Macalintal, supra full text

Romulo Macalintal filed a petition for certiorari, seeking that a declaration of certain provisions of
Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) be declared unconstitutional (suffer
from constitutional infirmity.) The Court upholds the right of petitioner to file the present petition. The
petitioner raises three issues, the 3rd issue is the one relevant to our current topic:

Whether or not Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in Section 25 of Republic Act No. 9189,
make changes and approve the rules that the Commission on Elections as provided for in Section 19 of
the same provision without affecting the independence of the Commission on Elections as stated in
Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?

Petitioner argues that Republic Act No. 9189 interferes with the independence of the COMELEC by
establishing the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee with the authority to modify and approve the
rules created by COMELEC. COMELEC, being a constitutional body, should not be under the control of
either the executive or legislative branches of the government. Only COMELEC itself should be allowed
to create rules and regulations, which can only be changed or revised by a majority of its members. If
the rules made by COMELEC violate any law, it is the responsibility of the Court, not the legislators, to
review them when requested by an interested party. (He submits that the creation of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee with the power to review, revise, amend and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the COMELEC, R.A. No. 9189 intrudes into the
independence of the COMELEC which, as a constitutional body, is not under the control of either the
executive or legislative departments of government; that only the COMELEC itself can promulgate rules
and regulations which may be changed or revised only by the majority of its members; and that should
the rules promulgated by the COMELEC violate any law, it is the Court that has the power to review the
same via the petition of any interested party, including the legislators.)

COMELEC is one of the respondents in this case. However, in this 3rd issue raised by the petitioner, it
agrees with the petitioner that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 are unconstitutional. COMELEC
furthermore adds that also a portion of the Section 17 of RA 9189 is likewise unconstitutional,
particularly the phrase, “subject to the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee” in the
first sentence of Section 17.1 which empowers the Commission to authorize voting by mail in not more
than three countries for the May, 2004 elections; and the phrase, “only upon review and approval of the
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee” found in the second paragraph of the same section.
COMELEC joins the petitioner in asserting that as an independent constitutional body, it may not be
subject to
interference by any government instrumentality and that only this Court may review COMELEC rules and
only in cases of grave abuse of discretion.

Also, Solicitor General, departs from their original position & now agrees with the petitioner's that
Sections 19 and 25 are invalid and unconstitutional, grounded in the belief that there is no provision in
Article VI of the Constitution that suggests that Congress possesses a concurrent authority to administer
and enforce election laws alongside with the COMELEC. This new found interpretation relies on the legal
principles of "exclusio unius est exclusio alterius" and "expressum facit cessare tacitum" to assert that
the Constitution explicitly outlines Congress's powers and that any authority not expressly granted is
excluded.

Whether or not certain provisions of RA 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) infringe on
the independence of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
The court upheld the arguments of the petitioner and the COMELEC, declaring the mentioned portions
of R.A. No. 9189 VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL particularly for being repugnant to Section 1,
Article IX-A of the Constitution mandating the independence of constitutional commission, such as
COMELEC.

1. The phrase in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: "subject to the
approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;"
2. The portion of the last paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: "only upon review and approval of the
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;"
3. The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19, to wit: "The Implementing Rules and
Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue
of this Act for prior approval;" and The second sentence in the second paragraph of Section 25,
to wit: "It shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the Commission" of the same law.

The Court believes it's important to explain how Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee (JCOC), influences the independence of the COMELEC, which is a constitutional body.

Composed of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee (JCOC) is a purely legislative body. There is no question that the authority of Congress to
"monitor and evaluate the implementation" of R.A. No. 9189 is geared towards possible amendments or
revision of the law itself and thus, may be performed in aid of its legislation. However, aside from its
monitoring and evaluation functions, R.A. No. 9189 gives to the JCOC the following functions: (a) to
"review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations" (IRR) promulgated by the
COMELEC [Sections 25 and 19]; and (b) subject to the approval of the JCOC [Section 17.1], the voting by
mail in not more than three countries for the May 2004 elections and in any country determined by
COMELEC.

Interpreting Section 1, Article X of the 1935 Constitution providing that there shall be an independent
COMELEC, the Court has held that whatever may be the nature of the functions of the Commission on
Elections, the fact is that the framers of the Constitution wanted it to be independent from the other
departments of the Government." The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to
play a distinct and important part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it
should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible
organization. The Commission may err, so may this court also. It should be allowed considerable latitude
in devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it
was created – free, orderly and honest elections. We may not agree fully with its choice of means, but
unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere.
Politics is a practical matter, and political questions must be dealt with realistically – not from the
standpoint of pure theory. The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts
with political strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with political
controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political questions. (Emphasis
supplied) The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent body
"except those specifically granted by the Constitution," that is, to review its decisions, orders and
rulings. In the same vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive legislative
power to enact election laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by
exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority.

