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OPERATION BAGRATION
OPERATION BAGRATION
THE SOVIET DESTRUCTION OF
GERMAN ARMY GROUP CENTER, 1944
IAN BAXTER
CIS0021
Print Edition: ISBN 978-1-61200-9230

Digital Edition: ISBN 978-1-61200-9247
© Casemate Publishers 2020
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any
form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording
or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the
publisher in writing.
Design by Battlefield Design

Maps by Battlefield Design
Color profiles by Johnny Shumate
Printed and bound in the Czech Republic by FINIDR, s.r.o.
CASEMATE PUBLISHERS (US)

Telephone (610) 853-9131
Fax (610) 853-9146
Email: casemate@casematepublishers.com
www.casematepublishers.com
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Telephone (01865) 241249
Fax (01865) 794449
Email: casemate-uk@casematepublishers.co.uk
www.casematepublishers.co.uk
Title page: Red Army troops charging into action during the Bagration
offensive.
Contents page: Well-armed panzergrenadiers pass a stationary command
Panther during operations on the Eastern Front during mid-1944. In an
attempt to stem the Soviet drive westward, the bulk of the Panther
battalions were committed to the Bagration operation in a desperate
struggle to try to contain the enemy offensive, if only temporarily.
Map: In total, Army Group Center comprised some 400,000 troops with
a further 400,000 in support and in non-combat units. Opposing the
Germans the Red Army had mobilized some 1,7000,000 troops for the
offensive.
All images are from the author’s collection, unless stated otherwise.
4
Contents
Contents
From the Creation of the SS Deutschland
Fall Weiss
RegimentoftoEvents
Timeline ............................... 7
.............................................6
Campaigns
Prelude in France
to Disaster and Yugoslavia ...........15
............................................8
1941–1942:
German The.................................................11
Forces Das Reich Division in the
Soviet Union.....................................................23
Soviet Forces ....................................................24
The 1943 Russian Campaign: Kharkov,
The Eve of Battle ..............................................30
Kursk, the Mius................................................35
Operation Bagration Begins: June 23–28,
1944–1945: The Years of Defeat .....................47
1944 ..............................................................42
Fighting for Survival: June 29–July 6, 1944 .. 64
Operations in the North: July 7–13, 1944 ....85
Operations in the Center and the South:
July 14–26, 1944 .........................................96
Soviet Triumph ..............................................111
Aftermath .......................................................121
Further Reading .............................................126
Index ...............................................................127
Operation Bagration
Timeline of Events
Named after Pyotr Bagration, the Russian general in the Napoleonic Wars,
Bagration was the codename for the Red Army’s 1944 summer offensive
that led to the destruction of German Army Group Center, the greatest
military defeat experienced by the Wehrmacht during World War II. On
June 22, 1944, over a million Soviet troops poured across the German
lines. What ensued was a swift and bloody battle of attrition. In the days
and weeks that followed, German units fought and hemorrhaged under
the constant hammer blows of Soviet ground and aerial bombardments,
and the endless armored and infantry attacks. As the Soviet might
punched a massive hole in the German lines, it sent shock waves through
Army Group Center forcing it to retreat. However, the Russian offensive
was so fast that many of the German units with their precious panzer and
infantry divisions quickly became encircled and destroyed, its remnants
retreating west in order to save themselves. By the end of the offensive
the cataclysm was bigger than that experienced at Stalingrad. It saw the
German Army being pushed out of Byelorussia into Poland with the loss
of over 300,000 men and most of its weaponry.
June 22, 1944:

Operation Bagration June 28, 1944:
May 1–31, 1944: June 19, 1944: Soviet is opened under Hitler replaces Field
Soviet planning for partisan groups go General Zhukov. Over Marshal Busch with
a major offensive into action against 1.2 million Soviet his “troubleshooter,”
against the German German supply and troops go into action General Field
Army in the East. communication. along four fronts. Marshal Model.
MAY JUNE
May 20, 1944: The June 23, 1944: 1st and June 29, 1944: The
Red Army’s launch 3rd Byelorussian Fronts Soviets capture
date for the new advance northeast of Minsk, Bobruysk. The 1st
summer offensive, surrounding the 4th Army. and 2nd Byelorussian
Operation Bagration, Fronts close in on
is set for June 22. Minsk, attempting to
June 26, 1944: Hitler orders the link up with the 3rd
9th Army to retreat westward to Byelorussian Front.
take up further blocking positions.
6
Timeline of Events
Russian riflemen charge a German defensive position during the initial phase of the
offensive. In a number of areas along the front Wehrmacht soldiers were quickly
surrounded or overwhelmed.
July 13, 1944: Vilnius is captured July 28, 1944: Lvov is

July 4, 1944: Minsk falls by Soviet troops. The 1st and captured. The following day
as 100,000 German 4th Ukrainian Fronts launch a Brest-Litovsk falls to the
troops are caught in fresh offensive toward southern Soviets. The drive westward
the Soviet encirclement Poland against German Army by the Red Army continues
of the city. Group North Ukraine. with unabated ferocity.
JULY AUGUST
July 11, 1944: The 9th Army July 17, 1944: Byelorussia is cleared August 15, 1944: The
is almost annihilated, and of all German forces. Some 57,000 Red Army is forced to
the remnants withdraw German PoWs are paraded through temporarily halt its
toward Lithuania. the Moscow in a victory parade. westward advance
German Army Group Center is due to overstretched
annihilated. supply lines.
7
Crew inside an Sd.Kfz. 251/3 communications vehicle fitted with extra radio
equipment for command, converse with a soldier out in the field. This photograph
was taken in early 1944 on the Central Front. Army Group Center during this period
comprised the 3rd Panzer Army, 2nd Army, 4th Army, and 9th Army.
Prelude to Disaster
Following the catastrophe of the last German offensive on the Eastern
Front, Operation Citadel, or the battle of Kursk, in the summer of 1943,
German tactics would now consist of a series of withdrawals with its
forces fanatically contesting every foot of ground. The war in the USSR
had taken its toll on the German war machine and losses in both men
and equipment were vast.
However, in spite of the reverse in fortune for the German forces along the battered front,
troops continued to hold their positions against overwhelming odds. Whilst a number of
areas simply cracked under the sheer weight of the Russian onslaught, there were many
places where German units continued to demonstrate their ability to defend the most
hazardous positions against well-prepared and highly superior enemy forces, particularly in
German Army Group Center.
8
Prelude to Disaster
By late 1943 Army Group Center’s front, covering some 180 miles, had more or less
stabilized, becoming relatively static with a strongly fortified defensive line. Much of the
German success along the Central Front was due to the winter weather, and the fact that the
Soviets had slowed their advance in order to bring up reinforcements and to regroup, and
replenish its units for the spring the following year.
Hitler made full use of the situation along the Central Front and ordered reinforcements
to the area, deploying panzer and infantry divisions, and assault gun brigades from other
army groups and from Germany to bolster the front. Although this could only be achieved
at the cost of weakening other fronts in Russia, he was determined that no yard of ground
should be given up without a fight, and that every officer and Landser in Army Group
Center should be instilled with the iron will to hold firm. In his eyes, if his forces could
hold the enemy, this would prevent the Central Front from collapsing and the Soviet armies
using it as a springboard into Poland. Hitler was under no illusion that the war in the East
could be won employing these types of tactics. But what could be achieved was a war of
attrition where his troops could wear down the enemy and stagnate the front into a fourth
Russian winter.
Sd.Kfz. 251 halftrack personnel carriers and late variant Panzer IVs on the Eastern
Front in the winter of 1944. The halftrack, especially the Sd.Kfz. 251, was a very
versatile vehicle and could travel across some of the most rugged terrain. Whilst
these halftracks were primarily used to transport troops to the forward edge of the
battlefield, they were often tasked for reconnaissance missions because of their
speed, versatility, protection and useful firepower.
9
Operation Bagration
By June 1944, German strategy was faced with a two-front war. More than 53 percent
of the army was fighting in Russia, whilst the other 47 percent was in Western Europe trying
to stem the Allied invasion along the Normandy coast. On the Eastern Front the German
Army strength had reached a new low of some 2,242,649 against more than 6 million Soviet
troops. German commanders in the field were well aware of the seriousness of the military
situation and looked ahead to the coming battles, knowing that that they were bound by
Hitler’s orders with which they could not successfully comply. In front of them stood a vast
enemy army whose strength was almost three times their own.
Sd.Kfz. 2s—or what the Wehrmacht called the Kleines Kettenkraftrad HK

