Journal of Rock Mechanics and Geotechnical Engineering.

2012, 4 (3): 193–204

Risk assessment and management in underground rock

engineering—an overview
Edwin T Brown
Golder Associates Pty Ltd., Brisbane, Queensland, 4064, Australia
Received 4 April 2012; received in revised form 10 June 2012; accepted 18 June 2012

Abstract: This paper attempts to provide an overview of risk assessment and management practice in underground rock
engineering based on a review of the international literature and some personal experience. It is noted that the terminologies
used in risk assessment and management studies may vary from country to country. Probabilistic risk analysis is probably
the most widely-used approach to risk assessment in rock engineering and in geotechnical engineering more broadly. It is
concluded that great potential exists to augment the existing probabilistic methods by the use of Bayesian networks and
decision analysis techniques to allow reasoning under uncertainty and to update probabilities, material properties and
analyses as further data become available throughout the various stages of a project. Examples are given of the use of these
methods in underground excavation engineering in China and elsewhere, and opportunities for their further application are
identified.
Key words: Bayesian networks; probabilistic risk analysis; risk analysis; risk management; underground rock engineering

of the application of risk assessment and risk

1 Introduction

This paper has been prepared as a contribution to
the International Summit Forum on Safe
Construction and Risk Management of Major
Underground Construction held in Wuhan, China, in
May 2012, and sponsored by the Chinese Academy
of Engineering (CAE). The topics listed for
consideration by the Forum are:
(1) Mechanism, understanding, prediction theory
and warning systems of rockburst, collapse, water
inrush, or large deformation of major underground
engineering.
(2) Optimal design methodology of major
underground engineering under conditions of high
stress, karst, high water pressure, or weak rocks.
(3) Risk management methods and strategies for
safe construction of major underground engineering
under conditions of high stress, karst, high water
pressure, or weak rocks.
This paper seeks to contribute to the consideration
of the third of these topics by providing an overview
Doi: 10.3724/SP.J.1235.2012.00193

Corresponding author. Tel: +61 7 3721 5451;
E-mail: tbrown@golder.com.au
management in underground rock engineering, based
largely on a review of the international literature.
Clearly, the topics of the Forum are of great concern
in China and to the CAE, as they are elsewhere in the
world. However, it is important not to lose sight of
the monumental achievements of rock mechanics and
rock engineering in China in recent years (Feng,
2011; Feng and Hudson, 2011; Qian, 2011).
2 Risk management terminology and
fundamentals
The international literature on risk analysis,
assessment and management contains a range of
definitions of risk and associated terms (Paté-Cornell
and Dillon, 2006). Here, the definitions given by
AS/NZS ISO 31000: 2009 (Standards Australia,
2009) will be used. It should be noted that these
definitions differ, sometimes marginally and
sometimes significantly, from those used in some
earlier publications, including those by Brown (2007)
and Brown and Booth (2009). The author
understands that there is not a specific Chinese risk
management standard comparable to AS/NZS ISO
 194
31000: 2009. Following Zhou and Zhang (2011), it
will be assumed that the general principles of the
International Standards Organisation (ISO) standard,
ISO 31000: 2009, will apply.
Standards Australia (2009) defines risk as “the
effect of uncertainty on objectives” and a risk source
as an “element which alone or in combination has the
potential to give rise to a risk”. In some earlier
accounts, a risk source appears to have been referred
to as a hazard, defined in the previous Australian
Standard as “a source of potential harm” (Standards
Australia, 2004). This term is not defined in AS/NZS
ISO 31000: 2009. The underground rock engineering
conditions of high stress, karst, high water pressure
and weak rocks could be regarded as hazards in this
sense.
The level of risk is defined as the “magnitude of a
risk or combination of risks, expressed in terms of the
combination of consequences and their likelihood”.
This definition allows for the common practice of
quantifying risk as the product of the likelihood of
the occurrence of an event and the consequences of
that event (Stacey et al., 2006; Brown, 2007; Brown
and Booth, 2009; Einstein et al., 2010). The
Standards Australia (2009) definition of an event as
an “occurrence or change of a particular set of
circumstances” is consistent with this usage. The
consequence of an event is the “outcome of an event
affecting objectives” and the likelihood is the
“chance that something will happen” (Standards
Australia, 2009). As an example of the differences in
terminology sometimes encountered, the probability
of an event occurring is sometimes referred to as a
hazard (Einstein, 1997; He et al., 2011).
