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Interring The Nondelegation Doctrine
Interring The Nondelegation Doctrine
Chicago Unbound
2002
Adrian Vermeule
Recommended Citation
Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, "Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine," 69 University of Chicago Law
Review 1721 (2002).
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Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine
EricA. Posnert
Adrian Vermeulett
INTRODUCTION
ory and statistical tests to derive a theory to determine variations in the amount of authority
granted to the executive branch); David B. Spence and Frank Cross, A Public Choice Casefor the
Administrative State, 89 Geo L J 97 (2000) (using public choice theory to argue that the adminis-
trative state promotes democracy). None of these scholars, however, provides the comprehensive
formal and functional critique of the doctrine that we provide here. Moreover, as we discuss at
various points below, it's not always clear whether these scholars would dispense with the doc-
trine entirely, as we propose to do. An intermediate case is Cass Sunstein, who provides trench-
ant criticisms of the nondelegation doctrine, but ultimately suggests that the aims of the doctrine
might nonetheless be pursued through appropriate canons of statutory interpretation. See Cass
R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U Chi L Rev 315,321-22 (2000). See also Daniel A. Far-
ber and Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction 81-82 (Chicago 1991).
We address that view below, in Part III.C.
3 For a notable recent defense of the nondelegation doctrine on originalist grounds, see
Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 Va L Rev 327 (2002). We respond to Law-
son's arguments, and to those of other proponents of the nondelegation doctrine, at various
points below.
4 See MarshallField & Co v Clark, 143 US 649,692 (1892) (claiming that Congress cannot
delegate legislative power to the president, but stating that the act in question "is not inconsis-
tent with that principle").
5 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp v United States, 295 US 495 (1935) (invalidating the
fair-competition provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act); Panama Refining Co v
Ryan, 293 US 388 (1935) (invalidating the hot oil provisions of the National Industrial Recovery
Act). See also Carterv Carter Coal, 298 US 238 (1936) (invalidating the labor provisions of the
Bituminous Coal Conservation and Recovery Act as an unconstitutional delegation to private
parties).
6 For the original package doctrine, see Brown v Maryland, 25 US 419,441-42 (1827) (an-
nouncing that states may not tax goods in interstate or foreign commerce while said goods re-
mained in their "original packages" and had yet to "become incorporated and mixed up within
the mass of property in the country"), repudiated by Michelin Tire Corp v Wages, 423 US 276,
282-83 (1976) (overturning Low v Austin, 80 US 29 (1872), and rejecting the "original package"
doctrine as a substantive rule).
7 For the doctrine of irrebuttable presumptions, see Cleveland Board of Education v LaF-
leur, 414 US 632, 645-46 (1973) (holding that "conclusive presumptions" embodied in rules such
as mandatory maternity leave violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment),
abandoned by Weinberger v Salfi, 422 US 749, 770-72 (1975) (holding that the irrebuttable pre-
9 Nothing in our account turns on the identity of the delegate; indeed, we argue below
that delegations to parties outside the federal government altogether are objectionable, if at all,
solely on grounds other than nondelegation. In this Part, we will refer to "the president" only for
convenience and to track the literature, in which delegations to the president are the core case.
10 SeeUSConstArtlI,§3.
11 462 US 919 (1983).
12 See id at 953 n 16 (1983) ("To be sure, some administrative agency action ... may re-
semble 'lawmaking ... [H]owever, '[in] the framework of our Constitution, the President's
power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker."')
(citations omitted). This simple conception has deep roots in American public law. See, for ex-
ample, United States v Grimaud,220 US 506, 521 (1911) ("[T]he authority to make administra-
tive rules is not a delegation of legislative power."); Railroad & Warehouse Commission v Chi-
cago,Milwaukee & St Paul Railroad Co, 38 Minn 281,37 NW 782,788 (1888) (distinguishing im-
permissible delegation from valid grants of rulemaking authority, which constitute "an authority
and discretion, to be exercised in the execution of the law, and under and in pursuance of it").
Note that Chadha's position is in some tension with the rationale of Humphrey's Executor v
United States, 295 US 602 (1935), which sustained the constitutionality of an independent agency
by describing the agency's activities, pursuant to a statutory delegation, as "quasi-legislative"
rather than purely executive. Id at 628. But rejecting the rationale of Humphrey's Executor
needn't cast doubt on the constitutionality of the independent agencies. Even if those agencies
exercise executive power, it is a separate question whether every official exercising executive
power must be removable at will by, or subject to the direction of the president. For references
on that question, see note 133.
13 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer, 343 US 579, 585 (1952) ("The President's
power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitu-
tion itself!'). We say nothing in this Article about when courts should find that the delegate is or
is not acting within the bounds of delegated statutory authority. That is a question of statutory in-
terpretation, one that must be answered whether or not one also believes that there is a further
question about the constitutional validity of the delegation. One who subscribes to the nondele-
gation position might, of course, hold that statutory delegations should be narrowly construed to
avoid the constitutional question of the delegation's validity; but since we don't subscribe to the
nondelegation position, we don't think that statutes should be narrowly construed on that
ground, although there might be other reasons for doing so. See notes 137-41 and accompanying
text (discussing the canon of avoidance and its relationship to the nondelegation doctrine).
14 488 US 361 (1989).
