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CASS MILITARY STUDIES

Militarism and International

Relations
Political economy, security, theory

Edited by
Anna Stavrianakis and
Jan Selby
Militarism and International
Relations

This book examines contemporary militarism in international politics, employ-

ing a variety of different theoretical viewpoints and international case studies.
Militarism – understood as the social and international relations of the prepa-
ration for, and conduct of, organized political violence – is an abiding and defin-
ing characteristic of world politics. Yet despite the ongoing social, political and
economic reach of military institutions, practices and values, the concept and
subject of militarism has not received significant attention within recent debates
in International Relations.
This book intends to fill the gap in the current body of literature. It has two
key overarching aims: to make the case for a renewed research agenda for IR
centred on the concept of militarism; and to provide a series of empirically
focused and theoretically informed case studies of contemporary militarism in
practice. Containing a wide-­ranging selection of chapters, the volume presents a
diverse and eclectic body of research on militarism, designed to act as a stimulus
to further research and debate.
This book will be of much interest to students of military studies, war and
conflict studies, international political economy and IR/security studies in
general.

Anna Stavrianakis is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the Univer-

sity of Sussex, and is author of Taking Aim at the Arms Trade: NGOs, Global
Civil Society and the World Military Order (2010).

Jan Selby is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of

Sussex, and author of Water, Power and Politics in the Middle East: The Other
Israeli-­Palestinian Conflict (2003), and co-­editor, with Feargal Cochrane and
Rosaleen Duffy, of Global Governance, Conflict and Resistance (2003).
Cass Military Studies

Intelligence Activities in Ancient Leaders in War

Rome West Point Remembers the 1991 Gulf
Trust in the Gods, But Verify War
Rose Mary Sheldon Frederick Kagan and Christian Kubik
(eds)
Clausewitz and African War
Politics and Strategy in Liberia and Khedive Ismail’s Army
Somalia John Dunn
Isabelle Duyvesteyn
Yugoslav Military Industry
Strategy and Politics in the Middle 1918–1991
East, 1954–60 Amadeo Watkins
Defending the Northern Tier
Michael Cohen Corporal Hitler and the Great War
1914–1918
The Cuban Intervention in Angola, The List Regiment
1965–1991 John Williams
From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale
Edward George Rostóv in the Russian Civil War,
1917–1920
Military Leadership in the British The Key to Victory
Civil Wars, 1642–1651 Brian Murphy
‘The Genius of this Age’
Stanley Carpenter The Tet Effect, Intelligence and the
Public Perception of War
Israel’s Reprisal Policy, 1953–1956 Jake Blood
The Dynamics of Military Retaliation
Ze’ev Drory The US Military Profession into the
21st Century
Bosnia and Herzegovina in the War, Peace and Politics
Second World War Sam C. Sarkesian and
Enver Redzic Robert E. Connor, Jr. (eds)
Civil-­Military Relations in Europe
Learning from Crisis and Institutional
Change
Hans Born, Marina Caparini,
Karl Haltiner and Jürgen Kuhlmann
(eds)
Strategic Culture and Ways of
War
Lawrence Sondhaus
Military Unionism in the Post Cold
War Era
A Future Reality?
Richard Bartle and Lindy Heinecken
(eds)
Warriors and Politicians
U.S. Civil-­Military Relations under
Stress
Charles A. Stevenson
Military Honour and the Conduct of
War
From Ancient Greece to Iraq
Paul Robinson
Military Industry and Regional
Defense Policy
India, Iraq and Israel
Timothy D. Hoyt
Managing Defence in a Democracy
Laura R. Cleary and Teri McConville
(eds)
Gender and the Military
Women in the Armed Forces of
Western Democracies
Helena Carreiras
Social Sciences and the Military
An Interdisciplinary Overview
Giuseppe Caforio (ed.)
Cultural Diversity in the Armed
Forces
An International Comparison
Joseph Soeters and
Jan van der Meulen (eds)
Railways and the Russo-­Japanese
War
Transporting War
Felix Patrikeeff and Harold Shukman
War and Media Operations
The US Military and the Press from
Vietnam to Iraq
Thomas Rid
Ancient China on Postmodern War
Enduring Ideas from the Chinese
Strategic Tradition
Thomas Kane
Special Forces, Terrorism and
Strategy
Warfare By Other Means
Alasdair Finlan
Imperial Defence, 1856–1956
The Old World Order
Greg Kennedy
Civil-­Military Cooperation in Post-­
Conflict Operations
Emerging Theory and Practice
Christopher Ankersen
Military Advising and Assistance
From Mercenaries to Privatization,
1815–2007
Donald Stoker
Private Military and Security
Companies
Ethics, Policies and Civil-­Military
Relations
Andrew Alexandra, Deane-­Peter Baker
and Marina Caparini (eds)
Military Cooperation in
Multinational Peace Operations
Managing Cultural Diversity and
Crisis Response
Joseph Soeters and Philippe Manigart
(eds)
The Military and Domestic Politics
A Concordance Theory of
Civil-­Military Relations
Rebecca L. Schiff
Conscription in the Napoleonic
Era
A Revolution in Military Affairs?
Donald Stoker, Frederick C. Schneid
and Harold D. Blanton (eds)
Modernity, the Media and the
Military
The Creation of National Mythologies
on the Western Front 1914–1918
John F. Williams
American Soldiers in Iraq
McSoldiers or Innovative
Professionals?
Morten Ender
Complex Peace Operations and
Civil Military Relations
Winning the Peace
Robert Egnell
Strategy and the American War of
Independence
A Global Approach
Donald Stoker, Kenneth J. Hagan and
Michael T. McMaster (eds)
Managing Military Organisations
Theory and Practice
Joseph Soeters, Paul C. van Fenema
and Robert Beeres (eds)
Modern War and the Utility of Force
Challenges, Methods and Strategy
Jan Angstrom and Isabelle Duyvesteyn
(eds)
Democratic Citizenship and War
Yoav Peled, Noah Lewin-­Epstein and
Guy Mundlak (eds)
Military Integration after Civil Wars
Multiethnic Armies, Identity and
Post-­Conflict Reconstruction
Florence Gaub
Military Ethics and Virtues
An Interdisciplinary Approach for the
21st Century
Peter Olsthoorn
The Counter-­Insurgency Myth
The British Experience of Irregular
Warfare
Andrew Mumford
Europe, Strategy and Armed Forces
Towards Military Convergence
Sven Biscop and Jo Coelmont
Managing Diversity in the Military
The value of inclusion in a culture of
uniformity
Daniel P. McDonald and
Kizzy M. Parks (eds)
The US Military
A Basic Introduction
Judith Hicks Stiehm
Democratic Civil-­Military Relations
Soldiering in 21st-Century Europe
Sabine Mannitz (ed.)
Contemporary Military Innovation
Between Anticipation and Adaption
Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky and
Kjell Inge Bjerga (eds)
Militarism and International
Relations
Political Economy, Security, Theory
Anna Stavrianakis and Jan Selby
(eds)
Qualitative Methods in Military
Studies
Research Experiences and Challenges
Helena Carreiras and Celso Castro
(eds)
Militarism and International
Relations
Political economy, security, theory

Edited by Anna Stavrianakis and

Jan Selby
First published 2013
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2013 selection and editorial material, Anna Stavrianakis and Jan Selby;
individual chapters, the contributors
The right of the editors to be identified as the authors of the editorial
material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted
in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and
Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
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Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation
without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Militarism and international relations : political economy, security and
theory / edited by Anna Stavrianakis and Jan Selby.
p. cm. – (Cass military studies)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. International relations–History–21st century. 2. Militarism–History–
21st century. 3. Militarism–Case studies. I. Stavrianakis, Anna. II.
Selby, Jan, 1972–
JZ1251.M56 2012
327.101–dc23 2012007398
ISBN: 978-0-415-61491-7 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-0-203-10147-6 (ebk)
Typeset in Times
by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear
For Caitlin
Contents

Notes on contributors xiii

Acknowledgements xvi
List of abbreviations xvii

Part I
Theorizing militarism 1

1 Militarism and international relations in the twenty-­first

century 3
A nna S tavrianakis and J an S elby

2 Twenty-­first century militarism: a historical-­sociological

framework 19
M artin S H aw

3 Challenging cartographies of enmity: empire, war and

culture in contemporary militarization 33
S imon D alby

4 Militarism, ‘new wars’ and the political economy of

development: a Gramscian critique 45
N icola S H ort

5 War becomes academic: Human Terrain, virtuous war

and contemporary militarism. An interview with
James Der Derian 59
A nna S tavrianakis and J an S elby
xii   Contents
Part II
Militarism and security 75

6 From Oslo to Gaza: Israel’s ‘enlightened public’ and the

remilitarization of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict 77
Y oav P eled

7 From political armies to the ‘war against crime’: the

transformation of militarism in Latin America 91
D irk K ruijt and K ees K oonings

8 The global arms trade and the diffusion of militarism 104

D avid K insella

9 Wilsonians under arms 117

A ndrew J . B acevic H

Part III
The political economy of militarism 131

10 The political economy of EU space policy militarization: the

case of the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security 133
I raklis O ikonomou

11 Producing men, the nation and commodities: the cultural

political-­economy of militarism in Egypt 147
R amy M . K . A ly

12 The Chinese military: its political and economic function 164

K erry B rown and C laudia Z anardi

References 177
Index 203
Contributors

Ramy M.K. Aly is a Lecturer in Anthropology at the University of Sussex. His

main areas of research interest are the performativity of gender and race, and
cultural production and social struggle in the Arab world.
Andrew J. Bacevich is Professor of History and International Relations at
Boston University. A graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, he received his
Ph.D. in American diplomatic history from Princeton. He is the author of
Washington Rules: America’s Path to Permanent War (2010), The Limits of
Power: The End of American Exceptionalism (2008), and The New American
Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War (2005), among other books.
Kerry Brown is Head of the Asia Programme at Chatham House, London,
where he leads the Europe China Research and Advice Network (ECRAN).
He is the author of The Cultural Revolution in Inner Mongolia (2006), Strug-
gling Giant: China in the 21st Century (2007), The Rise of the Dragon: Chi-
nese Investment Flows in the Reform Period (2008), Friends and Enemies:
The Past, Present and Future of the Communist Party in China (2009) and
Ballot Box China (2011), and editor of China 2020 (2011). He is currently
working on a political biography of Hu Jintao.
Simon Dalby is CIGI Chair in the Political Economy of Climate Change at the
Balsillie School of International Affairs in Waterloo, Canada. He is coeditor of
Rethinking Geopolitics (1998), The Geopolitics Reader (1998, 2006), the jour-
nal Geopolitics, and author of Creating the Second Cold War (1990), Environ-
mental Security (2002) and Security and Environmental Change (2009).
James Der Derian is a Professor (Research) of International Studies at Brown
University and a filmmaker. His articles on war, technology and the media
have appeared in the Berliner Zeitung, New York Times, Nation, Washington
Quarterly and Wired, and his most recent books are Critical Practices of
International Theory (2008) and Virtuous War: Mapping the Military–­
Industrial–Media–Entertainment Network (2009). He has produced three
documentaries with Udris Films, VY2K, After 9/11, and Human Terrain,
which won the Audience Award at the 2009 Festival dei Popoli in Florence
and has been an official selection at numerous international film festivals.
xiv   Contributors
David Kinsella is Professor and Chair of Political Science, and Director of the
Public Affairs and Policy Ph.D. programme in the Hatfield School of Govern-
ment at Portland State University. His books include World Politics: The
Menu for Choice (with Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr) and The Morality of
War: A Reader (edited with Craig L. Carr). His primary areas of research are
the global arms trade, regional conflict, democratic peace and just war theory,
and his most recent research focuses on illicit arms trade networks and the
implications for violent conflict and arms control.
Kees Koonings is Associate Professor of Development Studies in the Faculty of
Social Sciences, Utrecht University. One of his research specialisms is milita-
rism and democratization in Latin America. He is co-­editor of Megacities
(2009), Fractured Cities: Social Exclusion, Urban Violence and Contested
Spaces in Latin America (2007) and Armed Actors: Organized Violence and
State Failure in Latin America (2004).
Dirk Kruijt is Professor Emeritus of Development Studies at the Faculty of
Social Sciences of Utrecht University. He has published on poverty and
informality, military governments, guerrilla movements, drugs and violence,
and war and peace in Latin America and the Caribbean. At present he is
writing on the role of Cuba in Latin America.
Iraklis Oikonomou is a researcher at the Hellenic Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics. He holds a Ph.D. in International Politics from the University of
Wales Aberystwyth and recently completed a post-­doctoral research project on
EU military space policy, funded by the EFSPS programme and Riksbankens
Jubileumsfond. His main interests are the political economy of EU armaments
and space policies, and historical materialist theories of European integration.
Yoav Peled is Associate Professor of Political Science at Tel Aviv University
and a lawyer. His work has dealt with citizenship and ethnic politics in Israel
and with the Israeli-­Palestinian conflict. His book, Being Israeli: The Dynam-
ics of Multiple Citizenship, co-­authored with Gershon Shafir (2002), won the
Albert Hourani Prize of the Middle East Studies Association of North Amer-
ica for best book in Middle East studies in 2002. He is the co-­editor of Demo-
cratic Citizenship and War (2010) and Co-­Editor in Chief of The Public
Sphere: Tel Aviv Journal of Political Science.
Jan Selby is Senior Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the
University of Sussex. His research focuses on comparative peace processes,
water and climate security, the Israeli-­Palestinian conflict and international
relations theory. He is author of Water, Power and Politics in the Middle
East: The Other Israeli-­Palestinian Conflict (2003) and co-­editor of Global
Governance, Conflict and Resistance (2003, with Feargal Cochrane and
Rosaleen Duffy). He is currently writing a monograph provisionally entitled
Divided Environments: Geopolitics, Uneven Development, and the Climate-­
Water-Conflict Nexus, which examines climate and water security issues with
extended case studies on Cyprus, Israel-­Palestine and Sudan.
 Contributors   xv
Martin Shaw is Research Professor of International Relations at the University
of Sussex and at the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals (IBEI), and
Professorial Fellow in International Relations and Human Rights at the Uni-
versity of Roehampton, London. He is the author of Dialectics of War (1988),
Post-­Military Society (1991), Civil Society and Media in Global Crises
(1996), War and Genocide? (2003) and What is Genocide? (2007), and editor
of War, State and Society (1984) and The Sociology of War and Peace
(1987).
Nicola Short is Assistant Professor of Political Science, York University. She is
the author of The International Politics of Post-­Conflict Reconstruction in
Guatemala (2007). Her wider research interests are in the political economy
of inequality and difference in world affairs from the perspective of Gram-
scian political theory.
Anna Stavrianakis is Senior Lecturer in the Department of International Rela-
tions at the University of Sussex. She is the author of Taking Aim at the Arms
Trade: NGOs, Global Civil Society and the World Military Order (2010). Her
main research interests are the arms trade, military globalization and milita-
rism, and NGO activism and debates around global civil society.
Claudia Zanardi is a Ph.D. candidate in the War Studies Department, King’s
College, London, working on the modernization of the People’s Liberation
Army Navy. She also works on the perception of the PLA military modern­
ization by major EU Member States. Her wider areas of interest include inter-
national relations, international security in Sub-­Saharan Africa and East Asia,
as well as China’s military development and defence policy.
Acknowledgements

