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Issues in Science and Religion: Publications of the European
Society for the Study of Science and Theology
Michael Fuller
Dirk Evers
Anne Runehov Editors
Issues in Science
and Theology:
Creative
Pluralism?
Images and Models in Science and
Religion
Issues in Science and Religion: Publications of
the European Society for the Study of Science
and Theology
Volume 6
Series Editor
Michael Fuller, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
Editorial Board Members

Lotta Knutsson Brakenhielm, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden
Grzegorz Bugajak, Institute of Philosophy, Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University,
Warsaw, Poland
Dirk Evers, Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg, Halle/Saale, Germany
Mark Harris, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
Antje Jackelén, Church of Sweden, Uppsala, Sweden
Roland Karo, University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia
Javier Leach, Facultad de Informática, Departamento de Sistemas Informáticos y
Computación, Universidad Complutense Madrid, Madrid, Spain
Hubert Meisinger, Evangelische Kirche in Hessen und Nassau, Zentrum
Gesellschaftliche Verantwortung, Mainz, Rheinland-Pfalz, Germany
Lluis Oviedo, Teologia, Antonianum University, Roma, Italy
Fabien Revol, Catholic University of Lyon, Lyon, France
Knut-Willy Sæther, Religious Studies, Volda University College, Volda, Norway
Tom Uytterhoeven, KU Leuven, Onze-Lieve-Vrouw-Waver, Belgium
This series comprises biennial volumes produced by the European Society for the
Study of Science and Theology. Each volume will contain approximately 12-15
papers, which are edited by an expert panel. Each volume offers a ‘state of play’
perspective regarding the area of dialogue between science and religion being
considered, looking both at the current situation and at likely further developments
within that area. They aim to lay the fruits of current research in specific areas
before the wider science-and-religion community, and the general public.
Michael Fuller • Dirk Evers • Anne Runehov
Editors
Issues in Science and

Theology: Creative
Pluralism?
Images and Models in Science and Religion
Editors
Michael Fuller Dirk Evers
New College Universität Halle-Wittenberg
University of Edinburgh Halle (Saale), Sachsen-Anhalt, Germany
Edinburgh, UK
Anne Runehov
Uppsala University
Trelleborg, Sweden
ISSN 2364-5717 ISSN 2364-5725 (electronic)

Issues in Science and Religion: Publications of the European Society for the Study of Science
and Theology
ISBN 978-3-031-06276-6 ISBN 978-3-031-06277-3 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06277-3
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Preface
From 23 to 26 June 2021, ESSSAT, the European Society for the Study of Science
and Theology, arranged the Eighteenth European Conference on Science and
Theology (ECST XVIII) in Madrid, Spain, in collaboration with Comillas Pontifical
University. It was a conference under special conditions. The conference had been
planned for 2020 but had to be postponed due to the Corona situation, which
emerged in Spring that year. Finally, we chose June 2021 to catch up on the confer-
ence and were lucky to hit a time where travelling became possible again, at least
for some countries. With great effort and amazing energy, our local organisers at
Comillas set up a remarkable conference at a venue a little outside Madrid and made
it possible to participate in the conference online as well. In the end, there were
about 30 participants at the spot with many more joining the conference online.
Three of the five main speakers could also be with us, while two gave their lectures
online. At the venue, 15 short papers were presented in person, and nearly 30 short
papers were discussed in online sessions.
For many, the Madrid conference was the first academic conference to take part
in since the outbreak of the pandemic, and one could sense the joy and enthusiasm
throughout the conference, for which the beautiful weather, the wonderful city of
Madrid and the hospitality of the wonderful people from Centro Santa María de Los
Negrales, our venue, also contributed their share. Thus, ESSSAT was able to con-
tinue the study of the interactions of science, religious studies and theology with
this special conference that was under the theme Creative pluralism? Images and
models in science and religion. It had been a consensus in the science and religion
dialogue that convergences between science and religion are possible and, indeed,
necessary, because both disciplines refer to the same reality and try to interpret and
understand it. However, in recent years, not only the differences between religious
hermeneutics and scientific method have been stressed but also the inherent plural-
ity within both fields of academic study. And in epistemology it has become clear
how important perspectives, models and paradigms are, again for both science and
theology. Scientific theory, for example, develops mathematical models or visual
representations of phenomena, like brain scans, while theologians are aware of the
fact that for religion symbols are indispensable in pointing to the divine. It is widely
v
vi Preface
accepted that all human understanding is shaped and guided by models and images,
by intuitive approaches and cultural categories. And scientific as well as religious
communities provide such categories – for better or worse. Is there plurality in sci-
ence? How important, how inspiring and how limited are scientific models? Is plu-
rality of and in religions an indication of their problematic, arbitrary approach
towards reality? When do models and images serve as useful tools, and when do
they turn into limiting stereotypes and narrow prejudices – in science, in religion
and in the dialogue between both fields? These and related questions were discussed
during the inspiring days we had in Madrid. The five plenary lectures of the confer-
ence covered a broad spectrum of disciplines and approaches and are printed in this
volume in revised and edited versions. In addition, the editors chose a selection of
short papers presented at the conference and thus composed this volume of Issues in
Science and Religion (ISR).
As ESSSAT’s president, it is my pleasure and duty to take the opportunity of the
publication of this issue to thank organisers and sponsors of the conference. ESSSAT
expresses its deep gratitude to the local organisers Sara Lumbreras Sancho (ESSSAT
Vice President for the conference), Jaime Tatay Nieto (Comillas University) and
José Manuel Caamaño López (Theological Faculty) and their team from Cátedra
Francisco José Ayala de Ciencia, Tecnología y Religion (CTR) at Comillas
University. Special thanks go to Raquel López Garrido for her work as Secretary of
the Chair and registration officer before and during the conference. We thank
Comillas university for its support, both financially and logistically. Other members
of the Organising Committee were Ingrid Malm Lindberg (ESSSAT Secretary),
Sarah Lane Ritchie (Scientific Programme Officer) and Roland Karo (ESSSAT trea-
surer). Finally, we thank the staff from Springer for their cooperation on this volume
and our book series.
Halle (Saale), Sachsen-Anhalt, Germany Dirk Evers

March 2022
Introduction
How are we to understand images and models used in science and religion/theol-
ogy? What dialogues are feasible between these fields regarding these topics? Are
they totally divergent, in the sense that they describe entirely different realities, or
can they connect – and, if so, where, and how? Within the sciences, models are
mediators between hypotheses and the ‘real world’, or part of it. But what could the
real world mean within religion/theology? Could models be autonomous or semi-
autonomous agents that function as instruments of investigation into the domains of
religion/theology, the sciences and the ‘real world’? There is a considerable plural-
ism of disciplines within the sciences and likewise within theologies and religions.
The question addressed by the authors in this book is whether there could be a cre-
ative pluralism – in the sense that images and models used in different fields and
their pluralistic disciplines have potential for mutual beneficial interaction. For
example, in biology, whether experimental or historical-descriptive, models are
often used in senses that differ from those of physics. Furthermore, what kind of
models are used – explanatory or exploratory models? Living in the Covid 19 era,
both kinds of modelling are needed and used. At the explanatory level, the models
serve to synthesise and demonstrate what is already known, while the exploratory
model leads (or may lead) to further knowledge and insights. In other words, explor-
atory models are more open to the creative imagination compared to explanatory
ones. Imagination implies ‘seeing images’ and using them as a means for further
investigation: it is used in all academic disciplines. Creativity is the key requirement
for imagination and modelling. The authors in this volume, coming from a diversity
of disciplines, are therefore reflecting on academic creative pluralism.
This book is divided into three parts, looking first at some philosophical and
methodological considerations, then at some scientific perspectives, and finally at
some religious/theological perspectives. Of course, there are contributions which
cross these boundaries. This bears witness to the thoroughgoing interdisciplinarity
which surely must characterise discussions of pluralism and the use of images and
models within the academic fields of science and religion.
vii
viii Introduction
Philosophical and Methodological Perspectives
We begin with an exploration and comparison of pluralism in science and religion/

theology. According to Lluis Oviedo, the general assumption is that theology is
necessarily pluralistic while pluralism in science is provisional and limited: it is a
temporary state, waiting for better results to reveal a more accurate result. However,
Oviedo asks if this is indeed the case. Analysing the subject of pluralism in science,
he argues that science is not free from pluralism, especially when complex phenom-
ena are studied, such as life, the human person, or society and religion. He high-
lights two fundamental causes for pluralism in science. One cause is subjective,
meaning that scientific activity cannot avoid the cognitive conditions of the human
mind, mental styles and biases. The other cause is objective, referring to the com-
plexity of the realities science tries to describe. Oviedo argues that only multiple
accounts can render an accurate account of what is observed. He sees two common
grounds in the pluralism of science and theology: first, the complexity of both natu-
ral phenomena and the divine, and second, the role played by belief.
Language is, of course, a vital means of our communicating and teaching ideas
in both science and religion/theology, and metaphors and images have a crucial role
to play in this. Andrew Pinsent addresses the importance of these linguistic devices
as means of our understanding the world, noting that ‘a plurality of metaphors is
often needed for the kinds of objects of special study in both science and theology’,
and observing the particular importance of metaphor in revealed theology. He also
notes the ways in which, historically, theologians have borrowed from the science
of their day in developing metaphors through which to explore the divine.
But such considerations are by no means unique to explorations within the
Christian tradition. Writing from an Islamic perspective, Rana Dajani emphasises
the importance of religion for studying nature’s complexity. Indeed, she argues,
while science is about discovery, religion guides science by providing both a frame-
work for exploring nature and guidelines for how to deal with scientific discoveries.
Hence, religion is not concerned with questioning the sciences, but neither is it
about trying to make scientific discovery compatible with religious texts. Dajani
maintains that science and religion are not only compatible but also complementary.
She notes the challenges offered by cultural evolution, consciousness, and epi-
genetics, and the obstacles to science in grasping the richness of nature. Another
obstacle is the use of different concepts by the different disciplines to denote the
same phenomenon. She argues that while Islam is about searching for the truth by
way of the scriptures, carefulness regarding different interpretations is needed. Her
conclusion is that there is a need to raise awareness within education and within
multidisciplinary committees, and for further (interdisciplinary) research to pro-
ceed ‘with an open mind led by the ethical frameworks of theology, with respect
and trust’.
Silke Gülker investigates further the use of images in science and religion.
According to her, images function as a bridge between the available and the unavail-
able. Instead of contrasting science and religion, she focuses on the boundary
Introduction ix
between them. Gülker analyses the social construction of boundaries between avail-
ability, which is associated with science, and unavailability, associated with reli-
gion. To do so, she leans on Shütz and Luckmann’s phenomenological understanding
of transcendence, emphasising that experiences simultaneously refer to something
that is indicated by, but not present in, this experience. Gülker suggests that this
ambivalence is what the boundary is all about. The problem is, where to put the
boundary on the scale of what is available and what is unavailable. To answer the
question, she explores the function of images in the social construction of boundar-
ies between the available and the unavailable by looking at images used in stem cell
research.
Lisa Stenmark argues that the essence of the science and religion discourse
(SRD) is to explore the differences between the disciplines that lead to creative
insights about who we are and about the world we live in. For her, creative pluralism
is about the epistemic differences between religion and science, and this implies a
need for a better understanding of epistemic pluralism in order to find fresh
approaches to epistemic difference. After a brief presentation of some decolonial
critiques of Western epistemology, she proposes two alternative approaches. The
first is to realise that epistemology shapes ontology and not the other way around.
The second approach is Hannah Arendt’s method of ‘storytelling’. The aim of these
approaches is to show the importance of a multiplicity of worlds (pluriverse), rec-
ognising difference without privileging one world over another. Stenmark argues
that the SRD should be in the frontline of decoloniality; however, this implies a
critical analysis of the ways in which colonialism is still present in SRD’s structures
and ideologies. That in turn implies recognising the ways in which we still arbi-
trarily recognise the cultural neutrality of science, putting it over and above other
disciplines that have no such claims or recognition.
In the last chapter in this part, Emily Qureshi-Hurst explores the extent to which
science and religion should interact concerning models and theory formation. She
stresses the importance of reaching a ‘Maturation Point’ for a fruitful interaction
between these two academic fields of research to take place. This is because there
are three problems which must be overcome. First, science and theology use differ-
ent methodologies to construct their models. Second, these models are subject to
analyses using different assessment criteria in science and theology. Third, if an
interaction takes place too early, it can disrupt the integrity of the model and hence
does not lead to deeper insight. Qureshi-Hurst concludes that the academic fields of
science and theology should develop their models until they are robust and reliable:
then, and only then, can interaction between science and theology be encouraged.
Scientific Perspectives
In the second part of our book, scientific perspectives are to the fore. Eduardo
Gutiérrez Gonzáles explores Einstein’s views on the scientific imagination. After
briefly presenting Einstein’s vision of reality, as well as his ideas on transcendence,
x Introduction
Gutiérrez Gonzáles develops the fundamental features of Einstein’s cosmic vision.

To Einstein, scientific imagination can only take place once a cosmic religious feel-
ing, providing one with the appropriate motivation and space for innovation, is
established. But how does this happen? Gutiérrez Gonzáles explains this by discuss-
ing Einstein’s On the Method of Theoretical Physics. Imagination has two important
roles, which Gutierrez Gonzales calls visual image play and conceptualization.
Taken together, these roles of imagination in science serve as an analogical bridge
between experience and logical thinking.
Alfred Kracher emphasises the universal importance of metaphors and models in
science and religion. But do they denote the same thing? He argues that elucidating
differences in the use of metaphors and models can resolve misunderstandings and
may lead to new insights about their role. He argues that the meaning of metaphors
and models in science and religion may be roughly the same, but the relationship
between metaphor and model (within separate disciplines) turns out to be other-
wise. The difference between them is that models are analytical while metaphors are
holistic, even though there is no clear boundary between them, but rather a contin-
uum. Metaphors are processed by the human mind and appeal to both human cogni-
tion and human emotion. Metaphors have their basis in the evolution of Homo
sapiens who at some point combined specialised faculties (e.g., hunting) with their
intelligence, resulting in the ability to construct analogies. With the advances of the
sciences, metaphors were used to develop models, which, unlike metaphors, can be
tested. In science, once a model is in place, metaphors can be discarded. This is not
the case in religion, which is always metaphorical since transcendent reality can
only be captured in metaphors.
Can human cognition offer insights into all this? Lluis Amaral discusses the hard
problem of consciousness, using insights from recent advances in neuroscience. He
replaces the introspective approach of consciousness (a first person perspective)
with an empirical approach (a third person perspective) and moves from idealism to
realism. His aim is to show that using a realist-naturalist perspective, some yet
unsolved problems of philosophy of mind like the hard problem of consciousness
may be seen as misplaced questions. The questions which need to be addressed are:
(1) Why can the reality of consciousness not be explained? (2) How can neural pro-
cesses give rise to subjective states? (3) Why does consciousness exist at all?
Models may address various different concepts. Buki Fatona tackles the paradox
that is lurking in the use of those scientific and theological models which she calls
transcendent models. One such model is the infinite. Although these models are
meant to be imagined understandings of what they represent, what kind of imagery
could accompany such transcendent concepts? If imagining transcendent models is
meaningless, then so are the understandings acquired from these models. To resolve
this problem, Fatona contrasts two models of the infinite: John Scotus Eriugena’s
description of God as nihil per infinitatem (theology) and Euclid’s second postulate
that any straight-line segment can be extended ad infinitum (mathematics). To imag-
ine a thing, x, is to generate a kind of a mental image of that x; but neither God as
nihil per infinitatem nor an infinitely long line-segment can be imagined as such.
Drawing on philosophy of mind, cognitive neuroscience, mathematics and abstract
Introduction xi
art, Fatona establishes an alternative imagistic account of imaginations involving