15 Id at 424-25 (1989) (Scalia dissenting).
16 Consider Powell v McCormack, 395 US 486, 550 (1969) ("[I]n judging the qualifications
of its members Congress is limited to the standing qualifications prescribed in the Constitu-
tion.").
monly said to occur when the statutory grant of authority lacks an "in-
telligible principle" that provides a sufficient degree of direction in the
exercise of statutory authority. At bottom this is a metaphor: When an
intelligible principle is lacking, so that the degree of executive discre-
tion is too great or the scope of authority is too broad,"' rulemaking in
execution of the statute resembles or is akin to legislation, so that the
statute "in effect" delegates legislative power to the executive. 's
The source of the delegation metaphor is obscure. Most com-
monly, proponents of the delegation metaphor point to an argument
of Locke's:
The power of the Legislative being derived from the People by a
positive voluntary Grant and Institution, can be no other, than
what that positive Grant conveyed, which being only to make
Laws, and not to make Legislators, the Legislative can have no
power to transfer their Authority of making Laws, and place it in
other hands.'9
But Locke's epigram is fully consistent with the nalve view and its ac-
count of the constitutional bar on delegating legislative power; indeed
20 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 18 ("Congress shall have Power ... To make all Laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Of-
ficer thereof."). Gary Lawson argues that the word "proper" in the Necessary and Proper Clause
(which he calls the "Sweeping Clause") itself embodies the delegation metaphor. See Lawson,
1995 Pub Int L Rev at 152 (cited in note 17) (arguing that a statutory grant is "improper" if "the
agency's discretion is too large"); Lawson, 88 Va L Rev at 347-48 (cited in note 3). Lawson's
premise rests on an idiosyncratic reading of the Clause, one which holds that the single word
"proper" incorporates structural principles of separation of powers, federalism, and individual
rights as limits on Congress's affirmative authority. For a general discussion, see Gary Lawson
and Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper"Scope of FederalPower: A JurisdictionalInterpretationof
the Sweeping Clause, 43 Duke L J 267 (1993). A more plausible reading because a less dramatic
one, is just that the phrase "necessary and proper" is an example, among many in the Constitu-
tion, of an internally redundant phrase. Consider other instances in Article I, § 8, such as "Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises" (cl 1), "Government and Regulation" (cI 14), or "organizing, arm-
ing and disciplining" (cl 16). On this view, "proper" just means "appropriate," reinforcing the Su-
preme Court's longstanding and capacious interpretation of the companion word "necessary" as
meaning "useful" or "conducive to." See McCulloch v Maryland, 17 US (4 wheat) 316, 413-15
(1819).
But even granting Lawson's premise, the conclusion of his argument doesn't follow.
"Proper," as Lawson reads it, merely bars congressional authorization to violate principles em-
bodied elsewhere in the Constitution's text, structure, or history. So Lawson's point is content-
less; "proper" has no work to do unless the relevant constitutional principle can be traced to
some other valid source of constitutional law. What we deny is that there is any such source for
the delegation metaphor. The separation of powers won't do, because executive rulemaking pur-
suant to a statutory grant is just an exercise of executive power, rather than of legislative power.
Nor is there any other textual or originalist warrant for the nondelegation metaphor, as we dis-
cuss below.
gous delegation problems arise under Article III, but the Supreme
Court case law conspicuously lacks any suggestion that the delegation
metaphor or the concomitant intelligible principle test constrains con-
gressional delegations to the judges rather than the executive. Con-
sider Sibbach v Wilson & Co,2s which upheld the statute granting the
Supreme Court "the power to prescribe, by general rules," procedural
rules for the federal district courts.2 The Court sustained the statute
with barely a nod to the nondelegation idea, stating brusquely that
"Congress has undoubted power to regulate the practice and proce-
dure of federal courts, and may exercise that power by delegating to
this or other federal courts authority to make rules not inconsistent
with the statutes or Constitution of the United States."' It looks very
much as though Congress may delegate legislative authority "with vir-
tually no legislative standards at all," as David Currie puts it," so long
as the delegation runs to the courts. This is a grievous puzzle for the
standard view; if Congress has illicitly given away legislative power,
why should it matter who the recipient is?
To be sure, nondelegation proponents might be able, with enough
pushing and squeezing, to shoehorn Sibbach into the line of cases that
relax the intelligible principle test when the delegate enjoys a measure
of independent constitutional authority over the subject matter.2 Here
the suggestion would be that courts enjoy inherent constitutional
power over their internal procedures. But vague substantive statutes
like the Sherman Act and the Labor Management Relations Act have
also been held to delegate broad lawmaking authority to the judges,
and surely the judiciary has no inherent constitutional authority to
make antitrust law or labor law. In any event the great advantage of
the na've view of delegation is that it dispenses entirely with the need
28 312 US 1 (1941).
29 Id at 7.
30 Id at 9-10.
31 David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court The Second Century,1888-1986
218 (Chicago 1990). To be sure, the Rules Enabling Act at issue in Sibbach limited the scope of
the court's discretion by providing that the judicially-promulgated rules could not "abridge,
enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant" 48 Stat 1064 (1934), codified at 42
USC § 151 et seq (2000). Once that side-constraint was satisfied, however, the statute provided
no intelligible principle to guide judicial rulemaking within the area of delegated statutory au-
thority.
32 See Loving v United States, 517 US 748 (1996) (upholding a delegation to the president
of powers related to the constitutional duties of the Commander-in-Chief); United States v Cur-
tiss-Wright Corp, 299 US 304 (1936) (upholding a delegation to the president of powers related
to constitutional authority in international affairs).
