21 -P

SOLUTION NO.

THE COMMAND AND GENERAL

STAFF SCHOOL

Map Problem No —5 Series ?.

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1071—C. & 0 . S. Seh., Port L«»rtnworth—S-1M1-UU

 CODE NUMBER 2 1 .

INDIVIDUAL RESEAROH STUDY.

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OP T'ffi GERMAN ATTAOK AT VERDUN

BEGINNING FEBRUARY 2 1 , 1 9 1 6 .

SUBMITJ

THIS SOLUTION MUST BE RETUttlED FOR PERMAKEUT

FILE DY 5 : 0 0 P . M . , ON THE D.^H V.IQW B2L07.
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MAY 2 0 W33
 Fort Leavonworth, Kansas;
15 May,1955.

MEMORANDUM FORJ The D i r e o t o r Second Year C l a s s , The Command and General

S t a f f S c h o o l , F o r t Leavenworth,Kansas.

•SUBJECT: A C r i t i c a l A n a l y s i s o f t h e German A t t a c k a t Verdun,

b e g i n n i n g 21" F e b r u a r y 1 1 9 1 6 .

I . PAPERS ACCOMPANYING.

1. A Bibliography for the study *

2. Maps: Topographical Map Verdun (1918)* 1:20,000. Sheets A, B and 0.

II. THE STUDY PRESENTED.- A Critical Analysis of the German Attack at

Vordun, beginrilng 21 February 1916.
III. HISTORICAL FACTS R&LATING TO THE SUBJECT.­
A brief resume of the military situation ut the end of Iftl6.
The results obtained by the German armies curing 1915, gave just
cause for General Fa1kenhayn to be proud of his fifteen months as Chief
of Staff of the armies in the field ( i ) . Ruseia was broken, the eastern
front stood almost everywhere on Russian s o i l . Practically a l l the Russian
strategic apparatus had passed into German hands* The enoromus armies which
had a year before threatened East Prussia, SileBia and Hungary had incurred
severe losses und wore in grave danger of destruction ( 2 ) . Serbia had been
physically destroyed ( J ) . The danger of a hostile Balkan Confederacy was
at an end ( 4 ) .

(1) ( I - I , 15-555).
(2) (1-194} 15-557} 16-261).
(5) (1-194; 5-480; 16-261).
(4) (1-194; 15-557).

-1­
 Bulgaria oonvinoed of a German vJ.otory had become her ally and the
attacks of the British and French on the weatern front were almost at
a standstill (5)» Although the German military accomplishments had been
tremendous during the year, thnre were no evidences of an allied defeats
Why did the Germans select Verdun for their next major offensive?
General Falkenhayn the German Chief of Staff was direotly responsible
for this selection (6). The reason for this selection was based on his
conviction that Germany's real enemy was England* But to overthrow her

directly was impossible even though her Continental armies were driven
from Franoe(T). To overthrow her indireotly she must be struok at her most
sensitive spot- her overseas communications,or to strike her tools, the
forces of Franoej.Italy and Russia* To accomplish the former he urged an
early unrestricted submarine campaign,although the German Chancellor was
opposed to it.(8). For the accomplishment of the latter he insisted on
striking Prance; as he believed that the defeat of Italy would have very
little effect on England*and Russia would within a very short time withdraw
from the war because of growing, internal disturbances (8).
France, he insisted, has almost reached her breaking point because
of the strain placed upon her, and if the eyes of her people could be opened
to the fact that in a military sense there was nothing more to hope for
the breaking point would be reached and England's best sword knocked from
her hand (9). As for military objectives,- General Falkenhayn considered
only two- Belfort and verdunt He preferred the latter as it lay within
easy reach behind the French sector of the western front, ttet the French

(9) (1-195*194; 5-480,481; 15-555)

(6) (1-218* 4-57; 5-554 j 15-572)
(7) (15-562j 16-262)
(8) (1-215,2l6j 15-562; 16-262)
(9) (1-2171 15-562] 16-262)

-2­
Oeneral 8taff would throw in every man to retain it, and if they did BO
Verdun would become the anvil upon which Prance would be bled to death,as
there wae no question of a voluntary withdrawal, whether the objective was
reached or not (10). In making this selection there were other vital
considerations,namely, its nuvrow front and the lack of reserves to launoh
an attaok on a broader front* All fronts had been practically drained of
reserves, even on the western front it was impossible to raise the strength
of the reserves to more than twenty six divisions, a part of which would
have to remain where relief measuros would likely occur (11)*
The laok of reserves also preoluded any major attempt at a success­
ful breakthrough (12)« The Germane had been for some time very apprehensive
about the Vordun salient, it was only twelve miles from their lines of
communications and would require a rather small expenditure of effort to
make the German front in Prance untenable (1?)* These were the major
considerations that caused Central Palkenhayn to seleot Verdun for the next
major offensive*
A brief analysis of the terrain*
The Verdun salient resulted from the offensive launched by the
Crown Prince in September U>lA.(l4). It extended from St.Mihiel to
Avocourt, a distance of about forty five miles across its neck* The apex
and the greater part of the salient rests on the eastern side or the Ueuse(15)
It really forms a bridgehead from whioh an attack may be launched
against Metz or against the German lines of communications(l6)
The oity of Verdun lies in a pocket separated by the unfordable Mouse
river which flows in a north weetwardly direction, thus cutting the salient
into two unequal parts, the greater part lying east of the river*
The terrain on the eastern bank is hilly,wooded and out by many ravines.
(10) (1-217; 15-56J; 16-262)
(11) (1-2171 15-563; 16-262)
(12) (1-218,219 and 225; 12-117J 15-565; 16-263)
(1-218j 15-564; 16-26J)
(1-218,219; 15-563)
(15) (3-25; 12-117; 16-575; 18-18)
(16) (3-25; 16-575) -5­
 The ground rises abruptly from the east bank of the river to a height of
approximately six hundred feet and ia called, "The Heights of the Meuee".
Prom these heighte the ground elopee toward the eaet for a distance of
about eix miles, then breaking rather abruptly toward the wide flat plain
. . . • •

