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Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice 96
Marion Albers
Ingo Wolfgang Sarlet Editors
Personality and
Data Protection
Rights
on the Internet
Brazilian and German Approaches
Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law
and Justice
Volume 96
Series Editors
Mortimer Sellers, University of Baltimore, Baltimore, MD, USA
James Maxeiner, University of Baltimore, Baltimore, MD, USA
Editorial Board
Myroslava Antonovych, Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Kyiv, Ukraine
Nadia de Araújo, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil
Jasna Bakšic-Muftic, University of Sarajevo, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina
David L. Carey Miller, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, UK
Loussia P. Musse Félix, University of Brasilia, Federal District, Brazil
Emanuel Gross, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel
James E. Hickey Jr., Hofstra University, South Hempstead, NY, USA
Jan Klabbers, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland
Cláudia Lima Marques, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre,
Brazil
Aniceto Masferrer, University of Valencia, Valencia, Spain
Eric Millard, West Paris University, Nanterre Cedex, France
Gabriël A. Moens, Curtin University, Perth, Australia
Raul C. Pangalangan, University of the Philippines, Quezon City, Philippines
Ricardo Leite Pinto, Lusíada University of Lisbon, Lisboa, Portugal
Mizanur Rahman, University of Dhaka, Dhaka, Bangladesh
Keita Sato, Chuo University, Tokyo, Japan
Poonam Saxena, University of Delhi, New Delhi, India
Gerry Simpson, London School of Economics, London, UK
Eduard Somers, University of Ghent, Gent, Belgium
Xinqiang Sun, Shandong University, Shandong, China
Tadeusz Tomaszewski, Warsaw University, Warsaw, Poland
Jaap de Zwaan, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
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More information about this series at https://link.springer.com/bookseries/7888

Marion Albers · Ingo Wolfgang Sarlet
Editors
Personality and Data

Protection Rights
on the Internet
Brazilian and German Approaches
Editors
Marion Albers Ingo Wolfgang Sarlet
Faculty of Law Law School
University of Hamburg Pontifical Catholic University from Rio
Hamburg, Germany Grande do Sul
Porto Alegre, RS, Brazil
ISSN 1534-6781 ISSN 2214-9902 (electronic)

Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice
ISBN 978-3-030-90330-5 ISBN 978-3-030-90331-2 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90331-2
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022

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Contents
Personality and Data Protection Rights on the Internet:

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Marion Albers and Ingo Wolfgang Sarlet
Privacy Protection in the World Wide Web—Legal Perspectives
on Accomplishing a Mission Impossible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Markus Kotzur
Personality Rights in Brazilian Data Protection Law: A Historical
Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Danilo Doneda and Rafael A. F. Zanatta
Realizing the Fundamental Right to Data Protection in a Digitized
Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Jörn Reinhardt
Surveillance and Data Protection Rights: Data Retention
and Access to Telecommunications Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Marion Albers
Privacy Protection with Regard to (Tele-)Communications
Surveillance and Data Retention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Carlos Alberto Molinaro and Regina Linden Ruaro
The Protection of Personality in the Digital Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
Ingo Wolfgang Sarlet
Forgetting as a Social Concept. Contextualizing the Right to Be
Forgotten . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
Anna Schimke
Brazilian Internet Bill of Rights: The Five Roles of Freedom
of Expression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
Carlos Affonso Pereira de Souza and Beatriz Laus Marinho Nunes
v
vi Contents
Civil Rights Framework of the Internet (BCRFI; Marco Civil da

Internet): Advance or Setback? Civil Liability for Damage Derived
from Content Generated by Third Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
Anderson Schreiber
Self-regulation in Online Content Platforms and the Protection
of Personality Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
Ivar A. Hartmann
Regulating Intermediaries to Protect Personality
Rights Online—The Case of the German NetzDG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
Wolfgang Schulz
Online Anonymity—The Achilles’-Heel of the Brazilian Marco
Civil da Internet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309
Sohail Aftab
The Impact of Jurisdiction and Legislation on Standards
of Anonymity on the Internet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337
Lothar Michael
Digital Identity and the Problem of Digital Inheritance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
Gabrielle Bezerra Sales Sarlet
The Digital Estate in the Conflict Between the Right of Inheritance
and the Protection of Personality Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377
Felix Heidrich
Algorithms and Discrimination: The Case of Credit Scoring
in Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407
Laura Schertel Mendes and Marcela Mattiuzzo
Safeguarding Regional Data Protection Rights on the Global
Internet—The European Approach Under the GDPR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 445
Raoul-Darius Veit
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 485
Editors and Contributors
About the Editors
Marion Albers is Full Professor of Public Law, Information and Communication

Law, Health Law and Legal Theory at Hamburg University and Principal Investigator
in the Brazilian/German CAPES/DAAD PROBRAL-Research Project “Internet
Regulation and Internet Rights.” Main areas of research include fundamental rights,
information and Internet law, data protection, health law and biolaw, police law
and law of intelligence services, legal theory and sociology of law. Selected publi-
cations are Recht & Netz: Entwicklungslinien und Problemkomplexe, in: Marion
Albers/Ioannis Katsivelas (eds.), Recht & Netz, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2018, pp. 9–
35; L’effet horizontal des droits fondamentaux dans le cadre d’une conception
à multi-niveaux, in: Thomas Hochmann/Jörn Reinhardt (dir.), L’effet horizontal
des droits fondamentaux, Editions Pedone, Paris, 2018, pp. 177–216; Biotech-
nologies and Human Dignity, in: Dieter Grimm/Alexandra Kemmerer/Christoph
Möllers (eds.), Human Dignity in Context, München/Oxford/Baden-Baden: C. H.
Beck/Hart/Nomos, 2018, pp. 509–559, also published in Revista Direito Público,
Vol. 15 (2018), pp. 9–49; A Complexidade da Proteção de Dados, Revista Brasiliera
de Direitos Fundamentais e Justiça, Belo Horizonte, ano 10, n. 35, 2016, pp. 19–45.
Ingo Wolfgang Sarlet Dr. Iur. Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München is Chair

Professor for Constitutional Law and Current Head of the Graduation Program
in Law (LL.M.-Ph.D.) at the Pontifical Catholic University Rio Grande do Sul,
Brazil—PUCRS and Principal Investigator in the Brazilian/German CAPES/DAAD
PROBRAL-Research Project “Internet Regulation and Internet Rights.” Current
research projects are protection of human dignity and fundamental rights in the
digital domain and social rights, innovation and technology. Selected Publications
are A Eficácia dos Direitos Fundamentais, 13th Ed., Porto Alegre, Livraria do Advo-
gado, 2018; Dignidade da Pessoa Humana na Constituição Federal de 1988, 10th Ed.,
Livraria do Advogado, Porto Alegre, 2015; Direito Constitucional Ecológicol, 6th
Ed., Revista dos Tribunais, São Paulo, 2019; Grundrechte und Privatrecht—Einige
vii
viii Editors and Contributors
Bemerkungen zum Einfluss der deutschen Grundrechtsdogmatik und insbeson-

dere der Lehre Canaris’ in Brasilien, in: Festschrift für Claus-Wilhelm Canaris
zum 80. Geburtstag, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2017, pp. 1257–80; Menschenwürde und
soziale Grundrechte in der brasilianischen Verfassung, in: Stephan Kirste, Draiton
Gonzaga De Souza and Ingo Wolfgang Sarlet (eds), Menschenwürde im 21. Jahrhun-
dert. Untersuchungen zu den philosophischen, völker- und verfassungsrechtlichen
Grundlagen in Brasilien, Deutschland und Österreich, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2018.
Contributors
Sohail Aftab Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, Pakistan;

University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany
Marion Albers University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany
Carlos Affonso Pereira de Souza Rio de Janeiro State University (UERJ), Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil
Danilo Doneda Public Law Institute of Brasília (IDP), Brasília, Brazil
Ivar A. Hartmann Insper Learning Institution, São Paulo, Brazil
Felix Heidrich Leipzig University and Federal Administrative Court, Leipzig,
Germany
Markus Kotzur University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany
Marcela Mattiuzzo University of São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil
Laura Schertel Mendes University of Brasília (UnB), Brasília, Brazil
Lothar Michael Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf, Germany
Carlos Alberto Molinaro formerly: Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande
do Sul—Law School (PUCRS), Porto Alegre, Brazil
Beatriz Laus Marinho Nunes Intellectual Property Specialist, Pontifical Catholic
University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Jörn Reinhardt University of Bremen, Bremen, Germany
Regina Linden Ruaro Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul—Law
School (PUCRS), Porto Alegre, Brazil
Gabrielle Bezerra Sales Sarlet Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do
Sul—Law School (PUCRS), Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul, Brasil
Ingo Wolfgang Sarlet Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul–Law
School (PUCRS), Porto Alegre, Brazil
Anna Schimke University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany
Editors and Contributors ix
Anderson Schreiber Faculty of Law, Rio de Janeiro State University (UERJ), Rio
de Janeiro, Brazil
Wolfgang Schulz Leibniz-Institute for Media Research | Hans Bredow-Institut,
Hamburg, Germany
Raoul-Darius Veit University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany
Rafael A. F. Zanatta University of São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil
Personality and Data Protection Rights
on the Internet: Introduction
Marion Albers and Ingo Wolfgang Sarlet
Abstract This article gives a brief overview of the development of the Internet and
the rise of the onlife world. As a socio-technical arrangement, the Internet is both a
factor in and a product of modern society and comes together with fundamental social
change. The legal challenges emerging with the Internet involve fundamental issues
up to and including the question of what exactly the law is. They comprise cross-
sectional issues such as the declining relevance of the territorial borders of nation
states for applying and enforcing law. Last but not least, manifold legal questions in
particular areas arise. Legal answers must be Internet-specific to a certain extent, but
must also build on to or at least be coordinated with established legal solutions. As
communication on the Internet always includes datafication, among the pressing legal
problems is the handling of personal data and how to advance personality and data
protection rights. The contributions to this volume are dedicated to key questions,
ranging from the urgent need for transnational standards or convincing enforce-
ment mechanisms for regionally established data protection rights up to problems of
surveillance, forgetting on the Internet, regulation of intermediaries, anonymity, the
digital estate or algorithmic discrimination.
We are grateful for the support of the DAAD (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst) and
CAPES (Comissão de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Ensino Superior) for the Academic Exchange
and Research PROBRAL Project ’Internet Regulation and Internet Rights’ conducted by the Pontif-
ical Catholic University Porto Alegre, Brazil (PUCRS) and the University of Hamburg (Germany)
and coordinated by us both. This book is one of the outcomes of this project. We would also like
to thank Matthew Harris and Sandra Lustig for their help and constructive comments during the
process of editing this article and several other contributions in this volume.
M. Albers
e-mail: marion.albers@uni-hamburg.de
I. W. Sarlet (B)
Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul–Law School (PUCRS), Porto Alegre, Brazil
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 1

M. Albers and I. W. Sarlet (eds.), Personality and Data Protection Rights on the Internet,
Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice 96,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90331-2_1
2 M. Albers and I. W. Sarlet
1 The Emergence of the Onlife World
Whereas in its early years it was described as a separate sphere, “cyberspace”,

or as “virtual” (in contrast to “real”) reality, the Internet and the techniques and
arrangements associated with it are now widely and firmly embedded in society. The
“onlif e world” is one of the new catchwords referring to a blurred online/offline
“hyperconnected reality.”1 These developments entail numerous challenges for the
law.
From a technical point of view, “the” Internet can be described as a set of inter-
connected networks and computers that are in principle organized in a decentralized
way, but operate according to certain standards and (meta-)protocol families. It is
not a medium, but rather a multi-layered infrastructure that provides the basis for
various communication and media formats. It is based on technical developments, for
example on digitization, on decentralized and increasingly miniaturized computers,
on data transmission technologies, and on software architectures. To a certain extent,
it is shaped by their construction and their advancements.
The technical foundations, however, are not the only factor that matters. Devel-
opments and applications of technology are always embedded in social contexts
and in social practices in dealing with technology. For this reason, the milestones
of the Internet—from its early stages through the Web 2.02 and the “Internet of
Things”3 to the emerging “Internet of Bodies”4 —cannot be understood in terms of a
linear and seamless evolution. There are overlaps, a juxtaposition of technologies or
implementation of technical possibilities in social practices some of which unfolds
rapidly, some slowly and, in part, is not done at all. From a social science point of
view, the Internet presents itself as a socio-technical arrangement. It is a factor in and
a product of modern society and its characteristics: the global society, the functionally
differentiated society, the knowledge society or the individualized society.
How broadly and how deeply the Internet is anchored in society can be proven
by quantitatively measurable indicators of usage. More crucial, however, are the
radical transformations the ways and means of communication are undergoing and the
numerous qualitative societal changes. For example, communication on the Internet
comes with “datafication.”5 As a result, the possibilities for surveillance are unprece-
dented.6 And even if and precisely because the Internet as a socio-technical arrange-
ment is far from not forgetting, social knowledge, memory and forgetting are being
1 Hildebrandt (2016), p. 1 ff.; see also Floridi (2015).

2 For this term see O’Reilly (2005).
3 The term “Internet of Things” (IoT) is attributed to Kevin Ashton (1999), who used it to describe
the vision of a system of networked computers and things that operate relatively autonomously,
especially when it comes to data processing.
4 Cf., for example, the contributions in Leenes, van Brakel, Gutwirth and de Hert (2018) and
Matwyshyn (2019).
5 For this term see Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier (2013), pp. 23 f., 101.
6 Edward Snowden’s revelations about intelligence surveillance are a vivid example.
Personality and Data Protection Rights on the Internet … 3
subjected to fundamental structural change.7 In the economic system, the Internet is

a product of and a factor in globalization and the international division of labor.8 It
has become the basis for a multitude of new business models, including the “share-
conomy” in which data are conceived as valuable economic goods. Providers, search
engine companies, platforms and social network operators are becoming powerful
new players, boosted by mechanisms such as lock-in effects. Their selection and
mediation services have quickly become so indispensable that they are assuming the
role of gatekeepers.9 More importantly, they are making a considerable contribution
to the construction of social and individual knowledge.10 This applies regardless of
whether the Internet is associated with “filter bubble” 11 mechanisms or the view is
taken that there has never before been such far-reaching access to other opinions.
The challenges the Internet poses are also characterized by the speed and dynamics
of its evolutionary stages. From a technical point of view, the emerging Internet of
Things describes the networking of a wide variety of physical objects, within the
Internet as well as among the objects, with the help of a range of complementary
technologies, such as RFID technology, special sensor technologies, chip technolo-
gies or energy supply technologies. “Ubiquitous computing” aims at technologies
and Internet processes working in the background being omnipresent and at the
same time invisible, and being integrated as discreetly as possible into everyday
life. Wearable computing, smart houses or autonomous cars are no longer fiction.
If we consider the increasing storage, processing and analysis functionalities in the
context of Big Data analytics or artificial intelligence, the Internet of Things once
again has the potential to bring about fundamental societal changes that even extend
into ontology.
This is all the more true with regard to future scenarios of the Internet of Bodies
(IoB). These scenarios suggest that implants ranging from smart lenses to memory
chips and brain-to-brain interfaces will mechanize the body and connect people
“directly” to the Internet. In view of the convergence of biotechnologies and infor-
mation technologies that can already be observed today, even far-reaching futuristic
visions are by no means completely unrealistic.12 The catchword “onlif e,” which
already captures the essence of the current situation, would take on completely new
dimensions.
7 See, e.g., Schimke (2016) with further references.

8 Fuchs (2008), pp. 154 ff.
9 See, e.g., Introna and Nissenbaum (2000), pp. 169 ff.; Tavani (2020), Sect. 3.1.
10 Hinman (2008), pp. 69 ff., 75.
11 Popular: Pariser (2011).
12 Cf. for scenarios and challenges Koops (2013b); Andresen (2018), p. 491 ff.; Albers (2016a),
p. 63, esp. 72 ff.