101 or Kettenkrad—towing ordnance on the Eastern Front. Initially, the
Kettenkraftrad was a motorcycle tractor for airborne units and Fallschirmjäger. With
its overlapped and interleafed road wheels, it was used extensively throughout the
war, mainly in Russia. There were two variants of the vehicle: Sd.Kfz. 2/1 and Sd.Kfz.
2/2. Both were used with a trailer and had field communication gear mounted
behind the driver. It was primarily tasked with laying communication cable from a
mounted wire spool. However, because of its versatility, it could be used for a variety
of other tasks such as pulling heavy loads, and carrying troops. Later in the war
the Kettenkrads also appeared in reconnaissance patrols and independent scout
detachments, and were used especially where roads were almost impassable or in
dense forests.
10
German Forces
German Forces
The German soldiers of 1944 had gone through radical changes since they
began their war with the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941. They had
fought across hundreds of miles of steppe, an environment alien to them,
against a growing and hostile army. Initially, the Germans fought a series
of victorious offensive operations attacking more or less simultaneously
across large areas of enemy terrain in order to pin the enemy forces
ahead of them, while mobile formations were concentrated to attack
along narrow sectors of the front, breaking through to the enemy rear
and surrounding him.
Yet, due to the vast distances initially covered by the Wehrmacht, coupled with that first
winter, and a strong defensive enemy strategy, the German soldiers’ tactics and the way they
survived on the Eastern Front changed irrevocably. Through 1942 and 1943 the German
soldier was no longer fighting simultaneously across an entire front. Instead, there were
vast areas that had stagnated, like Army Group North. On the Southern Front, German
PaK 35/36 guns being towed by horses toward the front in the early spring of
1944. Contrary to popular belief, even by the latter stage of the war, much of the
Wehrmacht still made use of animal draft.
11
Operation Bagration
forces had unleashed their summer offensive and fought a bloody battle of attrition in and
around Stalingrad. Although Hitler said that the 6th Army had provided a valuable service
by tying down almost three quarters of a million enemy troops, the loss of the 6th Army was
so significant that it marked the turning point of the war in the East. The German soldier
was now faced with a relentlessly growing and improving Red Army. Apart from the last-
gasp Operation Citadel, German tactics in a number of areas now altered from offensive to
defensive operations with infantry formations deployed across the front to hold the main
defensive lines. Mobile formations were then concentrated in small numbers in various
locations from where they launched focused counterattacks against enemy forces who had
broken through the infantry’s defensive belts. Many of the armored vehicles too, notably the
Sturmgeschütz III, which had been initially deployed as an infantry support vehicle, were
now compelled to support other armored vehicles—panzers—due to the telling shortages.
This not only deprived the infantry of additional fire support, but it weakened their lines and
made them vulnerable to constant enemy attack.
Thus by 1944, the German soldier found himself in a vulnerable and fluid situation.
With a lack of proper armored fire support, additional men, and weaponry, soldiers were
compelled to dig in and defend positions often with only an array of machine guns and anti-
tank PaK (Panzerabwehrkanone) guns.
On the Central Front in April 1944 is a Hummel mounting its powerful 15cm howitzer.
These vehicles served in armored artillery battalions—Panzerartillerie Abteilungen—of
the panzer divisions, forming independent self-propelled artillery batteries, each with
six Hummels and one ammunition carrier. Whilst primarily designed for offensive
operations, they were successful in defensive roles as well.
12
German Forces
As a result of the lack of supplies, a sense of futility and gloom gripped the German
soldier. On the Central Front, countless thousands of soldiers had been killed since the
summer of 1943, and almost a year later the Germans found themselves pushed back,
holding parts of a front almost reminiscent of World War I—with a string of defensive
positions, trenches and shell holes—in which gains and losses could be measured only in
yards.
A late variant Sturmgeschütz III. By early 1944, about 55 percent of the Panzerwaffe
was comprised of assault guns. In February 1944 the organization of an assault gun
battery was changed to four platoons, one with three 10.5cm assault howitzer 42s,
and three with three 7.5cm assault cannon 40s each. With the battery leader’s two
assault guns, this amounted to 14 vehicles per battery. The alteration was supposed
to make the gun batteries more effective on the battlefield. Whilst it increased
the firepower, crews still found they were outnumbered and as a consequence still
suffered heavy losses. Yet, despite the setbacks, by the time the spring thaw arrived
in March and early April 1944, there was a genuine feeling of motivation within the
ranks of the assault gun units. Yet, these vehicles would have to be stretched along a
very thin Eastern Front, with many of them rarely reaching proper operating levels.
13
Operation Bagration
In Profile:
Panzergrenadier and MG 42
machine-gunner
A panzergrenadier in the summer of
1944. The Wehrmacht were slow in the
development of camouflage clothing
and it was not until the spring of
1942 that the first camouflage smock
appeared. This soldier, an NCO, has
donned a lightweight camouflage
smock with matching helmet cover.
He is armed with a 9mm MP40 and
is holding two M24 stick grenades.
Attached to his black leather belt is
his MP40 magazine pouch. Note the
entrenching tool in his belt. (Johnny
Shumate)
A light machine-gunner with his MG 42

machine gun with folded bipod. A common
method of carrying ammunition was the
ready-to-use belt—two linked-together
50-round belts—which is draped around the
machine-gunner’s neck with bullets pointing
outward to prevent them from digging
into the body. Though not seen, the soldier
will have carried all the relevant issued
equipment for a machine-gunner including
the standard infantryman’s personal
equipment used to sustain himself on the
battlefield. (Johnny Shumate)
14
German Forces
A German forward communication post in
the early summer of 1944. The position is
out in the open, and a Zeltbahn shelter has
been erected to help protect the men from
the elements and enemy detection.
15
Operation Bagration
The German Infantry Division in 1944

Surprisingly, the organization and composition of the standard infantry division had
remained virtually unaltered since 1942. A typical division was still made up of three
infantry regiments of three battalions plus an artillery component also being a regiment of
three battalions. Other units in the division comprised a battalion each of anti-tank artillery,
reconnaissance, signals, and pioneers. Initially, the total strength of a division was supposed
to be 17,200 of all ranks, but by 1944, this number varied wildly and mostly never reached
this figure.
The bulk of the weapons and equipment in a typical infantry division hardly changed
throughout the war. By 1944 the Wehrmacht was supplied with a huge variety of weaponry,
everything from small arms to heavy tanks. Weapons of foreign origin also saw considerable
use in Wehrmacht units, especially captured Soviet machine guns and anti-tank guns due to
the never-ending shortages and dwindling resupplies.
In order to support the shortfall of a typical infantry division during the last year of the
war, there was a large influx of mobile artillery vehicles and armored personnel carriers, so
that entire panzergrenadier battalions could be carried into battle. A typical panzergrenadier
division was comprised of two motorized infantry regiments, each of three battalions, all
armored and with artillery, anti-tank, and engineer units.
An assortment of German vehicles is purposely spread out across a field in the early
summer on the German Central Front. The vehicles are spaced apart like this to
minimize the risk and effective impact of enemy aerial and ground attacks.
16
German Forces
German soldiers setting up
a defensive position with
infantrymen in their foxholes.
Along the Front