Fig. 1 illustrates the overall risk management
process adopted by the ISO and Standards Australia
(2009). It helps clarify some of the terminology used
in this area. It is important to recognize that, in this
approach, the risk identification, risk analysis and
risk evaluation steps are together known as risk
assessment, the term used in the title of this paper.
Similar approaches, sometimes differing in detail, are
used by a number of other national and international
authorities (for example, the International Tunnelling
Association approach outlined by Eskesen et al.
(2004) and the PIARC approach used by Schubert
(2011)). Much of that which follows will be directed
towards the risk analysis and evaluation stages
identified in Fig. 1.
Edwin T Brown / J Rock Mech Geotech Eng. 2012, 4 (3): 193–204
Fig. 1 Risk management process (Standards Australia, 2009).
3 Risk analysis and evaluation
Risk analysis is the process of developing an
understanding of each of the risks identified in the
previous risk identification step in Fig. 1. It provides
an input to decisions on whether or not risks need to
be treated, and on the most appropriate and
cost-effective risk treatment strategies. It involves
consideration of the sources of risk, their
consequences and the likelihood of those
consequences occurring. Risks are usually analyzed
and evaluated by combining their likelihoods and
consequences. Risk analyses may be qualitative,
semi-quantitative or quantitative. The following
paragraphs provide brief overviews for some of the
risk analysis and evaluation tools that are commonly
used in geotechnical engineering and tunneling, and
may be suitable for use in large underground
construction projects.
Fault tree analysis (FTA) identifies, quantifies
and represents, in diagrammatic form, the faults and
failures, and the combinations of faults and failures
that can lead to a major hazard or event. It may be
used either with or without quantifying the
probabilities of events occurring.
Event tree analysis (ETA) provides a systematic
mapping of realistic event scenarios having the
potential to result in a major incident, and the
relationships, dependencies and potential escalation
of events with time. It also provides numerical
estimates of the likelihoods of occurrence of the
component events and of the escalated event.
Consequence or cause-consequence analysis is a
combination of fault tree and event tree analysis. The
Edwin T Brown / J Rock Mech Geotech Eng. 2012, 4 (3): 193–204
outcome is a diagram displaying the relationships
between the causes and the consequences or
outcomes of an incident. This technique is used most
commonly when the failure logic is simple because a
diagram combining fault and event trees can become
quite complex.
Fig. 2 shows a generic risk evaluation process for a
stope in an underground mine that uses simple event
and fault trees. The possible types of failures are
shown in the left hand column with a probability of
failure (POF) determined for each. The middle
column shows an event tree used to establish several
types of risk and their impacts or consequences such
as economic loss, the loss of reputation or the impact
on workers. The right hand column shows the final
evaluation of the acceptability or otherwise of these
risks. This general approach, which was developed
initially for use in rock slope engineering (Tapia et
al., 2007; Steffen et al., 2006), could well be used for
an underground civil engineering excavation, with
perhaps a modification to the nature of some of the
risks shown in the central column.
Bowtie diagrams show how a range of controls
may eliminate or minimize the likelihood of
occurrence of specific initiating events that may
generate risk, or reduce the consequences of an event
once it has occurred. Bowtie diagrams, originated as
Fig. 2 A risk evaluation process combining fault and event trees (Stacey et al., 2006).
195
a technique for analyzing safety incidents, but are
also useful for analyzing other types of complex risks
and for communicating key risks and critical controls
(Quinlivan and Lewis, 2007). Fig. 3 shows a generic
bowtie diagram which may be adapted to analyze
geotechnical risks of the types being discussed here.
Probabilistic risk analysis (PRA), including
Monte Carlo and other types of simulations, is
perhaps the most widely used method of quantitative
risk analysis in geotechnical engineering (Baecher
and Christian, 2003; Fenton and Griffiths, 2008).
This approach will be discussed in more detail in
Section 5 below.