2 Internet Regulation
The early days of the Internet gave rise to the idea that it is a law-free space.13 But
legal regulation has always existed in certain respects, for example with regard to the
establisment and operation of telecommunications infrastructures and networks. And
since the development of Web 2.0 and the increasing embeddedness of the Internet
in society, the extent of the need for regulation has become crystal clear. Just as
in “offline” cases, the law must guarantee legal frameworks and conflict resolution
in cases involving the Internet. This is why the Brazilian Marco Civil da Internet14
has attracted international attention.15 Looking at the features of the Internet and
the social arrangements made possible by it, legal regulation is facing numerous
unprecedented questions. On the one hand, novel approaches must be elaborated. On
the other hand, Internet cases do not require completely novel regulations in every
respect. Although the emerging legal issues may be Internet-specific to a certain
extent, they can at the same time build upon established legal solutions; they must
at least be coordinated with them. Consequently, the core of legal considerations
involves the questions whether, where, and to what extent particular cases are shaped
by features of the Internet in a legally relevant way, to what extent novel solutions
tailored to these characteristics are necessary, and what the relevant concepts could
be.
If we examine the challenges emerging with the Internet, we can, firstly, identify
fundamental and cross-sectional issues. From various points of view, the Internet
leads straight to the necessity to revisit the notion of “law.” Detailed fundamental
questions regarding how the law is to be understood present themselves when
decision-making processes are being driven by sophisticated software programs. In
addition, the problem of how to ensure normative requirements are observed in these
programs and decision-making processes must be solved as well. The ethical and
legal discussions on autonomously driven cars are an illustrative example. Turning
to the cross-sectional issues, it is particularly relevant due to the rise of the Internet
society that physical national borders are losing importance. Activities on the Internet
cross borders, whether in terms of the routes taken by the data packets transmitted
or in tems of server locations on the one hand and retrieval locations on the other.
Novel answers have to be developed concerning what criteria the applicability of
national or supranational law is based on and how to ensure the enforceability of the
applicable law. It is, among other things, in this context that the European Court of
13 Cf. Barlow (1996): “Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel,
I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to
leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. […] We are forming our own Social Contract”.
14 Lei no 12.965/2014.
15 On the Brazilian Marco Civil da Internet see, among others, Leite and Lemos (2014); Souza,
Lemos and Bottino (2018); and Del Masso, Abrusio and Florêncio Filho (2019).
Justice’s key decision Google Spain and Google of 2014 has been discussed interna-
tionally.16 Other high-profile decisions address the question of the prerequisites that
must be met for the transfer of personal data from the European Union to the US; in
the opinion of the European Court of Justice, EU law establishes requirements that
neither the Safe Harbor Agreement nor its successor, the Privacy Shield Agreement,
have fulfilled.17
In addition to fundamental and cross-sectional issues, there are, secondly,
numerous novel legal questions in fields that are closely related to the Internet or
are particularly influenced by its features. At the infrastructure level, questions of
access of competing providers to networks or of net neutrality are discussed as well
as problems of IT security. At the level of Internet services, attention was initially
focused especially on the legal responsibility of providers for their own or user-
generated content. With the further development of the Internet, the list of questions
is becoming endless. They range from the the civil law and consumer protection
issues raised by e-commerce or a shareconomy to the regulation of public commu-
nication with regard to hate speech or the use of social bots for the purpose of
manipulating public opinion. How search engine, platform and social network oper-
ators should be regulated appropriately, among other things in the area of conflict
between freedom of expression and protection of personality rights, is the subject of
heated legal controversies.18 Models such as the German Network Enforcement Act
are attracting attention across the globe.19
Across all areas, new legal problems center on the handling of data. This is obvious,
because communication on the Internet always includes “datafication.” Here too, the
list of legal issues is exploding and broadly diversified. Important aspects concern
society’s dependence on the Internet infrastructure and the resulting vulnerability.
Hazards are to be countered by multi-layered protection measures against failures
or attacks. Processing and using data as a basis for information and knowledge must
also be addressed from a variety of perspectives. The constructions of social and indi-
vidual knowledge created by search engines may be influenced by the control of the
general terms and conditions search engine providers are using as well as by antitrust
or competition law requirements aiming for plurality. The catchword “governing
16 The ECJ has ruled that the search engine result lists produced by Google are within the scope of
application of the European Data Protection Directive because the search engine business model is
inseparably linked to the placement of advertising, so that the processing of personal data resulting
from a search is carried out within the framework of the marketing activities of the Spanish branch
of Google Inc. based in the USA, Judgment of the ECJ (Grand Chamber) of 13 May 2014, C-131/12,
available under curia.europa.eu, para 55 ff.
17 As for the Safe Harbor Agreement: Judgment of the ECJ (Grand Chamber) of 6 October 2015, C-
362/14; for the Privacy Shield Agreement: Judgment of the ECJ (Grand Chamber) of 16 July 2020,
C-311/18, both available under curia.europa.eu. See also more closely on enforcement mechanisms
with regard to the GDPR Veit (2022), in this volume.
18 Cf. Schreiber (2022), in this volume; Hartmann (2022), in this volume.
19 See more closely Schulz (2022), in this volume.
algorithms,”20 as another example, focuses on problems of how the transparency

of algorithms can be ensured and which standards algorithms should meet so that
algorithm-driven data processing produces reasonable and proper knowledge. In the
context of the Internet of Things, questions about the ownership of data21 that are
generated or liability for faulty data processing can be added. More fundamentally,
we need to consider how to create a legal framework that ensures the functioning of
data architectures that may be extremely complex.22
In view of the increasing importance of data, information and knowledge, a closer
analysis reveals a wide range of requirements for protecting individuals adequately.
This applies, inter alia, to surveillance or tracking of identifiable persons. Activities
on the Internet leave data traces. Personal or relatively anonymous data are collected,
evaluated and passed on by a wide variety of state authorities or private companies.
These range from e-commerce companies that collect and evaluate their customers’
data in the course of other business transactions to the numerous companies whose
business model is “paying with data,” all the way to data brokers specialized in
tracking and data sales. Comprehensive profiling23 is a reality and calls for protec-
tion.24 As for disadvantages, usually only personalized advertising is mentioned—
effects of profiling that are detrimental enough, if the now very subtle forms of
influence are kept in mind.25 However, personalized advertising is by no means the
only problem that arises. This is shown by the data scandal surrounding the use of
Facebook data by Cambridge Analytica. Also worthy of attention is the far-reaching
potential for discrimination26 or consequences such as “dynamic pricing,” where
people shopping online are shown different prices depending on profiling results.27
But not only the commercialization-driven activities are a problem. One of the new
challenges in the field of surveillance is that state institutions, especially police agen-
cies or intelligence services, may be authorized to get access to the “honeypot” of data
gathered by private companies. Legally, the problems resulting from such “public–
private assemblages” of surveillance are reflected in the controversies and in the
series of court decisions on the lawfulness of telecommunications surveillance and
data retention.28
20 From the extensive discussions see, for example, Gillespie (2014), pp. 167 ff.; Ziewitz (2016),
pp. 5 ff. See also Mendes and Mattiuzzo (2022), in this volume.
21 On this issue differentiated and with critical remarks Determann (2018).
22 Sicari et al. (2018), pp. 60 ff.
23 See also the definition of Ferraris et al. (2013), p. 32.
24 More closely Elmer (2004); the contributions in: Hildebrandt and Gutwirth (2008); Schermer
(2013), pp. 137 ff.; Bosco et al. (2015), pp. 3 ff.

25 For an analysis of the mechanisms of personalized advertisement see Katsivelas (2018), pp. 221
ff.
26 Christl (2017).
27 Zuiderveen Borgesius and Poort (2017), pp. 347 ff., 521.
28 See Albers (2022), in this volume; Molinaro and Ruaro (2022), in this volume.
There are numerous other issues to be addressed. The Internet and the social
arrangements it makes possible not only raise the problem of a “right to be forgot-
ten”29 but also of how to manage the problem of “digital assets” that persists in social
media accounts. Do we need new legal approaches to protect the rights of deceased
persons, or can we work with existing regulatory patterns?30 Among the difficult and
controversially discussed questions is also whether there must be a highly protected
right to anonymity on the Internet, or whether and under what conditions legislation
could introduce a duty for people to use their own birthname.31 And do data protec-
tion principles offer anticipatory or procedural standards for the design of relevant
algorithms that go beyond a control of results?32
3 Advancing Personality and Data Protection Rights
Against this background, the contributions in this volume deal with the key ques-
tion of how personality and data protection rights on the Internet must be further
developed.33 New fundamental problems are addressed as well as cross-sectional
and specific issues.
A first fundamental problem is the urgent need for transnational standards for
personality and data protection rights on the one hand, while on the other hand it
seems to be difficult, if not impossible, to reach a consensus on such standards, given
the diverse legal cultures in the regions of the world. In the second contribution of
this volume, Markus Kotzur deals with the key research question of whether or not
certain personality or privacy rights and doctrinal figures such as the “duty to protect”
or the “horizontal dimension of fundamental rights,” which have been developed
at the level of international or European Union law—in particular by court deci-
sions—can be used to develop sufficiently universal standards for effective Internet
governance.34 He emphasizes that the problems of agreeing on overarching standards
reflect the deeper problem that there is no incontested conceptualization of “privacy”
and, in addition, Internet and social media have made it even more difficult to deter-
mine what “privacy” means. The traditional dichotomy between the private and the
public sphere, which has characterized the concept to a certain extent, however, has
always been only an ideal type. It is necessary to assume the existence of a spectrum
“composed of the in-betweens,” which diversifies into different constellations. At
the same time, we must acknowledge several dimensions of protection, above all,
besides rights of defense that are traditionally recognized also third-party effects and
29 On this topic Sarlet (2022), in this volume; Schimke (2022), in this volume.
30 See Bezerra Sales Sarlet (2022), in this volume; Heidrich (2022), in this volume.
31 As for the problems of anonymity on the Internet see Aftab (2022), in this volume; Michael
(2022), in this volume.

32 Cf. Koops (2013a) pp. 196 ff. Cf. also Schertel Mendes and Mattiuzzo (2022), in this volume.
33 For principle considerations on the complexity of data protection, see Albers (2016b).
34 Kotzur (2022), in this volume.
duties to protect. Markus Kotzur analyzes specific features of privacy protection both
within the state, here with regard to the German Basic Law [Constitution], as well as
beyond the state, looking at the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Universal Public Law and
Human Rights Law. He highlights that, even though universal minimum standards
of protection can and have to be created, we should not disregard the importance of
the underlying legal fabric that concretizes the individual’s rights and the necessity
of “law-in-context studies” while carrying out comparative work.
Danilo Doneda and Rafael Zanatta approach Brazilian protection of personality
and data protection rights with a view to their historical roots.35 Nowadays, the Marco
Civil da Internet and the recent General Data Protection Law (LGPD) form the back-
bone of the Brazilian legal framework for the society in the digital era.36 However,
they do not cover only new topics such as net neutrality or intermediary liability
and are not only influenced by European models of data protection. In particular, the
provisions of the LGPD also refer to a previously existing fragmented set of Brazilian
legislation which was created over many years. This body of legislation has itself
often been inspired by European legal traditions, among others the Portuguese and
German legal traditions. The establishment of personality and data protection rights
was advanced by, for example, the Brazilian Civil Code, the Brazilian Constitution
of 1988, and consumer protection rules. Danilo Doneda and Rafael Zanatta high-
light that, on the one hand, it is always important to understand the links between
the doctrine and tradition of personality rights as well as of other already established
protective rules and new data protection legislation. On the other hand, it is necessary
to respond to new challenges raised by the Internet and to strive for harmonization
with international and transnational standards on data protection.
Just like Brazil, the Europan Union is constantly renewing its legal framework
for data protection in the light of an increasingly digitized society. Since the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR) came into effect in 2009, the
catalogue of fundamental rights offers, in addition to the right to respect for private
life in Article 7 CFR, a right to the protection of personal data in Article 8 CFR. Jörn
Reinhardt takes a closer look at this right,37 especially because challenges to the
protection of personal data arise not only from state action, but also from the inherent
logic of the data economy. He stresses that Article 8 CFR includes certain conditions
the processing of personal data must fulfill in order to be lawful, for example the
principle of purpose limitation. Nevertheless, the protected interests behind the “right
to the protection of personal data” remain insufficiently defined and must be further
specified, not least with a view to other freedoms. Since data protection cannot be
limited to one specific goal, the protection requirements vary. After having clarified
positive obligations and horizontal effects in the context of Article 8 CFR, Jörn
Reinhardt works out central standards for data processing in the digital economy.
These standards include consent and control, protective legislation built upon an
35 Doneda and Zanatta (2022), in this volume.

36 For an overview of the LGPD Schreiber (2020), pp. 45 ff.
37 Reinhardt (2022), in this volume.
objectification of the interests involved, transparency as well as information rights

of data subjects, and data security.
After these general and overarching contributions, the following articles of this
volume address major challenges related to the life in the digital era which are being
discussed worldwide. How do personality and data protection rights address the
problems of unprecedented surveillance, of the assumption that “the Internet does
not forget,” of the power of intermediaries, of “digital heritage” or of algorithmic
decision making?
The fifth and sixth contributions deal with the topic of personality and data
protection rights confronted with the surveillance possibilities made available by
the Internet. Marion Albers first focuses on understanding surveillance and on the
changes it is undergoing under the conditions of the Internet. Protection needs are
wide-ranging and addressed not only by the right to respect for privacy but by a
broad spectrum of protected interests enshrined in the constitution, in human or
fundamental rights catalogues, or in statutes. Particularly in Europe, “data reten-
tion,” with its characteristics such as being a public–private assemblage as well as
blanket surveillance without cause, has become a major issue in heated debates
about surveillance on the Internet. Marion Albers explains the grounds for the series
of decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court and of the European Court
of Justice. She stresses where their approaches and criteria resemble each other and
where they differ, what key points the courts have worked out for the legitimacy of
data retention, and how much work still has to be carried out to appropriately assess
and regulate surveillance under Internet conditions.38 Carlos Alberto Molinaro and
Regina Linden Ruaro also highlight the changes that surveillance is undergoing in
this day and age.The Snowden revelations demonstrate how far surveillance by intel-
ligence services extends, even in the case of highly developed democracies such as
the United States of America and Great Britain. The threats it poses to democracy and
fundamental rights require that intelligence activity is fully subordinated to consti-
tutional and appropriate legal provisions and subject to various forms of control.
Carlos Alberto Molinaro and Regina Linden Ruaro then introduce the provisions of
the Marco Civil da Internet and other legal rules insofar as these regulations estab-
lish a legal framework for telecommunications surveillance, including data retention
rules as well as limits and safeguards, for example a judge’s proviso. Finally, they
discuss technical tools of protection against surveillance on the Internet.39
Another topic that is being discussed worldwide is the “right to be forgotten.”
There have been few decisions that have been discussed so intensively and controver-
sially in different countries, especially in Brazil and Germany, as the ECJ’s Google
Spain and Google judgment of 2014.40 This is due to the fact that in the Internet
society, remembering and forgetting penetrate societal processes and mechanisms to
38 See Albers (2022), in this volume.