transcendent models.
Bruno Petrušić and Niels Henrik Gregersen argue against Dennett’s view of con-
sciousness in terms of sub-personal mechanisms, using the Selective Awareness
Experiment (SAE) designed by Ulric Neisser and Robert Becklen (1975) and
repeated by Daniel J. Simons (1999). In contrast to Dennett’s naturalistic ‘nothing
but’ explanation of consciousness, based on ‘not yet realised’ neuroscience, they
show that different causes cannot be put together in one single explanation. Their
version of the SAE points to the different effects of conscious attention (awareness)
among participants in a psychological experiment. Their experiment shows not only
that consciousness matters but also defends the relevance of psychological character
traits, and socially and culturally learnt practices. Besides the experiment, they pres-
ent arguments, metaphors and contexts indicating that conscious states and indi-
vidual processes of learning have causal significance, and hence should be part of a
wide scope of reality. Causal effectiveness, they argue, is real, and not merely an
epiphenomenon. Learning processes and direct attention on a personal level are
mental states, whilst sub-personal mechanisms are brain states.
This part of our book concludes with Javier Monserrat’s investigation of the
metaphysical uncertainty which has its basis in holistic models assumed in the dia-
logues between science and religion. Monserrat notes the way in which a variety of
understandings of science in the twenty-first century has led also to a variety of
understandings of the roles played by models within science. In common with ear-
lier scholars like Barbour, Polkinghorne, Peacocke and Ellis, Monserrat argues that
the universe is enigmatic, implying the plausibility of a universe that includes God
and one that does not, and he maintains that the silence of God generates an obstacle
for deciding between the two. He further maintains that humans possess an inner
religiosity, which means that religion must be universal, and that there is a deep
essential unity of all religions.
Religious and Theological Perspectives
The third part of the book turns to religious and theological reflections. Ernst
M. Conradi explores models for intertwining the story of God with the story of the
universe. His question is: How do the stories of the immanent Trinity and the eco-
nomic Trinity relate to the story of life on Earth? Is the Christian story part of the
Earth story, or vice versa? To explore this question, Conradie suggests a new typol-
ogy. This typology includes five scenarios: (1) the Christian story encompasses the
universe story, (2) the universe story encompasses the Christian story, (3) the
Christian story and the universe story remain apart from each other, (4) the universe
story may be interpreted through the Christian story, and (5) the Christian story may
transform the universe story.
Are there discontinuities as well as continuities between the ways in which sci-
ence and religion/theology make use of models? Michael Fuller maintains that the
xii Introduction
models used by theology draw on analogies with the natural world, but this world is
entirely different from the world of the Divine. Fuller explores the idea of nescience
(not-knowing) in the work of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, and urges that the
importance of nescience in theology leads to a radical dissimilarity between it and
science. While both use models, accepting Dionysian theology implies that all mod-
els must remain inadequate when applied to God. Fuller concludes that ‘[u]lti-
mately, the approach to God has to do not with knowing – science – but with
not-knowing – nescience. And no model can assist in that approach’.
James Thieke presents a model for relating psychological and theological under-
standings of humanity which is based on Christology. In doing so, Thieke draws on
Deborah van Deusen Hunsinger’s use of the Chalcedonian Definition, exploring this
by way of the ideas of three Eastern Orthodox thinkers: John Zizioulas’ notion of
truth as communion, Christos Yannaras’ approach via the Energies of God and cre-
ation, and Alexei Nesteruk’s understanding of the epistemological horizons of sci-
ence and theology. Based on these, Thiecke argues that psychological and theological
understanding of humanity can be understood in terms of a relationship of
participation.
Janna Gonwa argues that scientific models may serve as a valuable tool for theo-
logical inquiry and may lead to more insightful and responsible theological models.
By way of a case study, she discusses merging dynamic system models within theo-
logical studies of personal identity, and explores the potential benefits as well as
inherent risks of integrating scientific models in theological reflection. As a benefit,
she mentions the power of integrative reflection to fulfil the apophatic mandate:
another benefit is that a scientific model may provide innovative ideas for theolo-
gians. She identifies as risks: (1) potential theoretical errors, which may arise
through not paying attention to the limits of scientific methodology, (2) category
mistakes, (3) theological supersessionism (replacement of previous theology by
new without giving due regard to previously important theological aspects), and (4)
concentrating more on the how of creation rather than its meaning. Finally, Gonwa
proposes a set of guidelines for how scientific models can be used in a responsible
manner in theology.
Philippe Gagnon asks the interesting question: Does pluralism itself need to be
plural? He argues that neo-positivism has for some time now focused on using a
fact-derived language, banning metaphoricity. He explores the reasons pluralistic
epistemology came to be adopted, and leads us through some important philosophi-
cal problems and how they were tackled by different philosophers and in various
times. Such philosophical problems or questions concern theories, truth and knowl-
edge. If a theory is considered to be the best one, on which criteria is this judgement
made? Might it be better to have several theories that are ex æquo? Gagnon argues
that even though ‘pluralism’ is a better term compared to ‘the many’, it does not
entirely escape relativism. Hence, he proposes to use ‘plurality’ instead, which does
not threaten the unity of truth. After this philosophical exploration, he turns to theol-
ogy, specifically Trinitarian theology, to implement his findings there.
Introduction xiii
There can be few issues more important in the twenty-first century than ecologi-
cal sustainability. Jaime Tatay notes the renewed involvement of faith-based organ-
isations with the quest for sustainability, looks at the science behind such a quest,
and explores the role that may be played within it by images, metaphors, and mod-
els supplied both by science and by interreligious studies. He argues that there are
partly overlapping metaphors, concepts and images concerning sustainability in
both disciplines that could lead to fruitful dialogues as well as joint action, and he
identifies and describes ten such overlapping themes. These themes are: steward and
inhabitant, common home, limit, stability, collapse, environmental justice, transi-
tion, dialogical knowledge, emergence, and alliance. Tatay concludes that ‘Reaching
a consensus on a narrative intelligible to both [scientific and religious] audiences
will help chart the journey towards a sustainable future’.
Our collection concludes with Sarah Lumbreras’ investigation of a possible new
understanding of embodiment. She presents some of the models of human beings
that have existed in Western and Eastern tradition through history, noting that it was
in Ancient Greece that the notion of dualism made its entrance. This dualism was
between matter (body) and mind but also, more specifically, between the heart and
the brain. Slowly there was a move towards cerebro-centrism, a dualism that would
lie at the heart of philosophy for centuries thanks to the influence of Descartes.
However, Lumbreras has a different understanding of the dualist problem. For her,
the body became ‘a consumer good […] something external to the identity of the
person’. This dualist view, she continues, is inconsistent with current scientific find-
ings. There is a need to develop more realistic models of embodiment; she suggests
looking more closely at Eastern philosophies/religions, not least the chakra system,
which could pave the way for new techniques to improve well-being.
As we noted above, many of the papers gathered together in this book resist clas-
sification, since they range widely over scientific, theological and philosophical ter-
ritory – reflecting thereby the creative outlooks of their authors. It is our hope that
they may prove stimulating and valuable to a readership with a wide range of aca-
demic interests.
Anne Runehov
Michael Fuller
Contents
Part I Philosophical and Methodological Perspectives

Unavoidable Pluralism in Theology and Transitory Pluralism
in Science? Mapping the Diversity �� 3
Lluis Oviedo

Image, Metaphor, and Understanding in Science and Theology �� 11
Andrew Pinsent

Science and Religion Complement Each Other,
Not Compete with One another�� 23
Rana Dajani

The Role of Images in the Social Construction of (Un-)Availability:
Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Illustrations�� 33
Silke Gülker

Telling Stories in the Pluriverse: Decolonial Options
for Creative Pluralism �� 45
Lisa L. Stenmark
the Importance of Reaching a ‘Maturation Point’
On
Before Science and Religion Can Interact �� 59
Emily Qureshi-Hurst
Part II Scientific Perspectives

The Holism of the New Physics and Its Openness
to the Modern Sense of the ‘Religious’�� 69
Javier Monserrat

Shifts in the Scientific Mind: Mapping Einstein’s
Views on Imagination�� 85
Eduardo F. Gutiérrez González
xv
xvi Contents

Models, Muddles, and Metaphors of the Transcendent �� 97
Alfred Kracher
the Hard Problem of Consciousness: How a Naturalist
On
(Representational) Epistemological Understanding Can
Be Easily Harmonized with Developments in Neuroscience,
and Post-modern Critique�� 109
Luís F. Amaral SJ

Imagining the Infinite: Transcendent Models as a Fundamental
Nexus Between Science and Religion �� 121
Buki Fatona
he Selective Awareness Experiment: An Argument
T
for Causal Pluralism�� 133
Bruno Petrušić and Niels Henrik Gregersen
Part III Religious Perspectives

Models for Intertwining God’s Story and the Universe Story �� 147
Ernst M. Conradie

Nescience: A Contrast in the Uses of Models Within Science
and Theology�� 159
Michael Fuller

Christology, Psychology, and Participation: A Model for Relating
Psychological and Theological Understandings of Humanity�� 169
James Thieke
Dynamic Systems Theory Meets Theological Anthropology:
A Case Study on the Use of Scientific Models
in Theological Inquiry �� 179
Janna Gonwa

Does Pluralism Itself Need to Be Plural?�� 187
Philippe Gagnon

Images, Metaphors, and Models in the Quest for Sustainability:
The Overlapping Geography of Scientific and Religious Insights�� 199
Jaime Tatay

Towards a New Understanding of Embodiment:
Alternative Models to the Western Mind-Body Relationship�� 209
Sara Lumbreras
Index�� 219
Contributors
Luís F. Amaral SJ Rua dos Três Vales, Caparica, Portugal

Ernst M. Conradie Jonde Court 6, Stellenbosch, South Africa
Rana Dajani Hashemite University, Zarqa, Jordan
Dirk Evers Universität Halle-Wittenberg, Halle (Saale), Sachsen-Anhalt, Germany
Buki Fatona Wolfson College, Oxford, UK
Michael Fuller New College, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
Philippe Gagnon Lille Catholic University, Lille Cedex, France
Janna Gonwa Gannon University, Erie, PA, USA
Niels Henrik Gregersen University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark
Silke Gülker University of Leipzig, Leipzig, Germany
Eduardo F. Gutiérrez González University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
Alfred Kracher Private Scholar, Apple Valley, MN, USA
Sara Lumbreras Institute for Research in Technology, Universidad Pontificia
Comillas, Madrid, Spain
Javier Monserrat Universidad Pontificia Comillas, Madrid, Spain
Lluis Oviedo Pontificia Università Antonianum, Rome, Italy
Bruno Petrušić University of Zadar, Zadar, Croatia
Andrew Pinsent Ian Ramsey Centre for Science and Religion, University of
Oxford, Oxford, UK
xvii
xviii Contributors
Emily Qureshi-Hurst University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

Anne Runehov Uppsala University, Trelleborg, Sweden
Lisa L. Stenmark San Jose State University, San Jose, CA, USA
Jaime Tatay ICAI, Madrid, Spain
James Thieke University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
Part I
Philosophical and Methodological
Perspectives
Unavoidable Pluralism in Theology
and Transitory Pluralism in Science?
Mapping the Diversity
Lluis Oviedo
Abstract A general perception expects that science might overcome current plural-
ism to achieve unified and proven knowledge regarding almost everything, while
theology must be content with an unavoidable level of pluralism that cannot be
overcome in the present circumstances. Deeper scrutiny shows that such a contrast
could be far from how things really are. Indeed, some recent studies point to a plu-
ralistic stance in scientific research, and a more realistic epistemology reveals sev-
eral levels at which pluralism appears as consubstantial to scientific activity, as
happens when beliefs are considered. Theology can find a better ground to dialogue
with science when this model is pursued, and this is particularly the case in the new
scientific study of religion.
Keywords Belief systems · Complexity · Consilience · Epistemology · Meaning ·

Reductionism · Theological pluralism
1 Introduction
A general perception assumes that theology is pluralistic by necessity, and cannot

be otherwise, while pluralism in science is just provisional and very limited. To
justify such views, the usual argument is that theology, by its own nature, object and
method, cannot settle in a definitive way the many versions or interpretations built
around canonical texts and traditions. Besides this, the inscrutable character of the
divine, which by definition is beyond any human representation or test, renders vain
any effort at reaching a more objective knowledge, or at least a greater consensus
among scholars when trying to better describe ultimate reality and the ultimate
source of meaning. Several attempts at organizing such pluralism witness to the
L. Oviedo (*)
Pontificia Università Antonianum, Rome, Italy
e-mail: loviedo@antonianum.eu
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 3

Switzerland AG 2022
M. Fuller et al. (eds.), Issues in Science and Theology: Creative Pluralism?,
Issues in Science and Religion: Publications of the European Society for the
Study of Science and Theology 6, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06277-3_1
4 L. Oviedo
theological vocation to come to terms with that condition (Niebuhr 1951; Frei 1992;
Bevans 1992).
Moving to science, the impression is that the apparent pluralism perceived in
several fields is just a provisional state waiting for better observation, experiments
and data, which – in due time – would settle the outstanding issues and finally reveal
the most accurate representation or model of the studied reality or process, some-
thing that would simply put an end to discussions and plural versions; it is just a
question of time. Indeed, we will hardly find in science something like Niebuhr’s
attempt to organize pluralism in theology in his classic book Christ and Culture
(Niebuhr 1951).
The aim of the present paper is to review those ideas, to show to what extent the
unavoidable pluralism in theology does not represent a negative stance, and to indi-
cate that science cannot display a greater degree of consensus or unanimity, particu-
larly when what is observed moves towards the limits or more mysterious and
complex realities – especially (but not only) at the anthropological level. Possibly,
when approaching such limits, both theology and science need to rely more on
belief systems, since certainty becomes scarcer, but nevertheless a guiding repre-
sentation is required, and meaning in life becomes a necessity. Related topics are the
recent discussion on cognitive pluralism and epistemic levels in every enquiry – sci-
entific and theological – and the consequent crisis of the most reductive approaches
and the dreams of a ‘consilience’ ideal aimed at connecting and ordering all the
levels present in real processes and in their cognitive models (Wilson 1998).
At this stage, theology is invited to engage with the current discussion and to find
its own place in the new representation, and in the epistemological clues revealed in
the high degree of complexity observed in nature, and the multi-level strategies that
more and more scientists demand when dealing with such complex dynamics.
Finding a new place and re-defining the relationships and connections of theology
with sciences become one of the greatest challenges when being aware about these
new trends, which open unexpected opportunities at the same time. This paper
attempts to compare scientific pluralism – after recent developments in analysing
it – and theological pluralism, as has been developed and elaborated in a long tradi-
tion. This comparative exercise could provide a better ground for dialogue, and for
tackling epistemic issues regarding those distinct cognitive styles. The apparent
conflict between new scientific and traditional theological accounts of religion
could be better described and settled after applying this analysis.
2 heology – Feeling Bad Before a Strong Science