33 For the Sherman Act, see NationalSociety of ProfessionalEngineers v United States, 435
US 679, 688 (1978) (stating that the Sherman Act invites courts to "shape" the statute by "draw-
ing on common-law tradition"). For the Labor Management Relations Act, see Textile Workers
Union v Lincoln Mills, 353 US 448,450-51 (1957) (interpreting the Act to confer on the federal
courts delegated authority to fashion a common law of national labor relations).
for this sort of troublesome theoretical epicycle. On the na've view, the
only question is precisely the question posed by the Sibbach Court:
whether the delegate has complied with applicable statutory and con-
stitutional restrictions. If that analysis is good enough for statutory
delegations to the courts, it's good enough for delegations to the ex-
ecutive as well.
Finally, we might count as a structural idea the claim that consti-
tutional restrictions on the scope or precision of statutory grants are
necessary to ensure that reviewing judges can keep executive agents
within the bounds of their authority-or, as the Court put it in Touby
v United States, "the purpose of requiring an intelligible principle is
to permit a court to ascertain whether the will of Congress has been
obeyed."3 Although this idea has floated around in constitutional law8
opinions
for a long time, occasionally surfacing in Supreme Court
and treatises, 37 it's hard to see it as anything other than conceptually
incoherent. David Currie supplied the refutation by observing that
"judicial review is not an end in itself but a means of enforcing [consti-
tutional and statutory] limitations on executive authority; if there are
no limitations there is nothing to review."38 The judicial review justifi-
cation for the delegation metaphor begs all the relevant questions. If
there is no constitutional requirement of an intelligible principle, the
legal question for judicial review would be simply whether the agent
had complied with the terms of the statutory grant-and that too
would amount to "ascertain[ing] whether the will of Congress had
been obeyed."
39 See Duff and Whiteside, 14 Cornell L Q at 168-69 (cited in note 2) (attempting to dis-
cover "how the maxim came into existence" and its application in the nineteenth century).
40 Shankland v Washington, 30 US 390,395 (1831).
41 Duff and Whiteside, 14 Cornell L Q at 169 (cited in note 2), quoting Joseph Story, Com-
mentaries on the Law ofAgency § 14 at 14-15 (Little, Brown 9th ed 1882).
42 See James 0. Freedman, Delegation and Institutional Competence, 43 U Chi L Rev 307,
309 (1976) (reviewing the Framers' beliefs about legislative delegations).
43 Max Farrand, ed, 1 The Records of the FederalConvention of 178767 (Yale 1911).
44 See id at 67-68.
45 See Freedman, Delegation at 308 (cited in note 42) ("The motion was defeated as un-
necessary."); Davis, 1 Administrative Law Treatise § 2.02 at 79 (cited in note 2) ("[Madison's mo-
tion] was defeated as unnecessary."). Butrsee John L. FitzGerald, Congress and the Separationof
Powers 35-37 & n 88 (Praeger 1986) (questioning the conventional view, but failing clearly to
specify an alternative account).
46 A search for references to delegation in the ratification debates of Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania (including the Harrisburg Proceedings),
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina turned up nothing relevant.
47 See Federalist 42 (Hamilton), in Benjamin Fletcher Wright, ed, The Federalist 473-75
(Belknap 1961).
48 See Davis, 1 Administrative Law Treatise § 2.02 at 79 n 14 (cited in note 2) ("Delegation
by legislatures before 1787 was common.').
49 See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress:The Federalist Period,1789-1801 256
(Chicago 1997) (describing objections to the proposed Alien Act by Representative Edward
Livingston on the ground that the bill "would grant the President a combination of legislative,
executive, and judicial powers").
50 Jonathan Elliot, ed, 4 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of
the FederalConstitution 560 (Burt Franklin 1888).
51 We have compiled this list of statutes from the extremely thorough discussions in Krent,
94 CoIum L Rev at 738-39 (cited in note 2) (recounting early delegations) and Kenneth Culp
Davis,A New Approach to Delegation,36U Chi L Rev 713,719-20 (1969) (same).
52 Act of September 29,1789, 1 Stat 95. See also Act of March 3,1791,1 Stat 218 (reautho-
rizing pensions to be paid out of the treasury "under such regulations as the President of the
United States may direct").
53 Act of July 22,1790, 1 Stat 137,137. David Currie describes this statute as "startling from
the perspective of the late twentieth century" by virtue of "the breadth of rulemaking power
given to the President." Currie, The Constitution in Congress:The FederalistPeriodat 86 (cited in
note 49).
54 Act of September 24,1789,1 Stat 73,83.
55 Act of April 10,1790,1 Stat 109,110.
56 Act of July 16,1790,1 Stat 130,130.
57 Davis, 36 U Chi L Rev at 719 (cited in note 51) (citing Act of May 26, 1790, 1 Stat 122,
o A statute that "authorized the President to fix the pay, not more
than prescribed maxima, for military personnel wounded or disabled
in the line of duty."'