In mid-1944 Army Group Center was relatively static along its prepared defensive positions
in the Byelorussian sector and had been for a number of months. In that time the Germans
had managed to construct extensive field fortifications and miles of trench lines, often to a
depth of some 3 or 4 miles. Spread along the front was a German force totalling some 34
infantry divisions, two Luftwaffe field divisions, two panzergrenadier divisions, including
components of Panzergrenadier Division Feldherrnhalle, one panzer division and seven
security divisions. Supporting these forces were some severely depleted Hungarian units
that were undermanned and lacked adequate weaponry to withstand any enemy attacks for
any appreciable length of time.
In total, Army Group Center comprised some 400,000 troops, with a further 400,000 in
rear-echelon roles and non-combat units. Whilst on paper the numbers appeared to confirm
that the Germans could hold their positions, units were in fact dispersed and overstretched
along their lines, and lacked sufficient heavy weapons. Each division had to cover a front
of about 25 miles, double the length of what it should have been defending. Each mile
of front was supported by some 80 to 100 troops with two or three artillery pieces and a
motley collection of assault guns. Some local towns and villages that fell in the path of these
defensive belts had already been evacuated. Thousands of women, children, and old men had
been removed from their homes with some pressed into service to construct massive anti-
tank ditches and other obstacles. A typical strongpoint deployed along the front contained
light MG 34 and heavy MG 42 machine-gun sections, an anti-tank rifle company, a sapper
platoon equipped with a host of explosives, infantry guns, an anti-tank artillery company
with a number of anti-tank guns, and occasionally a self-propelled gun.
Operating at intervals were Pz.Kpfw.IVs (Panzer IVs), Tigers, and a few Panthers, as
well whatever StuG III assault guns that could be scraped together. This front-line defensive
belt was designated as a killing zone where every possible anti-tank weapon and artillery
piece would be used to ambush Soviet tanks: whilst an enemy tank was subjected to a
storm of fire within the kill zone, special mobile engineer detachments equipped with anti-
17
Operation Bagration
In Profile:
The German Commanders
General Field Marshal Ernst von Busch
General Busch had an exemplary record
as commander of the 16th Army during
Operation Barbarossa in 1941. On February
1, 1943, he was promoted field marshal. On
October 28, 1943, following a vehicle accident
in which Field Marshal Günther von Kluge,
the commander of Army Group Center, was
injured, Busch was named as his replacement.
He would control 76 divisions across four field
armies, including five panzer divisions and 54
infantry divisions, with six from Hungary. By
June 1944, his command had been whittled
down to 38 infantry divisions.
General Field Marshal Walter Model

General Field Marshal Model was commander of the 3rd Panzer Army during the
invasion of Russia in the summer of 1941. Model’s character as a great military
tactician saw him go from one success to another, instilling vigor and determination
into his units. In January 1942 he was placed in charge of the 9th Army where he
again achieved great success occupying the Rzhev salient. By the summer of 1943,
he assumed command of the offensive against the northern Kursk salient. Although
Operation Citadel failed, soldiers in the field looked upon Model as the “Führer’s
troubleshooter.” As a result of his energy and brilliance on the battlefield, he took
command of Army Group North in January 1944. On March 30, he was placed in
command of Army Group North Ukraine in Galicia, which was withdrawing under
relentless attack from Zhukov’s 1st Ukrainian Front. It was here during bitter
fighting that he introduced
the “shield and sword”
doctrine, which stated that
retreats were tolerable, but
only if they paved the way
for a counterstroke later.
Out on the battlefield he
was not only courageous
and innovative, but was
friendly and popular
with his troops. By the
early summer of 1944, he
simultaneously became
commander of both Army
Group North Ukraine and
Army Group Center.
18
German Forces
General Walter-Otto Weiss
General Walter-Otto Weiss, of
Prussian aristocracy, quickly
advanced through the ranks as a
dedicated, loyal and determined
officer. He took part in Operation
Barbarossa and soon earned the
respect of his troops. In July 1942,
Weiss took command of XXVII
Army Corps, before being given
command of the 2nd Army on
the Eastern Front in February
1943. He continued to command
the 2nd Army on the Central
Front into the summer of 1944.
General Hans Jordan

General Jordan saw extensive
success on the Eastern Front
in 1941 commanding the 7th
Infantry Division and later VI
Army Corps. On 20 May 1944,
he was given command of
the 9th Army in Army Group
Center. He was a recipient of
the Knight’s Cross of the Iron
Cross with Oak Leaves and
Swords.
19
Operation Bagration
General Kurt von Tippelskirch

General Tippelskirch was commander
of the 30th Infantry Division, Army
Group North, during the invasion
of Russia in 1941. A great military
tactician, his skill and obstinacy
earned him the Knight’s Cross of the
Iron Cross on November 23, 1941.
He saw extensive action around the
Demyansk Pocket. By the summer of
1942, as the 6th Army began arriving
outside Stalingrad, Tippelskirch was
assigned as the liaison officer to the
Italian 8th Army near the River Don.
On February 18, 1943, he became
commanding general of XII Army
Corps, retaining this position until June
4, 1944, when he assumed command of
the 4th Army, Army Group Center, from
General Gotthard Heinrici.
General Georg-Hans Reinhardt

During Operation Barbarossa, General Reinhardt commanded XLI Panzer
Corps. As a dedicated and enthusiastic commander, his successes in the field
saw him assuming command of the 3rd Panzer Army, Army Group Center. He
led the advance on Moscow during Operation Typhoon. Following the German
defeat at the gates of the Russian capital, Reinhardt’s forces operated in the
Smolensk and Vitebsk regions. He assumed command of Army Group Center
in August 1944.
20
German Forces
personnel and anti-tank mines would quickly deploy and erect new obstacles, just in case
other tanks managed to escape the zone. If the crew from a disabled tank survived the initial
attack and bailed out, special sapper units would pick off any survivors.
Behind these defensive positions at varying depths were anti-tank defenses, including
mortars, Panzerschreck, Panzerfaust, 7.5cm and 8.8cm PaK guns, all ready to counter any
enemy armored vehicle that managed to break through. Yet supply levels of these weapons
were thinly stretched, and would be unable to deal with a massive offensive.
There was also little in the way of a strategic reserve on which to fall back if the front
caved in during an attack. The Germans did partly strengthen a number of towns along the
defensive line in what Hitler outlined in his “Blocking Formation” order, but again these
fortified areas were overstretched and weakly held by rear-echelon troops.
Although the soldiers at the front hoped that their meager defensive positions would
hold out for an appreciable length of time, they never had the proper support weaponry
to contain a significant attack. Assigned to these units along Army Group Center was an
assorted concentration of armor, comprising of 553 armored vehicles, of which 480 were
Sturmgeschütz IIIs. The largest contingent of armor was in the 4th Army, concentrated in
and around the town of Orsha. Its units were comprised of 40 panzers including 29 Tiger
Is, and 246 Sturmgeschütz IIIs. In addition, were a number of panzerjäger (tank destroyers)
and self-propelled guns such as the Hornisse. Further support consisted of 15cm and 10.5cm
howitzers, various PaK guns, MG 34 and MG 42 machine guns, and mortars of all sizes.
In the skies, support was provided by Luftflotte 6, comprising two fighter groups which
by mid-June could only muster 40 Bf 109K Messerschmitt fighters, due to massive losses
already sustained on the Eastern Front. Bomber strength totalled some 312 aircraft, mainly
Heinkel He 111 bombers and a small fleet of Junkers Ju 88s. Ground-attack aircraft were
limited to a few Ju 87G Stukas and Fw-190 fighter-bombers.
A light MG 34 machine-gunner in a defensive position along the Central Front

during the early summer of 1944. His foxhole has been partially concealed by the
camouflaged waterproof cape, or Zeltbahn.
21
Operation Bagration
Army Group Center Order of Battle

June 15, 1944
ARMY GROUP CENTER
Reserves
707th Infantry Division
OKH Reserves
Panzer Group F
221st Security Division
391st Security Division
2ND ARMY 9TH ARMY