of the Woovre. There are many dominant terrain features north,east of Verdun,
namely le Hort Homme and Cote JO^.whioh affords excellent observation over
the eastern part of the salient. These features lie within the French defensive
system* On the west bank of the Mouse the h i l l s gradually draw back from the
river and are out by a deep open valley through which runs the Paris-Verdun
railroad. The road net on both sides of the river is limited,.few are improved
and the others are practically impassible during wet weather^ 17).
The railroads east of the river consist of the Paris-Verdun and the line
running from Paris via Commarcy. The latter line runs thru the German front
at St.Mihiel and therefore cannot be used by the French.A single track one
meter line runs from Bar-le-Duc via Souilly but 1B inadequate in i t s e l f for
the supply of the troops defending the salient. The German rail net wae far
better than the French as there are a number of first class railroads that
radiate out from Metz, with two additional lines that have recently been
conctructed (Id).
From this brief terrain study the following conclusions can rightly be
madet- That the Frenoh have the better observation while the Germane have the
better communications.
This was well demonstrated during the attaok of the salient, when
the German right flank became exposed to the Frenoh artillery fire from
and
Oharny ridgeU9) the French supply requirements greatly excoeded their
railroad capaoity(2O). To overcome this railroad deficiency the Frenoh
organized what may be considered one of the greatest supply feats accomplished
during the war, that of organizing a motor transport consisting or approximately
three thousand motor vehicles for the transportation of supplies and troops
between Bar-le-Duo and Verdun(l9).
(17) (5-25,26,27} 7-22} 8-15,16} 10-159} 12-119)
(IS) (5-25; 10-158} 12-119)
(19) (4-57) 7-8} 16-147)
(20) (7-46} 12-121} 15-577)
 The Prenoh Organization of the Salient. The organization of the
salient consisted of four positionsj- The f i r s t extended generally along
the l i n e , - AVOOOURT-MALANOOURT - BOIS-de-FOROES - BRABANT - the northern
edge of the woods,of HAUMONT - OAURES - v i l l e HERBEBOIS *- ORNES. .
The second position extended along the general lines- North of HESSE
iioode - hill J04 - Le MORT HOMME - 0O03E HILL - SAMOGNEA'JX - hill 544 ­
North of Posee woods - South of ORNcS.
The third position further south ran generally along the l i n e , - TALOU
hill - PEPPER hill - hill 578 - north edge of Oaurieree woods - BEZO1IVAUX.
While the fourth position consisted of the line of forts from the
woods of BOURRJB to MOOLAINVILLE (20).
The defense as a whole lacked organization,, the permanent forts
were without artillery and badly in need of repaire(2l).
The Prenoh forces occupying Verdun consisted of a part of the
Prenoh Third Amy under command of General Barrail (22). The salient i t s e l f
was defended from east to west by the II,XXX and VII corps under command of
Qer.eral Herr (25). These forces were disposed for the defense as follows, ­
Between AYOOOURT and the Meusei The VII oorpB consisting of the 29th. and
67th. divisions. Prom the Uuese to STAIN: The XXX oorps consisting or the
72d., 51st., and the 14th. divisions. In the Woevre sector the II corps
consisting of the 152d., Jd and 4th. divisions.
The 57th*, 48th., and 16th. divisions were In reserve, while the I
and XX corps were in general reserve in the vioinity of Bar-le Due (24).
The organization of the ground and the disposition of the troops
conformed to the prinoiple of flexibility, the ground being organized in
depth while the mass of ths troops were held in reserve.

(20) (5-128) 4- 20,21} 7-5; 12-188)

(21) (5-llj 12-119; 15-572,575)
(22) (7-5; 1J-54; 15-568)
(25) (7-5; 15-54; 15-568)
(24) (4-55; 7-5; ll-44j 15-575,576; 18-8)
-5­
 The Disposition of the German Foroee prior to the Attack* The
German forceB opposing the Prenoh prior to the attack consisted of a part
of the German Fifth Army under command of the German Oroim Prinoo(25).
Theee forces were disposed as followsi On the l e f t bank of the Ueuse,
between AVOOOURT and the Mouse,- VI Reserve corps consisting of two reserve
divisions and the 2d. Land wshr division* On the right bank of the Meuee
between OONSEVOYE and FROMEZY, the V Reserve oorpe of two divisions;;between
FROMBZY and LAMORVILLE, the 5th* Landwehr and the 5Jd. Reserve division.,
and between LAMORVILLE and St.Mihiel the III Bavarian oorpe a total of ten
division.(26)

The German Plan for the Attack. The German plan ae submitted to the
Kaiser by General Falkenhayn became effective on Christmas day 1915 (27)*
The Grown Prince was placed in command of the operations by verbal
seoret orders at the time the plan was approved (23)*
This plan was prepared by General Falkenhayn, the German Chief of Staff
and called for a penetration on the narrow front of the salient north east
of Fort DOUAUMONT with a secondary attack west of the Meuee but to be
launched at a time later than the main attaok (29)* The penetration was to
be made by three corps supported by an extraordinary amount of heavy artillery,
l0//7/dr<\r, ammunition (50). For the whole operation the following troops
were placed under the cons end of the Orown Prince,- The Fifth Army (hie own
command), Von Strantz's detachment in Lorraine , Von Falkenhausen1 s detaohment
on the right bank of the Moselle in Lorraine and Lower Alsace and Von Gaede's
detachment in Upper Alsace

(25) (1-2J0) 12-120)

(26) ( 7-5J 15-1,2)
(27) (1-218] 15-56*0 16-264 j 17-121)
(28) (1-230} yi&t 1O-122J 12- l^J 8-20)
(29) (1-228,2291 4-5Jj 6-22; 15-571,572)
(56) ( 1-252J 11-258,259; 12-120)
(51) U-250; 12-120)
-6­
 In addition to the above troops,nine thoroughly rested and specially
trained divisions were to be assigned to the Staff of the Amy Group for
this operationt Also, three other piok6d divisions were to be sent to the
west bank of the Ueuse to be used i f necessity arose, while many other
divisions were to be held in readiness for immediate transfer to Verdun (52).
In support of the Inffintry there were alloted, in addition to'that
already in the area, approximately two thousand pieces of artillery
of all caliber , with a goneroue supply of ammunition inoluding gae shelle(55)
In support of the penetration the plan called for one battery per
150 meters of front with one battery per 500 meters for neutralization (5*0 •
Feints were to be executed on other fronts to divert the attention
of the French from these preparations{ and during December and January the
German Third and Sixth Armies executed a number of attacks for this
purpose (25)* The Original date set for this attack was for the 12th.
February but duo to unfavorable weather the attack was postponed until
February 21 &t», (j6)« When the plan of attack became known to the Orown
Prince he and hie Ohief of Staff, General Von Knobelsdorf.became very
apprehensive about i t s success* They felt that if the attack was to succeed
i t should be launohed on a broader front,comprising simultaneously both
sides of the Ueuse and larger reserves should be on hand at the outset
to exploit any i n i t i a l successes• The Orown Prince sent his Ohief of Staff
to present these views to General Falkenhayn.(57), but the German Ohief of
Staff insisted on his original plan,which called for a penetration on
(52) (1-230; 8-22; 12-120; 15-568)
(55) (I-252I 5-57)6-2; 8-21; 12-120)
(5*0 (15-572J 17-128)
(55) (1-252 j MU j 7-5; 6-22)
(56) (1-255] 6-19} 7-21 j 12-120; 17-129)
(57) ( 14-5751 I6-265)