T
and Its Certainties
Approaching science from a theological point of view could become a complex and
mortifying exercise, comparing the often fuzzy and symbolic style of theology with
the accurate, sure and highly formalized knowledge produced by scientists.
Theologians could not compete with that technical and sometimes elegant display
of systematisation and precision. While theology faces an insurmountable and
Unavoidable Pluralism in Theology and Transitory Pluralism in Science? Mapping… 5
somewhat chaotic pluralism, resulting from what Paul Ricoeur designated ‘the con-
flict of interpretations’ (Ricoeur 2007), scientific knowledge can fix everything with
a unified model able to disclose the mysteries of natural phenomena. Well, this was
at least the impression we might get at first. Obviously, pluralism and conflicting
interpretations are not unique to theology, but common to all the humanities, and
still more evident in philosophy and the social and human sciences; at least theology
can resort to a canon or authority that settles conflicting views within a tradition, but
for philosophy, history or anthropology, no such authority is recognized, and plural-
ism can – at best – be perceived as a richness, and – at worst – as a hindrance to any
attempt to build solid knowledge.
However, things have changed in the last few decades. A general perception is
growing that science is not free from pluralism, even if that trait is different in sci-
ence to the way it appears in theology and humanities. A necessary first step is to
review recent attempts to describe and come to terms with that growing awareness
regarding science. Several strands can be identified. The first one is philosophical or
epistemological: it points to general limits in human cognitive capacities. That
strand has been explored in several ways: one belongs to the postmodern tradition,
another exploits topics from cultural studies, and the most rigorous develops a plu-
ral epistemology as an unavoidable condition of knowledge. The second strand is
more descriptive and assumes a de facto pluralism in several scientific realms or
research programs, developing sometimes contrasting models, or at least some
patchwork parsing different areas in different ways. The third strand is structural
and reflects on different levels and methods approaching reality: pluralism becomes
an unavoidable trait when some more complex subjects are approached, like life, the
human person, or society and religion. Let’s look at these strands more closely.
In broad strokes, pluralism in science – somewhat different to that in theology –
recognises two fundamental roots or causes, one subjective and the other objective.
From the subjective side, arguments have been developed in recent years that clearly
reveal how scientific activity cannot avoid the cognitive conditions that are deeply
seated in the human mind and our resulting mental styles or biases. Furthermore,
cultural influences, values systems and interests clearly inform scientific research
programs and their development. For instance, Angela Potochnik in her book
Idealization and the Aims of Science (2017) points out how values are deeply
entrenched with scientific activity, and that even the researcher’s gender determines
interests and perspectives when studying some fields. The same can be stated
regarding climate studies, and how values and interests influence research at various
levels. She summarizes her point focusing on four different levels:
1. ‘Scientific products are partial and idealized’: they serve different aims.
2. Aims in science are shaped by values, reflecting human goals.
3. There is a lack of coherence in different levels of organization.
4. Scientific activity reflects human concerns or interests (Potochnik 2017: 219).
As a result, science becomes unavoidably plural, which should not be seen as a loss,
but rather as a state of affairs that invites us to recognise that the main goal of
science is not so much to reach the truth, or an accurate representation of real
6 L. Oviedo
processes, but understanding, or a cognitive state that satisfies human needs in a

given context and conditions. Such a conclusion invites a greater modesty, but that
does not prevent science from pursuing its goals in a rigorous way and looking for
the highest or deepest levels of description.
The second root of the observed scientific pluralism is objective, having to do
with the complexity of the reality science tries to better describe. To my knowledge,
the so-called Minnesota Group and their book Scientific Pluralism (2006) provides
the most convincing arguments and case studies to justify that perception. Their
initial target is what they design as scientific monism. In their own words, ‘The ulti-
mate aim of a science is to establish a single, complete, and comprehensive account
of the natural world (or the part of the world investigated by the science) based on a
single set of fundamental principles’ (Kellert et al. 2006: x).
Against such a program or ideal, the editors of that book develop the alternative
model of scientific pluralism, as a program or rather a ‘stance’ that assumes the
‘ineliminability of multiplicity in some scientific contexts’ (ibid.: xiii). The point is
that the complexity of factors observed in a phenomenon and their interactions
undermine the feasibility of a unique model able to represent them. From that per-
ception, only multiple accounts or approaches can render a more accurate view
regarding what is observed. It is important to remind ourselves that these authors
argue for a position of ‘Modest pluralist interpretation’, which would assume that
plurality is something provisional or, at most, is a set of competing theories in a
contest to gain more convincing status, after due tests and the burden of evidence
can settle the dispute. For those assuming instead the ‘radical’ pluralist version, the
issue is not so much epistemological or philosophical, but rather empirical, and
reflects a program in which solely empirical research cannot show which phenom-
ena require such pluralistic approach in a way that prevents that plurality from being
integrated into a unifying or consilience-like model.
There are other important points in this proposal: the plural stance could help us
to focus scientific progress as a plural activity and to avoid useless discussion
between contrasting methods or approaches to the same phenomena. And second,
such a stance invites us to consider science as a partial activity, that does not exhaust
human knowledge or insights that could be reached through other means, besides
the scientific method. Indeed ‘The monist interpretation can give rise to inflated
confidence about the comprehensiveness of scientific knowledge’ (Kellert et al.: xv).
New research offers a fresh confirmation of the de facto pluralism in scientific
practice. Martin Schweinsberg has gathered a large team of 37 colleagues to offer a
crowd analysis of an extensive database in the field of health science (Schweinsberg
et al. 2021). Each specialist tested two proposed hypotheses, arriving at contrasting
outcomes which prevented any consensus or agreement. Quite surprisingly, a great
plurality of methods, approaches and outcomes came out from this experiment,
clearly revealing that scientific research is not univocal or convergent, but pluralism
is the rule when the same data are analysed by different experts.
Summing up, a relevant point in this presentation of the ‘pluralist stance’ is that
assuming pluralism as a rather de facto state of things in scientific endeavour opens
the doors for a more comprehensive and dialogical version of science, while the
monistic approach becomes closed and exclusive approach in its attempt to provide
a complete and unified representation of reality. This contrast between scientific
styles reflects a similar one opposing those who pursue more reductive methods or
approaches in their research programs, claiming that they are more ‘scientific’, and
those who point to more holistic and multilevel approaches when trying to describe
a complex reality. The issue at stake is who is offering better science, the ‘hard’ ver-
sion. It seems that the firm candidate for that is the reductive and unifying version,
while the alternative – holistic, plural – would provide a ‘softer’ version. However
here we enter a disputed and slippery area, where it is hard to ascertain which sci-
ence is better and for which scope. As Michael Ruse once stated in a presentation
about organic vs. mechanistic models in biology (Ruse 2017), possibly the first one
is good for representing life in its entirety, while the second is better when trying to
reveal the genetic code of a virus. Again, depending on goals and fields, a scientific
method or approach becomes more appropriate and convenient, but we lack a gen-
eral principle to settle which model is more scientific, and in which context.
3 truggling with Pluralism in Science and Theology –

S
Different Values and Beliefs Systems?
After this brief assessment of scientific pluralism, it is time to contrast it with theo-
logical pluralism, to find out commonalities and differences. In broad lines, it can be
stated that theology knows a wider range of pluralism than science, or that the sci-
entific case is more reduced, and this is assumed sometimes to be a limitation and at
others to be a mere methodological condition. Indeed, a strong point made by those
defending scientific pluralism is that such a stance does not entail a disunity of the
real, except in the minority of cases in which more dimensions of reality – the obvi-
ous ones are the physical and the mental – are assumed. The intrinsic pluralism
found in theology obviously assumes both: the subjective or values-laden side of
every research program, and the objective side due to the complexity and unassail-
ability of several research fields. However, it adds a third strong factor: limits to the
accessibility of the divine, the absolute or ultimate reality. Here the plurality of
perceptions and experiences is ineliminable and gives rise to an infinite set of
possibilities.
However, this proposed analysis can offer some clues towards better assessing
these two models of plurality, and even connecting them. If we assume that plural-
ism in science increases when a studied phenomenon becomes more complex and
its interactions give rise to more competing views, then following a progression that
would move from living processes to human life, to mental reality, and to social
forms (a progression that entails an increase in complexity, and hence of scientific
pluralism), the idea of the divine would find some consequent amount of complexity
and indetermination, by its own nature, which would render pluralism in approaches
dealing with it not just unavoidable, but justified, and in line or in tune with other
epistemic forms of pluralism needed to approach some other realities.
8 L. Oviedo
The other common ground is the role that beliefs play in both the scientific and
the theological realms. This has been already been mentioned in relation to the sub-
jective side of this discussion. However, the topic deserves greater attention, since
the role played by values and beliefs, both in science and in theology, appears these
days to be inescapable, and ongoing research projects are trying to better specify
their dynamics (Angel et al. 2017). Trying to summarize the issue, the idea is that
science – in a similar way to religion – cannot work without assuming beliefs, and
scientists need to believe in a broad sense, for instance about the reality of our world
and its intelligibility, and also in a more concrete or proximate way, as a method-
ological step we proceed through beliefs about the natural phenomena that we try to
verify and explain. The anthropologist Agustin Fuentes has made this point more
explicitly (Fuentes 2019), showing how much beliefs are unavoidable in science, as
well as in economics and in loving or personal relations, besides religion, of course.
The point is that, as far as science needs to rely on beliefs, it becomes inevitably
pluralistic and probabilistic. We can object that beliefs do not work in science as
they do in religion, and it is debatable how much provisional or steady beliefs are
necessary in each realm, for instance when we cannot achieve a sure and complete
explanation based on the available data. Nevertheless, a more realistic epistemology
should take stock of such developments and draw the consequences.
A different issue is the extent to which the ideals of consilience are feasible in
science, and how they could determine the level of pluralism we still witness in sci-
ence. Even if originally this idea related to a methodological principle, the conver-
gence of different approaches in better describing a process, it became in the work
of E. O. Wilson a broad program aimed at building a unified knowledge, informed
by science, and able to integrate humanities, morality, art, and religion. This posi-
tion reflected a great confidence in the power of scientific enquiry to offer the best
explanations of everything, including human and social realities. Obviously, the
program reflected a highly reductive model, one less comfortable with complexities
and multilevel phenomena, using emergence as the clue to explain how more com-
plex phenomena arise from simpler ones. In this case, if that program were to suc-
ceed, the expectation is that scientific insight would in the short-term substitute for
belief and opinion, and – by its own nature – it would become univocal and avoid
unnecessary and distracting pluralism. However, this is clearly a matter of conten-
tion; indeed, an ideal state could be conceived in which a high level of consilience
is achieved through deeper scientific knowledge, but nevertheless it could offer
alternative explanations and theories about the same phenomena, regarding, for
example, human behaviour or social change. In my opinion, such a well-informed
scientific view could enrich our understanding providing alternative or more models
to explain the same happening. This is something which historians have known for
a long time: an historical event, like a battle, can be explained by several causes or
factors intervening in it, and we can hardly eliminate one or drop some after a
unique main cause is found. At least at this level – that of the pluralism of factors or
variables – complexity and plurality in science cannot be removed, and such an
outcome opens up other levels of pluralism in explanations and theory building.
4 A Final Note on the Scientific Study of Religion
A special study case regards the relationship – somewhat tense and conflictive –
between the new scientific study of religion, and particularly its most successful
trademark cognitive science of religion (CSR), and theology. Sometimes the practi-
tioners of the former have presented their endeavour as a hard science able to out-
compete theology as a more reliable and powerful understanding of the religious
mind and religious behaviour (Boyer 2001; Barrett 2004). The new axiomatics, and
the stance supporting scientific pluralism thus far described, open up a different
view, one that could probably help to better integrate both perspectives, provided
that everybody assumes a status of plurality and the principle that science cannot
exhaust a very complex human and social activity like religion.
The central issue is to what extent the new scientific study of religion is placed
within a model of aiming at a unifying or monist pattern, for a dominance of reduc-
tive methods against more holistic and multi-level approaches and assuming greater
or lesser degrees of modesty. The available data – I mean at the purely empirical
level – clearly point to the unavoidably plural character of that scientific program,
and to a field clearly distributed between different paradigms and models often in
dispute and hard to reconcile into a unitary super-pattern. In short, that scientific
approach, applying sophisticated methods and looking for accuracy, cannot avoid
being plural in its outcomes, and is far from a unified theory, or a consilience dream
that would place religion in continuity with the different levels in the natural world
(Day 2007; Jones 2015).
Now the question is whether such a perception will translate into an awareness in
that scientific field that could advise the scholars involved about the convenience of
keeping open doors towards alternative approaches to the study of religion. The
point is whether we would like to move beyond narrow and one-sided proposals,
which in themselves appear less convincing and scientific in the new environment
in which science is pursued. Perhaps it would be more constructive to assume a
pluralistic approach, which is able to integrate the cognitive and biological sciences
together with philosophical and theological explanations in a multidisciplinary and
multidimensional model, more able to account for the plurality and richness of reli-
gious believing and experience. In the end what is under discussion is which model
of science we have in mind, and which we intend to promote thorough our policies
and practices. A more pluralistic stance would surely help to enhance the dialogue
between science and religion, or theology, especially when what is at stake is the
delicate topic of religion itself. Monistic and reductive models of science are clearly
harder candidates for a constructive interaction between science and theology.
However, we are convinced that that is not the only way to practice science, nor
even the best way in which to try to better reflect on the complexity and riches of our
universe, and the mysteries of life and the human mind.
10 L. Oviedo
Bibliography
Angel, H.-F., L. Oviedo, R.F. Paloutzian, A.L. Runehov, and R.J. Seitz. 2017. Processes of
Believing: The Acquisition, Maintenance, and Change in Creditions. Dordrecht: Springer.
Barrett, J. 2004. Why Would Anyone Believe in God? Walnut Creek: Alta Mira Press.
Bevans, S.B. 1992. Models of Contextual Theology. Maryknoll/New York: Orbis.
Boyer, P. 2001. Religion Explained: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought. New York:
Basic Books.
Day, M. 2007. Let’s Be Realistic: Evolutionary Complexity, Epistemic Probabilism, and the
Cognitive Science of Religion. Harvard Theological Review 100 (1): 47–64.
Frei, H.W. 1992. Types of Christian Theology. Yale: Yale University Press.
Fuentes, A. 2019. Why We Believe: Evolution and the Human Way of Being. New Haven/London:
Yale University Press.
Jones, J.W. 2015. Can Science Explain Religion? The Cognitive Science Debate. Oxford/New
York: Oxford University Press.
Kellert, S.H., H.E. Longino, and C.K. Waters. 2006. Scientific Pluralism. Minnesota: University
of Minnesota Press.
Niebuhr, H. Richard. 1951. Christ and Culture. New York: Harper.
Potochnik, A. 2017. Idealization and the Aims of Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Richard, N. 1951. Christ and Culture. New York: Harper.
Ricoeur, P. 2007. The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics. Northwestern
University Press.
Ruse, M. 2017. The Christian’s Dilemma: Organicism or Mechanism. Zygon 52 (2): 442–467.
Schweinsberg, M., M. Feldman, et al. 2021. Same Data, Different Conclusions: Radical
Dispersion in Empirical Results When Independent Analysts Operationalize and Test the Same
Hypothesis. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 165: 228–249. https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2021.02.003.
Wilson, E.O. 1998. Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge. New York: Knopf.
Lluis Oviedo is a full professor of Theological Anthropology (Antonianum University, Rome);

and invited professor in the Theological Institute of Murcia (Spain) for questions of religion, soci-
ety and culture. He has published the books Secularization as a Problem, Altruism and Charity and
The Christian Faith and the New Social Challenges. He is Co-Editor with Anne Runehov of the
Encyclopedia of Sciences and Religions; and, with Jay Feierman, of The Evolution of Religion,
Religiosity and Theology. Currently he edits the Springer Series New Approaches to the Scientific
Study of Religion, and the bibliographic Bulletin ESSSAT News & Reviews. His research focuses
on new scientific study of religion and its theological impact, Christian and scientific anthropolo-
gies, and issues about secularization and religious social dynamics.
Image, Metaphor, and Understanding
in Science and Theology
Andrew Pinsent
Abstract Metaphors are important and perhaps indispensable for understanding,

and especially for the changes in understanding associated with paradigm shifts. In
addition, metaphors are especially important for the objects of study of science and
natural theology, and a rich plurality of metaphors can be found across diverse reli-
gions. In the case of revealed theology, a great plurality of metaphors are supplied
directly, for example through the parables of Jesus Christ or through the so-called
spiritual sense of scripture. Such narratives might be classified as revelation for the
right-hemisphere of the brain, connecting revealed theology with imaginable expe-
rience. Given its importance, especially for science and theology, I argue therefore
that those working in science and theology need to be adept in using metaphor and
to be alert to current and potential new metaphors to communicate and advance
understanding of their field.
Keywords Communication · Imagination · Insight · Metaphor · Narrative ·

Parable · Pedagogy · Phantasm · Second-person relatedness · Understanding
1 The Significance of Images
The notion that images play a role in communicating or explaining ideas in both
science and theology is scarcely novel, but what, exactly, is meant by an ‘image’ in
either context? The question is more challenging than it might seem. Perhaps the
first thought, when thinking of images, is that of a picture, which may range in com-
plexity from a simple diagram to some celebrated artistic masterpiece. Both science
and theology, of course, have a huge wealth and diversity of such images. Theology
A. Pinsent (*)
Ian Ramsey Centre for Science and Religion, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
e-mail: Andrew.pinsent@hmc.oc.ac.uk

Switzerland AG 2022
12 A. Pinsent
is manifested in a vast range of inspiring paintings, sculpture, and architecture.