Decision analysis, including decision tree analysis,
is a structured format used to analyze or assess the
outcomes of decisions or choices made, based on the
available information. Many decisions made in
underground construction involve significant
uncertainty. Decision analysis will be discussed
further in Section 6 below.
Multi-risk analysis is an approximate
computational method of calculation for cases
involving multiple statistically independent risks or
hazards that are each treated as stochastic variables.
It provides a method for dealing with uncertainty and
may be used in estimating costs in tunneling, for
example the study (Eskesen et al., 2004).
 196 Edwin T Brown / J Rock Mech Geotech Eng. 2012, 4 (3): 193–204

Cause
Pre-event Post-event engineering, many of the risk sources or hazards
controls controls Consequence
arise from geotechnical uncertainty or error. The
nature of the uncertainty and the errors that provide
the sources of geomechanics risk in geotechnical
engineering more broadly has been discussed widely
Event
in the literature. For example, Einstein and Baecher
(1983) classified the sources of uncertainty as:
(1) inherent spatial and temporal variability;
Time (2) measurement errors (systematic or random);
(3) model uncertainty;
Fig. 3 Generic bowtie diagram (Brown and Booth, 2009).
(4) load uncertainty; and
(5) omissions.
The Analytical hierarchy process (AHP) approach
Baecher and Christian (2003) and others have
is used to address ill-defined and ill-structured
described these sources of uncertainty as being
problems in decision making and risk assessment. It
aleatory or epistemic. Aleatory uncertainty is the
is a mathematical technique for multi-criterion
irreducible randomness or variability associated with
decision-making that allows decision alternatives to
phenomena that are naturally variable in time or
be ranked based on preferences through pair-wise
space, even when the system is well known. The
comparisons (Saaty, 1980; Taroun and Yang, 2011).
discontinuity geometries and the mechanical and
This technique has been used relatively widely in the
hydraulic properties of rock masses provide good
Chinese construction industry, sometimes in
examples of this natural variability. Epistemic
combination with other approaches (Deng and Zhou,
uncertainty, on the other hand, arises from
2010; Zhou et al., 2006).
limitations in our fundamental knowledge or
Bayesian networks are probability-based graphical
understanding of some aspects of a problem. This is
and mathematical tools that show cause and effect
sometimes termed conceptual uncertainty (Brown,
relationships between the components of a system.
2007) and may be reflected in the use of
They allow for conditional dependence between
inappropriate models in analyses, for example.
variables, provide a means of reasoning under
Recently, Hadjigeorgiou and Harrison (2011)
uncertainty, and allow probability tables to be
provided a valuable account of uncertainty and the
updated as more information becomes available. In
sources of error in rock engineering. In discussing
practice, they are usually used in combination with
the use of rock mass classification schemes in the
some form of decision analysis. Bayesian networks
design of underground excavations, they identified
and their application in underground engineering will
two groups of errors. The first group consists of
be discussed in more detail in Section 6 below.
errors intrinsic to the classification scheme used,
In addition to, or in association with, Bayesian
including errors of omission, errors of super-
networks, fuzzy logic and other artificial
fluousness, and errors of taxonomy associated with
intelligence (AI) methods which have been applied
the requirement to select a particular classification
in rock engineering (Dershowicz and Einstein, 1984;
rating value for a geomechanical property. The
Feng and Jiang, 2010) may also be used in risk
second group of errors are associated with
analysis and evaluation, sometimes in combination
implementation, and include errors of circumstance,
with other approaches (Choi et al., 2004; He et al.,
errors of convenience, errors of ignoring variability,
2006; Zhou and Zhang, 2011).
and errors of ignoring uncertainty (Hadjigeorgiou
It is important to note that many of the risk
and Harrison, 2011).
analyses carried out routinely in engineering practice
are qualitative or, at best, semi-quantitative (Zhou
and Zhang, 2011). In the remainder of this paper, 5 Probabilistic risk analysis
emphasis will be placed on the development and
application of quantitative approaches. For the last 30 or 40 years, probabilistic risk
analysis (PRA) has probably been the most widely
4 Geotechnical uncertainty and error used method of quantitative risk analysis, generally
of the risk of failure, in geotechnical engineering
It is important to recognize that in geotechnical more broadly (Baecher and Christian, 2003; Einstein,
engineering, including in underground rock 1996; Fenton and Griffiths, 2008; Honjo et al., 2009;
Edwin T Brown / J Rock Mech Geotech Eng. 2012, 4 (3): 193–204
Juang et al., 2011). It is also used in construction
time and cost estimation (Cretu et al., 2011) and in
project management in a wide range of engineering
and other fields (Paté-Cornell, 2007).
