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Muslims in
US Prisons
Muslims in
US Prisons
People, Policy, Practice
edited by
Nawal H. Ammar

b o u l d e r
l o n d o n
Published in the United States of America in 2015 by
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301
www.rienner.com

and in the United Kingdom by

Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU

© 2015 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Muslims in US prisons : people, policy, practice / Nawal H. Ammar, editor.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-62637-168-2 (hc : alk. paper)
1. Muslim prisoners—United States. 2. Prisoners—Religious life—United States.
3. Prisons—United States. 4. Corrections—United States. I. Ammar, Nawal H., 1958–
HV8865.M87 2015
365'.60882970973—dc23 2014041442

British Cataloguing in Publication Data

A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book
is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements

of the American National Standard for Permanence of
Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992.

5 4 3 2 1
 Contents

Acknowledgments vii

1 Exploring Islam in US Prisons

Mark S. Hamm and Nawal H. Ammar 1

Part 1 Context
2 Muslim History and Demographics, in and out of Prison
Hamid Kusha 9
3 Islamic Perspectives on Crime, Punishment, and Prison
Nawal H. Ammar 29
4 Challenges in Research Muzammil Quraishi 47

Part 2 Living and Spreading Islam in Prison

5 Religious Rights, Religious Discrimination
Kenneth L. Marcus 65
6 Conversion: Motives, Patterns, and Practices
Nawal H. Ammar and Robert R. Weaver 79
7 Imams in Prisons: Balancing Faith and Religious Politics
Nawal H. Ammar and Amanda Couture-Carron 97

Part 3 After September 11

8 Detention Immediately After September 11 Irum Sheikh 115
9 Prison Islam in the Age of Sacred Terror Mark Hamm 125
10 “Prislam” Myths and Realities Timothy Hiller 147
11 Policy Responses, Personal Implications Amir Marvasti 167
12 Muslims in US Security Prisons David P. Forsythe 183

v
vi Contents

Part 4 Conclusion
13 Building Better Understandings of Religion, Corrections,
and Society Nawal H. Ammar 203

References 217
The Contributors 241
Index 243
About the Book 255
 Acknowledgments

numerous people. I am grateful to all the chapter authors for their patience
This book could not have been completed without the help of

and rewrites. Without them this book never would have materialized. I ap-
preciate the efforts of the many people who supported me in reviewing
the manuscript. In particular I am grateful to Mehek Aref and Michael
Perkins, both students at the University of Ontario Institute of Technol-
ogy at the time of writing the book, for their assistance. The anonymous
reviewers of the manuscript provided constructive advice, and I appreci-
ate their time and effort. Without the encouragement, advice, and patience
of Andrew Berzanskis, editor, and Steve Barr, director of production, at
Lynne Rienner Publishers this book would not have seen the light of day.
I am also lucky to have worked with Linn Clark, whose thorough editing
improved the manuscript.
I am appreciative of the support of my husband, Robert Weaver, and
daughter, Soraya Weaver, who helped with and contributed to the book. Last
but not least I am thankful to my late parents, Hamed Ammar and Leila
Lababidy, for all the years of support, encouragement, and love. Unfortu-
nately neither will see the book. It is dedicated to their memory.

vii
 1
Exploring Islam
in US Prisons
Mark S. Hamm and Nawal H. Ammar

nated in the last decade by a post–September 11, 2001, framework.

The discussion of Muslim inmates in prison has been domi-

The urgency to understand these waves of “terrorist” acts that some

Muslims perpetuated is undeniably important. However, the idea that
US prisons have become hubs of Islamic extremism and violence
(Colson, 2002; Malkin, 2004; Marks, 2006) has moved the study of
this population of inmates from a correctional, crime, and punishment
perspective to a war-on-terror approach. In 2006, FBI director Robert
Mueller informed the public that “prisons are fertile ground for ex-
tremists. Inmates may be drawn to an extreme form of Islam because
it may help justify their violent tendencies” (Mueller, 2006). Several
years earlier, Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY) told Congress that
“militant Wahhabism is the only form of Islam that is preached to the
12,000 Muslims in federal prisons. These imams flood the prisons
with anti-American, pro–bin Laden videos [and] literature” (Schumer,
2003). The goal here, according to congressional testimony by the
Center for Security Policy, was “to recruit convicted felons in the US
prison system as cannon-fodder for the Wahhabist jihad” (Gaffney,
2005). Shortly after the attempted suicide bombing of a US jetliner
bound for Detroit on Christmas Day 2009, US Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee chairman John Kerry (D-MA) released a report indi-
cating that the Christmas Day plot represented the vanguard of an
evolving terrorist threat. According to the report, 36 Americans who
had converted to Islam while incarcerated in the United States had re-
cently traveled to Yemen, ostensibly to study Arabic, and had
“dropped off the radar.” Some of them had reportedly joined al-Qaeda
of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the organization responsible for the

1
2 Mark S. Hamm and Nawal H. Ammar

plot (US Senate, 2010). Academic researchers lent their voices to the
doomsday chorus. One prominent study declared that because Islam
feeds on resentment and anger all too prevalent in US prisons, it poses
a threat “of unknown magnitude to the national security of the US”
because “every radicalized prisoner becomes a potential terrorist
threat” (Cilluffo and Saathoff, 2006). The message was clear: US pris-
ons had become incubators for radical Islam and terrorist ideology.
None of these threats materialized, however. US prisons did not
become fertile ground for Islamic extremism, nor did they become in-
cubators for terrorism. The Senate’s 36 US converts who joined AQAP
turned out to be an exaggeration; experts were unable to identify any
former prisoners who moved to Yemen. Prison converts to Islam were
not turned into cannon fodder for jihad, and the threat posed by Wah-
habi clerics was dismissed by an FBI study showing that most cases of
prisoner radicalization in the United States were instigated by domes-
tic extremists with few or no foreign connections (Van Duyn, 2006).
The recent literature on Muslims in US prisons as it stands today
is full of gaps. Research in the last decade overlooks the historical de-
velopments of prisoners’ rights, black nationalism, the civil rights
movement, the Nation of Islam, and the growth of Wahhabism. It also
discounts the changing role of the federal courts and the Supreme
Court over the years (Herman, 1998; Smith, 2007; Smith 2011). Most
existing scholarship silences the role Muslim prisoners have played in
shaping the legal system’s treatment of prisoners generally, and the
role of religion in prison in particular. The research disregards the di-
versity and complexity of this group of prisoners, lacking empirical
study of either a qualitative or quantitative nature. Moreover, no
analysis is available on the extralegal issues that this complex group
of prisoners face outside prison—including identity crisis, social and
familial dislocation, poverty, racism, and discrimination.
This academic discussion of Muslims in US prisons within an
ahistoric context seems to address this group of prisoners as though
they were not present or had a negligible presence prior to the tragic
9/11 attacks on US soil, or that they were not subject to the pains of
imprisonment. This perspective contributes both to confusing the is-
sues and the development of less than rigorous academic work. While
the radicalization of Muslims in US prisons is a significant problem,
understanding it requires a deeper look at the issues. In a 50-state sur-
vey of prison chaplains in the US conducted by the Pew Forum on Re-
ligion and Public Life (2012), less than 41% of the chaplains inter-
viewed said that religious extremism is “very or somewhat common”
 Exploring Islam in US Prisons 3

in the prison where they work. The prison’s security level tended to
impact the chaplain’s view of the prevalence of religious extremism.
As such, while we must remain diligent in protecting the United States
from violence and terrorism, using sound social scientific methods
and frameworks to examine the issue of Muslims in US prisons is nec-
essary in order to arrive at a better understanding of this group of pris-
oners and of the role of prisons within US society. We must include
the history of Muslims in the United States inside and outside of pris-
ons, detail the context of Muslim incarceration, explore the traits that
they have in common with other prisoners and the ones particular to
them, examine their experiences in the post-9/11 environment, and
consider only evidence and empirical data about this group of inmates
to make systematic, analytic assertions as well as policy recommenda-
tions. This approach expands our understanding of this group of in-
mates and the role of prison radicalization in the United States.
Islam in US prisons is not a one-dimensional phenomenon.
Rather, in prison the Muslim faith is best conceptualized as a double-
edged sword, capable of producing positive and negative results. As
the contributors to this volume demonstrate, Islam can have a moder-
ating effect on prisoners, playing an important role in prison security
and rehabilitation. Once on the path to restricting their lives—down to
the way they eat, dress, form support networks, and divide their day
into periods for study, prayer, and reflection—Muslim prisoners have
begun the reformation process, making them less of a recruiting target
for terrorists than other prisoners, and certainly less of a target than
alienated street-corner youth of the urban ghetto. Programs aimed at
reversing self-destructive behavior—including basic education, “man-
hood” training concentrating on respect for women, information on re-
sponsible sexual behavior and drug use prevention, and life skills
management—all were initiated by Black Muslims during the US pris-
oner rights movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Aidi, 2002).
Black Muslims set up collect-calling services for inmates to telephone
families, established halfway houses and employment services to help
reintegrate ex-cons back into their communities, and through their ac-
tivism created circumstances necessary for civil rights legislation
challenging inadequate conditions of confinement (Gottschalk, 2006).
Many forget that Muslim inmates played a decisive role in negotiating
an end to the historic Attica prison rebellion of 1971 (Wicker, 1975).
While Islam is mainly a positive influence inside prison, research
presented in this book also shows that certain forces within the Mus-
lim prison community are aligned with the efforts of al-Qaeda and its
4 Mark S. Hamm and Nawal H. Ammar

associates to inspire convicts in the United States to conduct terrorist

attacks on their own. The number of prisoners who actually turn radi-
cal beliefs into terrorist action is remarkably few (Hamm, 2013). Yet
their actions should not be glibly dismissed as “hype and hysteria,” as
one scholar has described the threat (Atran, 2010). This terrorist threat
is fueled primarily by the incarceration of inmates in disorderly, con-
gested, and understaffed maximum-security prisons—by mass incar-
ceration itself. By their very nature, prisons are intended to induce
transformative experiences among inmates. However, the movement
toward mass incarceration has turned prisons into hotbeds for personal
transformation due to the increasingly chaotic nature of prison life
that overcrowding causes. Overcrowding has amplified the social mar-
ginalization of inmates and deepened their need for bonding, group
identity, spiritual guidance, and protection against predatory violence
in the maximum-security mix. Islam has thrived under these condi-
tions.
A leading theory of prisoner radicalization holds that the effects of
mass incarceration are breeding a desire in inmates to defy the author-
ities who incarcerate them (Neumann, 2010). This creates a condition
where other prisoners view “identities of resistance” favorably, repre-
senting a sort of “jihadi cool” behind bars (Sageman, 2008). Some
scholars argue that Islam, or the “religion of the oppressed,” is fast be-
coming prisoners’ preferred ideology of resistance, playing the role
that Marxism once did (Khosrokhavar, 2009). Along with protection
from victimization and the search for meaning and identity, this ideol-
ogy of resistance has assumed its place as a primary catalyst for in-
mate conversions to a range of Islamic traditions, including Islamist
orientations that may espouse ideologies of intolerance and violence.
Foremost among them is the amorphous social movement called
Salafism—the narrow, strict, puritanical form of Sunni Islam upon
which al-Qaeda is based—and “Prison Islam” groups that are known
for using religious medallions and tattoos, along with selective verses
from the Quran, to draw recruits from gang subcultures. Once radical-
ized by these extremist beliefs, prisoners become vulnerable to terror-
ist recruitment.
Islam—in all its forms and fashions—is now sweeping through
US prisons, bringing with it both unprecedented security challenges
and exceptional possibilities for progressive reform. The growth of
Islam is taking place against the backdrop of a global economic melt-
down and a rise in religious extremism and ethnic conflict, changes in
prisoners’ class and race compositions, a declining interest among
 Exploring Islam in US Prisons 5

prisoners in Christianity, new developments in youth subcultures, in-

creased access to smuggled cellphone technology, and the shifting
power dynamics of long-term maximum-security confinement—all
situated within the context of lingering post-9/11 fear. Islam in US
prisons is an issue of such profound sociopolitical complexity that
even the wardens who run the prisons barely understand it. This book
is timely and highly relevant for contemporary prison administration
and counterterrorism policy.
In this volume the authors attempt to provide a snapshot of a so-
cial scientific and legal perspective on Muslims in US prisons, emerg-
ing from current scholarly work and policy developments. As a result,
some terms, concepts, and concerns recur in different chapters within
varying frameworks. By necessity, the authors also deal with impor-
tant themes relating to corrections, crime, and punishment. While the
authors come from various disciplinary backgrounds and the chapters
cover disparate topics, the unifying premise is to underscore the sub-
ject’s complexity and to further our systematic knowledge of it.
The book includes three parts and a conclusion. Part 1 provides
the reader with a historic, theological, and research-based context
about Islam and prisons. The topics of Islam in prison and Muslims in
prison are scattered in a number of publications and journals, and
therefore are not easily accessible, gathered, or sorted. Part 1 attempts
to organize these topics to make them accessible for both the novice
and more experienced audiences. A number of chapters underscore the
differences among the various forms of Islam that exist in the United
States. Most importantly, the difference between normative Islam (the
Islam that emanated from Arabia in the 7th century C.E.) and the Na-
tion of Islam (NOI), often referred to as Black Muslims—a national-
ist/religious movement founded by Wallace (Warith) D. Fard Muham-
mad in the 1930s and led after his disappearance by Elijah
Muhammad until his death in 1975 and since 1977 by Louis Far-
rakhan. This difference is often glossed over or misunderstood. The
NOI’s beliefs are only tenuously linked to the theology of orthodox
Islam. The views of normative Islam and the NOI about “God, cos-
mology, Prophet Muhammad and the afterlife, traditional Islam”
(Fishman and Soage, 2013, p. 62) are not only starkly different but are
often at odds with each other. Colley writes, “The NOI’s doctrine
combined religious influences with African American history and her-
itage to produce a philosophy that spoke directly to African Ameri-
cans’ experiences with white privilege” (2014, p. 400). These differ-
ences are important to underscore, due to the liberating role that NOI
6 Mark S. Hamm and Nawal H. Ammar

played in US prisons in the 1960s and 1970s with African American

prisoners, the most famous among them being Malcolm X.
Part 2 explores the experiences of Muslim inmates in US prisons
and some legal, theological, and subcultural components of their lives
within prison walls. While it is difficult to remove the 9/11 impact on
any matter that involves Muslims in the US generally, and Muslims in
prison in particular, the writers have attempted to discuss the issues
that Muslim prisoners in US correctional facilities (at the state and
federal levels) encounter on a daily basis. The topics discussed are far
from comprehensive, serving only as a starting point to understanding
some of the facets of Muslim inmates’ lives in US prisons. Chapter 4
offers a unique perspective for US scholars: lessons learned from a
UK researcher.
Part 3 explores the multidimensional experiences of incarcerated
Muslims: being rounded up and incarcerated immediately after 9/11,
the impact of prison Islam on radicalization as well as rehabilitation,
and conditions in a variety of security prisons inside and outside the
United States.
The book’s conclusion discusses the connection among the vari-
ous chapters, assesses their contribution to the study of Muslims in US
prisons, and suggests future research ideas.
 Part 1

Context
 2
Muslim History and
Demographics,
in and out of Prison
Hamid Kusha

growth in the United States, including information about penal institu-

In this chapter I provide a brief historical account of Islam’s

tions and inmate conversion to Islam. I divide the chapter into three
main sections. Section one gives a brief account of the rise of the US
Muslim community, discussing waves of immigration to the United
States and the formation of Muslim mosques. I also explore whether
US and Muslim ideals can coexist and complement each other. In sec-
tion two I provide a brief history of the Nation of Islam (NOI) and
prominent figures within this organization. Finally I discuss Islam
among US prisoners and their motivations for conversion in prison.
Because the NOI has played an important historical role in prison-
bound conversion, I give some attention to its controversial view of
Islam, leadership, and efforts at conversion.