Science also can draw from awe-inspiring pictures of the cosmos, such as the
famous ‘Pillars of Creation’ (Dunbar 2018).
Nevertheless, an ‘image’ can often differ from what is generally meant by a pic-
ture or object with colours and shapes that can be inscribed on some medium in
space. The stuff of the human imagination is, in many respects, much more tolerant
of imprecision. As a well-known example, one can imagine a tiger without imagin-
ing the details of all the stripes of its coat, even though one cannot print or draw or
paint a tiger without addressing at least some such details (Blackburn 2016: 236).
For the human mind, it is sufficient simply to know that tigers are stripey, and this
stripey-ness is sufficient to distinguish tigers from otherwise similar animals in the
imagination. Moreover, the stuff of the imagination has content from the non-visual
senses, as well as the remembered or imagined experience of our own reactions,
such as increased adrenaline and heart rate in facing a potentially dangerous crea-
ture such as a tiger.
These considerations underline that ‘image’ is something qualitatively broader
and yet also more imprecise than most pictures, and in fact it may not easily be
represented as a picture. This term was known historically in philosophy as a phan-
tasm, which the Oxford English Dictionary defines as
4a. A mental image, appearance, or representation, considered as the immediate object of
sense perception (as distinct from the external thing itself or, in Platonic thought, its under-
lying form), or as the means by which the mind grasps the intelligible form of an object.
On this account, a phantasm has an objective aspect, to the extent that it is generated
by the characteristics of some cognised being. As the immediate object of sense
perception, however, the phantasm also has a subjective aspect. So, for example,
one or more experiences of actual tigers, with distinct patterns of stripes, may give
rise to a phantasm involving stripey-ness as well as the experience of a subjective
response to a dangerous predator, such as increased adrenaline and heart rate.
This term phantasm has, however, become neglected in modern philosophy for a
variety of reasons. One reason is that the standard vocabulary has changed. For
example, John Locke wrote, ‘I have used it [the word idea] to express whatever is
meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is, which the mind can be
employed about in thinking’ (Locke 1996: 6–7). In other words, the term ‘idea’ has
become a blanket term for mind stuff of all kinds, including the phantasm. The other
reason, however, is that the principal meaning of the phantasm has become ‘illu-
sion’ and hence it is often dismissed from consideration. Nevertheless, there is still
a need for a word other than ‘image’ that can denote an imprecise articulation of an
embodied experience of a thing and phantasm remains the best option.
Such an embodied experience is linked to language through what is usually
called a metaphor, a word that is itself a metaphor meaning ‘to transfer’ or ‘carry
across’. Some recent linguistic theories view all language in essence as metaphori-
cal, a position expressed strongly by Iain McGilchrist in the following passage:
Image, Metaphor, and Understanding in Science and Theology 13
I am talking of the fact that every word, in and of itself, eventually has to lead us out of the
web of language, to the lived world, ultimately to something that can only be pointed to,
something that relates to our embodied existence. Even words such as ‘virtual’ or ‘immate-
rial’ take us back in their Latin derivation – sometimes by a very circuitous path – to the
earthly realities of a man’s strength (vir-tus), or the feel of a piece of wood (material).
Everything has to be expressed in terms of something else, and those something elses even-
tually have to come back to the body. To change the metaphor (and invoke the spirit of
Wittgenstein) that is where one’s spade reaches bedrock and is turned. There is nothing
more fundamental in relation to which we can understand that. (McGilchrist 2009: 116)
In this passage McGilchrist claims that words cannot ultimately explain words.
Ultimately one has to connect words with embodied experience, and it is metaphor
that carries us across this gap between a system of signs and embodied, lived and
shared experiences. A metaphor is often just a single word or short phrase, as in the
phrase ‘God is my rock’, in which the embodied experience of rock as a strong and
steady foundation is associated with a characteristic of God. In a more extended
sense, metaphors may also be stories, such as the parables of Jesus Christ. Given
that stories have outcomes, they not only evoke experiences of things, as in the case
of simple metaphors, but they may also communicate whether such things are good
or bad, as assessed in terms of their contributions to these outcomes.
At this point, nevertheless, a challenge may be made. The description of the
grounding of language I have presented above may or may not seem plausible, but,
even if it is correct, why does it matter? Once one has a clear description of some-
thing sufficient for the phenomena of science, such as physical dimensions and
chemical compositions, why do we need to think about metaphors much, if at all?
The implicit metaphors involved in setting up a scientific hypothesis, such as treat-
ing a planet as a point in space for the sake of calculation, do not tend to change in
the testing of such hypotheses. Moreover, the phantasms associated with metaphors
also tend to be tolerant of imprecision. Even if metaphors play a role in the develop-
ment and use of language by each individual person, the world of science and sci-
entific descriptions is or aspires to be a clean world of clear and distinct ideas. What
possible benefit can derive from the consideration of metaphors?
There is a parallel challenge in the world of theology which, after thousands of
years in the case of the Judeo-Christian tradition, has a great many clear and distinct
ideas about God and the meaning and purposes of God’s interactions with humanity.
What then is the continuing value of the Gospels, for example, with all their com-
plex and overlapping metaphors, if there is already a highly systematic theology of
their contents? Do we still need Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John if we have, for
example, Denzinger’s Enchiridion Symbolorum et Definitionum (Denzinger 1854),
a vast collection of all the chief decrees and definitions of councils and popes in
Christian history? And if metaphors play, at best, an instrumental role in establish-
ing the more abstract ideas in which science and theology are often expressed, do
science and theology need to take any further account of them?
14 A. Pinsent
2 First Response: The Need to Understand
A first response to this challenge is from general experience, namely that it is very
hard to teach anything or to explain anything without metaphors. In science, there
are manifold examples of complex situations being represented by simplified mod-
els to which the complexity can be approximated, and these models also serve as
metaphors evoking one or more embodied experiences, directly or indirectly. As
one of many examples, as an undergraduate studying physics at Oxford, I asked a
professor to explain the gravitational slingshot effect by which a spacecraft can be
accelerated by a moving planet. Rather than bothering with the complex mathemat-
ics that an actual spacecraft would require, he asked me to imagine a parabolic orbit
in which the velocities of approach and recession are the same, and then to imagine
that this orbit is around a planet that is itself moving towards the spacecraft. In this
imaginable situation, I could understand that some of the momentum of the planet
can be transferred to the spacecraft. Of course, the actual trajectory is never as
simple as a parabola, but this simplified scenario was sufficient to communicate the
essential insight more clearly than performing the calculations.
In the case of theology, the Christian Gospels state that Jesus Christ would never
speak to the crowds without a parable (Mark 4:34; Matthew 13: 34–35) and, when
asked why, he responded,
To you it has been given to know the secrets of the kingdom of heaven, but to them it has
not been given … This is why I speak to them in parables, because seeing they do not see,
and hearing they do not hear, nor do they understand (Matthew 13: 10, 13).
This passage, taken from the Revised Standard Version translation of the Bible,
states that those who lack understanding need to be taught in parables, which also
implies that parables play a role in communicating understanding when it is lacking.
Such examples align well with Iain McGilchrist’s claim that metaphor ‘underlies
all forms of understanding whatsoever, science and philosophy no less than poetry
and art’ (McGilchrist 2009: 71). On this account, like everything else in science and
theology, considered separately or together, metaphor is not an optional extra or, as
he expresses it, a ‘nice thing if one were going to do a bit of lit crit’ (ibid.: 115). On
the contrary, metaphoric thinking is fundamental, ‘the only way in which under-
standing can reach outside the system of signs to life itself’ (ibid.). So one answer
to the need for metaphor is that it is important and arguably even essential for the
communication of understanding.
Even if metaphor is indeed important for understanding, however, there is a
counter challenge. Is understanding truly important? Arguably, in much experimen-
tal science, the task of understanding has been side-lined in the face of the attitude,
at least since the 1950s in physics, of ‘Shut up and calculate’ (Smolin 2006: 312).
Quantum mechanics, as a prominent example, is famous for calculating experimen-
tal predictions accurately even through it remains poorly understood or, rather, sub-
ject to competing kinds of understanding. Given that so much successful technical
work can be done in science even with limited understanding, what is its value and
hence also the value of metaphor? To put this question in an alternative form, what
does it matter that John Searle does not in fact understand Chinese in his celebrated
‘Chinese Room’ (Searle 1999), provided he still generates the right answers to
questions?
These questions are challenging, in part, because of a comparative neglect of the
epistemic goods of understanding prior to a relatively recent renaissance. Only in
the current year has the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy published an article
on understanding (Grimm 2021). What does seem clear is that understanding is
more of an epistemic achievement than knowledge, an achievement that tends to
involve knowing the causes of things and how particular things fit with other things.
What also seems clear is that understanding has its own special satisfaction. Those
who have come to understand some situation would be unlikely to be as content
with a scenario in which they lacked understanding yet could always answer ques-
tions correctly about that situation. Moreover, the act of coming to understand, often
called insight, often generates discernible physiological changes (Lonergan 1988;
Topolinski and Reber 2010). The same professor at Oxford who explained the sling-
shot effect to me frequently asked us in his tutorials if we had understood his expla-
nations of physics. He would not be satisfied with any of our claims to understand
until he had seen a visible change in our faces, the physiological manifestation of
the ‘aha!’ or ‘eureka!’ experience associated with coming to a new understanding.
So understanding is widely regarded as an epistemic good.
Moreover, understanding may sometimes be dismissed as adventitious or indeed
fade into the background of consciousness during periods of what Kuhn calls ‘nor-
mal science’ (Kuhn 1962). Nevertheless, the great breakthroughs in science are
almost always associated with vivid changes in understanding in which it is, pre-
cisely, the change in understanding that is the crucial issue. The mature Ptolemaic
account of the solar system could fit the observed motions of the planets more pre-
cisely than the early Copernican system of perfectly circular orbits, but the
Copernican understanding was, in broad terms, the correct one. Similarly in the
twentieth century, a new understanding of the world in terms of plate tectonics even-
tually explained many patterns of ocean trenches and mountain ranges across the
globe, the topologies of many coasts, and the evolutionary divergences of many
groups of living beings. All such revolutions are described in ways that involve
metaphors that evoke simplified phantasms or images.
In summary, metaphors play an important role in understanding, as attested in
both science and theology, and changes in understanding that are valued as impor-
tant or even revolutionary tend also, in an especially vivid way, to be associated with
changes in metaphor.
3 Second Response: The Value of Plurality
A second response is not only that metaphor is important for understanding, but that
a plurality of metaphors is often needed for the kinds of objects of special study in
both science and theology. In both fields, the ultimate objects of explanation tend to
16 A. Pinsent
be remote from immediate sense experience but also causally powerful. An ade-
quate understanding of such objects tends to require references via metaphor to a
plurality of objects that are capable of more immediate sense experience.
One example in science is nuclear matter which, to the best of current knowl-
edge, only exists in two wildly different kinds of stable states. The first state is that
of the dense cores of all atoms, stabilized against electromagnetic scattering by the
strong nuclear force, and which start to become unstable above about two hundred
and thirty-five nucleons (protons and neutrons). The second state is that of neutron
stars, in which a vast number of nucleons (~1057) are stabilised by their own mutual
and intense gravity. Neither of these states can possibly be experienced directly by
human beings. Atomic nuclei are, of course, far too small to register with our senses
and, although neutron stars are on the scale of human cities, all kinds of detrimental
effects on human bodies, notably the crushing gravity, preclude direct interaction.
Indeed, any human body on the surface of a neutron star would instantly be flattened
by gravity to a single layer of atoms while releasing the energy of an atomic bomb.
Nuclear matter can, however, be described by metaphors. The crucial point, how-
ever, is that a range of apparently incompatible metaphors is used, depending on
which aspect of the matter one wishes to highlight. Sometimes the nucleus, or rather
the distinct populations of neutrons and protons, are described as Fermi gases, even
though nuclear matter, with a density equivalent to about one hundred million tons
per teaspoon, would not intuitively be considered as a gas. Sometimes the nucleons
are described as behaving like the molecules in a drop of liquid, a model used to
account for the deformed shapes of nuclei. There is also a possibility that some
aspects of nuclear matter, especially near the surface of neutron stars, exhibit the
properties of a crystalline solid. So is nuclear matter a gas, a liquid, or a solid?
Under some conditions, one of these answers may be most plausible, but often two
or three metaphors are needed to capture diverse aspects of what cannot be experi-
enced directly.
Similarly, theology also needs a plurality of metaphors, the primary example
being God, and this diversity is also found across diverse religions. Islam, for exam-
ple, teaches that there are ninety-nine names for Allah, starting with ‘The Beneficent’
(ar-Raḥmān) and ‘The Most Merciful’ (ar-Raḥīm), both of which begin all but one
of the Surahs of the Quran, and concluding with ‘The Guide to the Right Path’
(ar-Rashīd) and ‘The Timeless or Patient’ (aṣ-Ṣabūr). The term Brahma in Hinduism
can refer both to the abstract ultimate metaphysical principle and to ‘The Creator’,
about whom many stories are told. In Buddhism, the term can also refer to all the
deities of the formless or anthropomorphic realms of existence, again giving rise to
a vast diversity of metaphors of engagement. The Hebrew and Christian Bibles also
contain many names for God, often as variants of the word for God or the Father
God Ēl, such as Ēl Shaddāi, conventionally translated into English as ‘God
Almighty’, and YHWH, conventionally written as ‘Yahweh’. There is also a huge
wealth of metaphors such as ‘rock’ (Deuteronomy 32: 4), ‘shepherd’ (Psalm 23: 1),
‘consuming fire’ (Deuteronomy 4: 24), and ‘light’ (1 John 1: 5).
Without examining the extent to which the various objects of denotation in these
religions overlap, converge, or are identical, one common theme emerges, namely
that thinking about ultimate causes, in theology as in science, tends to generate a

rich diversity of metaphors. This fact does not mean, or does not necessarily mean,
that the object is ambiguous but that multiple experiences or perspectives are needed
to gain an understanding. As Eleonore Stump once remarked to me in a seminar, ‘It
is hard to think up the ladder of being.’
The situation appears to parallel a problem in geometry, insofar as it is possible
to describe but not easily to imagine objects with more than three dimensions.
Whether or not an intuitive understanding of higher dimensional objects such as
tesseracts can be gained is a matter of debate, although the fact that a three-
dimensional world is grasped through the two-dimensional system of the human
retina offers hope that it is possible. Any attempt to gain an intuitive grasp of higher-
than-three dimensional objects, however, seems to start with multiple intersections
of these objects with three dimensional spaces. At the time of writing, there are
many online sources that try to communicate an understanding of 4D objects this
way (e.g. Leios Labs 2016). In other words, a multiplicity of diverse embodied
experiences is a step towards grasping a kind of object that cannot be experienced
directly or intuitively understood immediately.
On this account, not only is metaphor important for understanding in science and
theology but a rich multiplicity of metaphors will tend to be important, given that
both in science and in theology one attempts to understand causally powerful agents
that are often remote from direct embodied experience.
4 Third Response: Metaphors in Revealed Theology
A third response to validate the importance of metaphors is that revealed theology