As illustrated in Fig. 4, in the general geotechnical
probabilistic risk analysis approach we assess a
probability density function (PDF). Design
parameters such as the loads, stresses, or
groundwater pressures, are identified in Fig. 4 as
Demand. The strength of the soil or rock, often the
shear strength, is identified in Fig. 4 as Capacity.
This diagram illustrates how, as we progress from the
preliminary to the detailed and then the final design
stage, our knowledge of the design parameters
improves, or is refined as a result of further
investigation, and the probability of failure reduces.
Fig. 4 Illustration of uncertainty reduction during the
development of a project until the potential for failure is
minimized to an acceptable level (Valley et al., 2010, after
Hoek, 1991).
Stewart and O’Rourke (2008), among others,
express the probability of failure when a load
exceeds a resistance as:
pf  Pr ( R  S )  Pr ( R  S  0)  Pr [G ( X )  0]
where R is the resistance or capacity, S is the load or
demand and G ( X ) is a limit state function such
that G ( X )  0 defines the boundary between safe
and unsafe. A factor of safety (FOS) is often
calculated as FOS  R / S , where, in this case, R
and S are the mean or most likely values of the
capacity and demand, respectively. Some methods of
calculation allow for aleatory uncertainty in the
functions for R and S. However, they generally do
not allow for epistemic uncertainty, that is a
conceptual model or parameter uncertainty.
Therefore, in these cases, allowance should be made
for model error, ME, in the estimation of R and S:
197
G ( X )  ME  FOS (2)
If G  R  S , and R and S are statistically
independent, the probability of failure may be
calculated as:
pf   FR ( x) f s ( x)dx (3)
where FR ( x) is the cumulative distribution function
of the resistance and f s ( x) is the probability
distribution function of the load. The probability of
failure is related to the degree to which the demand
and capacity distribution curves overlap as illustrated
in Fig. 4. If both R and S follow normal distributions,
pf  1   (  ) , where  is called the reliability
index and is a function of the mean values and the
standard deviations of R and S.
The probability distribution functions of R and S
are often estimated using Monte Carlo, Latin
Hypercube or other types of simulations using
commercially available software such as @RISK
(Palisade Corporation, 2012) and Crystal Ball
(Oracle Corporation, 2012). In their simplest form,
these simulations consist of repeated calculations of
values of R and S, generally using equations
involving a range of input parameters such as those
used in stability calculations, selected on a random
number basis.
It is often assumed that the probability distribution
functions involved in these simulations are normal
distributions. In the case of the geotechnical variables
used in the estimation of values of capacity and
demand, this can be a far from reasonable
assumption. The distributions assumed can have
significant effects on the results of analyses. In most
engineering applications, including in geotechnical
engineering, it is also important to identify the time
frame over which the probability of failure is
assessed. For some items of major infrastructure, it
(1) may be overly conservative to base decisions on the
probability of a single failure occurring over the
lifetime of the structure. An average annual
probability of failure may be more realistic in some
instances (Stewart and Love, 2005).
The probability of failure may be related to the
FOS which engineers have traditionally used and
often prefer. Table 1 shows probabilities of failure
and the associated FOSs calculated for coal mine
pillars in an Australian database compiled by Galvin
et al. (1999). It must be remembered that the
Pf -FOS relationship is not unique as is sometimes
supposed, but depends on the input data, the
boundary conditions and the nature of the
distributions of R and S resulting in each case.
 198
Table 1 Calculated probability of failure versus factor of safety
for Australian coal mine pillars (Galvin et al., 1999).