Muslim Demographics in the United States

Immigration and the United States

Some scholars have suggested that Muslim sailors were long aware of
North America. Freed Numan, for example, cites Chinese documents
dating as far back as 1178 C.E. to support these claims. For example,
Numan asserts that Muslim sailors regularly traveled to Mu-Lan-Pi,
what we consider today’s United States (Numan, 1992). Some studies
report that the first modern wave of Muslim immigration to North
America took place in the 1870s (Kusha, 2009). Most of these immi-
grants came from the Ottoman Empire provinces of Syria, Lebanon,

9
10 Hamid Kusha

Jordan, and Palestine. These immigrants were also from various ethnic
groups, including Arabs, Kurds, Turks, and Albanians.
The second wave of Muslim immigration took place in the after-
math of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire that followed the
conclusion of World War I (1914–1919). Devastated by the war, signif-
icant numbers of Muslims from different parts of the Middle East for-
merly under the Ottoman Empire immigrated to the United States.
Consequently, the US Congress passed the Immigration Act of 1924,
also known as the Johnson-Reed Act. This act limited the annual num-
ber of immigrants permitted to enter the United States based on exist-
ing US populations; this legislation established a quota of 2% of the
existing population (Kusha, 2009). This statute put a decisive stop to
this second wave of immigration. Most African, Asian, and Middle
Eastern countries were given an annual quota of 100 immigrants; white
Europeans received the lion’s share of immigration rights. The prefer-
ential treatment gave the lowest quota to Spain (131) and the highest to
Germany (51,227); Great Britain and Northern Ireland had a combined
quota of 34,007 (Comprehensive Immigration Law, 1924).
Smith and Haddad (2002) observed that following World War II, a
new wave of Muslim immigration took place that continued intermit-
tently until the 1960s. Accordingly, this cycle of immigration was par-
tially the result of the US Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
which dismantled the quota regime of the 1924 legislation. Addition-
ally, the US civil rights movement ushered a new and more liberal per-
spective into US race and ethnic relations. This third wave of immigra-
tion went beyond the mostly Arab Muslims of the Middle East and
included immigrants from other Muslim countries in Asia and Africa
(Smith and Haddad, 2002).
The fourth wave started in the mid-1960s, due to a wholesale
change in US immigration law as well as to the post–World War II im-
plementation of global modernization and development schemes. In the
Middle East, Africa, and Asia, these schemes created a relatively well-
educated, upwardly mobile, and more contemporary intelligentsia in
the Islamic world. A segment of this new social class sought better
lives and economic opportunity in the United States. For the first time
in the United States, an immigrant’s history, education, and technical
expertise, as opposed to national origin, became the deciding factor for
admittance into the country. In contrast, as Europe stabilized economi-
cally, politically, and socially, due to the post–World War II reconstruc-
tion under the Marshall Plan, the number of European immigrants to
the United States declined noticeably (Smith and Haddad, 2002).
 Muslim History and Demographics 11

From the 1980s to the present, two main events have led to the
fifth wave of Muslim immigration into the United States. One was the
Iranian Revolution in 1979, which toppled the pro-Western Pahlavi
monarchy (r. 1925–1979). The second was the demise of the Soviet
Union in the early 1990s. The power vacuum resulting from the Iran-
ian Revolution led to eight years of war with Iraq (1980–1988), the
rise of Islamic fundamentalism, and state-sponsored terrorism. All of
these factors forced an unprecedented exodus of large segments of
Iran’s upper and middle classes to Europe and North America. In ad-
dition, the Iranian Revolution had a precipitous destabilizing impact
on the Middle East, including the radicalization of the Palestine-Israel
conflict, which inadvertently led to other regional wars. The Iranian
Revolution ultimately resulted in an unprecedented population dislo-
cation.
The resulting social and political instability in Caucasia (e.g., be-
tween the ex-Soviet republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan) and Central
Asia, however, is having a discernible centripetal impact on the whole
region. For example, a new and deadly form of Islamic fundamental-
ism has emerged in Afghanistan under the ex-Taliban regime. This
regime, now a full-fledged terror network of al-Qaeda, is drastically
impacting the emigration of Muslims from many Islamic countries to
the United States.

Formation of Various US Muslim Communities

US Muslim communities comprise diverse racial and ethnic groups

that exhibit different social, economic, and educational statuses. The
majority of North American Muslims adhere to Sunni Islam, the domi-
nant branch in the Islamic world; fewer adhere to Shiite Islam. Wah-
habism, an orthodox Sunni minority approach to Islam favored in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, also has a following among North American
Muslims. Finally, a variation of Islam that originated in the United
States and popular among some African Americans is known as the Na-
tion of Islam (NOI).
The NOI is controversial, with some NOI beliefs that are radically
different from the mainstream Islam practiced among the larger US
Muslim communities. For example, the NOI official website, on the
page titled “The Honorable Elijah Muhammad,” states, “We Thank
Allah, Who Came in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad for Raising
up His Last and Greatest Messenger, The Honorable Elijah Muham-
12 Hamid Kusha

mad!!” (Muhammad, 2011). The claim that Allah, the universal God in
the vernacular of the Quran, has appeared in the person of Master Fard
Muhammad is against the very core of traditional Islam’s understand-
ing of Allah.
The Quran (112–1:3) declares that Allah is the one who is and al-
ways has been. Allah declares in the Quran unequivocally that he nei-
ther begets nor was begotten, and that none compares to him. In addi-
tion, the Quran rejects any allusion to Allah’s need for reincarnation in
any human form. The idea that Allah has reincarnated in the persona of
the Master Fard who has chosen Elijah Muhammad as his “Last Mes-
senger” is antithetical to the Quran and the core dogma of Islam. The
Quran states that Muhammad Ibn Abdullah (570–632 C.E.) personifies
Allah’s last messenger, the Khatam al-Anbiya. Overall, though, the
NOI plays an important historical role in converting African American
inmates to its version of Islam. I discuss the issue of Islamic prosely-
tizing in US state and federal penitentiaries in some detail later in this
chapter.

The Number of Muslims in the United States

The US Constitution prohibits a religious-based census, which led to a

void in the research. Therefore, the question of how many US citizens
adhere to Islam inside or outside penal institutions is not easily re-
solved through referral to census or inmate population data from the
Federal Bureau of Prisons and state prisons. Different studies, how-
ever, have tried systematically to determine the approximate number of
Muslims residing in the United States as well as estimates for Muslim
inmates.
A 2001 study conducted by the Graduate Center of the City Uni-
versity of New York profiled the Muslim population and concluded
that fewer than 3 million Muslims reside in the United States (Kosmin
and Mayer, 2001). The telephone survey posed the central question,
“What is your religion, if any?” Out of more than 50,000 surveyed, 219
identified their religion as Islam. This number then served as the base
for identifying the number of US Muslims (Kosmin and Mayer, 2001).
The study authors cautioned that US Muslims should not be confused
with US Arabs. “Muslim” and “Arab” are not interchangeable terms:
they do not refer to the same people. This misconception results from
the fact that Islam emerged in the 7th century C.E. in Mecca, in the
western part of the Arabian Peninsula. At the time most Muslims were
 Muslim History and Demographics 13

Arabs, but not all Arabs were Muslims (Ammar, 1994). The Arab
American Institute estimates the number of Arabs living in the United
States at around 3.5 million. Of this number, 75% adhere to Christian-
ity, and 25% to Islam. Using this 25% as a base to determine the total
US Muslim population, one reaches at a total number that would not
exceed 3.4 million (Kosmin and Mayer, 2001).
Other sources and studies give different estimates of the total num-
ber of Muslims living in the United States. The Islam for Today web-
site puts the number at 4 million (Webb, 1995). Another Islamic site
puts the number at 5.7 million (New Internationalist Magazine, 2002).
The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) puts the number at
7 million (Council on American-Islamic Relations, 2011). Studies of
US mosques provide yet more information.

Mosques in the United States

Observers can discern the growth of US Muslim communities through
the growth of mosques in the United States; the growth of the mosque
as a religious institution also signals the spread of the Islamic faith in
the United States. As of April 2001, the US Department of State’s Of-
fice of International Information Programs published the following in-
formation, gathered through a survey titled The Mosque in America: A
National Portrait (see below):

• Mosques in the United States: 1,209

• American Muslims associated with a mosque: 2 million
• Increase in number of mosques since 1994: 25%
• US mosques that have some Asian, African American, and
Arab members: nearly 90%
• US mosques with a full-time school: more than 20%
• Ethnic origins of regular participants in US mosques:
-South Asian (Pakistani, Indian, Bangladeshi, Afghani): 33%
-African-American: 30%
-Arab: 25%
-Sub-Saharan African: 3.4%
-European (Bosnian, Tartar, Kosovar, etc.): 2.1%
-White American: 1.6%
-Southeast Asian (Malaysian, Indonesian, Filipino): 1.3%
-Caribbean: 1.2%
-Turkish: 1.1%
-Iranian: 0.7%
14 Hamid Kusha

-Hispanic/Latino: 0.6%
(US Department of State, n.d.)

A typical Muslim mosque in the United States, as this list shows,

seems neither a racially, ethnically, nor denominationally restricted in-
stitution of worship. It functions as a communal hub of congregation
and social activism open to all who profess an affinity with Islam.
However, not all Muslims necessarily attend mosques. From 1994 to
the present, US Muslim mosques have increased in numbers and are
present in every state. Most mosques are located in California (227),
followed by New York (140) and New Jersey (86) (US Department of
State, n.d.).
The comprehensive study of US mosques, The Mosque in America:
A National Portrait (Bagby, Perl, and Froehle, 2001), appeared in 2001.
Funders of this report included the Council on American-Islamic Rela-
tions based in Washington, DC; the Islamic Society of North America;
the Ministry of Imam W. Deen Muhammad; and the Islamic Circle of
North America. Researchers studied eight subject areas in relation to the
proliferation of the Muslim mosques in this country (Bagby et al.,
2001). The main areas covered were basic characteristics, worship, his-
tory, mission, programs, organizational dynamics, and finances. Accord-
ing to the report’s findings, the number of mosques and mosque partic-
ipants are experiencing tremendous growth. On average, over 1,625
Muslims are associated in some way with the religious life of each
mosque. The median number of Muslims associated with each mosque
is 500. The average attendance at Friday prayer is 292 persons. Median
attendance is 125 (Bagby et al., 2001).
In conjunction with similar studies, one can conclude that Islam is
a fast-growing faith in the United States, the mosque is an important
institution in the life of US Muslim communities, the mosque plays a
central functional role in the spread of the Islamic faith in the nation,
and the question of the number of US Muslims is relatively difficult to
determine with precision. Different social, political, and demographic
factors complicate impartial scientific research about this issue, espe-
cially after the events of September 11, 2001.

Demographic Characteristics of
American Muslim Communities
The Pew Research Center, in its 2007 survey titled “Muslim Ameri-
cans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream,” maintained that “Mus-
 Muslim History and Demographics 15

lims constitute a growing and increasing segment of American soci-

ety. Yet there is surprisingly little quantitative research about the atti-
tudes and opinions of this segment of the public” (Pew Research
Center, 2007, p. 2). The constitutional prohibition against a religious-
based census and the small Muslim population in the United States
are the two main reasons. Further, “The Pew Muslim American sur-
vey estimates that Muslims constitute 0.6% of the US adult popula-
tion. This projects to 1.4 million Muslims 18 years old or older cur-
rently living in the United States” (Pew Research Center, 2007). The
2007 Pew report cautioned that this number could indeed be “higher,”
because the survey was conducted exclusively over regular tele-
phones and did not include cellphones. In addition, an estimated
13.5% of the general public does not have any phone service, accord-
ing to the report, thus the rationale for the higher estimates (Pew Re-
search Center, 2007).
The most significant results of the 2007 Pew report were not the
attempts to determine the actual number of the US Muslim population
per se, but that from a socioeconomic perspective, the US Muslim
community generally is “middle class” and “mainstream.” According
to the report, “The Muslim American population is youthful, racially
diverse, generally well-educated, and financially about as well-off as
the rest of the U.S. public. Nearly two-thirds (65%) are immigrants
while 35% were born in the United States” (Pew Research Center,
2007).
Interestingly, Muslims who had immigrated to the United States
within the past three decades (1980–2007) gave four main reasons for
their migration: educational opportunity (26%), economic opportunity
(24%), family reasons (24%), and conflict/persecution (20%); 3% re-
ported “other,” and another 3% answered “don’t know.” In other
words, despite all the media hype that Muslims hate the United States
and are about to cause Armageddon, half of those who have immi-
grated to the United States are seeking socioeconomic opportunities for
bettering their lot, and almost half cite family or persecution issues.
One scholar has characterized US democracy as the most ideal for the
blossoming of Islam’s core teachings of peace and progress, with one
eye on social justice and the other on law and order (Kusha, 2002). As
the Pew report explains, “Although Muslim Americans have distinctive
beliefs and practices, their religiosity is similar to American Christians
in many respects.” The report concluded, “American Islam resembles
the mainstream of American religious life” (Pew Research Center,
2007).
16 Hamid Kusha

Can Islam and American Ideals Coexist?