(General Walter-Otto Weiss) (General Hans Jordan)
Reserves LV Army Corps
5th Hungarian Reserve Division 102nd Infantry Division
23rd Hungarian Reserve Division 292nd Infantry Division
4th Cavalry Brigade
1st Hungarian Cavalry Division XXXXI Panzer Corps
VIII Army Corps 35th Infantry Division
5th Jäger Division 36th Infantry Division
12th Hungarian Reserve Division XXXV Army Corps
XX Army Corps 383rd Infantry Division
3rd Cavalry Brigade 6th Infantry Division
XXIII Army Corps 134th Infantry Division
7th Infantry Division 129th Infantry Division
203rd Security Division
22
German Forces
4TH ARMY 3RD PANZER ARMY
(General Kurt von Tippelskirch) (General Georg-Hans Reinhardt)
Reserves Reserves
286th Security Division 201st Security Division
XII Army Corps
57th Infantry Division VI Army Corps
18th Panzergrenadier Division 299th Infantry Division
XXXIX Panzer Corps
31st Infantry Division LIII Army Corps
337th Infantry Division 6th Luftwaffe Field Division
XXVII Army Corps
260th Infantry Division IX Army Corps
25th Panzergrenadier Division Division Group 252
78th Sturm Division
A sudden downpour of rain on the Eastern Front during the summer months could
bring wheeled vehicles to a standstill. In this photograph taken in the early summer
of 1944 on the Central Front, artillerymen are attempting to get their 15cm howitzer
gun carriage out of the mire. Due to the bad road system in Russia, operations were
severely hampered by mud.
23
Operation Bagration
Soviet Forces
Although the opening months of the war in the East were a complete
catastrophe for the Russian troops, their commanders knew that ultimately
geography would aid them. Operating in Russia was unlike anything the
Germans had experienced before. Just a year earlier in 1940 they had fought
a Blitzkrieg campaign with good roads and an excellent infrastructure. In
the Soviet heartland dirt tracks often linked cities and towns, which could
be vast distances apart. Dust, mud, and later the extreme arctic weather
would take a heavy toll on the German war machine.
Coupled with overconfidence and a lack of knowledge, the Germans were slowly drawn
into a protracted war of attrition. In spite of the huge losses that the Red Army incurred in
1941, they held firm and fought back in what became the Great Patriotic War. The German
soldier had totally underestimated his foe, and the resources he had with which to defend
his country.
Following the German disaster at Kursk in the summer of 1943, the Red Army rolled
onto an unstoppable offensive from which the Germans would never properly recover. By
the fall of 1944, the Russian soldier had beaten his adversary back to the borders of Poland,
in spite of massive losses. However, these were losses that could be replaced. Soviet forces
were overwhelming both numerically and in the quality of their troops and weaponry. The
Red Army achieved a ratio of 10 to 1 in tanks and 7 to 1 in aircraft over the Wehrmacht. It
was only a matter of time before the enemy would be destroyed.
The Soviet Divisions in 1944

When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Russian ground forces opposing
them had 303 divisions and 22 separate brigades (5.5 million soldiers), including 166
divisions and brigades (2.6 million) garrisoned in the western military districts. A typical
basic infantry division during this period consisted of 14,500 men. However, the Red Army
divisions were totally unprepared for the German attack, despite various warnings from a
variety of sources. As a result, the Red Army was hit hard and suffered massive losses in the
field, mainly due to being only partly mobilized, disorganized, and poorly trained.
In spite of this, within months, Soviet infantry divisions had managed to improvise
even though there were some that deployed without weapons, vehicles, and other critical
equipment. Fortunately for the Russian infantryman, the German war machine soon
overreached itself, and, with the advent of the Russian winter, was brought to a grinding
halt. This gave the Russian infantry divisions time to regroup.
By 1944, with a string of successes on all fronts, the very backbone of the Red Army had
proved to be the rifle armies. Each contained three rifle corps, each of three rifle divisions.
Similarly, to support these divisions in the field was the tank army, which contained a large
proportion of mechanized infantry.
24
Soviet Forces
In Profile:
Red Army infantryman and
T-34 tanker
A Soviet infantryman wearing the Shapka-
Ushanka, the ear-flapped cap. Over his
standard army uniform he wears the
Telogreyka, the Red Army quilted padded
jacket. Attached to his brown leather
infantryman’s belt is a PPSh-41 SMG
71-round drum magazine canvas pouch for
his sub-machine gun, which he is holding.
An entrenching tool can be seen on his belt,
so he can access it at a moment’s notice
whilst in the field.
A T-34 tanker standing in front of

his vehicle. He wears the standard
canvas tank helmet complete
with Soviet shirt tunic, breeches,
boots, and belt. Before the war,
the tank helmet was made from
black leather, but later replaced by
black or gray canvas. The earflaps
are designed to allow an intercom
headset to be worn. In the summer,
tank crews often wore one-piece
coveralls.
25
Operation Bagration
In Profile:
The Soviet Commanders
General Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov
General Zhukov was regarded as the
most successful Russian general in World
War II. Throughout the entire campaign
in the East he was known as “the man
who did not lose a battle.” His first real
test was to save Moscow. He then used
his expertise to destroy the German 6th
Army at Stalingrad, which led to the
surrender of Field Marshal Paulus. Zhukov
then took full advantage of Germany’s
deteriorating military situation, utilizing
the fast-moving spearheads of the T-34
tanks to smash through the enemy
defenses. His victory at Kursk provided
him with a huge advantage over the
Germans in terms of armored warfare, which the German war machine never managed
to balance. For Bagration, Zhukov coordinated the 1st and 2nd Byelorussian Fronts, and
later the 1st Ukrainian Front too.
Army General Ivan Bagramyan

General Bagramyan was one of the
greatest military commanders of World
War II. He distinguished himself as a
fine leader, especially in the early part of
the war during Soviet counteroffensive
operations in the battle of Moscow
during December 1941. He was given
his first army command in 1942 as
commander of the 16th Army. Later
this army was redesignated as the
11th Guards Army following successful
operations during the Bryansk offensive
in February 1943. Bagramyan then led
the 11th Guards Army at the successful
battle of Kursk in July 1943 where
he was promoted colonel general. In
November 1943 he assumed his most
prominent role as the commander of
the 1st Baltic Front.
26
Soviet Forces
Army General Konstantin Rokossovsky
By 1944 General Rokossovsky had established himself as one of the greatest
commanders in the Soviet Union. His place in history was recognized during the
German invasion of Russia in 1941, in what the Soviets called the Great Patriot War. It
was in September 1941 that Stalin personally appointed Rokossovsky as commander
of the 16th Army which successfully defended the approaches to Moscow, due in no
small part to Rokossovsky’s tactical abilities and stubborn attitude in defense. In July
1942, with his growing stature as a great military commander, he was awarded his
first operational-level command in charge of the Bryansk Front. Later that year, as the
Red Army fought to the death defending the besieged city of Stalingrad on the Volga
River, Rokossovsky assumed overall command of the 65th Army (4th Tank Army),
the 24th Army, and the 66th Army, that were all brought together as the Don Front.
Following successful operations around Stalingrad, during Operation Winter Storm
and Operation Little Saturn, Rokossovsky was tasked with mopping up the remnants
of the defeated German forces at Stalingrad. In January 1943, with the Red Army on
the brink of victory at Stalingrad, he was promoted colonel general. A month later he
assumed command of the Central Front where he was entrusted with a key role during
the battle of Kursk. Later the Central Front was renamed the 1st Byelorussian Front.
In the spring of 1944, Rokossovsky was ordered to prepare his front with the objective
of smashing through German Army Group Center that had built a string of defensive
positions, and advance through Byelorussia into Poland.
27
Operation Bagration
General Georgy Zakharov

General Zakharov was regarded as a great strategist
and brilliant defensive tactician. His skills and
determination as a commander saw him very quickly
advancing through the ranks. In late 1941 he became
deputy commander of the Western Front, which
participated in defensive operations during the battle
of Moscow. During the spring thaw of April 1942, he
assumed command as chief of staff of the North
Caucasian Strategic Direct, and the following month
became commander of the North Caucasian Front.
By August, as the German 6th Army approached the
banks of the Volga River outside Stalingrad, he was
promoted chief of staff of the Stalingrad Front. Later
that year, as the battle inside Stalingrad intensified, he
became deputy commander of the Stalingrad Front,
where he directed a number of successful actions
defending the city. By January 1943 he was appointed
deputy commander of the Southern Front before being promoted commander of the
51st Army. Zakharov then went on to command the 2nd Guards Army during defensive
operations along the Mius and Molochnava. In the early summer of 1944, he assumed
command of the 2nd Byelorussian Front. (Photo credit: http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/
encyclopedia/heroes/USSR)
General Ivan Chernyakhovsky

General Chernyakhovsky was a young, determined, and competent tank commander
who had quickly risen through the ranks and by June 1942 he was commander of the
18th Tank Corps. The following month he was promoted again, assuming command
of the 60th Army which, in July 1943, he led during the battle of Kursk. Following
the liberation of Kiev in 1943, and the great strategic advances through the Ukraine
in early 1944, he was placed in command of the Western Front, which in April 1944
became the 3rd Byelorussian Front.
28
Soviet Forces
Establishment of a rifle division comprised some 9,000 men, with a rifle regiment totaling
about 2,000 men; each of the three rifle companies in a battalion comprised around 110 soldiers.
Also included in the rifle battalion order of battle was a medium machine-gun company of
three platoons, organized on the lines of the machine-gun platoons of the rifle companies.
Supporting the rifle and infantry divisions were mortar companies and artillery
batteries. A typical artillery battery comprised a gun troop, anti-tank, anti-aircraft, and
heavy machine guns and the Katyusha multiple-rocket launcher. The Katyusha had proved
so successful in the field that by January 1943 some 57 regiments were in service, together
with smaller independent battalions. This was the equivalent of 216 batteries, a staggering
amount of firepower. These rocket battalions were used extensively to support the infantry,
rifle, and tank divisions which ultimately brought success on all fronts.
Along the Front