39 Molinaro and Ruaro (2022), in this volume.
40 Judgment of the ECJ (Grand Chamber) of 13 May 2014, C-131/12, available under
curia.europa.eu. For critical remarks see, for example, Masing (2017), esp. pp. 442 ff. For the
Brazilian discussion see Branco (2017), Sarlet and Ferreira Neto (2018) and Frajhof (2019).
an exceptional degree. And for this very reason, the problem is not new—it is a fine
example of the finding that legal responses to novel challenges must partly build upon
previous approaches and partly find new solutions. This is also confirmed by recent
judgments issued by the German FCC on the “right to be forgotten.”41 Regarding
Brazilian law, Ingo Sarlet addresses the potential foundations of a “right to be forgot-
ten” in the Brazilian constitutional system and partial legislative expressions as well
as its acknowledgment and protection by the Brazilian superior courts. He explains
that there are “offline” as well as “online”-cases. The right to be forgotten already
has a rich history, but the Internet raises questions of its own, not least because inter-
mediaries and algorithms enter the picture. Ingo Sarlet emphasizes that the “right to
be forgotten” covers a range of subjective positions, e.g., a right to data erasure, to
de-referencing, to a digital response, or to the suppression of identity. Differentiation
and balancing conflicting rights is as necessary as careful regulation by the legis-
lator.42 In her contribution focusing on EU and German law, Anna Schimke aims at
contextualizing the right to be forgotten in terms of the insights of social and cultural
sciences, in order to improve legal approaches. Forgetting on the Internet refers to a
collective dimension or to communication and to information and knowledge rather
than to data: particular knowledge about a person which could previously have been
lawfully acquired should no longer exist in a certain social context. A closer analysis
shows that cases involving such problems had already come up in the European and
German jurisdictions, as well as in Brazil, before the Internet entered the picture.
Anna Schimke emphasizes that they are dealt with in various fields of law, not only in
data protection law but also in press law. She proposes that the areas of application
of these fields of law be determined with a view to their characteristics and strengths
and with recourse to the so-called media privilege, which can be found in European
and German law and also in Brazilian law. This helps to reasonably elaborate the
right to be forgotten and the range of subjective positions and claims that can be
developed as differentiated in European and German law as Ingo Sarlet has worked
out for Brazilian law. Such an approach also helps to develop a convincingly fair
balance with counter-interests.43
The following articles turn more closely to questions concerning conflicts between
personality and data protection rights on the Internet and communication freedoms,
especially the freedom of expression. Carlos Affonso Pereira de Souza and Beatriz
Laus Marinho Nunes explain the significant and multifarious role freedom of expres-
sion was given in the Brazilian Marco Civil da Internet. The constitutional founda-
tions are already multifaceted and rich in content. Depending on the context in which
reference is made to freedom of expression in the Marco Civil da Internet, particular
facets and impacts come into play. This is substantiated with regard to the founda-
tions of Internet governance in Brazil, to the principles for regulating Internet use, in
particular as regards anonymous discourse, to the conditions for the full exercise of
41 Judgments of the FCC of 6 November 2019, 1 BvR 16/13 and 1 BvR 276/17, both also available
in English under www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de.
42 Sarlet (2022), in this volume.
43 Schimke (2022), in this volume.
the right to Internet access, to Internet intermediaries’ liability, and to challenges to

copyright.44 Anderson Schreiber explains that the Internet is not per se a place of free
discourse, but can negatively affect the very essence of freedom of expression. The
“dark side” of social networks comprises new forms of oppression, such as virtual
bullying, verbal aggression, stigmatizing labeling, and online hate speech.
As a result, rules must ensure that freedom of expression is not exercised against
itself. Anderson Schreiber explains case law prior to the Brazilian Marco Civil da
Internet as well as their regulations with a view to the civil-law liability of Internet
providers for damage derived from content generated by third parties. He arrives
at the result, that the chosen regulation is extremely restrictive and lacks sufficient
protection of the rights of Internet users such as honor, image and privacy.45 Ivar
Hartmann advances the argument that content moderation—separating acceptable
from unacceptable content—should be achieved by new models of self-regulation
and by code rather than by the judiciary. Platform operators should implement decen-
tralized moderation systems where users are engaged as reviewers as much as content
producers and consumers. The rules set in the architecture and community guidelines
must comply with procedural boundaries established by the efficacy of fundamental
rights being asserted between private parties. Judicial review should play a role not in
evaluating the merits of content posted or shared, but rather in correcting the course
of the procedural rules that ensure self-regulation does not disproportionally restrict
personality rights.46 Wolfgang Schulz introduces the German Network Enforcement
Act, which has attracted attention across the globe. He analyzes its regulatory concept
and the obligations imposed on online platform operators as well as its compatibility
with higher-ranking law and fundamental rights. Based on the findings, he then
discusses human-rights-friendly alternatives to the platform regulation chosen in the
Network Enforcement Act.47
Facing the conflicts between personality and data protection rights and freedom
of expression, the possibilities for users to remain anonymous on the Internet deserve
special attention. Sohail Aftab analyzes protection needs and cases against the back-
ground of the Brazilian constitutional provision that prohibits online anonymity.
Taking a closer look at several court decisions, he shows that the Marco Civil da
Internet has no clear solutions for the balancing the apparently conflicting positions
of various constitutional provisions that, on the one hand, provide for the protec-
tion of private life, but on the other, prohibit anonymity. A comparative examination
illustrates that the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights encour-
ages anonymity and protects dignitarian interests diligently by means of a complex
balancing review. The value and the concept of anonymity are fleshed out, in partic-
ular with recourse to empirical evidence from Pakistan. The modern challenges to
anonymity in the online sphere call for broader elaborations. Sohail Aftab concludes
44 Affonso Pereira de Souza and Laus Marinho Nunes (2022), in this volume.
45 Schreiber (2022), in this volume.
46 Hartmann (2022), in this volume.
47 Schulz (2022), in this volume.
that anonymity necessitates complex conceptualizations and sympathetic regula-

tory approaches. Lothar Michael explores challenges, protection needs and limits
of anonymity with a view to online evaluation portals.48 While explaining conflicts
in multidimensional cases with diverging interests of the participants, he also looks
at the fundamental rights of the German Constitution and argues that they protect
anonymity (only) to a certain extent. He presents the grounds for prominent decisions
of the German Federal Court of Justice and concludes with remarks on the role of
the judiciary and of the legislator.
As activities on the Internet result in the accumulation of huge amounts of data,
one of the pressing issues in connection with personality and data protection rights is
how to handle the problem of “digital assets.” Just like the right to be forgotten, this
problem is a telling example of discussions about the question whether previous legal
approaches can be transferred to Internet cases or whether novel solutions are neces-
sary. From a Brazilian point of view, Gabrielle Bezerra Sales Sarlet explores more
closely the concept of digital identity and approaches to digital heritage. She explains
cases and conflicts between the guarantee of the right to intimacy and privacy and the
right to inheritance as well as Brazilian regulations. She arrives at the findings that
the simple application of inheritance rights to the digital universe is not convincing,
legislative gaps can be identified and, as a result, the need for further elaboration
becomes apparent.49 After differentiating among groups of data and cases of the
“digital estate,” Felix Heidrich focuses on German legal approaches. The important
leading decisions of German Civil Courts are introduced. In a detailed analysis, Felix
Heidrich then points out that digital estates enjoy protection under the fundamental
right of inheritance and neither the secrecy of telecommunications nor data protec-
tion in favor of the testator’s communication partners create obstacles to the right
of heirs to access a testator’s digital account data. For the German legal situation,
he comes to a different result than Gabrielle Bezerra Sales Sarlet for Brazil. He
concludes that, based on the cases discussed, there is no need for statutory regulation
beyond existing rules.50
Among the problems that, in a cross-sectional manner, extend across many fields
is the use of algorithms and the necessity to protect the individual with regard to
personal and data protection rights as well as against algorithmic discrimination.
Laura Schertel Mendes and Marcela Mattiuzzo explain the concepts of algorithm
and algorithmic discrimination and show how Big Data and algorithms have funda-
mentally altered decision-making processes in everyday life. They then focus on the
case of credit scoring. After exploring pertinent Brazilian regulations and decisions
of Brazilian courts, they turn to an overarching analysis of algorithmic discrimina-
tion and governance. Against this background, they point out which deficiencies in
current Brazilian law still need to be resolved when applied to credit scoring.51
48 Michael (2022), in this volume.

49 See Bezerra Sales Sarlet (2022), in this volume.
50 Heidrich (2022), in this volume.
51 Mendes and Mattiuzzo (2022), in this volume.
All these contributions addressing concrete challenges for personality and data
protection rights on the Internet show that legal solutions are and must be, at least
to a certain extent, embedded in the legal culture and the specific legal system of
a particular country. But what about the cross-border flow of data as an essential
characteristic of the Internet society?
In the last article of this volume, Raoul-Darius Veit analyzes the mechanisms
of the European General Data Protection Regulation which aim at ensuring that
data protection rights guaranteed in the European Union are also safeguarded on the
global Internet. The challenges being faced by data protection law in particular are
obvious. After having explained the jurisdiction of the ECJ which culminated in the
recent decision on the Privacy Shield Agreement,52 Raoul-Darius Veit explains the
external dimension of the EU data protection regime in detail. The effects doctrine
(Marktortprinzip) has direct extraterritorial effects, while the principles regulating
data transfer to third countries result in indirect extraterritorial effects. Their core is
the adequacy regime whose guidelines and flexibilities are worked out. Raoul-Darius
Veit highlights the finding that modern data protection laws need to be designed in
such a way that they are open to conflicting notions of privacy and political and
economic interests, while at the same time maintaining their normative claim.
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Pariser E (2011) The filter bubble: what the internet is hiding from you. Penguin, London, New
York
Reinhardt J (2022) Realizing the fundamental right to data protection in a digitized society. In: Albers
M, Sarlet IW (eds) Personality and data protection rights on the internet. Springer, Dordrecht,
Heidelberg, New York, London (in this volume)
Sarlet GBS (2022) Digital identity and the problem of digital inheritance: limits of the posthumous
protection of personality on the internet in Brazil. In: Albers M, Sarlet IW (eds) Personality and
data protection rights on the internet. Springer, Dordrecht, Heidelberg, New York, London (in
this volume)
Sarlet IW, Ferreira Neto A (2018) O Direito ao Esquecimento na Sociedade da Informação. Livraria
do Advogado Editora, Porto Alegre
Sarlet IW (2022) The protection of personality in the digital environment: an analysis in the light
of the so-called right to be forgotten in Brazil. In: Albers M, Sarlet IW (eds) Personality and data
protection rights on the internet. Springer, Dordrecht, Heidelberg, New York, London (in this
volume)
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Schermer B, Zarsky T (eds) Discrimination and privacy in the information society: data mining
and profiling in large databases. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, pp 137–152
Schimke A (2016) Vergessen als neue Kategorie im Recht. In: Autengruber A et al (eds) Zeit im
Recht—Recht in der Zeit. Jan Sramek, Wien, pp 87–104
Schimke A (2022) Forgetting as a social concept. Contextualizing the right to be forgotten. In: Albers
Schreiber A (2020) Right to privacy and personal data protection in Brazilian law. In: Moura Vicente
D, de Vasconcelos Casimiro S (eds) Data protection in the internet. Springer Nature, Cham, pp
45–54
Schreiber A (2022) Civil rights framework of the internet (BCRFI; Marco Civil da Internet):
advance or setback? Civil liability for damage derived from content generated by third party.
Schulz W (2022) Regulating intermediaries to protect privacy online—the case of the German
NetzDG. In: Albers M, Sarlet IW (eds) Personality and data protection rights on the internet.
Sicari S, Rizzardi A, Cappiello C, Miorandi D, Coen-Porisini A (2018) Toward data governance
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Things. Springer International Publishing, Cham, pp 59–74
Souza CA, Lemos R, Bottino C (2018) Marco Civil da Internet. Jurisprudência Comentada, Revista
dos Tribunais, São Paulo
Tavani H (2020) Search engines and ethics. Stanford Encycl Philos. https://plato.stanford.edu/ent
ries/ethics-search/. Accessed 11 Jan. 2022
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41:3–16
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Consum Policy 40:347–366
Marion Albers Dr. iur, Full Professor of Public Law, Information and Communication
Law, Health Law and Legal Theory at Hamburg University. Principal Investigator in the
Brazilian/German CAPES/DAAD PROBRAL-Research Project “Internet Regulation and Internet
Rights”. Main areas of research: Fundamental Rights, Information and Internet Law, Data
Protection, Health Law and Biolaw, Police Law and Law of Intelligence Services, Legal Theory
and Sociology of Law. Selected Publications: Recht & Netz: Enwicklungslinien und Prob-
lemkomplexe, in: Marion Albers/Ioannis Katsivelas (eds.), Recht & Netz, Baden-Baden: Nomos,
2018, pp. 9–35; L’effet horizontal des droits fondamentaux dans le cadre d’une conception à
multi-niveaux, in: Thomas Hochmann/Jörn Reinhardt (dir.), L’effet horizontal des droits fonda-
mentaux, Editions Pedone, Paris, 2018, pp. 177–216; Biotechnologies and Human Dignity,
in: Dieter Grimm/Alexandra Kemmerer/Christoph Möllers (eds.), Human Dignity in Context,
München/Oxford/Baden-Baden: C. H. Beck/Hart/Nomos, 2018, pp. 509–559, also published
in Revista Direito Público, Vol. 15 (2018), pp. 9–49; A Complexidade da Proteção de Dados,
Revista Brasiliera de Direitos Fundamentais e Justiça, Belo Horizonte, ano 10, n. 35, 2016,
pp. 19–45.
Ingo Wolfgang Sarlet Dr. Iur. Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität-München, Chair Professor for

Constitutional Law and current Head of the Graduation Program in Law (LLM-PHD) at the
Pontifical Catholic University Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil - PUCRS). Principal Investigator in the
Brazilian/German CAPES/DAAD PROBRAL-Research Project “Internet Regulation and Internet
Rights”. Current research projects: protection of human dignity and fundamental rights in the
digital domain and social rights, innovation and technology. Selected Publications: A Eficácia
dos Direitos Fundamentais, 13th Ed., Porto Alegre, Livraria do Advogado, 2018; Dignidade
da Pessoa Humana na Constituição Federal de 1988, 10th Ed., Livraria do Advogado, Porto
Alegre, 2015; Direito Constitucional Ecológicol, 6th Ed., Revista dos Tribunais, São Paulo, 2019;
Grundrechte und Privatrecht–Einige Bemerkungen zum Einfluss der deutschen Grundrechtsdog-
matik und insbesondere der Lehre Canaris’ in Brasilien, in: Festschrift für Claus-Wilhelm Canaris
zum 80. Geburtstag, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2017, pp. 1257–80; Menschenwürde und soziale Grun-
drechte in der brasilianischen Verfassung, in: Stephan Kirste, Draiton Gonzaga De Souza and Ingo
Wolfgang Sarlet (eds), Menschenwürde im 21. Jahrhundert. Untersuchungen zu den philosophis-
chen, völker- und verfassungsrechtlichen Grundlagen in Brasilien, Deutschland und Österreich,
Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2018.
Privacy Protection in the World Wide
Web—Legal Perspectives
on Accomplishing a Mission Impossible
Markus Kotzur
Abstract The paper aims at evaluating the power of law, in particular human rights
law, amongst the various instruments being recently discussed as means for effective
internet governance. Focusing on selected case law of the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECR), it discusses privacy rights, a
“right to be forgotten”, and a horizontal dimension of these rights as well as a duty to
protect these rights owed by the States and/or the International Community. The key
research question will be whether or not guarantees like these can—bottom-up—be
used to develop sufficiently universal standards for effective internet governance.
It is argued that regardless of the different levels of protection which the right to
privacy enjoys in different States and on the European/international plane, common
needs and dangers can be identified. Based upon them, universal minimum stan-
dards of protection can and have to be created. For a theoretical framing, the paper
finally addresses the so-called “public–private”-dichotomy and the rapid dynamics
it is facing in the age of the Internet.
1 Introduction: Little v. Big or How to Accomplish

a Mission Impossible
He did it again. Austrian national Maximilian Schrems had already succeeded in

2015 in a preliminary ruling proceeding related
to the interpretation, in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union (...), of Articles 25(6) and 28 of Directive 95/46/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data
(...), as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1882/2003 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 29 September 2003 (...), and, in essence, to the validity of Commission Decision
2000/520/EC of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46 on the adequacy of the protection
M. Kotzur (B)
e-mail: markus.kotzur@uni-hamburg.de

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90331-2_2
18 M. Kotzur
provided by the safe harbour privacy principles and related frequently asked questions issued
by the US Department of Commerce.1
The 2015 request had been made in the context of proceedings between him and the
Irish Data Protection Commissioner. It concerned the latter’s refusal to investigate
a complaint made by the applicant regarding the fact that Facebook Ireland Ltd
transferred personal data of its users to the United States of America and kept it on
servers located in that country.2 From August 2011 on, Schrems had lodged before
the Irish Data Protection Commissioner 23 complaints against Facebook Ireland, one
of which finally gave rise to a reference for the aforementioned preliminary ruling.
What seemed to be a “mission impossible” turned out to become one of the most
far-reaching recent landmark decisions of the European Court of Justice. Schrems
won his case and the Court held that
Article 25(6) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal
data and on the free movement of such data as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1882/2003
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 September 2003, read in the light of
Articles 7, 8 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be
interpreted as meaning that a decision adopted pursuant to that provision, such as Commis-
sion Decision 2000/520/EC of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46 on the adequacy of
the protection provided by the safe harbour privacy principles and related frequently asked
questions issued by the US Department of Commerce, by which the European Commis-
sion finds that a third country ensures an adequate level of protection, does not prevent a
supervisory authority of a Member State, within the meaning of Article 28 of that directive
as amended, from examining the claim of a person concerning the protection of his rights
and freedoms in regard to the processing of personal data relating to him which has been
transferred from a Member State to that third country when that person contends that the law
and practices in force in the third country do not ensure an adequate level of protection.3
An unlimited safe harbor-doctrine was history and data protection activists around
the globe had a new hero. His success made Maximilian Schrems even more active.
He has published two books on his legal proceedings against alleged infringements
of data protection. He has offered manifold lectures and has registered a number of
Internet websites such as blogs, online petitions as well as crowd-funding sites to
finance more upcoming legal proceedings against Facebook.4 He has furthermore
founded an association which seeks to uphold the fundamental right to data protection
and he has received various prizes. The little vs. big-story continued when Schrems,
by now a Robin Hood-like public figure defending private individuals against the
privacy-intrusive internet giants, has had assigned to him, by more than 25 000
people worldwide, claims to be brought in a class action against undertakings which
potentially endanger the fundamental right to privacy by their (online) activities.5
1 ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, para 1.
2 Ibidem, para 2.
3 Ibidem.
4 ECLI:EU:C:2018:37, para 12. Recently Schrems succeeded in another landmark decision:
Data Protection Commissioner versus Facebook Ireland Limited and Maximillian Schrems,
ECLI:EU:C:2020:559.
5 ECLI:EU:C:2018:37, para 14.
Privacy Protection in the World Wide Web—Legal Perspectives … 19
Regardless of his numerous—also commercial—activities, the European Court of