Is Islam compatible with the ideals expressed in the US Constitution

and the Bill of Rights? Muslim institutions and community leaders
have offered different answers, especially after 9/11. For example, the
Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), in an article titled “The Is-
lamic Foundations of Patriotism,” argues that being a US Muslim not
only is nonantithetical to the US notion of patriotism, but in fact is
complementary:

Our thesis is that the relationship is indeed synergistic: that within the
central dogma of Islam, the intellectual development of Islamic thinking
and jurisprudence, as well as Islamic history, there are many tenets consis-
tent with, and supportive of, the sentiment of patriotism to the United
States. (Muslim Public Affairs Council, n.d.)

Starting with this thesis, the article expounds on five major factors
that are intrinsic to both US and Islamic teachings in relation to the es-
sential ingredients of an ideal life, factors that make Islam quite com-
patible with the mainstream US notion of love for one’s country: sanc-
tity of life, liberty as an essential value, justice as equality before law,
justice as due process, and the pursuit of happiness (Muslim Public Af-
fairs Council, n.d.). The article defends these factors by citing different
verses from the Quran and from the words and deeds attributed to the
Prophet Muhammad.

The Nation of Islam

Origins and Leadership

The NOI was founded by a mysterious individual named Wallace D.
Fard Muhammad in the 1930s in Detroit, Michigan. Information about
his background and his alleged mastery of Islamic teachings is scarce.
The NOI, however, has accorded Fard the ultimate divine status:

We believe that Allah (God) appeared in the Person of Master W. Fard

Muhammad, July, 1930; the long-awaited “Messiah” of the Christians and
“Mahdi” of the Muslims. We believe further that Allah is God and besides
HIM there is no god and He will bring about a universal government of peace
wherein we all can live in peace together. (Nation of Islam, n.d.)

This claim to divinity comes despite the fact that, in the early ac-
counts of the rise of the NOI, Fard is portrayed as a silk peddler born
 Muslim History and Demographics 17

in the holy city of Mecca in the 1870s who migrated to the United
States and founded a “voodoo” religious cult among migrant black
workers (Benyon, 1937). The details of Fard’s life, which are almost
nonexistent, are beyond the scope of this chapter. Based on some
scholarly accounts, though, one Elijah Poole, the would-be next leader
of the NOI, enthusiastically embraced Fard’s claim to divinity. Poole
eventually became known as the Honorable Elijah Muhammad.
In the autumn of 1931, Elijah Poole attended his first lecture given
by Master Fard Muhammad. Overwhelmed by the message, Poole im-
mediately accepted it (FinalCall.com News, 2000). Upon the recom-
mendation of Master Fard, Poole changed his name to “Karriem” and
assumed the position of a minister in the Temple of Islam, precursor to
the NOI. Later, Master Fard elevated Karriem to the position of
“supreme minister,” advising him once again to change his name from
Karriem to Muhammad. The newly named Honorable Elijah Muham-
mad is on record that he never considered his Christian name as his
own. He explains, “The name Poole was never my name nor was it my
father’s name,” because “it was the name the white slave master of my
grandfather after the so-called freedom of my fathers” (FinalCall.com
News, 2000).
Robert Dannin (2002) has done much research on the history of the
NOI as well as on Muslim converts in US prisons. He maintains that
Master Fard was reported as having had already claimed that he was
the true reincarnation of one Noble Drew Ali, another mysterious fig-
ure who, based on some accounts, preceded Master Fard in claiming to
be Allah reincarnate. Dannin (2002) cautions his readers that in analyz-
ing the veracity of these bombastic reincarnation claims and their im-
pacts on the NOI, we not only have to go back to its precursor, the
Moorish American Science Temple, but also to the 19th-century Black
Freemasonry movement. These religious-fraternal organizations repre-
sented black aspirations within the late 19th century (Dannin, 2002).
However, one should not assume that the Moorish Temple’s view of
Islam had much ideological affinity with mainstream Islam, whose
genesis had emerged in the seventh-century Hejaz region, the old name
of what is known today as Saudi Arabia.
With the exit of Master Fard, Elijah Muhammad assumed the lead-
ership mantle of the NOI. Muhammad apparently was a man of humble
origins but undoubtedly was endowed with remarkable leadership.
Under Muhammad’s guidance, unlike other faith-based organizations
that preceded it by at least a century, the NOI’s proselytizing efforts
had a provocative antiestablishment tone to accompany its denomina-
18 Hamid Kusha

tional articulation, which partially accounts for why the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) under J. Edgar Hoover closely monitored the
NOI and especially its leader from the 1930s to the 1970s.

The Nation of Islam and the FBI

The NOI has credited Elijah Muhammad with many accomplishments;
however, the FBI had a different view of the NOI and its formative pe-
riod. Thus, in its early investigation of the NOI, the FBI depicted
Muhammad as the founder of the Muslim Cult of Islam (MCI), with its
military wing called the Fruit of Islam (FOI). The FBI files on the NOI
show that Muhammad was arrested in Chicago on September 20, 1942,
charged with the crime of sedition, and was subsequently interrogated
by FBI agents. The unsigned interrogation document purports that
Muhammad was of the firm conviction that in 1930 he had met Allah
reincarnated in the person of Wallace Fard Muhammad. During the
1930–1933 period, Fard, residing in Detroit, held general meetings
with an audience numbering around 800 to 900 to teach a religion that
was called “Islam.” He is reported to have had regular meetings with
Elijah Muhammad. During these sessions, Fard instructed him on
Islam’s teachings for a period of nine months and subsequently disap-
peared altogether, never to be heard from again (Muslim Public Affairs
Council, n.d.). What were the contents of these teachings of an Islam
that “Allah” had personally instructed to the NOI’s future leader?
Under the heading of “Principles,” the FBI interrogatory document
quoted Elijah Muhammad as enumerating the following as comprising
the principles of Islam:

• Belief in Allah
• Belief in the prophets
• Belief in the scriptures that the prophets bring
• The Bible
• The Holy Quran
• Prayer
• Charity
(Muslim Public Affairs Council, n.d.)

The NOI has stated that the FBI’s renditions and accounts of the
movement’s leadership cannot be trusted because they were con-
cocted to give a bad impression of the NOI. There is no doubt that the
FBI, from the inception of the NOI in 1930 to the present, has held a
 Muslim History and Demographics 19

negative view of the NOI. In the Red Scare atmosphere of the 1930s,
the NOI was considered a dangerous and seditious cult bent on creat-
ing anti-US sentiments among the larger black community. Conse-
quently, the NOI had a prominent place on the FBI’s list of those who
engaged in “anti-American” activities. Therefore, FBI agents likely
neither cared about nor could really understand the NOI’s Islamic
principles.

Islam and the Nation of Islam: Not the Same

When Elijah Muhammad was describing the NOI to the FBI, he did not
mention the Hajj, the obligatory pilgrimage to Mecca that every Mus-
lim must perform at least once. Neither was there any mention of the
principle of Ma‘ad, which stands for the Day of Resurrection, one of
Islam’s central beliefs. Missing from Muhammad’s view of Islam was
also the Saum, the obligatory dawn-to-dusk fasting during the holy
month of Ramadan. Most major and minor sects of Islam have adhered
to these principles, including the present NOI under the leadership of
the Reverend Louis Farrakhan (1975–2007). However, in the early
1930s, as Allah was giving instructions to his “last messenger,” Elijah
Muhammad, three crucial pillars of Islam were missing. Additionally,
in mainstream Islam—Sunnite or Shiite—it is considered blasphemy to
deny that the Prophet Muhammad is the sealer of all prophets, let alone
to suggest that a reincarnated Allah has given principles to another
“last prophet of God,” some of which contradict original Islamic prin-
ciples. In addition, a principal belief in Islam is that Allah does not ap-
pear to mortal souls through reincarnation, a concept with Hindu roots
and intrinsically anti-Quranic. Allah, as depicted in the Quran, is be-
yond human capacity to fathom, let alone to be spoken to in a reincar-
nated nature as the NOI claims.
Furthermore, some of the NOI’s arguments and claims about Islam
are quite controversial—for example, the notion that one of the essen-
tial purposes of Islam as a religion is spiritually and physically clean
up the “dark people” so they are respected by other civilizations on the
earth (Kusha, 2009). The purpose of Islam, like Judaism and Christian-
ity, from its inception to the present has been the purification of the
soul and body. However, the Quran does not express this desire for
black people per se, but for all faithful and, in fact, for all humanity, re-
gardless of race, class, ethnic origins, or gender. Islam, like its Judeo-
Christian counterparts, is race neutral in its core teachings, in contrast
to the vile and racist remarks that religious extremists (Muslim, Chris-
20 Hamid Kusha

tian, or Jew) have thrown against one another in the name of “purity”
of the faith.
The Quran reminds Muslims time and again that Jews and Chris-
tians are people of the book (Ahl al-Kitaab) to whom Allah has sent his
most beloved prophets, Moses and Jesus-the-Christ, for guidance, re-
demption, and salvation. In fact, the Quran is adamant that a “true”
Jew or Christian is as much a “true” Muslim as a “true” Muslim is a
“true” Jew or Christian; all men and women of true faith “submit” to
one God, whom the Quran portrays as Allah. This submission, how-
ever, is not coerced, as some Muslim fundamentalists advocate, but is
of an ecumenical nature that transcends time and culture.
In short, a true Muslim is neither racist nor a religious bigot bent
on waging jihad against the rest of the civilized world; a true Muslim
can find God in the Muslim mosque, the Jewish synagogue, or the
Christian church. This is the meaning of religion in the line of Abra-
ham, a concept that has millennia of tradition behind it.

Prominent Figures in the Nation of Islam

Malcolm X
One of the most famous members of the NOI is Malcolm X, who con-
verted in prison in the 1950s and who played an important role in the
early stages of the movement to convert other black inmates to Islam
(Van Deburg, 1992). Prior to his own conversion to Islam, which took
place in 1947 when he chose the name “Malcolm X,” he was known by
his Christian name of Malcolm Little and had been born into a devout
Baptist home in Omaha, Nebraska.
In 1946, Malcolm was arrested and charged with burglary. Upon
conviction, Malcolm was sentenced to 10 years in a Charlestown, Mas-
sachusetts, state prison. During his incarceration, Malcolm became ac-
quainted with the NOI and the teachings of its charismatic leader, Eli-
jah Muhammad. Malcolm’s conversion to Islam had lasting moral and
psychological impacts on him, as his writings, sermons, and interviews
demonstrate. Malcolm converted to Sunni Islam in 1964 and created
his own organization named Muslim Mosque Inc. Different reasons are
offered for Malcolm’s break from the NOI. Some argue that it was over
strategy; some claim that personality clashes were the cause—between
Malcolm and Elijah Muhammad, or with other young disciples of Eli-
jah, for example, the Reverend Louis Farrakhan (Van Deburg, 1992).
However, a look at Malcolm’s “A Declaration of Independence” of
March 12, 1964, shows that the fallout was due to deeply rooted differ-
 Muslim History and Demographics 21

ences between Malcolm and Elijah Muhammad over the NOI’s long-
term plans. Malcolm believed in the moral and spiritual power of Islam
to inculcate the requisite elements for the rejuvenation of the black
sense of self-worth and identity, both of which he proposed African
Americans had lost to the North American institution of slavery.
On February 21, 1965, Malcolm was assassinated while giving a
speech at the Audubon Ballroom in New York City. The ideas,
speeches, and charismatic personality of Malcolm X have played sig-
nificant roles in the rise of black consciousness. Having personally ex-
perienced the horrors of prison life and its devastating mental and
moral impacts on inmates, Malcolm must have realized the rehabilita-
tive role of Islam for the black community at large and prison inmates
in particular (Haley, 1964). However, his assassination deprived the
black community of one of its most charismatic young leaders at a crit-
ical time in the civil rights era.

Louis Farrakhan
The Reverend Louis Farrakhan has played an equally important if not
controversial role in Islamic proselytizing efforts during his leadership
of the NOI. Born Louis Eugene Walcott on May 11, 1933, in Roxbury,
Massachusetts, he gradually rose in the leadership cadre that Elijah
Muhammad had built. He collaborated with Malcolm X for some time
but later was appointed as minister of the Muhammad Temple when
Malcolm left the NOI over unsettled ideological and organizational is-
sues with Elijah Muhammad. Once Malcolm X fell out of favor with
the top leader, the time for Rev. Farrakhan to step in had come. Far-
rakhan and his supporters decided to rebuild the original NOI upon the
foundation established by W. Fard Muhammad and Elijah Muhammad.
In 2000, Imam Warith Deen Mohammed (W.D.) and Minister Louis
Farrakhan publicly embraced and declared unity and reconciliation at
the annual Saviors’ Day convention. Farrakhan has been a controver-
sial figure, with critics commenting on his anti-Semitic, racist, and ho-
mophobic views (Gardell, 1996). Regardless of this assessment of Far-
rakhan, the NOI’s contribution to conversion to this form of Islam is
beyond any doubt crucial to a discussion of Muslims in US prisons.

Islam in US Prisons

The establishment of Islam in US penal institutions dates back to the

1930s, with the “Black Muslims” name given to members of the NOI
and the Moorish Science Temple of America (Jenkins, 2003). Ammar
22 Hamid Kusha

and colleagues did not consider the NOI as a prominent movement in

the area of prison-bound conversion to Islam, stating that their data
showed that “most of the Muslims affiliate with the American Muslim
Mission rather than with the NOI, irrespective of when they identified
themselves with Islam” (Ammar, Weaver, and Saxon, 2004, p. 421)
However, the Office of the Inspector General, in its April 2004 report
titled “A Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Selection of Muslim
Religious Services Providers,” had a somewhat different view in rela-
tion to the NOI’s role in prisons.