Probability of failure Factor of safety
8 in 10 0.87
5 in 10 1.00
1 in 10 1.22
5 in 100 1.30
2 in 100 1.38
1 in 100 1.44
1 in 1 000 1.63
1 in 10 000 1.79
1 in 100 000 1.95
1 in 1 000 000 2.11
Furthermore, this simple probabilistic approach
does not permit us conveniently to allow for spatial
variability, uncertainties, effects of pre- or post-event
controls, dependent relationships between the design
parameters and variables, and parallel component
failure in an engineering system. There is a vast body
of literature discussing the wide range of
probability-based techniques used in geotechnical
engineering, often in combination with numerical
stress, deformation and water flow analyses, and in
many other fields of engineering (Baecher and
Christian, 2003; Fenton and Griffiths, 2008;
Paté-Cornell, 2007; Stewart and Melchers, 1997).
Only the simplest case has been introduced here in
order to provide an indication of the nature of
probabilistic risk analysis.
6 Bayesian networks and dynamic
Bayesian networks for quantitative
risk analysis
Many of the complexities referred to above may be
taken into account using a Bayesian network (BN)
approach. BNs are based on Bayes’ theorem or
Bayes’ law which is a relationship between
probabilities developed by Thomas Bayes (Bayes,
1763). In its simplest form, Bayes’ theorem may be
written as:
P( A B)  [ P( B A)  P( A)] / P( B)
where P( A) is the probability of A, P( B) is the
probability of B, and P( A B) and P( B A) are the
conditional probabilities of A given that B has
occurred, and those of B given A. In the Bayesian
Edwin T Brown / J Rock Mech Geotech Eng. 2012, 4 (3): 193–204
interpretation, probability measures a degree of belief
so that what will be referred to here as Bayesian
networks is sometimes referred to as Bayesian belief
networks (Charles River Analytics, 2008; Lee et al.,
2009). A more complex way of expressing Bayes’
theorem includes a hypothesis, past experience, and
evidence:
P( H E , c)  P( H c)  P( E H , c) / P( E c) (5)
where we can update our belief in hypothesis H
given additional evidence, E, and the background
context or past experience, c. The left-hand term,
P( H E , c) is called the posterior probability of
hypothesis H after considering the effect of the
evidence of the past experience, c. The term P( H c)
is called the a priori probability of H given c alone.
The term P( E H , c) is called the likelihood and
gives the probability of the evidence assuming that
the hypothesis, H, and the background information, c,
are true (Charles River Analytics, 2008).
Fig. 5 illustrates the components of a simple
Bayesian network, notably (1) the causal model
shown by the nodes and their links, and the
probability tables forming the Bayesian network
itself; (2) the input of expert knowledge; and (3) the
use of inference in decision-making (Smith, 2006).
Fig. 5 Bayesian network components (Smith, 2006).
In geotechnical engineering, dynamic BNs which
allow for changes in the decisions, relationships and
(4) probabilities with time are especially useful. In this
approach, the probability tables for the variables
involved may be updated as more information
becomes available during the lifetime of the project.
There are many ways of defining and describing
BNs. Formally, a BN may be defined as a concise
Edwin T Brown / J Rock Mech Geotech Eng. 2012, 4 (3): 193–204
graphical representation of the joint probability of a
domain that is represented by a set of random
variables (Russell and Norvig, 2009; Sousa and
Einstein, 2012). In summary, it may be said that a
BN:
(1) is a graphical and mathematical tool or causal
model showing cause and effect relationships
between the components of a system;
(2) represents the variables in a system as nodes
and their dependencies by directional links;
(3) quantifies the strengths of these dependencies
by conditional probabilities;
(4) allows for both aleatory and epistemic
uncertainties in assessing probabilities;
(5) allows the probabilistic model (generally
probability tables) to be updated as new information
becomes available, for example as a result of further
site investigation or monitoring during excavation;
(6) synthesizes and unifies knowledge related to
the problem;
(7) uses reasoning under uncertainty by means of
inferences; and
(8) can substitute for both fault and event trees.
Fig. 6 illustrates the concept of the unification of
expert knowledge and mathematical reasoning for a
given problem or domain in a BN.
Domain
Art “Science”
Expert Mathematical
knowledge representation
(Qualitative) (Quantitative)
Bayesian network
Unified knowledge representation
Fig. 6 Knowledge unification with Bayesian networks
(Conrady and Jouffe, 2011).