Justice held Maximilian Schrems still to be a consumer:
Article 15 of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted as meaning that the activities of
publishing books, lecturing, operating websites, fundraising and being assigned the claims
of numerous consumers for the purpose of their enforcement do not entail the loss of a private
Facebook account user’s status as a ‘consumer’ within the meaning of that article.6
The Court, however, denied the option of a class action brought by a consumer in the
courts of the place where she or he is domiciled. Whilst, as usually in its jurisprudence,
taking individual (consumer) rights seriously,7 the Court did not want to go that far
and invent a judge-made class action-procedure that neither in the primary nor the
secondary law would find a sufficient legal basis. Even though such a cross-border
class-action, unifying thousands of European users against Facebook, will not take
place—at least not without the European law maker taking action,8 it would be quite
a misunderstanding to believe that Schrems completely lost his case. On the contrary,
the Court granted Schrems standing for a single action against Facebook in his home
country Austria even though Facebook is not an Austrian undertaking but has its
registered office in Ireland.9
What also is, apart from the specific legal questions, the underlying narrative of
the just described little vs. big-scenario? Even though the relevant debates date back
farther than 1890, when US-Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis famously penned
the since then so-called “right to privacy”,10 “in today’s society, privacy has become
more complex than simply physical interference. The birth of the World Wide Web
has created a new landscape for which current legal standards are inadequate.”11
The underlying narrative thus is a story of inadequacy and Schrems sees himself
as an advocate for all those being negatively affected by this inadequacy. It is an
inadequacy not limited to reactions new technologies provoke but it starts with the
inadequate, for sure ambiguous notion of privacy itself. As stated by A. M. Brumis,
“thanks to the Internet and social media, personal privacy has been revolutionized,
public figures and private figures are becoming increasingly difficult to discern, and
until changes in the law occur, privacy violations in an Internet environment are hard
to determine”. Brumis, however, additionally refers to a quote by W. Hartzog to make
her point: “The proper legal response to the issue of social media and privacy has
proven elusive because there is no fixed conceptualization of privacy”.12 Here, at
the very core of “privacy”—be it a real world phenomenon, a social attribution, a
6 Ibidem, para 41.

7 Coppell and O´Neill (1992), p. 227 et seqq.; Weiler and Lockhart (1995), p. 579 et seqq.
8 One might not be misled believing that one strategic aim of Schrems’ action was to place an
incentive to do so.
9 ECLI:EU:C:2018:37, para 12; see also Die Zeit, online version, 25. 01. 2018, http://www.zeit.
de/digital/datenschutz/2018-01/maximilian-schrems-facebook-eugh-urteil-keine-sammelklage.
Accessed 11 Jan. 2022.
10 Brandeis (1890).
11 Brumis (2016), p. 1.
12 Hartzog (2013), pp. 50 at 51.
20 M. Kotzur
legal concept or an individual right—any further investigation on privacy protection

in the world wide web has to take its starting point before trying to accomplish an
(otherwise) mission impossible.
2 Spheres of the Public and the Private—Shades of Grey
Our investigative journey on privacy has to also take into account the very opposite
thereof—the public space, the public sphere and, in a broader sense, “publicity”.
The differentiation between the spheres of the public and the private is among
the well-established fundamentals of Western constitutionalist respectively legal
thought.13 Anglo-American literature pointedly uses the concept of a “public–private
dichotomy”.14 Along with this strict separation come—oft-criticized, for instance
by “legal feminism”15 —typifying status attributions, in other words: clichés—and
the placing of behavioral expectations on the individual. Even if black-and-white
stereotypes consistently fall short, the fact alone that the constitutionalist school of
thought continues to permeate and, to a degree, dominate current discourse, warrants
its consideration. What does the separation of the private and public signify? The
public space is where the active citizen, the political citoyen, operates.16 This is
where s/he takes part in the shaping of the polity, does her/his part in the concretion
of the common good and does not avoid the public eye, on the contrary: it is within
the sphere of the democratic public that individuals’ political actions reverberate,
thereby preserving civil liberties. The private domain, in contrast, is the refuge of the
bourgeois. Protected by fundamental rights, it is here that s/he can be her/himself,
unimpeded by the state and unobserved by the public. Here s/he can be sure of her/his
freedom, the level of said freedom rising with the degree of intimacy. Readers prone
to a comparative legal approach find the phrase of a “right to privacy”,17 or—perhaps
even more illustrative—a “right to be let alone” in US Supreme Court rulings. In
his famous dissenting opinion in Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. p. 442, the aforementioned
Justice Brandeis cites the ruling Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. p. 438, 478
(1928): “The right to be let alone (is) the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men.“18 The judicature of the German Bundesverfassungs-
gericht, differing from its US counterpart in many nuanced ways, but alike in its
13 See: Häberle (2006) for a fundamental discussion.

14 Weintraub and Kumar (eds.) (1997).
15 Pateman (1990), p. 118 et seqq.
16 Smend (1968), Dahrendorf (1974), in: Turner and Hamiliton (eds.) (1994), p. 292 et seqq.; Preuß,
in: Winter (ed.) (2002), p. 179 et seqq.

17 Outlined for instance in: Pfisterer (2014).
18 Ibidem, p. 273.
general direction, has adopted an equally illustrative concept by coining the term
“Allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht”, or “general right to privacy”.19
The rigorous separation of the private and the public, of citoyen and bourgeois,
has in its black-and-white dichotomy always been an ideal type all times being over-
shadowed by many grey areas. The Internet age with its social networks has only
added new shades of grey. On the one hand, the individual ever more so fears total
surveillance by a technologically, if not quite all-powerful, certainly over-powering
state. The NSA scandal20 serves here as only one jarring example of an Orwellian
“big brother is watching you” reinvented.21 On the other hand does the same indi-
vidual knowingly publicize information of private, even intimate character via social
networks like Facebook and thereby relinquishes the constitutionally guaranteed
protection of privacy, often without properly considering the long-term effects of such
self-exposure.22 The dreaded “Big brother” State is joined by many not less dreadful
“little brothers and sisters” of the online-community (or rather communities). To
again quote A. M. Brumis:
First, the distinction between a public figure and private figure is becoming increasingly
difficult to decipher, due to the Internet and social media platforms: The Rosenbloom plurality
opinion, by Justice Brennan, expressed: Voluntarily or not, we are all ‘public’ men to some
degree. Justice Brennan’s words ring even more true in the digital age. (...) In the age of
microcelebrity-fame – along with its associated benefits and burdens – is distributed along a
spectrum, not according to a dichotomy. The Internet has turned what many would previous
deem “private figures” into what could now be argued as public figures.23
A dichotomy that never really was one turned into a spectrum that always will be
composed of the “in-betweens”, too. Such a development, both technology- and
behavior-driven, does not only lead to sustained effects on the changing percep-
tion of private and public space, it also causes a number of issues with regard to
the protection of fundamental rights within and beyond the state.24 The suprana-
tional dimension is of course evident, as the world-wide-web, due to its very struc-
ture, escapes the regulatory power of the nation state and calls for global internet-
governance.25 The protection of privacy and private sphere play a significant role
within such a governance scheme. Whether fundamental rights guarantees in polit-
ical multilevel systems26 spanning the national-constitutional, the regional-public-
law and universal-public-law level, serve as sufficiently effective protection mech-
anisms, becomes the pivotal question. The following tour d´horizon is neither able,
19 Comprehensively—and with particular relevance to this context—discussed by: Taraz (2016);

furthermore Albers, in: Halft /Krah (eds.) (2013), p. 15; id. (2010), p. 1061.
20 For instance: Heidebach (2015), p. 593 et seqq.
21 Orwell (1949). For surveillance under Internet conditions see also Albers (2022), in this volume;
Molinaro and Ruaro (2022), in this volume.

22 Solove (2007); see also: Mayer-Schönberger (2015), p. 14 et seqq.
23 Brumis (2016), p. 1; Lat/Shemtob, Zach (2011), p. 403.
24 Fischer-Lescano (2014), p. 965 et seqq.; Taraz (2016).
25 Voegli-Wenzel (2007), p. 807 et seqq.; Uerpmann-Wittzack (2009), p. 261 et seqq.
26 Pernice (1999), p. 703 et seqq.; ibid, in: Bauer et al. (eds.) (2000), p. 25 et seqq.; ibid (2006),
pp. 973, 993; see also: Bilancia and Pizzetti (2004).

22 M. Kotzur
nor aiming to provide detailed answers hereto—no “mission accomplished” can be

expected. The much more modest goal is, rather, an initial mapping of the subject
area.
3 Basic Topology: Multipolar Fundamental Rights

Relations and the Protection of the Individual
from Her/Himself and Other Private Actors
The basic topology here is conceivably complex. The protection of the individual
from the state or sovereign power—exercised both within and beyond the state—is
no longer the primary concern, but rather it is about the protection of the indi-
vidual from other private actors—discussed as the “third-party-effect” or “horizontal
dimension/horizontal effect” in German fundamental rights doctrine27 —and from
her/himself, the dogmatic keyword here being the “obligation or duty to protect”.28
This duty is also resembled in international human rights law.29 As outlined by
the Office of the High Commissioner in his 2005 “Principles and Guidelines for a
Human Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction”30 : “All human rights—economic,
civil, social, political and cultural—impose negative as well as positive obligations
on States, as is captured in the distinction between duties to respect, protect and
fulfill. The duty to respect requires the duty-bearer to refrain from interfering with
the enjoyment of any human right. The duty to protect requires the duty-bearer to
take measures to prevent violations of any human right by third parties. The duty
to fulfill requires the duty-bearer to adopt appropriate legislative, administrative and
other measures towards the full realization of human rights. Resource implications
of the obligations to respect and to protect are generally less significant than those
of implementing the obligation to fulfill, for which more pro-active and resource-
intensive measures may be required. Consequently, resource constraints may not
affect a State’s ability to respect and to protect human rights in the same extent as
its ability to fulfill human rights.” This holistic human rights concept only allows
resource-based excuses when it comes to the fulfillment aspect. Both, the respect for
and the active protection of human rights, constitute resource-neutral and far-reaching
obligations.
In the Internet context, the latter comes into play in a very specific manner:
as—see above—a duty to protect the individual—notwithstanding her/his autonomy
and self-responsibility—from herself/himself. The duty to protect gains all the more
importance since the vulnerable individual publicizes private information voluntarily
27 De Wall and Wagner (2011), p. 743 et seqq.; Märten (2015).

28 On this topic: Rottmann (2014), p. 966 et seqq.
29 Cf. also for the European Union level Reinhardt (2022), in this volume.
30 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Principles and Guidelines
for a Human Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction, 2006, HR/PUB/06/12, pp. 47/48. See also De
Schutter (2014), p. 290.
and thereby not only potentially causes wholly unintended and unexpected conse-
quences, but gives away today—perhaps out of the spur of the moment, the inexpe-
rience of youth, or an adolescent urge for self-promotion—what shall be forgotten
tomorrow. Self-responsibility is limited when the future consequences of the actions
are hardly foreseeable in their full dimensions. Today’s innocent joke—the funny
semi-naked party picture of a drunken high school kid—can become the end of
tomorrow’s career—the former party kid now a public figure running for office and
being confronted with the “sins” of her/his past.31 Plenty are the examples of such
distressed public figures becoming an easy prey for the press. In the words of J.
Rosen: “Around the world citizens are experiencing the difficulty of living in a world
where the Web never forgets, where every blog and tweet and Facebook update
and MySpace picture about us is recorded forever in the digital cloud. This expe-
rience is leading to tangible harms, dignitary harms, as people are losing jobs and
promotions.”32
Whereas Rosen doubted that law was a good remedy for these harms,33 the ECJ
pursued a different path. In their Google ruling, the Luxemburg Judges established a
groundbreaking “right to be forgotten”34 or “right to oblivion” giving the concerned
individual’s privacy rights a stronger weight than the operator’s economic and the
general public’s information interests. The Court inter alia held that
in the light of the potential seriousness of that interference, it is clear that it cannot be justified
by merely the economic interest which the operator of such an engine has in that processing.
However, inasmuch as the removal of links from the list of results could, depending on the
information at issue, have effects upon the legitimate interest of internet users potentially
interested in having access to that information, in situations such as that at issue in the main
proceedings a fair balance should be sought in particular between that interest and the data
subject’s fundamental rights under Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter. Whilst it is true that the
data subject’s rights protected by those articles also override, as a general rule, that interest
of internet users, that balance may however depend, in specific cases, on the nature of the
information in question and its sensitivity for the data subject’s private life and on the interest
of the public in having that information, an interest which may vary, in particular, according
to the role played by the data subject in public life.35
More specifically turning to the “be forgotten” interest the Court continued:
31 One example is given by the case of Stacy Synder (Snyder v. Millersville Univ.), 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 97943 (E.D. Pa., Dec. 3, 2008), outlined by Rosen (2011), p. 345 at 346 as follows:
“She is the young woman who was about to graduate from teachers college, and days before her
graduation her employer, a public high school, discovered that she had posted on MySpace a posting
criticizing her supervising teacher and a picture of herself with a pirate’s hat and a plastic cup and
she had put the caption “drunken pirate” under it. The school concluded that she was behaving
in an unprofessional way and promoting underage drinking. Therefore, they did not allow her to
complete her student teaching practicum. As a result, her teachers college denied her a teaching
certificate”.
32 Rosen (2011), p. 345 at 345.
33 Ibidem.
34 ECJ, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317–Google/Spain; on this topic Schiedermair, in:
Lind/Reichel/Österdahl (eds.) (2015), p. 284 et seqq.; of further relevance in this context
again Rosen (2011), p. 345.
35 ECJ, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, para 81.
24 M. Kotzur
As the data subject may, in the light of his fundamental rights under Articles 7 and 8 of the
Charter, request that the information in question no longer be made available to the general
public by its inclusion in such a list of results, it should be held, as follows in particular
from paragraph 81 of the present judgment, that those rights override, as a rule, not only the
economic interest of the operator of the search engine but also the interest of the general
public in finding that information upon a search relating to the data subject’s name. However,
that would not be the case if it appeared, for particular reasons, such as the role played by
the data subject in public life, that the interference with his fundamental rights is justified
by the preponderant interest of the general public in having, on account of inclusion in the
list of results, access to the information in question.36
The protection from private actors becomes particularly relevant, as it is the providers
behind social networks who, primarily driven by economic interests and protected
by economic rights, entice the individual to publicize private data. But obviously
these private parties, as just stated, act under fundamental rights protections of their
own, which is why we speak of multipolar fundamental rights relations,37 that in turn
necessitate complex, and at times over-complex weighting processes. Public infor-
mation interests and the protection thereof make the necessary balancing approach
even more intricate.38 Finally, another factor comes into play when dealing with
globally operating providers and networks which transcend national borders—and
that is the question of the ex-territorial application of basic and/or human rights guar-
antees.39 The question of effective judicial enforcement of these rights is yet another
problem, entirely.40 Facing all these challenges, a cross-border Internet governance
being defined as “the evolving policies and mechanisms under which the Internet
community’s many stakeholders make decisions about the development and use
of the Internet”41 becomes an urgent desideratum in global politics and in schol-
arly research as well. A multi-stakeholder approach seems to be without reasonable
alternative.
4 Privacy Protection Within the State—Constitutional Law