On both originalist and Burkean grounds, these and other stat-
utes powerfully support the naive view of delegation; they presuppose
that the executive may receive statutory grants of rulemaking discre-
tion not constrained by any further intelligible principle or congres-
sional direction. Originalists believe that the acts of early Congresses
possess or confer a special originalist imprimatur, providing important
founding era evidence of the public understanding of the Constitu-
tion. 9 Burkeans believe, as did Madison, Marshall, and Frankfurter,
that consistent early practice, notably including legislative precedent,
can resolve constitutional ambiguities or even put controlling glosses
on constitutional text.6' On either count, the delegation metaphor finds
little support in the founding era, while the naive view finds a great
61
deal.
snippets from Madison and early legislators discussed above-is also post-ratification material.
To take Lawson's general objection seriously is to wipe out all of the affirmative founding-era
evidence that nondelegation proponents possess. (Note once again that generalities about the
separation of powers from Locke, Montesquieu, Madison, and other theorists don't count; those
generalities are equally consistent with the naive view, which holds that the exercise of statutory
grants of authority by executive officers is constitutionally permissible law-execution, not im-
permissible "legislation.") Moreover, on the standard textualist grounds to which Lawson's gen-
eral objection appeals, isolated quotations from the early period are far less weighty than actual
statutory enactments; the latter presumptively embody a judgment by the whole Congress, not
just by individuals, about the permissibility of delegation.
The specific objection cuts no ice either. Nondelegation proponents may chip away at the
early statutes as much as they please, adding ingenious epicycles to square the statutes with the
theory, but the cumulative impression these statutes create is that early Congresses just didn't
take constitutional objections to delegation very seriously. You can't beat something with noth-
ing; in the absence of any affirmative evidence for the nondelegation position, that conclusion
should be decisive for principled originalists.
62 Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium:A Delegation Doctrinefor
the Administrative State, 109 Yale L J 1399,1403 (2000).
63 11 US (7 Cranch) 382 (1813).
64 See id at 385-86.
65 Id at 388.
be decisively rejected by the courts.7 In this light, the last quoted sen-
tence clearly doesn't say that the "line" courts must draw is, as the
modem doctrine would have it, a line between excessively discretion-
ary grants of authority and adequately cabined grants of authority.
Rather, Marshall's line runs between powers that may not be dele-
gated in any degree ("subjects, which must be entirely regulated by
the legislature itself'71) and those that may. Nor is there any hint that,
once a power has been sorted into the latter category, there exists
some independent intelligible principle requirement. If there were
such a separate requirement, of course, it would have been extremely
odd that the Court upheld the statute, which looks very like a blank-
check delegation of rulemaking authority to the federal courts.
The critical passage from Wayman v Southard,then, adopts a dif-
ferent theory than the one modem nondelegation proponents have
read into it. At most the opinion as a whole is ambiguous; the upshot
is that the pedigree of the modem delegation metaphor can't even be
pushed back as far as 1825. Indeed, the modem view doesn't clearly
surface in any court until state courts of the mid-century began hear-
ing nondelegation challenges to referenda schemes and local-option
laws.7 The doctrine's appearance in a Supreme Court opinion came as
late as 1892, when dictum in Field v Clark not only announced that
"Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President," but
also cashed out that principle by suggesting, albeit in dictum, that
statutory grants of authority might "in [a] real sense, invest the Presi-
dent with the power of legislation" by leaving the president undue
"discretion in the premises.""
From the standpoint of the naive view of delegation, the objec-
tionable move here isn't the nondelegation principle, but the way in
which it is cashed out. The nalve view also holds that legislative power
may not be delegated to the president, but it holds that a statutory
grant of rulemaking authority never constitutes a delegation. From
that perspective, Field's reference to delegation "in [a] real sense'
gives away the game. It is an admission that the statutory grant was
not a delegation in the legal sense. After all, Congress didn't delegate
to the president its own statute-enacting power; rather, it exercised
precisely that power. The Field Court fell victim to an unexamined
76 276 US 394, 409 (1928) ("If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible
principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such
legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.").
77 Sunstein, 67 U Chi L Rev at 322 (cited in note 2). This point refutes any Burkean claim
that the nondelegation doctrine is now an entrenched feature of our public law by virtue of a
consistent course of judicial decisions. But see David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional In-
terpretation, 63 U Chi L Rev 877, 892-93 (1996) (justifying, on Burkean grounds, a nontextualist
and nonoriginalist approach to constitutional law that treats accumulated precedent as constitu-
tive of constitutional meaning). Our tradition, or the Supreme Court's tradition, has been to (al-
most always) reject nondelegation challenges, while commentators repeatedly proclaim the
death of the nondelegation doctrine. That is hardly a sufficiently robust and settled tradition to
underwrite an implied restriction on Congress' exercise of its express textual powers.
78 See generally St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries with notes of reference to
the constitution and laws of the federal government of the United States and of the Commonwealth
of Virginia (Lawbook Exchange Reprint 1996); Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution
of the United States (Carolina Academic Reprint 1987); James Kent, Commentaries on American
Law 1826-1830 (Little, Brown 12th ed 1896); William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the
United States ofAmerica (PH Nicklen 2d ed 1829).
83 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp v United States, 295 US 495, 541-42 (1935) (finding
the authority conferred under the Act to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power).
84 See, for example, The Clean Air Act, 42 USC § 7401 et seq (1994).
85 See generally John M. Carey & Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds,Executive DecreeAuthor-
ity (Cambridge 1998) (collecting comparative data).
86 See id ("[T]he conventional interpretation by which [executive] decree is regarded as
tantamount to executive usurpation of legislative authority has frequently been overstated").