Fig. 7 shows an example of a simple BN. The
arrows going from one variable to another reflect the
relationships between the variables represented by
the nodes. For example, the arrows going from C to
B1 and B2 indicate that C has a direct influence on
both B1 and B2. In order to obtain results or answers,
inference is used to compute answers to queries made
to the network (Sousa and Einstein, 2012).
199
C E
B1
B2 B3 B4
A H
F G
Fig. 7 A simple Bayesian network (Sousa and Einstein, 2012).
The two most common types of queries made are
the a priori probability distribution of a variable and
the posterior distribution of variables in the light of
evidence, generally available from observations
made. The a priori probability distribution of a
variable may be written as:
P( A)    P( X 1 , , X k , A) (6)
X1 Xk
where A is the query variable and X1 to Xk are the
remaining variables in the network. This type of
query can be used in the design phase of an
underground excavation, for example, to assess the
probability of failure under certain design
assumptions concerning geology, geotechnical
properties and hydrogeology.
The posterior distribution of variables given
evidence or observations is given by
P( A, e )
P( A e )  (7)
  P( X1 , , X k , A, e)
X1 Xk A
where e is a vector of all the evidence. This type of
query is used to update knowledge of the state of one
variable, or variables, when other variables (the
evidence variables) are observed. This sort of query
could be used to update the probability of failure of
an underground excavation, for example, after
construction has started and new information on the
geology, hydrogeology or geotechnical properties
becomes available (Sousa and Einstein, 2012).
The simplest, but least efficient, way of carrying
out inferences with this approach is to use these
equations to calculate the probabilities of every
possible combination of values of the variables and
identify those needed to obtain the result. Several
algorithms are available for carrying out efficient
exact and approximate inference in BNs. The most
commonly used exact inference method is the
variable elimination algorithm (Jensen and Nielsen,
2007; Sousa and Einstein, 2012).
In practice, decision analysis is often used in
conjunction with BNs as part of an overall risk
 200
management and decision-making approach (Smith,
2010). Decision analysis is a well-developed
specialist field that has been defined in a variety of
ways. Paté-Cornell and Dillon (2006), for example,
regarded it as the classic expected-utility framework
based on the axioms of rational choices (von
Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947) together with
methods of problem structuring, probability
assessment, single and multi-attribute preference
assessment, modeling approaches such as decision
trees, influence diagrams, and sensitivity analysis.
Others adopt fewer restrictive definitions which
include methods such as the analytic hierarchy
process (Saaty, 1980). Detailed examples of the use
of decision analysis in conjunction with BNs are
given by He et al. (2011) and Sousa and Einstein
(2012).
Fig. 8 shows the basic structure of the construction
strategy decision model used by Sousa and Einstein
(2012). In this case, the decision model is based on a
decision graph which is a BN (greatly simplified as
shown in Fig. 8) extended to model different actions
or alternatives and the associated utilities or
consequences. The model shows two chance nodes
(geological condition and failure mode), one decision
node (construction strategy) and one utility node (the
total cost), which represents the sum of the costs
associated with the different construction strategies
and the utilities associated with failure. The model
determines the optimal or best alternatives based on
the maximization of utility, for example by the
minimization of risk or of cost (Sousa and Einstein,
2012).
Fig. 8 Basic structure of a construction decision model (Sousa
and Einstein, 2012).
Currently, BNs are used throughout the world,
including in China, to assess probabilities and risks
Edwin T Brown / J Rock Mech Geotech Eng. 2012, 4 (3): 193–204
in an extremely wide range of fields including
sciences, medicine (particularly in medical diagnosis),
criminal forensics, several fields of engineering
including the construction industry, project
management and in the finance and insurance
industries–in fact, in any field that involves
relationships between probabilities. In geotechnical
and underground engineering, BNs have been
applied to risk assessment and management in dam
engineering (Smith, 2006), in tunneling (Sousa and
Einstein, 2007, 2012; Špačková and Straub, 2011), in
electric power industry construction projects (Jia et
al., 2011), in assessing the rock fall hazards along
highways (Straub and Schubert, 2008), in assessing
natural threats or hazards (Einstein and Sousa, 2006;
Einstein et al., 2010), in the underground injection of
carbon dioxide (He et al., 2011), and in a particularly
sophisticated case of a deep foundation pit
construction project for the Shanghai Metro (Zhou
and Zhang, 2011).