Foundations of the General Right to Privacy
The general right to privacy after all provides a solid legal basis at the constitutional
law level. Looking for an explicit protection clause in the German Grundgesetz (GG),
36 Ibidem, para 97. And it is not only the ECJ dealing with a right to be forgotten. From a comparative
perspective see, e.g., Argentina. Here, the leading case about a “right to be forgotten” involves a pop
star called Virginia da Cunha: V. Sreeharsha, Google and Yahoo Win Appeal in Argentine Case,
N.Y.TIMES, Aug. 20, 2010, at B4. For further reference again Rosen (2011), p. 345 at 351. Cf. also
Sarlet (2022), in this volume; Schimke (2022), in this volume.
37 Karavas (2007), p. 81 et seqq.
38 See also Albers (2016), p. 19; id., in: Gutwirth/De Hert/Leenes (eds.) (2014), p. 213.
39 On the extra-territorial application of the right to privacy: Töpfer (2014), p. 31 et seqq.
40 Cf. with regard to this problem Veit (2022), in this volume.
41 https://www.nro.net/internet-governance/. Accessed 11 Jan. 2022.
however, would prove futile. Similar to the US constitution in its amendments, the
Grundgesetz does not go beyond traditional basic rights guarantees. From a joint
assessment of Article 1(1), the human dignity clause, and Article 2(1), the right to free
development of one’s personality, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Federal
Constitutional Court) has conceptualized such a right in the 1980s and spelled it out
later on in a number of cases42 : the right to your own likeness, the right to your own
name, the right to mandate the use of one’s personal data, which was coined as the
somewhat awkward-sounding “right to informational self-determination”,43 the right
of protection of reputation, among others.44 What is important here is the reference to
human dignity.45 It does not only highlight the close connection between the general
right to privacy and the right to free development of one’s personality, but also
renders any justification of infringement subject to a strict proportionality assess-
ment—which, admittedly, can be seen as a typical German approach. Comparing
the American notion of freedom and the German concept of dignity, E. J. Eberle
highlights the quintessential feature: “First, and most fundamentally, the German
constitution is anchored in the architectonic value of human dignity, meaning, at
least, that each person is valuable per se as an end in himself, which government and
fellow citizens must give due respect “.46 This “due respect” by the fellow citizens
in particular refers to the horizontal dimension of human dignity as a human right.
Eberle continues explaining:
The influence of the Kantian maxim, [a]ct so that you treat humanity, whether in your own
person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only is clear (although it
would be an overstatement to say the GG is simply Kantian), and this gives rise to a German
“constitution of dignity,” as compared to the American constitution of liberty. One obvious
difference between the two is that the German constitution is value-ordered around the norm
of dignity, whereas the American charter is value-neutral based on an idea of liberty rooted
in personal choice.
Given this background of a value-based “constitution of dignity “ which goes beyond

a notion liberty “rooted in personal choice”, the indirect third-party-effect/horizontal
effect of the general right to privacy has been directly acknowledged by the
Bundesverfassungsgericht inter alia in its case rulings in the field of media law. So far
so good! Adding an extraterritorial dimension, however, quickly reveals the fragility
of this dogmatic construct—let alone the different cultural traditions around the globe
as just exemplarily touched by the comparison between quite different constitutional
concepts of freedom as enshrined in the US and the German constitution. A judi-
cially defined that is to say judge-made right, which the Grundgesetz expressly does
not envisage, now has to be stretched in order to apply to third-party private actors,
which is never explicitly stated in the constitution, although it is implied in Article
1(1) and (2). In addition, this right would now have to be transposed, referencing
42 On this topic and with a particular focus on the internet: Leible/Kutschke (eds.) (2012).
43 Albers (2005a); id. (2005b), p. 537; id, in: Friedewald/Lamla/ Roßnagel (eds.) (2017), p. 11.
44 Firgt (2015).
45 Sarlet (2015); Häberle, in: Isenesee/Kirchhof (2004), § 2; Enders (1997).
46 Eberle (2008), p. 1 at p. 3.
26 M. Kotzur
Article 1(2) and (3), to a sphere beyond the state where the responsibility of German
sovereign power becomes ever-more remote. An extraterritorial horizontal effect of
Article 1(1) Basic Law might not be the most solid dogmatic ground to base effec-
tive Internet governance upon. Just a brief procedural side remark: Violations of the
general right to privacy, particularly in civil proceedings, are first to be raised before
the specialized courts. It follows that “regulation 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters” plays a
decisive role in determining the place of jurisdiction on the EU level. This role shall
not be further discussed here, but it deserves mention, nevertheless. We, instead, shall
proceed to other options of privacy protection beyond the State.
5 Privacy Protection Beyond the State—International

Human Rights Guarantees Protecting the General Right
to Privacy
5.1 Regional Human Rights Protection Systems—The ECHR
As for the protection mechanisms at the European level, the ECHR shall be consid-
ered first. Article 8 ECHR takes center stage, here—it reads: “Everyone has the right
to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.” A right
to privacy becomes tangible here, based on the wording alone. The ECtHR views the
protection of personal data as a direct consequence of this right. This provision does
not, however, unfurl a direct third-party effect/horizontal effect on private actors, nor
is it explicitly grounded anywhere in the text of the ECHR. Therefore, as is the case in
national constitutional law, only an indirect third-party effect can be considered—not
a foreign concept to ECtHR jurisprudence, either. What is particularly interesting
with regards to the legal questions surrounding social networks, is the dogmatic
proximity of the third-party/horizontal effect and the above outlined duty/obligation
to protect. The Austrian scholar and judge at the Austrian Constitutional Court
Christoph Grabenwarter has carved this out, precisely:
The approach to a duty to protect advocated here – characterized by the victim-offender
relationship – also determines the relationship between a duty to protect and the horizontal
effect. Where the duty to protect applies to the legal relationship between private actors, the
indirect horizontal effect is satisfied through the fulfilment of the duties to protect. The state,
which, through civil laws and their enforcement ensures a balancing of interests as intended
by the ECHR, protects bearers of basic rights from infringements on behalf of private actors,
through means of criminal law (…), in so doing does not only fulfill its duty to protect. In
the process it also assumes all duties related to legal questions commonly discussed within
the dogmatic scope of the so-called effect. Problems of the third party effect are therefore
incorporated in the dogma of a duty to protect.47
47 Grabenwarter/Pabel (2016) (translation provided by the author), § 19 para 9, p. 160.

This approach centered on the duty to protect as core principle for further dogmatic
development shall also be used with regard to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,
and within its scope of application. As the decidedly more modern and therefore more
advanced convention as compared to the ECHR, the Charter strikes a more discerned
balance with respect to its rights guarantees. It differentiates between “respect for
private and family life” in Article 7 and the explicit protection of personal data
in Article 8 of the Charter, the latter’s protective quality enhanced by Article 16
TFEU.48 In its already above discussed Facebook-ruling (Schrems v. Data Protec-
tion Commissioner),49 the ECJ holds that secondary legislation, “in so far as they
govern the processing of personal data liable to infringe fundamental freedoms and,
in particular, the right to respect for private life, must necessarily be interpreted in the
light of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union.”50 This decision, unlike the “right to be forgotten” in the also
above discussed Google-Case, did not pertain to the protection of an individual using
social networks from her/himself, but rather to the passing-on of sensible personal
data by the EU, here the Commission, to a third country.
Nevertheless, this ruling is not of lesser significance regarding the contouring of
a duty to protect. In this case the Commission had assumed that the data would be
transferred to a “safe harbour”, that would provide an adequate level of protection
for personal data. The ECJ does not question the concept of a “safe harbour” in
principle. It demands, however, that the level of safety of that harbour is verifiable
and is actually being inspected. Again a quote from the decision:
Whilst recourse by a third country to a system of self-certification is not in itself contrary to
the requirement laid down in Article 25(6) of Directive 95/46 that the third country concerned
must ensure an adequate level of protection ‘by reason of its domestic law or … international
commitments’, the reliability of such a system, in the light of that requirement, is founded
essentially on the establishment of effective detection and supervision mechanisms enabling
any infringements of the rules ensuring the protection of fundamental rights, in particular
the right to respect for private life and the right to protection of personal data, to be identified
and punished in practice.51
The transferring state is not allowed to pass along its responsibility to control data
safety, herein lies its very duty to protect. What follows from this for the protection
of personal data in social networks: here, too, must there be an ultimate account-
ability on behalf of the responsible sovereign for the protection of personal data.
This accountability-based duty, if necessary, goes as far as to protect the individual
from her/himself and also has an indirect horizontal effect on private actors with
respect to their relevant fundamental rights. In every conceivable constellation must
“the persons whose personal data is concerned have sufficient guarantees enabling
their data to be effectively protected against the risk of abuse and against any unlawful
access and use of that data. The need for such safeguards is all the greater where
48 See more closely Reinhardt (2022), in this volume.

49 For further reading Buffa (2016).
50 ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, para 68.
51 Ibidem, para 78.
28 M. Kotzur
personal data is subjected to automatic processing and where there is a significant

risk of unlawful access to that data”.52
These groundbreaking holdings of the ECJ establish at the very least a guide-
line which provides substantive legal standards for “internet governance” to be
used in complex balancing processes in individual cases. The duty demands for
judicial enforceability that is to say effective legal remedies. Mere voluntary self-
commitments or best practice standards by providers would—even though a potential
first step53 —not be sufficient at the end of the day. The question as to the degree of
protection from her/himself that the individual requires remains unresolved, however,
and it will likely pose very difficult balancing questions for courts and decision-
makers to answer on a case-by-case basis. This might serve as a general measuring
stick: the greater the power-imbalance between provider and user, the less predictable
and further-reaching future consequences are, the more inscrutable technological
processing contexts are (for instance regarding the deletability of data), the more
vulnerable and in need of protection remains the individual, even in such cases
where s/he offers up personal information voluntarily and thereby turns her/himself
into a transparent user.
5.2 Universal Public Law and Human Rights Law
Privacy Protection is not a foreign concept to universal public law either. Back in
1948, the UDHR as a resolution of the General Assembly, formulated only soft law
in Article 12: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation.
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or
attacks.” Article 17 of the ICCPR transposes this protection into binding public inter-
national law, when reproducing Article 12 UDHR almost verbatim. Para 1 reads: “No
one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.” And
para 2 continues: “Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.”
52 Ibidem, para 91.

53 See: The Internet Governance Forum. Best Practices Built By You: “The Internet’s influence
has touched people all over the globe. In 2003 and 2005, the United Nations organized the World
Summit on the Information Society (WSIS). One of the most critical outcomes from this landmark
summit was the creation of the Internet Governance Forum, or the “IGF”. Each year there are global,
national, and regional IGFs events happening around the world. Every IGF offers a unique space for
a an amazing range of people to share information and develop solutions on key Internet issues. It
was purposefully designed not to be a decision-making body, which allows people to speak freely,
on an equal footing, without limitations linked to the negotiations of formal outcomes. What comes
out of the IGF, however, plays an essential role in shaping decisions taken by other groups that helps
the internet run.” (https://www.internetsociety.org/events/igf. Accessed 11 Jan. 2022.).
As clearly as these provisions bear out a consensus with respect to the protection
worthiness of the individual, at least in principle, it is equally clear that the manner
and scope of protection remains to a large degree subject to the cultural context. A
dogmatic fine-chiseling into the questions of universal protection worthiness and a
horizontal effect issue therefore proves futile (and perhaps is not even desirable). In
addition, the concept of what is private itself—this was the opening consideration—
is subject to dynamic cultural change. Recommendations for future research, as
outlined by A. M. Brumis, thus include:
exploring the overall implications of advancing technology on our personal privacy and right
to privacy, exploring the differences in terms and use across social media platforms to see
what impact these have on privacy expectations, exploring how self-disclosure throughout an
Internet landscape impacts an individual’s right to privacy, and exploring how government
plays a role in digital privacy laws. (…). These would be areas worth exploration, as each
relates to the future of digital privacy.54
Rapidly changing online-cultures may well lead us to a place where information

we would today assign to the sphere of protection-worthy privacy, could soon be
viewed as naturally being part of the public sphere. It is, however, this very dynamic
that affirms the protection-worthiness of the protective good of privacy. There is
no lack of fundamental or human rights guarantees and dogmatic constructs that
facilitate such protections, neither on the national-constitutionalist level, nor on the
universal public law level. On the contrary, the web of protection rules is rather close-
knit, if one also takes into account the fragmented protection regimes of the OECD,
which include specific provisions to protect privacy. The issue lies rather with the
effectuation/implementation and another deficit might require further consideration.
What is lacking, both at national and international level, are sub-constitutional that
is to say ordinary legal provisions based on international treaties, that concretize the
individual’s fundamental or human rights based claim to protection. Human rights for
sure provide a meaningful tool for internet governance and privacy protection. They,
however, are neither the only or per se most effective tool. The sole avenue of recourse
being available at the highly abstract level of fundamental and human rights, with
their respective uncertainties in regards to justification and (rights-)balancing, cannot
(fully) eliminate protection deficits if the underlying legal fabric is insufficient.
6 Conclusions—Including a Comparative Dimension
This paper has emphasized and even appraised the virtue of forgetting.55 However,
what’s got law to do with it? Very little, might have been the answer of J. Rosen,
who rather and very pragmatically endorsed some kind of expiration date for online
54 Brumis (2016), p. 1.
55 Mayer-Schönberger (2009).
30 M. Kotzur
published private data.56 It’s all about politics, stupid, might have been A. Brumis
reply:
As the field of public relations becomes increasing technology-driven, the right to privacy
across digital platforms will continue to be an important concern for both organizations and
individual clients. Public relations practitioners must steer clear of crises, and privacy viola-
tions can certainly turn into a crisis situation if an organization allows consumer information
to get into the wrong hands, or fails to protect employees from digital data breaches. As
more organizations are interacting with stakeholders through the Internet and social media
platforms, public relations practitioners must take into account the legal aspects of privacy,
and how to interpret it in a digital environment. The inadequate legal standards that currently
exist for digital privacy has led to privacy policies that protect both consumers and organi-
zations as user information is collected. However, these policies are not consistent across
all social media platforms, nor consistent among all organizations. Therefore, public rela-
tions practitioners must be well informed in order to avoid privacy violations and in order to
protect clients and organizations from digital privacy breaches or government intrusion.57
Human rights instruments might provide a suitable solution. Finally, it is the ECJ’s
more “law-optimistic” attempt which offers a mean of legal protection by a newly
shaped “right to be forgotten”. What all these approaches share is the very notion
that we are “more public and more interconnected than ever”.58 As D. Lat and Z.
Shemtob remind us:
“In this day and age – of blogs, where our private misadventures can be written about at
length; of streaming video and YouTube, where said misadventures can be seen and heard
by total strangers; of Facebook, where “friends” can post pictures of us, against our will
(maybe we can “de-tag,” but we can’t remove); of full-body scanners at the airport Justice
Brennan’s59 words ring more true than ever, for better or worse”.
If we want to evaluate the power of law within possible internet governance schemes,
in particular the steering powers human rights could unfold, we first have to take
a comparative look at the concept of privacy as such. Only if we find a “pri-
vacy language” spoken and understood in different legal systems respectively legal
cultures we can go one decisive step further towards effective legal instruments.
Law comparison, however, is a difficult job. R. Hirschl’s recent study on compara-
tive constitutional law can be invoked as convincing witness.60 Rather than simply
being looking for a blueprint of fixed solutions—let’s do it as the others do!, the
comparative lawyer is in permanent search for a matrix that allows him to weigh,
to probe, and to critically reconsider her or his own arguments against the back-
ground of experiences that others have made or solutions that others have found.61
56 Rosen (2011), p. 345.

57 Brumis (2016), p. 1.
58 Lat and Shemtob (2011), p. 403 at 416.
59 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971): “[v]oluntarily or not, we are all ‘public’
men to some degree”.

60 Hirschl (2014).
61 Constitutionalism in Europa, the Americas or in Asia should thus be engaged in a permanent
dialogue on constitutionalism; for die Asian example Chen (ed.) (2014).

Just to copy-paste a rule stemming from another legal system or to restate a judg-
ment of a foreign Court has nothing to do with meaningful comparative work and
for sure will fall short of getting the whole “privacy picture” as displayed by so
many different legal cultures and privacy traditions around the globe. A simplistic
copy-paste would both misconceive the cultural heterogeneity of the legal world and
ignore a political community’s own legal identity as cultural identity.62 Without any
doubt, the public–private-distinction is at the very heart of this “identity”. Both appro-
priate and advisable comparative work may not limit itself to the idea of comparing
“the laws” (that is to say written norms, legal texts or, in particular given common
law systems,63 judgements) but it has, in a broader sense, to encompass a sensi-
tive comparison of cultures64 —in our case of “privacy cultures”. Whoever wants
to undertake the endeavor of a so-characterized holistic comparison65 must neces-
sarily leave the ivory tower of pure legal thought as well as the narrow world of
law-school-comparison often constraining itself to some rather fruitless semantic
exercises. A shift from comparative law stricto sensu to broadly shaped comparative
“law in context”-studies is the obvious consequence.66
An effective “right to be forgotten” concept has to be aware of these comparative
necessities. All the more so should global players take into account the perspective
of the “relevant others”. The United Nations are well aware of the privacy issue
and thus wrangling over new forms of internet governance. The Internet Governance
Forum founded in 2006 should be mentioned, in particular. It is improbable, however,
that global (legal) discourse would easily bring about globally uniform, binding and
comprehensive treaty regimes in the near future. All the more important is it that those
already powerful actors/stakeholders, within their capabilities, accept their share of
responsibility for the protection of privacy and enter into willing-to-learn-and-listen
worldwide discussions. The ECJ, with its two (quickly deemed historic) decisions
on Google and Facebook, has emphatically fulfilled its responsibility. The Court has
assumed the active position of a committed advocate dealing with the question of
what Internet governance should accomplish. This is certainly encouraging—also
for our Brazilian-German-Forum and for what could be described as “Civility in the
Digital Age”.67
62 For further relevant discussions: Cownie (2004).

