “there has always been awareness
that the stability of Indonesia – a country with a large population and territory – is
very important for the stability of the whole Southeast Asia.” This was an
important factor motivating the Japanese support for Indonesia’s economic devel-
opment.81 Indonesia was important also for the realization of the previously men-
tioned Ikeda’s vision for the creation of an “Asian EEC.” The Japanese prime
minister was aware that such a plan could not be realized in a short time, but was
convinced that the strengthening of Japanese relations with countries such as
Indonesia and the Philippines would contribute to realizing his idea.82
When, in the first half of the 1960s, a dispute between Indonesia and Malay-
sia escalated into a low-intensity conflict, concerns mounted in Japan for the
implications that such a situation could have on regional stability. Among them,
a possible deterioration of Indonesia’s dispute with the British-backed Malaysia
might result in a tightening of Jakarta’s relations with Beijing. As a background,
in May 1961, Malaya’s Prime Minister Rahman mentioned the formation of the
Federation of Malaysia – comprising Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, and
Sarawak – which was formally established in September 1963 with the backing
of Britain. The formation of Malaysia was strongly opposed by Indonesian Pres-
ident Sukarno, who viewed it as a new form of colonialism and as a threat to
Indonesia.83 The Philippines, which had territorial claims in North Borneo, also
opposed the formation of Malaysia. In August 1963, just before the establish-
ment of Malaysia, the leaders of Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines had
agreed in Manila to establish “Maphilindo,” a regional plan through which the
three countries would tighten their relations. They also decided to entrust the
UN Secretary-General with carrying out a survey among people of North
Borneo and Sarawak to find out whether they supported joining Malaysia or
not. However, even before the results of the survey (which showed that people
in those areas were in favor of joining Malaysia) were made public, the forma-
tion of Malaysia was announced. This infuriated Jakarta and Manila.84 Fighting
ensued between Indonesia and Malaysia. An escalation of the conflict could
have had serious consequences for regional stability. Malaysia was backed by
Britain, as well as by Australia and New Zealand. By virtue of its alliance with
Australia and New Zealand, an attack against one of them would also drag the
United States into the conflict.85
To be sure, Japan did not oppose the formation of Malaysia. In fact, its
establishment was considered beneficial for the stabilization of Southeast Asia
and for the expansion of Japanese political and economic relations with this new
state. However, the importance of Indonesia for Japan led the Japanese to adopt
a prudent stance on the formation of Malaysia. Moreover, partly as a result of a
request by the Indonesian government, Japan avoided officially expressing
support for the establishment of Malaysia.86 Nevertheless, the Ikeda administra-
tion became involved in efforts to persuade the disputants to solve the problem
peacefully. In May 1963, Japan hosted talks in Tokyo between President
Sukarno and Prime Minister Rahman. Then, during his visit to Southeast Asia
later that year, Ikeda sought to persuade the leaders of Indonesia and the Philip-
pines to find a peaceful settlement of the problem and offered Japan’s
cooperation for that purpose.87 Following Ikeda’s visit to Southeast Asia, the
American ambassador in Tokyo, Edwin O. Reischauer, reported that the Japa-
nese were concerned “that developments consequent Sukarno’s confrontation
policy against Malaysia could lead to serious situation detrimental to long-term
Japanese interest.” In order to address this situation, during his visit to the Phil-
ippines, Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand, the Japanese made efforts “to
create atmosphere conducive to return situation to normalcy.”88 In November
1963, as part of efforts “to enable Japan to maximize its influence,” Tokyo sent
a high-ranking government official to Bangkok to attend the Colombo minis-
terial conference “in order to backstop Thai Fonmin Thanat’s mediation
efforts.” As Ambassador Reischauer pointed out, this move was in line with
Tokyo’s hope that “eventually Sukarno can be persuaded to forego aggressive
military adventures and instead establish position as leader of LDCs [least
developed countries] by successful development of Indonesian economy.”89
When Sukarno visited Japan in January 1964, Ikeda joined US Attorney General
Robert Kennedy in efforts to persuade the Indonesian president to end the
Indonesian military activities in Sabah and Sarawak.90 In the same month, Ikeda
sent a letter to Prime Minister Rahman of Malaysia in which he urged the settle-
ment of the dispute “by peaceful talks among the governments concerned on
the basis of the principle of international justice.” Ikeda also offered his good
offices by telling the Malaysian prime minister that Japan was available to give
“any help” if he wanted to discuss the peaceful settlement of the problem.91
Japanese efforts continued in June 1964 with the hosting in Tokyo of a summit
among the leaders of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, but the talks
were not successful.92 Additional mediating attempts by Japan were made in the
final months of the Ikeda administration.93 However, such efforts, as well as
those made by other countries, were proving ineffective in settling the dispute
between Indonesia and Malaysia. The administration of Prime Minister Satō
Eisaku who, in November 1964, succeeded Ikeda after he had to step down for
health reasons, took over in attempts to help restore peace between Jakarta and
Kuala Lumpur.
Japan’s relations with Southeast Asia under the Satō

administration
In his January 1965 policy speech at the Diet, Prime Minister Satō Eisaku stated
that it was Japan’s mission to work to reduce tension and to build peace in Asia.
He also announced he would visit Southeast Asia to tighten relations with local
leaders and discuss economic and technical cooperation.94 Similarly to his prede-
cessors Kishi and Ikeda, Satō also visited Southeast Asia twice. As explained by
then Foreign Minister Shiina Etsusaburō, Japan had a “national interest in South-
east Asian markets and raw material sources as well as a broad interest in contrib-
uting to stability and development” in that region.95 Indeed, the economic
importance of Southeast Asia for Japan had been growing. As shown in Table 1.1,
during the Satō administration, the total volume of Japanese trade with that
region was second only to Japan’s trade with the United States. Southeast Asia
Table 1.1 Japan’s major import/export markets (US$ thousand)
1960 1965 1972
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports
Total 4,054,537 4,491,132 8,451,742 8,169,019 28,591,144 23,470,711

United States 1,101,649 1,553,534 2,479,232 2,366,146 8,847,678 5,851,634
Southeast Asia 1,306,622 914,876 2,194,877 1,406,149 6,309,572 4,171,248
Middle Near 177,770 449,272 356,155 1,111,813 1,173,904 3,490,784
East
EC 315,387 313,431 743,083 570,251 3,299,444 1,958,972
Source: MOFA, Diplomatic Bluebook, 1973, p. 753.
followed the United States as Japan’s second-largest source of imports and export
market. The dependency of Southeast Asian countries on trade with Japan was
also high (Table 1.2); as far as exports were concerned, in 1967, 26 percent of
Southeast Asian exports went to Japan, whereas in 1970, the percentage rose to
34 percent. Southeast Asia also became the largest recipient of Japanese official
development assistance (ODA) (Figure 1.1). In 1970, the amount of aid dis-
bursed by Japan to this region was US$192.49 million, that is, 52.7 percent of the
total Japanese economic assistance to Asia (Table 1.3).96
The Satō government inherited the previous administration’s line of linking
the preservation of Japanese interests in Southeast Asia with the countering of
communist influence in that region. A few weeks after the inauguration of the
Satō cabinet, the US Department of State noted that Japan “keenly feels the
7,000
6,000
5,000
(million US$)
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
–1,000
Asia Southeast Asia Africa Middle East

South/Central America China South Asia
Figure 1.1 Total Japanese official development assistance (ODA) by region (million US$).
Source: Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs ODA database, www3.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/
shiryo/jisseki/kuni/index.php (accessed February 14, 2017).
Table 1.2 Southeast Asia’s dependency on trade with
Japan by export/import
Year Export (%) Import (%)
1967 26 27
1968 26 28
1969 29 30
1970 34 35
Source: MOFA, Diplomatic Bluebook, 1973, p. 755.
Table 1.3 Percentage of Japanese ODA to Southeast Asia

out of total Japanese ODA to Asia (US$ million)
Asia Southeast Asia %
1969 342.53 164.66 48.0