involves encounters with situations that go beyond the kinds of reasoning or expla-
nations familiar from daily life. The challenge is not simply that these situations
extend or stretch natural reason but that they purportedly involve a direct encounter
with that which is beyond creation entirely. As one of many examples, for Aristotle
God was good, living, and eternal (Metaphysics XII.7.1072b24–31), but Aristotle
never imagined God being born in a stable or dying on a cross, as Christianity
claims. As another example, many characteristics of God are described by natural
metaphors such as ‘rock’ to convey stability, ‘light’ to convey sapiential illumina-
tion, or ‘consuming fire,’ to convey, for example, power and purification. Revealed
theology, however, also describes other attributes of God that are arguably a good
deal less intuitive, such as humility and second-personal love (caritas) (Matthew
11: 29; 1 John 4:8).
As another example, consider the passage below, from the First Letter to the
Corinthians 10: 1–4 of the New Testament, taken from the Revised Standard Version
except for the substitution of ‘supernatural’ with ‘spiritual’, a more literal transla-
tion of pneumatikos:
18 A. Pinsent
I want you to know, brethren, that our fathers were all under the cloud, and all passed
through the sea, and all were baptized into Moses in the cloud and in the sea, and all ate the
same spiritual food and all drank the same spiritual drink. For they drank from the spiritual
rock which followed them, and the rock was Christ.
This passage refers to the ancient narrative of the Book of Exodus, the story of
Moses who encountered God on Mount Sinai and led the people of ancient Israel
from slavery in Egypt to freedom in a promised land after a journey of forty years
in a wilderness. The text above from 1 Corinthians also shows that the early
Christians read a second-order meaning from this story. On this account, the cross-
ing of the Red Sea, enabling the people to escape Pharaoh’s army (Exodus 14:
15–30), is a baptism. Moreover, the rock struck by Moses from which the people
drank to relieve their thirst in the wilderness (Exodus 17: 6; Numbers 20: 7–13), and
which rabbinical interpretation had previously described as journeying with the
people through the wilderness, is here interpreted as Christ, from whose pierced
side blood and water poured when he hung dead on the cross (John 19: 34–36).
This interpretation from 1 Corinthians 10: 1–4 is an instance of the spiritual
sense of Scripture, a second-order mode of interpretation that has been hugely influ-
ential in Christian history, especially in the early centuries. Another instance is
Galatians 4: 22–26, in which the readers are encouraged to belong to the heavenly
rather than earthly Jerusalem by interpreting the story of Hagar and Sarah, the slave
and wife of Abraham, as the old and new covenant. Yet another and more subtle
instance is the language of Mary’s visitation of Elizabeth in Luke 1: 39–56, which
seems shaped to echo the language of 2 Samuel 6. Brant Pitre identifies four paral-
lels: 2 Samuel 6: 2 with Luke 1: 39; 2 Samuel 6: 9 with Luke 1: 43; 2 Samuel 6:
15–16 with Luke 1: 41–42; and 2 Samuel 6: 11 with Luke 1: 56 (Pitre 2018: 54–62);
and the vision of the Ark of the Covenant in conjunction with a woman who is
‘clothed with the sun, with the moon under her feet, and on her head a crown of
twelve stars’ (Revelation 12: 1). The most common interpretation of this woman in
Christian history has been Mary, the mother of Jesus Christ and of the Church,
implying that the Ark of the Covenant, which held the word of God on tablets of
stone, can be interpreted as signifying Mary, who bore the Word of God Incarnate.
These connections, between the crossing of the Red Sea and baptism, or Sarah
and the new covenant, or the Ark of the Covenant and Mary are not natural meta-
phors, in the sense that they are not drawn from the natural attributes of a sea cross-
ing, or a woman, or a venerated artefact. Presumably, however, they are metaphors
of some kind insofar as the unique events in the stories associated with this crossing,
this woman, and this artefact communicate imaginable experiences. Hence these
second-order meanings, like natural metaphors, plausibly play the role of commu-
nicating supernatural understanding that may be lacking if one has only revelation
in the form of abstract propositional truths. In the case of the baptism, for example,
one may be told that sin is defeated in baptism but if the connection is also made
with the drowning of pharaoh’s forces in the story of Exodus, then one also has a
concrete and imaginable image of the defeat of sin associated with the theological
proposition. Indeed, this image has been considered important enough to remain in
the Catholic Rite of Baptism today.
The extent of this spiritual sense of scripture has been a matter of some contro-
versy in the history of Christianity, given that many additional interpretations were
generated long after the completion of the books of scripture. Nevertheless, since at
least some such spiritual interpretations are part of the canon of the New Testament,
they are part of revelation to anyone who accepts the New Testament. Along with
the parables of Jesus, these second-order interpretations are clearly one of the ways
in which an understanding of revelation is communicated. In the language of Iain
McGilchrist, they constitute revelation for the right-hemisphere, connecting theol-
ogy with imaginable experience.
Finally, it should also be noted that, in Christian history, the understanding com-
municated from revelation has sometimes been expressed using metaphors drawn
from science. Consider, for example, the term ὁμοούσιον, the accusative case form
of ὁμοούσιος (homoousios), to signify the unity of substance of the Father and the
Son. The term was adopted by the First Council of Nicaea (325) and was controver-
sial, in part, because it did not come from Scripture but from Greek philosophy. The
root term, substance, was shaped in part by Aristotle’s study of biology, especially
the unity of individual living and growing beings. As exemplars of substance, for
example, Aristotle cites ‘the individual man’ or ‘the individual horse’ (Categories
2a11–15), each of which organizes its matter to promote the continuance and flour-
ishing of its life. The early Christians adopted this term because there was no stron-
ger principle of unity than substantial unity. When a principle of distinction was
then needed between the Father, Son, and Spirit, this need spurred the evolution of
the term ‘person’ (Spaemann 2006).
More recently, in working on the meaning and role of the gifts of the Holy Spirit
in the work of Thomas Aquinas, I found many parallels between Aquinas’s claims
and contemporary research in experimental psychology and neuroscience (Pinsent
2012). In particular, Aquinas’s claims about the way in which the Spirit ‘moves’ us
do not suggest anything like physical movement. Instead, the scenario he describes
resembles that of shared or joint attention, a second-personal mode of engagement
that is manifested most clearly by all kinds of interpersonal actions of children, such
as pointing, gaze-following, and turn-taking, as well as psychological mirroring
between adults (Eilan et al. 2005). This metaphor of second-person relatedness has
so far turned out to be immensely fruitful, offering a new key to interpreting
Aquinas’s massive virtue ethics of the Christian life as well as a new approach to
virtue ethics in general.
5 Conclusion
Metaphors, which connect words with embodied experiences, are immensely

important and perhaps even indispensable for understanding, especially for those
changes in understanding associated with paradigm shifts. Apart from direct embod-
ied experience, one source for such metaphors can be images in the form of pictures.
Another important source is narrative.
20 A. Pinsent
Many objects of investigation in both science and theology tend to be both caus-
ally powerful and remote from immediate sense experience. As one consequence, it
is frequently valuable to appeal to a plurality of metaphors by which the diverse
characteristics of what is remote can be associated with what is familiar. In the case
of revealed theology, a great many such metaphors are supplied directly, for exam-
ple through the parables of Jesus Christ or through second-order interpretations of
scriptural narratives, the so-called spiritual sense of scripture. Such narratives might
be classified as revelation for the right-hemisphere of the brain, connecting theology
with imaginable experience.
As is often the case in science, changes to theological understanding communi-
cated by these means are also expressed frequently through new metaphors. Some
of the most important such metaphors in theology have themselves been drawn from
science. One such case is homoousios in the Christian Creed, drawn from the bio-
logical unity of living things. Another case is the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the work
of Aquinas, interpreted in terms of shared attention in contemporary experimental
psychology.
These considerations alone should be enough to establish that those working in
science and theology need to be adept in using metaphor and to be alert to current
and potential new metaphors to communicate and advance understanding of
their field.
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Andrew Pinsent is Research Director of the Ian Ramsey Centre for Science and Religion at the
Faculty of Theology and Religion, University of Oxford. Formerly a particle physicist on the
DELPHI experiment at CERN, followed by several years in scientific and business consultancy, he
has degrees in philosophy and theology and a second doctorate in philosophy. The main focus of
his research now is second-person relatedness in science, philosophy, and theology. His publica-
tions cover virtue ethics, neurotheology, science and religion, the philosophy of the person, insight,
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venues, he is a regular contributor to public engagement with science and faith issues.
Science and Religion Complement Each
Other, Not Compete with One another
Rana Dajani
Abstract Science seeks to understand nature around us. In the past few hundred
years modernity attempted to do so by compartmentalizing knowledge into disci-
plines and hierarchies. In Nature phenomena exhibit spectra with everything related
and connected to everything else in a highly complex fashion that we are barely
starting to understand. Nature is constantly changing and evolving, and we only
take snap shots and then build assumptions and models. This approach may have
helped at one point, but ultimately hindered and blinded us because we became
stuck in a narrow path of looking at the world and were missing out on the whole
picture. The religion of Islam complements science by providing the framework and
the guidance compelling us to ask questions to seek the truth to pursue curiosity and
knowledge. Therefore religion is not about questioning the science, nor is it about
trying to make the scientific discovery compatible with religious texts. The realm of
religion is giving a framework to explore and guidance on how to deal with the
discoveries. The plurality in Islam is a manifestation of the diversity of humans
striving to understand how religion guides us. Examples of the challenges that face
scientists and theologians include cultural evolution, consciousness and epigenetics.
Dealing with these challenges in the future requires raising awareness, education,
the creation of multidisciplinary committees and ongoing research with an open
mind led by the ethical frameworks of theology, with respect and trust.
Keywords Allostasis · Consciousness · Cultural evolution · Epigenetics · Ethics ·

Evolution · Islam · Ijtihad · Maslaha · Philology · Religion · Science · Shoura
R. Dajani (*)
Hashemite University, Zarqa, Jordan
e-mail: rdajani@hu.edu.jo

Switzerland AG 2022
24 R. Dajani
1 Introduction
Science seeks to understand nature around us. In the past few hundred years moder-
nity attempted to do so by compartmentalizing knowledge into disciplines and hier-
archies (Lee 2019). But what we have come to learn and discover is that nature is
not compartmentalized and divided. Nature is fluid. In Nature phenomena exhibit
spectra that spread all over the place with everything related and connected to every-
thing else in a highly complex fashion that we are barely starting to understand. For
example, signaling transduction within cells and among cells is highly complex and
each path cannot be understood in isolation from all the others.
What is surprising is how scientists and humans have the audacity to think that
we can understand complex systems when only studying one isolated pathway.
Another example is evolution of species. Pierre-Henri Gouyon, curator at the
Muséum National d’Histoire Naturelle in France, discusses how there are really no
species in the sense we have come to understand (Gouyon 2001: 96). All species are
connected by intermediary forms. We just don’t have the capacity to observe them
all. Yet they exist. Nature is constantly changing and evolving, and we only take
snap shots and then build assumptions and models. Rather than realizing the fluidity
of nature and the continuity and connectiveness of everything around us, science
has attempted to understand nature by drawing models and metaphors. This
approach may have helped at one point but ultimately hindered and blinded us,
because we became stuck in a narrow path of looking at the world and were missing
out on the whole picture. To undo this compartmentalization is difficult. It would be
better to approach nature in a raw, naïve and fresh new way.
We can find raw, fresh approaches by inviting people from sectors outside of sci-
ence who have not been subjected to the conditioning or brain washing, such as
people in the arts and humanities. Also, modern science is based on western phi-
losophy, developed by white Anglo-Saxon males. Therefore, including people from
other genders, minority groups and other philosophical frameworks is essential.
This approach also requires courage and boldness to challenge the status quo and to
ask the difficult questions that make people uncomfortable. However, this is how
science advances in every instance. Take for example, Shinya Yamanka, a Japanese
scientist at Kyoto University (Shinya 2001; Takahashi and Shinya 2006: 663). He
challenged the agreed-upon concept that it is impossible to take a fully differenti-
ated cell and reverse it into a stem cell. If anyone had suggested such a notion he/
she would have been considered ignorant or crazy. But it was exactly that sugges-
tion that led him to discover a mechanism to reverse cell fate and turn a fully dif-
ferentiated adult cell into a stem cell. This technique was later called induced
pluripotent stem cell technology, and it ultimately won him a Nobel prize in 2012
because of the implications of his discovery on human health.
Another example is research around trauma impact on Syrian refugees in Jordan.
Usually, research is conducted by Western scientists in global south countries with-
out establishing true partnerships with local scientists. In 2015 a project lead by
Catherine Panter-Brick at Yale University set out to study the effectiveness of a
Science and Religion Complement Each Other, Not Compete with One another 25
psychosocial intervention designed by an International NGO, Mercy Corps, to

reduce stress and anxiety and promote resilience among refugee adolescents in
Jordan. Panter-Brick partnered with a local academic, Rana Dajani (the present
author) in the design of this research project. The co-leader in Jordan had a team of
local research assistants who carried out the data collection. The strategic approach
of the local team was to gain community trust, to explain the science to raise aware-
ness of the power of science, and to foster agency among the refugees by giving
them the opportunity to partake in evaluating the Program that was being imple-
mented on them, not only by giving samples but by sharing the results of the study.
The result was high participation, raised awareness of science, better programming
and a boosted sense of resilience (Panter-Brick et al. 2020: 40). Most importantly, it
was the local research assistants who realized that the surveys were making the
children feel stressed, and suggested adding a positive scale to the battery of sur-
veys. This suggestion led to the development of a resilience scale in Arabic for
adolescents and a better understanding of how resilience is fostered in Arab com-
munities (Panter-Brick et al. 2018: 1803).
2 Science
To see nature in its complexity and attempt to understand it will always be restricted
by the viewer herself. However if we include multiple viewers from different angles
and perspectives we begin to see the real picture and start putting it together. The
famous example is when many blindfolded people attempt to describe an elephant
by touching different parts of the elephants body. I would like to cite examples from
contemporary media such as the series ‘see’ and the Hollywood movie ‘A quiet
place’. These both remind us of how, when we are not using one of our senses (in
the case of ‘see’ vision, and in the case of ‘a quiet place’ hearing), we interpret the
world in a very different way. Our brain has the capacity to imagine and play games
using our imagination. We don’t know what we don’t know!
In his book ‘An Anthropologist on Mars’ (Sacks 1996), Oliver Sacks had
described how situations of disease or malfunction give us a glimpse of how nature
works. For example, in the case of Tourette syndrome what is happening in the brain
that allows a Tourette syndrome patient to be able to fly a plane or conduct highly
sophisticated medical operations, or how the lack of color vision cognition in the
brain allows us to understand how we comprehend color, or how an autistic person
has to learn social cues as if they are encountering a new species. All these real life
examples lend us a glimpse of how little we know, and the importance of multiple
perspectives to attempt to fill the gaps.
Another point to consider is philology, terminology and the words we use, and
how these can be limiting in how we approach concepts in nature and religion. In
her book ‘The century of the gene’, Evelyn Keller very eloquently describes (Keller
2000) how the words we use limit us in our description of the world. Therefore we
must always seek better ways of explaining things. For example, the concept of the
26 R. Dajani
gene, as understood and defined by the scientists who coined the word, later limited
the imagination and therefore the possibilities of new discoveries for future genera-
tions until someone had the courage to question the dogma, and now the original
concept of the gene is no longer valid in the light of new discoveries.
Another example is the concept of inheritance. In the past scientists had postu-
lated that we inherit our DNA that contains the blue print for our bodies. Today we
have come to learn that the environment around us impacts and changes, through
chemical reactions, the expression of the genes we have inherited in a fashion that
can be transferred across generations (Cavalli and Heard 2019: 489). This concept
leads to a blurring of how much of who we are is a product of our DNA and how
much is a product of the environment, since a person can be exposed to trauma that
changes the methylation of a gene and hence its expression. This change can be
transferred to the next generation. Therefore the concept of the impact of the envi-
ronment on the organism stopping with the organism does not hold anymore. Our
experiences and lifestyles have an impact on future generations. This led to the
emergence of the concept of cultural evolution (Creanza et al. 2017: 7782).
Human culture includes ideas, behaviors, and artifacts that can be learned and
transmitted between individuals and can change over time. This process of trans-
mission and change is similar to the theory of evolution. Stresses and benefits of
many kinds are translated into phenotypic expression in future generations via epi-
genetics. Epigenetics is the term used to describe the complex biochemical path-
ways that regulate the genetic code. This new field opens a slew of questions about
how cultural nurture has been shaping biological nature throughout human history.
The boundary between biology and culture, nature and nurture, in the human past is
an open question (Brooke and Larsen 2014: 1500). This search for the truth is never
ending because of the unlimited potential of new perspectives that is as unlimited as
human diversity. As recent Nobel prize winner Albert Szent Gyoung describes a
scientists as one who sees what everyone has seen but think what no one has thought.
3 Religion
Religion on the other hand in my view is not comparable to science. Religion, and I
am speaking of Islam in this context, is about the how and why of doing science.
Religion is not actually doing the job of science, i.e. explaining natural phenomena.
Religion in this sense complements science by providing the framework and the
guidance. The framework developed in Islam sets the stage to goad us, compelling
us to ask questions and to seek the truth to pursue curiosity and knowledge.
Behold! in the creation of the heavens and the earth, and the alternation of night and day,
there are indeed Signs for men of understanding (Quran 3: 190).
Humans are called to leave no question unanswered, to ask all the questions – even
the toughest ones, such as Abraham’s question to God in the Quran: ‘And when
Abraham said (unto his Lord): My Lord! Show me how Thou givest life to the dead,
He said: Dost thou not believe? Abraham said: Yea, but (I ask) in order that my heart
may be at ease. (His Lord) said: Take four of the birds and cause them to incline
unto thee, then place a part of them on each hill, then call them, they will come to
thee in haste, and know that Allah is Mighty, Wise’ (Quran 2: 260).
This is the scientific method spelt out, and it explains the philosophy that was the
main driver for the scientific discoveries of the golden age of the Islamic civiliza-
tions in medicine, physics, astronomy and chemistry (Farouqi 2006: 391).
Islam reminds us of what is important is our intention in seeking the truth. Islam
rewards us for attempting to answer the question even if we get it wrong. Islam in
this way celebrates failure and embraces it is an important part of the path of
discovery.
When a judge gives judgment and strives to know a ruling (ijtahada) and is correct, he has
two rewards. If he gives judgment and strives to know a ruling, but is wrong, he has one
reward (Bukhari (b00), 9.133: 7352 (a2)).
The guidance provided by Islam helps guide us through the ethics of what to do with
our discoveries and how we use these discoveries to help our fellow humans, the
earth and the universe we live in.
Behold, thy Lord said to the angels: I will create a vicegerent on earth (Quran 2: 30).
Therefore religion is not about questioning the science, nor is it about trying to
make the scientific discovery compatible with a religious text. The realm of religion
gives a framework to explore, and guidance on how to deal with the discoveries.
The plurality found in Islam is a manifestation of the diversity of humans striving
to understand how religion guides us. Therefore there are multiple ways in which to
interpret religious verses. In each case what matters is the intention of the inter-
preter, and he or she is judged only by intention. And the only judge according to
Islam is God, not humans. Therefore in Islam what matters is your intention to be
sincere in seeking the truth. You are rewarded twice if you get it right and once if
you get it wrong. This is to encourage the search for the truth without being afraid
to commit a mistake. It is a sin not to try.
Again, we must remind ourselves not to be caught up and therefore be limited by
multiple viewpoints, but rather to celebrate them as possibilities. Similarly we must
be careful regarding language and how different interpretations may mean different
things, and that all this is a celebration of diversity that is one of the tenets of Islam.
4 Challenges and Solutions
In cases where an apparent contradiction/controversy arises, it most probably arises