63 See in this context also Singh (1985).
64 A classic of such an approach is Häberle (1982), p. 33; id. (1998), p. 463 et seq.; later Wahl
(2000), pp. 163, 173 et seq.; furthermore Varga (ed.) (1992); Ehrmann (1976).
65 Hirschl (2014), at p. 13 suggests “that for historical, analytical, and methodological reasons,
maintaining the disciplinary divide between comparative constitutional law and other closely
relates disciplines that study various aspects of the same constitutional phenomena artificially and
unnecessarily limits our horizons”.
66 Ibidem at p. 151.
67 Weckerle (2013).
32 M. Kotzur
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Wahl R (2000) Staat-Souveränität-Verfassung. Festschrift für Helmut Quaritsch, edited by Dietrich
Murswiek/Ulrich Storost/Heinrich A. Wolff, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 2000. ISBN 3-428-
09623-1
Weckerle A (2013) Civility in the digital age: how companies and people can triumph over haters,
trolls, bullies and other jerks. Que Publishing, Indianapolis
Weiler JHH, Lockhart NJS (1995) ‘Taking rights seriously’ seriously: The European court and its
fundamental rights jurisprudence. CMLREV 32(2):579–627
Weintraub J, Kumar K (eds) (1997) Public and private in thought and practice: perspectives on a
grand dichotomy. University of Chicago Press, Chicago
Markus Kotzur Prof. Dr. Iur. (Universität Bayreuth), LL.M. (Duke University, NC, USA),
Professor for Public International and European Law, President of Europa-Kolleg Hamburg.
Main research areas: Global Constitutionalism, Global Governance, Human Rights Law,
EU-Institutions, European and National Constitutional Law. Selected Publications: European
Union Treaties. A Commentary (together with Rudolf Geiger and Daniel-Erasmus Khan),
C.H.Beck/Hart, Munich/Oxford 2015; Grenznachbarschaftliche Zusammenarbeit in Europa.
Der Beitrag von Article 24 Abs. 1a GG zu einer Lehre vom kooperativen Verfassungs- und
Verwaltungsstaat. Habilitationsschrift, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2004; Legal Cultures in
Comparative Perspective, in: M. P. Singh (Hrsg.), The Indian Year-Book of Comparative Law
2016, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2017, pp. 21–50; Solidarity as a Legal Concept, in: A.
Grimmel und S. M. Giang (Hrsg.), Solidarity in the European Union, Springer, Cham 2017,
pp. 37–45; Theorieelemente des internationalen Menschenrechtsschutzes. Das Beispiel der
Präambel des Internationalen Paktes über bürgerliche und politische Rechte, Berlin 2001.
Personality Rights in Brazilian Data
Protection Law: A Historical Perspective
Danilo Doneda and Rafael A. F. Zanatta
Abstract This chapter traces the influence of personality rights and European legal
thought in the development of data protection law in Brazil. We argue that the
Brazilian Data Protection Law enacted in 2018 is grounded on a solid legal tradition
of civil law. In order to demonstrate this argument we trace how Brazilian lawyers
took advantage of European legal thought in the 20st century and how the concept
of personality rights was intellectually constructed. We also argue that personality
rights had an important role in legal struggles during the Brazilian civil-military
dictatorship (1964–1985). The chapter also presents new data about the history of
data protection in Brazil.
1 Introduction
The enactment of the first Brazilian data protection legislation in August 2018 was
the culmination of a process dating back to 2010, when earlier versions of its text were
submitted to public comments on the Internet. First conducted by the federal govern-
ment and later by the Brazilian parliament, the development of the text received
reasonable feedback from society following a path already taken by another piece
of legislation, the Internet Civil Rights Framework (known as the Marco Civil da
Internet 1 ). Both these statutes form the backbone of the Brazilian legal framework
for the information society, together with other legislation regarding issues ranging
from access to information to intellectual property.
D. Doneda
Public Law Institute of Brasília (IDP), Brasília, Brazil
R. A. F. Zanatta (B)
University of São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil
1 Law 12.965 of 2014.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90331-2_3
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«Nous sommes bien une vingtaine nous connaissant et faisant cercle.—
La bande des Sans-Vert.—Sais-tu pourquoi?
«Ernest de Vernaye est arrivé ici, tout féru d’un jeu nouveau, qui faisait
fureur à l’Estang.
«Il s’agit de porter toujours sur soi, d’une façon apparente ou non, de
huit heures du matin à minuit, un brin de verdure qui doit être présenté à
toute réquisition d’un membre de l’association, vous rencontrant, où que ce
soit. De n’être jamais, enfin, pris «sans vert», d’où le nom... Faute de quoi
on paye une amende.
«C’est comme une immense et perpétuelle philippine.
«Ruses et surprises sont permises, et tu peux croire qu’on en use.
«On entre innocemment dans l’eau. Quelqu’un saute du radeau:
«—Mademoiselle, votre vert?...
«Encore faut-il y avoir été prise, pour songer à se précautionner d’une
branche de verdure plantée dans ses cheveux.
«Si tu tiens compte de la rareté de la végétation au bord de la mer, ce qui
fait qu’au moment du danger on n’a pas à étendre seulement la main pour
se procurer un pavillon; de la fréquence des rencontres en revanche, tu
saisiras l’animation du jeu, et l’entrain qu’il met dans un groupe vivant
ensemble.
«Notre cagnotte est si nourrie qu’on va la casser un de ces jours, et la
manger, je ne sais comment.
«Nous pourrons faire un tour de France.
«Notre maison est jolie. Une villa particulière, qui se loue cette année
par hasard. Sur la mer, bien entendu, ou, pour être plus exacte, donnant sur
le dos des cabines.
«Pars de l’eau, je vais te décrire l’aspect de la plage en deux lignes.
«La mer donc. Un banc de galets, un second banc de galets, un troisième
banc de galets. Des planches, le demi-quart de celles de Trouville en
largeur, pas même, je crois.
«Deux rangées de cabines; un très grand espace planté de becs de gaz, et
soigneusement garni de gravier; des maisons, posées coude à coude, sans un
espace entre elles. Devant chacune d’elles huit mètres de jardin, enclos de
barrières.
«Tu n’as rien vu qui ressemble davantage à un décor d’opéra-comique.
J’ai toujours envie de passer derrière pour regarder ce qu’il y a.
«Entré dans les maisons, on commence à croire à leur profondeur; mais
ces façades en brochette, bâties différemment toutes, avec des recherches
d’originalité, de bois croisés, de grands toits!... On est généreux en leur
accordant la fenêtre praticable, d’où l’on va venir chanter un air.
«Le casino est tout petit, mais charmant d’animation.
«On parle beaucoup de celui, superbe, qui le remplacera l’année
prochaine; mais pour ce que nous en faisons, je doute qu’il y ait mieux.
«Nous nous y retrouvons tous les soirs, quand on ne se réunit pas chez
l’un de nous.
«L’orchestre est parfait. Des tsiganes, avec ce coup d’archet, et ce chant
de leurs instruments, qui donnent ce mal agréable aux nerfs qu’on a quand
c’est eux qui font danser.
«A côté, les petits chevaux. Les délices et le désespoir.
«Les délices quand on m’y laisse jouer. Le désespoir, parce que, ici, ils
sont organisés en roulette, avec des tableaux, et que je n’y comprends plus
rien.
«Je te recommande, pourtant, l’as et le sept. Il est sûr qu’ils sont pipés;
ils gagnent toujours!
«D’énormes falaises grises; belles si on veut, parce qu’elles sont hautes;
mais sans sauvagerie ni grands éboulis.
«Une charmante église, adorablement située à mi-côte dans la verdure.
Un port très vivant. Mers là-bas, que nous regardons avec dédain du bout de
notre jetée. Voilà, tu as vu Le Tréport.
«A mer basse et à mer haute, on vit là, sur ces galets; boitillant, se
tordant les pieds, s’y asseyant comme sur le plus moelleux banc de mousse.
«On plante dedans de grands parasols, avec des demi-rideaux qu’on
oriente, pour s’abriter comme on l’entend. Et comme la plage est toute
petite, et qu’il y a beaucoup de monde, les ombrelles pullulent et se
touchent.
«Cela ressemble de loin à un village nègre.
«Rien de plus drôle que de le traverser, et de voir en passant chacun
menant là-dessous son train. Une espèce de petit chez-soi, où on s’observe
encore un peu, mais où on fait pourtant ses affaires, depuis sa
correspondance jusqu’à raccommoder ses bas—ceci du côté des falaises!
«C’est notre bonheur à Madeleine et à moi que ces visions successives.
«Nous partons bras dessus, bras dessous, faire ce que nous appelons nos
observations de vie vécue.
«Maman n’aime pas beaucoup ça...
«Malgré le temps qui est atroce, nous nous baignons avec furie, et jamais
la philosophie de Gribouille ne nous a été plus nécessaire.
«C’est toujours le moment amusant, le moment du bain, autour de quoi
tout pivote ici.
«—A quelle heure la haute mer?...
«Et on place d’après ça: promenades, visites, réunions; et ceux qui ne se
plongent pas viennent regarder, et ceux qui se baignent en sont enchantés, et
tout le monde potine avec jubilation.
«Entrer dans l’eau, passe encore; mais que c’est difficile d’en sortir sans
être affreux!
«On a beau s’arranger très bien, lancer son imagination à la recherche de
mille petits embellissements: hou! que c’est laid, quand c’est laid!... Et les
trop maigres! et les trop grasses!...
«J’ai pourtant cousu trois bouclettes au bord du foulard que je noue sur
mes cheveux. Ça fait très bien. J’applique, je serre et je fais mon nœud. Je
suis gentille. Puis avant-hier, une vague arrive que je n’attendais pas. Elle
passe sur moi. Je bois un peu. Je barbote. Je ressors; je porte la main à ma
tête... Plus de fichu.
«La mer me gardera le secret, et j’aime mieux ma mésaventure que celle
d’une pauvre petite dame que je ne peux plus regarder sans rire.
«Suzanne se baigne avec des bas, de grands bas noirs bien tirés, et sur
lesquels ses souliers de caoutchouc s’attachent en cothurnes très joliment.
«On la plaisante là-dessus, à perte de vue et d’esprit; à perte de peine
surtout, car elle tient à son arrangement comme à ses prunelles.
«Le seul argument qui la touche et l’exaspère, c’est l’hypothèse que si
elle fait ça, c’est sans doute qu’elle a ses raisons, et se rembourre tout
vulgairement comme un suisse de cathédrale.
«—Mon Dieu! s’écriait-elle l’autre jour, au comble de l’impatience,
comment ne comprenez-vous pas, que s’ils étaient en coton, ils
«égoutteraient quand je sors!» «Ils» sous-entendant la partie injustement
attaquée.
«C’était probant, et comme Suzanne n’est pas la seule baigneuse ici qui
mette des bas, voilà toute une partie de notre groupe cherchant, sur chacune
des autres, la révélation accusatrice.
«On l’a trouvée—ou prétendu—car je ne vois pas bien, au milieu du
ruissellement général, comment faire des distinctions; et l’infortunée petite
femme qui l’a fournie sert de plastron depuis ce temps-là.
«—Shocking! dirait ta miss.
«Quoi? de parler des choses que nous montrons toutes si paisiblement
ici?...
«—C’est les bains de mer.
«Au fait, Françoise, pourquoi mettre si péremptoirement de côté le
bonnet soufre?...
«Supposons que je renverse la combinaison et que j’y adjoigne un fichu
rouge?
«Les fichus se posent tout seuls, et le rouge fait la peau si blanche... et
sur la tête, cette grosse chose jaune, tout à fait ramassée en petite cloche. On
dirait une rose trémière.
«C’est ça que je ferai!...
«Comment! si, tu sauras tout, les idées, les propos et les gens? Mais tu
croiras y avoir été!...
«Tu aurais été heureuse hier au Casino. Grand déballage d’officiers. Tout
Amiens était là.
«M. d’Étiolles en connaissait deux qu’il nous présente, qui présentent
leurs camarades; et voilà l’escadron autour de nous.
«C’est joli, les uniformes; il n’y a pas à discuter ça. Mais c’est dommage
qu’on dise toujours: «C’est joli, l’uniforme.» Je trouve que ça fait tort à
l’homme.
«Si j’étais officier, je serais jaloux de mon dolman.
«M. Le Thorney me tourmente pour savoir ce que j’ai choisi, et prétend
que la couleur de mon bonnet sera celle de son écharpe!...
«Livrer mon bonnet soufre! Il veut rire!...
«Je n’ai pas pu y tenir pourtant; il fallait que j’en parle à quelqu’un, et je
l’ai décrit en dansant à un des officiers d’hier.
«C’est un passant, il emportera ma confidence, comme la mer mes
bouclettes, et il sera muet comme elle!...
«Je t’embrasse à grands bras.
«BRIGITTE.»
22 août.
«Je suis décidée pour le blanc!
«Je t’écris ceci en courant, ma nouvelle combinaison me faisant tout
recommencer. Mais cette fois ce sera le rêve.
«Tu vois le petit mouflu en soie floche, gros comme le poing, et qui n’est
terminé par rien? Je le pose très simplement, en l’aplatissant un peu, de
façon qu’il fait auréole.
«Je mets une robe de mousseline de soie, une robe blanche très froncée.
Les manches au coude, avec un volant. Au corsage, très remonté, une
longue collerette souple. Une ceinture haute d’un doigt.
«Le milieu entre la robe de nuit, et ces espèces de tuniques qu’on met
aux anges!... Ce que j’appelle une silhouette!...
«Je ne t’écrirai plus jusque-là.
«Aujourd’hui, promenade en mer, et séance de crêpes de blé noir que
nous devons apprendre à faire chez ma tante d’Hauterive.—La dégustation
précédant pratiquement et prudemment la promenade en mer.
«Ce soir, repos, et parlote entre jeunes filles.
«C’est déplorable; jamais le théâtre n’est possible pour nous au Casino.
Jane Hading vient d’arriver; mais ça n’a pas amélioré les choses. Alors nous
nous réunissons, celles qu’on laisse à la porte, chez les unes ou les autres; et
nous causons! nous causons!... Que n’es-tu là, ma petite Françoise! il y
aurait encore parole pour une... Mais pas pour plus!
«BRIGITTE.»
25 août.
«Eh bien, c’était ravissant! et d’une gaieté, et d’un imprévu, et, tu
m’entends? d’une variété invraisemblable!...
«Mais j’avais eu un départ qui n’avait pas marché tout seul!
«J’entre au salon avec maman.
«Papa nous regarde toutes les deux, puis de son ton tout à fait fâché:
«—Brigitte ne va pas sortir comme ça?
«—Pourquoi donc, mon ami?
«—Qu’est-ce que c’est que cette robe-là?
«—Sa robe blanche que vous connaissez...
«—Vous ne voyez pas de quoi elle a l’air?...
«Trop réussie, mon idée. Ça sautait aux yeux tout de suite; et pendant
que maman répondait en haussant doucement les épaules:
«—Oui, je lui ai dit qu’elle avait eu tort de mettre cette grande collerette;
mais pour cette fois... à la mer...
«J’ajoutais en me glissant près de papa:
«—C’est comme Jeanne d’Arc sur son bûcher. Elle n’est pas
inconvenante, Jeanne d’Arc?...
«—Parfaitement, tu dis très bien, c’est Jeanne d’Arc sur son bûcher. Et
comment cela s’appelle-t-il, ce qu’elle avait sur le dos?...
«Bref, j’ai un peu baissé ma collerette, en redécolletant mon corsage, ce
qui en changeait très peu l’aspect; et on m’a laissé aller.
«C’était charmant chez Suzanne.
«La salle à manger décorée d’énormes guirlandes de feuillage, piquées
de fleurs rouges, comme on met aux bals de village.
«Sur la table des dahlias et de petits soleils mêlés. Une grosse nappe en
toile bise, avec deux larges guipures, une entre deux, et une au bord.
«Tout son vieux rouen: corbeilles, plats, saucières et huiliers, répandus
au hasard et remplis de crèmes, de fruits et de papillotes. Le reste du service
en copies de la même faïence.
«Du cidre dans des pichets. Le champagne dans des pots d’étain. Une
grosse verrerie, drôlement taillée, qu’elle a trouvée je ne sais où.
«Dans l’office, tendu de draps blancs, piqués des mêmes fleurs que les
guirlandes, un violon, un hautbois et une vielle, assis sur des tonneaux, et
qui jouaient des airs villageois, après nous avoir conduits à table sur une
marche sautillante.
«Vraiment joli.
«Maintenant que te dire des gens? c’est presque inrendable ces choses
faites du chic, de la couleur et de la figure!
«Les femmes charmantes en général, et le blanc dominant de beaucoup.
«Madame de Ronceray, merveilleuse en rouge. Un corsage drapé comme
une statue, sans forme, ni couture; le bonnet façonné en bonnet phrygien.
«Mais c’était surtout parmi les hommes que la variété était remarquable.
«Littéralement, il y avait de tout.
«Plus respectueux de la lettre que nous, ils s’étaient bornés à chercher les
couleurs diverses, en gardant le bonnet classique; et rien que par la façon de
le mettre, c’étaient autant de types ou de professions.
«Un épicier, un meunier, un forçat admirable, avec le bonnet gris sur les
yeux, un numéro sur son bourgeron, et une figure ravinée. Un matelot... Un
charmant matelot!...
«M. d’Olonne, comme on lui avait dit. Son bougeoir d’une main et son
journal de l’autre; mais intarissable de verve; impossible à faire taire. Un
des boute-en-train de la table. Ce que c’est que l’esprit de contradiction!
«Simon, l’horrible Simon du petit Louis XVII, reconnaissable à être
nommé par tout le monde.
«C’était M. de Tresmes, et il a même eu un bien bon mot, qu’il ne nous a
pas pardonné, je crois!...
«Comme on tourmentait la République pour faire un discours au dessert
et qu’elle ne savait que dire:
«—Je passe la parole au plus dévoué de mes enfants, s’est-elle écriée en
montrant le vilain bonhomme.
«Seulement M. de Tresmes, qui n’est pas éloquent, n’en trouvait guère
davantage; et Suzanne, qui souffrait de le voir patauger, a fini par lui dire,
espérant le tirer d’affaire et le mettre dans l’esprit de son rôle:
«—Simon, parlez-nous de Robespierre, vous avez bien vu
Robespierre?...
«Il est parti tout de suite alors, sur ce ton solennel que tu connais, sans
rire, et tout fier de nous révéler un point d’histoire ignoré.
«—Robespierre, a-t-il dit gravement, Robespierre avait ses heures
faibles, il a perdu trois fois la tête. La première fois à la Convention, devant
Tallien. La seconde fois, à l’Hôtel de Ville, au sein de la Commune, en
délibérant au lieu d’agir. La troisième fois enfin sur la guillotine!...
«—Cette fois-là, c’était sans remède! a conclu sérieusement M.
d’Olonne.
«Je crois que le pauvre de Tresmes n’a digéré ni le fou rire, ni la bêtise
dite.
«Il y avait un Colin superbe, d’une naïveté réjouissante. Une gardeuse
d’oies «homme» à perruque jaune, avec la chemisette froncée que je
méditais, sortant du gilet de son habit!...
«A trois heures, nous dansions encore, avec notre vielle et notre
hautbois, et il a fallu des pourparlers sérieux pour empêcher toute une partie
de la bande, un peu lancée, de se faire reconduire en noce, par les musiciens
ahuris...
«J’ai eu tout le succès que je désirais avoir, puisque que c’était un succès
très «unique» que je cherchais. Devines-tu?
«En rentrant, la robe de Jeanne d’Arc était oubliée, et je n’ai pas eu la
gronderie que j’attendais.
«Et puis?... Et puis demain, ou après, nous recommencerons, puisque
nous sommes ici pour nous amuser!
«Bonsoir, ma chérie.»
ENTRÉE DANS LE MONDE
8 juillet 1895.
M ’A-T-ELLE fait rêver ta lettre! En ai-je assez lu chaque mot, en ai-je

