DEMURRER RULE 33

REPUBLIC V. DE BORJA (G.R. No. 187448)

Facts:

 Complaint filed by the Republic of the Philippines for the recovery of ill-gotten assets
allegedly amassed by the individual respondents during the administration of President
Ferdinand Marcos.
 Specific respondent in this case is Alfredo R. De Borja.
 Complaint filed before the Sandiganbayan (SB) and sought "Accounting, Reconveyance,
Forfeiture, Restitution, and Damages."
 Allegations that De Borja collected address commissions on behalf of Geronimo Z.
Velasco, President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Oil
Company (PNOC).
 Instead of remitting the address commissions to PNOC, Velasco instructed that they be
remitted to Decision Research Management Company (DRMC), a defendant
corporation in the case.
 Republic claimed that De Borja acted as Velasco's dummy, nominee, and/or agent for
corporations he owned and/or controlled, such as DRMC.

Issue:

 Whether the evidence presented by the Republic is sufficient to prove De Borja's liability.

Ruling:

 The Supreme Court affirmed the Sandiganbayan's decision to grant De Borja's Demurrer
to Evidence.

Ratio:

 A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.

 The question in a demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiff has been able to establish
a prima facie case.
 The Court defers to the factual findings of the trial court and is not a trier of facts.
 The evidence presented by the Republic was insufficient to prove De Borja's liability.
 The only evidence presented against De Borja was the testimony of a witness, Epifanio F.
Verano, and the affidavit of another witness, Jose M. Reyes.
 Verano's testimony was found to be insufficient as he did not know the contents of the
envelopes he claimed to have delivered to De Borja and did not confirm whether De
Borja actually received them.
 Reyes' affidavit was deemed inadmissible as hearsay due to his untimely demise.
 The Republic failed to show any right to the relief sought and therefore, the Demurrer to
Evidence was properly granted.
JUDGMENT RULE 36

DE LEON V PEOPLE (G.R. No. 212623)

Facts:

 Enrique De Leon was charged with grave oral defamation for publicly uttering slanderous
words against SPO3 Pedrito Leonardo.
 The incident occurred on April 17, 2006, in Manila, Philippines.
 De Leon and his son had filed a complaint for grave misconduct against SPO3 Leonardo.
 During the first hearing of the case, De Leon confronted SPO3 Leonardo and made
defamatory remarks.
 SPO3 Leonardo reported the incident and filed a complaint against De Leon.
 The prosecution presented three witnesses, including SPO3 Leonardo, who testified to
the defamatory remarks made by De Leon.
 The defense presented witnesses who claimed that there was a prior incident where SPO3
Leonardo had threatened De Leon with a gun.
 The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) found De Leon guilty of grave oral defamation and
sentenced him to 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor to 1 year, 1 month and 11 days of
prision correccional.
 De Leon appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which affirmed the
MeTC's ruling.
 De Leon then filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals (CA), which
affirmed the RTC's decision with a modification to the penalty imposed.

Issue:

 Whether the MeTC decision lacked necessary facts and law.

 Whether De Leon's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
 Whether the decision was based on personal sentiments harbored by the judge against De
Leon.

Ruling:

 The Supreme Court (SC) ruled that the MeTC decision clearly stated the facts and law on
which it was based.
 The SC upheld the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses, including SPO3 Leonardo,
and found no evidence of bias or partiality on the part of the judge.
 The SC downgraded the offense from grave oral defamation to slight oral defamation.
 The SC considered the relationship between De Leon and SPO3 Leonardo, the timing of
the utterance, and the lack of intent to ridicule or humiliate SPO3 Leonardo.
 The SC modified the MeTC's decision and sentenced De Leon to pay a fine of P200.00
for slight oral defamation.
 De Leon was also ordered to pay P5,000.00 as moral damages to SPO3 Leonardo.

Ratio:
  The SC emphasized that decisions must express clearly and distinctly the facts and law
on which they are based, but there is no rigid formula for the language to be used.
 The SC found that the MeTC decision met this requirement.
 The SC upheld the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses, including SPO3 Leonardo,
and found no evidence of bias or partiality on the part of the judge.
 Judges are presumed to decide cases with impartiality unless there is concrete proof of
bias.
 The SC considered the relationship between De Leon and SPO3 Leonardo, the timing of
the utterance, and the lack of intent to ridicule or humiliate SPO3 Leonardo.
 The defamatory remarks were not made in connection with SPO3 Leonardo's public
duties and therefore constituted only slight oral defamation.
 The SC modified the MeTC's decision and imposed a lesser penalty of a fine for slight
oral defamation.
 De Leon was also ordered to pay moral damages to the offended party.

The Court's Ruling

The MeTC Decision clearly stated the facts and the law on which it was based

Under Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, no decision shall be rendered by
any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based. Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Court provides that a judgment
or final order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and
directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based, signed by him and filed with the clerk of the court.

Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is
indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. A decision that does not
clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark
as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint
the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. More than that, the requirement is
an assurance to the parties that, in arriving at a judgment, the judge did so through the processes
of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him
from deciding ipse dixit.

In De Leon v People, there was no breach of the constitutional mandate that decisions must
express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based. The CA correctly
stated that the MeTC clearly emphasized in its decision, the factual findings, as well as the
credibility and the probative weight of the evidence for the defense vis- -vis the evidence of the
prosecution. The MeTC presented both the version of the prosecution and that of the defense. De
Leon was not left in the dark. He was fully aware of the alleged errors of the MeTC. The RTC,
as an appellate court, found no reason to reverse the decision of the MeTC.