1970 364.8 192.49 52.7
1971 424.43 220.32 51.9
1972 466.73 295.71 63.3
1973 673.07 411.53 61.1
1974 762.5 480.11 62.9
1975 638.03 425.92 66.7
1976 581.25 425.68 73.2
1977 533.03 307.65 57.7
1978 923.45 588.26 63.7
1979 1,331.15 791.74 59.4
1980 1,382.51 860.93 62.2
Source: Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs ODA database,

www3.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shiryo/jisseki/kuni/index.
php (accessed February 14, 2017).
need to further strengthen and develop friendly relations with the Asian coun-
tries,” including countries such as Indonesia and Cambodia “which are more
sympathetically inclined towards Communist China,” thus maintaining “as great
an influence as possible upon these countries.”97 Similarly, in January 1965, the
Japanese embassy in the United States informed the American secretary of state
that Prime Minister Satō was “deeply disturbed” over Communist China’s
“conduct in Southeast Asia.”98
On the other hand, as previously mentioned, the willingness in Japan to
improve relations with the People’s Republic of China continued. During a
January 1965 summit with President Johnson, Prime Minister Satō made the
point that “politics and trade are differentiated in Japan’s contacts with main-
land China,” and added that Japan “cannot ignore the mainland’s propinquity
and its long history of cultural contact with the Chinese. Therefore, Japan has
developed trade relations with the mainland.”99 To be sure, China’s recent
nuclear tests had increased concern about Chinese intentions. The Cultural
Revolution in China added confusion and uncertainty about the impact of
domestic developments on that country’s external behavior. The reality was that
Satō believed that China had “a greater influence in Asia” compared to the
Soviet Union and that “the nations of Southeast Asia fear China above all.”100
Moreover, the Satō administration viewed Southeast Asia not only as a “Cold
War battlefield” against communism and as an attractive market and source of
raw materials, but also as important in the context of efforts to enhance Japan’s
international profile. As noted by the US Department of State in January 1965,
“Satō intends to expand Japan’s non-military aid to Southeast Asia” not only to
protect Japan’s “vital stake in Southeast Asia” but also “to serve the twin object-
ives of strengthening the US–Japan partnership and increasing Japan’s influence
in world affairs.”101 Indeed, Satō sought to make Japan’s role in the region more
visible. As Foreign Minister Shiina explained to Secretary of State Rusk, the Satō
administration was “re-examining Japan’s policies toward Southeast Asia with
the aim […] of making greater efforts in this area beyond mere commercial
transactions.” These areas included “the development of economic and cultural
ties with political overtones between SEA nations and Japan.”102 However, there
were two challenges to Southeast Asia’s stability and, consequently, to Japanese
interest in the region: they were the situation of Indonesia and the deterioration
of the conflict in Vietnam. These issues are discussed in the following sections.
The Indonesian issue

Similar to the Ikeda administration, also under Prime Minister Satō, Japan fol-
lowed closely the developments in Indonesia and made diplomatic attempts in
relation to them. Over and above the ongoing confrontation with Malaysia, in
January 1965, the situation of Indonesia was complicated by President Sukar-
no’s decision to withdraw the country from the United Nations. Just after the
announcement, Satō sent a cable to the Indonesian president trying, in vain, to
persuade him to change his decision. Meanwhile, Tokyo mobilized its ambas-
sador in Jakarta who, accordingly, had a series of meetings with Sukarno with
“frank exchanges of views, but Sukarno had been adamant.”103 A US Depart-
ment of State confidential paper of January 7, 1965, reported that the Japanese
were growingly concerned about Indonesia and noted that “[t]hey are inclined
to favor a conciliatory approach as a means of keeping Indonesia ‘friendly’ to
Japan and the Free World.” However, such a Japanese conciliatory stance “does
not stem from any sympathy for Sukarno’s policies […].” In fact, “Japan will
be cautious about making commitments to Indonesia that might impair its
position of impartiality and thus undercut its hopes of contributing to a resolu-
tion of the confrontation crisis with Malaysia.”104 A few days later, during talks
with US President Lyndon B. Johnson on January 12, Satō raised the issue of
Indonesia’s withdrawal from the UN. The specter of Communist China tight-
ening its links with Indonesia was at the top of the Japanese prime minister’s
mind. He emphasized to Johnson that the United States should “avoid actions
which would drive Sukarno […] into the arms of Communist China.”105 In the
following months, Japan continued approaches to Sukarno to convince him to
reverse his decision about his country’s participation in the United Nations. As
MOFA officials pointed out, Japan “feels it cannot give up on dealing with
Sukarno; if Indonesia collapses, communism will take over.” Therefore, it was
necessary to take “every opportunity” to have Sukarno and Rahman sit at the
negotiating table.106
A major turning point arrived a few months later in Indonesia, with the
attempted coup of September 30, 1965. Major General Suharto played a key
role in stopping the organizers of the coup from bringing it to completion and
restored order. Following the coup, Suharto’s authority increased, whereas
Sukarno’s power weakened. In March 1966, Suharto took over as the new pres-
ident of Indonesia, ending the Sukarno era. Under Suharto, the tightening of
Beijing–Jakarta relations – an outcome that Tokyo and Washington had been
trying to avoid during the Sukarno administration – was no longer a matter of
concern. Japan supported the stabilization of Indonesia by approving US$30
million in emergency credit for that country.107 Meanwhile, Japanese imports
from Indonesia grew, hence helping Jakarta in those delicate transitional years.
In 1967, 24 percent of Indonesia’s exports went to Japan. That percentage
increased to 31 percent in 1968, 38 percent in 1969, and 50 percent in 1970.108
During 1966, Indonesia and Malaysia established diplomatic relations and their
dispute was settled. This removed a source of instability in Southeast Asia.
Meanwhile, the situation in Vietnam had become by far the largest threat to
regional stability. The Satō administration’s response to this problem is dis-
cussed in the next section.
Tokyo’s dealing with the Vietnam War problem