The Number of Muslim Inmates

The NOI claims that it has intensified its prison-bound proselytizing
activities to convert a large number of black inmates to its version of
Islam. However, the actual number of these Muslim inmates is as elu-
sive as the actual number of Muslims living in the United States. Dif-
ferent estimates are made for the rate of conversion to various denom-
inations of Islam, including the NOI. For example, Jane I. Smith, in a
comprehensive study of the spread of the Islamic faith in the United
States, estimated the number of prison conversions to Islam at 30,000
(Smith, 1999). Nyang (1999) has estimated that prison conversion to
Islam is a fast-growing phenomenon among the African American
Muslim community, to the effect that one of every 10 African Ameri-
can conversions to Islam take place within the prison settings.
Lisa Miller, in her September 1999 article in the Wall Street Jour-
nal, observed that “the growth of Islam in US prisons is creating anxi-
ety among some Christian ministers. While the vast majority of in-
mates in federal prison are still Christian, the number of Muslim
inmates has nearly tripled over the last six years to 6,500” (Miller,
1999). Citing data from the American Correctional Association, Miller
estimated that Muslim inmates constituted about 20% of the inmate
population in Maryland, New York, and Pennsylvania.
Robert Dannin (1996) has conducted primary research in a number
of prisons in New York State, known for housing a large number of
African American Muslim inmates. He collected data on the number of
black converts during the 1980s and 1990s (see Table 2.1).
Dannin states that his “study does not account for the numerous
Muslims at New York’s municipal Rikers Island prison, a massive fa-
cility holding over 15,000 prisoners where there has been a very active
(missionary) da’wa program for many years, apparently under the aus-
pices of a group of Muslim corrections officers” (Dannin, 1996, as
 Muslim History and Demographics 23

Table 2.1. African American Inmates Professing Islam in New York Prisons

Total Inmate Muslim Percentage of

Population Inmates Muslim Inmates

1989 50,000 7,554 15%

1992 60,000 10,186 16.9%

Source: Dannin, 1996 (as cited in Kusha, 2009)

cited in Kusha, 2009). That a similar trend is observable for the first
decade of the 21st century is highly probable.
Changing one’s religion is a personal and complex decision that
can results from many factors. In the following section I outline the
motivations for conversion, trying to answer the questions of who con-
verts and why.

Islam’s Appeal to Prison Inmates

One premise of this chapter is that adherence to Islam is growing
among US inmates, especially African American inmates, who consti-
tute a large percentage of the incarcerated population in state and fed-
eral penitentiaries. This growth likely connects to the powerful social
justice message of Islam, as well the need to cope with a prison life
that is oppressive, violent, and dehumanizing. Survival is one of the
main concerns of inmates despite the many rehabilitative, educational,
and even recreational programs that have been instituted throughout
the past century to make prison life more secure and rehabilitative, and
less violent.
Additionally, based on the available literature, conversion to Islam
seems to connect individual inmates to a protective network inside the
prison. However, the fact that Islam is gaining a significant following
among black inmates constitutes a powerful challenge to US penology,
considering the fact that the North American nations of Canada, the
United States, and Mexico have historically used a Judeo-Christian
penal philosophy in their criminal justice systems (for example, sup-
porting Penance, reading of the scripture, and individual prayers).

Prison-Bound Conversion as a Male Phenomenon

Felicia Dix-Richardson and Close (2002) showed that although black
male inmates convert to Islam on a regular basis, black female inmates
24 Hamid Kusha

have a marked resistance to Islam. Accordingly, “For over the past 60

years, it has been common practice for African American male inmates
to convert to Islam as part of the prison experience. The yearly number
of prison converts is estimated at 30,000 (Dix-Richardson and Close,
2002, pp. 107–108). Taking the authors’ estimates of conversion to
Islam for the past 60 years at its face value, 1.8 million imprisoned
black males have converted to Islam during the past six decades. This,
of course, is an estimated number of conversions to Islam on a longitu-
dinal basis subject to the dynamics of demographic change within the
prison setting. However, the assertion is an important indicator of the
prevalence of Islamic conversion among black male inmates in this
country. Why do female inmates not convert to Islam with the same en-
thusiasm and frequency as male convicts? One main reason might re-
late to the idea that Islam, like other Abrahamic traditions, is patriar-
chal, despite a number of important social, economic, and legal rights
that the Quran has recognized for women.

Prison-Bound Conversion as an Exercise

of Religious Freedom
Among the NOI’s prison-directed activities is its effective campaign
for the recognition of the right to the free exercise of religion in US
penitentiaries. Such rights include holding religious sermons or serv-
ices, wearing religious emblems, corresponding with religious leaders,
and proselytizing (Palmer, 2006). These achievements for the NOI are
significant, considering the US public’s apprehension post-9/11 over
the possibility of inmate radicalization. Exercise of these rights,
though, is not absolute and must be balanced against the security con-
cerns of the prison administrators. Thus, US state and federal courts
have responded differently to what is perceived as inflammatory Is-
lamic literature. For example, in Northern v. Nelson (1970), the court
did not agree with Muslim inmates’ contention that they were entitled
to access copies of the Quran, but allowed access to Muhammad
Speaks, a controversial piece of NOI literature (Palmer, 2006).
Muhammad Speaks is “a collection of Elijah Muhammad’s words of
wisdom, public declarations, and religious views that included, among
others, religious sermons whose thrust was that incarceration was a di-
vine test of one’s strength of faith against injustice, a theme that
Muhammad vociferously proclaimed” (Kusha, 2009, p. 164).
 Muslim History and Demographics 25

Conversion as a Just Cause

Freedom, justice, and racial equality have historically made up the tripar-
tite demands of the NOI that it regularly propagates among inmates. The
NOI literature from the time of Elijah Muhammad to that of the Rev-
erend Louis Farrakhan has been adamant that white America has to com-
pensate black America for a wide range of injustices inflicted on blacks
during four centuries of slavery and socioeconomic exploitation. The
compensation sought is not solely of a financial nature but is more mul-
tifaceted, having social, political, and legal dimensions (Clines, 1992).

Conversion’s Benefits Outside Prison

Once released from prison, those who have succeeded in becoming
good and reliable converts can further benefit from the NOI’s social
and communal reward system. In fact, the NOI claims that it has now
expanded its rehabilitative outreach and agenda to embrace all inmates
and not just Muslim African Americans. For example, in its January
18, 2000, document titled “Nation of Islam Calls on All Prisoners,” ad-
dressed to an inmate gathering at the Manchester, Kentucky, Federal
Correctional Institution, a Muslim chaplain, Minister Benjamin
Muhammad, stated,

Some of you thought that the NOI was just concerned with Black people.
Yes, we are concerned with Black people, but you cannot be concerned with
Black people and not be concerned with all people. In truth, no race, no peo-
ple are going to survive this planet alone; no ideology of supremacy is going
to work. (Muhammad, 2000)

Fatherhood and Conversion

One of the main features of Islam attractive to those who convert to it,
within or outside the prison setting, is Islam’s stress on the central role
of the family, especially on the father’s role in confronting some of the
black community’s main problems. For example, one purpose of the
Million Man March organized by the NOI in 1995 in Washington, DC,
was to stress that the black family, as an institution, has been in a mul-
tifaceted crisis that requires the urgent attention of white and black
politicians and social critics. The NOI believes that the problem of the
black family not only has not been resolved but in fact is deepening be-
cause white and black politicians have failed to address its root causes.
Even with this nod toward a biracial solution, NOI literature portrays
26 Hamid Kusha

Rev. Farrakhan as the new sine qua non black leader, comparable to Dr.
Martin Luther King Jr., who is capable of resolving this problem by
calling the black community, especially black males, into action. In the
Million Man March, pledges were made that from that day onward, the
followers of the NOI would not engage in self-destructive behavior,
but “will pledge to love my brother as I love myself. . . . strive to im-
prove myself spiritually, morally, mentally, socially, politically and
economically for the benefit of myself, my family and my people”
(Million Man March Pledge, n.d.). In addition, pledges against drug-in-
duced violence toward women and children were made, as well as
against crime. The organizers also made a pledge to continue working
to improve black communities and especially the status of the black
male. On the 10th anniversary of the Million Man March in October
2005, ten similar pledges were made concerning the issues of unity,
spirituality, education, economic development, political power, repara-
tion, the prison industrial complex, health, artistic/cultural develop-
ment, and peace.

Conversion Strengthening the Family

The family occupies a central place both in African American and immi-
grant Muslim communities. This centrality stems from the fact that the
faith of Islam has historically portrayed family as the most important so-
cial institution in which Islam’s core values are inculcated. These core
values include, among others, family values such as love and respect for
parents. The Quran places much stress on the family being characterized
as the provider of legitimate goods, discipline, and authority. The Quran
also alludes to cooperation between the parents as providers and charges
both with the responsibility for maintaining an emotionally fulfilling and
nurturing family environment. Notwithstanding the fact that a strictly
sexual division of labor has existed in the Islamic world, the faithful be-
lieve that only in such a disciplined and yet nurturing home environment
are parents in a better position to instill in their offspring a set of anti-
criminogenic values, such as (1) respect for self, siblings, parents, grand-
parents, and other members of the society; (2) a conscientious fear of so-
cial disrepute preventing the offspring from engaging in deviant,
delinquent, or criminal behaviors; and (3) appreciation of the importance
of education and positive involvement in the social affairs of the com-
munity. In addition, offspring who are brought up in such a positive fam-
ily environment learn about and appreciate the importance of legitimate
authority. Once these offspring adequately internalize such factors, youth
 Muslim History and Demographics 27

can better appreciate the repercussions of engaging in deviant or delin-

quent acts by defying parental authority at home or that of other author-
ity figures in society at large.

Conclusion

Even in light of the information presented in this chapter, questions re-

main. For example, are the faith-based prison-bound activities in the
name of Islam capable of manifesting Islam’s redemptive powers
within penal settings? Do Muslim inmates (black or otherwise) with
strong religious beliefs refrain from committing criminal acts while in-
carcerated? Is there a relationship between the strength of belief and
the number of prison-bound infractions? The literature on the subject
of the redemptive power of religion in prison is extensive but mostly of
a speculative nature, according to Todd Clear and Melvina T. Sumter
(2002). They maintain that “during the twentieth century there has
been much speculation by scholars in the United States about the rela-
tionship between religion and prisoners.” Despite these efforts, “We
know little about religion in prison, particularly as it relates to the psy-
chological adjustment of offenders to the prison environment” (Clear
and Sumter, 2002, p.125). Clear and Sumter conclude that their re-
search—based on self-report questionnaires of a nonrandom sample of
769 inmates under incarceration in 20 prisons scattered in 20 states—
has shown “A significant relationship exists between inmate religious-
ness and multiple measures of inmate adjustment to the prison environ-
ment.” (Clear and Sumter, 2002, p. 147). Similar studies, albeit with
different methodological approaches, have reached similar results. For
example, O’Connor and Perreyclear studied the relationship between
prison-bound religious sermons and offender rehabilitation. They con-
cluded that, after controlling for relevant demographic and criminal
record factors, “as religious involvement increased the number of in-
mates with infractions decreased” (O’Connor and Perreyclear, 2002).
Thus, one could argue that those who possess strong religious faith
may promote a more harmonious prison existence.
Studies on Muslim prisoners have reached similar conclusions,
such as research done by Ammar and colleagues (2004). Based on sam-
ple questionnaires sent to close to 4,000 Muslim males in Ohio State
prisons to assess reasons for conversion to Islam while incarcerated,
the authors found demographic, ideological, and ethnographic ratio-
nales for conversion.
28 Hamid Kusha

The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) “houses approximately 150,000 in-

mates in 105 BOP facilities nationwide. According to the chief of the
BOP’s Chaplaincy Services Branch, approximately 9,000 inmates,
about 6% of the inmate population, seek Islamic religious services.
While Muslim inmates are not required to report which sect of Islam
they identify with, inmate self-reporting indicates that Muslim prison-
ers can generally be classified into four groups: Sunni, Shiite, Nation
of Islam, and Moorish Science Temple of America. Approximately
85% of BOP inmates who identify themselves as Muslim are Sunni or
Nation of Islam” (Office of the Inspector General, 2004).
In any case, prison-bound conversion to Islam in the United States
is a fact, whether the result of the NOI’s or the more mainstream im-
migrant Islam’s proselytizing activities. One advantage of religious
belief is that it could organizationally link the convict with a respec-
tive church, synagogue, or mosque in the surrounding community as
well as with the regional or national headquarters of that denomina-
tion. Once linked up with the larger religious organization, the whole
dynamic of incarceration changes, depending on the overall linkage
that a religious denomination has established with its inmate faithful
in state or federal penitentiaries. In this respect, faith-based prison-
bound activities have provided a powerful challenge to US penal phi-
losophy.
 3
Islamic Perspectives on Crime,
Punishment, and Prison
Nawal H. Ammar

justice system has received little attention in English-speaking aca-

The subject of prisons as punishment in the Islamic criminal

demic writings. For a long time, among English-speaking academics,

prisons and Islam related mainly to the experience of Black Muslims
and their conversion, and was an issue for comparative research. De-
mographics of prisoners and the events of the last decade render the
understanding of prisons and prison as a form of punishment in Islamic
law as an important domestic US issue with internal racial implications
and global political consequences. According to King, Mauer, and Hul-
ing (2004), since the 1970s there has been more than a 500% rise in the
number of people incarcerated in the nation’s prisons and jails, result-
ing in more than 2.2 million people behind bars. This growth “has been
accompanied by an increasingly disproportionate racial composition,
with particularly high rates of incarceration for African Americans,
who now constitute 900,000 of the total 2.2 million incarcerated popu-
lation” (Mauer and King, 2007, p. 1). While the increase in the rate of
African American incarceration does not imply a direct increase in
Muslims in prisons, it is nevertheless a good indicator of an increase in
potential converts within the prison walls. The precise number of Mus-
lims in this exploding population in prisons, according to Kusha
(2009), is mostly anecdotal. Nonetheless, a Citizens against Recidivism
(2009) report provides an idea of the magnitude of the Muslim popula-
tion in New York State’s prisons. The report indicates that 30% of
African Americans in prison nationally are Muslims. An estimated
350,000 Muslims are housed in federal, state, or local prisons around
the country. About 5% of all Muslims in the United States and 12% of

29
30 Nawal H. Ammar

all African American Muslims are in prison or jail across the country.
About 80% of those seeking faith while in prison come to Islam. The
number of Muslims in US prisons renders an understanding of the Is-
lamic conceptualization of prisons and prisoners a constructive en-
deavor, not only for program implementation in US prisons and jails,
but also for beginning to understand such a group from a social scien-
tific perspective beyond media and religious leadership interpretations
(Center against Recidivism, 2009, p. 1).
In this chapter—based on a review of original and secondary
sources of Islam as well as interviews with two religious clerics—I ex-
amine Islam’s position on crime, punishment, and prisons.1 I ask a va-
riety of questions to define and understand the structure and function
of prisons within Islamic penology. These questions include issues re-
garding the meaning of prisons in Islam, the role prison plays in the Is-
lamic concept of punishment, classifications of prison types, the nature
of prison sentences, the Islamic ethic of treating prisoners, Islamic law
and prisoners’ behavior, and alternatives to prisons. The importance of
understanding the Islamic perspective on prisons is at the core of un-
derstanding Muslims in prison. In comprehending how Islam perceives
prison, crime, and punishment, prison administrators are able to more
precisely and effectively interact with and react to the ever growing
Muslim inmate population. Scholars concerned with prison conditions,
prisoners’ rights, the effectiveness of prison as punishment, and the
abolition of prisons as punishment can also benefit from a clearer un-
derstanding of Islam’s legalistic and theological understanding of
prison, crime, and punishment.
Before addressing the main themes of this chapter, however, I
briefly describe and outline Islamic law and its sources in order to
frame the discussion that follows.