-7­
 the nose of the salient, with a seoondary attack west of the Mouse but
to be launohed after the main attack. There was to be an anvil upon whioh
the Frenoh weretfo be bled to death by the artillery and just enough infantry
to exploit success (^8). In other words the artillery was to destroy the
Frenoh defensive position prior to the advanoe of the infantry- limited
objective attacks and violation of soft spot taotioe* During January and
February four corps were concentrated for-the attack, the III, XVIII,XV
and VII corps (59). The VII, XVIHand III corps were to make the i n i t i a l
penetration, while the XV corps was not to attaok except on direct orders
from the armyi The VII Oorpe and 2d*Landw)hr division which were occupying
the front west of the Mouse were not to participate initially in the attack,
other than i t s artillery whioh were to neutralise the P.renoh artillery
on the east bank of the Mouse (4o)«

(.%) (1-217,218j 7-1J 12-5751 16-265)

159) (11-258,259} 9-22)
(40) (15-578) 9-22)

-8­
 THE GERMAN ATTAOK. (See appendix "A" and B8" attached hereto)
The attack was launched at 7tl5 AM 21 February 1916 (41).
The attaok began with a terrific artillery preparation along the entire
front from AVOOOURT to Les ESPAROES with the mass of the fire east of the
Mouse ( 4 2 ) . The preparation was participated in by all caliber of artillery,
and was directed against the Frenoh first and second positions, and by dark
had praotically destroyed the front line trenches and paralyzed their
communications (45). The artillery was assisted by many captive balloons
while the aviation was engaged in maintaining air superiority (44).
The artillery preparation laoted until five o'clock in the afternoon,
and had for i t s objeotive the destruction of the Frenoh front line trenches %
so as to allow the Infantry to oocupy this position with as few losses as
poeeible(45). The infantry attack began at 5100 PM. with the main attack
directed against HAUMONT AND CAURES woods, and by dark the HAUMOHT woods
and the hostile position In Oauree woods north of HERBEB0I8 were captured.
(46). During the night patrols were sent out to roconnoiter the flecond
position,in order to obtain information for the artillery preparation the
next morning (47) • The following morning the attack was resumed and was
proceeded by another terrifio artillery prej/aration^with the mass of the
fire directed against the village of HAUMONT (48).

The taotios employed the previous day were again in evidence^

the long artillery preparation, the heavy shelling of the Frenoh front line
trenohes in order that the infantry may advanoe with the minimum of losses.
(49)* The attack of the Infantry was direoted principally against the village
of HAUUONT and OAURES woods,and by dark the village was captured and the
greater part of Oaures woods were in the hand a of the Germane (50).
(41) (5-44, 4-51; 7-6, 15-153; 8-51)
(42) (5-44/45,46) 7-6) 8-52)
(45) (5-44,45,46; 7-6; 8-52; 10-155,157)
(44) (5-45) 7-6j 9-49)
(45) (1-253) 6-19) 11-238,259) 15-572)
(46) (3-45,46) 4-55) 7-8; 10-158) 9-44)
(47) (5-47) 4-48) 7-6; 10-139)
(48) (1-255) 7-2?)
(49) (>48) 9-44) 10-158)
(50) (M8) 9-44) 10-159) AO
 The 1OB0 of HAUMONT made a dangerous salient in the Prenoh position in
the vioinity of BRABANT, whioh the Prenoh evacuated during the night (51) *
' On the morning of the 23d. the attack was continued, and by the use
of the limited objeotive attaoks the infantry were able to advanoe their lines
generally along SAMOGNEUX - just north of hill 344 - north of BEAUUONT ­
northern edge of Les FOSSE to ORNES (52)* During the day the French
launohed several unsuooessful counterattacks against the left of the line
in the vioinity of SAUOGNEUX ( 5 J ) . The Germans were foroed to commit a
number of their local reserves in order to repulse theae counterattacks,
(54)• During the night the Frenoh again withdrew their flanks to OHAMFNEU­
VILLE and Le OHAUME northwest of BBZONVAUX (55). On the morning of the
24th• the Germane made their main effort toward the capture of hill *h*t,
and BEAUMONT. The former being captured during the day (56)*

An attempt to capture BEAUMONT by an envelopment from the east

was unsuooeasful, but the attack did penetrate Bois des Oaurrieree and Les
FosseSj thus driving another dangerous salient into the Frenoh lines
between the village of BEAUMONT and ORNES (57). The Frenoh made several
attempts to reduoe this salient but were unsuccessful (58)* The Frenoh
then gradually withdrew their right flank from ORNES to BEZONVAUX and
by dark almost the entire second position had been lost to the Frenoh..
(59). The loss of this position wae a severe blow to the Fienoh,ae the only
remaining position between this and the line of forts was a position
only partly organized and partly dominated.fry hill *M (60).
General Herr wae aware of the oritical condition of the defense
(51) (3-47,48; 9-44; 10- 139)
(52) (5-48; 9-44? 10-1^0Jl4l)
(53) (3-49) 10-140)
(54) (7-2J) 9-5)

'(&) (5-51,52,53J 4-54; 7-8) 10-142,143,145; 9-44)