The Japanese expected a communist takeover in South Vietnam to have reper-
cussions on regional stability, on Japan’s interests in Southeast Asia, and on the
Japanese domestic political situation. Such was the assessment already under the
Ikeda administration. During a meeting with US Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara on July 11, 1964, Fukuda Tokuyasu, the director general of Japan
Defense Agency, stated that if South Vietnam ended up in communist hands, it
would result in the strengthening of the political left in Japan and in boosting
its opposition to the Japan–US Security Treaty and the presence of American
bases on Japanese territory. Fukuda also pointed out that an American defeat in
South Vietnam would mean a loss of commercial opportunities in Southeast
Asia.109 From a broader regional perspective, Fukuda argued that a communist
victory in South Vietnam would have repercussions in several countries, includ-
ing Thailand and Indonesia, whereas in South Korea it would possibly boost the
local Communists’ activities. Japan would certainly be affected by the materiali-
zation of such a regional scenario.110 The Satō administration’s stance on the
Vietnam problem emerged in a meeting that Satō had in December 1964 with
US Ambassador Reischauer. The Japanese prime minister expressed hope that
the United States “would remain firm and not pull out” from Vietnam, but
believed the American bombings of North Vietnam were “a great mistake.” For
Satō, “the most important problem is to create civil stability and protect people
against guerillas.”111 A few days later, during talks with President Johnson, Satō
expressed his view that “[n]either an advance north nor American withdrawal
was desirable. The latter would provoke a ‘falling domino’ situation. The US
should hold on” and be patient.112
Japan’s position on the Vietnamese issue was largely influenced by the exist-
ence within Japan of opposition to the American military intervention in
Vietnam. As Ambassador Reischauer explained in a May 1965 telegram to the
State Department, the Satō administration had expressed in public its under-
standing and moral support for the American actions in Vietnam. However,
public opinion in Japan had been “overwhelmingly critical” and “[e]ven gov-
ernment leaders, realizing the political danger of getting too far out of line
with public opinion, have tended to be somewhat equivocal in their statements
of support […].” Reischauer assessed that such a reaction by the Japanese
public was a result of “fear that Japan might become involved in the war if it
further escalates” and of “a natural sympathy in Japan for the apparent ‘under-
dogs’ in the bombings, since they are racially, culturally and geographically
closer to the Japanese than are the Caucasians who come from afar, armed with
superior weapons.” A third factor highlighted by Reischauer was the existence
among the Japanese of a sense of “identification of the American position [in
Vietnam] with that of the Japanese armies in China before and during the
Second World War.”113
Although there were those within MOFA who supported the US policy in
Vietnam, including bombing activities against North Vietnam,114 critical voices
of the American military operations in North Vietnam existed. In April 1965,
during working-level policy planning talks between officials of the US Depart-
ment of State and of MOFA, the Japanese side expressed “major reservations
[…] regarding the wisdom and utility” of the American bombing of North
Vietnam. MOFA officials showed “a strong preference for a formula under
which the United States would temporarily suspend bombing during a period
of mediation” and suggested a temporary suspension of bombings and the
setting up of a mechanism – “to collect evidence regarding continued DRV
[Democratic Republic of Vietnam] activities in South Vietnam” – in which the
Japanese expressed readiness to participate. They also “made the implicit sug-
gestion that a cessation of bombing on the US part be lined with a cessation of
infiltration on the part of North Vietnam.”115
Nakae Yōsuke, a MOFA official who, in the second half of the 1960s, served
in the Japanese embassy in Saigon and later became director general of MOFA’s
Asia Bureau, confirmed that several people within MOFA did not completely
support the United States on the Vietnamese issue. For example, the thinking
within the Asia Bureau was that it was necessary to address the Vietnam problem
from the point of view of what was best for the Vietnamese people. Such an
approach, according to Nakae, was different from the one of MOFA’s North
American Affairs Bureau.116 Differences existed also in the understanding of the
nature of the North Vietnamese struggle. Nakae pointed out that, in Japan,
there were those who believed that rather than being a communist, North
Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh was a nationalist who was pursuing a struggle
for his country’s liberation and independence.117 Miyazawa Kiichi, a Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) politician and future prime minister of Japan, explained
in 1965 that Vietnam was not likely to end up under the influence of China.
The reason was the existence among Vietnamese people of some fear of the
Chinese which was the result of the difficult history of Sino-Vietnamese rela-
tions, characterized by Chinese invasions of Vietnam. On the other hand,
according to Miyazawa, the Americans were “seriously convinced that they are
fighting [in Vietnam] to counter China, thus to protect Vietnamese people’s
freedom and democracy.”118 In other words, Miyazawa disagreed with the US
belief that a communist victory in Vietnam would lead to the formation of a
regional communist bloc under Chinese influence because such a belief did not
take into consideration the Vietnamese people’s difficult feelings toward the
Chinese. Nevertheless, Miyazawa still believed that if the whole of Southeast
Asia ended up under Chinese influence this would be “a significant obstacle” for
Japan’s trade with Southeast Asia.119
One effect of the existence of domestic opposition to the Vietnam War was
that, during much of 1965, Japan’s support for the US policy in the region was
“inhibited” and Japan was “discouraged” from providing aid to the South Viet-
namese.120 Miyake Wasuke, a MOFA official who, in 1969, became director of
the First Southeast Asia Division (which was in charge of Indochina) revealed
that the United States requested Japan to provide economic aid to South
Vietnam but, due to domestic political opposition to providing large quantities
of aid to Saigon, Japan focused on the provision of humanitarian aid.121 As a
background, by mid-1965, Tokyo had contributed non-military aid to South
Vietnam for a total amount of US$1.5 million. This added to the US$39
million in reparations that Tokyo had previously agreed upon with South
Vietnam. Nevertheless, despite the highly sensitive nature of the Vietnam
problem, Japan, always acting with caution, made attempts to create the
environment for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. As part of these efforts,
Tokyo sought to convince the North Vietnamese to sit at the negotiating table.
Not having diplomatic relations with Hanoi, the Japanese endeavored to have
their message delivered to North Vietnamese authorities through the Soviet
Union. Tokyo also sought Moscow’s cooperation to persuade Hanoi to nego-
tiate. When MITI Minister Miki Takeo visited the USSR in July 1965, during
talks with Premier Kosygin he raised the issue of Vietnam and of the need to
reach a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Washington did not oppose Japanese
efforts vis-à-vis the Soviets “to urge Hanoi to enter into unconditional discus-
sions,” but was skeptical that the Soviets had “any appreciable influence” with
the North Vietnamese.122 President Johnson’s decision in December 1965 to
temporarily suspend the bombing of North Vietnam boosted Japanese moves
for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. In January 1966, Foreign Minister
Shiina went on a mission to Moscow. Before his departure, he explained the
objective of his trip by stating that “[t]he ChiComs are trying to prevent Hanoi
from negotiating because continuation of the war will benefit Peking.” There-
fore, he was about to go to Moscow hoping “to urge the USSR to influence
Hanoi toward negotiations.”123 In Moscow, Shiina met with Foreign Minister
Gromyko and told him that the United States was ready to stop the conflict,
but “unless Hanoi also inclined to stop war, there would be no solution.” The
Japanese foreign minister then urged his counterpart to “exert influence on
Hanoi to come to a conference,” but Gromyko maintained an inflexible atti-
tude and made the point that the Vietnam problem could be solved if the
United States ended its military operations, withdrew from Vietnam, and
abided by the Geneva agreement.124 Meanwhile, in late January 1966, Prime
Minister Satō dispatched former diplomat Yokoyama Masayuki on a mission to
a number of countries in Europe and Asia “to meet with North Vietnamese
diplomatic representatives in an attempt to foster support for a peace confer-
ence on Vietnam.” As before, however, the mission did not bear immediate
fruit.125 A channel with Hanoi was opened in Moscow by the Japanese ambas-
sador, who began to meet periodically with the North Vietnamese ambassador
to discuss the Vietnamese situation and possible ways to end hostilities.
However, “after four meetings – in July, September, and December 1966, and
in January 1967 – the North Vietnamese ambassador was reassigned and the
talks ceased.” Japan tried in vain to open a similar channel with the new North
Vietnamese ambassador. Other options were explored, with Prime Minister
Satō giving instructions in March 1967 to “Japanese embassies in locations
having North Vietnamese representation to attempt to open a diplomatic dia-
logue.”126 A few months later, in July and August 1967, Foreign Minister Miki
embarked on a trip to USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, all coun-
tries that had close contacts with North Vietnam. Miki sought their
cooperation to induce Hanoi to reach a peaceful settlement of the conflict.
During discussions with the Polish foreign minister on July 26, Miki tried to
persuade him to use Polish channels with the Soviet Union, Communist China,
and North Vietnam with the ultimate objective of a peaceful settlement of the
Vietnam conflict.127 The following day, Miki met his Hungarian counterpart
and, pointing out that Hungary had deep relations with Hanoi as well as con-
tacts with the United States, asked the Hungarian foreign minister if his
country could play a “mediation role” between North Vietnam and the United
States. Miki also asked the Hungarians to inform Hanoi that Japan was always
available to contribute to a resumption of peace in Vietnam.128 Commenting
on this type of Japanese diplomatic effort, Alexis Johnson, the US ambassador
in Japan between 1966 and early 1969, stated that “[t]he Japanese government
tried to act as intermediary several times, as did many other governments, but
was cold-shouldered by Hanoi.”129 Despite the failures of the Japanese
attempts, Vice Foreign Minister Shimoda Takesō provided an explanation of
Tokyo’s intensified diplomatic activity on the Vietnam problem. As reported by
Ambassador Johnson, Shimoda told him that the fact that Japan could not
provide military help “gave it a special ability to take advantage of whatever
openings for diplomatic resolution presented themselves.”130
In addition to the above-mentioned intensification of Japanese overtures to
create the condition for negotiations among the warring parties, starting from
about 1966, Japan increased its support for the US policy in Vietnam. Ambas-
sador Johnson reported from Tokyo that “[d]uring 1966 the Vietnam hostili-
ties, while still a source of concern in Japan, dropped noticeably in prominence
as an irritant in US–Japan relations.” This was a result of factors such as the
“[i]ncreasing understanding in Japan of the Vietnam situation resulted from the
bombing pause and peace offensive at the start of 1966” and “from the repeated
displays of the Communists’ unwillingness to negotiate […].” Moreover,
Ambassador Johnson noted that,
growing recognition in Japan of the importance for that country of the

