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NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
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NON-INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
YORAM DINSTEIN
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Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108836180
DOI: 10.1017/9781108864091
© Yoram Dinstein 2014, 2021
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First published 2014
Second Edition 2021
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Dinstein, Yoram, author.
Title: Non-international armed conflicts in international law / Yoram Dinstein,
Tel-Aviv University.
Description: Second edition. | Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY : Cambridge
University Press, 2021. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2020037951 (print) | LCCN 2020037952 (ebook) | ISBN 9781108836180
(hardback) | ISBN 9781108799447 (paperback) | ISBN 9781108864091 (epub)
Subjects: LCSH: War (International law) | Intervention (International law) | War victims–Legal
status, laws, etc. | War crimes. | War.
Classification: LCC KZ6355 .D56 2021 (print) | LCC KZ6355 (ebook) | DDC 341.6–dc23
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vi
III. The Dichotomy of NIACs and IACs 26
IV. The Territorial Dimensions of NIACs 28
A. A NIAC as an Armed Conflict within the Territory of a
Single State 28
(a) The Internal Character of a NIAC 28
(b) Extraterritorial Spillover 30
(i) General Spin-off Effects 30
(ii) Cross-Border NIAC Hostilities in a
Neighbouring Country 30
(iii) NIAC Hostilities on the High Seas 31
(iv) Cyberspace 33
(c) The ‘War’ on Terrorism 33
(d) Divided Nations 34
V. A Clash between Organized Armed Groups inter se 35
A. Disappearance of the Government (a ‘Failing State’) 35
B. Governmental Weakness 36
C. Governmental Inaction 36
D. The Law Applicable 37
VI. Sufficient Organization 38
A. Insurgency Distinguished from Mob Violence 38
B. Insurgents as a Party to the Conflict 39
VII. Protracted Violence 41
A. The Temporal Element 41
B. How Much Time Is Required? 42
VIII. Intensity of the Fighting 43
A. Terrorist Activities 43
B. Intensity as an Independent Criterion 44
C. Indicia of Intensity 45
IX. The End of a NIAC 46
A. The Termination of Hostilities 46
B. A Peace Accord as a Requirement for the End of a NIAC 48
C. The Objectives and Standing of a Peace Accord 50
D. Post-Peace Accord Hurdles 51
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vii
(c) Other Organized Armed Groups under
Responsible Command 57
(i) A ‘Group’ 58
(ii) An ‘Armed’ Group 59
(iii) An ‘Organized’ Armed Group 59
(iv) The Five Factors of Organization 61
(d) Control over Territory 62
(e) Sustained and Concerted Military Operations 64
(f ) Capacity to Implement AP/II 65
D. Over the Third Threshold 65
II. Interaction between NIACs 67
A. Two or More NIACs within the Territory of the
Same State 68
B. Two or More NIACs within the Territories of
Adjacent States 68
III. Interaction between NIACs and IACs 71
A. Simultaneous Combinations of NIACs and IACs 71
B. Consecutive Combinations of NIACs and IACs 72
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viii
II. Military Intervention by a Foreign State in Support of the
Incumbent Government 98
A. The Requirement of Consent 98
(a) Consent as a Door-Opener to Foreign Intervention 98
(b) The Position of the Institut de Droit International 99
(c) The General Practice of States 101
(d) The Validity and Parameters of Consent 103
(e) Consent by Treaty 105
(f ) Revocation of Consent 106
(g) Constraints 107
B. ‘Failing States’ 108
III. Military Intervention by a Foreign State against the
Incumbent Government 109
A. Use of de facto Organs 109
B. Military Assistance to Insurgents 109
IV. Military Intervention by a Foreign State against Insurgents without the
Consent of the Incumbent Government 111
A. The Duty of Vigilance 111
B. ‘Extraterritorial Law Enforcement’ 112
V. The Hazards of Foreign Interventions 113
VI. The Applicable Law 115
A. LONIAC or IAC jus in bello? 115
B. Some Outstanding Problems 117
VII. Intervention in a NIAC by the Security Council 118
A. The UN Charter 118
B. The Case of Libya 121
C. The Range of the Security Council’s Intervention 122
D. UN Monitoring and Peacekeeping Forces 124
6 Recognition 127
I. Recognition of an Insurgent Government 127
A. Conditions for the Existence of a State and a Government 127
B. Recognition of a New Government 128
C. Issues Related to Recognition of Governments 130
(a) The Three Main Scenarios 130
(b) Formation of an Insurgent Government 131
(c) Only One Government Can Be Recognized at Any
Given Time 131
(d) Unlawful, Premature and Artificially
Prolonged Recognition 132
(e) De facto Recognition 133
(f ) Implied Recognition 134
(g) Recognition as a Step towards Intervention in a NIAC 135
(h) Democracy and Constitutionality 137
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ix
(i) Avoiding Recognition 138
(j) Government-in-Exile 139
D. Action by the Security Council 140
II. Recognition of a New State 141
III. ‘Recognition of Belligerency’ 142
A. ‘Recognition of Belligerency’ by the
Incumbent Government 142
B. ‘Recognition of Belligerency’ by Foreign States 144
C. Implied ‘Recognition of Belligerency’ 145
(a) Implied Recognition by the Incumbent Government