Islamic Law and Its Sources

Interpretations of Islam have varied throughout the centuries, as have

the diverse cultures within which the religion is practiced. Muslims
disagree about some interpretations, and variances have created heated
debate. Most Muslims, however, would agree that the sources of Islam
are the following: the Quran, which is composed of the words of God
transmitted through the angel Gabriel to the Prophet Muhammad; the
sunnah, or the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad; the hadith, or the
sayings attributed to the Prophet Muhammad; and the sharia, or code
of law based on various interpretations, or mathib (Ammar, 2001).
 Islamic Perspectives on Crime, Punishment, and Prison 31

The human interpreters of divine revelation in Islam developed the

science of jurisprudence, Ilm al-fiqh. The Arabic word fiqh is used to
denote the basis of law and as a means of understanding the reason or
cause of the speaker’s words. The content of fiqh, however, varies with
the distinct schools of thought. Strictly speaking, one can argue that
there are six schools of fiqh across the two major divisions of Islam:
the Sunni and Shiite sects (Bahnasi, 1983a). The four schools in the
Sunni sect include Hanafi, Shafi, Maliki, and Hanabli (Ammar, 2001).
In Shiite Islam the two main schools of interpretation are the Jafari and
the Ithnaashaar (Khoja, 1978). These schools vary in their interpreta-
tions in both process and content. The process by which knowledge is
derived from the sources also varies according to the schools of inter-
pretation. Some include pure questions of faith (Hanafi school), others
see the strict interpretation from divine sources as the only basis for in-
terpretation (Shafi), and yet others view the application of reason as es-
sential (Maliki; Khoja, 1978). Schacht (1982) claimed that in the 10th
century C.E. the doors of interpretation, ijtihad, closed for Sunni Mus-
lims. Melchert (1997), however, notes that this is not possible and that
the ijtihad gate cannot close as long as a Muslim jurisprudent delivers
opinion in a systematic and rational way.
In Shia Islam the issue of interpretation of the divine revelation
and the sources of the law are different.2 While Sunnis view the literary
and explicit meaning of the text, Shias (including Sufis) look at the in-
ternal and hidden symbolism. This difference for Shia Muslims lies in
the concept of “Imam’s judgment.” According to the Shiites, “The
Imam is not there by the suffrage of people, but by divine right. . . .
And He is the final interpreter of the Qur’an” (Khoja, 1978, pp. 54–
58). The Shia disagreements based on the right to succession are fur-
ther divided into many schools. For the Shia, the Prophet’s sayings are
a source of law. However, the Sunnis have developed a science, Ilm al-
hadith, to ascertain genuine from fabricated hadiths, whereas the Shia
accept only hadiths related by the imams who have descended from the
Prophet (Khoja, 1978).

US Islam and Pluralism

The issue to underscore is that neither Islam as a religion nor its

sources are monolithic. Today, with more than 1 billion Muslims living
in more than 85 countries who speak more than 200 dialects, dis-
cussing Islam as an ideology with a singular interpretation is impossi-
ble (Ammar, 2003). The interpretations of Islam have varied through-
32 Nawal H. Ammar

out the last 15 centuries, along with the diverse cultures within which
the religion is practiced. Such interpretations have been diametrically
opposed, and the variances have often caused serious dissension. To
this diversity of interpretation, one can add the growth of Islam in the
United States and Canada. Islam is a universal and growing religion in
North America. Today, it is estimated that Muslims constitute the
largest “minority religion” in the United States, comprising over 2.6
million adherents in 2010 (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life,
2011). This point is essential in the history of Islam, since as a religion
it has thrived more as a majority than as a minority religion. As such,
on the American continent, Islam is reexperiencing its earlier history of
being a minority religion. While such an experience is not new to Is-
lamic law, the context in which it is appearing in North America is dif-
ferent. Over the centuries Islam has become a minority religion in a
number of countries and not in the context of colonization. Sikand
(2002), speaking of Islam as a minority religion in India—a situation
closer to North America’s—asserts that classical Islamic law developed
in a context of Muslim political authority. Hence, the classical jurists
devoted little attention to the status of Muslim minorities, and none at
all to what was then only a hypothetical situation. In contemporary
India, in theory at least, Muslims are neither rulers nor the ruled, but
equal citizens along with people of other faiths.
While Muslims in the West, and in North America in general, are
in principle minorities of equal status within the larger society, in real-
ity various issues such as race, ethnicity, ethnocentrism, immigration,
and meaning of nation or community complicate this equal status.
Duderija emphasizes that as a direct result of moving from a “majority
religion/culture context into a minority one, new immigrants belonging
to minority religions undergo significant changes in the way their iden-
tity is constructed” (2007, p. 153). This change renders religion a locus
of identity construction. This new locus of identity, Cesari (2003)
notes, becomes a decisive element in the transformation of Muslim
practices and their relationship to Islam.
In addition, the case of Islam, in particular, as a minority religion
in the United States—unlike in Europe or Canada—encounters a his-
torically oppressed minority community: African Americans, whose
practice of Islam, the Nation of Islam, was infused with issues of
racism and liberation. Many scholars have described the Nation of
Islam community in depth (Allen, 1996; Austin, 2003; Evanzz, 1999;
Haley, 1964; Kusha, 2009). Nonetheless, I offer next a brief view that
frames the two main forms of Islam practiced in US prisons: normative
Islam and the Nation of Islam.
 Islamic Perspectives on Crime, Punishment, and Prison 33

Islamic Diversity in the United States

The existing community of Muslims in the United States includes a

number of religious divisions, including the Nation of Islam, the Five
Percenters, and the Moorish Science Temple of America. The more
dominant politically and demographically among those divisions has
been the Nation of Islam (NOI). The adherents of NOI were often re-
ferred to as Black Muslims, a name they do not encourage (Tinaz,
1996). The NOI was founded in 1930 by W. D. Fard (Wali Fard; Tinaz,
1996). According to Haley, Fard taught that “God’s true name was
Allah, that His true religion was Islam, that the true name for that reli-
gion’s people was Muslims” (1964, p. 211). Austin argues that “Islam
in the Nation of Islam was an idiosyncratic mixture of ideas from or-
thodox Islam, Christianity and other sources” (2003, p. 59). In 1934
Fard disappeared mysteriously, and Elijah Muhammad assumed leader-
ship of the group in Detroit and then moved the headquarters to
Chicago (Lomax, 1979). Austin (2003) reports that Muhammad en-
couraged members to read the Quran and to pray five times a day, and
in 1970 he instructed his followers to fast in the month of Ramadan ac-
cording to the Islamic calendar. He even made a pilgrimage to Mecca
in 1959. Austin (2003) notes further that upon his return from Mecca,
Muhammad renamed his then “temples” to “mosques.” In 1975 upon
Muhammad’s death, his son Wallace Muhammad became the new
leader (Tinaz, 1996). As the new leader, Wallace (later Warith Deen)
gradually initiated a process of reconstructing and aligning the organi-
zation with the international Islamic community, moving toward Sunni
Islamic practice, and eventually renamed the group the Society of Mus-
lims (Tinaz, 1996). In 1977, Minister Louis Farrakhan, a national
spokesman for the NOI, was dissatisfied with the way the group was
going and formed an independent organization by “reactivating and du-
plicating the old forms of the movement which reiterated the original
teachings and ideals of Elijah Muhammad” (Columbia Electronic En-
cyclopedia, 2009).
The theological premises and the historical context of the Nation
of Islam and normative Islam (both in its Sunni and Shia forms) as
practiced in the Middle East vary. Most Muslims view the contribu-
tion of the NOI in the struggle against racism in the United States as
monumental. More recently and after September 11, 2001, Muslims
experienced some of the same oppressions that African American
Muslims have endured for years (Talhami, 2008). Nonetheless, the
differences between those interpretations of Islam are irreconcilable
theologically.
34 Nawal H. Ammar

Normative Islam, like the other Abrahamic religions—Judaism and

Christianity—is built on a nonanthropomorphic view of God. God will
neither reproduce nor was born. The theology of creation is very simi-
lar to the other Abrahamic faiths, where Adam and Eve play a promi-
nent role in producing the human race regardless of color. The Quran is
clear about the creation of one human race:

O Humankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female,

and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that
ye may despise each other). Verily the most honored of you in the sight of
Allah is (he who is) the most righteous of you. (49:13)

According to the theology of the NOI, however, Wali Fard was be-
lieved to be “Allah in person” (Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia,
2009). Austin (2003) notes that in the NOI creation story, non-Euro-
pean whites were descendants of “the Original Man,” a race of Asiatic
good scientists known as the Tribe of Shabazz. The Tribe of Shabazz
founded the Holy City of Mecca in Arabia. On the other hand, Tinaz
(1996) explains that the NOI’s perception of the difference in origin
between the Asiatic tribe and the whites lies with the story of Yakub,
who was believed to be an evil scientist who created a race of whites
through genetic engineering. Consequently, the whites he created
turned out to be devils. According to the teachings, Allah has allowed
the race of white devils to rule the world for 6,000 years, a period
about to end with the destruction of the world in the “Battle of Ar-
mageddon,” after which a new world will be ruled by a nation of right-
eous blacks.
These differences make the two theologies not only distinct but
also at odds with the two core theological concepts of their conception
of human creation and God. Moreover, the histories of the genesis of
the two religions are different not only in the sense of time, place, and
sociopolitical context but also in terms of integration. According to
Austin (2003), Muslims from the Middle East (Arabs and Persians)
were often not allowed to enter NOI temples or mosques. The few who
did enter were connected to the leaders of NOI, including Muhammad
and Malcolm X. Tinaz (1996) summarizes the main difference between
the two theologies by noting that the NOI’s focus on Islam was second-
ary, used mostly to boost its doctrines and eschatology. NOI leaders
sought to combine black identity with the culture of Islam to form the
myth of black supremacy.
In US prisons, Middle Eastern Sunni Islam became the visible and
approved form of Islam beginning in the 1980s (McCloud and Al-
 Islamic Perspectives on Crime, Punishment, and Prison 35

Deen, 2008). In the next section, I examine normative Islam’s view of

crime and punishment, providing a comparative perspective between
the US legal system and normative Islam’s understanding of such is-
sues.

Normative Islam’s View of Crime and Punishment

Given the complexity of Islamic opinions on legal matters, space limi-

tations make it necessary to focus on one major source of jurispru-
dence; here I discuss the Sunni schools (Mathahib). My choice of the
Sunni opinions and jurisprudence is based on the fact that 80% of Mus-
lims in the world are Sunni, most Muslim US prisoners practice the
Sunni tradition, and it is the main theology approved for Muslims in
most state and federal prisons (Ammar, 2001).
Normative Islam, according to Houidi, is generally not “obsessed”
with crime and punishment (1994, p. 73), as evidenced by the fact that
only 30 Ayah (units of revelation) out of 6,236 address crime and pun-
ishment. Muslim jurists consider the function of the punishments
named in the Quran as “deterrence and suppression” (Al Alfi, 1979, p.
279). Punishment in this life, according to Islamic law, is penance, but
it does not guarantee forgiveness on the Day of Judgment. However,
the Islamic view of crime does not resort to punishment until it has ex-
hausted all possible means of crime prevention (Ammar, 2001). Islamic
jurisprudence, however, has systematized the field of crime and pun-
ishment within Islamic political systems, starting from the seventh cen-
tury until today. Islamic penology divides crime and punishment into
two classes: those mandated in the Quran (hudud and qisas) and those
left to the discretionary powers of the ruler or the ruler’s designee
(ta’zir; Bahnasi, 1983a). These categories indicate different bases of
infringed rights and obligations: God’s right (the individual’s obliga-
tion toward God’s creation for public and communal good) or an indi-
vidual right (the individual’s obligation to God’s creation for personal
enjoyment).

Hudud Crimes and Punishments

Hudud crimes are the most serious of crimes and their punishments are
the harshest, because the individual has violated God’s right (Haq
Allah), by injuring the harmony of the community that is God’s cre-
ation—a public right. These crimes and their punishments are pre-
36 Nawal H. Ammar

scribed in a general manner in the Quran (Bahnasi, 1983b). They in-

clude seven crimes: theft, adultery, slander, drinking alcohol, highway
robbery, rebellion, and apostasy (Ammar, 2002).
An offender can only be punished for hudud crimes under specific
conditions: the offender must have committed the act under no coer-
cion, have been an adult, have been in full possession of one’s mental
faculties, and must not have been ignorant of the law; also, evidence
must prove guilt without doubt (Ammar, 2002). The had (singular for
hudud) crime is difficult to prove and execute; for that reason, the
crime and punishment are often reclassified to the lesser level of qisas
or ta’zir (Ammar, 2001).
Jurists disagree regarding the type of mandated hudud punishments
since the Quran prescribed only general rules, leaving conditions and
applications to other sources, including the Prophet’s hadiths and
sharia (Ammar, 2002).