Scholarship at its best is collaborative, and producing an edited volume has gen-
erated opportunities for engagement that have surpassed our expectations, as
well as unexpected challenges whose struggle, if not resolution, have provided
their own stimulation in turn. This book began life in a conversation between the
editors in 2008 and has grown and developed in myriad ways in the intervening
four years. In the process we have accrued several debts. In particular, Iraklis
Oikonomou played an instrumental role in the original conference on which the
volume is based, and in an early editorial capacity. We are grateful for his
unstinting intellectual and practical contribution to the development of the
project, for his seemingly boundless energy, and for his friendship. The Univer-
sity of Sussex, Sussex’s Centre for Global Political Economy, the British Inter-
national Studies Association, the Transnational Institute and the Network of
Activist Scholars of Politics and IR, all provided material support for the confer-
ence, and a small army of student volunteers ensured the proceedings ran
smoothly in what proved to be a fruitful and collegial collective endeavour.
Many thanks also to Matthieu Hughes for transcribing the editors’ interview
with James Der Derian, and to Vanessa Iaria for her precision and timeliness in
copy-­editing.
We are grateful to Oxford University Press for permission to reprint an
abridged version of Chapter 1 of Andrew J. Bacevich’s The New American
­Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War (2005).
Abbreviations

AD Anno Domini
ALBA Bolivarian Alternative for the Peoples of Our America
ASD AeroSpace and Defence
BOPE Special Police Operations Battalion
CEO Chief Executive Officer
CMC Central Military Commission
COSTIND Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for National
Defence
CPC Communist Party of China
CSF Central Security Forces
EADS European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company
EC European Commission
EDA European Defence Agency
ELN National Liberation Army
EMF European Metalworker’s Federation
EP European Parliament
ESA European Space Agency
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy
EU European Union
FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FMM Four Mothers Movement
FRNP National Popular Resistance Front
GAESA Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A.
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GLD General Logistics Department
GMES Global Monitoring for Environment and Security
GNP Gross National Product
GPS Global Positioning System
G-­MOSAIC GMES services for Management of Operations, Situational
Awareness and Intelligence for regional Crises
HTS Human Terrain System
IDF Israel Defense Forces
IFI International Financial Institutions
xviii   Abbreviations
IMF International Monetary Fund
IR International Relations
LIMES Land and Sea Integrated Monitoring for European Security
MIC Military Industrial Complex
MIME-­NET Military Industrial Media Entertainment Network
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO Non-­Governmental Organization
PAPF People’s Armed Police Force
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PLO Palestine Liberation Organization
PRC People’s Republic of China
PRS Public Regulated Service
RCC Revolutionary Command Council
RMA Revolution in Military Affairs
R&D Research and Development
SAF Second Artillery Force
SASTIND State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for
National Defence
SCAF Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
SOE State Owned Enterprises
SPASEC Space and Security Panel of Experts
UAR United Arab Republic
UK United Kingdom
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
US United States
US United States of America
WEU Western European Union
WMD Weapon of Mass Destruction
Part I
Theorizing militarism
1 Militarism and international
relations in the twenty-­first
century
Anna Stavrianakis and Jan Selby

Militarism – understood as the social and international relations of the prepara-

tion for, and conduct of, organized political violence – is an abiding and defining
characteristic of world politics. Recent and ongoing wars in Sri Lanka, Rwanda,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia, Syria, Libya and Sudan, plus at least 30
lesser armed conflicts (Themnér and Wallensteen, 2011), and rising global mili-
tary expenditures since 2001 (Perlo-­Freeman et al., 2010), are but the most con-
spicuous contemporary indications of this. Successful military coups in Fiji and
Thailand (both 2006), Mauritania and Guinea (2008), Madagascar and Honduras
(2009), and Niger (2010), and the entrenched power of Middle Eastern military
actors, even in the face of the Arab Spring protests (2011), all speak to the
enduring power of military actors within political, economic and social life. In a
very different but far from unrelated way, the recent record of the British state in
supporting its domestic arms industry through a range of morally and legally
questionable means – from facilitating the early release of Abdelbaset Megrahi
from Scottish jail in order to promote arms (and oil) interests in Libya, to unlaw-
fully quashing investigation of corrupt activity by BAE Systems, to collaborat-
ing with defence contractors to systematically under-­budget military capital
projects (Quinn, 2010; Peel et al., 2008; Haynes and Coghlan, 2010) – clearly
suggests that militarism is characteristic of global North and global South alike.
Yet despite the ongoing social, political and economic reach of military insti-
tutions, practices and values, the concept and subject of militarism have not
received significant attention within recent debates in International Relations
(IR). A great deal of scholarly work was produced during especially the late
Cold War era on arms races, military expenditure, arms sales to the Third World,
the vast numbers of people under arms, and those militaristic attitudes, structures
and practices that produce, or are shaped by, modern warfare (e.g. Albrecht et
al., 1975; Eide and Thee, 1980; Enloe, 1988; Thompson, 1982). Extensive work
was also undertaken on the concept of militarism itself (e.g. Berghahn, 1981;
Mann, 1987; Skjelsbaek, 1979; Vagts, 1959; Shaw, 1988). But such sustained
research and reflection has largely disappeared since the early 1990s, revitalized
only in part by US adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan (e.g. Bacevich, 2005;
Johnson, 2004). In some fields, most notably political geography, discussion of
militarism and militarization remains strong, so much so that political
4   A. Stavrianakis and J. Selby
geographers can claim with some merit that ‘the topic of militarization has been
resurgent in recent years’ (Bernazzoli and Flint, 2010; Bryan, 2010; Kuus, 2009;
Loyd, 2009; Woodward, 2005). The same could not be said from the perspective
of International Relations, however. Some, especially historical sociologists (e.g.
Mann, 2003; Shaw, 2005) and feminist scholars (Enloe, 2000, 2004; Sjoberg and
Via, 2010; Whitworth, 2004), have kept discussion of militarism alive. But there
has been little uptake of their concerns in the wider discipline. Contemporary
textbooks on world politics, IR theory, and security and strategic studies make
few, if any, references to militarism and militarization. Even more tellingly,
while since the mid-­1980s IR has gone through an intellectual revolution –
marked by the collapsing hegemony of conservative realism and a proliferation
of assorted critical approaches, as well as a huge amount of epistemological,
conceptual and theoretical innovation – none of this seems to have inspired
much reflection on militarism. The systematic academic study of militarism and
IR appears to be a thing of the past.
The evident contradiction between militarized social and international rela-
tions on the one hand, and little or no academic debate on the other, is paradox­
ical, and provides the motivation for this volume. Based on papers presented at
an international, interdisciplinary conference held at the University of Sussex in
May 2009, plus additional invited contributions, it brings together researchers
working on militarism, militarization and international politics from a diverse
range of theoretical perspectives. The guiding objectives of the conference were
to identify the current state of play in the recent literature on militarism; to reflect
on what we might learn from earlier discussions of militarism, as well as how
these earlier understandings might require updating and revision; to analyse a
wide range of contemporary practices and dimensions of militarism; and to con-
sider how both the concept and practices of militarism and militarization might
be studied, empirically and theoretically, at the crossroads between international
political economy, security studies and IR theory.
The resulting book has a two overarching aims: to make the case for a
renewed research agenda for IR centred on the concept of militarism; and to
provide a series of empirically focused and theoretically informed case studies
of contemporary militarism in practice. It does not, and is not intended to provide
either a comprehensive survey of contemporary militarism, or a unified or exclu-
sionary theoretical framework. The individual chapters’ substantive focuses vary
widely, some considering militarism and militarization in specific national or
regional contexts, from the US to China to the Middle East. Others concentrate
on the extension or expansion of militaristic practices into new social, political
and economic domains such as space, or popular culture. But there are many
countries and domains on which the book does not touch, or discusses only in
passing. Theoretical frameworks also vary widely, with chapters being variously
informed by liberal, realist, Marxist, Gramscian, post-­structuralist, constructivist
and Weberian understandings of militarism. To this extent, the book aims to
present a diverse and eclectic body of research on militarism, which hopefully is
a stimulus to further research and debate.
 Militarism and IR in the 21st century   5
The book is loosely structured into three parts. Part I provides a set of theo-
retical reflections on militarism, including chapters by Martin Shaw, with a his-
torical sociological reading of militarism and one of its contemporary iterations,
‘global surveillance war’; by Simon Dalby, utilizing a critical geopolitics frame-
work to argue that taken-­for-granted geographical representations are key to the
legitimization of violence; and by Nicola Short, utilizing a neo-­Gramscian
framework to theorize recent transformations in militarism in the global South.
This section also includes an interview with James Der Derian, focusing on his
recent film Human Terrain, as well as on key themes relating to militarism –
culture, simulation, virtue, networks – within his research. Part II analyses mili-
tarism in relation to security, including chapters by Yoav Peled, on
transformations in Israeli militarism and the role of the ‘enlightened public’
therein; by Dirk Kruijt and Kees Koonings, documenting the transformation of
militarism in Latin America, from ‘political armies’ to the war against crime; by
David Kinsella, on the role of the arms trade in the international diffusion of
militarism; and by Andrew Bacevich, surveying contemporary US militarism
(this chapter being abridged from his seminal 2005 book The New American
Militarism). Finally, Part III turns to political economy, including chapters by
Iraklis Oikonomou, offering a Marxist reading of the militarization of EU space
research and policy; by Ramy Aly, on the history and political economy of the
military and militarism in Egypt; and by Kerry Brown and Claude Zanardi, on
the role of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in business and politics.
This introductory chapter both sets out a case for reviving the study of militar­
ism in IR, and introduces and contextualizes the contributions to follow. We start
by reflecting on why the concept of militarism has been so marginal within post-­
Cold War debates in IR, emphasizing in particular the political and intellectual
ascendancy of liberalism, and the dominant disciplinary concerns with ‘new
wars’, ‘state failure’, ‘human security’ and ‘securitization’. In each case we
contend that these new emphases and conceptualizations do not provide solid
grounds for jettisoning militarism, either as a concept or object of analysis. We
then set out a more positive case for studying militarism, first by considering
contending definitions and conceptions thereof, and theoretical approaches
thereto; and second by giving an overview of some of the key empirical dimen-
sions of, and recent transformations in, militarism and militarization. In each of
these sections, we both map existing literatures, and discuss, compare and con-
trast the particular contributions in this volume. A brief conclusion reflects on
some of the difficulties that we, as editors, have faced in pulling the book
together, and on some of its consequent limitations.