of Ruritania 146
(b) Implied Recognition by a Foreign State 148
IV. ‘Recognition of Insurgency’ 148
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x
VI. Foreign Intervention 168
A. Responsibility of the Foreign State for Acts of Its Organs 168
B. Complicity 169
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PREFACE
xv
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xvi
Much attention is devoted in this study to available treaty texts: what
they contain and what they do not; what they mean and what can
perhaps be read into them. Customary international law coincides with
many treaty provisions, but sometimes custom either goes beyond treaty
law or falls short of it.
The second edition takes into account the latest events (until early
2020) in terms of the practice of States, judicial pronouncements and
Security Council resolutions. Recent NIACs and new phenomena (such
as Da’esh and the struggle against it) have been explored. The entire text
has been reviewed and revised to reflect up-to-date developments. The
discussion of several themes (e.g., peace accords terminating hostilities or
the complicity of intervening States) has been substantially amplified.
The present book serves as a companion to three other volumes
published by Cambridge University Press, dealing respectively with the
jus ad bellum,* the jus in bello in international armed conflicts** and the
law of belligerent occupation.*** Largely speaking, between them, the
four volumes cover the general spectrum of the law of armed conflict in
its various aspects. To minimize repetition, matters considered in detail
in the companion volumes are not rehashed here.
There is one important omission: namely, the treatment of internees
(either in international or in non-international armed conflicts). The
reason is that the topic calls for a juxtaposition and analysis of inter-
national legal rules affecting diverse categories of civilian detainees – in
peacetime and in armed conflict; in inter-State as much as in intra-State
strife; and in occupied territories – plus the special status of prisoners of
war. Such a comparative survey has to be done methodically, and it is not
undertaken in the present book (just as it was not attempted in the
companion volumes).
The numerical cross-references in the text of the book (as distinct from
the indices) are to paragraphs and not to pages.
To facilitate syntax, generic pronouns relating to individuals are usu-
ally drawn in masculine form. This must not be viewed as gender-
specific.
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TABLE OF CASES
REFERENCES ARE TO PAGE NUMBERS
Delalić et al., Prosecutor v. (ICTY, Trial Chamber), 12, 16, 18, 74, 222, 234
Diakité v. Commissaire Général aux Réfugiés et aux Apatrides (CJEU), 315–16
xvii
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xviii
Đorđević, Prosecutor v. (ICTY, Trial Chamber), 78
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xix
Koi et al., Public Prosecutor v. (UK Privy Council), 143
Kordić et al., Prosecutor v. (ICTY, Appeals Chamber), 199
Krnojelac, Prosecutor v. (ICTY, Appeals Chamber), 273
(ICTY, Trial Chamber), 272
Kunarac et al., Prosecutor v. (ICTY, Appeals Chamber), 16, 48, 220, 269
(ICTY, Trial Chamber), 220, 222–3, 293–4, 298
Kupreškić et al., Prosecutor v. (ICTY Trial Chamber), 279
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xx
Petrolane, Inc. v. Iran (Iran–US Claims Tribunal), 154
Pinson (France) v. Mexico (Arbitration), 163
Prlić et al., Prosecutor v. (ICTY, Appeals Chamber), 246–7
Puerto Cabello and Valencia Company case (Arbitration), 165
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TABLE O F S ECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS
REFERENCES ARE TO PAGE NUMBERS
xxix
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xxx
Resolution 2499 (2019), 51
Resolution 2504 (2020), 119
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TABLE OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY
RESOLUTIONS
xxxi
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1
The Framework
I. Introduction
A. NIACs and IACs
1. Every armed conflict is either international or non-international in
character (see infra 71). Non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) –
often called internal armed conflicts or, in the past, civil wars – are an
older phenomenon than the modern nation-State. The Roman Republic
was subverted and ultimately destroyed by enervating civil strife. The late
Roman Empire was shaken to its foundations by near-constant bruising
fights between rivals who wished to assume the purple. The Islamic
Caliphate went through the turmoil of fitna; and in the long history of
the Chinese Empire regimes and dynasties often succumbed to aggressive
warlords. Throughout medieval and early modern Europe, internal con-
flicts between barons and kings, interspersed by many a jacquerie and
fronde, were commonplace. In a multitude of countries, the animosities
and fervour of such ruptures (exemplified by the War of the Roses in
England) brewed for long periods of time. In more recent times, NIACs
like the American Civil War (1861–5), the Russian Civil War (1917–22)
or the Spanish Civil War (1936–9) left scars of self-inflicted wounds not
healed for generations.