defense of South Vietnam against Communist attack, and the unacceptabil-
ity to Japan of the simple alternatives such as US withdrawal from Vietnam
or settlement there on Communist terms.
Therefore, even though the Japanese “continued to avoid direct involvement

even in significant economic aid to South Vietnam,” they undertook several
initiatives to promote a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. However, “[t]he desire
to preserve a sufficiently uncommitted posture to make such efforts credible to
Hanoi joined with domestic political concerns in inhibiting strong open backing
for South Vietnam.”131 As evidence of Satō’s somewhat less cautious tone com-
pared to previous statements he made on the Vietnam problem, in July 1965,
Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer reported that the Japanese prime minister,
referring to the American bombings of North Vietnam, had told him that
“although international reaction at this time might not be good […] the US
had to carry through with military actions, good results of which would be
recognized later.” However, Satō added that “it was important […] to concen-
trate attacks on military facilities and at the same time keep up talk about will-
ingness to negotiate.”132
Reflecting the Satō administration’s increased support for the American
policy in Vietnam, Tokyo invited South Vietnam Foreign Minister Tran Van Do
to visit Japan in April 1967; then, in October of the same year, Satō visited
South Vietnam. Satō received a request from the United States to make the
visit. According to Kusuda Minoru, Satō’s private secretary from 1967 to 1972,
Satō believed that accepting the American request to visit South Vietnam would
represent “a plus” in the context of negotiations for the reversion of Okinawa.
As Satō stated on July 14, 1967, at the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Upper
House, “with the current situation in Vietnam, the reversion of Okinawa is not
possible. The end of the Vietnam War is the top priority.” At the same time,
Satō was convinced that visiting South Vietnam would show Japan’s commit-
ment to the cause of the Free World and that this would also open the way for a
Japanese role under international spotlights when a peace process in Vietnam
would start.133 The idea of Satō’s visit to Saigon, however, met with strong
resistance, not only from opposition parties in Japan, but also from within part
of the LDP itself. Politicians such as Fujiyama Aiichirō were particularly critical
of Satō’s trip to South Vietnam. Kusuda Minoru revealed that, on July 11,
1967, Fujiyama and Maeo Shigesaburō of the LDP met with Prime Minister
Satō and told him that his visit to South Vietnam would result in the loss of
Japan’s free diplomatic position and in embroiling Japan with the warring coun-
tries. Despite this criticism, Prime Minister Satō and the LDP politicians who
supported the visit maintained the position that it was natural for Satō to visit
South Vietnam and that in case future talks started to settle the Vietnamese con-
flict, participants in such talks would be the warring parties and those countries
which had shown “a concrete interest.” Therefore, in order to make sure that
Japan’s could have a say in a future Vietnamese peace process, it was a good
thing to “create a record” by having Satō visit South Vietnam.134 According to
Satō’s private secretary, Kusuda, the prime minister’s thinking was that,
if he avoided [to visit] Vietnam – which had become the focal point in Asia
– while continuing to speak of the need to push ahead [Japan’s] Asia diplo-
macy, the whole world would view Japan’s diplomatic line as lip service and
would therefore be critical [of Japan].
Therefore, Satō thought that it was “necessary to avoid such [a negative]