87 See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrus" A Theory of Judicial Review 183 (Cam-
bridge 1980).
A. Welfare Arguments
The welfarist argument by the critics of delegation boils down to
the claim that social welfare would be greater if Congress made all the
specific policy choices rather than delegating that power to agencies.
This claim is like an argument that the owner of a corporation should
design the corporation's products rather than hiring engineers and
marketing experts. The owner knows that the agents might make spe-
cific choices that he would not make himself, but by rewarding the
agents on the basis of an ex post evaluation of performance, he en-
sures that they act roughly in his interest while at the same time ex-
ploiting their expertise and the other benefits of a division of labor.
What makes Congress different from this corporation? One pos-
sibility is that Congress's goals are objectionable. If the corporation
produces illegal products, we might want to prevent the owner from
delegating power. But we really want the corporation to cease produc-
tion. Similarly, if Congress's goals were wholly objectionable-if it
transferred wealth to interest groups and did nothing for the public-
then removing any tool at its disposal could only make the public bet-
ter off. Constitutional prohibition of delegation would be justified, but
so would constitutional interference with any congressional action, to
the extent that we would simply want judges to refuse to enforce all
statutes&
If we start, then, with the presumption that Congress does some
good, and thus should have some power, we can justify a nondelega-
tion doctrine only by explaining what is special about delegation, what
83 As Mashaw points out, see Mashaw, Greed at 144-45 (cited in note 2), this is the prob-
lem with Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn, and Glen 0. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative
Delegation, 68 Cornell L Rev 1, 7 (1975) (proposing "a renewed nondelegation doctrine" as a
tool to "deprive the legislature of its ability to shift responsibility and to create lotteries in pri-
vate benefits through regulation").
makes it especially bad? There is only one basic proposal on the table,
though many variations, and it is this: When Congress delegates, it
conceals political transfers from the public, making it more difficult
for the public to interfere with these transfers. How does it do this?
Through delegation Congress authorizes agencies to make the trans-
fers for it. Courts and other institutions cannot interfere with the
agencies' transfers because the agencies are given vague grants of au-
thority. Citizens have no power to monitor the agencies' transfers be-
cause agencies' behavior is more secretive than Congress's, nor can
they punish agencies because the agencies are insulated from the po-
litical process. Agency heads do not stand for reelection; agency staffs
cannot be disciplined.
This argument assumes, implausibly, that Congress wants to give
away its power to other institutions. If, as is more likely, Congress
wants to exert its power through the agencies, and retains power to
discipline agencies that do not make the right transfers to the right in-
terest groups-those that have influence on Congress-then the pub-
lic can ensure that agencies act in the public interest to the same ex-
tent that it can ensure that Congress serves the public interest when
Congress passes nondelegatory statutes. If citizens have the capacity
to sanction politicians who make bad policy in statutes, they should
also have the capacity to sanction politicians who fail to punish agen-
cies that make bad policy, or who delegate authority to such agencies
in the first place.8" Imagine that citizens obtain all their information
from the media, and journalists have only enough time and expertise
to monitor congressional debates, and not enough to monitor agency
decisionmaking. When Congress initially delegates authority to an
agency, the media should report to the public that Congress has cre-
ated a mechanism that will make transfers to interest groups. Clearly,
such a statute is bad-just as bad as a statute that directly makes a
transfer to interest groups-and the public should punish Congress for
delegating as much as it punishes Congress for enacting the direct
transfer.
This argument remains valid even if we accept the assumption
that Congress really does not want much authority because then it has
to make difficult decisions about to whom it should make transfers,
when it would rather accumulate political goodwill by engaging in
constituent service.' Thus, Congress delegates authority to agencies
89 Mashaw makes essentially this argument. See Mashaw, Greed at 146-47 (cited in note 2).
90 See Farber and Frickey, Law and Public Choice at 81-82 (cited in note 2) (emphasizing
that monitoring technology is endogenous, and should improve as agencies acquire more power).
91 See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretationand the Balance of Power in the Adminis-
trative State, 89 Colum L Rev 452,497 & n 204 (1989); Aranson, Gellhom, and Robinson, 68 Cor-
nell L Rev at 33 (cited in note 88).
B. Democratic Arguments
Some critics of delegation argue that delegation violates democ-
ratic values. Their main argument focuses on accountability. Suppose
that Congress delegates certain powers to an agency. Those who want
to influence policy will make arguments to the agency, not to Con-
gress. Those who are disappointed by the agency's decisions will ap-
peal to the agency, not to Congress. Members of Congress are thus not
accountable for political outcomes under their responsibility. But in a
well-functioning democracy those who are ultimately responsible for
it. '
policy should be directly accountable to those who are affected by
The problem with this argument is that Congress is accountable
when it delegates power-it is accountable for its decision to delegate
power to the agency. If the agency performs its function poorly, citi-
zens will hold Congress responsible for the poor design of the agency,
or for giving it too much power or not enough, or for giving it too
much money or not enough, or for confirming bad appointments, or
for creating the agency in the first place. And, as noted above, Con-
gress is accountable not only in this derivative sense. Congress retains
the power to interfere when agencies make bad decisions; indeed, it
does frequently."