2. In the past several decades, NIACs have led to genocide and
appalling massacres. But even when less calamitous in their effects, they
have caused abundant losses of life and tangible damage to property. The
incessant ordeals of NIACs (meeting the preconditions set out in
Chapter 2) have occurred in scores of countries all over the globe.1
Some of these NIACs were (or are) exceptionally brutal; others were
1
The following list of NIACs occurring in the postcolonial period can be compiled in
alphabetical order: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bolivia, Bosnia/
Herzegovina, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African
Republic, Chad, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Congo-Brazzaville, Cyprus, Djibouti,
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(or are) less harsh. Some are ongoing; others are definitely over; and still
others are in danger of re-eruption. Then, there are places of unrest and
confrontation (not listed here) – like Venezuela – that have been
teetering on the brink of a NIAC.
3. Experience demonstrates that an incumbent Government – averse
to being tarnished with the stain of a revolt – is often prone to shy away
from an unwelcome truth, clinging to the fiction that internal violence is
sporadic and that no genuine rebellion against its writ is underfoot.
There are a host of examples of governmental reluctance to concede
the existence of a NIAC, even in the face of overwhelming evidence to the
contrary.2 The international community, too, may recoil at the thought
of recognizing what is actually happening. Thus, for a considerable time,
there was an indisposition to concede that a NIAC had begun in Syria in
2011.3
4. Despite the frequent ‘mischaracterization’ of NIACs for political and
other reasons,4 the outbreak of a NIAC has to be determined on the basis
of objective criteria rather than subjective predilections. In fact, official
refusal by an incumbent Government to acknowledge that a NIAC is
going on may be a counterproductive stance, inasmuch as the
Government may then be held to more stringent international legal
standards of behaviour in resorting to ordinary law enforcement meas-
ures (for an illustration, see infra 140).
5. NIACs are certainly much more pervasive today than international
armed conflicts (IACs). They are also liable to leave behind more carnage
and devastation. The Syrian NIAC – which has been going on for a whole
decade since 2011 – is a prime example: the fighting between the
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.
incumbent Government and numerous separate insurgent armed
groups5 (and recurrently among those groups clashing with each other)
has been carried out à outrance. The NIAC has left in its wake hundreds
of thousands of fatalities and countless wounded; it has brought about
utter destruction of cities, towns and villages; it has obliterated cultural
property; and it has driven away millions of refugees and displaced
persons. Fuel has been added to the disastrous conflagration by outsiders:
(i) Russia and Iran – both directly and indirectly (through surrogates,
like Hezbollah, and mercenaries) – have militarily intervened in
support of the Syrian Government, thereby saving it from collapse.
(ii) Turkey has militarily intervened in support of certain insurgents
against the Syrian Government, and other countries have supplied
various groups of insurrectionists with arms and supplies.
(iii) A large international coalition has militarily intervened against
Da’esh (on the Da’esh phenomenon, see infra 189 et seq.) without
seeking permission from the Syrian Government.
(iv) Tens of thousands of Moslem, non-Syrian, individuals – impelled by
religious fanaticism – joined the fighting against the Syrian
Government on behalf of Da’esh.
6. For sure, not every NIAC necessarily ends up in a catastrophe. But
the societal tissue may not mend for a long time following outbursts of
implacable hatred and enmity among inhabitants of the same national
space. Winning domestic peace subsequent to a sanguinary NIAC may
be a slow and arduous process. Indeed, a NIAC that is ostensibly over can
flare up again cyclically, perhaps in a reconfigured manner.
