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Himsworth BotswanaCustomaryLaw 1972
Himsworth BotswanaCustomaryLaw 1972
Author(s): C. M. G. Himsworth
Source: Journal of African Law , 1972, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1972), pp. 4-18
Published by: School of Oriental and African Studies
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APPLICATION
We must first consider the sections concerned with the general rules
relating to the choice of law, starting with section 3 which sets out the
primary rule that "the courts of Botswana shall . .. apply customary law
. . . [where] by virtue of the provisions of this Act, or any other law, custom-
ary law is properly applied and where it is not properly applied such courts
shall apply the common law". The two types of law are defined for the
purposes of the Act in the interpretation section (section 2).
" 'Customary law' means, in relation to any particular tribe or tribal
community, the customary law of that tribe or community in so far as it is not
"In the exercise of its original jurisdiction in civil cases and proceedings the
High Court of Botswana, and any other court authorized thereto by the
President by notice in the Gazette, shall, in accordance with the provisions of
this Act, observe and enforce the observance of the appropriate customary
law."
From this it is clear that in the first instance one very important class of
courts, i.e., the Subordinate Courts, was to be excluded from the courts to
be permitted to apply customary law. According to the Minister of State,
Mr. Nwako,2 it was originally intended that the President should, in accord-
ance with the terms of the original section 3, extend the application of the
Act to the Subordinate Courts by notice in the Government Gazette.
This being the case, it was perfectly natural that there should have been
presented to the National Assembly, on the same day as Bill No. 34, the
Subordinate Courts (Amendment) Bill, I968,3 the purpose of the Bill being
inter alia to amend the provisions of the Subordinate Courts Proclamation4
with respect to the transfer of cases involving customary law from the
Subordinate Courts to the African Courts. The new provisions5 were intended
to complement provisions contained in the African Courts (Amendment)
Bill6 relating to the transfer of cases from the African Courts (to be renamed
under the Bill as Customary Courts) to the Subordinate Courts.7 No longer
was the Clerk of a Subordinate Court to have the power to order the com-
mencement of an action in a Customary Court rather than a Subordinate
Court but decisions to order the transfer of a case were now to be taken in all
cases by the court itself. Although it is not clear from the terms of the
1 To clauses 2, 6, 8 and 9.
2 House of Chiefs Official Report, 15.
3 Published as a supplement to the Gazette of November 8th, 1968, Bill No. 32.
4 Laws of Bechuanaland, 1959, cap.5.
s6No.
See Iespecially
of 1968. clauses 3 and
Published as 4a amending s.I6toand
supplement theintroducing
Gazette of aJuly
new 12th,
s.3 1A 1968
respectively.
and sub-
sequently becoming law as Act 57 of I968.
7 Amending s.29 of the African Courts Proclamation, '1961.
1 3 A. "(i) A Subordinate Court at any time after the issue of summons commencing
action, where both parties are tribcsmen, either of its own motion or on the application of
either party, where it is of the opinion that the matter in issue is justiciable under customary
law may, if it considers it in the interests of justice so to do, order that the action be trans-
ferred to a customary court of appropriate jurisdiction established or recognized under the
Customary Courts Proclamation, 1961.
(2) Before making an order under subsection (2) the Subordinate Cour t shall afford the
parties an opportunity of making representations in the matter.
(3) For the purposes of this section "Tribesmen" and "customary law" shall have the
meaning assigned them in the Customary Courts Proclamation, I961."
21 ."Consequent to the introduction of the African Courts (Amendment) Bill, 1968, amend-
ment is required to section 16(1) of the Subordinate Courts Proclamation (Chapter 5) which
provides for the reference of actions between Africans to the African Courts. Since the
Subordinate Courts lack a customary law jurisdiction in matters of first instance, it is
necessary to retain the power to refer actions justiciable under customary law to the custom-
ary courts, but, since a decision to refer a case amounts to a decision to deprive a person of
his common law rights, if any, in the matter (just as a failure to refer may deprive a person of
his customary law rights) it is considered that the question of the reference of a case to the
customary courts should be fully canvassed in the Subordinate Court and should not be a
matter which, as at present, may be left to the Clerk of the Court."
3 House of Chiefs Official Report, 18.
4 No. 57 of 1968.
s No. 32 of 1968.
6 House of Chiefs Official Report, 22.
7 No. 23 of 1969. Published as a supplement to the Gazette ofJuly 11th, 1969. No. 23 of 1969.
8 It is almost identical to the extract from the earlier Memorandum, quoted at n. 2, supra.
9 Section 31A of the Subordinate Courts Proclamation now reads:
" Transfer of Cases to Customary Court
31 A. (i) Where at any time after the commencement of any proceedings, a Subordinate
Court is of the opinion-
1 "8.(i) Subject to the provisions of section ten, and of subsection (2) of this section, a
customary court shall have and may exercise civil jurisdiction over causes and matters in
which-
(a) the matter is justiciable under any law administered by the Court under sec
and
(i) all the parties are tribesmen; or
(ii) the defendant consents in writing to the jurisdiction of the court.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (I), a Customary Court sha
jurisdiction to hear and determine suits for the recovery of liquid civil debts due to t
or any Town or District Council in which the defendant is a tribesman or consents in
to the jurisdiction of the Court."