In geotechnical engineering more broadly, BNs are
perhaps most commonly used to update probability
tables, model parameters, analyses and design curves
as more data become available following further
investigation or during construction (Christian and
Baecher, 2011; Najjar and Saad, 2011; Sousa and
Einstein, 2012). Recognizing the power of BNs in
this regard, Christian and Baecher (2011) asked
recently, “Why haven’t we used it (Bayes’ theorem)
to bring the observational method into the 21st
century?”
7 Applications to underground rock
engineering
In the author’s experience, risk assessment and
management techniques are applied most commonly
in underground engineering projects through a
qualitative or a semi-quantitative approach.
Generally, a risk register is developed, identifying
the risk events potentially associated with the project
in each of several disciplinary fields (such as
geotechnical or rock engineering); the likelihoods
and consequences of each of these risk events; the
control, counter, mitigation measures planned or
required to be put in place (see Fig. 3); the residual
risks existing following the implementation of these
control measures; and the “ownership” of the risk. A
formal means of updating the risks following the
implementation of control measures will be outlined
Edwin T Brown / J Rock Mech Geotech Eng. 2012, 4 (3): 193–204
below. It would normally be expected that the risks
associated with events such as rockbursts, large
deformations, collapses, karst, water inrushes and
weak rock would be listed in such a risk register. The
consequences may be a range of economic or
non-economic impacts on the project, such as those
identified in Fig. 2. Likelihoods are usually assessed
over a given period of time.
Most organizations use this approach to develop
likelihood and consequence ratings for each risk
event by providing overall risk ratings based on
qualitative or semi-quantitative scales. These ratings
may be updated throughout the development of a
project from the conceptual and various design stages
through to construction. A typical qualitative risk
determination matrix and the associated general risk
management options for risk levels E, H, M and L
are shown in Table 2.
Table 2 Qualitative risk determination matrix and risk
management options (Brown and Booth, 2009).
Consequences
Likelihood
Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Catastrophic
A H H E E E
B M H H E E
C L M H E E
D L L M H E
E L L M H H
E: Extreme risk—immediate action required; unacceptable risk
H: High risk—senior management attention required; unacceptable risk
without action
M: Moderate risk—management responsibility, acceptable with control
measures
L: Low risk—manage routine procedures; acceptable risk
As discussed in Section 5, quantitative
probabilistic risk analysis is now widely used in
geotechnical and underground rock engineering. And
as noted in Section 6, the extension of quantitative
probabilistic methods through the use of BNs and
decision analysis is now practiced commonly, if not
universally, in a number of fields, including
underground rock engineering and construction
engineering more generally. These methods would
appear to have great potential to contribute to the
improved assessment and management of the risks
encountered in underground rock engineering
projects. It is considered that they could be applied to
greater effect during the site investigation, in the
various stages of project development and design, in
construction time and cost estimation, and in the
construction management stages of underground rock
engineering projects.
An approach suggested for adaptation and
adoption in underground rock engineering is that
201
developed by Einstein for dealing with natural
geotechnical threats or hazards (Einstein, 1997;
Einstein and Sousa, 2007; Einstein et al., 2010). This
approach uses the structure of decision making under
uncertainty to formalize the risk assessment process
for natural threats or for geotechnically-related
threats of the types being considered here. In
Einstein’s terminology, potential threats or events are
combined with a probability to express a hazard. This
in turn is combined with consequences to express a
risk, R, as:
R  P[T ]  u (C ) (8)
where P[T ] is the probability of the threat or
hazard, and u (C ) is the utility of the consequences
where C is a vector of attributes using a multi-
attribute approach (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976).
The fact that the consequences are uncertain, often
called the vulnerability, is expressed by the
conditional probability, P[C T ] , so that the risk may
be expressed as:
R  P[T ]  P[C T ]  u (C ) (9)
Assuming that as a result of the active control or
mitigation measures (e.g. support or drainage) put in
place as discussed earlier in this section, P[T ] is
reduced to P[T ] , and that passive countermeasures
(e.g., monitoring) reduce the vulnerability P[C T ]
to P[C T ] , or reduce the consequences from u (C )
to u (C ) , or both.