7. Although a NIAC is an intra-State – rather than an inter-State –
affair, traditional international law could not be entirely oblivious to its
external reverberations. In particular, NIACs had to be woven by the
international legal system into the fabric of the principle of non-
intervention (see Chapter 5), the concept of recognition (see
Chapter 6), and the norms of State responsibility (see Chapter 7).6 Yet,
for centuries, international law brushed aside the principal issue of
streamlining the conduct of hostilities in the course of a NIAC.
5
On the principal insurgent armed groups, see D. Wallace, A. McCarthy and S.R. Reeves,
‘Trying to Make Sense of the Senseless: Classifying the Syrian War under the Law of
Armed Conflict’, 25 Mich.SILR 555, 562–9 (2017).
6
See J.H.W. Verzijl, IX International Law in Historical Perspective 501–2 (1978).
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8. All this changed radically in 1949 upon the adoption of the four
Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims (see infra 21).
Since that date, the international regulation of the conduct of hostilities
in NIACs has undergone exponential growth, becoming a fulcrum of
contemporary interest. In large measure, the normative corpus apposite
to NIACs may be seen as an extrapolation of the more robust jus in bello
applicable in IACs (a body of law whose genesis had already occurred a
century earlier). But, as we shall see (infra 824 et seq.), the relationship
between the two legal regimes of IAC and NIAC law of armed conflict is
characterized not only by convergence: close attention must be paid to
the built-in divergence between them.
B. LONIAC
9. Throughout the present volume, usage will be made of the acronym
LONIAC standing for ‘law of non-international armed conflict’, which
must be understood as synonymous with the common expression IHL
(‘international humanitarian law’). The locution LONIAC is preferable
by virtue of its dispassionate connotations: it avoids a false impression
(implicit in the ‘humanitarian’ limb of IHL) that the rules governing
NIAC hostilities are de rigueur humanitarian in nature. It is an irrefut-
able fact that, even though humanitarianism is an overarching consider-
ation, many of these rules are engendered primarily by military necessity
to prevail in the fighting.
10. LONIAC is a branch of international law. The essence of LONIAC
is the imposition of restraints on both the incumbent Government and
those rising against it. All parties to the conflict must refrain from
employing certain means or methods of hostilities that are banned by
LONIAC. But the norms restricting freedom of action in the conduct
of hostilities do not imply that the international community questions
the fundamental right of the Government to suppress an insurrection
by force.7
11. Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions (AP/II) of
1977 – which is dedicated in its entirety to LONIAC (see infra 22) – sets
forth in Article 3(1):
Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked for the purpose of affecting the
sovereignty of a State or the responsibility of the government, by all
7
See Commentary, I Geneva Convention 61 (ICRC, J.S. Pictet ed., 1952).
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.
legitimate means, to maintain or re-establish law and order in the State or
to defend the national unity and territorial integrity of the State.8
12. The phrase ‘by all legitimate means’, appearing in both texts, must
be underscored. It connotes that, although the beleaguered Government
has a right and a responsibility to restore law and order, it is not allowed
to utilize means and methods that do not cohere with LONIAC.10 There
is a delicate balance here. LONIAC ordains restraints in the conduct of
hostilities without denying the existence of ‘imperative military reasons’
(see infra 557) or ‘necessities of the conflict’ (see infra 670). The incum-
bent Government is vested with a prerogative of vigorously putting law
and order back on track, but it can do so only on condition that it acts in
compliance with LONIAC.11
8
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (AP/II), 1977,
Laws of Armed Conflicts 459, 461–2.
9
Rome Statute of the ICC, 1998, Laws of Armed Conflicts 1314, 1321.
10
See A. Zimmermann and R. Geiss, ‘Article 8’, Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court: A Commentary 528, 579 (3rd ed., O. Triffterer and K. Ambos eds., 2016).
11
See M. Bothe, ‘War Crimes’, I The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court:
A Commentary 379, 424 (A. Cassese et al. eds., 2002).
12
Charter of the United Nations, 1945, 9 Int.Leg. 327, 332.
13
See Y. Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence 100–2, 110 (6th ed., 2017).