(56) (3-50) 10-142)
(57) (>-51,52) 4-54; 10-42)
(58) (3-51) 10-142)
(59) (3-51,52,53; 4-54) 7-8) 10- 142; 9-44)
(60) (7-2; 15-577)
-10­
and had issued prior ordera for a retirement during the night to the line
of tho Haute - do- Mouse, a position aa yet not oooupied (61). Thie retire­
ment wa« successfully oarried out during the night and by daylight the mass
of tho troope were oooupying the line: VAOHERAUVILLE - Oote do Pouvre ­
eouth of LOUVEMONT - Lee CHAM8RETTES farm - La VAUOKE - HAR0AUMONT -VA'JX
(62)* The Oermane did not become aware of thie retirement until late the
following morning ( 6 5 ) . The Germans had ueed the greater part of five
divisions against th*e nos« of the salient, the blunt of which were against
the Slat, and 72d. divieions of the French KXX Corps ( 6 4 ) . This Corps had been
eo eeverly used during the attack that i t was withdrawn during the night
of the 24th* and replaced by the 57th. division and the 506th. and J l e t .
brigades* (69)* The I and XX Corps which were in general reserve in the
vicinity of Bar-le-Duo had not yet arrived, although orders had been issued
for theifc movement on the night of tho 2 5d.( 66). The delay in ordering
these two Oorps forward was due to the doubt that existed in the minds of
the French Ooneral Staff whether the Verdun attack was to be the major one
(67). The Germane had not attempted to drive against the sides of the
salient except with one division on the eastern side. The 2d* divioion of
the XV Oorpe and the 2d Landwehr division had been committed on the 2Jd.

They also oommitted (the 15th.division whioh wae in reserve on the

24th. ( 6 8 ) . , or a total of eighteen divisions had been used to attaok this
comparatively narrow salient,Whije the French had used approximately half
thiB number l69)* The Qencane had succeeded in gaining tactical surprise,
but had failed to take full advantage of it* On the night of the 24th. the
(61) (4-54; 7-8i TO- 142)
(62) (4-56; 7-8; IO-i44)
(65) (4-54; 7-8)
(64) (7-8; 10-1421 17-129)
(65) (4-54; 7-8)
(66) (4-56j 15-576)
(67) (5-49) 15-574j 17-128)
(68) (7-8; 9-5)
(69) (4-56; 10-145) -ii«
 Germane allowed the Prenoh to retire to their third position whioh wae only
partially organized without making any attempt to follow up or pursue.
During the retirement the infantry wae held in place awaiting for the
artillery to diaplace forward (70)• On the morning of the 25th. the Germane
again resumed their attaok,which was directed mainly against the two ends
of the position} POIVRE and HARDAUM0NT(7i)»The artillery preparation wae
somewhat delayed^especially on the eastern side because of the difficulty
in displacing forward the artillery to positions where effeotive fire could
bo plaoed on the Oote du Poivre (72)* The attack on the western side
of the salient was doomed to failureias the terrain on this flank gave
excellent observation and field of fireand the German right flank cane under
flanking fire from Frenoh artillery on OKARNY ridge on the west side of the
Ueuse(75)* The attaok on the center and on the eastern side of the salient
progressed very rapidly, hill $73 and thu village of LOUVEMONT was oaptured,
while the 24th. Brandenburg regiment captured Fort DOUAUMONT, the cornerstone
of the Frenoh defense causing a gap in the defense at this point (74)*
The German advance had now carried thea to within four miles of
Verdun and victory appeared to be within easy reach of the Germans.

Both General Langle de Gary and General Herr realized the gravity
of the situation as early as the 24th* and had accordingly informed General
Joffe who on the night of the 24th sent orders to General Langle de Gary
by General de Caetelnau, (the General in command of the Armies) that there
must be no retreat at Verdun (75). General de Castelnau arrived at Verdun
on the morning of the 25th, and ordered that the heights of the lleuee would
be held at all cost (76). He had previously ordered General Petain to prooeed
to Verdun ana -ake command, Petain arrived on the afternoon of the 25th.(77).
(70) (1-234; 4-56; 16-266, 1M35)
(71) (4-57; 7-8| 10-147)
(72) (18-195; 10-145)
(73) (1-2J4; 7-8; 10-147)
(74) (5-56,57; 4-59; 10-151; 9-44)
(75) (4-65; 15-576)
(76) (8-41; 15-576)
-12­
 and during the night the XX Corps of two divisions commanded by General
Balfourier arrived (78). This division was ordered to counter attack at
daylight in the general direotion of Fort Douaumont, this attack was launoh­
ed and the Germans vrere driven back to the rim of the plateau (79)*
With the arrival of General Petain and the XX Oorpsjcan be said
to be the turning point in the German attack* General Petain began an
immediate reorganization of the defenee;and improvements in his lines of
communications by the establishment of a marvelous system of motor convoy
from Bar-le-Duo to Verdun (80). He divided the defense into four sectors,
eaoh of which was under command of a Corps Commander and a staff. The
re-grouping of the forces *as as followst-

Piret groupment Bazelaire,-r- between AVOCOURT and the MEUSE.

(29th. and 67th.divisions).
Second groupment Guillaumat,- between the Meuse and DOUAUMONT. (exol).
(59th. and 2d. divisions)
Third groupment-Balfourier,- between the village of DOUAUMONT and EIX.
(48th, " 14th, and 1st divisions with the
212 Territorial and one brigade of the
48th. division).
Fourth groupment Duoheene,- between HAUTECOURT and She PAROOHES.
( 158th., Jd., 4th., ani 68th.divisions
with the 211 th. Territorial and one
brigade of the 16th. division). (8l)«
This organization narrowed the sectors and considerably increased the troops
for the defense of the aaliont*
The attaok from the 27th.of February to the 5th. of March.
The attaok during this period was directed principally against the
DOUAUMONT sector and by the evening of Ma.oh 4th. had oaptured the village
which had already been reduced to a mess of ruins by the artillery ( 8 2 ) .
(78) (10-152) 17-15D
(79) (4-65) 8-45; 10-152)
(80) (4-65) 15-577) 17-129)
(81) (7-IOj 12-121)
(82) (5-58,59 j 4-68) 7-10).