David Schoenbrod's variant of this argument emphasizes the
ability of Congress to claim victory over some difficult problem (for
example, pollution) by enacting a vague statute that seems to tackle
the problem (the Clean Air Act) but in fact delegates authority to an
agency that will have to make the difficult compromises (between
clean air and economic growth)." But as Mashaw points out, Congress
can engage in happy talk about nondelegating statutes as well.'"' Ei-
ther citizens and the media believe it or not; there is nothing special
about delegation per se. If members of Congress can be taken to task
at the next election for saying that welfare reductions will help poor
people, then they can be taken to task for saying that the Consumer
Product Safety Commission will help small businesses.
Critics of delegation might argue that this response makes unre-
alistic assumptions about the psychology of the electorate. Anecdote
and intuition tell us that a member of Congress is more vulnerable to
criticism for voting in favor of a law that, say, shuts down a local pol-
luter who employs many constituents, than for voting for a law that
authorizes an agency to shut down polluters, or for not voting for a
law that stops an agency that already has that authority. But this ar-
gument overlooks the price that the member of Congress pays for
delegating power. The member of Congress receives less criticism be-
cause he has less control over the outcome. He shares the criticism
with the president who appointed the agency officials, and the criti-
cism is diluted to the extent that the agency otherwise does a good
job.
Accountability is not lost through delegation, then; it is trans-
formed. Congress is accountable for the performance of agencies gen-
erally, and people properly evaluate the agencies' accomplishments as
well as failures when deciding whether to hold members responsible
for authorizing the agency, or for failing to curtail its power, fix its mis-
takes, or eliminate it altogether. In a similar way, corporate managers
are held responsible for the general performance of employees, not
for a particular error that an employee makes, unless the error is fore-
seeable and egregious. Like the manager, Congress monitors its sub-
ordinates as best it can, and tries to design rewards and penalties that
give them the right incentives.' 1
It should also be noted that the nondelegation doctrine restricts
delegation to executive agencies but not to other agencies within the
legislative branch. Epstein and O'Halloran argue that if Congress
could not delegate broad powers to agencies, it would delegate more
power to congressional committees and staff members. ° Whether this
substitution would occur, and would not reduce accountability if it did,
are difficult questions, but ones that the critics of delegation have not
adequately addressed.
Manning ties the nondelegation doctrine to the Constitution by
emphasizing the values underlying the bicameralism and presentment
requirements of Article I, § 7:
101 Also emphasized by Spence and Cross, 89 Geo L J at 133 (cited in note 2); Epstein and
O'Halloran, 20 Cardozo L Rev at 958-60 (cited in note 2) (purporting to provide evidence);
Mashaw, Greed at 139 (cited in note 2); Roderick D. Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, The
Logic of Delegation:CongressionalParties and the AppropriationsProcess 33-34, 232-33 (Chi-
cago 1991).
102 See Epstein and O'Halloran, 20 Cardozo L Rev at 961-62 (cited in note 2).
103 John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 Sup Ct
Rev 223,239-40 (footnotes omitted).
104 Manning reports rather than makes these arguments. He is interested in defendinj the
doctrine's implications for statutory interpretation, not the doctrine itsel We discuss this argu-
ment in Part III.C.
105 See Schuck, 20 Cardozo L Rev at 782-83 (cited in note 2).
106 For examples of the influence of (mostly small) western states on authorizing statutes,
see George Cameron Coggins and Doris K. Nagel, "NothingBeside Remains". The Legal Legacy
of James G.Watt's Tenure as Secretaryof the Interior on FederalLand Law and Policy, 17 BC En-
vir Aff L Rev 473,492-93 (1990).
is a reflection of the logic of the decision cost theory, not our criticisms
of it.
The decision cost argument might be cast in less instrumental
terms. The critic of delegation might argue that bicameralism and pre-
sentment encourage Congress to deliberate about policy, and if Con-
gress can delegate easily, then deliberative values are lost. It is democ-
ratically preferable for Congress to deliberate about policy rather
than for the head of an agency to deliberate about policy, even if they
would in the end choose the same policy. But a step up to the next
level of generality reveals the defect in this argument. The scale of the
policy choices that Congress must make is itself an appropriate topic
for congressional deliberation. If Congress concludes that in light of
its limited resources it should deliberate more about the general struc-
ture of government, including the delegation of powers, and less about
policy minutiae, then judicial interference with this choice can hardly
be thought to promote deliberation.
However the argument from democracy is understood, it cannot
be used to justify the nondelegation doctrine in the absence of evi-
dence that delegation interferes with accountability and other democ-
ratic values, and that this interference is not justified by other consid-
erations. The critics of delegation load the dice against Congress by
arguing that the absence of constant supervision of agencies shows
that Congress is unaccountable,"' when the absence of constant super-
vision is the intended consequence of delegation. Constant interfer-
ence with an agency would be evidence of delegatory failure."' Be-
sides, Congress does enact laws that reverse the decisions of agen-
cies,"9 weaken their powers, 0 and even abolish whole agencies."' And
Congress often takes care to draft statutes to confine discretion, and
give interest groups the ability to alert Congress when the agency goes
astray. 2 One cannot in the abstract say whether the level of monitor-
107 See Schoenbrod, Power without Responsibilityat 99-105 (cited in note 94).
108 See Barry R. weingast and Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional
Control?:Regulatory Policymakingby the FederalTrade Commission, 91 J Polit Econ 765,768-70
(1983).