Whatever happened to militarism in IR?

Since the end of the Cold War, discussion of militarism has fallen out of fashion
in IR. It would be wrong to overstate this development: as Short shows (Chapter
4 in this volume), this change has been relative, not absolute. That said, it is
noteworthy that the concept of militarism has been largely bypassed by IR’s
6   A. Stavrianakis and J. Selby
‘post-­positivist revolution’, and that this has occurred without it having been
subjected to any sustained or profound theoretical critiques. As this suggests, the
notion of militarism has fallen by the wayside less because it is fatally flawed,
than because it has become deemed passé. There are, we suggest, three main
reasons behind this: the post-­Cold War political and intellectual hegemony of
liberalism; the rise of influential discourses on ‘failed states’ and ‘new wars’;
and the predominance of discussions of ‘security’ and ‘securitization’, as against
‘militarism’ and ‘militarization’, within critical IR and security studies.
However, each of these reasons, we argue, actually provides quite thin grounds
for discarding or bypassing the concept of militarism.
The revolutions of 1989–91 and the consequent global ascendency of liberal
capitalism provide the most fundamental structural reason why recent IR schol-
arship has been so inattentive to militarism. Discussions of militarism during the
Cold War era had focused predominantly on the Soviet–American superpower
rivalry, on arms racing, and on what E.P. Thompson (1982) labelled ‘extermin-
ism’. With the end of the Cold War, not only was this era-­defining rivalry
de­cisively resolved, but global military spending sharply declined, as also did
the incidence of inter-­state armed conflicts and the proportion of authoritarian
and military regimes worldwide. In the view of much mainstream as well as crit-
ical scholarship in IR, an era structured by geopolitical conflict had given way to
one defined, for good or ill, by democratization, economic liberalization, globali-
zation, global governance and peace dividends. Moreover, it was widely
assumed – building upon a long tradition of liberal thought on the subject – that
these processes of liberalization and democratization would inexorably challenge
and undermine militarist ideologies, practices and structures. At the apex of such
thinking, democratic peace theorists came to consider it no less than an ‘empiri-
cal law’ that democratic states did not and would not go to war with one another
(Levy, 1988: 661–2); whilst others extended this thesis into claims that democ-
racy, trade and high economic development are systemically correlated with a
decline in the incidence and severity of warfare (Souva and Prins, 2006; Lacina
et al., 2006), and that democratic states are more internally pacific too (Rummel,
1997; Hegre et al., 2001) – a claim which to this day informs accepted interna-
tional doctrines of ‘liberal peacebuilding’ for societies emerging from civil war
(Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Richmond, 2007). Right across these intellectual
and policy terrains, it has been widely if often only tacitly assumed that liberal-
ism is ascendant, that liberalism and militarism are antithetical, and that militar­
ism is thus on the wane.
The problem with such claims is that liberalism is neither incompatible with
militarism, nor quite as hegemonic as its proponents imagine. Though rarely rec-
ognized by liberal or democratic peace theorists, liberal states – whatever their
pacific inclinations towards other liberal states – actually have an unusually high
propensity towards war with illiberal ones (Doyle, 1983). The leading liberal
states of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Great Britain and the United
States respectively, fought more wars during these periods than any others
(Blum, 2006: 162–220; Carr, 1946). The current leading liberal democratic state,
 Militarism and IR in the 21st century   7
the US, accounts for over 40 per cent of global military spending (SIPRI, 2011),
and has military personnel in over 150 states (US DoD, 2011). Historically,
liberal ‘civil society militarism’ visited genocide upon large swathes of the non-­
European world (Mann, 1996). Moreover, internal political and economic liber-
alization in the post-­Cold War era has often been quite compatible with the
entrenchment or extension military power (as a number of the contributions in
this volume demonstrate). This is not to deny that some world regions and social
domains have witnessed progressive demilitarization. But the claim, or sugges-
tion, that the post-­Cold War era has been characterized by a general decline in
militarism simply cannot be sustained.
This being the case, it begs the question as to why critical scholarship, in par-
ticular, in International Relations has not in recent years been more attentive to
militarism and militarization. This brings us to our second factor: the rise of
influential policy and academic discourses, including within critical IR scholar-
ship, on ‘state failure’, ‘new wars’ and ‘human security’. Since the end of the
Cold War, ‘failed’, ‘collapsed’, ‘weak’ and, more recently, ‘fragile’ states have
routinely been identified as the pre-­eminent threat to international security
(Helman and Ratner, 1993; Rotberg, 2003; Ghani and Lockhart, 2008; Depart-
ment for International Development, 2009: 5). The underlying premise of this
discourse is that it is in the weakening or collapse of the Weberian legitimate
monopoly over violence, rather than in the assertion or extension of state power,
from which the central challenges to human well-­being and world order pres-
ently derive – whether this be internally, for example in increasing civil violence
and population displacement within failed states, or internationally, for instance
through the use of ungoverned territories by drug cartels or international terror-
ists. In parallel to this failed states discourse, it has been widely claimed that the
post-­Cold War era is characterized by a qualitatively new type of warfare ‘asso-
ciated with globalisation and the disintegration of states’ (Kaldor, 2005: 491).
Where classical ‘old wars’, it is asserted, were fought between formal state mili-
tary institutions, in support of declared military, political or ideological objec-
tives, and in a manner that was productive of state power, ‘new wars’ are thought
to be internal or transnational rather than international, to be disorganized and
informal, to revolve around identity conflicts and economic predation, and to
reverse rather than support processes of state-­building (Duffield, 2001; Kaldor,
1999; Münkler, 2004; Snow, 1996). A key policy and academic response to the
violence associated with new wars and state failure has been the promotion of
‘human security’, with its emphasis on legitimate political authority, promotion
of human rights and the rule of law, reform of institutional structures, and poli­
cing and community interventions to bolster the forces of civility in the context
of the blurred boundary between war, crime and organized violence (Glasius and
Kaldor, 2005; Kaldor, 2007a; Muggah and Krause, 2009). In all three discourses
of ‘failed states’, ‘new wars’ and ‘human security’, then, contemporary political
violence is seen essentially as a problem of declining and de-­institutionalized
state capacity. Viewed thus, the traditional IR problematique of military power
and violence has been superseded by the problem of internal lawlessness and
8   A. Stavrianakis and J. Selby
anarchy – with the corollary, if this is indeed correct, that the study of militarism
is also somewhat outdated.
It is, however, not correct that the problematique of internal lawlessness has
superseded that of military power. Indeed, the way the concepts of ‘state failure’,
‘human security’ and ‘new wars’ have been used has obscured our understand-
ing of the predominant forms of war-­making, war-­preparation and military
power in contemporary world politics, which remain predominantly state-­based
and retain powerful connections to state formation. For, not only has there not
been, empirically, a ‘proliferation of armed conflicts within states’ since the end
of the Cold War (ICISS, 2001: 4), but in addition conceptually, the ‘new wars’
discourse is premised on idealized and Eurocentric models of both inter-­state
and civil warfare (Barkawi and Laffey, 2006; Kalyvas, 2001). And for its part,
whatever its policy world appeal, the ‘failed states’ discourse has been exten-
sively critiqued as descriptively shallow and misleading, and as more suited to
justifying interventionism than informed analysis (Boas and Jennings, 2007;
Call, 2008; Hill, 2005; Jones, 2008). Many so-­called ‘failed states’ have very
powerful state structures including strong military and related paramilitary and
intelligence institutions, whose influence is highly uneven, however, especially
in territorial peripheries. ‘Human security’ interventions, meanwhile, are not, in
principle, incompatible with analyses of militarism: they can be deployed as a
critique of the traditional normative privileging of state over individual security.
Yet in practice, human security discourse has focused on inter-­personal violence,
gang warfare and economically motivated crime (Geneva Declaration Secretar-
iat, 2011; Human Security Centre, 2006), in the process underplaying the extent
and nature of state, paramilitary and organized group involvement in this and
other violence. Often, violence that may superficially appear to be between non-­
state actors is in fact no such thing: the ongoing ‘narco-­war’ in Mexico, for
example, which has resulted in 40,000 fatalities since 2007 but is not categorized
as a ‘war’ in civil war datasets, is being fought not just between drug cartels, but
with the active complicity of the Mexican state (Hernández, A., 2010; Wood,
2011). Furthermore, ‘human security’ analyses tend to sideline the wider influ-
ence that organized military actors exercise on social relations above and beyond
direct lethal violence and war preparation, and whose significance goes beyond
the number of people they kill.
The enduringly organized and centralized nature of contemporary political
violence becomes even clearer if we adjust our conception of statehood and rec-
ognize its heterogeneity and historicity. In International Relations debates, the
label ‘state’ and the notion of ‘sovereignty’ are usually reserved for those institu-
tions which are internationally recognized as such, even if their actual control
over territory is in certain respects limited: IR mostly follows a ‘juridical’ as
against ‘empirical’ understanding of statehood (Jackson, 1990). During the late
Cold War, the dominant approach to IR, neo-­realism, focused on states (viewed
as functionally undifferentiated and homogeneous ‘billiard balls’) and on their
interaction within the international arena. The many post-­positivist critiques of
this dismissed neo-­realism but with it also a strong analytical or critical focus on
 Militarism and IR in the 21st century   9
states and their militaries. Yet the problem with these critiques was that they too
readily accepted neo-­realism’s problematic understanding of states. States
remain the central institutions of world politics and global order, both legally
and practically. But they are far from homogenous in form and function, and
some barely deserve the name. Simultaneously, there are institutions of organ-
ized political violence that do not possess international recognition, but nonethe-
less have strong state-­like characteristics (in that they are organized, centralized,
have institutionalized military and administrative capabilities, and exert control
over territory) and may in certain cases possess more ‘state-­ness’ than recog-
nized national states (Clapham, 1998; Davis, 2003). Organized military and
related institutions remain the central agents of the preparation for, and conduct
of, political violence worldwide. And much of what we often call ‘non-­state’
violence is conducted by paramilitary groups, militias or other organizations
which are, both politically and financially, dependent clients or proxies of states
(e.g. Alden et al., 2011). Most contemporary battle deaths and war deaths still
occur at the hands of states and associated para-­state actors.
Sudan illustrates all of these points well. Often characterized as a ‘failed’ or
‘failing’ state (Helman and Ratner, 1993; Rotberg, 2003), Sudan is nonetheless
ruled by a powerful military authoritarian regime, which has a measure of legiti-
macy in northern Nile states, but much less within geographical peripheries,
especially the (newly independent) South and the western region of Darfur (e.g.
de Waal, 2007; Jok, 2007; Mamdani, 2009). It has experienced extensive politi-
cal violence, of course, but this, far from being disorganized, has revolved pri-
marily around attempts to variously extend or resist state power. Moreover,
much of this violence could quite properly be described as ‘militarized’. The
post-­2003 violence in Darfur, for instance, while it was led on the ground mainly
by the horse- and camel-­riding Janjaweed militias, was organized and financed
by the military regime in Khartoum. The Janjaweed often wore regular army
uniforms, operated in the company of regular Sudanese army units, and would
regularly undertake their attacks hot on the heels of bombing raids by Sudanese
Air Force Antonov An-­12 transporters, combat helicopters and MiG fighters
(Prunier, 2005). An analysis of militarized state structures is crucial to under-
standing patterns of contemporary political violence in purportedly ‘failed states’
such as Sudan. The claimed rise of ‘new wars’ and ‘failed states’, in sum, does
not provide good grounds for a retreat from analysis of militarism; to the con-
trary, such currently fashionable formulations systematically understate the
enduring reach and violence of military power.
A third major reason why militarism currently receives such little attention
within IR lies, we suggest, in the discipline’s predominant concerns with ‘secu-
rity’ and more recently ‘securitization’. Since 1945, with the establishment of
the UN Security Council, the de-­legitimization of wars of aggression, and the
shifting fortunes of ministries of war, defence and security, the concept of ‘secu-
rity’ has gradually become the central organizing concept for both the practice
and the study of international affairs (Buzan and Hansen, 2009; Neocleous,
2000). Moreover, since the end of the Cold War, discourse on ‘security’ has
10   A. Stavrianakis and J. Selby
been significantly extended beyond a concern with the territorial defence of the
nation-­state – with new referents such as human, global and environmental secu-
rity (e.g. Kaldor, 2007a; Tickner, 1992; Dalby, 2002), and a range of emergent
issues such as migration, trafficking, disease, health and minorities becoming
significant new focuses of policy intervention and analysis (e.g. Neal, 2009;
Lobasz, 2009; Elbe, 2010; Jutila, 2006). Critical IR scholarship on security, in
turn, has attended above all to the ways in which claimed ‘security threats’ are
framed, constructed, ‘securitized’, and as a result elevated above normal demo-
cratic politics, to politically problematic or at best ambiguous effect. If ‘militar­
ism’ was a key concept and critical tool during the darkest periods of the Cold
War, its parallel today, at least in European IR, is ‘securitization’ (Buzan et al.,
1998; Balzacq, 2010; Wæver, 1995; Williams, 2003). With this transformation
in discourse has come a change in the objects of critique – away from a core
concern with the excessive influence of arms, and military institutions and ideol-
ogies, on domestic and international politics, to a broader concern with the prac-
tice and legitimization of exceptional ‘security’ measures, regardless of whether
these be the work of the military, or instead of intelligence services, domestic
law enforcement agencies, the media, or any number of state, private sector and
international ‘securitizing actors’. Implicitly and sometimes explicitly, this secu-
ritization research ‘[q]uestion[s] the primacy of the military element and the
state in the conceptualization of security’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 1). Viewed thus,
the traditional IR problematique of military power and violence has been dis-
placed not only by the problem of failed states, but also by the problematique of
security (Bernazzoli and Flint, 2010).
There is much to be said for such arguments, especially in light of the
increased importance attached to international surveillance, border control and
homeland security since the events of 9/11 – and to this extent, the securitization
framework advances a far wider research agenda than that suggested by the
concept of militarism. In other regards, however, the opposite holds true. First,
since the central aim of securitization research is to interrogate the mobilization
of a normative concept, ‘security’, it inexorably follows that this research is
highly discourse-­centric in its methods and objects of analysis, whether analys-
ing specific securitization acts (e.g. Atland, 2009; Herington, 2010; Cui and Li,
2011) or the broader discursive contexts within which security threats are con-
structed and emerge (e.g. Balzacq, 2005; Hansen, 2011; Roe, 2008). It is for this
reason that securitization research almost always operates within a constructivist
or post-­structuralist theoretical framework. The concepts of militarism and mili-
tarization, by contrast, suggest a central focus on the institution of war (its prepa-
ration, conduct and effects) and on military organizations (that often have
enduring and widespread influence outside of war). They are therefore amenable
to either discursive or materialist treatments, and from any number of theoretical
perspectives (as the contributions to this volume testify). Second, the central
focus of securitization research on the extension of security thinking to new
threats and domains means that in consequence it has had very little to say about
those areas where security discourse has traditionally been applied. It has
 Militarism and IR in the 21st century   11
contributed little to our understanding of, for instance, international military alli-
ance structures, or the international arms trade, or military–industrial relations,
or the continuing political and social power of military institutions right across
Asia and Sub-­Saharan Africa. Arguably, then, though securitization research has
undoubtedly broadened the focus of security studies beyond the military, it has
simultaneously detracted critical attention from the problems of militarism and
militarization. Moreover, and third, securitization research’s broadening of the
security problematique, and downgrading of the problem of militarism, both has
an ‘explicitly European flavour’ (Huysmans, 1998: 480), and is premised on a
liberal democratic model of ‘normal politics’ that does not speak to political
realities across much of the global South (CASE Collective, 2006: 455). Securit­
ization research is limited then, not only in its focuses on discourse, and on
emerging security threats, but also in its Eurocentrism. The concept of milita-
rism, by contrast, is of global relevance and applicability. While in certain
respects the concepts of security and securitization broach a wide and important
research agenda, in other respects the concept of militarism has much more
extensive analytical – and therefore also normative political – purchase.
If the arguments above appear somewhat conjectural, corroborating evidence
for them can be found in the intellectual trajectories of those erstwhile scholars
of militarism who, during the 1990s, shifted their research much closer to North-
ern security and development priorities. Mary Kaldor, for example, shifted from
a quasi-­Marxian analysis of militarism and ‘modes of warfare’ (1982a, 1982b),
to becoming one of the most prominent scholars of ‘new wars’ and also ‘global
civil society’ (2003). Robin Luckham’s research formerly focused on class,
international conflict and militarism, especially in Sub-­Saharan Africa
(Luckham, 1977a, 1977b; Luckham and Bekele, 1984a); but in the post-­Cold
War period, his work moved in large measure towards a focus on ‘complex
emergencies’ and ‘security sector reform’ (Luckham and Cliffe, 1999; Luckham
and Cawthra, 2003). Keith Krause formerly wrote on state formation and mili-
tary development in the Middle East (1994, 1996), but his current focus, espe-
cially as editor of Small Arms Survey, centres on small arms proliferation and
armed violence in the global South and human security. As these examples
suggest, post-­Cold War political shifts, new donor funding agendas (plus also
the increasing reliance of Northern academia on these donor funds – tellingly, all
of the ‘new wars’, ‘security sector reform’ and ‘small arms’ research above has
attracted significant donor funding), and consequent shifts in intellectual dis-
course and priorities, are key to understanding why discussion of militarism is
currently so marginal within IR.