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State; or (ii) for the incumbent Government to use its extensive resources
in furtherance of the suppression of the revolt.14
14. The fact that international law is content with a ban on recourse to
inter-State force – unaccompanied by a cognate prohibition of resort to
intra-State force – may seem surprising, given the frequency, ferocity and
far-flung fallout of NIACs. But the indisputable, albeit grim, reality is that
international law distances itself from prohibitory injunctions against
NIACs. Some scholars would like to create ‘a new jus contra bellum
internum’, but they do not deny that this is proposed purely de lege
ferenda.15 Of course, the absence of an international lex lata banning
NIACs does not impede domestic legislation ensuring the preservation of
the State’s internal order. It is a deeply ingrained characteristic of all
domestic legal systems that an insurgency designed to topple the lawfully
established Government is a criminal offence, generally categorized as
high treason.16
15. The posture of international law vis-à-vis NIACs is twofold. While
the population of a State is not obliged to desist from an insurrection, the
flip side of the coin is that international law does not deny the entitle-
ment of the incumbent Government to stamp out an insurgency by
force.17 It has been suggested that international law should at least
require the parties to a NIAC to settle their dispute amicably (through
negotiation, mediation or arbitration),18 but even that does not seem to
be in the offing.
16. The absence of an international jus ad bellum internum has far-
reaching consequences affecting the whole vista of NIACs. Pre-
eminently, the concept of a right to self-defence as an exception to the
prohibition of the use of force – which plays a central role in IACs19 – has
no traction in the context of NIACs.
17. The Security Council’s powers under the UN Charter have been
exercised in a manner catching NIACs in the Council’s net. Thus, in
14
See A. Randelzhofer and O. Dörr, ‘Article 2(4)’, I The Charter of the United Nations:
A Commentary 200, 214 (3rd ed., B. Simma et al. eds., 2012).
15
See C. Kress, ‘Towards Further Developing the Law of Non-International Armed
Conflict: A Proposal for a Jus in Bello Interno and a New Jus contra Bellum Internum’,
893 IRRC 29, 39 (2014).
16
See E. Castrén, Civil War 18 (1966).
17
See A. Bellal and L. Doswald-Beck, ‘Evaluating the Use of Force during the Arab Spring’,
14 YIHL 3, 12 (2011).
18
See R. Wedgwood, ‘The Use of Force in Civil Disputes’, 26 Is.YHR 239, 248–9 (1996).
19
See Dinstein, supra note 13, at 197–327.
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The Project Gutenberg eBook of The vanguard of
Venus
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most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
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before using this eBook.
Illustrator: R. E. Lawlor
Language: English
Credits: Roger Frank and Sue Clark from images generously provided
by the Internet Archive.
Copyrighted 1928
EXPERIMENTER PUBLISHING CO., 230 Fifth Avenue, New York
The lights had now reached their maximum, giving the huge room the
effect of being flooded by intensely bright moonlight. Behind me, and on
all sides, stood scores of these creatures, similar in appearance to the
Field General on the throne. They stood motionless, regarding me stolidly
with their smoldering, beady eyes. . . . Finally Oomlag turned to me: “The
Field General wants to ask you a few questions,” he said, stepping to one
side.
The VANGUARD of VENUS
By LANDELL BARTLETT
(Extract from letter dated February 16, 1927, from Oliver Robertson, banker of
Calcutta, India, to J. B. Cardigan, President of Cardigan Press Service, Inc.)
(Stanley Murdock’s document, enclosed with the above letter, printed just as he
himself wrote it. Pursuant to Mr. Robertson’s instructions, and to prevent uneasiness
among the credulous, the public is warned that the story is undoubtedly fiction.)
IT came over me like a flash that I had not noticed that rock when we
made camp—in fact, being now fully wide awake, I recalled that there
was no large rock of any kind near our camp. I blinked my eyes and
pinched myself to see if I was really awake. Could I have been
mistaken about my first impression of our camp site, and have
overlooked an object as large as that rock? My work has always
called for keen observation, and it was absurd to think that if a fairly
sizable boulder had been in sight, especially all by itself as this one
was, I would have failed to note it. Yet there it was, gleaming dully in
the moonlight, apparently firmly imbedded in the ground. But it
couldn’t (I reasoned) have been there when we first arrived. Imagine
two geologists failing to see a rock of that size! How in the world could
it have gotten there? Was it placed there by someone during the night,
while we slept? And if so, why? But I had not noticed any footprints
around it. It was obvious that it could not have rolled from anywhere. It
had not been there four hours ago, it had not been carried, it had not
rolled . . .