-15­
 The attack on both sides of the MeuBe from the 6th* to 12th. Uaroh.
The Qormane by the 6th. of Uaroh had advanced their attack to include
the Frenoh first,second and third positions, while the Franoh wore defending
their fourth and laet position, except Fort.DOUAUMONT whioh had already been
reduced to ruins ( 8 j ) . The German right flank which had been under flanking
artillery fire from OHARNEY ridge for the past ten days ,had been unable to
make any appreciable progress,while the III Corps exhausted and suffering
from severe casualties had to be withdrawn from aotion (84)« This Corps was
replaced by units composed partly of reoruits whioh were forwarded from the
interior(85). In order to advanoe tho right flank i t became neoeseary to attack
west of the Mouse* On Uaroh 4th* the Orown Prinoe i-seued an order whioh was
read to his command urging them after a feo days rest to prepare for a supreme
effort to take Verdun,"The Heart of France"* (86). But before thiB supreme
effort could be made, A he General Staff decided i t was essential to seize the
Mort Homme ridge and the Bois de Cumieres on the right bank of the Mouse, as
from these positions the French artillery could take in rear, all attacks made
on the l e f t bank of the Meuee (87)• This attack was launched on the 6th. of
Maroh to obtain these objectives (88). It began with a long artillery preparation
along the whole Frenoh fronts and by the evening of the 7th. had captured only
a part of their objectives, the.dominating features of l e Mort Homme wsre s t i l l
• in possession of the Frenoh (89). The supreme effort spoken of by the Orown
Prinoe was launohed on the 8th.of March. This attaok was launohod on the left
bank of the Meuse from Cote du Poivre to the outskirts of Fort Vaux,and lasted
for four days with some initial successes,but these were later lost thru
successful counterattacks by the Frenoh. The whole attaok was a failure and
resulted in nothing more than a mass of casualties for the Germans (90).

(85) (4-92) 12-121).

(84) (1-2J4) 7-8) 10-147).
(85) (5-60) 9-2)
(86) (5-60) 7-11) 9-2)
(87) (1-254) >60) 9-2)
(88) (>-6l) 4-20) 9-2)
(89) (5-65,64) 7-H) 9-2)
(90) (5-64j 7 - U , l 2 j 9-2)
-14­
 «,+.+.« ck from March 12th. to April 9thj.
During thie period the Germans directed their attacks against both sides of
the salient and were fairly suooessful especially on the west side of the Ueuse.
Here the advance reached the general linej-AVOOOURT - MALANCOURT ­
BETHINOOURT - OORBEAUX woods -OUMIERES village. On the eastern side the lines
were" advanced to inolude the village of VAUX and the high ground northwest
thereof (91).
The attack on the 9th. and IOth. of April.
This attack constituted another German supreme e f f o r t , i t was launched on both
sides of the Ueuee with an unusually long artillery preparation along the entire
front (92)* Eleven regiments of five different divisions participated in the
attaok against le Mort Homme, while the VII Corps attacked for possession of
the Cote du Poivre. Thie attack lost i t s impetus on the second day, resulting
in le Uort Homme remaining in "no man's land? and the Cote du Poivre s t i l l in
possession of the Frenoh (95)• This attack cost the Germans severely in casual­
t i e s and reserves (94)* From the 12th. of April until the 22'd. June the attaok
was continued with the front remaining praotically stationary* This was due to
the persistent counterattacking of the French (95)* On May 2d. General Nivelle
succeeded General Petain in command of Verdun the latter being given command
of the Oentral Army Group1 General Nivelle carried out hie predecessors polioy
of counter attacking wherever possible (96). During the latter part of May and
June General Falkenhayn became very apprehensive about the impending allied
offensive on the Somme and Russian frontB, and believed i t necessary to launch
another major attack without delay in order to capture Verdun (97). This attack
was launohed on the 2Jd. of June (98). The objectives for this attack were three
foldt- 1st. the Froidettiere ftjrtifioatiorie in the west, the village or FLEURY in
the center and the fort of 80UVILLE in the east (99).

(91) (4-76; 7-12; 5-75,76,77,78) (97) (1-259; 4-78; 7-16)

(92) (4-76; 7-12) (98) (l-239i 4-79; 7-16)
(95) (5-81; 7-12; 15-378) (99) (1-259; 4-80; 7-16)
(94) (5-79J8OJ 4-76; 7*12)

(95) (4-79,80; 7-15)

(96) (5-88; 12-121) .15.
 Tho plan of this attack became known to the Prenoh thru the capture of

a map from a German prisoner, this map showed the topography of the area

with the objectives as far as Verdun, including a road leading to Paria (100).

The artillery preparation began on the afternoon prior to the attack

and lasted throughout the night with the mass of the fire placed on the ridge

of 80UVILLE, FLEURr and FROIDTERRE, the objeot being to reduce theBe areas

to euoh extent that they could be captured with the leaBt opposition (101).

In addition to thie long artillery preparation the Germans assembled

approximately eight divisions for this attack (102). The attack resulted in

the capture of the heights at Pleury, the village of Pleury and the fortifications

of THIAUMONTt The defenses at FROIDETTERES were entered by the leading aseault

unite, but these were quickly driven out by a Prenoh counterattack (IOJ).

On July 1st* the Prenoh and British launohed their offensive on the

Somme which immediately froze the German strategical reserves (104). The

Orown Prince thereafter had to rely on his own forces for future reserves (105) •

The lack of reserves, apparently, did not immediately perturb the Orown

Prince, as he at once began preparations for another attaok in an effort to

capture Verdun* He had previously abandoned any hope of sucoess on the west

bank of the Meuss, and now with no prospect of reinforcements, oentered his

attention on the front between Fleury and Damlop (106). This attaok was launohed

on July 11th. and like a l l previous attacks was preo^eded by a long and heavy

artillery preparation (108). The objeotive for this attaok was the ridge at

SOUVILLE, called the"Key to Verdun". Twelve regiments were used in the capture

of this ridge, which inoluded a battery of artillery at Damloup (109). This

attack was halted after a few days by Frenoh repeated counterattacks (HO).

This proved to be the end of the German offensive, as the situation was

becoming so critical on other frontB that the German Ohief of Staff deemed i t

necessary to preserve MB troops and supplies to combat these new emergencies

(HI).

(100} (4-79; 7-16). (109) (1-268; 4-80).

(101 (4-791 7-l6i 12-122). (no) (4-80; 7-17).
(102) (4-79; 7-16). (HI) (1-268; 4-80) 12- 122)
(105) (1-259; 4-79; 7*16).
(104) (1-262; 4-80; 7-17).
(103) (4-80; 7-17)
(106) (1-268; 4-80; 7-17).
(108) (1-268; 4-80; 7-17).

-16­
 The battle of Verdun wae a stupendous affair* the Prenoh had ueed by
July let. approximately sixty five divisions in the defense of the salient
while the Germans used approximately fifty (112) These figures inolude
divisions that were withdrawn from Action but later returned to the line.
Both foroeo suffered heavy casualties, the French losses were
approximately 400,000,including killed,wounded and missing in action,,while
the Qermane losses amounted to approximately J00,000. (115)* On August 29th.
General Falkenhayn was relieved as the German Chief of Staff and was replaced
by General Kindenburg, who* abandoned the Verdun offensive in September 1916

(112) (7-25) 17-150)

(115) (4-1191 15-579)
(114) (l-268j 4-6Oj 12-122).