The implementation of control measures involves
costs, so that the reduced risk for active counter
measures can be written as:
R  P[T ]  P[C T ]  u (C )  u (CA) (10)
where u (CA) is the utility, or in simpler terms, the
cost, of the active counter measures. Similar
expressions can be formulated for passive counter
measures or for combinations of active and passive
controls. Einstein and Sousa (2007) also showed how
Bayesian updating can be used to represent the fact
that not all control measures may be 100% effective
in practice.
A detailed account of the general rock engineering
design process has been given by Feng and Hudson
(2011), which represents the outcome of the work of
the Commission on Rock Engineering Design
Methodology of the International Society for Rock
Mechanics in the period 2007–2011. Although the
book has many outstanding features and is to be
 202
highly recommended, it does not include any specific
formal treatment of risk assessment and management
methods, although these topics are considered
indirectly or implicitly throughout the book. It is
suggested that the formal, quantitative methods of
risk assessment and management outlined above
could be a suitable topic for consideration in the
future work of the Commission and in future editions
of the book by Feng and Hudson (2011).
Although, as discussed in Section 6 and earlier in
this Section, the literature contains a number of
examples of the advanced use of risk assessment and
management methods in underground rock
engineering, in geotechnical engineering more
broadly, and in construction management in China, it
is suspected that, as is generally the case elsewhere in
the world, greater use could be made in China of
both the more routine qualitative and semi-qualitative
and the more formal quantitative methods of risk
assessment summarized in this paper. Although more
than four years have passed since their paper’s
publication, a study reported by Tang et al. (2007)
identified some advances made, and some scope for
improvement, in the use of risk management in the
Chinese construction industry. They suggested that,
inter alia, “current risk management systems are
inadequate to manage project risks, and the lack of
joint risk management mechanisms is the key barrier
to adequate risk management”. They further
suggested that “future studies should be conducted to
systematically improve the risk management in
construction by different approaches that facilitate
equitable sharing of rewards through effective risk
management among participants. Such studies
should also consider the establishment of an open
communication risk management process to permit
the corporate experience of all participants, as well
as their personal knowledge and judgment, to be
effectively utilized.”
8 Conclusions
This paper has attempted to provide an overview
of risk assessment and management practice in
underground rock engineering based on a review of
the international literature and some personal
experience. The contributions made by Einstein,
Sousa and their co-workers were found to be
especially informative (Einstein, 1996, 1997;
Edwin T Brown / J Rock Mech Geotech Eng. 2012, 4 (3): 193–204
Einstein and Baecher, 1983; Einstein and Sousa,
2007; Einstein et al., 2010; He et al., 2011; Sousa,
2010; Sousa and Einstein, 2007, 2012).
The terminologies used in risk assessment and
management studies may vary from country to
country. Probabilistic risk analysis is probably the
most widely-used approach to risk assessment in
rock engineering and in geotechnical engineering
more broadly. It is concluded that great potential
exists to augment the existing probabilistic methods
by the use of Bayesian Networks and decision-
making analysis techniques to allow reasoning under
uncertainty and to update probabilities, material
properties and analyses as further data become
available through the various stages of an
underground project. Examples have been given of
the use of these more formal methods in underground
excavation engineering in China and elsewhere, and
opportunities for their further application have been
identified. It is suggested that the risks associated
with events such as rockbursts, large deformations,
collapses, karst, water inrushes and weak rock could
be assessed and managed using these methods.
Finally, it is suggested that an opportunity exists to
incorporate these methods into the rock engineering
design methodology developed by Feng and Hudson
(2011).
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank the Chinese Academy
of Engineering and Academician Qihu Qian for
having invited him to prepare this paper and
contribute to the Academy’s International Summit
Forum. He also thanks Professors Xiating Feng and
Shigang She for their kind advice on the preparation
of the paper, and Drs Italo Oñederra, Benoît Valley,
Hongbo Zhou and Huanchun Zhu for having
provided him with material used in assembling the
paper. Finally, he would thank Rob Morphet,
Principal, Golder Associates Pty Ltd., Brisbane, for
proof-reading a draft of the paper, and Jillian Roche
for her assistance in preparing it for publication.
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