The Court has said that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) must be independent according to the
1935 Constitution. This means it should not be controlled by other parts of the government. COMELEC
is an important constitutional body responsible for ensuring fair and honest elections.

In doing its job, COMELEC should have some freedom to make decisions. While we might not always
agree with its choices, the Court should only step in if those choices are clearly illegal or a big abuse of
power. Politics is practical, and political questions should be dealt with realistically, not just in theory.

The Court does not have the power to supervise COMELEC except for the authority given by the
Constitution, which is to review its decisions and orders. It's not correct to say that because Congress
has the power to make election laws, it can interfere with COMELEC's independence by controlling its
rule-making authority.

In simple terms, the law (R.A. No. 9189) allows the COMELEC (Commission on Elections) to make rules
and regulations to implement the law. This is a common practice where a government agency is
trusted to create detailed rules for a law because of their expertise. Once a law is passed by Congress,
its job is considered done. Congress can review and amend the law if needed, but it should not get
involved in approving, reviewing, amending, and revising the COMELEC's rules.

In this case, Congress overstepped its authority by giving itself the power to approve, review, amend,
and revise the COMELEC's rules, which violates the independence of the COMELEC as mandated by
the Constitution. The Court has decided that certain provisions in the law related to the creation and
powers of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee are unconstitutional.

All the members of the Court agreed with Justice Reynato S. Puno's opinion on the unconstitutionality
of these specific sections of R.A. No. 9189 concerning the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.
Title: Macalintal v. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 157013)
Petition for certiorari, Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal, member of the Philippine Bar
• For declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity.
• Macalintal claimed to have actual and material legal interest in the subject matter as taxpayer
and lawyer, ensuring that public funds are used lawfully and properly appropriated.

Section 29 of R.A. No. 9189 appropriated funds to carry out the provisions and for the establishment of
overseas absentee voting. Taxpayers like Macalintal have the right to challenge the expenditure of
public funds on unconstitutional act/provision.
The case dealt with three principal questions raised by Macalintal:
• Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 violate the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V
of the Constitution? Section 5(d) allows immigrants or permanent residents abroad to vote upon
executing an affidavit expressing their intent to return to the Philippines.

Whether or not the provisions of Republic Act No. 9189, particularly Section 5(d), violate the
constitutional requirements for voting by overseas Filipinos.

Macalintal argued that Section 5(d) appeared to conflict with the constitutional residency requirement.
Macalintal contended that the mere execution of an affidavit should not be sufficient to qualify Filipinos
abroad who do not meet the residency requirement to vote.
The Court considered the significance of absentee voting as a relatively new concept and the intention
of Congress to provide a system for voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. The Court concluded that while
Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 may initially seem to contravene the Constitution, the risk of
unconstitutionality was more apparent than real. It found that the Constitution should be construed as a
whole and that Congress had the authority to enact laws to govern absentee voting (Section 2, Article 5).
The Court held that the mere execution of affidavits by immigrants or permanent residents abroad,
expressing their intent to return to the Philippines, does not necessarily violate the Constitution.
The Court also considered the historical context of absentee voting and the fact that the Constitution did
not impose specific limitations on Congress's power to enact such laws. Therefore, the Court found no
clear and unmistakable violation of the Constitution in Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189.
The case primarily addressed the constitutional provisions in Section 1 and Section 2 of Article V of the
1987 Constitution, which deal with the right of suffrage and the authority of Congress to provide a
system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The Solicitor General's position is based on the premise that the execution of the required affidavits by
immigrants and permanent residents in foreign countries, as outlined in Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189,
provides an opportunity for these individuals to manifest that they have not abandoned their Philippine
domicile. He contends that these immigrants and permanent residents have expressed their intent to
return to the Philippines, demonstrating the necessary "animus manendi" (intent to stay) and "animus
revertendi" (intent to return).

Furthermore, the Solicitor General asserts that Filipino immigrants and permanent residents abroad
have an unquestionable right to exercise the right of suffrage under Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution once their registration is approved in accordance with R.A. No. 9189.

In essence, the Solicitor General's argument challenges the presumption that holding a "green card"
implies an abandonment of Philippine domicile, suggesting that the execution of affidavits should be
considered a valid means of expressing the intent to maintain ties with the Philippines. While normally,
a person cannot be both a resident and an absentee at the same time, the passage clarifies that in the
context of election laws and court decisions, an absentee remains connected to their residence in the
Philippines, as "residence" is often considered synonymous with "domicile." This distinction is relevant
to the legal interpretation of who is eligible for absentee voting.

• Does Section 18.5 of the same law empower the COMELEC to proclaim winning candidates for
national offices, including the President and Vice-President, violating the constitutional mandate that
Congress should proclaim these winners?
• Can Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee, review, revise, amend, and
approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations without violating the independence of the COMELEC?