from a failure to understand the complementary roles of science and religion. In
these instances committees of scientists and religious scholars should come together
to have dialogues and conversations, to listen to each other and learn from each
other and to reach a consensus.
28 R. Dajani
This consensus may and will be revisited in the future, as new scientific discover-
ies happen and as new interpretations of verses come about because of the diversity
of humans who are born new into every generation. We need to be brave, bold and
creative. We should create groups of experts and stakeholders to address these issues
by studying them in depth: this is called ‘Shoura’ in the Islamic tradition. This is
defined in the Collins dictionary (Collins 1994) as ‘a consultative council or assem-
bly: the process of decision-making by consultation and deliberation.
The guiding principles for these groups should be:
1. they should bring together experts from all walks of life, minorities, etc.
2. it is acceptable to make mistakes.
3. their thinking is continuous and evolving.
The guiding ethical principles should be based upon the ‘Maslah’, the general good
for the community, or the public interest, which is an important concept in Islam.
The application of this concept is increasingly more important because of contem-
porary legal issues that have arisen in modern times.
Laws should not be stagnant laws: verdicts should be ever-changing. This is sim-
ilar to nature which is fluid and changes as a result of interacting with the
environment.
How can this play out in practice? I will share a few examples:
1. The establishment of the first stem cell law in Jordan and the region and Islamic
world to govern stem cell research and therapy (Dajani 2014: 189).
2. The initiative spearheaded by Agha Khan University to create a dialogue and
platform for plurality of voices concerning advances in biotechnology that
impact human health and research (Personal Communication). The diversity of
perspectives also makes for doing better science. Today, with advances in bio-
technology and the ensuing ethical dilemmas that arise, we are in need of every
perspective to help guide us as humanity to do what is right. Drawing from other
philosophies is imperative and fundamental, not only to ensure inclusivity and
respect but also to learn and grow (Qosay et al. 2019).
In order to create these diverse communities to foster discussion and exchange we
need to train participants in the skills of dialogue and debate, as well as in a basic
understanding of other disciplines. So, for example, we need religious scholars to
have a basic training in biology and biologists to have some training in theology in
order to understand where each person is coming from, in order to reach a common
ground. There are programs that are offering such courses, for example:
1. Advancing theological and scientific literacy in Madrasa discourses at the
University of Notre Dame. This project is lead by professor Moosa Ibrahim and
funded by the John Templeton foundation. The project is designed to teach grad-
uate level students in traditional Muslim schools in Pakistan and India the role
that reason and evidence plays in the scientific method. The project aims to
encourage students to be critical not only in science but in theology. For more
information, see https://contendingmodernities.nd.edu/about/research-areas/

madrasa-discourses/ (accessed 12/21/2021).
2. The Middle East Research Ethics Training Initiative (MERETI). This was estab-
lished in 2005 and has provided training to individuals from Egypt, Sudan,
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Yemen on research
methodology and research ethics. For more information, see https://www.med-
school.umaryland.edu/mereti/ (accessed 2/21/2021).
3. The Fogarty Research Ethics Program in Jordan led by the University of
California San Diego and Jordan University of Science and Technology (JUST).
The program involves 12 months graduate-level course work and a placement to
develop the next generation of researchers to carry out high quality and ethically
acceptable research. For more information, see https://www.fic.nih.gov/Grants/
Search/Pages/bioethics-TW010026.aspx (accessed 12/21/2021).
4. The Institute for Critical Thought. This was founded in 2015 as an independent
site for research and teaching in the liberal arts. It provides a space for creative
and critical engagement with the arts, humanities, and social sciences while cul-
tivating relationships among members of the community. For more information,
see https://www.ictamman.org/history (accessed 12/21/2021).
This is essential if we are to get out of our silos and start to build bridges and to
address complex questions. One of the big questions, as John Templeton calls them.
is: what is the soul? What is consciousness? These questions are ancient, but are
brought to the fore with new scientific discoveries and advances. For example, when
the hype around Henrietta Lacks and her cells forming the basis for most biological
discoveries was all over the scientific news, the question was asked: does Henrietta
live in her cells? (Skloot 2018). To address such questions we need scholars from all
disciplines to come together in a continuous conversation.
Another question is how much of our behavior is random and how much is under
our conscious control. This is an ancient ongoing question that we all struggle with.
Consciousness is an important concept for understanding human nature. However,
little is known about where consciousness lies, anatomically and physiologically.
Researchers from different disciplines can look at the same data and draw different
conclusions. Therefore, different theories of consciousness exist and each is siloed
from the other. The Templeton World Charity Foundation’s Accelerating Research
on Consciousness initiative (ARC) proposes a solution to these problems. As stated
on their website, ‘The foundation aims to draw on best practices in open science and
adversarial collaboration to promote open and rigorous engagement among
researchers of opposing theories to reduce the number of theories and accelerate
research and increase the legitimacy of the remaining theories’ (Templeton World
Charity website).
Another example is allostasis and the evolution of human concept of health that
is described by Peter Sterling in his book ‘What is health?’ (Sterling 2020) This
approach forces us to take a wholly different viewpoint on health and disease.
Human traits exist on a spectrum. We need all the variations of the trait to survive.
This shifts our definition of what is normal to the extent of throwing out the concept
Another random document with
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maanviljelijöitä, 45 miljoonaksi markaksi. Että tästä vajavuudesta
kärsi kaikki muukin liike, oli välttämätöntä. Sellaiset numerot ovat
riittävänä selityksenä vuoden kauheihin tapahtumiin.
X.
Kerjäläiset.
Muistellessa niitä kauhun kuvia, jotka lakkaamattomana

panoraamana pitkin loppumatonta talvea 1868 liikkuivat silmien
edessä, yksitoikkoisesti esittäen kelkkaa vetävää miestä, jonka
alastomuutta ankarassa talvipakkasessa tuskin peitti surkeat
repaleet, äiti perässä kulkien vanhempien lasten ympäröimänä, ja
molemmat, portaille saavuttuansa, kaivaen esille ryysyjen joukosta
pienimmät, usein sairaat lapsensa, vuotavat uudestaan särjetyn
sydämen heikosti umpeen kasvaneet haavat, ja käsi vastenmielisesti
muodostaa nuo mustat kirjaimet, jotka eivät pysty kuvaamaan sitä,
mitä veripunaisilla kirjaimilla on muistiin painettuna. Taikka astui
raskaita askeleitaan joku 10—12vuotias pienokainen, tuskin enää
muistaen kaukaista kotipaikkaansa, taikka vanhempiansa, jotka, kun
viimeinen leipäpala oli syötynä, epätoivossa oli lähettänyt hänet pois
lämpöisestä kodista kylmän ja pimeän talven valtaan. "Mene
hakemaan elatuksesi maailmalta;" kuka kuvaa ne kyyneleet, joita
tuhansissa kodeissa tällä kamalalla eronhetkellä vuodatettiin.
Mutta turhaa on luetella erityisiä henkilöitä ja tiloja; jokainen ikä
kumpaakin sukupuolta oli yhtä runsaasti edustettuna. Ja koko tämä
mahtava tulva vyörytti aalloissaan kuolettavaa ruttoa, levittäen sitä
erotuksetta rikkaan taloon ja kurjimpaan mökkiin. Kerjäläiskyyti oli
yhtenäisenä velvollisuutena missä vain hevosta oli, ja kuormasta,
joka ajoi pihaan, autettiin tahi kannettiin sairas tahi kuolevainen
huoneesen, jossa tuo onneton sai viipyä kunnes hän oli vähän
lämminnyt ja syönyt sen ruokapalasen, minkä kenties jaksoi syödä,
ja hevonen oli vaihdettu uutta matkaa varten. Mitä heikompi sairas
oli, sitä tärkeämpi oli jouduttaa lähtöä naapuritaloon, jotta
jouduttaisiin kunnallislautakunnan esimiehen tahi jonkun sen jäsenen
luo, että paästäisiin arkun teosta ja muista hautauspuuhista. Tiellä ei
aina vaivattu sairasta kysymyksillä hänen nimestänsä ja
kotipaikastansa, ja kun hän vihdoin saapui jonkun viranomaisen luo,
ei hän enää kyennyt antamaan näistä asioista selkoa.
"Tuntemattoman kiertolaisen ruumiin-arkusta 0 markkaa"
lautakunnan tileissä on hänen ainoa hautakirjoituksensa.
Mutta olihan tuommoinen meno sydämetöntä, suorastaan

petomaista! Eikö olisi voitu ryhtyä johonkin tehokkaampaan
toimeen? Pyydän saada vakuuttaa, että ihmisiä mekin siellä
maaseuduilla olimme, ja koetettiinhan monessa paikassa laittaa
sairashuoneita, kerjäläismajoja y.m. Mutta niissä ennen pitkää nousi
hävityksen kauhistus ylimmilleen. Tietysti niihin aluksi määrättiin
hoitaja. Se kuoli; määrättiin toinen: se kuoli. Kolmatta ei saatu tahi ei
tahdottu lähettää varman surman suuhun. Kävi niissä
itsensäuhraavia naisia koettamassa saada edes raitista ilmaa noihin
rutonpesiin, mutta useissa tapauksissa toivat sieltä muassaan taudin
kotiinsa. Niin jäivät nämä "sairashuoneet" vihdoin sairaiden omaan
huostaan. Aamulla kantoivat ne, jotka siihen kykenivät, yöllä kuolleet
ulos johonkin vajaan, siksi kun kunnallislautakunta tahi
paikkakunnan järjestysmiehet saapuivat irroittamaan jäätyneet
ruumiit maan poveen korjattaviksi. — Omasta näkemästäni en voi
tätä kauheutta todeksi vakuuttaa. Mutta niin kerrottiin niistä
paikkakunnista, joissa tätä keinoa oli koetettu. Monessa
kaupungissakin täytyi sulkea nuo peräti saastutetut huoneet; mikä
mahdollisuus olisi siis ollut maaseuduilla pitää niitä missään
kunnossa? Omassa pitäjässäni koetin sijoittaa sairaat mokkiläis-
akkojenn luo, yhden kuhunkin paikkaan. Yleinen puutteen-alaisuus
vaikutti, että ottajia tarjoutui, vaikka loppupäätös tavallisesti oli itse
hoitajan sairastuminen. Mutta toinen kuin toinenkin keino oli
oljenkorsi, johon tuossa suuressa haaksirikossa tartuttiin, ilman
vähintäkään toivoa, että se kannattaisi, siksi kun joutuisi pelastava
laiva, suvi, jonka tuloa niin kiihkeästi pakkasen ja pimeyden
vallitessa rukoiltiin.
Minun käsitykseni ja kokemukseni mukaan oli sittenkin paras

ensinmainittu keino, että väentulvaa pidettiin alituisessa ja
tasaisessa liikkeessä. Seisova vesi mätänee, sitä saatiin täydellisesti
tuta, kun toivo saada työtä rautatienrakennuksessa seisautti liikkeen.
Jumala oli siihen aikaan Suomen hätääntyneille antanut saman
käskyn kuin "ikuiselle juutalaiselle:" eteenpäin, eteenpäin! Parhaana
lääkkeenä oli raitis ilma, jota oli mahdoton saada missä suurempia
ihmisjoukkoja pitemmäksi ajaksi pysähtyi. Umpinaisesta pirtistä ulos
raittiisen talvi-ilmaan niin kauan kuin siihen mahdollisuutta oli, siinä
ainoa pelastuskeino.
Sopinee kysyä: miksi lähtivät nämä joukot liikkeelle kotipaikoiltaan,

kun hätä oli melkein yhtä suuri kaikkialla? Eikö jokainen paikkakunta
olisi voinut hoitaa omia hädänalaisiansa samoilla kustannuksilla,
joilla kerjäläisjoukot ruokittiin, semminkin kun kovimmin ahdistetut
paikkakunnat saivat runsaimmat apuvarat? Totta epäilemättä on, että
paljon kauheutta olisi vältetty, jos niin olisi tapahtunut. Mutta ensiksi
olivat köyhät liikkeellä jo ennen vuotta 1867, eikä tämä vuosi
suinkaan ollut omiansa lakkauttamaan tulvaa. Tuskin olisikaan varat
pantu niin tasan, jos vaivaishoitohallitus olisi vaatinut samoja
uhrauksia kuin ne, jotka tehtiin nälkään nääntyvän kanssa-ihmisen
hyväksi, kun hän omaan pirttiimme saapui. Kotikulmalla ei aina
tahdottu kerjätä, eikä kotipuolen kerjäläisiä kenties olisi kohdeltukaan
yhtä suopeasti kuin kaukolaisia. Waikka kohtalo tuolla raskaalla
matkalla, johon perhekunnittain lähdettiin, olikin tietämätön ja
kaikista mahdollisuuksista kuolema mahdollisin, älkäämme sentään
ihmetelkö, ettei perhe jäänyt omaan tyhjään kotiinsa nääntymään,
vaan lähti ainakin etsimään pelastusta, niin epävarmalta kuin se
näyttikin.
Toinen kysymys, johon ihmisjärki turhaan etsii vastausta, on se:

millä tuo liikkuva väestö vihdoin saatiin hengissä pysymään? Tosin
oli sille tarjottu elatus niukka, jopa kurja ja riittämätön, mutta kuolon
koko runsas niitto ei ollut suorastaan nälän tuottama, koska se
raivosi niissäkin, jotka eivät mitään varsinaista nälkää nähneet.
Jumala siunaa sen vähän, mitä hyvästä sydämestä ja vähästä
annetaan. Ja Suomen kansan kunniaksi olkoon julki lausuttuna, että
näinä aikoina täydellisesti ja yleisesti nähtiin kauniimpien legendain
toteutumista, kun viimeinen leipä taitettiin nälkäiselle veljelle.
Kiitettäköön täydellä syyllä niitä, jotka keräsivät runsaita lahjoja
hätääntyneille, mutta jättäkäämme tätä vertaamatta niiden
avuliaisuuteen, jotka, itse hätäleipää syöden, ruokkivat päivä päivältä
kulkevia, usein tietämättä mistä heidän oma huomispäiväinen
leipänsä oli saatava. Kovassa koulussa kasvatettuna, osaa Suomen
kansa tarpeen tullessa tätä armeliaisuutta harjottaa jalommin kuin
kukaan muu.
Tuskinpa lienee ollut sitä metsätorppaa, joka ei saanut joka päivä
kestitä jotakuta vierasta. Taloissa niitä kävi keskimäärin ainakin
kymmenkunta, jopa suurimmissa 60 ja enemmänkin. Miksipä
viillettäisiinkään lukijan sydäntä kuvaamalla tuota jokapäiväistä,
kuukausia kestävää ruoanjakoa. Mutta syystä ylistäkäämme
naistemme ihmeellistä kestävyyttä, kun heidän velvollisuutensa
vaatii heitä taisteluun kuolemaa ja kurjuutta vastaan. Omasta
puolestani täytyy minun, olkoonpa häpeäkseni, tunnustaa, että vain
pari kertaa satuin tuota hirveätä näytelmää näkemään, enkä
olisikaan ollut siinä muuta kuin jaloissa. Surkeinta siinä ei suinkaan
ollut noiden kova-onnisten näkeminen ja ruoanjako heille. Tapahtui
joskus, että avunetsijäin joukko äkkiä rupesi tavattomasti
karttumaan, vihdoin kahdenkertaiseksi. Mikä nyt on? Katsottiin
tarkkaan. Huomattiin, että samat henkilöt olivat käyneet talossa
useina päivinä perätysten, ja että ne, pysyäksensä tuntemattomina,
mikä milläkin tavoin koettivat asettaa rääsyjänsä toiseen muotoon.
Se kurja pala mikä noille onnettomille eilispäivänä oli tarjottu,
houkutteli heitä yöpymään likeisiin mökkeihin ja palaamaan yhtä
kurjan suuruksen saamista varten. Mutta näin padottu tulva olisi
epäilemättä upottanut sekä auttajat että avun-etsijät. Eteenpäin,
eteenpäin! ja sijaa uusille tulijoille, niin täytyi armottoman, mutta
ainoan mahdollisen käskyn kuulua. Miltä se käskijän sydämessä
tuntui, sitä ei ole tarvis tässä mainita.
XI.
Kuolevaisuus 1868.
Jokaiselle on hyvin tunnettu asia, että väestösuhteet kaikkialla

riippuvat kansojen varallisuuden tilasta, siten että ahtaampi
toimeentulo vaikuttaa sekä syntyneiden että kuolleiden lukuun,
toiseen vähentämällä, toiseen lisäämällä. Sotavuodet ovat tietysti
säännöllisistä laskuista poisjätettävät, koska väkiluvun suhteet silloin
riippuvat aivan satunnaisista oloista.
Suomessa, missä maanviljelys on verrattomasti tärkein ja

viimeisiin aikoihin saakka on ollut melkein ainoana elinkeinona,
vieläpä niinkin että viljanviljelys on ollut melkein yksinomainen,
vaikka se meidän ilman-alassamme ja viljelyksemme alkuperäisellä
kannalla ollessa luonnollisesti on ollut suurimmassa määrässä
epävarma, vaikuttaa vuositulo luonnollisesti tuntuvammasti kuin
missään muualla. Ei olekaan yhtään maata, missä väenlisäys olisi
niin epätasainen kuin meillä. Tämän vuosisadan kuluessa on, paitsi
vuotta 1808, ollut viisi vuotta, jolloin väkiluku on varsinaisesti
vähentynyt. Nämä vuodet ovat 1833, joka vähensi väkiluvun 22,246
hengellä 1832 vuoden kadon tähden, samoin 1836 1,107 hengellä ja
vihdoin nuo suruvuodet 1866—1868. Kaikkina muina tämän
vuosisadan vuosina on kyllä väestö lisääntynyt, mutta useina
vuosina varsin vähän: 1832 1,023 ja 1837 467:llä hengellä.
Prosenteissa vaihtelee väkiluvun muutokset -7,90 ja +1,69 välillä
(vuonna 1825). Ruotsissa pysyy sama aaltoliike +0,24 (1813) ja +
1,72 (1860) välillä; lisääntyipä väkiluku 1868:kin + 0,65 %. Tämä
todistaa selvästi Ruotsin vakavampaa taloudellista asemaa, johon
meidän maamme vasta 1868 vuoden jälkeen menestyksellä on
pyrkimässä.
Katovuodet eivät vaikuta väkilukuun ainoastaan lisääntyneiden

kuoleman-tapausten kautta, vaan myöskin syntyneiden luvun
vähentymisellä. 1868 aleni syntyneiden luku 43,757:ään, oltuansa
vuosina 1864: 71,307, 1865: 62,780, 1866: 58,853, 1867: 59,170,
siis vähimmästäkin luvusta noin viidellätoistatuhannella. Paljoa
pikaisemmassa suhteessa kuin syntyneiden luku väheni, kasvoi
kuolleiden luku. Se nousi vuonna 1866: 61,894, 1867: 69,774 ja
1868: 137,720.
Näiden vuosien hirveä kuolevaisuus oli kyllä katovuosien

seurauksena siten, että sopimattomat ja riittämättömät elatus-aineet
tuottivat tavallisen seurauksensa: nälkä-lavantaudin. Mutta tämä
tauti, kerran päästyänsä valtaan, ei suinkaan rajoittunut ainoastaan
niihin, jotka varsinaisesti olivat puutteenalaisia, vaan raivosi yhtä
säälimättömästi niiden seassa, jotka olivat alituisessa yhteydessä
nälkäisten ja sairasten kanssa. "Huomattava on", sanoo
lääkintöhallituksen ylitirehtori F. von Willebrand kertomuksessaan
lääkintölaitoksesta Suomessa vuodelta 1868, "että rutto verrattain
harvoin kohtasi kerjääviä, niin kauvan kun viettivät vaeltavaa
elämäänsä, jota vastoin ne henkilöt, jotka joutuivat heidän
kanssansa yhteyteen, ensikädessä ja melkein auttamattomasti
saivat taudin, mutta kulkevaiset vasta sitten kun rupesivat
pysyväiseen olopaikkaan, joko työlaitoksiin taikka talollisten
palvelijoiksi. Yksityisissä kodeissa kohtasi tauti erittäinkin
kyökkipalvelijoita tahi niitä henkilöitä, jotka kyökeissä jakelivat ruoka-
annoksia; niinikään pappeja, lääkäreitä, sairastenhoitajia ja yleensä
niitä, jotka virkavelvollisuudesta tahi armeliaisuuden toimissa
joutuivat välittömään yhteyteen kerjäävien kanssa. Moni jalo
maamme kansalainen, joka alttiudella toimi väliaikaisten
sairashuoneiden järjestämisessä tahi muissa armeliaisuuden
laitoksissa, vaipui kuolemaan tuossa suuressa taistelussa maan
yleistä hätää torjuessansa."
Kun viralliset tiedon-annot ilmoittavat, että nälkään ja nälkäripuliin

kuoli yhteensä 2,349 (joista yksi kaupungissa!), niin nämä numerot
tosin eivät voi merkitä paljon, muun muassa senkin tähden että
kansa hyvin vastenmielisesti ilmoitti tätä kuoleman syytä eikä sitä
edes käsittänyt, mutta yleensä vahvistavat ne herra v. Willebrandin
lausuntoa. Lavantaudin uhrit ilmoitetaan 57,363:ksi, mutta monet
muutkin taudit olivat epäilemättä suoranaisessa yhteydessä
nälänhädän kanssa, niinkuin esimerkiksi punatauti, joka kaatoi 7,666
henkeä, ja hinkuyskä, jonka uhrit nousivat 3,382:teen.
Ylipäänsä kestivät naiset tuntuvasti paremmin kuin miehet.

Miespuolisten kuolleiden luku oli 72,214 ja naispuolisten 65,506.
Kaikissa ikäluokissa on miespuolisten kuolleiden luku suurempi,
mutta erittäinkin tuntuva on tämä erotus ikäluokissa 25-50, jossa
kuolleiden miesten luku nousee 16,179, jota vastaa 13,386 naista.
Helposti huomasikin jokainen siihen aikaan maaseudulla eläjä, että
mitä tukevampi mies, sitä helpommin sairastui hän ja sitä
varmemmin seurasi tautia kuolema. Wielä merkillisempi on suhde
kuolleiden aviomiesten ja aviovaimojen välillä. Miehen kuoleman
kautta, näet, tuli puretuksi 24,267 ja vaimon kuoleman kautta 15,717
avioliittoa. Kuinka luokkia järjestetäänkin, niin ei ole missään erotus
yhtä silmiinpistävä. Osaksi saattaa erotus olla luonnollinen, koska
mies avioliitossa on vanhempi, mutta tämä ei likimainkaan riitä
yksinomaiseksi syyksi.
Walaisevan kuvan tuonen tuhotöistä saamme niinikään

tarkastamalla kuolemantapausten lukua vuoden eri kuukansina.
Koko vuonna 1867 oli kuolleiden luku jo suurempi kuin minäkään
edellisenä vuotena, mutta ei noussut varsin kammoksuttavaan
määrään kohta leikkuunkaan jälkeen, jolloin vielä oli jonkinmoisia
viljavarojakin hätäleivän ainesten sekaan pantavaksi. Joulukuussa
kasvaa kuolleiden luku jo verraten hyviin vuosiin melkein
kahdenkertaiseksi, ollen se 6,603, kun se samassa kuussa 1859
nousi ainoastaan 3,216. Mutta uuden vuoden alusta kiihtyi
niittomiehen työ yhä raivokkaammaksi. Tammikuussa kuoli 7,959,
Helmikuussa 9,367, Maaliskuussa 14,529, Huhtikuussa 20,626,
Toukokuussa 25,248. Kesäkuussa alenee kuolleiden luku
17,668:saan ja Heinäkuussa 12,866:teen. Silloin ei ollut vielä mitään
uutta viljaa leikattu, ja kuolevaisuuden väheneminen on siis suorana
seurauksena lämpöisestä ilmasta, mutta varmaankin myös mielten
virkistymisestä, kun taas nähtiin kedot viheriöitsevinä, tähät
pelloissa, ja kiitollinen huokaus pääsi jokaisesta sydämestä: "Herra
koettelee, vain eipä hylkää." Wuoden loppukuukausina ja uuden
leikkuun jälkeen vähenivät kuolemantapaukset vähenemistään, niin
että niiden luku Joulukuussa ei ollut varsin tuntuvasti keskimäärää
suurempi.
Jos jätämme lukuun ottamatta isonvihan aikakautta, jolloin miekka

ja vaino vuosikymmeniä tekivät kauhean tehtävänsä, ei ole surma
tehnyt maassamme semmoista hävitystyötä sitten kun nälkävuosina
1696—98. Keskimäärin koko maan väestöstä kuoli 7,90 %,
kaupungin-asukkaista 5,21 % ja maaseudulla 8,10 %.
Odottamattomasti kyllä osoittaa Hämeen lääni suurimman
kuolevaisuuden 10,65 ja sen jälkeen Kuopion lääni 10,35 %. Oulun
läänissä ei ollut kuolevaisuus niinkään suuri (7,20 %) kuin
Uudenmaan läänissä (7,55 %). Wiipurin ja Mikkelin lääneissä, joissa
1867 vuoden sato oli verrattain parempi, teki kuolleiden luku 5,28 %
ja 6,33 %.
Mutta tarkastaessamme kuolevaisuuden suhteita eri

paikkakunnissa, ilmaantuu vielä kauheampia tosi-asioita.
Korkeimmalla kuolevaisuuden prosentilla esiintyy Parkanon pitäjä
Turun lääniä, jossa se nousi 23,18, s.o. likimain joka neljäs henkilö
seurakunnassa laskettiin maan poveen. Kaikkiaan kuoli
seurakunnassa 765 henkilöä ja syntyi 31. Tämän jälkeen
korkeimman prosentin tapaamme Oulun läänissä Reisjärvellä, 21,92.
Turun läänin pitäjistä osoittaa Ruoveden pitäjä (18,64 %) ja Hämeen
läänissä Orihveden pitäjä (16,93 %) korkeimmat prosentit.
Tähän otetut numerot olen saanut tilastollisen viraston erittäin

valaisevasta ja laveasta kertomuksesta väkiluvun suhteista
Suomessa, sen II:sta vihosta.
Ylen surkeata on, että ne suurenmoiset ja kiitettävät ponnistukset,

joihin ryhdyttiin hallituksen ja yksityisten puolelta, eivät voineet
paremmin häätää yleisen kadon seurauksia. Tietystikään tämä ei
alenna niiden arvoa. Ne pelastivat varmaankin satojatuhansia, mutta
se ei ole riittävänä lohdutuksena kun kuitenkin niin lukuisten
kansalaisten täytyi nääntyä yleiseen kurjuuteen. Mitä erittäin
terveydenhoitoon tulee, lausuu siitä päätirehtori v. Willebrand jo
ennen mainitussa kertomuksessaan: "Täytyy tunnustaa yleiseksi
totuudeksi, että äsken loppunut koettelemuksen aika, ennen
kuulemattomine kärsimyksineen sittenkin on jättänyt ratkaisematta
kysymyksen, mitenkä oikeastaan ovat autettavat kerjäläiset ja
hädänalaiset tarkoituksenmukaisimmalla tavalla. Tähän päätökseen
tulee siitä, että useimmat yritykset, sekä yleiset että yksityiset, jotka
tarkoittivat joko suoranaista apua taikka työnansion hankkimista,
sekä vihdoin kaikki, mitä saatiin toimeen tuon suuren sairasjoukon
hoitamisessa, ovat jättäneet sen muiston, että ne, vaikka lähtivätkin
jaloimmasta myötätuntoisuudesta kärsiviä lähimmäisiä kohtaan,
usein tuottivat niukkoja hedelmiä, jopa onnettomuutta siunauksen
verosta."
Nämä lohduttomat sanat, josko liioiteltujakin, valitettavasti pitävät

pääasiassa yleensä paikkansa.
XII.
Kuinka kansa kesti koetelmuksessa.
"Tätä nykyä ovat pistoolit sujuvammasti täällä kaupaksi käypää

tavaraa", kirjoitti syksyllä 1867 Helsingfors Dagbladin jonkinmoinen
kroniköri, sillä verrattoman kevytmielisellä hävyttömyydellä, joka on
moisille herroille omituinen. Ei tarvinne sanoa miltä tuo suora
viittaus, ellei juuri kehotuskaan, vastaisiin väkivaltaisuuksiin tuntui
maaseutulaisille, joilla ei ole onni saada huutaa poliisia joka
kadunkulmassa, ei edes nyt, kun niistä on pidetty isällistä huolta
poliisivoiman lisäämisellä. Mutta paheksumista ja vastalauseen nosti
tämä törkeys jossakin pääkaupunginkin lehdessä. "Tuosta pilasta",
joksi sitä sitten H.D. sanoi, kävi kuitenkin selville mitä
pääkaupungissa ajateltiin kansasta ja lähimmästä tulevaisuudesta.
Entä maaseuduilla? Siellä tosin ensikädessä ei ajateltu ryöstöä ja

pistooleja, mutta totta on, että mielet olivat syys-yötä synkemmät.
Joka miehen laskut osoittivat, että jos viljavarat pannaankin tasan,
niin kuolee hiirikin jyväaitoissa nälkään uuden vuoden aikaan. Mitä
kauhua silloin tulee eteen, kun täytyy sulkea porttinsa ja ovensa
nälkäisiltä laumoilta, jotka kuoleman tuskissa kamppailevat niiden
edustalla? Niin kysyttiin, ja jos vastaus saatiin, niin kuului se: ei sitä
voi kestää. "Rukoilkaat ettei teidän pakonne tapahtuisi talvella."
Olisihan todellakin sopinut luonnolliseksi otaksua, että kaikki

yhteiskunnalliset siteet raukeisivat odotettavassa suuressa
hävityksessä. Onhan monessa maassa nähty, että suurina
ruttovuosina vimmastunut kansa syyttää lääkäreitä ja ylhäisiä
kaivojen myrkyttämisestä ja muista ilkitöistä kansan surmaamiseksi.
Mutta Suomen kansa yksinkertaisella talonpoikais-filosofiallansa
käsitti täydellä todella katovuotta Jumalan rangaistukseksi. Tuota
"ennakkoluuloa" olivat siihen siis menestyksellä tyrkyttäneet sen
papit. Ja moni näistä papeista näkikin nälkää kilvan
seurakuntalaistensa kanssa, paahtoi tuokkosissa leivänmukaisensa,
kun pitäjän hallan-panemista viljoista ei saatu leiviksi leivottavaa
taikinaa, lähti ruttoisiin mökkeihin lohdutusta kuoleville antamaan ja
vaipui samaan yhteiseen hautaan niiden kanssa.
Tuo matala "talonpoikais-filosofia" ei jaksanut kohota