impression about Japan.”135
Regional cooperation and Japan

Under the Satō administration, Japan became involved in the establishment of
frameworks for regional cooperation, marking some degree of broadening of
the Japanese bilateral approach to the region. In April 1965, President Johnson
delivered a speech in Baltimore at the John Hopkins University. In his address,
the president called for Southeast Asian countries to cooperate to develop their
region and announced he would request that Congress endorse a “billion-dollar
investment” as an American contribution to that end. Johnson also mentioned
interventions to promote the development of sectors such as health and educa-
tion.136 Secretary of State Rusk pointed out to President Johnson that Japan
“was more forthcoming than any other” in responding to his John Hopkins’
proposal for Southeast Asia. The Japanese “indicated readiness to give leader-
ship in forming the Southeast Asia Development Bank, to study participation in
the Southeast Asia Development Fund, and to explore other means for acceler-
ating economic development in the area.”137 In 1965, the Japanese launched an
initiative: the Ministerial Conference for the Economic Development of South-
east Asia which, in April 1966, held its first session in Tokyo. Participants were
Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and Japan. Indo-
nesia and Cambodia were observers, and Burma chose not to participate. The
objective of this Japanese initiative was to promote regional solidarity and
cooperation by gathering Southeast Asian nations and have them discuss issues
related to their economic development – in fields such as agriculture, education,
health, industry, transportation, and communication – and ways to cooperate
on them.138 On the basis of a decision adopted at the first Ministerial Confer-
ence for the Economic Development of Southeast Asia, the first Conference for
the Agricultural Development of Southeast Asia was held in Tokyo in December
1966. Participants included Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philip-
pines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Japan, and representatives of FAO,
ECAFE, and the Asian Development Bank. As explained by MOFA’s Economic
Cooperation Bureau, the basis for this initiative was the objective of gathering
countries of the region to discuss issues related to their agricultural development
and make proposals for agricultural policies.139 In the same month, the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) was established with the objective of promoting eco-
nomic growth and cooperation in the region. Japan actively supported its estab-
lishment and committed US$200 million to it.
Despite these Japanese contributions, Washington wanted Japan to do more.
When Prime Minister Satō visited the United States in November 1967, Pres-
ident Johnson requested that Japan buy US$500 million in securities, to
increase its contribution to the ADB Special Fund by providing US$200
million, and to provide more aid to South Vietnam. In making his request,
Johnson made the point that “Japan can’t send men [to Vietnam], but it would
seem that she could provide dollars […].” Satō replied he would try his best on
these matters.140 A few months later, there was an important development in
relation to the Vietnam conflict. In the aftermath of the Tet Offensive, launched
in late January 1968 by North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces, President
Johnson announced on March 31, 1968, a partial suspension of American
bombings in North Vietnam as a move to favor negotiations with the North
Vietnamese. He also announced he would not seek re-election in the forthcom-
ing presidential election. Johnson’s statements signaled that important changes
were about to take place in the region.
Conclusion
Two interconnected dimensions explain the importance of Southeast Asia in
Japan’s foreign policy during the 1950s and 1960s. On the one hand, the
region became instrumental for the pursuit of a primary national goal, namely,
the postwar recovery of Japan’s economy. After Japan lost access to China’s
markets and natural resources as a result of defeat in the Pacific War, South-
east Asia was identified as the “replacement” for China. On the other hand,
the development of Japanese economic relations with this region was threat-
ened by the risk of the spread of communist influence in Southeast Asia; in
this regard, China represented the main source of concern. In this context,
promoting the economic development of Southeast Asia became a main
objective of Japan’s policy toward the region during this period. Increasing
the size of the economies and the living standards in the region was viewed by
Tokyo as beneficial from two points of view: first, to enhance those countries’
capacity to “buy and sell,” that is, to make them more valuable economic part-
ners for Japan; and second, to minimize the risk that those countries could
end up under the influence of Communist China. Japan’s policy toward
Southeast Asia in this period was, therefore, largely shaped around a more
immediate economic interest and the protection of such interest. At the same
time, Japanese war reparations, economic assistance, and initiatives for regional
multilateral cooperation also helped the process of mending relations with
Southeast Asia, although, in this phase, this motivation was still not as strong
as it would be later as a driver in Japan’s approach to the region. Nevertheless,
the awareness of the need to rebuild relations with countries of this region not
only influenced Japan’s approach to Southeast Asia but also represented a
point of difference with the United States, whose involvement in the region
was largely based on Cold War strategy motivations. In order to realize its
objectives in Southeast Asia, Japan relied heavily on an “economic diplomacy”
centered on trade, investments, and economic assistance to Southeast Asian
countries. This approach continued under the several Japanese administrations
of this period.
As discussed in this chapter, some of the Japanese leaders and decision-
makers viewed improving relations with this region as important in the
process of rebuilding and enhancing Japan’s role in international affairs. To be
sure, at that time, this was not yet a well-articulated goal of Tokyo’s foreign
policy in the region. Being well aware of the legacy of the Pacific War, in this
period the Japanese preferred to maintain a rather cautious and low-profile
approach in their regional diplomacy. Nevertheless, the idea of Japan acting as
a bridge between Asia and the West as well as a promoter of regional prosper-
ity, stability, and cooperation was circulating among some of the Japanese
policymakers and leaders. In this period, Japan actually became involved in
efforts to peacefully solve regional problems such as the conflict between
Indonesia and Malaysia and the Vietnam War. However, especially on the
Vietnamese problem, as an ally of the United States, Japan was hardly in a
position to act as a neutral broker and, as a matter of fact, its diplomatic initi-
atives were not successful.
During the 1950s and 1960s, the above-mentioned Japanese objectives and
concerns in Southeast Asia were largely shared by the United States. Although it
rejected some of the Japanese initiatives for the economic development of
Southeast Asia, Washington encouraged the expansion of Japan’s economic
relations with this region as a way to both support Japan’s economic recovery
and to counter the advance of communist forces in that region. However, it is
important to point out that Japan’s economic and diplomatic initiatives to
develop and stabilize Southeast Asia were based on policy objectives toward
Southeast Asia that were consistently pursued by the several administrations ana-
lyzed in the chapter. In fact, even though Japan was acting as an ally of the
United States and as a member of the Free World, Tokyo was simultaneously
pursuing its own interests in the region. In other words, in this period, there
was a commonality in the Japanese and American objectives and strategies
toward Southeast Asia.
In the late 1960s, important developments in US Asia policy opened new
scenarios for the future of the region. The new American president, Richard
Nixon, whose mandate was inaugurated in January 1969, was determined to
pursue an “honorable peace” in Vietnam and to end the US involvement in the
conflict. If, on the one hand, this development increased hopes for a resumption
of peace in Indochina, on the other hand, in Japan it created uncertainty about
the implications of a possible withdrawal of American forces from the region.
These changes in the American regional policy occurred at the same time with
signals of US willingness to improve relations with the Soviet Union and China.
How did these developments affect Japan’s Southeast Asia policy? What was
Japan’s response to them? These questions are addressed in the next chapter.
Notes
1 Gaimushō (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs), “For the Atlantic Monthly.
‘Japan’s Place in Asia,’ by Shigeru Yoshida,” in “Sutetomenuto narabi ni enzetsuan”
[Statement and draft speeches], December 1, 1954, “Yoshida sōri Ōbei hōmon
ryokō kankei kiroku” [Records of Prime Minister Yoshida’s visit to Europe and the
US], microfilm A-0136, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Japan (hereafter DAMOFA); Shigeru Yoshida, “Japan’s Place in Asia,” Atlantic
Monthly (January 1955): 102.
2 Gaimushō, “Address by Prime Minister Yoshida, National Press Club,” November
8, 1954, Washington, DC, in “Sutetomenuto narabi ni enzetsuan,” “Yoshida sōri
Ōbei hōmon ryokō kankei kiroku,” microfilm A-0136, DAMOFA.
3 Shigeru Yoshida, “Random Thoughts from Ōiso,” 1957, 1, and 1961, 8–9, in
Shigeru Yoshida, Ōiso zuisō: sekai to Nihon [Essays from Ōiso: the world and Japan]
(Chūōkōronsha 2015).
4 Gaimushō, “Tōnan Ajia to no keizai kyōryoku” [Economic cooperation with South-
east Asia], May 19, 1954, in “Yoshida sōri Ōbei hōmon kankei ikken” [Prime Minister
Yoshida’s visit to Europe and the US: one case], microfilm A-0137, DAMOFA.
5 Gaimushō, “Trip and General Questions,” in “Yoshida sōri Ōbei hōmon kankei
ikken,” microfilm A-0137, DAMOFA.
6 Shigeru Yoshida, “Random Thoughts from Ōiso” 1958, 8–9, in Yoshida, Ōiso zuisō.
7 Gaimushō, “Tōnan Ajia to no keizai kyōryoku.”
8 Gaimushō, “For the Atlantic Monthly.”
9 Gaimushō, “Trip and General Questions.”
10 Ajia-kyoku (Asia Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan [hereafter, Asia
Bureau]), “Tōnan Ajia ni okeru kyōsan seiryoku no dōkō” [Trends of communist
forces in Southeast Asia], May 18, 1954, in “Yoshida sōri Ōbei hōmon kankei
ikken,” microfilm A-0137, DAMOFA.
11 Gaimushō, “Tōnan Ajia to no keizai kyōryoku.”
12 Ibid.
13 “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy to the Consultant (Allison),” Wash-
ington, January 18, 1951, Foreign Relations of the US (hereafter FRUS), 1951,
Vol. 6, Part 1, 804–805.
14 Ibid., 805.
15 “Statement of Policy by the National Security Council on US Objectives and
Courses of Action with Respect to Southeast Asia,” FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. 12,
Part 1, 127, 129.
16 Dwight D. Eisenhower. The President’s News Conference,” April 7, 1954, www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10202 (accessed September 10, 2016).
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Milly's face crimsoned. "Not till I'm grown up," she exclaimed eagerly. "I can't leave Emily
for a good while yet."
"I suppose the Hindoos are not very neat."
"Oh, no! I never thought about it till I came here; but the bungalows are awfully dirty. The
people have to bathe in the water tanks made for them. That is one of their laws; but they
are filthy after all."
"That is true," said grandma, "of all people who do not have the Bible to guide them. One
of the first changes which the poor heathen make when they learn about God our heavenly
Father, and his Son our Saviour, is cleanliness."
Milly started up and clasped her hands, her eyes shining like stars.
"I know it I know it! One of our women went to the sahibs, that means missionaries, and
learned to read the Bible. Everybody said she was better than before. She always wore
such clean sarrees, that's the kind of dress Hindoo women have. I used to wear them, too.
And she kept her hair smooth. I never thought though about its being the Bible that made
her so much nicer."
"Yes, Milly, that is always the effect of true godliness."
CHAPTER VIII.
THE MISSIONARIES.
"SHALL I tell you a story about an Indian girl, who lived this side of the Rocky Mountains?"
"Is that near Calcutta, ma'am?"
"No, it is our own country. She belonged to a tribe called Cherokees, and her name was
Iwassee."
"Until some good missionaries went to her tribe to tell them about the great God who
made the sun and moon, the boundless forests and the swift running rivers, Iwassee knew
nothing what would become of her soul when her body was tied up in a tree for the birds
to pick the flesh from the bones. She lived in a kind of tent without glass, with a hole in
the top to let out the smoke when they kindled a fire on the heap of stones inside."
"Her parents had no money; but her father used to go out to the forest with his bow and
arrows, and bring home some wild fowl or a deer on his back. Her dresses, when it was
cold enough for her to wear dresses, were made from the bark of trees. On her feet, she
wore moccasins of deer skin. In the winter, her mother worked moccasins with wampum or
bead-work, to be sold to visitors."
"Iwassee, as she grew older, helped her mother to tan the skins of the bears, wolves and
deer, which her father killed. These skins were their beds and seats. They were thrown on
the floor or ground inside the tent. Iwassee herself, her father, mother and all her tribe
were savages. They lived from day to day only to eat, sleep and carouse. They knew
nothing of the pleasures which Christians enjoy. They quarrelled, stole from each other,
told lies to cover their guilt, and broke every one of God's commands. They were filthy,
too, filthy in their own persons, in their dress, in their food, and in their tents. They
thought it quite too much trouble to wash their clothes often, or to keep their tents in
order."
"Their arrows were hung in a quiver near their bows, on a peg in their tents. The kettle
they cooked their venison in, was hung there too, unwashed from month to month. They
would have thought it very foolish to sweep out the floor of the tents, about which the
vermin were running, or to have washed and cleansed their own bodies. They much
preferred, when their work was done, to lounge on the grass in the sun and think of
nothing."
"Poor Iwassee lived year after year in this way, until the missionaries, I spoke of, went to
the tribe. It was a terrible trial for the wife, who had been brought up so delicately, to
settle down in the midst of such pollution. Even the touch of the filthy women and girls,
whose soiled garments were alive with vermin, was dreadful. Nothing but their love to
Jesus Christ, and their desire to tell these poor heathen about him could have induced this
intelligent Christian lady to remain there a day."
"But this love was so strong, they were glad to obey his command to preach the gospel of
salvation to every creature. The missionary put up his tent in the wilderness, and then
called the people together to talk to them in their own language about God. Iwassee was
one of the first who went to hear the talk. When she learned of the love of Jesus Christ for
poor sinners, tears of joy ran down her swarthy cheeks. Her heart began to swell with love
and gratitude to him. She could not leave the spot. She went to the missionaries' tent
early and late to beg them to tell her more; and when Mrs. Johnson assured her that
Christ was waiting to be her friend, she threw herself on the ground in a transport of joy.
She was the first of the tribe who accepted Jesus as her Saviour; but she was not the last;
for the labors of the good missionaries were greatly blessed."
"When Iwassee had once felt her need of pardon and had found her Saviour, she did not
stop there. She saw how comfortably the tent of the Christians looked; what a contrast to
the filth and confusion in her father's. She told the Missionary's wife her trouble, and the
lady encouraged her to strive after cleanliness, as one of the first of Christian virtues. She
opened the book which contains God's word and read: 'Wo to her that is filthy!' She told
her that everywhere in the Bible, sin and uncleanliness are named together, while order
and cleanliness follow holiness."
"Iwassee listened and remembered. The next time she went to the Missionaries' tent, she