Definitions, conceptions, approaches

While the above suggests reasons why there is currently so little discussion of
militarism within IR, and also argues for the concept’s continuing relevance
within an era of liberalism, security politics and so-­called ‘new wars’, it only
hints towards answers on the question of how militarism should (or might) be
12   A. Stavrianakis and J. Selby
approached and understood. Broadly speaking, there are five ways in which mili-
tarism has been defined or conceptualized. In turn, these different conceptions of
militarism mostly correspond to distinct theoretical assumptions or perspectives.
Many (but by no means all) of these conceptions and approaches are represented
in this volume.
Historically, first, militarism was often understood as an ideology – one that
glorified war, military institutions, and the prevalence of martial values in
society. Thus seminally for Vagts (1959: 13, 14, 17), militarism referred to that
‘complex of feelings which rank military institutions and ways above the ways
of civilian life, carrying military mentality and modes of acting and decision into
the civilian sphere’; for him, militarism was characterized by ‘qualities of caste
and cult, authority and belief ’, and involved ‘an emphasis on military considera-
tions, spirit, ideals, and scales of value, in the life of states’. Emerging in the
second half of the nineteenth century, this type of definition became particularly
popular in relation to Germany around the time of the First World War, where
militarism assumed ‘the importance of a basic cultural value’ (Berghahn, 1981:
32). However, such ideology-­centred conceptions are now rare, both because
wars and militaries are no longer subjects of straightforward glorification, and
because it is reductionist and limiting to essentialize militarism as ideology (see
Shaw, Chapter 2 in this volume). While many late twentieth-­century writers,
from Mann (1987: 71) to Enloe (1988: 7), have understood militarism as involv-
ing a ‘set of attitudes’ or ‘set of values and beliefs’, this has usually been as part
of a broader interpretation, encompassing material as well as ideational ele-
ments. Indicative of this, none of our contributors deploy an essentially ideologi-
cal reading of militarism.
A second and more common understanding is behavioural, conceptualizing
militarism as the propensity to utilize force to resolve conflict. Eide and Thee
(1980: 9), for example, define militarism as ‘the inclination to rely on military
means of coercion for the handling of conflicts’; while Kinsella (Chapter 8 in
this volume) defines it as a ‘disposition or proclivity . . . to employ military over
non-­military means of conflict resolution’. By such understandings, militarism is
defined in terms of, and identified by, actual policy outcomes. The value of such
conceptions, of course, is that, by contrast with ideological definitions, they do
not assume that a propensity to use force is necessarily or essentially rooted in
martial values or the glorification of war. The weakness of such outcome-­
oriented interpretations, however, is that they tend to neglect or downplay the
political or sociological processes underlying war and military power. Moreover,
as several of the contributions herein make clear, militarism draws upon numer-
ous sources for its power and legitimacy, not just on acts of violence; and can
remain entrenched even in relatively pacific (at least international) contexts
(Kruijt and Koonings, Chapter 7 in this volume).
A third conception of militarism, and also militarization, equates them with
military build-­ups, and especially with quantitative increases in weapons produc-
tion and imports, military personnel and military expenditure. This is the domi-
nant conception of militarism within contemporary peace research, meshing
 Militarism and IR in the 21st century   13
neatly with the latter’s predilection for statistical analyses (e.g. de Soysa, 2008;
Gibler and Sewell, 2006; Murshed Syed and Mamoon, 2010). Ross (1987), for
instance, understands and measures militarism by six indicators: levels of mili-
tary expenditure, arms imports and arms production; size of armed forces; and
number of wars and military regimes (Ross, 1987; SIPRI, 2011). Such an
approach no doubt lends some degree of quantitative and scientific robustness to
the study of militarism. However, as with the behavioural understandings dis-
cussed above, build-­up conceptions offer little by way of insight regarding the
social embeddedness, power or meanings of militarism, or regarding those
social, political and indeed international structures and processes in which mili-
tary build-­ups are so powerfully rooted (for a critique of the thinness of this
‘militarization thesis’, see Shaw, 1991). Of course, this is not to deny that build-
­up scholarship on militarism can be of great value, as the large and influential
literatures on military arsenals and the arms trade surely testifies. In this volume,
Kinsella adopts such an understanding, combining a behavioural understanding
of militarism with a build-­up conception of militarization – this dual focus on
capabilities and outcomes being illustrative of a broadly realist take on the prob-
lematique of militarism.
Fourth, institutional conceptions of militarism centre on relations between
military and political institutions, and particularly on situations where the former
are deemed to exert excessive influence over the latter. This type of understand-
ing is characteristic of a civil–military relations approach (Huntington, 1957;
Finer, 1962; Perlmutter, 1997), which is premised on broadly liberal democratic
assumptions about the importance of demarcating the sphere of political
decision-­making and debate from that of military power, and keeping the mili-
tary ‘above’ or ‘out of ’ politics. In their analyses of militarism in Latin America
and China respectively, both Kruijt and Koonings (Chapter 7) and Brown and
Zanardi (Chapter 12 in this volume) adopt such an institutional understanding of
militarism – in both cases focusing on the internal rather than international
dimensions of militarism, as is characteristic of this approach. The self-­evident
value of doing this is that it directs attention towards those internal political
processes and structures which often lie behind military build-­ups and the resort
to force. However, institutional conceptions arguably still remain too narrow.
They do not speak clearly to non-­liberal democratic societies, and especially
communist systems, where there may be no clear distinction between civilian
and military elites, and where the norm of an apolitical military may not apply
(Perlmutter and LeoGrande, 1982: 780). Moreover, as Ben Eliezer (1997)
observes, militarism can arguably be as deeply ingrained in ‘militaristic socie-
ties’ where military thinking, images and means are privileged without the mili-
tary itself taking power, as in praetorian states with periodic military coups.
Coups d’état, or other forms of intermittent incursion of the military into poli-
tics, do not by themselves provide an adequate barometer of militarism.
While liberal institutional conceptions revolve around and valorize the civil–
military distinction, our fifth and final category – sociological understandings of
militarism – seek from various different theoretical perspectives to problematize
14   A. Stavrianakis and J. Selby
and transcend the civil–military divide, by understanding militarism as embed-
ded within society. Most of the contributions to this volume rely, whether expli­
citly or implicitly, on just such a sociological understanding of militarism. Shaw,
both in this volume and elsewhere, sets out perhaps the most comprehensive
articulation of a sociological reading of militarism, as referring to ‘the penetra-
tion of social relations in general by military relations’ and the ‘relationship of
war preparation and society’ (Chapter 2; 1991: 9–15). In Shaw’s work, the
concept of ‘military’ is used not as a noun to refer to an institution, but to
describe ‘all social relations, institutions and values relating to war and war
preparation’ (2003: 106); and militarism, in turn, is understood as the tendency
or extent to which these military relations influence social relations as a whole.
Shaw’s specific interpretation of militarism arises from a neo-­Weberian histor­
ical sociology, which emphasizes amongst other things the autonomous impacts
of violence, war preparation and geopolitics in constituting social relations; in
this, his work has close affinities with that of Mann (1986, 1993). But by no
means are all sociological conceptions of militarism informed by such neo-­
Weberian premises. During the Cold War era, Marxism provided fertile soil for
sociological analyses of militarism, whether in Kaldor’s analyses of modes of
warfare, E.P. Thompson’s critique of nuclear ‘exterminism’ – as he famously
stated, the US and USSR do not have, but are, military industrial complexes
(1982: 22) – or numerous other analyses of military–industrial relations; in the
present volume, Oikonomou, Peled and Short all develop (very different)
Marxist readings of militarism. Post-­structuralism can also provide a fertile
resource for analysing the sociology of militarism, as illustrated by Dalby’s
(Chapter 3) analysis of the discursive and cinematic underpinnings to contempo-
rary imperial practice; and elsewhere, feminist sociologies have explored the
mutually constitutive relations between militarism and patriarchy (Cock, 1991;
Cockburn, 2010; Enloe, 1988; Segal, 2008). Sociological approaches to milita-
rism, in short, are many and varied. What unites them, however, and wherein
lies their value, is their focus on the embeddedness of militaries, and war making
and preparation, in society. In addition, unlike those approaches which conceive
of militarism essentially as ideology, or the resort to violence, or military build-­
ups, or indeed the excessive influence of military institutions on politics, socio-
logical approaches understand militarism broadly, as in principle encompassing
all of these other elements. In this sense, many empirical studies which eschew
explicit theorization nonetheless implicitly rely on a broadly sociological under-
standing of militarism (see, for example, Bacevich, Chapter 9 this volume). For
all these reasons, a sociological understanding of militarism provides the overall
guiding framework for this volume, as indicated by the definition used right at
the beginning of this chapter.
Some would dispute the very concept of militarism, of course (though as
noted earlier in this chapter, the relative decline in discussion of militarism
within IR has been more a function of changing intellectual fashions, than of any
systematic critique). Der Derian (Chapter 5 in this volume) declines to use the
concept, partly out of a philosophical aversion to ‘isms’, and partly on the
 Militarism and IR in the 21st century   15
grounds that the notion of ‘militarism’ is premised on a normative attitude of
‘anti-­militarism’, something that he views as inappropriate to the complexities of