-17­
 ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM. The Oerraan attack at Verdun may be considered
under two headings! Strategical and Tactical*
The strategical plan as conceived by General Falkenhayn was based on
his pereonal conviotion, and aB etated in hie own words, "That Prance was
military and economically weakened to the limit of hor endurance, and an
attack on Verdun would cause her to throw in every man to retain it and
Verdun would become an anvil upon whioh eho would be bled to death, as there
waB no *iueotion of a voluntary withdravrl, whether the objective was reached
or not (115)» In thie aseuaption Ooneral Falkonhayn was only partly correct
France did defend Vordun,and would prehaps, .if necessary, put in her laet
man to retain it, but as to her being economically weakened to the point of
breaking ie an assumption that cannot be based on Bound reasoning (116)•

General Fa 1 ken hay r. admitted that other fronts had been drained of
reserves and that it would be impossible to raise more than twenty six divisions
on the western front, a part of which would have to remain for relief measures.
(117). With this limited force it ie not reasonable to boliovo that France
could be weakened to suoh a point that she would be of no further value as
a military opponent. As for the objeotive for the attack, the one selected
by Goneral Falkonhayn did lay within eajy reaoh of the German army, but hiB
plan did not call for a rapid capture of this objective, but rather for an
anvil upon which the French forces could be bled to death (118)* The objoctive
the Germans ware never able to roach, although the French did place approximately
sixty five divisions on the anvil, resulting in approximately 400,000 of hor
mon being bled to death. (119). In the execution of this plan the German in
turn placed approximately fifty of her divisions on an anvil, resulting in
a lose of approximately 500,000 of hor men (120).
(llCi). (1-217; 15-565; 16-262).
(116) (12-576; 16-155).
(117) (1-217; 15-565; 16-262)
(118) (7-25; 4-119; 15-579; 17-150)
(119) (7-25; 17-150).
(120) (4-119; 15-1)7?)
-18­
c
With thOB© figures in mind i t does not appear that tho netiiod used in
securing tho objective was corroot, oapeoially when the t a c t i c a l plun WUB
devised to achieve t h i s objective with ue fen loBfiea aa possible (121)•
The taotical plan culled for a surprise penotration on tho nose of
the narrow salient, with a Bocondary effort vioet of tho MeuBe, the l a t t e r
to be launched after the main attuc!<(122). The plan also called for an
enorraoue amount of a r t i l l e r y , irj&/2&Cng ammunition to be maesed behind tho
saliont prior to the attuok (125). The a r t l l l o r y was to destroy the French
trench eyetein prior to the advanco of the infantry in order to allow the
infuntry to occupy these poeitions with as few Ioe6ee us possible (12^).
The order aleo prescribed that three corps participate i n i t i a l l y in the
attack, while the corps on tho tveaf flank withold their aHack until they
received direct orders from.the army (125). The corps that were to attack
i n i t i a l l y wore given definite limited objectives with apparently no provisions
made for the rapid exploitation of any successes• (126) The attack waB
carried out substantially as planned. The Germane did secure tacticul surprise,
ae was Bhown oarly in the campaign, whon tho French General Staff hesltBtod
in ordering the I and XX corpe from Bar-lo-Duo to Verdun (127)» The attack
was launched with throe corps on the nose of.the salient, while the attuck of
the XV corps on the loft flank was held up utvtil tho third day, then only a
part of this corpe was co.rjnittod to action.(128) • The attaok on the right
flank,except for a r t i l l e r y support, wue not launched until the 6 March, or
fourteen days luter (129)# then only after the the right of the forces making
the penetration became exposed to flanking fire from French Artillory on
CHARIEY ridge (1J0). Tho OermanB uBually rolied on long a r t i l l e r y preparations
in order to completely destroy the French defensive positions, before they
launched thoir infantry attacksi this was particularly true in tho oarly phases
(121) (1-217,218; 7-8; 12-575). (128) ­ C5-61i 4-20; 9-2).
(122) (1-218; 7-8; 12-575). (129) (7-8, 9-5).
(125) (1-250; 5-75J 8-21} 12-120). (150) (X-2?4j 7-8; 10-1^7)
(12A) (1-255) 6-19; 15-572)
(125) (6-19; ll-258;259).
(126) (J-56; 9-M.
(127) (5-^9; 15-57A; 17-128)
-19­
of the campaign (15l)» When the attack was launohed on the 21 February the
the Infantry did not advunce until 5:00 PM., then the advance waB limited ae
to the objectives (152). After reaching those objectives the infantry was
held in place until the second linet,trenohes could bo rooOnnoitered and
destroyed by tho artillery(155) • The Germane did not attempt to maintain
strong pressure against tho French forces, especially during the night, thuB
allowing the French to withdraw without opposition, this fact was well illustrated
during the night of 24-25 February (154). By the use of the limited objective
attacks the Germans denied themselves the use of the soft spot t a c t i c s , which
were indicated on a number of occasions,especially on the 24th.,when they
drove the deep salient in the French lines bet?roon BEAUMOMT and OHIJES (155)»
Those taotios also allowed the French time to bring up reserves,to
strengthen their lines, f i l l gaps or to replace worn out units* During the
l a t t e r part of the campaign the principal objective, that i s the usure of
the French army to such un extent that i t v/ould be of no futher use as a
military* opponent was apparently ohanged, as tho Crown Prinoe announces to
his troops that after a few days r e s t a supreme effort would be made to
capture Verdun (1^6)• This offort was made, but too late, as the French
had brought into the area fresh troops, had reorganized the salient and were
determined to hold at a l l cost* The Germans on the other hand haB exhausted
their reserves to such an extent that when the Somrae offensive was launched
the Verdun offensive had to be discontinued in order to preserve troops for
t h i s new threat (157)»
(151) (5-45,46; 7-6; 8-52)
(152) (1-2555 6-19; 15-572)
(155) (5-47* 4-48; 7-3; 10-159)
(154) (5-51; 10-45)
(155) (5-52; 4-54; 10-42).
(156) (5-6Oj 7 ; i l ; 9-2).
(157) (1-263; 4-80; 12-122)

-20­
 IV. CONCLUSIONS OF THE AUTHOR.