looked so different, that the lady scarcely knew her. She had always been in the habit, like
other women of her tribe, of oiling her face with bear's or other grease, and staining her
nails. Now she had bathed in the stream which ran through the settlement, and in the best
manner she could, had made herself tidy."
"This was very cheering to Mrs. Johnson. She took courage to talk with other women of the
tribe. In two or three years, there was a wonderful change. Many of the men and women
had become earnest Christians, and took the Bible for their guide. It was of course very
hard for them to give up their old habits; but when they found that God requires it, when
Mrs. Johnson read to them such passages as these: 'Then will I sprinkle clean water upon
you, and ye shall be clean; from all your filthiness and all your idols will I cleanse you;'
they did make great efforts to be clean. If any stranger visited the tribe, and walked along
by the tents, it was not necessary to tell him:"
"'Here lives a man who has become a Christian.' He could see that for himself. Everything
about the small home looked thriving and attractive. The tents were better too. Sometimes
a log hut had been made, set in a small garden. Sometimes too, there were bright-colored
blossoms before the doors. When the people assembled on the Sabbath either under a tree
or a large tent, Mr. and Mrs. Johnson no longer shrank from their touch. They were clean
and dressed according to their fashion, in neat garments."
CHAPTER IX.
ORDER FROM CONFUSION.
"So you are at your old business of telling stories, grandma," exclaimed Mr. Morgan.
Milly caught the old lady's hand, kissed it, and ran from the room.
After half an hour, her aunt found her in a grand hurly burly of clearing up. Her cheeks
were brilliant with excitement as she cried out:
"Oh, Aunt Priscilla! I'm going to make my room look as nice as Emily's. I never knew
before that only the heathen were so disorderly. That's the reason Emily is so neat, and
has her drawers all fixed up, because she is so very good a Christian."
"But, Milly, it will take a day at least to restore your clothes to their places. Why did you
not arrange one drawer, or one shelf at a time?"
"Because," answered Milly, her eyes sparkling, "I wanted to do it quick. Do you think when
I'm done, Emily's grandma will look at it?"
"Yes, indeed, it was her story, then, that suggested such a grand overturn?"
"Yes, aunty; and I'm going to try real hard to keep my things in order."
"That's right, dear. Did grandma repeat to you this verse? 'Let all things be done decently
and in order?'"
"I didn't hear it. I wish the Hindoos knew about the Bible. They're awful; but I didn't think
about its being bad, till I came here. When I go back, I shall tell them what God says."
"Milly, Milly, where are you?"
It was Emily's voice in the hall. Naturally amiable and affectionate, she had become greatly
attached to her cousin, whose ardent, impulsive nature, and stronger traits harmonized
well with her gentler ones.
Mrs. Morgan with a glance of dismay around the chamber into which one could scarcely
find a standing place, was just returning to the parlor, when she stopped to see what Emily
would say to all this confusion.
"Why, Milly Lewis! What are you doing?" exclaimed the little girl, holding up her hands in
surprise.
"I'm fixing my room up," answered Milly, coloring at Emily's tone.
"Don't you want me to help you? But I forgot, Papa's going to take us to ride, I came to
call you."
"Oh, dear! What shall I do? I'm sorry I began to be neat to-day."
"Come and ride," suggested Emily, "then I'll help you put away your things."
"Well, I will."
"You must make yourself look nicely, you know," urged Emily, archly. "Where's your
brush?"
"I don't believe anything is anywhere," was the mournful reply. "I laid my sack down; but I
can't find it, nor my hat either."
"Emily! Milly! Come, now, if you're going with me," called papa from below.
Milly flew about throwing the clothes with which the chairs were covered upon the floor.
"Oh, that is not the way to find anything! Where did you see your sack last?"
"Milly," said her aunt, coming to her aid, "I will give you your choice to go to ride and leave
your room in this confusion, or to stay at home and take a lesson from me in order."
"I want to go with Emily," began the child. Then with a face full of resolution, she added:
"No, Aunt Priscilla, I'll stay at home."
"That's a dear child," said her aunt, kissing her. "Now run and carry this shawl to grandma
to tuck around her, and then we'll go to work in earnest."
"Now," added the lady, when Milly returned, "We will make a beginning by hanging all the
dresses in the closet. After this, remember that it is not a good way to turn closets and
drawers inside out. Take one thing at a time; or what is better yet, keep everything in
place so that there is no need of such an overturn."
"I must put all the skirts in the closets, too," exclaimed Milly. "Oh, here's my lost sack!
Where shall I hang that?"
"Fix upon one hook and always hang it there. Then you will not be in danger of losing a
drive, because you can't find it."
"I'll keep it on this one, because it's low, and my thick sack can go on the next hook."
"Here are two shelves, Milly. I would take the upper one for my school hat, and the lower
for shoes. There, the closet begins to look in order. Run to Hannah for her hand brush and
pan. The bits of paper must be swept up."
CHAPTER X.
MILLY'S CHAMBER.
"OH, Aunt Priscilla! You're so kind to help me. Doesn't it look beautifully? What shall we do
next?"
Mrs. Morgan paused and looked around her. They had made a beginning; but it was only a
beginning. Every article was taken from the drawers; the books from the rack were
tumbled over the floor.
"Why did you take down the books, my dear?" she asked mildly.
"I saw Emily dusting hers this morning, so I—"
"But you did not see her throw down the volumes in this way. You should take down two or
three at a time, dust them and then put them back. You'll remember after this."
"Yes, indeed, Aunty."
"Perhaps we had better do the drawers first; and then we can have space to walk around.
But what is this? Crumbs?"
"I put my cake there, the day my head ached; and then I forgot it."
"Oh, what a pity! See how it has soiled this pretty ribbon. I wouldn't bring cake up stairs.
Hannah will take care of any such thing for you."
"I won't do it again. I'm going to be real good. Do you think, Aunt Priscilla, that I can be as
good us Emily?"
"In what particular do you mean?"
"Why, as good a Christian. If I was, I'd be neat and kind as she is, of course."
"I hope, Milly, that you already love the Saviour. You know he came to wash and cleanse
us from all sin. If you pray to him to help you conquer all your bad habits, he will do it. He
always helps those who try to obey his commands; and you are trying now to do all things
'decently and in order.' You must remember that Emily has been taught to be neat from
her babyhood."
"And I had nobody to tell me about anything good," exclaimed the child, with a burst of
feeling.
"God our Father knows all that. He never expects from us more than we can do. While you
were ignorant of the duty of cleanliness and order, he was not displeased with you for
being untidy."
"But now he will be. But what if I forget?"
"No doubt you will occasionally; but every day your habit of neatness will be strengthening
until it will never occur to you to throw your hat on one chair, your sack on the hall table,
and your books somewhere else. You will hang your sack on this hook, put your hat on the
shelf, and your books in the place I gave you for them."
"Oh, aunty! There's the door-bell. I do hope nobody will call to see you; but I could go on
by myself now; at any rate I'd 'try, try again,' as the verse says."
"Mrs. Lang to see you, ma'am," said Hannah, opening the door.
Mrs. Morgan looked as though she was sorry; but Milly insisted that she could do the rest.
"Finish one drawer at a time then," said her aunt. "Find all the articles that go in it, and
then take another."
"I'll sweep up your room for you," said Hannah, kindly. "There'll be a good many scraps
about."
"Thank you, Hannah," and Milly began to sing at the top of her voice one of her favorite
songs:
"Flowers, wild wood flowers."
At length, the upper drawer is in order. The child stands and gazes into it with pride.
"It looks just like Emily's," she murmurs. "Now, if I can only keep it so; but it is so hard
when I am in a hurry, to stop and put back the things. I'll lock it till Emily comes. I'll ask
her to bring grandma in here. Oh, what a nice grandma she is! What good stories she tells.
Oh, here is the Chinese puzzle, Uncle George gave me!"
On the floor, she drops to put together the pieces of the game. Five, ten, fifteen minutes
fly quickly away; but she is so absorbed in making squares and oblongs and
parallelograms out of the smooth, ivory pieces, that she knows nothing about the time.
"Are you ready for me?" asks Hannah, coming in with a broom and dust pan. "Why, Milly,
what are you doing?"
"I'm sorry, Hannah." The child's tone was humble, and her countenance expressed such
real regret that the girl could not scold, as at first she felt inclined to do.
"I've done one drawer, and it looks real nice; but then I found my puzzle, and I forgot. I'll
fix the rest just as quick as I can."
"Well," said Hannah, "you ought not to have stopped to play till your work was done; but it
can't be helped now. You just bring me all the under clothes, and I'll fold them for you.
Seems to me I wouldn't toss everything about so again."
"No, I never shall. I'm beginning to be neat, now. Grandma has been telling us a story
about it. You know the Hindoos and the Indians, and everybody who don't have the Bible,
are filthy. The Bible says so," she added, earnestly, seeing Hannah smile. "And just as soon
as they begin to be good, they clean their houses and wash themselves, and make their
hair smooth. I knew a girl who did so in Calcutta. Her name was Waroo. She used to
worship an idol. It was a little brass thing. She kept it hung on the wall. After she learned
of the missionaries about God, she threw away her idol; and then she began to look real
nice. Her sarree was clean; and her face washed. Papa asked her what had come over her,
and she said 'I'm trying to be like the missionaries and worship their God.'"
CHAPTER XI.
A DRIVE TO THE BEACH.
By the time Mr. Morgan, grandma, Cousin Mary and Emily, returned from their drive, Milly's
room looked as neat as possible. Hannah seemed almost as pleased as Milly; and when the
little girl, in an ecstasy of delight kissed her thanks, she said, encouragingly:
"It's a picture to see. If I were you, I'd keep it just so."
To complete her pleasure, grandma and Mrs. Roby came in, on their way to their own
chambers, and praised the little girl for her own self-denial in staying to arrange her room
rather than to go out for a drive.
Every drawer and shelf were opened for inspection, and received great praise.
The next morning, at the breakfast table, Mr. Morgan, after a roguish glance at Milly, said:
"This afternoon, I propose to take you all to the seashore. We must have dinner at twelve,
so that we may have time enough for a ramble on the beach."
"Can we all go in one carriage?" asked mamma.
"I will provide seats enough," Uncle George answered, adding in a mysterious tone, "If
there are any persons here who have been housecleaning of late, those persons are
especially invited."
"I know who you mean, papa," said Emily, laughing. "You mean Milly."
"I mean any little girl who is trying hard to correct her faults."
Milly's face crimsoned with pleasure, while her poor little heart fluttered and beat fast with
love to everybody.
"It's a beautiful world to live in," she said to herself, running to bring her uncle's daily
paper from the door, "and God is just as good to me as he can be."
During the forenoon, Mrs. Ward, a relative of Mrs. Morgan, called to see grandma, who
was a kind of aunt to her.
"We have been anticipating a visit to the beach for a long time," she said, when she heard
of the contemplated drive. "I'll go directly to my husband's office, and ask him to go this
afternoon. Why can't we have a fish chowder on the beach?"
"We can. I'll go at once, and tell cook to pack whatever will be necessary."
"I'll carry a hamper of crackers, cake and coffee, with milk for the children. Ernest will be
crazy with delight, when I tell him. We'll meet at Ruggles street, where we turn off for the
beach. Whoever gets there first will wait for the other. By the way, I'll send over directly, if
William can't go; but I hope he can. Good-by, till afternoon."
Everything turned out in the most satisfactory manner. Mr. Ward declared himself delighted
with the project, said it was just the day for the shore and for chowder. The hampers were
packed, not forgetting a great iron pot and the potato-cutter. On reaching Ruggles street,
Mr. Morgan saw Mr. Ward looking out of a carriage which contained his wife, his sister, and
his three children.
Mr. Ward called out as he turned his horses out of the street, "We've only been here five
minutes. All right. Drive on."
When, after a delightful ride, the party came in sight of the ocean, with the foamy billows,
rolling up, and breaking on the sand, Milly could not restrain her delight. She laughed and
clapped her hands exclaiming:
"I love you, good old ocean!"
Emily, who was much less enthusiastic, gazed at her cousin with some surprise, asking, at
last:
"Why do you love it, Milly?"
"Because it's so blue and so beautiful. Oh you don't know at all by seeing it now, how the
water looks at sea! The waves are as high as mountains, and instead of looking quiet and
blue like this, it is dark green. The ship goes up and down this way. You couldn't help
loving the sea, if you had sailed on it as long as I have."
"Uncle George," whispered the happy child, catching him by the coat as he was helping her
out last of all, "I've got a basket for mosses. Please, don't tell anybody when you see me
picking them."
CHAPTER XII.
MILLY'S ESCAPE.
THE person to be thought of first of all was grandma, who was an old lady, and not very
strong. Mrs. Morgan proposed that she should have a room in the public house close by
the beach, and lie down while the gentlemen caught fish, and others made ready for the
famous chowder. But she said the salt air strengthened her; and she wished to breathe all
she could of it.
So, instead of having the horses taken out at the stable, Uncle George drove down to a
great rock close by the high water mark, and then had the hostler unharness and lead the
horses back.
Mr. Ward thought this a capital idea, and did the same. Then, with the cushions of both
carriages, they made a most comfortable lounge on the back seat, where grandma could
lie and watch everything that was going on.
Mr. Morgan and Mr. Ward then took their fish tackle, and started off for the rocks to catch
rock perch, while the ladies unpacked the baskets, and the children gathered stones into a
heap to set the kettle on, and plenty of sticks for the fire.
All were amused to watch Milly, running here and there in search of a stone of the right
size, then tugging it toward the pile, her eyes shining, her checks rosy, her hat off, and her
hair streaming behind her.
At last, the small chimney, as Ernest called it, was built. And Milly took her basket and
wandered off in search of bright mosses; leaving Emily and Ernest to gather sticks to make
the pot boil.
The other children being too young to run round by themselves, played around the
carriages, or gathered stones and shells within their reach. Emily and Ernest wandered
here and there till they were almost out of sight of the great rock near which the carriages
stood. They had each gathered an armful of broken pieces and were about to return with
them for the fire, when Ernest threw his down and kneeled upon the sand, calling out to
Emily to come and see what he had found.
There, on the smooth, silvery beach, lay a large, round, slippery-looking creature, basking
itself in the sun. Earnest did not know what it was; but by the description, his father
afterwards told him, it was called a jelly fish. It was a disgusting creature; but the boy
didn't care for that. He took one of his sticks, and punched it; and then, as it did not stir,
he told Emily it was dead. When they had examined it as long as they wished, and Emily
had filled her pocket with smooth, bright stones, Ernest picked up his sticks again, and
they went back to the rock.
"Where is Milly?" inquired Mrs. Morgan.
"He took one of his sticks, and punched it."
"I thought she would be back here by this time," answered Emily. "She did not go with us."
"Which way did she go?"
"Round the other side of the rock."