"herrasfilosofian" tasalle. Se ei tullut ajatelleeksi "että varmaankaan
eivät herrat ja rikkaat ole käytöksellään loukanneet Jumalata ja
sentähden pääsivät he kai siitä rangaistuksesta, joka kohtasi kaikkia
köyhiä." Tämä filosofia ei tartu meidän kansaamme, sentähden, että
se on hienoissa hotelleissa maailman-viisauttansa oppineiden
luoma. Niihin tosin ei ulotu Jumalan rankaiseva käsi, vaikka kuinka
koettaneekin. Mutta jokainen, joka tietää ihmisessä olevan muuta
kuin vatsaa, jokainen, joka tuntee itseänsä solidariseksi kansansa
kanssa, sai kyllä siksi osansa yleisestä onnettomuudesta, että hänen
täytyi, mikä hänen asemansa muutoin olikaan, nöyrtyä Jumalan
käden alle. Kun tuhansia kaatui oikealla ja tuhansia vasemmalla, kun
tässä epätoivoisessa taistelussa nälkää ja kuolemata vastaan
yleinen suru välittömästi tahi välillisesti tunki jokaiseen yksityiseen
kotiin, missä olisi silloin löytynyt niin paatunut, että hän olisi tullut
ajatelleeksi "köyhien" yksinomaista syntisyyttä ja omaa moitteetonta
esiintymistä Herran Jumalan edessä.
Eikä tuo nälkäinen kansa itsekään tullut semmoiseen ajatukseen;

se kyllä omin silmin näki, mitä eivät nähneet nuo veltostuneet
sydämet ja tyhjät aivot, että rangaistus oli sekä yhteinen että yleinen.
Mikäpä muutoin olisikaan estänyt noita nälkäisiä joukkoja
liittäytymästä väkivaltaisia töitä harjoittamaan? Ei ainakaan
poliisivoima maaseuduilla. Mutta varma on, ettei yhtäkään lukkoa
tarvinnut lujittaa, ei yhtäkään ovea tahi akkunaa tarvinnut teljetä, eikä
yhtäkään pistoolia ladata. Isäntäväki nukkui levollisesti huoneessaan
vieraiden, kaikilta maakunnilta kokoontuneiden joukkojen
ympäröimänä. Eivät osoita meidän rikosluettelomme mitään
tavallisista oloista poikkeavaa. Kuolla osasi Suomen kansa, vaan
etsiä pelastustansa rikoksilla sitä se ei osannut.
Semmoiseksi näyttäytyi kansamme tässä taistelussaan.
Ja mistä tämä voima? Siitä tosin "vanhasta aatteesta", että Jumala

katsoo terveelliseksi joskus muistuttaa ihmisiä, että rakentaja
turhaan rakentaa, kylväjä turhaan kylvää, ellei Herra anna
siunaustansa, mutta että tämä sama Herra on laupias ja antaa
myöskin lievitystä tuskissa. Olin usein tilaisuudessa keskustelemaan
näistä asioista kansanmiesten ja -naisten kanssa, mutta kumminkin
on mieleeni painunut pari kohtausta, joissa kansan käsitys käy
erittäin selville.
"Kyllä väittää meidän viisaat, ettei tähän maailman aikaan ihmeitä

tapahdu", sanoi eräs ukko minulle. "Mutta kyllä ainakin nyt näemme
silmiemme edessä ja laveassa määrässä päivä päivältä uudistuvan
tuon ihmetyön, että Kristus ruokkii 5,000 miestä viidellä leivällä ja
kahdella kalalla. Ei suinkaan väki tähän aikaan pysyisi hengissä
vuosisadollaan, hätäleivän aineksilla eikä keräyksillä, ellei Jumala
antaisi näille vähille varoille erinomaista siunaustansa" (Wertaa herra
Tavaststjernan sanoihin: "Ei heidän luoksensa tullut mikään ihana
vapahtaja, joka kolmella leivällä ja viidellä kalalla ravitsi tuhansia.").
Eräänä päivänä olin pyydetty kalunkirjoitusta pitämään varalliseen

naapuritaloon, jossa nuorenläntä isäntä oli kuollut lavantautiin.
Toimitusmiehet tietysti saivat runsaan ravintonsa, ja höystivät, kuten
ainakin, ruokahaluansa puhumalla nälästä. Eräs heistä sanoi:
"Kuinka rikkaaksi tulleekaan Suomen kansa, jos Jumala vielä antaa
tavallisiakin vuosia, kun nyt on opittu näin vähillä toimeentulemaan,
ja viljat vastedes saadaan myydä ulkomaille!" Emäntä joka tunnetun
tavan mukaan passasi pöydässä, vastasi siihen: "Älkää sitä uskoko,
että kansa silloin voi elää niin vähällä kuin nyt. Kun viljaa saadaan
tavallisesti, niin kyllä ihminen tarvitsee tavallisen ravintonsa. Mutta
kun Jumala sulkee kätensä, niin hän antaa voimiakin kestämään
sillä, mitä hän antaa. Ei ihminen elä ainoasti leivästä."
Semmoinen on kansan katsantotapa.
Sittemmin olen saanut asiasta paremman selon. Innostuneena

kerroin näitä keskusteluita eräälle ajattelevalle herrasmiehelle. Hän
sanoi: "Kyllähän tuo on varsin kaunis metafori. Mutta itse asiassa se
ei ole muuta kuin mitä Darwin sanoo ihmisen adaptioni-kyvyksi"
(Ihmisen kyky mukaantua oleviin oloihin). Olihan tuo ämpärillinen
kylmää vettä hehkuvan sydämeni kiukaalle. Mutta kyllä lähtikin siitä
tulikuumaa löylyä.
Nämä onnettomat! Dogmi-uskoa ne sättivät, mutta kaikella heidän

ajatusvoimallaan eivät jaksa huomata, kuinka ovat suin silmin
jokaisen muka tieteellisen päiväkautisen dogmin orjina. Eläkööt
mitenkä jaksavat. Mutta Suomen kansa kestää taisteluissaan niin
kauan kun se pysyy vanhoissa "ennakkoluuloissaan." Riistäkää ne
siltä, ja se tulee myrskyjen ajeltavaksi lastuksi, ilman rauhaa, ilman
satamaa.
Pyydän tässäkin turvautua "virallisiin todistuskappaleisin."

Kuolevaisuussuhteita tutkiessani tapasin Lääkäriseuran
Toimituksissa myöskin kertomuksen Kangasalan lääkäripiirin tilasta
vuonna 1868, jonka on antanut silloin siellä asuva piirilääkäri E. von
Bonsdorff. Hänen todistustansa käytän sitä kernaammin, koska omin
silmin näin mitä hän kertoo, ja koska opin hänessä tuntemaan
miestä, joka säälimättä pani voimansa ja terveytensä alttiiksi
yhteisessä taistelussa ja myöskin osasi asettua kansan
käsityskannalle. Hän sanoo: "Ei sovi kieltää, että useilta puuttui se
vähinkin määrä, mikä ihmisen hengissä pysymiselle, vaikka sitä
kuinkakin supistettaisiin, on välttämätön. Mutta siinäpä, ja siinä
kenties enimmin, kävi ilmi kansan suuremmoinen altistus, kun ei
vaikeimmissakaan oloissa kuultu väestön ilmoittavan nälästä
tapahtuneita kuolemankohtauksia. Useimmiten sattui lavantauti
tekemään lopun, tuottaen sen lohdutuksen, että kuolema oli tullut
vähemmän hirvittävästä syystä. Mutta silloinkin kun ei lavantauti
kohdannut, vaan kuoleman syynä oli yleinen nääntyminen, sanottiin
tätäkin taudiksi, tavallisesti 'jalanpäälliseksi taudiksi', se on
semmoiseksi taudiksi, jossa sairas oli jalkeilla, kunnes kuolema tuli.
Tämä harso peite hädän kauhujen yli oli kuitenkin sekä
hätääntyneille että näkijöille tarpeellinen lievitys aseman vaikeuksien
kestämiseksi." Toisessa paikassa sanoo hän: "Koko tätä surkeutta
jaksoi kestää ainoastaan sen tähden, että kärsimyksen
ylenmääräisyys tylsistytti ja paadutti näkijää, kun ei ollut
ihmisvoimassa mitään tehokasta apua sitä vastaan. Mitä silloin
kärsittiin, sitä ei tule mikään kynä kuvaamaan, koska kansa ei
tahtonut tuoda tuskiansa päivän valoon. Se kärsi täydellisesti
vaijeten."
Arvokkaammilla sanoilla ja jalommalla päästökirjalla Suomen

kansalle en voi lopettaa tätä lukua, kuin seuraavalla otteella Oulun
läänin kuvernöörin, nykyisen senaattorin, parooni G. von Alfthanin
virallisesta kertomuksesta läänin tilasta 1865—70: "Liikuttavalla
alttiudella kärsi ja menehtyi satoja ja tuhansia, ilman että niiden
mieleenkään joutui käydä käsiksi paremmassa tilassa elävien
naapuriensa omaisuuteen, ja ihmeteltävällä pontevuudella ja itsensä
kieltämyksellä kynti väestö uudestaan peltonsa, ja kylvi siihen sen
siemenen, jolla kalvava nälkä olisi voitu hetkeksi sammuttaa."
Niin kesti Suomen kansa koetelmuksensa.

XIII.
1867 vuoden merkitys.
Taistelukentällä oli surman pitkä päivätyö vihdoinkin loppunut.

Kuten ainakin miesten tappotantereella, nousi kysymys minkä voiton
kansan uhraukset olivat tuottaneet, mikä merkitys äsken päättyneelle
hirmu-aikakaudelle oli kansan historiassa annettava. Lohdutonta olisi
niiden, jotka tahtovat kansojen kohtalojen johdossa nähdä
kaikkiviisaan sormen, eikä ainoastaan ylivoimaisten luonnonlakien
hillitsemätöntä leikkiä, ajatella että kaikki kärsimykset, kaikki alttius,
kaikki jalo kestävyys ja pontevuus olivat olleet pelkästään hetken
itsensäpelastus-vaistoa, ilman mitään vaikutusta omaan aikakauteen
ja nouseviin sukupolviin. Oliko Suomen kansa todellakin kärsinyt ja
haudannut toistasataatuhatta lastansa kaiketta pysyväisettä
tuloksetta?
Osoittaahan historiamme useita ajan kohtia, jolloin kansamme on

nääntymiseen saakka ponnistanut voimiansa ilman näkyvää toivoa.
Me, jotka voimme laveammalta silmäillä tapauksia ja niiden
seurauksia, käsitämme helposti, mitä hedelmiä olemme korjanneet
kansamme kestävyydestä ison vihan hävityksissä, sen
uskollisuudesta ja horjumattomuudesta "Suomen viimeisessä
taistelussa."
Älkäämme yrittäkökään vertaamaan puheena olevia vuosia näihin

äsken mainittuihin aikakausiin. Mutta yhtä hyvin pysyy vankkana ja
lohduttavana totena, että se voitto, jonka kansamme tälläkin kertaa
suunnattomilla uhrauksillansa saavutti, ei ole jäänyt tuottamatta
pysyväistä tulosta. Näyttää välttämättömältä edistymiselle, että
kansoja tuon tuossakin järkähytetään juuria myöten, jotta heräjävät
tavallisten päivien unettavasta yksitoikkoisuudesta virkeämpään
toimeen. Myrskyt henkisessä maailmassa ovat yhtä tarpeelliset kuin
aineellisessakin.
Pahin haava suomalaisessa maataloudessa, kotitarpeen

viinanpoltto, oli kyllä säätyjen päätöksen kautta 1863-64 vuosien
valtiopäivillä saatu poistetuksi, mutta surullisena seisoi maanviljelijä
aution "pränninsä" ovella eikä ymmärtänyt miten olla, kuinka elää.
Wähimmin kääntyi hänen ajatuksensa karjaan, tuohon
"välttämättömään pahaan", eikä enää ollutkaan "rankkia" saatavissa,
joka oli ollut ainoana sen hengissä pysymisen ehtona. 1867 vuoden
kato oli vihdoin vaikuttavana saarnana. Oli nähty mitä
mökkiläisämmä oli lehmästänsä myynyt, ja rehukasvien viljelys sekä
paremmat navettarakennukset rupesivat, kuten ihmeen kautta,
näkymään kaikkialla.
Ojitetuilla pelloilla oli huomattu verraten parempi kasvu, koska niitä

kutakuinkin oli voitu 1867 ja 1868 vuoden sateisina syksyinä
aikanaan kylvää, ja lapiomiehet saivat ankaraa kiirutta. Kyllähän
ojien tarpeellisuutta ennenkin tiedettiin, mutta "hullu paljon työtä
tekee, elää viisas vähemmällä", ja "väittihän isäni, ettei hän ikinä
mitään ole ojasta leikannut." Mutta nyt oli saatu kokea, mihin

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Science and Religion in America 1800 1860 Herbert

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Eastern Orthodoxy and the Science Theology Dialogue

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Science and Religion in India Beyond Disenchantment 1st

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Issues in Science and

ISSN 2364-5717 ISSN 2364-5725 (electronic)

Halle (Saale), Sachsen-Anhalt, Germany Dirk Evers

Philosophical and Methodological Perspectives

We begin with an exploration and comparison of pluralism in science and religion/

Gutiérrez Gonzáles develops the fundamental features of Einstein’s cosmic vision.

art, Fatona establishes an alternative imagistic account of imaginations involving

Religious and Theological Perspectives

Part I Philosophical and Methodological Perspectives

Part II Scientific Perspectives

Part III Religious Perspectives

Luís F. Amaral SJ Rua dos Três Vales, Caparica, Portugal

Emily Qureshi-Hurst University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

Keywords Belief systems · Complexity · Consilience · Epistemology · Meaning ·

A general perception assumes that theology is pluralistic by necessity, and cannot

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 3

2  heology – Feeling Bad Before a Strong Science

processes, but understanding, or a cognitive state that satisfies human needs in a

3  truggling with Pluralism in Science and Theology –

4 A Final Note on the Scientific Study of Religion

Lluis Oviedo is a full professor of Theological Anthropology (Antonianum University, Rome);

Abstract Metaphors are important and perhaps indispensable for understanding,

Keywords Communication · Imagination · Insight · Metaphor · Narrative ·

1 The Significance of Images

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 11

is manifested in a vast range of inspiring paintings, sculpture, and architecture.

2 First Response: The Need to Understand

3 Second Response: The Value of Plurality

that thinking about ultimate causes, in theology as in science, tends to generate a

4 Third Response: Metaphors in Revealed Theology

A third response to validate the importance of metaphors is that revealed theology

Metaphors, which connect words with embodied experiences, are immensely

Keywords Allostasis · Consciousness · Cultural evolution · Epigenetics · Ethics ·

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 23

psychosocial intervention designed by an International NGO, Mercy Corps, to

4 Challenges and Solutions

In cases where an apparent contradiction/controversy arises, it most probably arises

information, see https://contendingmodernities.nd.edu/about/research-­areas/

Muistellessa niitä kauhun kuvia, jotka lakkaamattomana

Mutta olihan tuommoinen meno sydämetöntä, suorastaan

Minun käsitykseni ja kokemukseni mukaan oli sittenkin paras

Sopinee kysyä: miksi lähtivät nämä joukot liikkeelle kotipaikoiltaan,

Toinen kysymys, johon ihmisjärki turhaan etsii vastausta, on se:

Jokaiselle on hyvin tunnettu asia, että väestösuhteet kaikkialla

Suomessa, missä maanviljelys on verrattomasti tärkein ja

Katovuodet eivät vaikuta väkilukuun ainoastaan lisääntyneiden

Näiden vuosien hirveä kuolevaisuus oli kyllä katovuosien

Halle (Saale), Sachsen-Anhalt, Germany Dirk Evers

Philosophical and Methodological Perspectives

Religious and Theological Perspectives

Part I Philosophical and Methodological Perspectives

Part II Scientific Perspectives

Part III Religious Perspectives

2 heology – Feeling Bad Before a Strong Science

3 truggling with Pluralism in Science and Theology –

4 A Final Note on the Scientific Study of Religion

1 The Significance of Images

2 First Response: The Need to Understand

3 Second Response: The Value of Plurality

4 Third Response: Metaphors in Revealed Theology

4 Challenges and Solutions

information, see https://contendingmodernities.nd.edu/about/research-areas/