Qisas Crime and Punishment

Qisas is the second category of crime in Islamic criminal fiqh. These
crimes include all types of murder—voluntary and involuntary—and
crimes against persons, including assault, battery, mayhem, and other
bodily harm, that result in injury or death (Bassiouni, 1982). The types
of rights that are violated in qisas are subject to debate. Modern Is-
lamic jurists, however, agree that this category combines both public
and private rights in the case of intentional homicide. Qisas is public
because humans are God’s creation and private because the victim’s
family has lost a loved one. The Quranic verse states,

Oh ye who believe the law of equality are prescribed to you in cases of mur-
der: the free for the free, the slave for the slave, the woman for the woman.
But if any forgiveness is made by the brother of the slain, then grant any rea-
sonable demand and compensate him with handsome gratitude. This is con-
cession and mercy from God. (Al-Baqarah 178)

To guarantee the equitable application of punishment in qisas

crimes, the administration of justice should be in the hands of an “ap-
pointed guardian” (Wali al-Amr)—a mediator—who can be a judge or
local administrator and not left to the community, the victim, or the
victim’s family. Qisas crimes can only be adjudicated at the request or
initiation of the victim or the victim’s family (Bahnasi, 1984).
Jurists agree that there are thee kinds of homicide: willful murder,
quasi-intentional murder, and killing by mistake (Qaiyd, 1997; Shah,
 Islamic Perspectives on Crime, Punishment, and Prison 37

1999). Only willful murder is punished by qisas. According to Shah,

the other kinds of murder and their punishment are “quasi intentional
murder [which] is punishable by an aggravated amount of diyah [mon-
etary reparation]; and killing by mistake [which] is reparable with nor-
mal diyah” (1999, p. 160). For all the determined and fixed punish-
ments, high standards exist for evidentiary rules. When evidence is not
sufficient, the punishment is relegated to qadi (judge) justice and not
jury justice.
Death as punishment in Islamic law can apply to qisas crimes. The
rules that apply to punishment by death in qisas crimes have been sub-
ject to debate among the various schools of jurisprudence. Some argue
that retaliation by death is prescribed; others advocate for equal-harm
retaliation; and yet others negate the prescription of murder for crimes
other than adultery, apostasy, or highway robbery (Ammar, 2001; Bah-
nasi, 1988). Forgiveness is a recommended practice in qisas crimes,
particularly after reading verse 178 of Al-Baqarah: “But if forgiveness
is made by the brother of the slain, then grant any reasonable demand
and compensate him with handsome gratitude” (Houidi, 1982). Forgive-
ness in qisas crimes, notes Bahnasi (1988), does not abrogate the state’s
right to punish less punitively by either imprisonment or compensation.
Within the pre-Islamic context of retaliating against the murder of
one person by annihilating entire clans, the Quran stated the range of
possible punitive measures: “O ye who believe the law of equality are
prescribed to you in cases of murder: the free for the free, the slave for
the slave, the woman for the woman” (Al-Baqarah 178).
The Quran cautions against vengeful retaliation as a punishment
for the crime of murder:

We ordained therein for them life for life, eye for an eye, nose for nose, ear
for ear, tooth for tooth and wounds for equal. Anyone remits the retaliation
by way of charity; it is an act of atonement. (Al-Maidah 45)

Alternatives to the retributive death punishment exist in the case of

qisas crimes. These include giving a diyya (victim’s compensation) or
reconciliation. Either Wali al-Amr (the appointed guardian/arbitrator),
the victim, or the victim’s family can order the forgiveness and con-
sider the alternatives. Such cases have been documented by many soci-
ologists and anthropologists of the Middle East (Ammar 1954; Antoun
1972; Ammar 1988).
Diyya (compensation) in qisas crimes is procedurally complex.
Generally, diyya is due in cases of doubtful evidence, of involuntary
Another random document with
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richesse de la Bosnie, puisque, outre la consommation locale et la
préparation du slioovitz, la liqueur nationale des Slaves, des
quantités énormes de ces fruits sont expédiées à l’étranger, en
Allemagne, en Angleterre et jusqu’en Amérique. Quant à la France,
elle s’en tient sagement aux pruneaux de Tours et d’Agen. Les fruits
ne sont pas encore mûrs, mais d’honnêtes musulmans goûtent les
joies de la sieste, mollement étendus à l’ombre du feuillage. Les
Serbes, plus actifs, travaillent à la terre.
A Jancici, la dame blonde prend congé de ses compagnons. Le
galant employé du cadastre, que de nombreuses libations ont rendu
tout à fait élégiaque, essuie un pleur et jure que, grâce à la société
de sa voisine, ce voyage sera « le plus beau jour de sa vie ». Le
maréchal des logis et le vaguemestre barbu rient sous cape.
On s’arrête encore quelques minutes à Dervent, qui, pendant
quatre ans, est resté le point terminus de la ligne. Jusqu’en 1882, il
fallait prendre la poste ou se mettre en quête d’une voiture pour
gagner la capitale du pays. A présent, la petite locomotive, dont la
lanterne de l’avant vient d’être allumée, file directement sur
Sérajewo, au milieu d’un paysage qui ressemble par moments à
cette partie du Hochland bavarois que l’orient-express parcourt
avant d’arriver à Munich. Involontairement on tend l’oreille ; il semble
que l’angélus va saluer le coucher du soleil. Mais il n’y a pas de
clocher ni de cloches, à peine un minaret. Maintenant la ligne du
chemin de fer n’est plus régie par l’administration militaire ; dans les
gares, bâties tout à fait d’après le système des petites gares de
campagne en Autriche, les employés portent des vêtements civils ;
une casquette à liséré jaune et noir les fait reconnaître.
Avec une ponctualité toute militaire, le convoi, qui était parti de
Brod vers sept heures du matin, entre en gare à Sérajewo à huit
heures vingt minutes du soir. Il a parcouru deux cent cinquante
kilomètres. Le flying scotsman de Londres à Glasgow et le rapide de
Paris à Marseille vont plus vite, c’est certain, et peut-être pourrait-on
accélérer le mouvement des « moulins à café » ; mais, comme me le
disait plus tard le spirituel colonel Tomascheck, directeur de la ligne
dont il a dirigé la construction : « Pourquoi cette hâte fiévreuse ?
Qu’importe si l’on arrive à Sérajewo deux heures plus tôt ou deux
heures plus tard ? » Heureux pays, où l’on peut jouir de la vie sans
qu’il soit nécessaire de la brûler !
 CHAPITRE IV

Sérajewo pendant l’occupation autrichienne. — Tableaux de rues et de

marchés.