The lady looked very anxious. "I'm afraid she will be lost," she said. "Some of us must go
and look for her."
Cousin Mary Roby, and also Mrs. Ward's sister Jennette, at once volunteered to make the
search. So taking the sun umbrellas, they started off in the direction Emily had seen her
cousin go.
But neither in this, nor in any other direction, could they find her. They inquired of children
coming and going, if they had seen a little girl with a basket; but no one had noticed her.
At last, they were obliged to return without any intelligence of the wanderer.
"What shall we do?" exclaimed her aunt, in real distress. "It was very wrong of her to go
out of sight."
"Oh, mamma! Don't say so," urged Emily. "I'm sure she didn't mean to do wrong."
"Did you call her name, Mary?"
"We tried to; but the roaring of the water quite drowned our feeble voices."
"I must go at once," said Mrs. Morgan, taking a broad rimmed hat from the carriage. "I do
wish George would come."
Just at this moment, there was a loud shout from behind the rock.
"Emily! Emily!"
"Oh, that's Milly!" screamed her cousin. "I'm so very glad."
"So am I," added her mother. "I was really alarmed."
"Why, what have you been doing!" exclaimed Emily, as she caught sight of her cousin
whose clothes were dripping with wet; but whose face was beaming with delight.
"I was almost drowned," said Milly calmly. "But I've got some beauties. Look here!"
She held up her basket, lifting two or three bright red pieces of moss.
"But, Milly, you'll take cold with those wet clothes. Come right to mamma."
"Well, I will, if you'll put this under Uncle George's seat. Don't let any body see you. I'll
show them to you when we get home."
Poor Milly was indeed a sight to behold. She had lost the ribbon that tied back her hair.
And by constantly putting up her wet hands to push the locks from her face, she had
covered her forehead with sand; her boots were saturated with water, and her skirts
dripped with wet. Nobody seemed to know what to do with her, till grandma proposed to
take off her wet garments, wrap her in a shawl, and let her stay in the carriage till her
clothes dried, which they would in a few minutes, if hung in the hot sun.
Lying on the seat beside grandma, with the roaring of the billows to lull her, Milly's tender
heart was at rest.
She told the old lady that she jumped on a rock to look at the waves, and staid there so
long that the water came up all around her. At first, she thought it would go away again;
but it came up higher and higher, until it covered her feet on the rock.
"How did you feel?" asked grandma, greatly moved. "Were you afraid?"
"I was at first, but not after I asked God to take care of me. He knows I've been trying to
be good. Then I thought of Emily; and I felt awful bad when I said 'I shall never see her
again.' So I shut my eyes, and jumped right into the water, and a great wave came and
pushed me right up on the beach. Wasn't God real good to answer my prayer so quick? It
makes me love him dearly, dearly."
"He was indeed, my dear child, I hope you will never forget it."
"No, ma'am, I never shall. When I go back to India, I shall tell my father. I know he'll be
glad, too. I mean to go as soon as I can, so as to tell the poor Hindoos about God. When
they know how to read the Bible they'll learn to be neat, you know."
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Japan and The Shaping of Post Vietnam War Southeast Asia Japanese Diplomacy and The Cambodian Conflict 1978 1993 1st Edition Andrea Pressello