In all my experiences in out-of-the-way, God-forsaken places, I have
never known fear. I have been shot at by Mexicans, held up by thugs,
even bitten by a rattlesnake—but nothing has ever made me afraid.
Not even intense shell fire on the Western Front, where I had served
the last month of the war as an infantry captain in the 8th Division,
ever made me aware of danger. I was cited once by the French
government for bravery, but I take no credit for that. It is simply my
make-up—I have no “nerves.” But now—this inexplicable rock
appearing from nowhere—the very obvious fear it instilled in the
horses—
My first impulse was to waken Olin and tell him of this startling
phenomenon. The remote possibility that I might be mistaken, and
had for some reason failed to notice this rock, due to my absorption in
my note making, deterred me. How Olin would laugh at me if I roused
him because of some foolish fancy about an innocent boulder that had
been there all the time. He would never get done guying the life out of
me. But I was positive that it had not been there when we made camp.
I was debating whether to investigate the rock and prove once for
all there was no cause for alarm, or arouse Olin and get his opinion,
when the rock was suddenly thrown back and I could see that it was
only a hollow camouflage over a hole in the ground. Before I could cry
out, I was seized from behind and strong hands had placed a gag in
my mouth and a bandage over my eyes. I attempted to struggle, but
my efforts were useless. It was as though my arms and legs were held
in a powerful vise. Something sweetish that may have been
chloroform was held over my nose, and before I lost consciousness I
heard the squeal of a horse and the pounding of his hoofs as he broke
from his tether and ran. There was no sound of any kind from my
captors. I was dimly aware of being carried in powerful arms and laid
upon some smooth surface that seemed to sink beneath me as
darkness pressed upon me and I knew no more.
HOW they could have made the place look like ordinary flat ground,
with no footprints or other signs of disturbance anywhere, puzzled me
greatly. Several of them had come out and had seized me from
behind, but how had they covered their tracks, and where had they
hidden that I did not see them as I gazed around? They must have
come from some distance off, and been lightning quick to get me as
they did. And having captured me so neatly and noiselessly, why was
I now left alone with my thoughts, free to blunder around and break
my neck in the darkness? They evidently thought to cow me, so that I
would prove tractable, using the terror that comes from darkness and
solitude as their trump card. I resolved that, come what might, I would
never let them believe that I felt the slightest fear. And I further
resolved that once I was free, I would leave no stone unturned to seek
out this rendezvous and capture the whole gang, if it took half the
United States army. Why I have not done this will be made evident as
I continue.
Just as I had thoroughly determined to make bravery my one
inflexible gesture, no matter what they did to me, I became aware of a
presence approaching. It was only the faintest sort of rustling sound,
as though someone in a flapping kimono and sandals were walking
toward me. That someone, or something, was coming toward me in
absolute darkness, apparently moving at a steady pace in spite of that
fact, made my bravery dissolve into thin air. After all, what is fear? We
can steel ourselves to meet known dangers philosophically, or even
unknown ones if they are not totally unexpected; but when we are
suddenly confronted with the unknown, with all its potentialities of
horror aggravated by the awful cloak of inky darkness, or any equally
terrifying circumstance, we become as frightened children. It is only
natural. As the rustling sound grew louder, I involuntarily uttered a
stifled, sobbing moan, and sought to crawl away in the opposite
direction. I found that I could not move. I was paralyzed with a blind,
unreasoning, sickening fear. I felt faint with nausea, and my teeth
clicked together, as though I were perishing with cold. I have said
before that I have no “nerves” and that ordinary perils have never
ovecome me; but this was no ordinary situation, and what I had
already been through paved the way to this climax of complete terror. I
felt that death, sudden and painless, would be the most welcome thing
that could happen.
Whatever it was, stopped near me and I could hear it breathing
faintly. I tried desperately to control the clacking of my teeth and the
trembling of my limbs. I cursed myself for having called Olin, for the
noise, no doubt, had attracted the creature’s attention. As I could see
nothing, not even the faintest indication of glowing eyes, my terror-
stricken mind finally grasped the fact that no beast was near me; it
was probably only one of my captors. Yet, how had he found his way
to me, and where had he come from. My terror died away as quickly
as it had come, leaving me still trembling and faint, but with my mind
alert for what might follow, no matter how strange.
“YOU tell me,” I said, as casually as possible, “that your visitors are
allowed to see your work, but that before that event you prepare them
by a little explanatory lecture here in the dark to better withstand the
‘shock.’ Would it be presumptuous of me to ask why it should be a
shock to see you and your work?”