Opposing the German Army, spread out between the Pripet marshes in the south to the
Dvina River east of the city of Vitebsk in the north, was the Red Army, a formidable force
totaling eight tank and mechanized corps, 118 rifle divisions, six cavalry divisions, 13
artillery divisions and 14 air defense divisions. In all, there were some 1,700,000 troops and
support personnel bearing down on a front with a force more than double the size of the
enemy’s.
Spread out along the front were hundreds of thousands of fully equipped riflemen,
with massed artillery and armor in support. Some 2,715 tanks and 1,355 assault guns were
assigned to the front, supported by vast amounts of artillery of all calibers. Most of the tanks
deployed to the combat zone were T-34s and the newer T-34-85s that had entered service
earlier that year. There were also some lend-lease American M4 Sherman tanks as well as
T-70 and British-Canadian Valentine light tanks.
Supporting the armor was a vast array of artillery, totaling some 10,563 pieces
distributed across four fronts on the Central Front. The largest concentrations of firepower
were found in the 5th Artillery Corps, attached to the 3rd Byelorussian Front, and the 4th
Artillery Corps attached to the 1st Byelorussian Front. Additional firepower comprised
4,230 anti-tank guns, plus 2,306 multiple-rocket launchers.
The capabilities of the ground firepower were immense. If this was not enough, in the
air the fronts were supported by 21 fighter divisions comprising 2,318 fighters, eight bomber
divisions of 655 medium bombers, 16 strategic bomber divisions totaling 1,007 bombers, six
night-bomber divisions of 431 light bombers, and 179 reconnaissance aircraft. In total the
Soviet Air Forces boasted a staggering 5,327 combat aircraft, just on the Central Front alone,
outnumbering the Luftwaffe by more than 7 to 1.
The Soviet forces opposing German Army Group Center were gargantuan, yet
the Germans still underestimated their opponents. Whilst they sat in their trenches,
overstretched and lacking in weaponry and armor, they believed that their extensive
fortifications and minefields would be enough to hold back a large Soviet attack. However,
the German tacticians had wholly overlooked the massive array of Soviet engineer support
and logistics. In the field the Red Army was reinforced by specialized engineer tank units
specifically assigned to mine-sweeping operations, including flame-thrower tank regiments
and assault pioneer battalions. The Soviets would use these support units to wrench open
parts of the front in order to allow armor and troops to pour through.
29
Operation Bagration
The Eve of Battle

By the early summer of 1944, the Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH)—the
German high command—began receiving reports of a pending large-scale
offensive against Army Group Center. They anticipated that Soviet forces
would attack the Central Front in order to smash through the fortified
German lines, wrench open the front, and pour vast quantities of men and
equipment toward the Polish frontier and then onto German soil.
Hitler, for one, believed that there was a strong possibility that the Red Army was preparing
such a large-scale offensive against the center. His intelligence had for some time been
intercepting various radio transmissions relating to enemy movements and the buildup
of troops and armor in the area. German reconnaissance too, both on the ground and in
the air, was also closely monitoring the Soviets and the intelligence gathered from these
missions confirmed that the Russians were indeed preparing an offensive of considerable
size. Yet, in spite of this, much of the information was limited and unreliable. German
radio inceptors could not always attain significant intelligence due to strict Russian radio
silence. Aerial reconnaissance too was often limited due to heavy Russian flak and aircraft
activity. Furthermore, the Russians had already taken into consideration that the Germans
would be trying to deduce their movements and plans. In view of this, Soviet intelligence
purposely prepared special plans to deceive Army Group Center in order to dupe them into
believing that they were actually going to attack on the southern front, and not in the center.
These large-scale deception plans, using a variety of false radio transmissions together with
dummy ground movements, led to German intelligence believing that while there would be
an attack on the Central Front, the main assault would actually be in the south.
In view of this, Hitler and his commanders felt they had the initiative. With this in
mind, the Führer stripped essential Army Group Center units of armor and troops to create
a reserve strike force in North Ukraine. This consequently starved a number of formations
in Army Group Center of their panzers, self-propelled and anti-tank guns, and anti-aircraft
capabilities, in many cases the majority.
Whilst Army Group North Ukraine prepared its positions for the main Soviet thrust,
by early June 1944, German intelligence services began receiving worrying reports that Red
Army formations, including substantial troop and armored concentrations, were moving
northward to face the fortified lines of Army Group Center. Yet, even at this stage, when
it seemed that German intelligence had indeed been duped, Hitler still remained resolute
during the first week of June that the main attack would be unleashed in the south. However,
it was not until around June 10 that he received reports of four large Soviet armies deploying
opposite Army Group Center.
German intelligence then sent a string of reports concluding that they now predicted
the main attack was against the center. One of the last German reports, sent on June 19,
indicated that enemy attacks were expected against Army Group Center’s sector around
Bobruysk, Mogilev, Orsha, and possibly southwest of Vitebsk. The report highlighted that
the sheer scale of the Soviet armies indicated that the Russian objective was to bring about
the total destruction of Army Group Center’s salient by penetration on several sectors.
30
The Eve of B attle
In Profile:
Luftwaﬀe and Heer soldiers
This Luftwaffe field soldier is part of the
3rd Panzer Army, LIII Army Corps of the
4th Luftwaffe Field Division, June 1944. In
late 1942 the Luftwaffe created its own
field divisions and within a year these had
grown substantially. This soldier surveying
the battlefield through a pair of 6x30
Zeiss binoculars, wears the M-43 field
cap. For additional protection against
the elements such as wind and rain, he
wears his cotton drill Zeltbahn shelter as
a parka over his standard service field
uniform. Worn over his Zeltbahn are the
leather Y straps and leather belt to which
are attached his MP40 9mm magazine
pouches. He is armed with the MP40,
which was normally supplied to troop
leaders.
This Heer soldier is armed with the

1m optical Em.1m R.36.B rangefinder,
complete with tripod mounting
and support harness consisting of a
V-shaped shoulder and back support
that hooks into the ammunition
pouches on the front of the belt.
Attached to the back of the V support
is a flat triangular steel case for the
rangefinder scissors supports and
cross tie. The soldier is signaling to
what is probably a flak position, and
shouting instructions on the location
of an enemy target. He wears the
M-43 field cap and wears a summer
uniform, comprising a two-pocket
German Army camouflage field service
tunic. Attached to his leather belt is an
MP40 9mm magazine pouch.
31
Operation Bagration
Preparing for battle

The Red Army was determined to smash German Army Group Center. Facing the German
lines the Soviets had collected some 1.7 million troops for the massive assault. The offensive
was codenamed Bagration; initially Soviet planners had wanted the attack to coincide with
the Normandy landings on the Western Front on June 6, 1944. However, due to logistical
problems, radio silence, and extensive deception plans to fool the Germans that they would
attack farther south, Bagration was temporarily postponed. Instead, planners decided that
they would commemorate the German invasion of the Motherland with the offensive
commencing on June 22, 1944, exactly three years to the day.
For the “great summer offensive” the Red Army looked upon their attack as the last
great push on the Eastern Front. The principal objective was to crush Army Group Center
and advance westward at speed, annihilating the remaining German forces withdrawing
into Poland.
Along the front every German soldier defending the area was aware of the significance
of their being overrun and destroyed. Hitler had made it quite clear that all remaining
Heer, Luftwaffe, Fallschirmjäger and rear-echelon personnel defending the lines were not
to evacuate, but to stand and fight, to wage an unprecedented battle of attrition. He was
determined not to allow the Red Army to spill out and reach Poland. Since March 1944,
Hitler had issued what was known as the “Fester Platz” or “Fortified Area” order, to establish
defensive fortified positions—literally fortresses—in a number of Russian towns and cities
to be manned by German forces that were ordered to fight to the death. This order was
probably the most significant directive made by Hitler in 1944, but it was a desperate
measure. All along Army Group Center the order was drilled into the men, and in the towns
and cities of Bobruysk, Mogilev, Orsha and Vitebsk these defensive policies were taken very
seriously with soldiers fortifying these urban centers.
What Hitler was trying to avoid that summer, was the destruction of Army Group
Center and then a desperate defense along the frontier of Poland. For this reason, he wanted
to draw as much of the main Soviet force away from its concerted effort toward Poland.
It was for this reason he made it known to his commanders in the field that their troops
would have to defend their meagre positions with every drop of blood if they were to avert
a complete disaster on the Eastern Front.
During the early morning of June 22, 1944, the Red Army sent out reconnaissance
missions in the Byelorussia area and began making a series of company- and battalion-sized
infantry raids along defensive positions in Army Group Center.
Initially, for the Germans there was no major concern of an imminent large-scale
Soviet attack. Over the last few months there had been a number of escalating enemy raids
against the Germans’ defense and commanders in the field were not duly threatened by
them. However, what the Germans were not aware of was that these attacks were probing
missions to identify weak spots along the front, being undertaken so that selected parts of
the front could be targeted for the mass artillery bombardment preparatory to the main
attack, which would commence in less than 24 hours.
32
The Eve of B attle
Red Army Order of Battle, June 23, 1944
1ST BALTIC FRONT
4TH ASSAULT ARMY Army Artillery