Tho German attack a t Verdun can bo c l a s s i f i e d a s a frontal

a t t a c k . Thia form of a t t a c k i s rarely successful, e s p e c i a l l y when launched

on a do op and nurron s a l i e n t . I t would undoubtedly h^ve boon b e t t e r to

launch t h i s a t t a c k a g a i n s t one or both sideB of the e a l i e n t , i n an e f f o r t

t o rupidly reduoe i t . This the Germane failed t o do, us t h e i r objective Has

not a raoid reduction of t h e s a l i e n t , but r a t h e r a methodical destruction

of the Fronch army by the uee of t h e i r a r t i l l e r y , then to occupy p o s i t i o n

a f t e r ^ o e i t i o n with t h e i r i n f a n t r y , in order to minimise l o e e e e . These

limited o b j e c t i v e a t t a c k s v i o l a t e the p r i n c i p l e of movement, deny the use

of BOft spot t a o t i c e and allowed the French s u f f i c i e n t time t o counterattack

and maneuver t h e i r r e s e r v e s . The Germans should have ended t h e i r u r t i l l e r y

preparation a t d a y l i g h t , then to support tho i n f a n t r y in t h e i r a t t a c k , which

should have advanced aB far and as rapidly as the s i t u a t i o n p o r m i t t e d .

Their ehould have been provided adequate r e s e r v e s t o e x p l o i t any i n i t i a l

suocese, and the infantry sn6uld have maintained close contact with tho French

a t a l l times in order to determine the time and place for Buch e x p l o i t a t i o n .

V. RECOMliaiDATIONS None r e q u i r e d .

VI. CONCURRENCES. None r e q u i r e d .

-21­
 APPENDIX "A".

THE OERMAN FIELD ORDER FOR THE ATTAOK.

(COPY)

January 27,1916.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY.

No. 418. STRICTLY SECRET­

ORDERS FOR THE ATTAOK.OORPS.

(I) In the forenoon of February 1 2 t h . the bombardment o f the Frenoh

p o s i t i o n along the e n t i r e front surrounding the f o r t r e s s w i l l s t a r t i n

acoordanoe with, "Orders for the employment of the A r t i l l e r y and Trenoh

Mortars", Fifth Army, January 27>19l6,Ia 588 s e c r e t . During the bombardment

the a t t a c k troops o f the corps w l l l b e posted eo that the infantry w i l l

suffer as l i t t l e loss as practicable, the positions to bet-

VII Reserve Corps in sector — A.
See
V W T /, M A « operations
XVII Corps in sector — B.
map attached
III Corps in BOO tor ————— 0. hereto*
XV Corps in sector — - — — — D.

(2). At 5.00 PM., February 12th. Corps in seotor A-0, will rush
forward in their slcirmish lines toward the first hostile lines and
capture that line* These skirmish lines should be reinforoed by flame
throwers and hand grenade squads* If we succeed in gaining a foot hold
in the enemy's first line, we must make an effort to reoonnoiter the Frenoh
second line , in order to obtain exact information as a basis for an
artillery preparation ddring the following morning*
(5) In the same manner as oonoerna artillery fir©, eo in the infantry
attacks for the entire battle around Fortress of Verdun, the prinoipal
point i s never to l e t the attack come to a standstill, so that the Frenoh
-22­
 will have no opportunity to make a stand in rear of the line to re­
organize hie defense*
(4). The different corpe will at first have the following missionei­
(A) VII Reserve Corps. Capture the fortifications on the
HAUMONT, advance to the eouth slope of the two ridges in the direction
of SAMOONEUX, clearing out the sector between HAUMONT foreet,SAM03NBJX
and the Meuee*
For the second part of the task , troops of the 77th* brigade
in the sector and flame throwers in readineee in the BOIS de OONSENVOYE will
be attached to the VII Reserve Corps* The portion of the V Reserve Oorps
thus attached, will not participate in any attack while the HAUMONT is
being taken. The VII Reserve Corps and the XVIII Oorps will come to an
agreement between themselves as to the use of the ridge east of Bois de
Caures during the attack. ( Chiefs of Staff of both Oorps to hold
consultations at Army Headquarters).
After having accomplished its mission, the VII Reserve Corps
will receive orders as to its subsequent employment.
(B) XVIII Corps* Drive the enemy out of Caures woods and
advance on the plateau in the direction of CHAMPNEUVILLE as far as the
dominating hill jVl, so that this line will be securely in our possession
during the course of the battle* One part of the Corps will be assigned
the mission of turning the hostile fortifications on La WAVRIVILLE north
of BEAUMONT (l!>25,000 map) to support the III Corps in the Capture ,of
these woods* It must be the general endeavor of the XVIII Corps and the
III Corps to fight in close connection along their common boundary*
(0). Ill Corps* Attack along the ridge, east of the ville
dovant OHAUMONT - VACHEREAVILLE road, cleaning out the HERBEBOIS by
turning the left flank in with the rear eohelon, while advancing with
the center in the direction of DOUAUMONT. The portion of the V Reserve
Corpe in the attaok sector in rear of the XVIII Corps and the III Corps are
not under orders of these Corps*

-25­
 (D) XV Oorpa. Capture the h o s t i l e position south of VAUX - Oharriere

foreBt - FROMEZY. The infantry attaoka for this purpose will be started

however on direot orders from the Army, This will depend on a successful

advanoe along the top of the Oote. Those portions of the V Reserve OorpB

in rear of the attaok seotor of the XV Corps are not plaoed under orders

of the XV Oorpo.

(E) The V Corps will for the present remain in i t s position, keeping

i t s troops in increased readiness. I t will however proteot the concentration

for a l l Corps for the attaok. The 77tht Brigade will bo placed under orders

of the VII Reserve CorpB after that Corps succeeds in taking HAUMONT.

The portion of the V Reserve Corps in the sector of the XVIII CorpB

and the III CorpB will be assembled by the orders of the Corps Commander

during the time the two above Corp*'push forward, so that there w i l l bo

the l e a s t loss for the following missions:- "Capture of the hostile position r

ORNES- L i t t l e MAUOOURT forest -*- MAUOOURT - MOOEVILLE5

This attaok can be made only after the III Corps hae pushed into

the Fosses and Ohaume forest and when the XV Corps hae accomplished i t s

mission, orders w i l l be issued from the army. The 9th. Reserve Division

will remain in i t s present position according to detailed instruction of

the V Reserve Corps. Headquarters of the V Reserve Oorpe will arrange at* to

what portion of that division w i l l participate in the attack against the

linei ORNES- MOGEVILLB.