assez usé les plis!...
Il me semblait qu’en la tenant, je n’avais qu’à fermer les yeux et
que je voyais tout ce bal. C’était ma lampe d’Aladin. Je la prenais entre les
mains, et «tes» lustres s’allumaient. Les gens circulaient au-dessous; ma
Lucette passait en tournant, avec son bel ami penché, qui l’écoutait dire ses
folies; la musique m’arrivait après...
Je l’aurais racontée, ta fête, à qui aurait voulu m’entendre. J’y regardais
danser chaque soir.
T’ai-je enviée aussi, pour tout dire! Pas de la vilaine envie dont on fait,
je ne sais pourquoi, un des neuf très affreux péchés. De la jolie envie,
naturelle à l’homme et aux petites filles, d’être là où l’on s’amuse. Pas d’y
être «à la place» de quelqu’un; d’y être aussi, voilà tout...
Elle me faisait envie cette valse, envie ces voix qui chantaient et qui
entraient au bout des doigts... J’aurais donné pour voir tout ça, je crois, une
jambe et un bras! Payés après, bien entendu, pour être intacte à la fête!...
Non! ne te fais pas de remords, tu n’as pas eu tort de m’écrire. Si tu ne
me disais plus tout, et que je n’aie pas de tes plaisirs la joie vraie que j’en
ai, je serais un monstre enfin. Nous ne serions plus toi et moi.
Et puis...—écoute bien cet «et puis...»—Peut-être mon rôle de
spectatrice est-il très près de finir... Ah! je ne peux pas attendre plus. Tu
devais faire toutes les étapes et passer toutes mes transes; mais je ne pourrai
écrire librement qu’après t’avoir dit le plus inouï.
Hier, à l’Élysée, dans un garden party dont je pense que, comme tout le
monde, tu as entendu parler, j’ai fait comme toi l’autre soir, mon entrée
dans le monde!...
—Toi?
—Moi!
—Depuis Saint-Denis? Restant élève!...
—Depuis Saint-Denis, où je suis encore.
Imagines-tu cette bombe éclatant dans la maison: «Tant d’élèves de
chaque classe, invitées à la Présidence...» et la nouvelle se répandant. Une
folie!... Un délire!
Accepterait-on d’abord? Ceci, pas de doute, comme tu penses. Un chef
d’État, tu comprends, on ne discute pas avec lui.
Mais comment se ferait le choix? Tirage au sort? Cote personnelle?
Notes de travail? De quoi allait-on tenir compte?
Les bruits les plus divers couraient. Il nous revenait des Loges, que la
sélection là-bas serait faite artistement, «à la beauté».
Très décorative, cette idée; mais qui ne serait pas de mise chez nous, la
«Maison» avec un grand M, tu sais?
Le sort, c’était l’espoir pour toutes, l’égalité dans l’infortune.
Le travail, la justice pure, la récompense scolaire, dans toute sa gravité
décente.
Dans le doute, et en attendant, le flot des suppliantes se pressait à la
chapelle, s’efforçant de diriger le ciel par ses prières.
«Sainte Vierge, faites que ce soient les bien notées qu’on demande»,
disaient les très sûres d’elles-mêmes...
«Sainte Vierge, dites le grade des pères... La hiérarchie, c’est quelque
chose... Celles qui savent danser le pas de quatre. Celles qui...» Chacune
invoquant sa vertu spéciale jusqu’au troupeau général qui, n’ayant rien à
perdre, réclamait le sort à grands cris, avec les mystères de son sac.
Puis des prières, des stations, à genoux sur le carreau, presque le front
dans la poussière... Et des offrandes pour «après»!... Des neuvaines, des
rosaires, des sacrifices d’objets aimés; des livres et des livres de cierges!...
Des promesses à corrompre un saint! sans préjudice, rentrées dans les
classes, d’échange d’objets qui «portent veine», de mots contre le mauvais
sort, de gris-gris sauvages à porter. Des pratiques de sorcières... Une folie
véritable, et qui ne l’a pas vue, n’a rien vu!...
Décision céleste ou terrestre, c’est au choix par les notes qu’on s’est
arrêté enfin; et les noms bienheureux, officiellement proclamés, le mien
appelé à son tour, et entendu de mes oreilles, avec un sursaut à mourir; tout
notre besoin de vibrer s’est répandu sur la toilette!...
Tu sais la camaraderie réelle et charmante d’ici. Les déceptions subies,
tout se reportait sur nous. Nous étions les héros du jour, et on nous traitait
comme telles, en ne parlant plus que de nous.
Comment allait-on nous mettre? Laisserait-on chacune à sa guise
demander une robe chez elle, ou imposerait-on une mesure? Ferait-on de
nous un «ensemble», comme on appelle ici nos déguisements du lundi gras,
quand toutes les élèves d’une classe se font la même tête?...
«L’ensemble» a prévalu, et sais-tu comment l’a résolu, le plus
simplement du monde, madame la Surintendante?... Nous irions en
uniforme.
Quelques-unes ont jeté des cris, et j’ai eu moi un peu gros cœur!
Sans approcher de ton duvet, de ta blancheur et de ta mousse, je voyais
une petite robe lilas... Mais il y a des malheureuses qui s’habillent comme
des paquets. Cela les sauvait du grotesque, sans compter qu’à bien tout
prendre, cela nous donnait à toutes un petit cachet spécial. Presque un
parfum d’autrefois. Un air de demoiselles de Saint-Cyr, s’en allant à
Versailles pour jouer Esther chez le grand roi?...
Chacune aurait une robe neuve, des souliers neufs, et des gants blancs.
Le chapeau serait remplacé et changé en un canotier!
Les coutures de nos robes seraient, pour cette fois, faites par
extraordinaire en soie au lieu de fil; et, la veille du grand jour, par les soins
de madame l’Économe, une distribution de quatre bigoudis par tête—c’est
le cas d’employer le mot—nous serait faite, avec l’autorisation de nous en
servir, et le droit de les mettre, dès le soir, en nous couchant!...
Appuyée sur tes godets, que penses-tu de mes coutures? Faites en soie,
tu entends, Luce!
Et mon canotier, je te prie? Songes-tu au cabriolet, que j’aurais porté
jadis, mué en ces petits bords coquins?
Quant aux quatre bigoudis, et à leur pose le dernier soir, on ne reverra
plus ça!
Conçois-tu qu’on s’était demandé si toutes sauraient s’en servir! Pas, des
plus petites aux plus grandes, une qui n’ait demandé la méthode. On est des
femmes enfin! Mais une variété de conceptions dans l’emploi de ces objets,
des miracles d’invention... des traits de génie, je t’assure, comme la
nécessité en peut seule inspirer, pour friser à la fois, avec son petit matériel,
le haut de la tête, les côtés, la nuque et le bout de la natte. Jusqu’à ce qu’une
de nous, bravement, ait tiré du renfort de sa poche. Nous restions dans
l’esprit, n’est-ce pas? et tortillons, rubans, papillotes se sont épanouis à
l’instant.
Des figures à se rire au nez... Claudanne pansant un bouton qui l’affolait
depuis huit jours—une tête d’épingle sur l’oreille gauche;—Fontelle
polissant ses ongles. Elle a une main à bénir les foules... Bressoult me
passant du sucre, trempé dans de l’eau de Cologne, qu’elle me forçait à
manger pour-nous rendre les yeux brillants... Une réussite inouïe d’ailleurs.
Un moyen à retenir.
Et notre départ le lendemain; les conseils de la dernière heure. Aux
petites sur le buffet. A nous sur la bonne tenue.
L’examen réciproque de tous ces canotiers entre eux et des coiffures
inédites. Les bigoudis ont fait merveille; il y a des négresses blondes.
Nos ceintures sont bien posées et égaient notre laine noire, nos
collerettes, très 1830; candides et propres à la fois...
Fouette cocher, et nous roulons vers les grandeurs.
C’est madame la Surintendante qui nous conduisait en personne, pour
nous remettre entre les mains du général Février, et le grand chancelier lui-
même qui devait aller présenter son troupeau à l’Élysée.
Tant d’honneurs nous excitent, le côté mondain s’efface, nous
récapitulons nos gloires. On est très chauvin chez nous.
C’est quelque chose, tu sais, que Saint-Denis et les Saint-Denisiennes, et
cette croix que nous voyons partout nous est très fort dans le cœur.
Quai d’Orsay, nous nous arrêtons et nous changeons de conducteur. A la
porte de l’Élysée nous descendons un peu tremblantes, nous formons nos
rangs, très correctes, et le général Février, son beau grand-cordon en travers
de la poitrine, prend la tête de son petit monde.
A cette minute, positivement, j’ai senti que Napoléon était un peu avec
nous. Ne ris pas, Luce, je t’assure, il est adoré chez nous. Tu sais qu’il nous
appelait ses filles et nous surveillait de très près... J’ai eu froid seulement au
cœur quand j’ai pensé aux canotiers. Il ne les aurait pas aimés!...
Je suis restée dans ce nuage de griserie et d’héroïsme pendant tout le
premier quart d’heure, ravie, soutenue; puis quelque chose m’a fait
retomber. Quelque chose de bien vulgaire. Sais-tu quoi, ma pauvre
chérie?... Mes souliers... que je regardais pour la première fois depuis le
matin avec des yeux devenus conscients de leur effroyable laideur; des yeux
qui en voyaient d’autres à présent. De vrais souliers, jolis, coquets, qui
marchaient tout autour de moi, qui se posaient sur le sable en y marquant
une petite trace, comme une patte de bergeronnette que j’effaçais, moi, en
passant et que mon pied cachait toute, comme un pied de paysanne!
Ma joie s’est envolée. Napoléon et Louis XIV se sont retirés de moi, et
je me suis sauvée à l’écart!
Qui voudrait s’approcher de moi? qui songerait à me faire danser?...
Oh! pour ces petits talons coquets, ce que j’aurais donné à cette heure!
Les ombrelles claires, les jolies robes; je regardais tout ça sans penser
même à la laideur de mon noir; mais mes pieds, c’était une souffrance. Ils
s’allongeaient, ils s’allongeaient... Je ne voyais plus qu’eux dans le jardin.
Une gaucherie à perdre le sens et à ne pas pouvoir remuer.
Partout l’entrain gagnait, on nous mettait de la fête avec une bonté
charmante. Les petites, au buffet, s’escrimaient avec ardeur. Toujours
emmenées pour y aller, très sages, Dieu merci, mais les yeux luisants de
plaisir.
D’autres, des grandes, dansaient déjà, en insouciance parfaite des
galoches qu’elles traînaient. Moi, je restais dans mon massif.
Bien sotte! diras-tu. Bien sotte, assurément. Mais il me semblait que je
comprenais pour la première fois combien nous étions loin, nous autres,
matériellement et moralement, des gens qui vivent dans le monde—
j’entends celles qui doivent rester à Saint-Denis pour toujours—que ce
massif était la Maison, et que pas plus dans l’un que dans l’autre, nul ne
viendrait jamais me chercher!... C’était triste, ma chérie!...
—Voulez-vous, mademoiselle, me permettre de vous demander cette
valse?
C’était un polytechnicien approché à tout petits pas; nullement amené
par un officier, mais arrivé de sa volonté, l’air tranquille autant que j’étais
effarée et désorientée, et qui attendait ma réponse!...
J’ai cru voir l’ange de Tobie me tendre la main!... mais comme toi, dans
l’excès de ta joie, ma crise de mélancolie me rendait tout mot impossible, et
je faisais seulement: «Non, non», en y ajoutant un sourire pour n’avoir pas
l’air d’une idiote amenée de l’infirmerie.
—Quoi? Vous ne savez pas danser, on ne vous apprend pas ça là-bas?...
Je me charge de vous conduire...
Et comme je protestais encore:
—Qu’est-ce qui peut vous empêcher?... On ne vous l’a pas défendu?...
Mon ange était raisonneur et voulait savoir les pourquoi?... Et j’ai avoué
mon souci; pas complètement, comme tu penses, avec mes noires idées
d’avenir... Ma peine de coquette seulement.
—Eh bien! nous danserons sur l’herbe, a-t-il dit en riant comme un fou.
Ils ne tiendront pas toute la pelouse ces souliers d’ordonnance!... Et vous
verrez comme il fait bon.
Et il faisait bon en effet.
Danser la nuit peut être exquis. Mais, Lucette, danser le jour, tantôt dans
un rayon de soleil qui rend les yeux clairs et riants; tantôt dans un coin bien
à l’ombre, qui a un air tout mystérieux, parce qu’on y est presque seuls à
deux... Les feuilles qui remuent doucement, pas de tapage sur un parquet, et
ce vent frais sur les joues!...
Veux-tu nous faire bergères, Luce? et nous danserons tous les
dimanches, comme j’ai dansé hier!... Tu amèneras ton beau valseur.
Entre temps, nous marchions un peu, pour nous reposer en causant... J’ai
parlé beaucoup, je crois. Il m’a fait dire ce qu’il voulait.
Ma vie, mon nom, mon pauvre père, que le sien a connu jadis...
On est frères dans l’armée, tu sais;—pas les enfants heureusement!—et
on se sent tout de suite liés.
Passé commun, avenir pareil, dont on parle du même ton et avec le
même enthousiasme.
Avec lui j’osais, sans gêne, reprendre mes grandes ardeurs.
Nous nous servions des mêmes mots. Nous croyons les mêmes choses.
Je lui ai confié notre arrivée. Cette fierté en entrant qui m’avait remué le
cœur pour tout ce que nous rappelions... Et puis aussi les choses drôles... La
soie de nos coutures, qu’il avoua ne pas remarquer; l’agitation des jours
d’avant... Toutes les folies que je t’ai dites.
Puis comme ça me ramenait naturellement à mes souliers, à mes
déplorables souliers! je lui ai fait la question qui me tourmentait depuis une
heure et qui était le pourquoi de sa venue subite près de moi... Pitié?...
Curiosité?... Quoi?...
Il s’est assez fait prier, et m’a répondu par morceaux.
—Parce que j’étais enchanté de rencontrer quelqu’un qui avait plus peur
que moi, a-t-il dit d’abord en riant.
Peur, avec cet air net et tranquille, ce n’était guère probable, n’est-ce
pas?
—Eh bien! a-t-il repris vivement, parce que je vous trouvais jolie,
craintive et attristée, vous enfonçant dans ce buisson.
Et comme je me taisais, n’osant plus rien ajouter:
—Et aussi,—a-t-il continué, mais sans rire du tout cette fois,—pour vous
connaître vite beaucoup, et pouvoir vous demander de vous revoir chez
votre tante.
Crois-tu à mon empereur, aux mots qui appellent les bons sorts; à ce que
c’est joli la vie?...
Je t’adore, ma chérie! Je t’adore, je t’adore!...
HÉLÈNE.
PETITE PLAGE
Saint-Pair, 5 août 1896.
S I nous essayions d’une petite plage cette année? avait dit maman. D’un
petit coin, pas joli, pas connu du tout, où nous vivions «une» fois
tranquillement, sans casino ni pique-niques...
—Alors cela vaudrait la peine de quitter Paris, avait répondu papa d’un
ton joyeux.
Et ni l’un ni l’autre ne disant leur vraie pensée, ni l’un ni l’autre, lassés
du casino et des amis; ni l’un ni l’autre, et bien moins encore, joyeux! ils
avaient pris une carte, et cherché le petit coin «pas joli» où ils désiraient
soudainement aller.
La vérité est qu’ils voulaient donner à tout le monde le temps de ne plus
parler de ce mariage que l’on vient de me forcer à rompre; et à moi le calme
et l’éloignement nécessaires pour me faire oublier le fiancé qu’on m’a
enlevé—en admettant que cela s’oublie,—ce qui est encore tout autre chose
que de le faire oublier au voisin, je crois...
Pauvre calmant et mauvais antidote, que la liberté de penser
éternellement, de ne penser qu’à une même chose, avec l’accompagnement
le plus mélancolique qui existe, et la vision la plus propre à mener au
rêve!...
Jamais nous n’en parlons entre nous. Assurément, personne ici ne
prononcera son nom inopinément devant moi. Mais, est-ce avec les autres
qu’on parle des sentiments profonds, surtout quand ces sentiments sont
douloureux? Est-ce de la bouche d’un maladroit que j’ai besoin d’entendre
sortir ce nom, pour que chacune de ses syllabes me sonne aux oreilles?...
Enfin, c’est un bienfait pourtant que la solitude véritable. J’ai promis de
tâcher d’y chercher tout l’adoucissement qui peut s’y trouver...
Hélas! j’y trouve aussi le mot actuel de ma vie, le «je suis seule» avec
son autre sens; et ce n’est pas la bonne solitude, ça. C’est l’amertume
intense, et la révolte continuelle.
7 août.
Le chemin de fer n’arrive pas ici. On quitte le train à Granville. C’est là
qu’est venu nous prendre Coursin, le voiturier, pour nous conduire chez
nous en une demi-heure.
La route est jolie, découverte, côtoyant la mer en hauteur.
Rien de grandiose ni de pittoresque; mais une gaieté et une lumière dont
l’éclat, peut-être particulier le jour de notre arrivée, m’irritait, pendant que
notre petit break roulait au milieu.
Des prés très verts, coupés de haies d’où partent les arbres qui font les
chemins du pays ombragés et joliment encaissés.
A gauche, un peu avant l’arrivée, une avenue qui mène à une sorte de
château gris, qui n’est peut-être qu’une grande ferme délabrée, et met enfin
dans ce vert et ce bleu une note terne. Puis les villas commencent des deux
côtés de la route.
Une mare en forme de bénitier, où des canards barbotent. Un joli moulin.
C’est Saint-Pair.
La plage de sable est belle, assez morne et indéfinie. Des deux côtés, des
falaises en terre qui s’éboulent par place, et sur le sommet desquelles
serpente un petit chemin gazonné que j’aime à l’heure de la haute mer.
De gros rochers par-ci par-là. Beaucoup d’horizon. On voit et on pense
loin.
Point de bateaux, point de pêcheurs, rien de l’animation de la mer telle
que je l’ai vue toujours. C’est la grande privation de mon pauvre père, pas
de port! Il sera souvent à Granville, je crois.
10 août.
L’église est vieille, très vieille et jolie.
Autour est le cimetière, comme dans la plupart des villages.
Des croix renversées, de la mousse, des herbes et des orties. J’ai toujours
été frappée de voir combien, à la campagne, les tombes sont abandonnées.
Est-ce le temps qui manque pour les soigner? Une espèce d’indifférence de
«l’après»?...—On y est plus religieux que dans les villes cependant, et on
l’est ici extraordinairement.—Ou plus de résignation aux choses de la
nature?... On naît, on meurt; cela doit être?...
Nulle part le culte des morts n’est plus fervent ni plus fidèle qu’à Paris;
mais peut-être est-ce une sorte de culte particulier qui s’adresse au souvenir
seulement et n’y mêle rien de religieux.
Quoi qu’il en soit, la vue est charmante depuis ce cimetière, et je viens
souvent m’y asseoir sur le mur, les pieds sur des pierres écroulées.
J’ai pourtant découvert une tombe, parmi toute cette dévastation, qui est
intacte. C’est un granit entièrement uni, sans nom ni date, et qui porte
seulement ceci, comme inscription:
J’ai été ce que vous êtes.