contemporary networked societies. Whatever one may think of these post-­
structuralist informed arguments, it is clear that the question of the meaning and
value of the concept of ‘militarism’ is far from resolved.
These conceptual and theoretical questions aside, two further sets of issues
stand out in considering how to approach the study of militarism. The first of
these is methodological, relating especially to the scale at which militarism is
analysed. Many studies of militarism use an essentially ‘statist’ or ‘methodologi-
cally nationalist’ (Chernilo, 2006) framework for studying militarism, this being
especially so within country case studies, within studies of civil–military rela-
tions, and also within those quantitative analyses which compare different levels
of militarization between states. Many of the contributions to this volume
operate with just such a nation state-­centred understanding of militarism, despite
their very different conceptual and theoretical premises (e.g. Bacevich, Brown
and Zanardi, Kinsella, Peled). Others, by contrast, are implicitly or explicitly
critical of such state-­centrism, emphasizing instead the ways in which militarism
is structured by, or embedded within, transnational, imperial or global social
relations. Informed by research in critical geopolitics, Dalby argues that contem-
porary militarism is rooted in, amongst others, statist representations of enmity,
implying in turn that critical engagement with militarism requires forms of
scholarship which escape from such a ‘territorial trap’ (Agnew, 1994). From a
Marxist perspective, Oikonomou points to the trans-­national processes which are
leading to the militarization of European space research and policy. Shaw (2005;
this volume) meanwhile, emphasizes that there exists a ‘new Western way of
war’ – ‘risk transfer militarism’ – which is not limited to particular states, but is
instead a practice of the emerging ‘global state’ (Shaw, 2000a). Elsewhere, Sta-
vrianakis (2010, 2011) argues that the international arms trade, often seen as the
last bastion of national sovereignty, is marked by hierarchical and mutually con-
stitutive imperial relations. Our premise as editors is that both ‘levels of analy-
sis’ – considered not in isolation, but in co-­constitutive interaction – are crucial
to any adequate analysis of militarism, and hence that militarism should be
understood as a simultaneously social and international phenomenon.
A final set of issues is normative, relating to analysts’ ethico-­political
approach towards militarism, the nature and extent of their critical engagement,
and the relationship between critique and analysis. Most scholarship on militar­
ism, including that in this volume, is doubtless informed by some degree or
form of anti-­militarism – though what this ‘anti-­militarism’ means and involves
varies widely. For some (e.g. Kinsella, Chapter 8), critique is directed towards
the excessive build-­up of military capabilities, whereas for others (e.g. Oikono-
mou, Chapter 10) the implicit critique is of military power per se and its relation-
ship to capitalism. With two exceptions, however, the contributions to this
volume do not explicitly discuss or draw upon a notion of anti-­militarism. The
first exception is Shaw, who warns that the possibility for opposition to militar­
ism depends on both the character of militarism itself in any given place and
16   A. Stavrianakis and J. Selby
time, as well as on wider socio-­economic, political and cultural patterns. The
second exception is Der Derian who, as already noted, rejects the idea of ‘anti-­
militarism’ – favouring instead a politics of ‘counter-­militarism’, which involves
responding to the diffuse character of contemporary military power with broader
forms of critical engagement beyond simple opposition, such as dialogue, sub-
version and mimicry. In Human Terrain and in the interview in this volume, Der
Derian also reflects on the involvement of academics, and especially anthropolo-
gists, in recent US military operations, as part of ‘human terrain teams’ – Der
Derian’s ‘critical practice’ (2009a) in relation to these involving an emphasis on
the complexity of these academic-­military interactions, rather than any outright
condemnation.
For most of the contributors to this volume, and for the editors, an implicit
working principle is that the study of militarism should not be over-­determined
by normative commitments. In keeping with this, many of the chapters consider
not only the negatives of, and violence associated with, militarism, but also its
(actual or claimed) positive and productive dimensions. For instance, Aly
(Chapter 11) and Kruit and Koonings (Chapter 7) discuss the role of militaries as
agents of economic and political development, and guardians of national consti-
tutions, building upon literatures dating back to the 1960s on the military as
modernizing forces within ‘new nations’ (e.g. Finer, 1962; Huntington, 1957;
Janowitz, 1960; Pye, 1961); while Bacevich (Chapter 9) considers the tendency
within contemporary US politics and society to view the military as a bearer of
superior values. There is also, of course, a large and varied literature on the pro-
ductivity of war and violence for social, economic and political development
(Cramer, 2006; Barkawi, 2008; Reno, 1998), which is however not represented
here. From the perspective of the editors, these are all important issues, which
should not be ignored or downplayed out of normative opposition to militarism.
Political commitments are doubtless one motivation for scholarship, but the new
research agenda that we propose is fundamentally sociological and analytical,
not ‘anti-­militarist’.

Contemporary militarism in practice

While one aim of this book is to revive the concept of militarism within IR, the
second is to provide some evidence of recent transformations in militarism. The
coverage here is by no means comprehensive, but four broad themes stand out.
A first theme relates to changes and continuities in national and international
political economies of militarism. On the one hand, as a number of the contribu-
tions to the volume testify, there have been significant transformations in struc-
tures of military production (Brown and Zanardi, Oikonomou), and in levels of
military spending (Bacevich). And yet on the other, there are continuities in the
patterns of the arms trade (Kinsella), and entrenched economic and institutional
interests of national militaries (Siddiqa, 2007; see also Aly in this volume in
relation to Egypt). What is most remarkable about these continuities is that they
have often occurred within contexts of economic and political liberalization.
 Militarism and IR in the 21st century   17
However, as a number of our contributions show, in practice there has often
been little contradiction between the rise of neo-­liberalism and the continuation
of militarized social relations. In relation to Israel, for instance, Peled analyses
how, since the collapse of the peace process with the Palestinians, economic lib-
eralization has been accompanied and legitimized by an increasingly ethno-­
nationalist form of political discourse, which in turn has fed increasingly
militarist social attitudes. And at a more general level, Short argues that neo-­
liberalization has led, not to a waning of militarism, but instead to its re-­
articulation through networks and actors criss-­crossing the public-­private divide.
A second broad theme relates to the increasing importance of culture as an
arena for militarism. Thus Dalby and Peled (both this volume) examine how par-
ticular works of literature and film can variously shape or reveal militarist atti-
tudes. Der Derian argues (this volume; 2009b) that popular entertainment is now
so closely tied in with the military that a focus on the ‘military–industrial
complex’ is anachronistic, and needs replacing with a broader consideration of
‘military–industrial–media–entertainment networks’ (or ‘MIME-­NET’). Bacev-
ich and Shaw (both this volume) emphasize that contemporary militarism and
war have been transformed by a new aesthetic of violence, involving ‘smart
weapons’ and real-­time televisual representations of war-­as-spectacle (see also
Mann, 1988). In a rather different way, Der Derian (this volume) contends that
owing to its interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, culture has now become a
key concern of the US military; ‘culture’, he argues, has become the ‘killer vari-
able’ of contemporary US warfare. As all of these contributions emphasize,
culture is a hugely important site for the consolidation or transformation of, or
contestations over, militarism.
Third, a number of contributions explore the extension or expansion of mili-
taristic practices into new domains, quite apart from culture. Oikonomou and
Shaw examine, albeit in very different ways, the use of surveillance technologies
for the extension of militarism, as well as for what Oikonomou calls the ‘militar­
ization of space’. Kruijt and Koonings argue that Latin America’s militaries are
taking on new responsibilities, and obtaining new power and legitimacy, in the
domain of internal law enforcement. And Short emphasizes that processes of
neo-­liberalization and privatization have led to the migration of militarism across
the public-­private divide, to a range of new non-­state actors in the global South,
especially private military/security companies (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2007;
Avant, 2005). Elsewhere, it has been widely argued that recent years have wit-
nessed a militarization of humanitarianism, as closer and closer relations develop
between security and emergency relief and development organisations within
conflict zones (Byman, 2001; Lischer, 2007).
Last but by no means least, many of our chapters identity specific national or
regional transformations in militarism. Thus on the US, Bacevich shows that
Wilsonian liberalism has been utterly transformed during the Cold War and post-
­Cold War eras, such that the US is now on many levels a highly militaristic
society. In China, meanwhile, Brown and Zanardi emphasize that while the
Chinese military is more professionalized and less politicized, its economic role
18   A. Stavrianakis and J. Selby
has increased with liberalization; the overall impact on the balance between mili-
tary and civilian leaders remains unknown. On the EU, Oikonomou identifies
processes of militarization at a Europe-­wide level, notwithstanding the post-­Cold
War declines in national military spending within most EU states. On the Middle
East, Aly (on Egypt) and Peled (on Israel) show how militarism and military
institutions continue to exercise powerful holds over their societies, this being
despite these two states having been at formal peace with one another since
1979, and, in Egypt’s case, despite the overthrow of the Mubarak regime in early
2011. And on Latin America, Kruijt and Koonings show that the ‘political
armies’ which dominated Latin American politics through much of the twentieth
century have been transformed – not only towards apolitical professionalism,
however, but also through the militarization of law enforcement.