83rd Rifle Corps 8th Guards Artillery Division
16th Rifle Division 21st Breakthrough Artillery Division
119th Rifle Division
332nd Rifle Division 43RD ARMY
360th Rifle Division 1st Rifle Corps
6TH GUARDS ARMY 306th Rifle Division
2nd Guards Rifle Corps
9th Guards Rifle Division 60th Rifle Corps
166th Rifle Division 357th Rifle Division
22nd Guards Rifle Corps 334th Rifle Division
90th Guards Rifle Division
47th Guards Rifle Division 92nd Rifle Corps
51st Guards Rifle Division 145th Rifle Division
23rd Guards Rifle Corps
51st Guards Rifle Division 1st Tank Corps
67th Guards Rifle Division 89th Tank Brigade
71st Guards Rifle Division 117th Tank Brigade
159th Tank Brigade
103rd Rifle Corps
29th Rifle Division 3RD AIR ARMY
270th Rifle Division 11th Fighter Aviation Corps
5th Guards Fighter Aviation Division
190th Fighter Aviation Division
(includes independent air units)
33
Operation Bagration
3RD BYELORUSSIAN FRONT
5th Artillery Corps 65th Rifle Corps

2nd Guards Breakthrough Division 97th Rifle Division
20th Guards Breakthrough Division 144th Rifle Division
4th Guards Gun Artillery Division 371st Rifle Division
11TH GUARDS ARMY 72nd Rifle Corps

8th Guards Rifle Corps 63rd Rifle Division
5th Guards Rifle Division 215th Rifle Division
26th Guards Rifle Division 277th Rifle Division
83rd Guards Rifle Division 2nd Tank Brigade
153rd Tank Brigade
16th Guards Rifle Corps
1st Guards Rifle Division Army Artillery
11th Guards Rifle Division 3rd Guards Breakthrough Artillery
Division
31st Guards Rifle Division
31ST ARMY
36th Rifle Corps
173rd Rifle Division
352nd Rifle Division
2nd Tank Corps
39TH ARMY
25th Guards Tank Brigade
Army Artillery 91st Guards Rifle Division
7th Guards Mortar (Multiple Rocket) 251st Guards Rifle Division
Division
84th Rifle Corps
5TH ARMY
45th Rifle Corps
28th Tank Brigade
34
5TH TANK ARMY 1ST AIR ARMY
The Eve of B attle

3rd Guards Tank Corps 1st Guards Bomber Corps
3rd Guards Tank Brigade 3rd Guards Bomber Aviation Division
18th Guards Tank Brigade 4th Guards Bomber Aviation Division
19th Guards Tank Brigade 5th Guards Bomber Aviation Division
6th Guards Bomber Aviation Division
3rd Guards Cavalry Corps
5th Guards Cavalry Division
32nd Guards Cavalry Division
(includes Fighter Aviation Corps)
3rd Guards Mechanized Corps
7th Guards Mechanized Brigade
2ND BYELORUSSIAN FRONT
33RD ARMY 81st Rifle Corps

70th Rifle Division 32nd Rifle Division
157th Rifle Division 95th Rifle Division
344th Rifle Division 153rd Rifle Division
42nd Guards Tank Brigade
49TH ARMY 43rd Guards Tank Brigade
62nd Rifle Corps
50TH ARMY
64th Rifle Division
19th Rifle Corps
69th Rifle Corps 38th Rifle Corps
42nd Rifle Division 110th Rifle Division
222nd Rifle Division 139th Rifle Division

76th Rifle Corps

121st Rifle Corps
49th Rifle Division
(includes the 4th Air Army)
35
Operation Bagration
1ST BYELORUSSIAN FRONT
4TH ARTILLERY CORPS

3RD ARMY 28TH ARMY
3rd Guards Rifle Corps
35th Rifle Corps
20th Rifle Corps
40th Rifle Corps
20th Rifle Division
41st Rifle Corps

128th Rifle Corps
61st Rifle Division
46th Rifle Corps
82nd Rifle Division
Army Artillery
5th Breakthrough Artillery Division
12th Breakthrough Artillery Division
80th Rifle Corps

48TH ARMY
5th Rifle Division
29th Rifle Corps
9th Tank Corps

42nd Rifle Corps
23rd Tank Brigade
95th Tank Brigade
108th Tank Brigade
8th Mechanized Brigade
53rd Rifle Corps
Army Artillery
17th Rifle Division
5 Guards Mortar Division
73rd Rifle Division
36
The Eve of B attle
96th Rifle Division 1st Mechanized Corps
194th Rifle Division 19th Mechanized Brigade
Army Artillery
22nd Breakthrough Artillery Division
219th Tank Brigade
61ST ARMY
Army Artillery
26th Artillery Division
212th Rifle Division FRONT UNITS
2nd Guards Cavalry Corps
89th Rifle Corps
3rd Guards Cavalry Division
23rd Rifle Division
55th Rifle Division
415th Rifle Division 4th Guards Cavalry Corps
65TH ARMY
18th Rifle Corps
44th Guards Rifle Division 7th Guards Cavalry Corps
69th Rifle Division 14th Guards Cavalry Division
105th Rifle Corps
15th Rifle Division Dnieper Combat Flotilla
193rd Rifle Division 1st Riverine Brigade
354th Rifle Division 2nd Riverine Brigade
356th Rifle Division 3rd Riverine Brigade
(includes 6th & 16th Air Armies &
1st Guards Tank Corps independent units)
1st Guards Mechanized Brigade
37
Operation Bagration
In Profile:
Soviet anti-tank rifleman and
infantryman
A Soviet anti-tank rifleman armed
the PTRD-41 (Degtyaryov Single Shot
Anti-Tank Weapon System Model of
1941). This single-shot weapon fired
a 14.5x114mm round, and although
unable to penetrate the frontal armor
of German tanks, it could penetrate the
thinner sides of lighter tracked vehicles
such as half-tracks, self-propelled guns
and similar vehicles. He is wearing the
SSh-40 steel helmet. Slung over his back
is his standard-issue rolled groundsheet,
and a canvas backpack or veshmeshok,
but known by Soviet soldiers as a “sidor.”
A Soviet rifleman going into battle. He

wears the regulation infantryman’s steel
helmet with the gimnasterka two-pocket
jacket complete with shoulder boards.
Attached to his portupeya black belt
are ammunition pouches for his Mosin
Nagant M1891/30 rifle. By 1944, the
Soviet rifleman had become a highly
mobile, lightly equipped, hardened and
experienced soldier. Often carrying little
more than field rations, ammunition, his
greatcoat or plash-palatka, and whatever
he could fit in his canvas rucksack or
myeshok (which can be seen slung over
his shoulder), he undertook his task with
steely determination. He was a very
different soldier from the early days of
the war on the Eastern Front.
38
The Eve of B attle
In total, Army Group Center comprised some 400,000 troops with a further 400,000
in support and in non-combat units. Opposing the Germans the Red Army had
mobilized some 1,7000,000 troops for the offensive.
39
Operation Bagration
Army Group Center Order of Battle