(F) Proper arrangements uust be made that independent of messages

for the Corps by liaidon officers the Corps will maintain permanent

comaAnications with the army so that the l a t t e r will be informed at a l l

times of the battle situation.

(Q) Orders will be Issued every evening at Army Command Post the

hour will be designated daily, the Command Post i s to be established at

VILLARVILLS.

The Commander - in - Chief,

•ULKELM

Crown P r i n c e o f t h e Gorman Empire and o f P r u s s i a .

 FURTHER INFORMATION.

(1) On the west bank of the Ueuse, the reinforced VI Reserve Oorpe
will at first aot defensively* lte artillery will participate in neutral­
izing the fire of hostile batteries on the east bank*
(2) "A" Detaohment Strantz will also for the present participate with its
artillery only.
(5) The time when the VI Reserve Corps and "A" Detachment STRANTZ will
attaok will be published in timely orders from these headquarters*

(1J8) (6-19; 11-258,259).

-23­
 APPENDIX "B»«

PLAN FOR THE ARTILLERY ATTAOK.

(OOPY) January 4 , 1 9 1 6 .

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY

N o . l a - 78 S e c r e t •

(1) The field of attack reaches from the southwest corner of

HAUMONT forest to a position south of Good Hope Nose.
(Corps sectors shown on sketch- missing)
Where the boundary of artillery eeotore overlap Oorpe boundaries
arrangements will be made for regulating the use of roads.
(2) Preparing the field of attack for the assault.
Mortar batteries have been exclusively assigned against the leading
infantry positions, one battery per 150 meters of front*
At the same time second line supporting points are to be eilenoed.
For this purpose a portion of the heaviest high angle fire batteries
and heavy field howitzer: batteries are designated.
Depending on the progress of the attack, the f i r s t line batteries
Bhift their fire on the second line, and batteries of the second line on
to the third line. Fire for adjustment of batteries on their targets,
and for ascertaining their flank boundaries has been arranged, prior to
the opening of the battle proper.
(5) ARTILLERY DUEL. The number of batteries available therefore

i s insufficient to engage every hostile battery, newly appearing separately •

Arrangements will therefore be made to have groups of batteries

situated near eaoh other, so called battery neete, attaok with gas ammunition

The howitzer batteries designated therefore are shown with a green

oirole on the Bketch(missing) and the battery nests are in oirclee and. crossed

green. When there will remain in eaoh sector a sufi'ioiont number of heavy

and l i g h t field howitzers, old guns, 9cm guns, and l i g h t batteries to fire
-26­
 on newly appearing targets in their sectors.

(4) For the employment of the heavy guns,see sketch, (missing)

(5) Short range flanking of the separate hostile lines, neutralising
minor fronts, mutual support of adjacent sectors (VI Reserve 0orps)(9th.
reserve division) are to be arranged for in detail, but have not yet been
fixed.
(6) For engaging forts See sketch.(missing)
(7) OBSERVATION» The front edge of the hostile position, except a
portion in seotor B can be seen in part from elevated station B, and a part
from our infantry positions! Arrangements have been made for air observation
against second line positions*

(8) AMMUNITION* There i s no example so far in the war for the attack
against the fortress of Verdun as regards amounts'of materials, preparation
and defense* Consequently no experience can be used as to ammunition
requirements and expenditures. It appears that bringing up ammunition
i s connooted with great difficulties because of bad roads and road connectionsB
- insufficient in number and conditions* Therefore a six day supply will
be arranged for prior to opening fire. One day supply to be stored in bomb
proof6*1 th batteries, tiro days supply as olose to the batteries as terrain
permits, * v ule secure against fire and three days supply in eeotor ammunition
dumps* Replenishment of ammunition expended must be brought up*
(9) FIRE CONTROL* Fire control remains in the hands of the army.
Fire orders will be issued by army headquarters and Generals of Corpsj
foot artillery respectively. The distribution into regiments and battalion^
groups as shown on slcetoh. (missing)
(10) THE BATTLE OBJECTIVES FOR FIRST DAY. Is the line marked in
blue on sketoh (missing)* Thus the battle to be oarried forward without
pause, has for Its f i r s t objeotivee, the.linet- LOUVEMONT - BEZONVAUX.
Sketoh (missing) will show which guns can fire from thoir f i r s t
positions to that l i n e . Under proteotion of the firs of those guns the
remainder of the guns - in so far as roads and connections permit will
change position forward*
-27­
 In the selection of the first battery positions,proper attention
ha8 been given for a rapid change of positions on the part of the important
batteries*

The Conmander in Ohief,

WILHELM
Crown Prince of the Herman Empire and of Prussia.

(159) (6-19; 11-257).

-28­
 BIBLIOGRAPHY.

KEYJ (1-69) No. I Text (below), page 69.

Text. Author.

1. General Headquarters and i t a General Von Falkenhayn.

Critical Decisions 1914-1916.
2. Military Geography of tho Western Front Lt.O'ol. X.H.Priee,USA.
J . The Battle of Verdun 1 Henry Ougard.
4 . The Cavalry of Verdun General Passaga.
5» The Unknown War (19J1) * Winston S.Churchill.
6. German Fifth Army, Extraote from documents on the
campaign of Vordun. ( t r a n s l a t i o n s ) . —-—-— The G4GSS Library,Pile
No. JOO-A.
7» History of the Battle of Verdun (translations) L1Action Nationals.
8. History of the World War (volume 111) —— . Simond.
9» French Staff Reports on the action about Verdun,
25 February to 2 March 1916. (translations) — The OS&GSS Library,File
No. 926.
10.Nelsons History of the War (volume XIII) — Nelson.
II.Die Tragodie Von Vordun 1916 ( t i e l I) Studienrat Ludwig Gold.
12. Military History of the World War (volume I ) O.R.Howland*
l j . Verdun-January <S» February 1916. — —--—-— General Paquet.
15. The World Crisis 1911-1918 Winston S.Churohiil.
16. Oontroveraal Questions of the World War Lt.General Ernst Rabischi
17* Evolution of Taotical Ideas in France-Germany 19l4-'l6. Lucas.
18. War Operations Verdun — — — A.Grasset*
19' Topography and Strategy in War —-—— Johnson.

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