Conclusion
Is militarism waxing or waning? This volume does not provide a conclusive
answer to this question, and perhaps none is possible. The contributions show
that there are social domains and regions of the world where militarism is being
transformed, determined by other political, economic, technological and cultural
transformations. They demonstrate that there are regions and domains where
militarism exercises enduring power and influence, even in the face of chal-
lenges – such as economic liberalization, democratization, and the reduction in
levels of inter-­state warfare – that might be thought to undercut militarized atti-
tudes, institutions and social relations. They show that military power is being
extended into new arenas, despite (or perhaps to some degree because of ) pro­
cesses of quantitative demilitarization. And some also show that anti-­militarist
political movements are evidently in retreat in certain parts of the world. There
is clearly much more to be said about continuities and transformations in con-
temporary militarism. It is hoped that this volume, modest as it is, serves as a
stimulus to further research on the subject.
The contributions to this volume demonstrate the transformations and
ongoing salience of militarism in contemporary international politics. But there
are various aspects of militarism which are conspicuous by their absence herein.
In particular, none of the contributions focus centrally on the gendered or racial-
ized character of militarism (though the chapter by Aly does touch on the
former), or on the key regions of Sub-­Saharan Africa and South Asia. This is
regrettable but not for want of trying or a result of analytical exclusion. These
lacunae are in some cases the outcome of logistical difficulties encountered on
the long road to producing an edited volume. In other cases, however, they are a
function of the problems that much contemporary scholarship seems to have in
engaging with the concept of militarism. This applies especially to scholarship
on Sub-­Saharan Africa, where ‘failed states’, ‘new wars’ and ‘security’ dis-
courses are especially hegemonic. As editors we hope that these limitations of
this volume will be taken up as a challenge by other scholars to help in broaden-
ing the scope of research on militarism and militarization.
2 Twenty-­first century militarism
A historical-­sociological framework
Martin Shaw

The idea of ‘militarism’ has at best an uncertain status in contemporary interna-

tional studies. The concept is academically marginal: strategists, and with them
many historians, eschew the term because of its associations with political
opposition to military power as such. Moreover, even those who recognize its
histo­rical relevance may doubt its contemporary applicability: thus Volker
Berghahn and Hugh Bicheno (Berghahn and Bicheno, 2009) suggest that ‘[w]ith
the end of the Cold War, the concept of militarism has lost most of the ideo-
logical steam that seemed to make it worth discussing. It is rarely used to
describe present-­day systems and policies but instead is seen as a phenomenon
of the past to be examined with the tools of the historian.’ Contrary to this judge-
ment, the idea has undergone a revival in the last decade, but (potentially rein-
forcing the criticism that it is a political rather than scientific concept) in the
hands of critics of the global war on terror. For Michael Mann (2003) and
Andrew Bacevich (2004), US militarism involves excessive reliance on military
power, out of kilter with its more limited economic, political and ideological
capabilities. Although polemically framed, these are serious analyses (Mann’s
derives from his major study of power (1986, 1993), which involves probably
the most extensive analysis of ‘militarism’ in recent scholarship) which have
demonstrated anew the concept’s potency. Thus criticisms of the very idea of
militarism are as misguided as some of the simpler polemical uses of the term,
because the concept refers to enduring and important sociological realities. If
‘militarism’ has done little serious analytical work in International Relations
(IR), this suggests a failure of the field to address some important questions.
The most common usage of the term, proposed by Vagts (1973: 11), refers to
the state of society that ‘ranks military institutions and ways above the prevail-
ing attitudes of civilian life and carries the military mentality into the civilian
sphere’; this idea is frequently summarized as ‘glorifying’ military power. Mann
(2003: 16–17) defines it more broadly as ‘a set of attitudes and social practices
which regards war and the preparation for war as a normal and desirable social
activity’. It is sociologically unenlightening to restrict the meaning to ideology:
the core idea is the ‘carrying’ of military forms into the civilian sphere, and this
is not merely a matter of ‘mentality’ or ‘attitudes’ but (as Mann notes) of ‘social
practices’. Moreover, the military forms which are carried may not necessarily
20   M. Shaw
‘rank military institutions and ways above the prevailing attitudes of civilian
life’, let alone ‘glorify’ war in a simple sense. While the differences between
ideologies which glorify war and those which do not are significant, glorifying
and non-­glorifying ideologies may equally justify war and military power, and in
this sense have the same core social function. Therefore we need a common term
for all such ideologies, which we may distinguish by qualifying adjectives (e.g.
fascist militarism, democratic militarism). Furthermore, a narrow ideological
definition separates ideology from the social relations of which it is a part. The
core meaning of ‘militarism’ should be specified not in terms of how military
practices are regarded, but how they influence social relations in general. Milita-
rism develops not just when ideas of war are strong, but when military relations
widely affect social relations and practices. Hence I have proposed (Shaw, 1991:
9–15) that militarism denotes the penetration of social relations in general by
military relations; in militarization, militarism is extended, in demilitarization, it
contracts.
Another advantage of this approach is that it pre-­empts the political abuse to
which the ideological definition easily lends itself. Invariably, ‘their’ war-­
making and war-­preparation is aggressive, destructive, glorifies war and is ‘mili-
tarist’, ‘ours’ is defensive, humanitarian, does not glorify war and is not
‘militarist’. The deeper sociological definition removes the simple negative con-
notation and in principle allows that arguments justifying militarism and milita-
rization may be plausible, although it retains critical potential. It is possible to
use it in a coherent social-­scientific manner, in ways which tie it neither to a par-
ticular political critique nor to the analysis of the past.

The re-­emergence of the problem of militarism in the 1980s

The conference on which this book is based called for revisiting the ‘forgotten
literature of the 1980s’, the last period in which ‘militarism’ was widely used.
Themes in the social sciences are strongly influenced by the international
political context, so that interest in ‘militarism’ has waxed in periods of mili-
tarization in Western societies like the Second Cold War of the early 1980s
(Halliday, 1981) and the 2000s’ war on terror, and waned in periods of demili-
tarization, such as that after 1989. Until the 1980s, the growth of IR and stra-
tegic studies in US and Western academies was centred on the Cold War and
the nuclear arms race, and had little place for ideas of militarism. Certainly, a
secondary focus on ‘war and society’, growing out of military-­historical work
in Britain enabled some attention to the problem (e.g. Howard, 1978).
However, the Second Cold War particularly stimulated new theoretical
approaches to war and military power, with important general conceptualiza-
tions and theorizations.
Another feature of the intellectual context was that these developed in critical
tension not only with strategy, but also with Marxism. The 1970s had seen an
unprecedented adoption of Marxist approaches in the Western academy, coincid-
ing with the expansion of the social sciences, especially sociology. However,
 Twenty-first century militarism   21
Marx and Engels had placed the mode of production, not war and military
power, at the centre of their theory of history. Critical political economy was the
dominant mode of the new Marxist analysis, and it did not find a considered the-
oretical place for war and militarism. This too reflected the international situa-
tion: in the decade of détente, Marxists were more preoccupied by the emerging
‘crisis of capitalism’ than by warfare, and mostly saw the military crisis of the
time, in Vietnam, through the prism of imperialism rather than militarism.
Therefore the principal social theorists of militarism felt the need to transcend
the perceived limitations of Marxist, as well as strategic, theory. Some were
influenced by Marxism, but were unconvinced of its capacity to deal with war
and militarism: E.P. Thompson (1982) parodied the title of Lenin’s famous pam-
phlet on imperialism in his essay on ‘exterminism’, developing a critique of
Marxist ‘immobilism’ in the face of the danger of the nuclear-­war-producing
military system. Thompson argued that the arms race and the military–industrial
complexes had their own dynamics, which had become self-­reproducing and
threatened to destroy civilization; they could not necessarily be explained (or
constrained) by the ‘rational’ political-­economic interests of the superpowers in
avoiding mutual destruction, although they could be challenged by international
social movements. Yet Thompson did not develop a more general theory of war
or militarism, and in his historical work he largely failed to explore their signifi-
cance for the social movements he examined (Shaw, 1991). His critique was
taken forward by Mary Kaldor (1982a), whose Marxisant language disguised a
partially Clausewitzian theoretical framework. Developing Clausewitz’s pro-
posal that battle is to war what cash payment is to commodity exchange, she
argued that the ‘modes’ of war and production should be treated as distinct but
analogous, rather than the former being dependent on the latter. She proposed
that the roots of war lay in the complex tensions between the two modes, partic-
ularly when warfare became a burden on capitalism. Kaldor (1982b) also used
Clausewitzian logic to analyse the contradictions of Western weapons platforms,
which she argued had become ‘baroque’, increasingly unusable and vulnerable
to simpler anti-­system devices.
The other main sources of militarism theory were neo-­Weberian historical
sociologists like Charles Tilly (1990), Theda Skocpol (1979), Anthony Giddens
(1985) and, especially, Mann. These writers rejected the fall-­back Marxist idea
of the ‘last-­instance’ determination of economic relations: the autonomous role
of military power was a core assumption. However, like Marxists who con-
sidered war and militarism as extensions of capitalism or imperialism, these
histor­ical sociologists mostly considered the role of war and military power (for
example in state formation and revolution), rather than nature and internal
dynamics of war and the ‘war-­system’ with which Thompson and Kaldor (fol-
lowing Clausewitz) were concerned:

To paraphrase Marx’s First Thesis on Feuerbach, the defect of most social

theory of war and militarism is that it has sought to reduce war to rational,
material interests: it has not considered war as practice, i.e. what people
22   M. Shaw
actually do in war. Hence again ‘the active side has been developed
abstractly’ – in this case by military theory.
(Shaw, 1988: 10)

Moreover, only some of these theorists were concerned with militarism,

and their analyses were often problematic. One reflection of the political
context was the conclusion that new forms of militarism implied an overall
extension of militarization. Thus Thompson, from his examination of nuclear
competition, asserted that there was a growing general militarization through
the Cold War system. Likewise Cynthia Enloe (1988), in a path-­breaking fem-
inist exposé of the militarization of soldiers’ wives, prostitutes, etc., concluded
that there was a general ‘militarization of women’s lives’. However, others
came to different conclusions. Military sociologists, such as Jacques van
Doorn (1975) on the ‘end of the mass army’ and Charles Moskos (Moskos and
Wood, 1988), who examined the ‘occupationalization’ of the military, ana-
lysed processes of societal demilitarization – and even the civilianization of
the military – rather than growing militarization. Mann (1987) argued that
Western militarism had bifurcated into an elite ‘deterrence science militarism’
and a popular ‘spectator sport militarism’, in which audiences consumed tele-
visual wars rather like the Olympic Games. Only in the Soviet bloc did classi-
cal, early-­twentieth-century mass-­participation militarism remain – and this,
of course, collapsed with the end of the Cold War. The trend was, Robin
Luckham (1984a) argued, towards the displacement of old-­style militarism,
centred on military institutions and culture, by ‘armament culture’, centred (in
popular video-­gaming as well as nuclear war-­gaming) on the instant annihila-
tion which high technology promised. Militarism remained important in a
‘post-­military’ (post-­classical-militarist) society, but its social-­structural foun-
dations were weakened and its cultural mechanisms were changing (Shaw,
1991).
The militarism theory of the 1980s was more influential in sociology, but IR’s
problem in dealing with war and militarism is not dissimilar to that of the Marx-
ists and the historical sociologists. IR has been primarily interested in their role
in interstate relations and international institutions (e.g. Holsti, 1989), rather than
in the production of war and military power, how they produce militarism in
society, and how these in turn re-­enter interstate relations. Yet militarism is
highly significant for the process of war, and thereby for international political
processes of which war is an extension. In what follows I first lay out a frame-
work for analysis, then I consider the contemporary implications.

Foundations of a historical-­sociological framework

The study of war is too often conflated with the study of the current or last war,
so that developments are examined without the benefit of long-­term historical
perspective and are endowed with excessive novelty. Recent reinventions of war
studies have been no more immune to this problem than Cold War-­era
 Twenty-first century militarism   23
theorizing: despite constructive reorientations in the study of armed conflict in
the last two decades (notably much more attention to ‘hot’ wars in the non-­
Western world), continuities with the transformations of militarism identified in
the final stages of the Cold War are often neglected. For example, US remilitar­
ization after 9/11 was largely restricted – like that of the Second Cold War or the
Falklands War – to the ideological level (patriotic celebration of armed forces
etc.), with little reversal of structural demilitarization. Military participation
remained mostly restricted to small professional forces: the roles of reservists
and private contractors were enhanced, but forces remained small and special-
ized compared to earlier conscript mobilizations. The main paradox of late Cold
War militarism – the decoupling of total destruction from the total mobilization
with which it had been inextricably linked in total war – continues.
Thus a sociological framework which encompasses societal militarism as well
as interstate conflict must necessarily encompass successive historical transfor-
mations. Distinct types of social organization and conflict together form the
general complex of the social forces and relations of warfare in a given histor­
ical period (in Kaldor’s terms, the ‘mode of warfare’). Militarism in a given
period depends, first, on the typical social forces mobilized in military power.
Armed actors (states or armed movements) always mobilize social resources
(economic, political, cultural) and social constituencies (nations, classes, ethnic
and religious groups). In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Western
states waged large-­scale war by using expanding state bureaucracy to conscript
rapidly growing peasant and working-­class populations into mass armies, using
industrial systems to produce increasingly lethal weaponry and complex
weapons platforms, and mobilizing new mass electorates through nationalism,
party systems and mass media. Militarized revolutionary movements mobilized
peasant production and used both nationalist and class ideology to mobilize
peasants to support guerrilla war.
Militarism results, second, from the social relations of military power,
centred on the always potentially antagonistic relation between armed actors
(combatants) and civilians (non-­combatants), which is in turn the foundation of
distinctive social stratifications (hierarchies) embodied in military institutions
and their relations with society even outside war. Peter Beaumont argues of con-
temporary conflicts:

in war all life is negotiated around weapons. Societies are reordered into
sharply defined new hierarchies: into those who have weapons and those
who have not. A man with a gun can walk to the front of the bread or petrol
queue. With his militia friends he can take over a petrol station if he likes
and reorganize the distribution while skimming money off the top. With a
rifle you can order a woman to have sex. Weapons redistribute wealth
through ‘taxes’, protection rackets and straight theft. Scores can be settled,
under the cover of generalized violence. This is only the most recent form
of core relations which exist in all organized warfare.
(Beaumont, 2009)
24   M. Shaw
These fundamental categories are also keys to important secondary distinctions.
For example, different social bases and methods of mobilization, as well as dif-
ferent military methods, give us distinctions such as those between regular and
guerrilla forms of modern war. The armed actor-­civilian distinction enables us to
distinguish between ‘legitimate’ war, which is primarily between armed actors
and in which civilian harm arises as an unintended consequence; degenerate war,
in which civilians are targeted as a method of pursuing war against an armed
enemy; and genocide, in which civilian populations are targeted as enemies in
themselves and where their destruction is an end rather than a means. The dis-
tinction of terrorism as a specific variant of warfare uses both distinctions, since
if it has any social-­scientific meaning it must imply specific types of military
method and social mobilization and a specific type of civilian targeting.
The concept of the mode of warfare brings to the fore a series of key analyti-
cal questions: how should we specify particular modes of warfare historically?
When and why do transitions between different modes arise? How are transi-
tions between modes of warfare related to transitions in other social domains?
Of course these are very large questions which I cannot answer fully here. But
modes of warfare should be specified on the basis of their own internal charac-
teristics, rather than prior concepts of transitions in the mode of production or
international systems; the articulation of modes of warfare, production, etc. is
complex; causality is not simply in one direction; and historical transitions in
one mode are not mechanically synchronized in another.

Towards a historical theory of contemporary

transformations
I propose that we should understand the forms of contemporary militarism as
manifestations of the transition from the mode of industrialized total warfare to
a new mode, global surveillance warfare. The advantage of the ‘mode’ approach
is that it enables us to see continuous development of the potential for war in
economy, society and politics, encompassing periods of relative ‘peace’ as well
as actual war-­fighting.
Thus the dominant modern mode of industrialized total warfare is the general
complex of social relations, processes and institutions through which wars were
prepared, military power was organized and wars fought in the high modern
period, as a result of changes in social relations in general from the eighteenth
through to the twentieth century. This mode of warfare developed as the pre-­
existing practice and organization of interstate warfare adapted to the rise of the
modern nation-­state, nationalism, mass politics, mass media of communication
and industrial capitalism. Its first major manifestation was in the Revolutionary
and Napoleonic Wars (Bell, 2007). From about 1840 onwards, the ‘industrializa-
tion of warfare’ proceeded apace, leading to military–industrial sectors within
the advanced national economies (McNeill, 1982). The first major industrialized
war took place in the United States in 1861–65, but it was not until 1914–18 that
the wider potential of this new mode was more fully realized, chiefly in Europe,
 Twenty-first century militarism   25
although the war was part of a global struggle between the European empires.
The Second World War was of course much more fully industrialized, mass-­
politicized, mass-­mediated and globalized (with Asia as a main theatre alongside
Europe), and can be seen as the culmination of this mode of warfare.
Industrialized total warfare was accompanied by classical modern militarism:
with mass peasant and worker mobilization, armies and other state institutions
penetrated society in unprecedented ways. Through conscription, which became
general in continental Europe and beyond, young men from diverse local cul-
tural and linguistic backgrounds were incorporated into national states. Compul-
sory military service served as a ‘school of the nation’, and adult male
populations formed reserve armies of trained soldiers who could be re-­
conscripted in time of war. This institutional web was reinforced by a general
cultural diffusion of military values: for example, popular literature (for children
as well as adults) concerning military exploits in imperial locales; and images of
soldiers, commanders and military crests nested in mass commercial products.
The mass circulation of the press, the first truly mass media, enabled more per-
sistent, widespread information about and celebration of military institutions and
events. Finally, mass political parties also legitimized military values, while
army and navy leagues mobilized society for military expansion. Thus classical
militarism both reflected war and war-­preparation and facilitated them.
Mass militarism also facilitated the view of the civilian population as part of
the enemy: if civilians became participants in war – economically as well as
politically and ideologically – then they were more easily seen as targets. Thus
this kind of militarism was instrumental in the degeneration of war into system-
atic targeting of civilians, and even in its extension into genocide, where ‘other’
civilian populations were regarded as enemies in themselves, which had already
been extensively practised in colonial locales (Kiernan, 2007).
We must emphasize the dynamic character of military relationships. This
mode of warfare involved constantly developing forms of technology and armed
forces, and relations with the economic, political and cultural spheres. The
Napoleonic Wars, the US Civil War and the World Wars represented four radi-
cally different experiences, each ‘total’ in distinctive ways. The forms of the dia-
lectic between mass mobilization and mass destruction changed, with a rapid
acceleration in both technologies of destruction and the politicization of mass
mobilization. The latter had profound implications for the ideological side of
militarism, whose staples of patriotism and imperialism were recast within the
framework of the global struggle between fascism, communism and democracy.
This mode of warfare represented a particular mode of articulation between
military and other social domains. Especially in the period leading up to and
during the Second World War, and continuing into the first phase of the Cold
War, this mode of warfare increasingly dominated the principal other domains
(economy, polity and culture), conditioning major social changes: war and arms
economies; state-­managed capitalism; and political and cultural arenas defined
by international military confrontations. Militarism, in increasingly politicized
forms, permeated social life more intensively than before or since.
26   M. Shaw
How did this system unravel? The same dynamics that produced it played
central roles in its transformation: they were determined primarily within the
war-­system. The outcome of the last major total war, the Second World War,
was the replacement of the wider inter-­imperial conflict by Cold War bipolarity;
its military-­technological outcome was the increasing displacement of mass
armies by high-­technology weaponry. These twin developments decoupled the
central dynamics of destruction and social mobilization. The implications for
militarism were major: shifts from conscript armies to professional forces, and
from extensive, mass-­production equipment to more intensive, high-­technology
military industry. Many of the cultural paraphernalia which had celebrated
modern militaries also started to lose their meaning.
These structural changes in warfare articulated with major transformations in
economy, polity and culture during the later Cold War. The changes in warfare
removed much of the logic for state control of the economy, enabling Western
governments to liberalize, and for the state control of mass media, allowing more
open media systems. Political and cultural life increasingly escaped from the
Cold War straitjacket of Atlanticism vs. Communism. The loosening of military
demands allowed state forms in Western Europe to develop the Cold War inter-
nationalizing dynamic beyond the Cold War, into an expanded continental Euro-
pean Union. Chiming with these developments, the dynamism of the post-­war
Western economy, media and culture made the Soviet system seem increasingly
atrophied, even before its breakdown. And despite the intensity of the Cold War
at crisis points, there was a secular trend towards managing the potentially
ruinous superpower conflict, which ultimately led to the new détente of the late
1980s through which the Cold War system dissolved.
Of course there was great variation in the way these changes were imple-
mented: Anglo-­American warmaking had long had a greater steer towards tech-
nology, leading to a distinctive ‘liberal militarism’ (Edgerton, 1991), and the UK
and US led the move from conscription. This was initially resisted in other West
European countries (for reasons of continental location, tradition and politics)
and even more in the Soviet bloc, and only realized across most of Europe after
the Cold War. However, an indicator of the military significance of the change
was that the Western states that led the way in changing military organization
were those most likely to fight wars. The perception of the ‘Vietnam syndrome’,
the US failure (mistakenly) believed to result from inadequate management of
that ‘first television war’ (Mandelbaum, 1982; Hallin, 1986), was instrumental in
seeking new ways of war-­fighting in a context of media surveillance. In the
1980s, wars like the UK’s Falklands campaign allowed glimpses of a new form
of militarism centred on mass-­mediated limited war, with media management
rather than direct control (Glasgow University Media Group, 1985).