La gare de Sérajewo est reliée à la ville par un rail sur lequel

circule l’unique voiture de tramway et le fourgon de poste et de
bagages que l’on détache du convoi et que des chevaux traînent
jusqu’au centre de la cité. Trois bâtiments de construction récente se
présentent au nouvel arrivant : la manufacture de tabac avec ses
trois corps de logis qui abritent une population de six à sept cents
ouvriers, la direction des chemins de fer et enfin le palais du
gouvernement (Landesregierung), dont la construction, ainsi que la
position, rappellent le palais fédéral de Berne. Des fenêtres de cette
construction administrative, on aperçoit des glaciers qui ne sont pas
sans analogie avec ceux de la Jungfrau et des autres sommets de
l’Oberland bernois. Tous les rouages de la bureaucratie autrichienne
en Bosnie-Herzégovine sont concentrés dans ce palais, qui, outre
une centaine de bureaux plus ou moins spacieux, contient une
grande salle des fêtes aux proportions imposantes, qui, jusqu’à
présent, n’a pas été inaugurée. Quand je l’ai vue, elle n’était même
pas meublée, mais l’hiver prochain on y donnera des banquets, et le
gouverneur civil, M. de Nikolich, comptait y faire danser les fringants
officiers avec les séduisantes Viennoises et leurs sœurs magyares
importées en vertu de l’adage que la femme doit suivre son mari…,
même quand il est nommé fonctionnaire en Bosnie.
 La plus grande partie de Sérajewo est bâtie en amphithéâtre sur
les flancs de deux montagnes qui se font face : le Pasim Brdo et le
Trebovitch. Cette disposition avec ses jardins et son opulente
verdure, qui encadre les habitations, est très réjouissante à l’œil.
Sérajewo a gardé un cachet oriental très prononcé. C’était, à
l’arrivée des Autrichiens, en 1878, une ville exclusivement turque. Le
confort européen y faisait entièrement défaut, et les maisons, en
exceptant les consulats et cinq ou six habitations particulières,
n’avaient pour tout mobilier que les éternels divans des musulmans.
Les tables et les chaises y étaient inconnues ; les chrétiens eux-
mêmes s’étaient accoutumés pendant des siècles à la position de
tailleurs devant leur établi, si chère aux Orientaux. Le voyageur
européen égaré dans ces parages était obligé de se plier aux us et
coutumes du pays, et s’il n’avait la chance d’être recueilli
hospitalièrement par le consul de sa nationalité, il devait se
contenter de l’hospitalité rudimentaire et de la cuisine problématique
des hans ou auberges turques. Ce genre d’établissement n’a, il faut
bien le dire, rien d’engageant ; une nourriture atroce et des tapis
pleins de vermine, tel est en général le bilan de la « table et du
logement » qui y sont offerts.
Il n’en est plus de même depuis que l’occupation a conduit dans
le pays un triple contingent de consommateurs exigeants, mais
habitués aussi à solder ces exigences argent comptant : les officiers
de tout grade, les fonctionnaires et les négociants qui, pour soigner
leurs affaires nouvelles, font la navette entre Vienne, Pesth et la
Bosnie. Aujourd’hui, sans parler des auberges d’un rang inférieur qui
abritent surtout les ouvriers et les petits employés, deux hôtels très
confortables offrent aux voyageurs des chambres très propres, un
service satisfaisant et une table qui vaut celle de beaucoup de
restaurants viennois. Le Serbe qui a fait construire le plus grand de
ces deux hôtels, et qui l’exploite avec un plein succès financier, a
laissé carte blanche à son architecte viennois, lequel a élevé, au
milieu des maisonnettes et des masures de la vieille ville, un édifice
de la hauteur des maisons qu’on trouve sur le boulevard ou sur le
Ring, avec toute la recherche artistique que ses confrères ont mise à
la mode, même lorsqu’il ne s’agit que de constructions particulières.
L’effet de cette maison de grande ville européenne est des plus
étranges ici ; elle domine de toute la hauteur de ses quatre étages
les huttes de bois de l’Orient. La rue où se trouve l’Hôtel de l’Europe,
avec son café aux proportions quasi monumentales, est l’artère
principale de Sérajewo ; elle conduit du quartier commercial, ou
Tscharchia, jusqu’à la gare. Par une délicate attention pour le
nouveau suzerain des territoires occupés, la municipalité de
Sérajewo a appelé cette rue Franz-Josephstrasse. On y trouve aussi
quelques magasins installés par des négociants autrichiens ; mais le
nombre de ces boutiques n’est pas, il s’en faut de beaucoup, aussi
considérable qu’on pouvait s’y attendre dans un pays neuf qui a paru
à beaucoup de négociants israélites une sorte de Terre promise. Il y
a eu pendant un temps beaucoup d’appelés, mais il s’en faut que
tous fussent des élus. Quelques-uns ont trouvé la déconfiture et la
faillite devant l’indifférence des indigènes, qui évitaient
soigneusement les magasins des swabas (Allemands) et
continuaient à s’approvisionner dans les échoppes du bazar, où ils
marchandent pendant deux heures une aune de cotonnade ou une
paire de babouches, en discutant les affaires publiques et en humant
cette bouillie sucrée jusqu’à l’écœurement qu’on appelle « le café
turc ».
Le seul produit autrichien qui ait réellement obtenu l’approbation
et la clientèle des indigènes, c’est la bière. Mahomet, qui ne
connaissait apparemment pas les différents braü, n’a interdit que le
raisin fermenté. Aussi les Turcs les plus orthodoxes ne se font-ils
aucun scrupule de vider bocks et doubles bocks, alors qu’ils
écarteraient avec indignation un modeste verre de vin. De leur côté,
les officiers et employés autrichiens ne sauraient se passer de leur
Lager et de leur Pilsner. Résultat : huit brasseries, dont trois assez
considérables, ne suffisent pas à la consommation et font des
affaires d’or. Mais il n’est pas donné à tout le monde d’être brasseur.
La Franz-Josephstrasse offre des solutions de continuité et des
lacunes de constructions assez énigmatiques dans la rue la plus
fréquentée d’une localité. Cette anomalie s’explique lorsqu’on sait
qu’un incendie terrible qui éclata un an après l’occupation, le 15 août
1879, détruisit en moins d’une journée la moitié de Sérajewo, et que
presque toutes les maisons de la Franz-Josephstrasse furent
brûlées. Un garçon épicier fut, par sa négligence, l’auteur de cette
terrible catastrophe. Occupé à remplir une tonne d’esprit-de-vin, il
approcha la bougie de l’alcool. Le tonneau d’abord, l’épicerie
ensuite, prirent feu comme un paquet d’allumettes, et comme le vent
soufflait assez fort et que les secours faisaient défaut, les flammes
trouvèrent une facile proie. Plus de mille familles se trouvèrent
littéralement sur le pavé, n’ayant pour tous vêtements que ceux
qu’ils portaient. Des ruisseaux d’alcool enflammé couraient sur le
pavé, portant plus loin la dévastation. C’est aux efforts surhumains
de la garnison que l’autre moitié de la ville dut d’être préservée.
A la suite de cette catastrophe, l’autorité autrichienne arrêta que
les maisons détruites ne pourraient pas être reconstruites en bois et
que les plans de toute nouvelle construction devraient être soumis à
l’administration pour être examinés au point de vue de la sécurité et
de l’alignement des rues. Jusqu’à présent, plusieurs propriétaires
turcs n’ont voulu se décider ni à vendre leur terrain, ni à construire
en conformité des nouveaux règlements. Ils espèrent que
l’administration cédera, et leur permettra de réédifier des baraques
en bois qui flamberont comme des allumettes, à la première
occasion. L’autorité, bien entendu, ne songe pas le moins du monde
à céder, et en attendant que l’un de ces entêtements l’emporte sur
l’autre, les terrains restent vagues et sans emploi. Quant à
l’expropriation pour cause d’utilité publique, il ne saurait en être
question, l’autorité autrichienne évitant avec soin tout ce qui pourrait
froisser les idées, les coutumes et jusqu’aux préjugés de la
population ottomane.
La Tscharchia, le bazar de Sérajewo, se trouve à l’extrémité de la
Franz-Josephstrasse. On peut aussi gagner cette pittoresque
agglomération d’échoppes par un passage souterrain qui autrefois
servait de dépôt général des marchandises. Pour plus de trois
millions de francs de denrées de toute espèce y furent détruites en
1879.
 Maintenant on ne vend guère dans ce souterrain que des restes
d’étoffes, des marchandises achetées d’occasion, des tissus, des
cotonnades provenant des faillites des marchands autrichiens. Le
véritable marché oriental se trouve dans la Tscharchia.
Imaginez une douzaine de ruelles grimpant en pente raide et
rayonnant en éventail autour d’une petite place munie d’une
fontaine. De chaque côté, des échoppes en bois complètement
ouvertes, sans portes, sans fenêtres, sans vitrines, exhaussées de
deux marches au-dessus du sol et séparées les unes des autres par
de simples parois. Quand la nuit vient, une clôture d’une seule pièce
est placée devant l’ouverture de la boutique ; on la fixe au moyen de
traverses en bois, et voici une fermeture tout à fait hermétique.
C’est dans deux cent cinquante à trois cents échoppes de ce
genre que se concentre le commerce local de Sérajewo. Il faudrait la
palette de Descamp ou de l’infortuné Regnault pour fixer les
physionomies si diverses, si expressives, si mobiles, des marchands
ou des artisans assis les jambes croisées dans ces boutiques,
travaillant à petits coups le cuir, le fer, les peaux, ou discutant avec
les clients tout en suivant les spirales de fumée de leurs cigarettes.
La population bosniaque est particulièrement riche en types
originaux qui frappent par une individualité nettement accusée. Le
musulman bosniaque est le plus souvent d’une taille bien au-dessus
de la moyenne, vigoureusement musclé, et sa figure est rarement
insignifiante. Ajoutez que le costume, tout ce qu’il y a de plus vieux-
turc, avec turban, cafetan et larges culottes bouffantes, rehausse
encore le caractère des physionomies, et tenez compte de ce que ce
costume lui-même est parfois un assemblage curieux de pièces et
de lambeaux ne tenant que par miracle.
A certaines heures de l’après-midi, la foule grouille parmi les
rangées d’échoppes ; des marchands de pain de maïs et de fruits
prônent leur denrée sur le mode criard et en poussant des
exclamations qui déchirent les oreilles ; les femmes turques
apparaissent, la figure couverte d’un voile impénétrable et non d’une
gaze légère et presque indiscrète comme les dames de
Constantinople : les musulmanes orthodoxes de Sérajewo observent
minutieusement les ordres du Prophète, et c’est derrière un double
rempart de grosse toile qu’elles dissimulent des charmes que l’œil
d’aucun ghiaour ne saurait contempler. Sont-elles belles, et ces
précautions sont-elles justifiées par des attraits qui induiraient en
tentation les infidèles ? Il est amusant de se poser ce problème
quand on voit s’avancer une de ces créatures encaquée dans son
long manteau, qui souvent, hélas ! laisse voir des jupes trouées,
rapiécées, et de vieilles bottes éculées qui enlèvent à l’apparition
toute poésie.
Les maris, gens sages et posés, marchands de prunes et
propriétaires d’immeubles, — lisez de cabanes en bois — dont les
fonctionnaires autrichiens payent largement et exactement le loyer,
se promènent gravement, en majestueux rentiers, deux par deux,
trois par trois, s’arrêtant devant les échoppes de leurs
connaissances pour échanger quelques propos qui, la plupart du
temps, font éclore le sourire sur les lèvres, car le musulman
bosniaque n’est pas l’ennemi d’une douce gaieté. Si la conversation
se prolonge, ils entrent dans l’échoppe, se déchaussent et
continuent l’entretien, commodément installés, les jambes croisées
sur le tapis. Je m’imagine que si la propre épouse d’un de ces Turcs
venait tâter les étoffes, le mari aurait peine à la reconnaître, tant les
voiles sont épais et tant le costume et la démarche se ressemblent
chez toutes ces dames.
Et les affaires, comment vont-elles avec ces promeneurs si
occupés, ces clientes qui tâtent, qui palpent, mais qui n’achètent
pas, et ces causeries prolongées ? S’il plaît à Allah, les affaires iront
bien, la marchandise se vendra, les florins, les ducats et les
napoléons d’or (la monnaie préférée du Turc bosniaque)
s’empileront dans sa cachette. Sinon, eh bien ! ses objets, auxquels
il tient comme s’ils étaient destinés à son usage personnel, ne
passeront pas en d’autres mains. Comme les frais de bureau et les
frais généraux sont à peu près nuls, comme il a payé ses
marchandises comptant et n’a pas de traites en circulation, la faillite
ou la banqueroute ne le tourmentent pas. Si sa maison ne brûle pas,
il aura toujours de quoi se loger, et quant à la nourriture, on m’a
affirmé que des familles turques vivaient avec dix sous par jour. Il en
sera quitte pour porter son costume trois ou quatre ans de plus, et
madame se privera d’essence de roses.
Ces indolents négociants vendent surtout des chaussures
orientales, bottes de peau couleur safran, souples comme des
gants, et que les deux sexes chaussent indistinctement ; des sabots
en bois, des babouches et des pantoufles. Une des rues les plus
animées est celle des échoppes de bourreliers et de selliers.
Autrefois cette industrie était des plus prospères en Bosnie ; tout le
monde allait à cheval, et les transports s’effectuaient à dos de bêtes
de somme. Aujourd’hui, les chemins de fer portent un rude coup à
ces moyens de transport primitifs, et comme si ce n’était pas assez,
la concurrence, la hideuse concurrence a contribué à réduire les
bourreliers de Sérajewo à la portion congrue. Autrefois, leurs selles,
leurs brides, leurs harnais étaient renommés en Macédoine, en
Anatolie, chez les Bulgares ; on en faisait venir à Constantinople.
Maintenant, Stamboul pourvoit aux besoins de toute cette clientèle ;
aussi les boutiques de la rue des selliers ont-elles un aspect
mélancolique ; les belles pièces qu’on y admirait jadis sont rares, on
y trouve peu de marchandises toutes faites, le cuir pend en lanières
au plafond, en attendant qu’une commande ferme donne à l’artisan
l’occasion de montrer son habileté sans que l’objet confectionné lui
reste pour compte.
Il y a plus d’activité dans la rue où s’exercent les petites
industries locales, où l’on travaille « l’article de Sérajewo ». Ceci
n’est point une fantaisie. Depuis des siècles, les Bosniaques
excellent dans la confection de travaux de filigranes et dans les
incrustations sur métal ou sur bois. Les Orientaux et les Vénitiens
ont exercé sur eux une égale influence au point de vue artistique, et
cette combinaison a donné pendant longtemps d’excellents
résultats. On leur doit des travaux très curieux, devenus rares, et
dont les collectionneurs donneraient de hauts prix.
Malheureusement, le secret de beaucoup de ces dessins s’est
perdu : les ouvriers-artistes le gardaient avec un soin jaloux et le
transmettaient à leurs enfants. Quand une génération était éteinte ou
que les enfants abandonnaient le métier paternel, le modèle était
perdu. Le gouvernement autrichien fait de grands efforts pour
conserver et développer ces industries locales, que la tendance de
notre époque, la concurrence des fabriques, menacent d’une ruine
complète. M. de Kallay, à qui rien de ce qui touche à sa chère
Bosnie ne saurait être étranger, encourage de toutes les façons, par
des primes, par des commandes, les plus habiles ouvriers ; il a
prescrit la création d’un musée, que l’on vient d’installer au
Regierungsgebaüde de Sérajewo ; il a fait établir des modèles
d’après lesquels les ouvriers pourront travailler ; enfin il a chargé un
fonctionnaire du ministère d’étudier à Paris les moyens de donner à
l’industrie bosniaque — tout à fait spéciale, tout à fait orientale
jusqu’à présent — une tournure plus appropriée aux goûts et aux
modes de l’Occident. Pourquoi pas, après tout ? Les qualités de
finesse et d’élégance un peu particulière qui distinguent ces travaux
seront appréciées en Europe ; et qui sait si quelque jour la mode, qui
a donné leurs grandes et petites entrées dans nos salons, nos
boudoirs et nos cabinets de travail à tant d’objets chinois ou
japonais, ne demandera pas aux ouvriers-artistes de Sérajewo
d’incruster les manches de nos couteaux, les bois des éventails, ou
les poignées des ombrelles de nos élégantes ?
On m’a montré à l’ouvrage un de ces incrustateurs. L’escalier qui
conduit à son atelier est raide et assez étroit ; il faut y monter, ou
plutôt y grimper, avec une sage précaution. Tout en haut, nous nous
trouvons dans une pièce assez spacieuse, très propre et éclairée
par trois fenêtres. Le mobilier ne se compose que d’un grand divan
qui court tout autour de la chambre. Dans un coin, tout contre une
fenêtre, est installé l’établi, devant lequel est accroupi sur deux
coussins superposés un jeune Turc à la moustache blonde, à la
mine avenante, portant le costume national en belle étoffe et d’une
bonne coupe. Outre son creuset et ses instruments de travail, il a
posé sur son établi un verre de sirop à la rose étendu d’eau et un
pain de froment. Une belle montre en or suspendue à côté de l’établi
indique l’heure turque. Quand les deux aiguilles seront réunies sur le
chiffre XII, c’est-à-dire vers huit heures du soir d’après l’heure
européenne, il pourra mordre dans le pain et porter le verre à ses
lèvres ; en le faisant plus tôt, il commettrait un grave péché, car nous
sommes en plein ramazan. Depuis deux heures du matin, l’ouvrier-
artiste, pieux observateur des règles du Prophète, a dû s’abstenir de
boire, de manger, et, ce qui est plus dur peut-être, de fumer. Lorsque
l’heure sera venue, quand le canon du castel aura donné le signal
de la rupture du jeûne, notre ciseleur pourra non seulement faire
cesser le supplice de Tantale, que lui font subir le pain et le sirop
placés devant lui, mais il pourra festiner toute la nuit, jusqu’à ce que,
vers deux heures du matin, un nouveau coup de canon annonce aux
fidèles que le jeûne absolu a recommencé ! Et il en est ainsi pendant
trente jours. Au moment où le jeune artiste nous explique son
procédé de moulage, le coup de canon réglementaire fait trembler
les vitres. Alors le jeune homme jette alternativement sur nous et sur
sa frugale collation des regards suppliants. Il n’ose y toucher, par
crainte de donner au Roumi le spectacle de sa gloutonnerie. Et
pourtant il doit avoir l’estomac dans les talons, et le gosier à sec.
Nous comprenons la situation, et nous battons en retraite, non sans
lui avoir fait nos compliments sur une aiguière avec plateau qu’il
vient de terminer, et qui est un véritable objet d’art.
Là-bas, dans la Tscharchia, à l’ouïe du coup de canon, trois
cents bras se sont levés à la fois comme par un mouvement
automatique pour porter aux lèvres trois cents tasses de café ou
trois cents verres de sirop, et trois cents cigarettes se sont allumées.
Puis les marchands turcs ferment les devantures de leurs boutiques,
et courent à la maison, où les attend le premier repas. Ils prennent le
second, pendant le ramazan, à minuit et demi. Dans l’intervalle, on
se promène, on chante, on danse dans les jardins, on joue aux
dames et aux dominos dans les cafés ; les femmes vont en visite
d’un harem à l’autre, précédées de servantes qui portent de grosses
lanternes en forme de lampions gigantesques, avec des parois en
forte toile et des couvercles en cuivre curieusement travaillés.
Et il en est ainsi pendant trente jours.
 CHAPITRE V

Sérajewo (suite). — Détails historiques et administratifs.