Vous serez ce que je suis.
Songez-y bien!...
S’il a été ce que je suis, ce «il» inconnu, il a souffert; et quand je serai ce

qu’il est, j’aurai peut-être la paix complète. C’est meilleur et plus rare que
ne le suppose ce prophétique avertisseur. Pourquoi n’y songerais-je pas?...
Dans l’église sont les cinq tombeaux des cinq apôtres du pays: saint Pair
—ou saint Patern—comme dit le bon curé chaque fois qu’il prêche; saint
Scubilion, saint Aroast, saint Sénié et saint Gaud, sous le patronage,
l’invocation et la pensée desquels nous vivons constamment.
Je m’explique mieux à présent le nombre prodigieux de villas qui portent
ici des noms de saints ou de saintes!...
Pas une quête qui ne soit faite en leur nom, pas un sermon où ils ne
soient rappelés à la mémoire des fidèles; et jamais l’un n’est nommé sans
que tous les autres le soient aussi.
Pourquoi prêche-t-on dans les campagnes avec tant d’emphase et de
mots confus?
Si je pouvais monter en chaire, il me semble que je ferais un si bon
sermon! Tout court, tout simple... Je dirais à ceux qui m’écoutent:
—Vous êtes tous, mes pauvres enfants, presque tous, presque toujours,
bien malheureux!... j’ai bien pitié!...
Et puis pour les encouragements et les exemples d’abnégation, il me
faudrait aussi revenir à saint Pair, saint Aroast, ou d’autres sans doute qui
ont souffert, et souffert bravement.
Venus jadis, dans la sauvagerie et la solitude presque absolues de ce coin
de la côte, pour évangéliser les rares habitants qui s’y trouvaient, ils y
pensèrent périr de soif, après des peines de toutes sortes. Puis au bout d’une
longue patience, saint Pair ayant prié, une source jaillit près de lui, et c’est
l’eau que nous buvons encore.
Que ne l’a-t-il demandée donnant l’oubli!...
Leurs tombeaux en pierre dure, dont l’usure brille comme du marbre,
sont presque entiers.
Le seul saint Gaud est représenté par une statue neuve. Crossé, mitré,
enluminé, chargé d’ors et de mauvais goût. Aussi on pense l’admiration et
la considération qui vont à lui!...
13 août.
Un des charmes de la liberté d’ici, c’est l’emploi de nos soirées, que
nous passons sur la plage.
Pas de lumières, peu de va-et-vient. Des groupes confus, qui font comme
nous et qui respirent.
Le temps est d’une douceur extrême, et le sable reste si chaud, même
après le soleil couché, qu’on peut s’y asseoir ou s’y étendre sans éprouver
l’ombre de fraîcheur.
C’était hier le 12 août. La nuit de la pluie d’étoiles, et je n’ai rien vu de
si beau.
Couchée, mon plaid sous ma tête, sans autre horizon que le ciel, avec ce
bruit d’eau éternel, qui revient toujours dans le même temps, avec le même
choc, je n’avais plus ni pensées, ni paroles; j’étais toute dans mes yeux et
mes oreilles. Et plus je regardais, plus ce nombre incroyable d’étoiles
augmentait. Elles semblaient surgir du ciel, comme des bulles montent de
l’eau.
Puis tout à coup une d’elles se détachait, glissait au milieu du
scintillement; et sa chute avait tant de douceur que, malgré la distance,
c’était le silence de son mouvement qui m’étonnait et me ravissait le plus.
Puis d’autres encore repassaient, et le mot de «pluie» était littéral.
Oh! l’admirable soirée! Si mélancolique et pas attristante! Pas attristante
enfin à la façon de ces bandes qui nous ont envahis après. Les choses sont
tellement moins pénibles que les gens!
Ils étaient là une vingtaine, gâtant la nuit et le calme par un grand feu qui
éclairait tout, et des cris d’orfraies.
Ils ont fini par danser autour, en se tenant par la main, comme des
sauvages qu’ils étaient; puis ils sont partis en chantant.
On chante beaucoup ici d’ailleurs, sur les routes, sur la plage. En
marchant et assis, tous les refrains en canons, toutes les rondes d’enfants,
tous les airs populaires. C’est une bonhomie et un chez-soi dont rien ne
m’avait donné l’idée; et de loin cela n’est pas laid.
Pour le bain, il en va de même.
A moins que la distance ne devienne une fatigue, on se déshabille au
logis tranquillement; et il n’y a rien de plus comique, que de voir dans la
rue les rencontres et les causeries, des peignoirs et des bonnets amis...
Jambes à l’air; caoutchouc tiré jusqu’aux sourcils; si paisibles et si
ridicules... Se reconduisant, s’attendant!...
Et encore est-ce leur beau moment!
Il faut les voir au retour. Les lèvres bleues, les joues marbrées, lancés au
trot, de peur du froid; le peignoir claquant sur les chevilles, laissant deux
traces d’eau sur la poussière de la route!...
Mon Dieu! ce serait si bon pourtant de rire sans amertume!
J’ai de tout, des êtres et des actes, une irritation, une impatience, un
sentiment agressif et mauvais, que je voudrais leur montrer pour les blesser!
18 août.
C’est joli, Granville. Une petite ville étroite et noire dans sa vieille
partie; mais très pittoresque, et partout animée, gaie et populeuse.
D’anciennes maisons, de petits passages, des rues qui grimpent!...
Une surtout, avec un parapet sur la gauche, la vue de la mer et des
bateaux, et vers le milieu de la montée, une porte en pierres qu’on passe; à
demander le chevalier du guet!
Nous n’avons pas tardé à le rencontrer d’ailleurs, le guet, au grand
complet; car cette rue d’aspect moyenâgeux, menait bonnement au marché,
et tous les officiers de la garnison y faisaient, je crois, ce que nous y allions
faire nous-mêmes et flânaient par groupes.
Assises sur leurs talons, les marchandes d’œufs et de légumes les
interpellaient gravement. Mais nous n’étions guère meilleurs clients les uns
que les autres, et ils riaient en les regardant.
Le port est bien; la plage ordinaire, toute petite, je crois. Je l’ai peu vue,
elle m’a fait fuir.
On y arrive par une porte ouverte dans le rempart. On croit entrer dans
un jardin. On trouve des tentes, des cabines, et la mer devant soi. Et comme
c’était l’heure du bain, cela fourmillait de monde. Des toilettes claires, des

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Personality And Data Protection Rights

On The Internet: Brazilian And German

Data Protection And Privacy: The Internet Of Bodies 1st

Judicial Protection of Fundamental Rights on the

The Internet And Constitutional Law The Protection Of

Big Data Investments Effects of Internet Search Queries

Comparative Studies of Social Structure Recent German

The Right to Erasure in EU Data Protection Law: From

On Weaving New Expanded Edition Anni Albers

Data Protection Without Data Protectionism: The Right

More information about this series at https://link.springer.com/bookseries/7888

Personality and Data

ISSN 1534-6781 ISSN 2214-9902 (electronic)

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022

Personality and Data Protection Rights on the Internet:

Civil Rights Framework of the Internet (BCRFI; Marco Civil da

About the Editors

Marion Albers is Full Professor of Public Law, Information and Communication

Ingo Wolfgang Sarlet Dr. Iur. Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München is Chair

Bemerkungen zum Einfluss der deutschen Grundrechtsdogmatik und insbeson-

Sohail Aftab Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, Pakistan;

Marion Albers and Ingo Wolfgang Sarlet

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 1

1 The Emergence of the Onlife World

Whereas in its early years it was described as a separate sphere, “cyberspace”,

1 Hildebrandt (2016), p. 1 ff.; see also Floridi (2015).

subjected to fundamental structural change.7 In the economic system, the Internet is

7 See, e.g., Schimke (2016) with further references.

p. 63, esp. 72 ff.

algorithms,”20 as another example, focuses on problems of how the transparency

(2013), pp. 137 ff.; Bosco et al. (2015), pp. 3 ff.

3 Advancing Personality and Data Protection Rights

(2022), in this volume.

35 Doneda and Zanatta (2022), in this volume.

objectification of the interests involved, transparency as well as information rights

38 See Albers (2022), in this volume.

the right to Internet access, to Internet intermediaries’ liability, and to challenges to

that anonymity necessitates complex conceptualizations and sympathetic regula-

48 Michael (2022), in this volume.

Ingo Wolfgang Sarlet Dr. Iur. Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität-München, Chair Professor for

1 Introduction: Little v. Big or How to Accomplish

He did it again. Austrian national Maximilian Schrems had already succeeded in

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 17

Regardless of his numerous—also commercial—activities, the European Court of

6 Ibidem, para 41.

legal concept or an individual right—any further investigation on privacy protection

2 Spheres of the Public and the Private—Shades of Grey

13 See: Häberle (2006) for a fundamental discussion.

in: Winter (ed.) (2002), p. 179 et seqq.

19 Comprehensively—and with particular relevance to this context—discussed by: Taraz (2016);

Molinaro and Ruaro (2022), in this volume.

pp. 973, 993; see also: Bilancia and Pizzetti (2004).

nor aiming to provide detailed answers hereto—no “mission accomplished” can be

3 Basic Topology: Multipolar Fundamental Rights

27 De Wall and Wagner (2011), p. 743 et seqq.; Märten (2015).

4 Privacy Protection Within the State—Constitutional Law

Given this background of a value-based “constitution of dignity “ which goes beyond

5 Privacy Protection Beyond the State—International