Global surveillance war and the new militarism

With the end of the Cold War, it became clear that these were the beginnings of
a more fundamental change, which lead me to argue that a new mode of warfare
Another random document with
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1229 Spangler A 45 May
E 20
111 May
1281 Swineheart J W
B 22
89 May
1404 Seyman Aaron
D 27
June
1672 Sprague W L Cav 6K
6
22 June
1773 Simmons Jno Bat
- 9
35 June
2220 Shannon E
A 20
45 June
2230 Stanett J
C 20
93 June
2376 Stiver J
C 23
11 June
2524 Smith G W
K 26
89 June
2575 Sampson C
D 27
45 June
2638 Stults P
F 29
31 July
2783 Shiver L
B 2
July
2792 Smith N H 1H
2
21 July
3116 Smith G, S’t
I 10
100 May
42 Sabine Alonzo
A 11
July
3252 Short Jas, S’t Cav 4A
13
July
3288 Smith D 7H
13
3361 Saffle J 2E July
 15
33 July
3536 Steward C S
K 18
111 July
3602 Stevenson D
B 19
49 July
3298 Squires Thos
C 20
July
3744 Snyder Thos 9G
21
July
3770 Smith D, Cor 2 I
22
July
3794 Sever H H 2C
22
Shephard J H, July
4249 2E
Cor 29
July
4275 Smith J B, S’t 1B
29
July
4294 Steward J, S’t 2K
30
72 Aug
4745 Steiner J M
F 5
93 Aug
5018 Smock A
D 8
93 Aug
5054 Smarz A
E 8
Aug
5066 Shipple John Cav 6G
8
Aug
5133 Scott S E 4 I
9
Stevenson 111 Aug
5287
John B 11
14 Aug
5330 Spegle F
D 11
101 Aug
5373 Schem J 64
K 11
5455 Stevens G W 101 Aug
K 12
78 Aug
5896 Sullivan W
D 16
89 Aug
6010 Staley G
A 17
Aug
6032 Smith Wm Cav 9G
18
32 Aug
6178 Simpson W J
F 19
Aug
6199 Sheddy G 2K
19
105 Aug
6214 Shaw Geo W
A 20
24 Aug
6253 Shoulder E
F 20
72 Aug
6779 Soper P
G 25
89 Aug
6870 Scarberry O
D 26
Aug
7034 Sutton J 4A
27
Shoemaker J, 47 Aug
7065
S’t E 28
Stinchear F E, 101 Sept
7436
S’t A 1
Sept
7475 Shafer J 9G
1
125 Sept
7540 Sell Adam
E 2
19 Sept
7788 Stewart John S
B 4
Sept
7897 Smith H H Cav 2A
5
7986 Selb Jacob 28 Sept
 - 6
45 Sept
8014 Shriver Geo
K 6
Sept
8015 Snider Jas 4C
6
72 Sept
8156 Sturtevant W
A 8
Sept
8197 Shrouds J Bat 6 -
8
Sept
8200 Stroufe A 7E
8
15 Sept
8229 Shaw W
I 9
121 Sept
8300 Smith N
H 9
49 Sept
8319 Sheldon W
E 10
135 Sept
8422 Sullivan Jno
F 11
18 Sept
8728 Sisson P B
H 14
51 Sept
8752 Sickles J
I 14
Sept
8914 Simmonds S P 1A
16
15 Sept
8931 Stull G
G 16
63 Sept
9009 Sharp F S
K 17
12 Sept
9244 Schmall J D
E 19
158 Sept
9386 Smith L
H 20
33 Sept
9645 Scott J H
H 24
9649 Skiver J 114 Sept
H 24
81 Oct
10250 Sheets W
A 3
Spencer S M, 89 Oct
10312
Cor E 4
Oct
10434 Shingle D Cav 2L
6
Stanford P W, Oct
10437 Cav 2A
S’t 6
51 Oct
10576 Stonchecks J D
F 9
101 Oct
10618 Schafer P
I 10
Oct
10703 Stout Samson 2F
11
34 Oct
10833 Sheppard Jno
D 13
72 Oct
11139 Shark H
F 17
45 Oct
11146 Smith G A, Cor
F 19
76 Oct
11249 Sullivan F
C 21
124 Oct
11433 Swaney E
A 24
69 Oct
11579 Smith P
I 28
20 Oct
11595 Sapp W N, S’t
E 28
122 Nov
11711 Spiker J
- 1
72 Nov
11797 Shaler F, Cor
E 4
12105 Sly F 89 Nov
 G 20
Dec
12281 Singer J 6G
13
49 Dec
12305 Sweet M, S’t
F 18
Jan
12441 Shoemaker C 8F 65
12
Jan
12538 Stewart A F 2D
27
71 Jan
12562 Sponcerlar Geo
B 31
89 Feb
12668 Shorter W
K 17
123 Mar
12769 Sloan L
D 13
50 Mar
12789 Stroup S
B 17
132 Mar
12793 Seeley N
D 18
75 Mar
12810 Scott R
G 24
April
730 Tweedy R Cav 1A 64
25
Trescott April
743 2C
Samuel 26
40 May
999 Trimmer Wm
H 10
May
1196 Turney U S Cav 2G 64
18
10 May
1496 Thomas Wm Cav
M 30
Aug
4784 Thompson J 2E
5
13 Aug
4951 Toroman W R
E 7
5356 Tierney W Art 1L Aug
11
90 Aug
5552 Tinsley M
B 13
12 Aug
5668 Terilliger N
C 14
32 Aug
6330 Tanner A, S’t
G 21
26 Aug
7224 Thompson V B
C 29
45 Aug
7246 Turner S B
B 30
44 Sept
7640 Thomas Jas
C 2
135 Sept
8850 Talbert R
F 15
103 Sept
9774 Thomas N
B 26
26 Sept
9945 Townsend J
C 28
153 Oct
10471 Tattman B
C 7
93 Oct
10800 Tinway R
- 12
Townsley E M, 89 Nov
11820
S’t B 5
Feb
12577 Tensdale T H Cav 2E 65
3
12 Dec
12251 Uchre S 64
E 9
45 June
2194 Vining W H H
G 19
123 July
3902 Valentine C
H 24
4450 Vaugh B 125 Aug
 F 1
103 Aug
4497 Vangrider H
H 1
Aug
5263 Vatier J F Cav 6 -
10
17 Aug
6170 Vail Jno L, S’t
C 19
21 Aug
6859 Vanaman M
E 26
Aug
6985 Vanderveer A 6H
27
Sept
7756 Victor H Art 1D
4
34 Sept
9576 Volis J
H 23
12 Oct
10252 Vail N
K 3
Oct
10389 Vail G M 7D
5
14 Oct
10472 Van Fleet H
I 7
135 Oct
11095 Van Kirk G
B 18
89 Oct
11097 Van Malley J M
G 18
Jan
12554 Vanhorn S Cav 9C 65
30
82 Mch
7 Wiley Samuel 64
A 5
111 Mch
185 Wickman Wm
B 27
45 April
779 Wooley Jno
B 28
45 April
807 Werts Louis
D 30
1085 Wood Wm 89 May
A 14
Wentling 100 May
1449
Joseph K 29
15 June
1604 Wood Joseph
B 4
Wilkinson W, 89 June
1836
Cor D 11
93 June
1913 Wilson Jas
I 13
44 June
2020 Way Jno
I 15
15 June
2041 Windgrove S R
- 15
45 June
2172 Webb E
A 19
June
2358 Walters F 9E
23
June
2536 Wing Cav 2M
26
89 July
2815 Willis A
A 3
89 July
2840 Wroten L
H 3
90 July
3188 Williams D
A 12
April
34 Wright Wm 7H
24
15 July
3310 White H
A 15
75 July
3325 Whitten G
K 14
89 July
4214 West J B
B 29
4681 Witt Jno T 93 Aug
 G 4
111 Aug
4688 Won J, Cor
B 4
33 Aug
4695 Wile A, Cor
D 4
70 Aug
5121 Winder I
D 9
Aug
5211 Wood N L Cav 4L
10
145 Aug
5726 Winters Geo
K 15
89 Aug
6314 Wainwright S G
G 20
35 Aug
6318 Wisser F J
A 20
Aug
6362 Wistman N 9G
21
Aug
6397 Wilson E 4A
21
21 Aug
6700 Watson G
A 24
123 Aug
6761 Wood S 64
A 22
59 Aug
7056 Wood W H
E 28
90 Aug
7373 Wyatt J
B 31
72 Sept
7582 Wentworth L
A 1
89 Sept
8298 Wright J S
E 9
14 Sept
8396 Warner T
C 10
73 Sept
8907 Wyckmann D
G 16
9384 Worte J 116 Sept
- 20
135 Sept
9527 Woodruff J M
F 22
93 Sept
9691 Wagner J
F 24
21 Sept
10007 Whitney E
K 29
Oct
10230 Williams Orland C 7K
2
72 Oct
10309 Weaver M
H 4
21 Oct
10402 Ward Francis
H 6
33 Oct
10464 Whitehead A B
E 7
26 Oct
10528 Wiley A
I 8
73 Oct
10733 White I
E 11
Westbrook R L, 135 Oct
10844
Cor F 13
65 Oct
11013 Walker C
I 16
14 Oct
11034 Waldron H
A 16
60 Oct
11417 Williams S M
F 24
122 Nov
11770 Worthen D
B 3
35 Nov
11874 Weason J
F 6
14 Nov
12042 Wickham J
H 16
12073 White R M 15 Nov
 D 18
35 Nov
12158 Warner B F
E 25
72 Feb
12584 Whitaker E 65
A 4
57 Mch
12722 Wella E
A 3
Mch McL’s
12759 Winklet T Cav - -
12 Sqn
102 Mch
12786 Warner M
G 16
Webricks Josh Aug
4833 9G 64
H 6
45 April
638 Yuterler W A
E 20
80 Aug
5477 Younker S
F 13
Aug
6068 Young Jno 7E
18
Sept
7816 Yeager Jno Cav 7B
4
Sept
7876 Young J 9F
5
Oct
10583 Young W 6G
10
15 Feb
12659 Young W 65
A 16
100 July
3225 Zubers J M 64
B 12
72 Oct
11253 Zink A J
E 21
Total
1031.
 PENNSYLVANIA.
Mch
224 Attwood Abr’m C 18 I 64
29
Mch
250 Armidster M Cav 4A
30
April
468 Ackerman C 8B
9
April
758 Arb Simon Cav 4C
27
May
846 Allbeck G B, S’t 52 F
3
May
975 Algert H K 54 F
9
May
1282 Arble Thos Cav 13 A
26
June
1837 Ait M 21 K
11
June
2348 Akers Geo 90 H
23
June
2398 Allison E 55 K
24
103 June
2547 Anderson D, S’t
K 27
June
2648 Able J 54 F
20
103 July
2956 Amagart Eli, S’t
F 6
July
3018 Ackley G B Art 3B
7
July
3917 Alexander M Cav 1F
14
July
3967 Ardray J F, S’t 13 F
25
4055 Anderson J, Cor 79 I July
 27
July
4143 Aches T J 7H
28
145 July
4149 Alcorn Geo W
F 28
July
4495 Archart H 51 C
29
Aug
4673 Allen C Cav 8K
4
Aug
4973 Andertin J Cav 4L
7
103 Aug
5286 Aler B
D 11
101 Aug
5511 Ault J L
C 13
Armstrong Cas, Aug
5862 Cav 4C 64
S’t 16
Aug
6029 Anersen Jno 91 C
18
184 Aug
7163 Arnold Daniel
C 29
Sept
7887 Angstedt Geo W 1F
5
101 Sept
8185 Allen J L
I 8
Sept
8232 Ambler C Cav 13 D
9
Sept
8388 Alexander W Res 2 I
10
Sept
8653 Armstrong A 7K
13
Sept
8655 Arnold L 73 A
13
Sept
8765 Altimus Wm 7E
14
1743 Ainley Wm Cav 3E June
8
Sept
9150 Alcorn J W “ 18 D
18
Sept
9896 Allison D B 55 K
27
135 Oct
10487 Anderson A
F 7
126 Oct
10570 Allen D
A 9
Oct
10823 Allin S Cav 7H
13
149 Oct
11419 Applebay T M
K 24
Oct
11607 Antill J 61 I
28
118 Nov
11710 Auger W
- 1
Nov
11852 Affleck T 2F
6
184 Nov
11860 Amandt J
D 6
142 Jan
12520 Atchinson W P 65
F 25
Mar
228 Bull Frank Cav 4H 64
29
Mar
249 Burton Lafayette C 18 D
30
April
332 Briggs Andrew C 13 H
2
April
427 Begler A 27 C
8
April
543 Breel Jacob, Cor 27 H
14
569 Black Jas A Cav 14 D April
 15
April
661 Bradley Alex “ 3F
21
April
671 Burns Sam 73 K
22
April
673 Barra J 54 F
22
145 May
822 Bayne Wm
I 1
May
874 Bradley M Art 3A
4
May
897 Brown Henry 90 H
5
May
938 Brown D 4C
7
May
974 Batting Isaac, Cor Cav 8H
9
May
1046 Baker J D 57 F
12
May
1188 Butler Wm 90 B
18
May
1300 Boyd Thomas 9D
23
May
1309 Bryson J Cav 2D
23
May
1327 Brining J “ 13 B
24
13 May
1375 Burney J “
G 26
May
1393 Brown J B “ 4K
26
June
1576 Boman Sam’l Art 3B
3
103 June
1601 Berfert R
B 4
1654 Brumley Geo Cav 4 I June
5
June
1790 Butler J D 76 B
10
73 June
1859 Berkhawn H
G 12
June
1872 Brooks D S 79 -
12
183 June
1923 Brian Chas
F 14
June
1999 Bixter R 73 C
15
June
2026 Burns Owen Cav 13 C
15
June
2046 Bigler M “ 4 -
15
June
2127 Brown C “ 3B
17
June
2134 Buckhannan W Art 3B
18
June
2180 Ball L 26 K
19
June
2236 Barr J T Cav 4K
20
June
2323 Baker Henry “ 18 I
22
June
2483 Bisel Jno, S’t “ 18 K
25
June
2539 Balsley Wm “ 20 F
26
June
2610 Brown M “ 14 C
28
July
2727 Brenn J 73 K
1
2733 Bolt J H, S’t Cav 18 E July
 1
July
2741 Beam Jno 76 E
1
July
2816 Burns Jno Cav 13 A
3
108 July
2913 Bish J
F 5
115 July
2918 Belford Jno
F 5
July
3005 Bryan P Art 3A 64
7
103 July
3019 Barr S
G 7
July
3027 Braney J 48 E
7
101 July
3051 Barnes W, Cor
H 8
118 July
3097 Butler L J
E 10
110 July
3109 Brunt A
G 10
101 July
3216 Beraine A A
B 12
103 July
3294 Burns Jas
F 14
157 July
3442 Brinton J
D 17
103 July
3477 Baker Wm
F 17
July
3535 Burnside J, S’t 57 H
18
103 July
3600 Black W O
G 19
July
3693 Billig J L Cav 3H
21
3716 Brenlinger W R, “ 4D July
S’t 21
148 July
3808 Butter C P
A 22
July
3821 Batchell D 55 D
23
July
3917 Bright E 90 I
23
July
3988 Bradford L 10 I
26
July
4002 Berkley M 50 I
26
116 July
4084 Backner Adam
G 27
July
4330 Barrett J 6K
30
53 July
4360 Brown J
G 31
53 July
4402 Butler D
G 31
Aug
4494 Barton Jas Cav 4B
1
Aug
4500 Burke J 90 A
1
Aug
4610 Baker E, Cor 4K
3
Aug
4667 Behreas A 7E
4
Aug
4752 Bennett Geo 55 D
5
Aug
4989 Bowers J Art 2 I
7
Aug
5040 Bammratta —— 73 D
8
5071 Barber C 6D Aug
 8
Aug
5084 Buck B F Cav 2K
8
Aug
5113 Brown M 50 D
9
141 Aug
5324 Burlingame A J
K 11
Aug
5391 Bear Jno 79 D
12
101 Aug
5416 Bruce Jno
C 12
Aug
5526 Bower Benj Cav 6L
13
143 Aug
5587 Burnham H
F 14
Aug
5592 Broadbuck A Cav 11 A
14
Aug
5662 Buck B F “ 2K
14
103 Aug
5877 Browning Thos
A 16
115 Aug
5948 Bohnaberger A
G 17
Aug
5969 Boyer F 43 E
17
101 Aug
6061 Baker Jas
C 18
103 Aug
6074 Bower G W
K 18
Aug
6099 Baily J F 18 D
18
103 Aug
6127 Benhand J A
D 19
55 Aug
6229 Bear Sam’l
G 20