June 23, 1944
General Field Marshal E. Busch
General Field Marshal W. Model (from 28 June 1944)
ARMY GROUP CENTER
Reserves
707th Security Division
20th Panzer Division
Panzer Grenadier Division Feldherrnhalle
2ND ARMY 9TH ARMY

Reserves LV Army Corps
5th Hungarian Reserve Division 102nd Infantry Division
23rd Hungarian Reserve Division 292nd Infantry Division
4th Cavalry Brigade
1st Hungarian Cavalry Division XXXXI Panzer Corps
VIII Army Corps 36th Infantry Division
5th Jäger Division 12th Infantry Division
12th Hungarian Reserve Division XXXV Army Corps
XX Army Corps 45th Infantry Division
3rd Cavalry Brigade 134th Infantry Division
XXIII Army Corps 296th Infantry Division
7th Infantry Division 383rd Infantry Division
203rd Security Division
40
The Eve of B attle
Later that day, in front of the German lines, Soviet artillery batteries began preparing
for a massive fire mission. Almost 22,000 guns and mortars, and 2,000 Katyusha multiple-
rocket launchers were readied for action. In the surrounding woods and hedges assault teams
begun moving up to the front to wait at their jumping-off points. These units were composed
of sappers and infantry, supported by heavy machine guns, mortars, and a number of tanks
and self-propelled guns. Behind the assault teams came advanced battalions, which were
heavily supported by tanks and battalions of self-propelled guns.
4TH ARMY 3RD PANZER ARMY

Reserves Reserves
286th Security Division 201st Security Division
XII Army Corps
18th Panzergrenadier Division VI Army Corps
XXXIX Panzer Corps
12th Infantry Division LIII Army Corps
31st Infantry Division 4th Luftwaffe Field Division
XXVII Army Corps
25th Panzergrenadier Division IX Army Corps
78th Sturm Division Division Group 252
41
42
Operation Bagration Begins
Soviet 152mm M-10 artillerymen preparing for a fire
mission against German positions. On the morning of
June 23, the Red Army unleashed a massive artillery
bombardment along the German Central Front.
43
Operation Bagration
Operation Bagration Begins:

June 23–28, 1944
During the early morning of June 23, 1944, the stillness of German Army
Group Center was shattered by a massive Soviet preparatory ground and
aerial bombardment as its batteries attempted to soften up some of the
strongest German defensive positions, lines that comprised intricate
systems and mazes of blockhouses and trenches. However, whilst it
appeared that the Germans were prepared for the offensive, much of
their matériel employed was too thinly spread. Commanders too were
unable to predict precisely where the strategic focal point of the Soviet
attack was.
Red Army riflemen charge German positions during the early phase of Bagration.
44
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
asked to pass. In no other way, can we acquire our own knowledge
that the Supreme Court has yet to hear and consider the real
challenge to the supposed new Article in which governments attempt
to exercise ungranted power and to grant new power to interfere with
the individual freedom of the American citizen. As we well know, that
one real challenge is that the new Article was not made by those
who alone can make it, that it was not made as it can be
constitutionally made, by the makers of that kind of Article
named in the Fifth Article, the “conventions” of the Seventh and the
Fifth Articles, the “We, the people” of the Preamble and “the people”
of the Tenth Amendment.
CHAPTER XXIII
THE CHALLENGES THAT FAILED
The validity of the Eighteenth Amendment (seven litigations being