Pour surprendre les Turcs en négligé, c’est-à-dire tout à fait dans

leur quartier, il faut, par un bel après-midi, — pourvu cependant que
le soleil ne brûle pas trop ardemment les atroces pavés, — monter à
la citadelle. Nous passons d’abord devant le café Bimbaschi, dont
l’aménagement est complètement turc à l’intérieur, mais dont la
terrasse donnant sur le joli torrent la Miljanka, avec ses tonnelles et
ses kiosques, a été arrangée d’après un modèle viennois. Des
musiciens musulmans arrachent à la guitare bosniaque (tamboura)
et à la guzla des sons lamentables et des gémissements aigus. Des
sous-officiers qui promènent leur payse, des employés avec leur
famille, des begs au port majestueux savourent le café, la bière ou
l’eau de roses, boisson au nom poétique et au goût délicieux. Un
peu plus haut, dans une maison assez confortable, entourée d’un
jardin très soigneusement entretenu dans le goût européen, avec
beaucoup de belles roses, est installée l’administration du Vacouf,
c’est-à-dire des biens ecclésiastiques.
Le vacouf est certainement, à l’heure qu’il est, le principal
propriétaire de la Bosnie. Les legs pieux, les dons, les fondations
grossissent chaque année ses revenus, qui atteignent près d’un
million de francs. C’est avec ces fonds qu’on entretient les
innombrables mosquées, — Sérajewo seul en compte cent pour
17,000 musulmans, — avec leur personnel d’hodjas, d’imams et de
muezzins ; que l’on secourt les couvents des derviches et que l’on
dote les hôpitaux. En outre, le vacouf veille à ce que les fontaines
sur les routes soient toujours en bon état ; il fournit des fonds aux
écoles et exécute, à l’occasion, des travaux publics importants.
L’origine de la prospérité du vacouf de Bosnie remonte à Shazi
Chousref Beg, troisième gouverneur du vilayet après la conquête par
les Turcs. Cet Osmanli fut, comme l’indique son titre Ghazi (le
victorieux), un grand batailleur, mais il fut aussi un grand
philanthrope. On lui doit la plus belle mosquée de Sérajewo, un chef-
d’œuvre d’ornementation orientale. Les belles mosaïques, si
finement travaillées (peut-être par des artistes vénitiens),
commençaient à s’effriter quand, sur la demande expresse de
l’administration autrichienne, la mosquée fut remise à neuf, et l’éclat
primitif rendu à cette ornementation. Il eût été dommage de laisser
perdre cet échantillon du goût d’il y a plus de trois siècles, car la
mosquée doit avoir été construite avant 1535, puisque, à cette date,
Chousref Beg succomba dans une bataille au Monténégro. Il est
enterré avec son esclave favori, dans un mausolée construit dans la
cour de la mosquée ; un drap noir recouvre le cercueil de pierre, et
différentes offrandes sont déposées à ses pieds, entre autres un
Coran magnifiquement calligraphié qui n’a pas coûté moins de cinq
cents ducats (six mille francs).
Chousref Beg n’a pas seulement fondé des mosquées, il a légué
des sommes considérables pour la création d’hôpitaux affectés aux
malades chrétiens et musulmans, et afin d’accentuer encore son
esprit de tolérance, il a abandonné aux juifs chassés d’Espagne le
ghetto qu’ils habitent encore aujourd’hui, et qu’ils habiteront jusqu’à
ce qu’on se décide à abattre ces misérables masures où de riches
spagnioles, ceux-là mêmes dont les femmes et les filles portent des
colliers de cinquante ducats, demeurent dans une atmosphère
saturée de miasmes qui ne rappelle en rien les parfums de l’Arabie.
Pour en revenir au vacouf, trois ou quatre fois par semaine, la
commission chargée de l’administration des biens se réunit dans la
jolie maison entourée du jardin si bien planté. On discute l’emploi
des fonds, les secours à donner, les travaux à entreprendre. Tous
les commissaires sont musulmans, cela va de soi ; mais depuis
l’occupation, le gouvernement s’est réservé le droit de nommer un
commissaire chargé d’assister aux séances et de surveiller l’emploi
strict et exact de ces revenus. Le commissaire actuel est un
gentleman très aimable qui s’entendra à merveille avec ses
collègues.
Après la maison du vacouf, la vue devient superbe. La vallée
s’ouvre largement, et tout au fond apparaît une ligne de montagnes
dont plusieurs sont couvertes de neiges éternelles. Là-bas, dans les
profondeurs des forêts qui garnissent les flancs des monts, les
chasseurs trouvent à l’automne leur paradis, non pas ceux-là qui
courent le lapin et la perdrix, mais les nemrods qui recherchent le
gros gibier et les belles émotions. Des isards que le pied le plus
agile peut poursuivre pendant des journées sans les atteindre, des
loups, des ours, tel est le menu de ces parties cynégétiques. On
trouvera dans plus d’un campement occupé par un officier autrichien
les trophées de ces chasses sous les espèces de chauds tapis ou
de descentes de lit.
En se retournant, ce sont des maisons très blanches, très
réjouissantes à l’œil, qui grimpent le long du Pasim Brdo avec force
mosquées et minarets. Justement les terrasses situées au faîte de
ces tours pointues s’animent, le muezzin vient passer l’inspection
des gros lampions et des verres de couleur qui, en l’honneur du
ramazan, seront allumés à la tombée de la nuit.
La citadelle est devant nous. La route fort large qui y conduit a
été établie, comme l’indique une inscription gravée dans le rocher,
par un bataillon de pionniers. Après avoir contourné la colline, elle
nous ramène en plein quartier turc. Si les femmes musulmanes se
sentent chez elles, les voiles des épouses sont moins épais et les
jeunes filles non mariées se promènent le visage à découvert. Elles
sont pour la plupart jolies, toutes fraîches et rieuses. Leur costume
est étrange et pittoresque ; elles portent une large jupe de couleur
voyante, la plupart du temps rayée, fendue au bas du mollet et
formant pantalon. Une chemise brodée et une sorte de fez ou une
mantille complètent cet accoutrement. Beaucoup courent les jambes
nues ; d’autres sont chaussées de sabots en bois attachés avec des
lanières de cuir. C’est qu’elles savent combien peu les chaussures
européennes résistent aux aspérités des infâmes galets qui forment
le pavage des villes turques.
Les enfants sont remarquablement bien venus et paraissent
admirablement soignés. La musulmane est une excellente mère,
pour ce qui est de l’éducation physique du moins, car pour le reste
elle est trop bornée d’esprit et trop futile pour leur donner de
l’instruction et cultiver l’intelligence de ces êtres, qui, jusqu’à l’âge de
douze ou quatorze ans, ne quittent guère le harem. Les ruelles sont
remplies de bambins et de gamins de trois à dix ans qui paraissent
s’amuser prodigieusement à toutes sortes de jeux. Les petites filles
ont un air particulièrement résolu et délibéré.
Rien de particulier à signaler à la citadelle. Elle se compose de
deux bastions, le jaune et le vert, d’où l’on pourrait, en cas
d’insurrection, foudroyer la ville. Une caserne toute neuve, dans le
style officiel autrichien, — un long bâtiment à deux étages,
badigeonné de jaune, à toiture très pointue, — a été construite à mi-
chemin des deux bastions pour abriter deux compagnies d’infanterie.
Troupe et officiers ont cherché à s’installer de leur mieux sur la
hauteur ; un cantinier bosniaque débite du raki et du café turc aux
soldats ; les officiers, en véritables austro-hongrois, ont établi un jeu
de quilles, et lorsque le service chôme, ils bombardent
impitoyablement le roi et ses huit satellites.
La citadelle est surplombée par le Trebovitch, plus haut que le
Brdo, auquel il fait vis-à-vis. C’est sur cette montagne qu’il faudrait
établir une ligne de fortifications pour défendre Sérajewo contre une
agression du dehors. Mais comme, sous ce rapport, l’administration
militaire ne paraît rien redouter, il n’est pas question de renforcer le
système de défense de la capitale. Si nous grimpons sur le
Trebovitch, la vue s’élargira encore, et nous pourrons suivre pendant
un assez grand nombre de kilomètres la belle route de Mostar, qui
est également l’œuvre du génie militaire autrichien. Avec une
lorgnette, nous distinguerons également les bains d’Illitz, où le
gouvernement fait construire en ce moment un nouvel établissement
balnéaire avec hôtel, et un peu plus loin nous remarquerons l’endroit
où la Bosna, le principal fleuve de la Bosnie, s’échappe en susurrant
de trois crevasses pour se répandre à travers la province.
 CHAPITRE VI

Organisation militaire de la Bosnie. — Les gouverneurs. — Le

feldzeugmeister Appel et son état-major.

Le commandement du 15e corps d’armée et le gouvernement

militaire de la Bosnie et de l’Herzégovine ont été exercés jusqu’à
présent par quatre généraux de l’empereur.
Le premier, le feldzeugmeister Philippovic, est cet homme de
guerre à la rude poigne de Croate qui fit la conquête du pays, et qui
ne se gêna nullement pour faire sentir aux insurgés vaincus la loi
rigoureuse du vainqueur. Lorsque le pays fut complètement pacifié,
l’empereur François-Joseph ne voulut plus appliquer à ses sujets le
régime sommaire : le Standrecht expéditif, qui formait la base du
système Philippovic. Le feldzeugmeister, couvert des marques de la
distinction impériale, rentra donc à Prague, où il exerçait toujours les
fonctions de commandant militaire de la Bohême. Il fut remplacé à
Sérajewo par un général moins fougueux, et dont l’humeur patiente
s’accordait mieux avec la mission humanitaire de l’Autriche. Le
prince de Wurtemberg, qui avait pris une part si considérable à la
conquête, installa au Konak de Bosna-Seraï l’heureux et habile
pacificateur de l’Herzégovine ; le lieutenant général Joanovic fut
adjoint au prince en qualité de suppléant. Joanovic, qu’une mort
prématurée a enlevé, au mois de décembre 1885, à l’affection de
l’armée entière, était, avec son beau-frère, le général Rodich,
gouverneur de Croatie, l’officier autrichien qui connaissait le mieux la
péninsule des Balkans ; grâce à une pratique de vingt-cinq ans, il
savait le mieux aussi de quelle façon il fallait traiter, gouverner et
administrer ces populations que les passions nationales et
religieuses mettaient en ébullition constante. A différentes reprises,
le commandant et plus tard colonel, Joanovic, avait pris part aux
missions de paix et de conciliation ayant pour but de rétablir le bon
accord parmi les populations chrétiennes et les Turcs. De 1865 à
1869, il avait rempli à Sérajewo les fonctions de consul général, et il
était entré en relations très suivies avec les notables du pays. Sa
façon d’être, simple et joviale, sa rondeur militaire, jointe à une
grande finesse, ses saillies caustiques, lui avaient valu une
popularité que renforçait encore sa renommée militaire, conquise sur
maints champs de bataille, et que venait de consacrer sa difficile
campagne de l’Herzégovine. On pouvait donc beaucoup espérer de
son expérience et de son prestige au milieu des populations
récemment soumises.
Par malheur le Slave Joanovic et l’Allemand Wurtemberg ne
purent s’entendre sur une foule de points ; et ne voulant pas être
responsable des mesures qu’il désapprouvait, le lieutenant général
préféra se retirer.
L’empereur, bon appréciateur de ses services, lui accorda une
compensation brillante : le gouvernement civil et militaire de la
Dalmatie, un poste politique de la plus haute importance, qui
permettait à son titulaire d’exercer son action sur les pays occupés,
voisins de la Dalmatie. Le prince de Wurtemberg, général modeste
et affable, administrateur de bonne volonté, ne garda pas longtemps
ses fonctions, et céda bientôt le gouvernement au feldzeugmeister
Dahlen, qui eut à réprimer l’insurrection de la Cricovice, aggravée
dès le début par la désertion des gendarmes indigènes, et qui eut
également à lutter contre des désordres administratifs auxquels mit
un terme l’avènement de M. de Kallay au ministère.
Le ministère de la guerre semble avoir pour principe de changer
assez fréquemment les gouverneurs généraux en Bosnie, peut-être
pour éviter les inconvénients qui sont inhérents à l’exercice prolongé
de charges aussi importantes, peut-être aussi pour donner à un plus
grand nombre de généraux l’occasion de se distinguer à ce poste et
de connaître les territoires occupés. En vertu de ce principe M. de
Dahlen fut rappelé, et c’est M. le feldzeugmeister baron d’Appel qui,
depuis trois ans, est à la tête du gouvernement.
Ce militaire, que j’ai eu l’occasion de présenter au lecteur en
entrant en Bosnie, est âgé de soixante ans environ, et il a pris part
depuis 1848 à toutes les grandes et petites guerres où le drapeau de
la monarchie autrichienne s’est trouvé engagé.
Il appartenait à la cavalerie, et c’est dans un régiment de lanciers
polonais qu’il fit les campagnes d’Italie contre Charles-Albert, et de
Hongrie contre Kossuth. Dix ans plus tard, dans la guerre de
l’indépendance italienne, le baron d’Appel servait sous les ordres du
général Benedeck. Il se distingua dans une rencontre avec un fort
détachement de cavalerie française, de façon à mériter la croix de
Marie-Thérèse, qui n’est accordée que pour des actions d’éclat tout
à fait particulières. C’est dans cet engagement qu’il reçut au-dessus
de l’œil droit un furieux coup de sabre dont il porte encore les traces
aujourd’hui, ce qui l’oblige à se garantir l’œil par la visière que j’avais
remarquée lorsque je vis le général à Brod. A partir de 1859, le
brillant officier de cavalerie, qui avait fait toutes ses preuves de
bravoure personnelle, voulut approfondir théoriquement l’art
militaire ; il se mit sérieusement à l’étude, et ne tarda pas à devenir
un des officiers les plus savants de l’armée. Ses nouvelles aptitudes
lui valurent un prompt avancement, et c’est aussi en raison de ses
connaissances qu’il fut choisi comme gouverneur des territoires
occupés. C’est qu’il faut là-bas des généraux qui sachent non
seulement sabrer, mais qui sachent organiser et administrer.
Le domicile officiel du général est le « Konak » des anciens valis
turcs, parmi lesquels il y avait de fortes têtes enturbannées, tels
qu’Omer Pacha, le « grand capitaine » (Serdar Ekrem) et Ali-Pacha,
qui devait trouver Sérajewo bien mesquin et bien petit à côté des
capitales où il avait représenté son maître le Sultan. Ce Konak a été
transformé à l’intérieur et garni de meubles européens à la place des
éternels divans. La porte d’entrée, devant laquelle se promènent
deux sentinelles, est flanquée de deux petites pièces de montagne,
de véritables bijoux astiqués et propres comme des sous neufs,
mais bien inoffensifs, puisque l’on a relevé les écouvillons.
Au premier étage, auquel conduit un bel escalier, sont installés
les bureaux de l’état-major ; on y travaille ferme, chaque officier qui
entre dans le « Stab » est envoyé pendant deux ans en Bosnie. Sous
la conduite d’un chef tel que M. le baron d’Appel, ces jeunes gens ne
manqueront pas de se former à bonne école.
Le second étage est réservé personnellement au commandant.
La pièce principale est le salon d’attente, qui, dans les occasions
extraordinaires, sert de salle à manger et de salon de réception. Une
grande baie vitrée donne vue sur le magnifique panorama de
Sérajewo avec ses maisons étagées les unes sur les autres et ses
innombrables minarets et les hauteurs que couronne le « Castel ».
De cet observatoire, rien de ce qui se passe dans la ville ne saurait
échapper à l’œil vigilant du maître et de ses officiers d’ordonnance,
dont l’un est installé à poste fixe dans cette pièce, chargé de
recevoir et au besoin de faire patienter les visiteurs, ce dont il
s’acquitte avec la plus parfaite courtoisie.
Je reconnais le fringant officier de hussards que j’avais vu à
Brod, dans le cortège du commandant général. Nous faisons plus
ample connaissance avec le capitaine de Vukelich, c’est le nom de
l’officier. Il me raconte certains détails typiques sur l’excursion de
l’archiduc Albert, qui a affronté non seulement la chaleur, la
poussière des routes, la fatigue, mais aussi les discours
interminables des moines franciscains, des popes grecs et de
certains maires de village, qui voulaient faire preuve d’éloquence.
L’archiduc écoutait jusqu’au bout sans sourciller, bien qu’il ne soit
pas grand amateur de harangues.
Bien souvent, dit mon interlocuteur, j’avais peine à me retenir et à
ne pas interrompre le fâcheux prolixe en lui disant : « Mais tais-toi
donc, animal ! » Que voulez-vous, on n’est pas hussard pour rien.
Tandis que nous causions, d’autres visiteurs, désireux de voir le
général, se réunirent également dans le salon d’attente. L’un des