“Not at all,” came the voice of Oomlag. “But before I do that, you
should be enlightened further as to why you are here. In a way, you
are our slave, in the sense at least, that you will be compelled by us to
spend the next few years underground. However, if you cooperate
with us as I believe you will, you will be well treated and allowed to
roam around as you please. If, after things have been fully explained
to you, you do not prove agreeable and refuse to help, I can only say
that you will very soon change your mind.
“Now, if you will be kind enough not to interrupt me, I shall give you
a little discourse that you will probably not believe. No matter. You
have all, being earth creatures, been most skeptical about what is, to
your way of thinking, impossible. But at least try to follow me, and
when you do see us at work, you will be less apt to think it is all a
dream or that you have lost your reason.
“As I said before, we are from the planet you call Venus. For many
hundreds of years past we have been in a high state of civilization,
one as far superior to yours as yours is to that of the crudest cave-
man. We have developed certain scientific instruments and
discovered forces that enable us to do things scarcely dreamed of by
your scientists. Some of these things you will be shown in due time. It
is well that we have made the wonderful advance that we have, for it
has given us the secret of interplanetary flight, and in time to relieve
the pressure of our population. Fortunately, your earth is only a little
larger than ours, some 10%, and though almost half again as far away
from the sun, your atmosphere is even better suited to us than our
own. It is cooler and more stimulating. We were energetic enough as it
was, but here on your earth we are paragons of energy. After we have
conquered you and eventually exterminated you, as all your own
superior tribes have done to your own inferior ones, we shall be the
absolute masters of the two planets. With what we already know, plus
things we shall find out as we begin to expand, I know that our
population problem will not bother us again for untold centuries.
“After we have consolidated our position here, we intend to make an
expedition to the ruddy planet you call Mars. We do not intend to
settle, as conditions are not at all favorable for prolonged life there for
us; but we do intend to see that the Martian civilization is broken and
we ourselves secure from their menace. Though we cannot live
comfortably on their planet, they can on yours, so it is wise to crush
them as soon as possible, as they have a rather advanced civilization
and might outdo us later. As for the larger planets known to you, such
as Saturn, Neptune, and Uranus, and our smaller neighbor, Mercury,
they may be disregarded, some being populated by crude insect-like
creatures and others having only a low form of vegetation. Besides,
their mass alone would prohibit our survival, even as it would yours.
Though I weigh several pounds more here on your Earth than I would
on Venus, its only effect is to give a corresponding feeling of well-
being. Those who have come here direct, as my parents, say it is like
a man under weight getting his full quota of flesh; he feels stronger,
and he is stronger.”
THE creature paused, and I could hear his garments rustling. In spite
of the fact that I still thought I was dealing with a lunatic, I felt but little
fear. Though the strange throaty quality of his voice gave the words an
accent rather difficult to understand at times, his choice of English was
excellent and stamped him as a man with a splendid education.
Perhaps he was some professor of astronomy who had become
insane from overstudy, and was living his life underground, clever
enough to wrest a living by going at times to the outside world and
obtaining food somehow. Long familiarity with his habitat undoubtedly
explained his uncanny ability to get around in the dark, and sense my
position. And his rock camouflage—that was wonderfully clever. Yes, I
would rather deal with an intelligent man obsessed on one subject
than with a rambling, mumbling idiot. Could there be any truth about
others working with him? Hardly. Later he would probably point out an
imaginary series of tunnels and what not, firmly believing everything
was there. If I was diplomatic enough I might get him to show me the
entrance through which he had brought me, and then make a break
for freedom. . . .
My face must have betrayed my growing interest and lack of fear,
for Oomlag’s next remark indicated as much.
“What do you say now, Stan-lee?” he asked me, his garments still
rustling like strips of dry, hard leather rubbing against each other.
“Have I told you enough to make you realize how very much you are
in my power, and to make you wish to see the things I have
mentioned; or do you wish to ask questions about things I have
overlooked? Our Field General has communicated with me, wanting
to know if you are sufficiently enlightened. If you care to proceed now,
I shall give the signal and we may advance; but if you are still afraid
for your safety, further parley is your privilege.”
My mind was made up. Under the circumstances, there was only
one thing I could do—go with the fellow, and find out once for all
whether he was a lunatic or not. I could only hope I would not be
hurled into some pit in the darkness.