109 An example is Congress's reversal of the FCC's low-power FM radio rules. For a general
discussion, see Stewart Benjamin, Douglas Lichtman, and Howard Shelanski, Telecommunica-
tions Law and Policy 325-32 (Carolina 2001).
110 See, for example, James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy:What Government Agencies Do and
Why They Do It 242-43 (Basic Books 1989) (discussing examples); Terry M. Moe, The Politicsof
BureaucraticStructure, in John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, eds, Can the Government Gov-
ern? 267, 289-97 (Brookings 1989) (chronicling the crippling of the Consumer Product Safety
Commission through reauthorizations in 1975,1978, and 1981).
111See, for example, Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995, Pub L No
104-88, 109 Stat 803 (1995); Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub L No 90-443, 90
Stat 1704 (1984) (terminating CAB).
112 See Epstein and O'Halloran, 20 Cardozo L Rev at 954-60, in 22-37 (cited in note 2);
Kiewiet and McCubbins, Logic of Delegation at 206-10 (cited in note 101) (discussing congres-
ing and punishment that we observe shows that Congress remains ac-
countable, but this just means that the nondelegation proponents have
failed to carry their burden of proof.
To show that delegation has reduced accountability, one must
provide a more particular kind of evidence, namely, that the agency
regulates against the interests of Congress and the public or the inter-
est groups that have influence with Congress, and that Congress does
not attempt to discipline the agency. And that is only the first step. To
show that this lack of accountability is due to the delegation rather
than to the nature of Congress itself, one must show that when Con-
gress does not delegate, the rules it creates reflect more closely the de-
sires of the public or of interest groups. We have not found
11 3 the kind of
systematic study that could shed light on these questions.
C. Is Delegation Special?
The welfarist and democratic arguments share a flaw, namely, that
they cannot make delegation special. Congress can use its lawmaking
powers for good or evil: to single out one of these powers for restric-
tion one needs a theory that explains why this power is subject to
greater abuse than others. Critics of delegation have made their case
by pointing to the potential ill effects of delegation, but they have
shown only that delegation is a powerful tool, and so its effects-
whether good or bad-can be substantial. But we can say the same
thing about Congress's power to tax. If one focuses only on the bad
uses of the taxation power, one would be quite impressed, but no one
argues that Congress should not have the power to tax. Both taxation
and delegation can be put to good and bad uses; what makes delega-
tion especially bad?
Someone might yet come up with an economic theory that ex-
plains why delegation should be restricted, but we are pessimistic. A
theory that envisions the political process as interest group warfare
will not be able to explain why delegation is worse than any other tool
at Congress's disposal. A more subtle theory that focuses on the dif-
ferential costs of monitoring political actors"' will have trouble ex-
plaining why those who monitor political actors face greater difficul-
ties evaluating statutes that delegate, and the regulations they author-
ize, than statutes that do not delegate; and why these additional moni-
toring costs, if they exist, are likely to exceed the gains from institu-
tional division of labor.
The problem with democratic critiques of delegation is that de-
mocratic theories are usually indeterminate at the institutional level."'
A flourishing democracy might be direct or representative or parlia-
mentary; it might involve heavy reliance on committees in its repre-
sentative institution; it might rely on strong parties; it might rely on
appointed judges or elected judges, with or without tenure; it might be
confederated or not; it might have strong libel laws or strong speech
protections; and it might rely heavily on autonomous agencies or do
its work through judicial enforcement of private rights of action. In
their preoccupation with delegation among all the other devices used
to make policy, the critics of delegation treat the nondelegation doc-
trine as a fetish that would ward off all the evils of representative de-
mocracy. But arguments about democratic accountability can be used
to criticize all of the other devices and institutions as well. Beneath
their masks, the critics of delegation are direct democrats, and they
should aim their arguments at representative democracy, not at dele-
gation, which is but a small part of it. In doing so, however, they would
make clear that they are arguing against the Constitution-which is
hardly a charter for direct democracy-not from it.
A. Nondelegable Powers
We have already mentioned the theory of nondelegable powers
articulated in Wayman v Southard."6 Although consistently rejected by
modern courts,"7 it continues to garner an occasional endorsement by
115 See Dan M. Kahan, Democracy Schmemocracy, 20 Cardozo L Rev 795,797-800 (1999)
(claiming that "the concept of democracy, by itself; doesn't uniquely determine the structure of
government institutions").
116 23 US 1 (1825). See text accompanying notes 66-76.
117 See, for example, Skinner v Mid-America Pipeline Co, 490 US 212,222-23 (1989) (reject-
ing claim that the taxing power is intrinsically nondelegable); Synar v United States, 626 F Supp
commentators. "' Surely, the reasoning runs, Congress may not by stat-
ute create a federal court or agency with delegated authority to exe-
cute the House's power of impeachment, or the Senate's power to
convict on a bill of impeachment, to approve treaties, or to confirm of-
ficers. Does our rejection of the delegation metaphor require accept-
ing those hypotheticals?
No, it doesn't. The nalve view of delegation holds that a statutory
grant of authority is never unconstitutional on the ground that it con-
fers "legislative" power on the executive, although it may be unconsti-
tutional on other grounds. Those other grounds might include, say, an
attempt to grant the executive the power to regulate intrastate non-
commercial activities, or the power to violate the First Amendment; in
both cases Congress could not itself enact the relevant rule, so it may
not confer that power upon its agents either. Congress may not confer
a power that it doesn't possess in the first place. So Congress couldn't,
for example, transfer to executive agents a power that the Constitu-
tion vests in some other institution, such as the Supreme Court. All
this is common ground.