Witness´s testimony is credible when there is no ill motive on the part of the witness for him or
her to weave a tale of lies against accused. Second, if Judge was able to observe witness
´s demeanor during trial. Witness was observed to be candid and composed and his or her
conduct on the witness stand did not mirror that of an insincere or false witness.

No bias and partiality on

the part of Judge Soriaso

Unless there is concrete proof that a judge has a personal interest in the proceedings and that his
bias stems from an extra-judicial source, this Court shall always presume that a magistrate shall
decide on the merits of a case with an unclouded vision of its facts. Bias and prejudice cannot be
presumed, in light especially of a judge's sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer
justice with impartiality. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge;
mere suspicion of partiality is not enough.

The crime committed is only

Slight Oral Defamation

Oral Defamation or Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in writing. It is
defined as "the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his
reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood."

The elements of oral defamation are:

(1) there must be an imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission, status or circumstances;

(2) made orally;

(3) publicly;

(4) and maliciously;

(5) directed to a natural or juridical person, or one who is dead;

(6) which tends to cause dishonour, discredit or contempt of the person defamed.

Oral defamation may either be simple or grave. It becomes grave when it is of a serious and
insulting nature.

In U.S. v. Tolosa,

where a woman of violent temper hurled offensive and scurrilous epithets including words
imputing unchastity against a respectable married lady and tending to injure the character of her
young daughters, the Court ruled that the crime committed was grave slander.

In Balite v. People, the accused was found guilty of grave oral defamation as the scurrilous
words he imputed to the offended party constituted the crime of estafa.
In some cases, the Court has declared that the defamatory utterances were not grave on the basis
of the peculiar situations obtaining.

In the case of People v. Arcand,

a priest called the offended party a gangster in the middle of the sermon. The Court affirmed the
conviction of the accused for slight slander as there was no imputation of a crime, a vice or
immorality.

In Pader v. People,

the Court ruled that the crime committed was only slight oral defamation as it considered the
expression, "putang ina mo," as expression to convey anger or displeasure. Such utterance was
found not seriously insulting considering that he was drunk when he uttered those words and his
anger was instigated by what the private complainant did when the former's father died.

Also in Jamilano v. Court of Appeals,

where calling someone "yabang" (boastful or arrogant) was found not defamatory, the
complainant's subsequent recourse to the law on oral defamation was not sustained by the Court.

Considering the factual backdrop of this case, the Court is convinced that the crime committed
by De Leon was only slight oral defamation for the following reasons:

First, as to the relationship of the parties, they were obviously acquainted with each other as they
were former jogging buddies. Prior to the purported gun-pointing incident, there was no reason
for De Leon to harbor ill feelings towards SPO3 Leonardo. DHITCc

Second, as to the timing of the utterance, this was made during the first hearing on the
administrative case, shortly after the alleged gun-pointing incident. The gap between the gun-
pointing incident and the first hearing was relatively short, a span of time within which the
wounded feelings could not have been healed. The utterance made by De Leon was but a mere
product of emotional outburst, kept inside his system and unleashed during their encounter.

Third, such words taken as a whole were not uttered with evident intent to strike deep into the
character of SPO3 Leonardo as the animosity between the parties should have been considered.
It was because of the purported gun-pointing incident that De Leon hurled those words. There
was no intention to ridicule or humiliate SPO3 Leonardo because De Leon's utterance could
simply be construed as his expression of dismay towards his actions as his friend and member of
the community.

To reiterate, their altercation and De Leon's subsequent defamation were not in connection with
SPO3 Leonardo's public duties. Taking into account the circumstances of the incident, calling
him "walanghiya" and "mangongotong na pulis" was evidently geared towards his reputation as
a private individual of the community. Thus, the defamation committed by De Leon, while only
slight in character, must not go unpunished.
KUMMER VPEOPLE (G.R. No. 174461)

Facts:

 Petitioner Leticia I. Kummer appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirming the Regional Trial Court's (RTC) judgment finding her guilty of homicide.
 The prosecution's evidence showed that on June 19, 1988, Jesus Mallo, Jr. went to the
petitioner's house and was shot by the petitioner's son, Johan.
 The petitioner and Johan then moved the victim's body away from the house and turned
off all the lights.
 The next morning, the police informed the petitioner that the victim was found dead in
front of her house.
 The petitioner and Johan were charged with homicide and pleaded not guilty.
 During the trial, prosecution witnesses positively identified the petitioner as one of the
assailants.
 The RTC found the petitioner and Johan guilty based on the testimonies of the witnesses
and the positive findings of gunpowder nitrates on their hands.
 Johan was released on recognizance, while the petitioner appealed the judgment.

Issue:

 Whether the CA committed a reversible error in affirming the RTC's decision convicting
the petitioner of homicide.

Ruling:

 The petition is devoid of merit, and the CA decision is affirmed.

Ratio:

 Inconsistencies between the testimonies of witnesses in open court and their affidavits do
not affect their credibility, especially if they only refer to minor and collateral matters.
 The positive and direct testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses, coupled with the
positive findings of gunpowder nitrates on the hands of the petitioner and Johan, establish
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
 The fact that the judge who penned the decision was not the one who heard the
testimonies does not render the judgment erroneous, as long as the decision is based on
the records before the judge.
 Motive is irrelevant when the accused has been positively identified by an eyewitness.
 Inconsistencies and improbabilities in the testimonies of witnesses do not necessarily
discredit them, as people may react differently in a given situation.
 Public documents, such as the chemistry report showing positive results of the paraffin
test, are admissible in court without further proof of their due execution and authenticity.
 A change in the date of the commission of the crime, if the disparity is not great, is
merely a formal amendment and does not require arraignment.