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Japan and The Shaping of Post Vietnam War Southeast Asia Japanese Diplomacy and The Cambodian Conflict 1978 1993 1st Edition Andrea Pressello

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Japan and the shaping of post Vietnam

War Southeast Asia Japanese

Japan and the shaping of post Vietnam War Southeast

China in India s Post Cold War Engagement with

Story of the Vietnam War 1st Edition

The Chronicle of a People's War: The Military and

Chineseness and the Cold War: Contested Cultures and

Conflict in Ukraine The Unwinding of the Post Cold War

Shaping Jerusalem Spatial Planning Politics and the

Cold War Monks Buddhism and America s Secret Strategy

The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978 and the consequent outbreak of

Andrea Pressello is Assistant Professor at the National Graduate Institute for

New Dynamics in US–China Regional Community Building in

Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia Contested Ideas of Regionalism in

ISBN: 978-1-138-20023-4 (hbk)

Introduction: regional conflict, Cold War, and Japan’s

1 Southeast Asia in Japan’s postwar foreign policy,

2 US “exit” and Japanese “entry”: post-­Vietnam War

3 The Cambodian conflict and the polarization of

4 New Cold War and Japan’s pursuit of its regional agenda,

5 The unfolding of Japan’s “twin-­track” diplomacy in

6 Changing Cold War environment and the intensification

7 The Cambodian peace process and the shaping of

A case of passive diplomacy?

Reinterpreting Japan’s Southeast Asia diplomacy after the

Sources and structure

Japan’s postwar economic recovery and Southeast Asia: the

Japan and the threat of communism in the region

[t]he setting up of communist rule in China has already brought to Japan

if Japan is to be on the side of the free world, it will be necessary to assure

The Yoshida administration’s initiative for the development of

After these premises, Yoshida called on Western powers to join Japan in a

all our payments in goods and services should be so channeled as to help

Southeast Asia and the enhancement of Japan’s international profile

Therefore, Yoshida argued,

The Hatoyama administration and Southeast Asia

the US cannot undertake, even in combination with other Western countries

The meaning of Southeast Asia for Prime Minister Kishi

Japan’s economic self-­reliance depends on exports to the US, on the pro-

The Southeast Asia Development Fund proposal

Along similar lines, in December 1957, during a meeting with Australia’s

if this idea [the Southeast Asia Development Fund] is realized, Japan’s

that the proposed organisation [the Southeast Asia Development Fund]

[i]t is in our interest to encourage participation by Japan in SEA economic

with the establishment of official diplomatic relations with this country

Indeed, under him, Japan and Indonesia reached an agreement on reparations

Southeast Asia in Prime Minister Ikeda’s foreign policy

The Ikeda administration and China’s influence in Southeast Asia

The Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation and Japan’s diplomacy

Japan’s relations with Southeast Asia under the Satō

1960 1965 1972

Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports

Total 4,054,537 4,491,132 8,451,742 8,169,019 28,591,144 23,470,711

Source: MOFA, Diplomatic Bluebook, 1973, p. 753.

Asia Southeast Asia Africa Middle East

Year Export (%) Import (%)

Source: MOFA, Diplomatic Bluebook, 1973, p. 755.

Table 1.3 Percentage of Japanese ODA to Southeast Asia

Asia Southeast Asia %

1969 342.53 164.66 48.0

Source: Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs ODA database,

The Indonesian issue

Tokyo’s dealing with the Vietnam War problem

2 US “exit” and Japanese “entry”: post-Vietnam War

5 The unfolding of Japan’s “twin-track” diplomacy in

Japan’s economic self-reliance depends on exports to the US, on the pro-

Table 1.3 Percentage of Japanese ODA to Southeast Asia