2 Section 29(3) (a).
Although, on the face of it, the effect of the first part of section 4 may appea
to be quite clear, it seems a pity that its wording is not completely consisten
with that of section 3. That section refers to cases in which customary law
is "properly applied", and one might have expected the same terminolog
in section 4 but instead the wording has changed to "applicable". A different
word, but has it a different meaning? It is submitted that the Legislatu
must have intended that if customary law is "applicable" for the purpos
of section 4 (the heading to that section introducing yet another phrase
"Customary Law to be Applied"), such law must also at the same time be
"properly applied" for the purposes of section 3 (i.e., "applicable" denote
"requiring to be applied" rather than "capable of being applied").
The exceptions to this primary rule that customary law is applicable i
cases between tribesmen are not difficult. The first is where "it appear
either from express agreement or from all relevant circumstances that the
parties intended or may reasonably be deemed to have intended the matt
to be regulated according to the common law".1 This presumably mean
that, in a situation where it appears from the relevant circumstances tha
one party only "intended or may reasonably be deemed to have intende
the matter to be regulated according to the common law"2 then customary
law will still be applicable and thus in the terms of section 3 "properly
applied". The court will not, therefore, be left in such a case any choice but
to apply customary law (despite the fact that a greater injustice might resul
therefrom).
The second exception is any case where "the transaction out of which the
case or proceedings arose is one unknown to customary law", and the third
where "the parties express to the court their consent to the common law
being applicable; and any consent referred to in this paragraph shall be
recorded in writing and attached to the court record of the case and shall
be irrevocable."3
Presumably the effect of this third exception is again to remove any dis-
cretion in the court as to which system of law to apply. Once the parties
have "consented" to common law being "applicable", it presumably means
that customary law would not in the terms of section 3 be "properly applied"
and that, therefore, the common law must be applied. If it be true that it is
possible under the Act for the parties to a case to decide conclusively which
system of law shall apply, the question of the rights of third parties arises. It
would be unfair if a pact between plaintiff and defendant in a case resulting
in the application of the common law could oust the action of a second
plaintiff against the same defendant relying on the same facts but based on
the customary law. 4Such unfairness would in fact be avoided so long as the
I Section 4 (a).
2 Section 4 (b).
3 Section 4 (c).
4Cf., Schreiner, J. A., in Ex Parte Minister of NativeAffairs in Re rako v. Beyi, 1948 (I) S.A.
388 (AD), at 400.
Section 8(1) provides that "Nothing in section 4 shall prevent the appli-
cation of the common law where the claim arises out of personal injury to, or
the death of, any person." As this subsection refers specifically to section 4,
its intention is presumably to allow the application of the common law for
The intended effect here must presumably be that, where a plaintiff has
not had the benefit of subsection I but has had a claim decided in accordance
with customary law, he will not be faced with a plea of res judicata when he
presents a claim framed in accordance with the common law. The last
clause in the subsection concerning damages does nothing to resolve the
difficulties of a defendant where he is sued first by a plaintiff under the
customary law and then by a second plaintiff under the common law.'
Presumably any damages he has been compelled to pay to one plaintiff
under customary law will not be set off against any further damages he is
required to pay to a different plaintiff under the common law.
Section 8(3) provides that:
"Any person entitled under customary law to support from any other person
shall be entitled to claim damages under the common law for loss of support
from any person who unlawfully causes the death of or personal injury to that
other person or who is liable in law in respect thereof."2
1 Despite, e.g., the warning of Lansdown, J. in Bereng Griffith v. 'Mantsebo Seeiso Griffth,
1926-53 H.C.T.L.R. 5o, at p. 58 that "great caution, however, is necessary in seeking
any guidance from these authorities".
2 Samotsoko v. Palane, 1958 H.C.T.L.R. 75.
3 See also Allott, op. cit. 284-
4 Act 57 of 1968.
5 Proclamation Ig9 of 1g961.
6 Section io(i)(a).
'Section io(i)(b).
I Section xo(I)(c). N.B. also that in the original bill (Bill 34 of 1968) the clause equivalent
to s.xo was much more comprehensive and included, inter alia, provision for the application
of a combination of any two or more customary laws.
2 A similar phrase has long existed in the Subordinate Courts Proclamation as a juris-
dictional limitation.
3 See Allott, New Essays in African Law, 44.
4 See supra at p. io.
Practically the same wording was used in the Memorandum to the second
Bill " propos of ascertainment-surprising since the provision for an inquiry
1 N.B. also that by virtue of s.2'judicial notice may be taken of customary law not on
Botswana but also from other parts of Africa.
2 Despite the virtually identical wording of the memorandum to the bill referred to
3 Section I I, Proviso (iii).
4 For which provision is made in the High Court Act, s.I2 and the Subordinate C
Proclamation, s. I9.
2
RESUME