JUDGMENT WRITING- DURGA THATHERA V.

NARAIN
THATHERA & ANR.

BA LLB
SEMESTER-8
SUBMITTED BY: BRAHM SAREEN
ROLL NO: 01716503820
SUBMITTED TO: MS. SARITA
(PHD- IOS)

UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW AND LEGAL STUDIES

GURU GOBIND SINGH INDRAPRASTH UNIVERSITY
DWARKA
NEW DELHI, 110075, INDIA,
2024
In the High Court of Allahbad

Durga Thathera v. Narain thathera and Anr.

AIR1931ALL597

14th July, 1931

Present:
Hon'ble Mr. Brahm Sareen, Presiding Judge

Durga Thathera - Appellant

vs.
Narain Thathera and Anr.- Respondent

1. The instant appeal arises from a suit for redemption, wherein the appellant contests
the dismissal of their suit by the learned Munsif and subsequently by the Additional
District Judge. Central to the appeal is the contention that the judgments rendered
were deficient in clarity and procedural adherence.
2. The primary issue before this Court pertains to the procedural requirements governing
judgments delivered under Order 41, Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code.
Specifically, the question arises as to whether such judgments necessitate compliance
with the provisions delineated in Rule 31, encompassing the obligation to provide a
written judgment detailing points for determination, decision rationales, and relief
entitlements.
3. This appeal originates from a case concerning the redemption of property. Initially,
the suit was dismissed by the Munsif after a detailed 12-page judgment, provided by
the appellant. Subsequently, the Additional District Judge, hearing the plaintiff's
appeal, summarily dismissed it under Order 41, Rule 11, issuing a brief judgment
consisting of only seven typed lines. The judgment essentially conveyed the Judge's
satisfaction with the lower court's decision, citing insufficient proof of the alleged
mortgage and the failure to establish certain historical property details.
4. In the second appeal process, I find myself lacking essential details regarding the
lower appellate court's judgment, including the specific points considered for
determination and the reasoning behind the conclusions reached by the learned Judge.
5. Notably, the underlying case involves intricate property matters, notably a mortgage
allegedly executed approximately 32 years prior to the suit's initiation.
6. The plaintiff-appellant contends that the judgment rendered by the lower appellate
court fails to adhere to legal standards, necessitating the issuance of a proper
judgment.
7. It's essential to recognize that while findings of fact are typically binding on second
appeal, they must be arrived at in accordance with established legal principles.
However, the absence of a comprehensive written judgment in this case deprives this
Court of the advantage of assessing the validity of the factual findings.
8. Thus, to ensure a thorough examination of the matter and uphold legal standards, it is
imperative for the lower court to provide a properly reasoned judgment.
9. Upon comprehensive examination of the submissions advanced and the statutory
framework, this Court undertakes an alternate stance, diverging from the prevailing
interpretation.
10. In reviewing the case law, particular attention is paid to the precedent established in
Samin Hasan v. Piran [1908] 30 All. 319, wherein it was opined that the rules
articulated in Section 574 of the erstwhile Civil Procedure Code did not
unequivocally extend to appeals heard under Section 551. It is noteworthy that
subsequent to the legislative amendments, Order 41, Rule 31 has supplanted the
aforementioned provision, whereas Order 41, Rule 11 mirrors the former Section 551.
11. Furthermore, the divergence in judicial opinion among various High Courts, as
highlighted in Ma Saw v. Ma Bwin Byu A.I.R. 1926 Rang. 129, underscores the
interpretive latitude inherent in this matter.
12. Upon meticulous consideration, this Court posits that the legislative intent behind the
formulation of Order 41, Rule 11 was to provide appellate courts with discretion in
disposing of appeals deemed lacking in merit or substance. This discretion extends to
the manner in which judgments are rendered, allowing for summary adjudication
where warranted by the circumstances of the case.
13. Moreover, the rigid application of Rule 31 to judgments delivered under Rule 11
would unduly fetter the appellate courts' prerogative to streamline the adjudicatory
process in cases devoid of substantive issues necessitating extensive elucidation. Such
 a strict interpretation would encumber the expeditious disposal of appeals and run
contrary to the overarching objective of procedural efficiency.
14. While cognizant of the persuasive authority cited and the principles enshrined therein,
this dissenting opinion contends that a strict adherence to Rule 31 in the context of
Rule 11 dismissals may impose unwarranted procedural burdens, impeding the
expeditious administration of justice. The legislative intent, as discerned from the
statutory framework and the historical evolution of appellate procedures, suggests a
nuanced approach that accommodates the exigencies of each case.
15. Furthermore, the reliance on Samin Hasan v. Piran and the interpretive flexibility
afforded by Ma Saw v. Ma Bwin Byu A.I.R. 1926 Rang. 129 underscores the
inherent ambiguity surrounding this issue. Rather than advocating for a categorical
imposition of Rule 31 requirements, this dissent emphasizes the need for a contextual
assessment that balances procedural regularity with the imperative of judicial
efficiency.
16. In conclusion, while acknowledging the persuasive value of precedent, this dissenting
opinion advocates for a more flexible approach that accords appellate courts the
requisite discretion to tailor their judgments to the exigencies of each case, thereby
promoting both procedural regularity and judicial efficiency.

Sareen, J.
Presiding Judge