But a statute granting the executive the House's authority to im-
peach, or the Senate's authority to approve treaties, would be legally
identical to a statute granting the executive the Supreme Court's
power to decide cases. The reason is that Congress may exercise or
confer by statute only the authority that Congressitself possesses; and
the treaty approval power is held by the Senate as a separate institu-
tion, not by the Congress. Precedent from both the Supreme Court 9
and Congress itself has always recognized that distinction. Consider
that Congress has always denied that it possesses constitutional au-
thority to regulate, by binding statute, the internal rules and regula-
tions of its respective houses, precisely because the Constitution
grants that power to each house separately.m Nor, of course, could the
separate houses separately transfer their powers to the executive
branch, for the houses acting alone lack the power to enact the statute
necessary to trigger the president's law-execution authority. Recall
that the executive must trace its authority to a constitutional or statu-
1374, 1385-86 (DC Cir 1986) (rejecting claim that the appropriations power is inherently non-
delegable).
118 See, for example, Tribe, 1 American ConstitutionalLaw at 982 (cited in note 17) (claim-
ing that certain legislative powers are nondelegable).
119 See Chadha,462 US at 955-56:
[When the Framers] sought to confer special powers on one House, independent of the
other House, or of the President, they did so in explicit, unambiguous terms. These carefully
defined exceptions from presentment and bicameralism underscore the difference between
the legislative functions of Congress and other unilateral but important and binding one-
House acts provided for in the Constitution.
120 See Posner and Vermeule, 111 Yale L J at 1665 (cited in note 81) (collecting references).
121 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer, 343 US 579, 585 (1952) ("The President's
power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress of from the Constitu-
tion itseW").
122 Skinner,490 US at 220.
123 See id at 224.
tive powers. Rather they are about the allocation among potential
delegates of other powers, notably the executive power and the power
to appoint officers of the United States. Consider, for example, the
question whether Congress may authorize state officials to enforce
federal statutes. In Printz v United States'" the Court, through Justice
Scalia, suggested that such authorization would violate Article II's
Vesting Clause by transferring law-execution authority to someone
other than a federal executive officer subject to presidential control.'n
The same theory-the "unitary executive" theory-has been urged,
with little success to date, against the congressional creation of inde-
pendent agencies staffed by federal officials executing statutory au-
thority free from plenary presidential control." Note that in all of
these settings, the predicate for the unitary executive claim is precisely
that the relevant delegates are exercising executive power rather than
legislative power-in other words, that any nondelegation challenge
has already been rejected. The question about the identity of the dele-
gate is analytically independent of the question about delegation.
A different legal challenge to nonexecutive delegations involves
the Appointments Clause of Article II, which provides that all "offi-
cers of the United States" must be appointed by one of several proce-
dural mechanisms. Where the delegate exercises "significant author-
M
ity" pursuant to federal statute,'5 yet has not been so appointed, the
delegate may be described as an invalidly appointed federal officer.
An example involves the previously described chemical weapons
treaty that authorizes members of international bodies to conduct
domestic searches. John Yoo argues persuasively that the best consti-
tutional objection to the treaty is that the international officials exer-
cise federal law-execution authority without having been validly ap-
ing significant authority" to be an "Officer of the United States" for Article II purposes).
136 See John C. Yoo, The New Sovereignty and the Old Constitution:The Chemical Weapons
Convention and the Appointments Clause, 15 Const Comment 87,116-30 (1998).
137 See, for example, Sunstein, 67 U Chi L Rev at 317-18 (cited in note 2) (suggesting that
the nondelegation doctrine is flawed, but the aims of the doctrine might nonetheless be pursued
through appropriate canons of statutory interpretation).
138 See, for example, FDA v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 529 US 120,161 (2000) (us-
ing a nondelegation canon to hold that the Food and Drug Administration lacks authority to
regulate tobacco products); MCI Telecommunications Corp v American Telephone & Telegraph
Co, 512 US 218,234 (1994) (using a nondelegation canon to hold that the Federal Communica-
tions Commission's authority to "modify" rate-filing requirements does not permit it to make
"basic and fundamental" changes to those requirements).
139 Sunstein, 67 U Chi L Rev at 327 (cited in note 2) (arguing that judicial enforcement of
the conventional nondelegation doctrine "would produce ad hoc, highly discretionary rulings").
140 Manning, 2000 Sup Ct Rev at 256 (cited in note 103).
141 See George Moore Ice Cream Co, Inc v Rose, 289 US 373,379 (1933) (facing the ques-
tion of a statute's constitutionality because Congress's intent was clear).
142 See Manning, 2000 Sup Ct Rev at 257 n 172 (cited in note 103) (discussing Mashaw,
Greed at 105 (cited in note 2)).
CONCLUSION
Delegation of powers is so common in public and private life, and
has been so common since time immemorial, that critics looking for
constitutional grounds for banning this practice must carry a heavy
burden. Yet nothing in the language or structure of the Constitution
supports their position, and the arguments from democratic theory
and public choice theory are exceedingly weak-conjectures at best,
backed up by anecdotes rather than systematic evidence. For these
reasons, courts should finally shake off the cobwebs of the old juris-
prudence and acknowledge that the nondelegation doctrine, and its
corollaries for statutory interpretation, are dead.