heard together) was argued on March 8, 1920, and for several days
thereafter.
As we are not concerned with the meaning of the second section
of the Amendment or with the validity of the Volstead Act (passed by
Congress under the grant of said section) except as the validity of
the Act depends upon the validity of the Amendment, we shall make
no mention of either.
The Court announced its decision, in all the litigations, on June 7,
1920. Somewhat to the amazement of the country, but (in our
humble opinion even at the time) very wisely, the Court refused to
write any opinion whatever. Nothing could more certainly settle that
the Court determined no question except the specific questions
presented by those who challenged validity. That we may be certain
that the Court neither heard nor considered nor passed upon the real
and the invincible challenge to the existence of the supposed new
national Article, we will let the Court, in its own words, state exactly
just what were the four propositions, advanced against validity, and
state the simple fact that it negatived each of those four propositions.
Thus, in an impressive manner, we shall acquire our own knowledge
that the fifth conclusion, which later we shall state, is but the
conclusion of fact that nothing, in the four propositions negatived,
impairs the validity of the supposed Article.
Mr. Justice Van Devanter announced the conclusions of the
Court.
Power to amend the Constitution was reserved by Article V,
which reads:...
(As we have been in the conventions which made it, we know it.)
The text of the Eighteenth Amendment, proposed by
Congress in 1917 and proclaimed as ratified in 1919, 40 Stat.
1050, 1941, is as follows:...
(The text of the first two sections is quoted on page 465 herein.)
We are here concerned with seven cases involving the
validity of that Amendment and of certain general features of
the National Prohibition Law, known as the Volstead Act, c.
83, 41 Stat. 305, which was adopted to enforce the
Amendment. The relief sought in each case is an injunction
against the execution of that act.... The cases have been
elaborately argued at the bar and in printed briefs; and the
arguments have been attentively considered, with the result
that we reach and announce the following conclusions on the
questions involved:
1. The adoption by both houses of Congress, each by a two
thirds vote, of a joint resolution proposing an amendment to
the Constitution sufficiently shows that the proposal was
deemed necessary by all who voted for it. An express
declaration that they regarded it as necessary is not essential.
None of the resolutions whereby prior amendments were
proposed contained such a declaration.
2. The two thirds vote in each house which is required in
proposing an amendment is a vote of two thirds of the
members present—assuming the presence of a quorum—and
not a vote of two thirds of the entire membership, present and
absent. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 248 U. S. 276.
3. The referendum provisions of state constitutions and
statutes cannot be applied, consistently with the Constitution
of the United States, in the ratification or rejection of
amendments to it. Hawke v. Smith, ante, 221.
4. The prohibition of the manufacture, sale, transportation,
importation and exportation of intoxicating liquors for
beverage purposes, as embodied in the Eighteenth
Amendment, is within the power to amend reserved by Article
V of the Constitution. (National Prohibition Cases, 253, U. S.
350, 384.)
We are not interested in the first two propositions which the Court
negatived. They were that the Congress resolution should have said
that two thirds of Congress deemed it necessary to propose the
Amendment and that the proposals should have been made by two
thirds of the entire membership of the House instead of two thirds of
a quorum in each House. These are trifling and unimportant matters
when over one hundred million Americans seek to learn when they
ceased to be citizens of America and became absolute “subjects” of
governments in America.
The third proposition negatived has naught to do with ourselves,
the citizens of America. It deals only with the rights of some state
citizens as such, where their state constitution has a referendum
provision. For our protection against usurpation by any government
of our own reserved rights or powers, we look to our own American
Constitution. We have lived through its making with the Americans
who made it to secure individual liberty of themselves and their
posterity, ourselves, the citizens of America.
The clear statement of simple fact, expressed in the Court’s fourth
conclusion, tells us something, which, with Madison, we have known
since he wrote and suggested his Fifth Article, at Philadelphia, on
September 10, 1787. Our stay in the “conventions,” which made the
Fifth Article, has taught us that the Americans in them, even Henry
and the opponents of the Constitution, were fully aware of the fact
that the Fifth Article provided the constitutional mode in which the
“conventions” could thereafter exercise the existing omnipotence of
the citizens of America themselves to make any kind of an Article of
government. The same stay fixed firmly in our minds that every one
in them knew that the Fifth Article is not a grant of any ability from
themselves to themselves, from the “conventions” named in the
Seventh Article to the same “conventions” named in the Fifth Article,
all being the “conventions” of the American citizens assembled to
exercise their own omnipotence.
And so, coming from the only “conventions” of that kind yet held,
we grasp at once the absolute accuracy of the statement in the
fourth conclusion of the Court in 1920. The mention of the same
“conventions” in the Fifth Article, a mention made by the
“conventions” of the Seventh Article, is the sound basis for our
knowledge that, as the Tenth Amendment expressly declares, those
“conventions” of the Seventh expressly reserved to themselves (the
same “conventions” named in the Fifth, “the people” of America in
the Tenth Amendment) their own exclusive ability to make national
Articles, like the First Article and the Eighteenth Amendment. For
which reason, we know the truth of the Court statement in its fourth
conclusion, that the power to make the Eighteenth Amendment “is
within the power to amend reserved by Article V.” The exclusive
ability of the “conventions” of 1787 and 1788—to make the Article
which is that new Amendment—is something known to all who were
in those “conventions.” That the ability—to make Articles like the
First Article and the new Amendment—remained exclusively in such
“conventions” of the American citizens, because such Articles are
national and either directly interfere with or are the basis for direct
interference with individual freedom of the American citizen, was
also known to every one in those “conventions.” That is why the
Americans in those early “conventions” insisted that the Tenth
Amendment expressly declare that such exclusive ability was
reserved to them, “the people” of that Amendment, and why the
same “conventions” mentioned themselves, the “conventions,” in the
Fifth Article and provided therein the constitutional mode of
procedure in which that exclusive ability could thereafter be
exercised by those who had it, the “conventions” of the American
citizens.
Even though this knowledge, which we bring straight from the
“conventions” which made the Fifth Article, be not shared at all by
the lawyers of 1920, we are aware that it is also the knowledge of
the Supreme Court. That is why Marshall long ago pointed out that,
when individual welfare required that government should be granted
some national powers or powers to interfere with individual freedom,
“the necessity of deriving such powers from the people themselves
was felt and acknowledged by all.” That is why in 1907 the Supreme
Court again declared “the powers the people have given to the
General Government are named in the Constitution, and all not there
named, ... are reserved to the people and can be exercised only by
them, or upon further grant from them.” As the First Section of the
new Amendment is the exercise and the Second Section is the grant
of one of those reserved powers, and as the Fifth Article provides the
constitutional mode of procedure in which it can be exercised or
granted by those, who alone have it, “the people” of the Tenth
Amendment and the “conventions” of the Fifth Article, it is very
natural to read in the same Supreme Court, in the National
Prohibition Cases, that the ability to make the Eighteenth
Amendment “is within the power to amend reserved by Article V.”
When the Supreme Court of Marshall’s day knew that state
“legislatures” could not make Articles like the First Article and the
Eighteenth Amendment, when the Supreme Court of 1907 still knew
that only the “people” or “conventions” could make Articles of that
kind, when the Supreme Court of our own day knows that the Fifth
Article deals only with “reserved” power, we Americans feel that we
are to remain free men and citizens. We have come from the
“conventions” with our own accurate knowledge that the power to
make the new Amendment or any other Article like the First Article
“is within the power to amend reserved by Article V.” But, for the
very reason that our knowledge is accurate, we know that the power
to make such Articles was not reserved to the state legislatures, who
did not have it, but was reserved to the “conventions,” who did have
it and who were exercising it (in making the First Article) at the very
moment when they made the Fifth Article.
We have examined the four conclusions of the Supreme Court
which deal with any argument presented against the existence of the
Eighteenth Amendment. Those conclusions negative every such
argument that was presented. But, because every brief assumed
and asserted that the amending power “reserved” in the Fifth Article
had been “granted” therein, the four conclusions make clear that the
Court has yet to hear and pass upon the challenge which reads the
Eighteenth Amendment out of our Constitution. When that challenge
is presented by American lawyers, who know what American basic
law is and how American citizens are constitutionally protected
against usurpation of power by governments in America, there can
be no doubt of the decision of the Supreme Court. In that decision,
there will be no conclusion denying the most important legal fact in
America, namely, that governments cannot exercise ungranted
power or create new government power to interfere with the
individual freedom of the American citizen. In that decision, there will
be again the simple statement of the undoubted fact that the ability
to make the Eighteenth Amendment “is within the power to amend
reserved by Article V.” But, in that decision, there will be added the
plain statement of the Tenth Amendment that such ability was not
reserved to the state legislatures who never had it, but was reserved
to the “conventions,” who always had it and still have it. And,
comparing that future decision (which is certain to come from the
Supreme Court) with the decision, which merely negatived the four
unsound challenges which were made to the Eighteenth
Amendment, we know that the first five conclusions of the latter
decision—all the conclusions that have aught to do with the
existence and validity of the Eighteenth Amendment—merely hold
that the existence of the new Amendment is not affected by any of
these challenges which were made.
With exceeding wisdom in our humble opinion, the Court carefully
refrains from passing upon or determining any question except the
exact challenges which were presented. That is why no opinion was
written. When any general statement (seeming to bear upon
questions not presented or submitted) might come back to perplex
and annoy the Court in future litigation where protected liberty of the
American citizen was the challenge to the government-made new
Article, common sense and sound reason and the experience of
generations dictated that no general statement should be made.
And, as there was but one way to avoid a single general statement,
no opinion was written. This method of deciding those particular
litigations, with their four unsound challenges, would leave the
decision itself without even an apparent influence upon a litigation in
which some real challenge might be presented.
And so we find the Court merely stating “that we reach and
announce the following conclusions on the questions involved.”
Nothing could make more clear that no conclusion is reached or
announced on any question not presented by those who urged
invalidity.
The first four conclusions reached and announced are conclusions
of law against the opposite legal conclusions urged by those
opponents. The fifth conclusion is a conclusion of fact that validity of
the Amendment is not affected by any of the four propositions
advanced by the opponents of the Amendment. In other words, the
first five numbered conclusions, all that deal with validity of the
Amendment, can be expressed in our own words, viz: “Although the
proposing Resolution did not state that Congress deemed the
proposal necessary, although only two thirds of a quorum in each
House (and not two thirds of the membership of each House) made
the proposal, although the citizens of each referendum state have
not acted as part of their respective state legislatures, and although it
is urged that the Fifth Article reserved abilities do not include ability
to make an Amendment like the Eighteenth, we decide that none of
these things affect the validity of the new Article.”
And, when we make this accurate statement of what was decided
in those National Prohibition Cases, we average Americans, fresh
from our education with the Americans who found themselves
“subjects” and made themselves and their posterity free men, have
some startling facts brought home to us.
Undoubtedly thousands of lawyers had worked, for more than a
year, in the preparation of the arguments that were made and the
briefs that were filed. When these amazingly important litigations
were reached, the arguments lasted for several days. On the
exhaustive briefs filed against validity, there appear twenty-two
lawyers, many of them among the leaders of the American Bar. On
the briefs to support state government omnipotence over the citizens
of America, “in all matters whatsoever,” thirty-five lawyers, headed by
a former member of the Supreme Court, appear.
We know, with a knowledge that brooks no denial, because it is a
knowledge brought from our experience with those who made
themselves free men and established the Constitution to secure that
result to themselves and to us, that the new Article is not in the
Constitution unless at some time prior to 1917, the free men of
America, all the individual citizens of America, became the “subjects”
of some state governments.
It is clear, therefore, that the existence of the Eighteenth
Amendment has always depended upon the correct answer to the
question whether the American is “Citizen or Subject?”
If we are subjects, the new Article may be in the Constitution not
made by us but made by governments.
If we still are citizens, as once undoubtedly we were, the new
Article cannot be in our Constitution, because we have not made the
new Article, assembled in our “conventions.”
Where men are citizens, governments cannot exercise ungranted
power or create new power to interfere with individual liberty.
In a nation of free men, established by former “subjects” with a
dominant purpose that no American should ever be the “subject” of
any governments, it is amazing that one government should propose
that governments constitute, and it is amazing that forty-six
governments should attempt to constitute, new government of men
—new government power to interfere with individual human freedom.
But most amazing of all, in a nation with the history of America, is
the fact that, when audacious government had so proposed and
audacious governments had so attempted, the prolonged arguments
and voluminous briefs of fifty-seven leading members of the
American Bar never once knew or stated the simple fact which made
the proposal and the attempt a legal and constitutional absurdity.
The fact itself, the one most important legal fact in America, was
once known and “felt and acknowledged by all” Americans. Yet, not
once in any brief in the National Prohibition Cases, was it either
known or urged that the “conventions” of the Fifth Article are the
“conventions” of the Seventh Article and that both are the whole
American “people” of the Preamble and the Tenth Amendment and
that, therefore, the Constitution expressly reserves to the
“conventions” of the Fifth Article, the citizens of America, their
existing and exclusive ability to create new government power to
interfere with their own individual human liberty.
Why none of these briefs did make this challenge became known
to us when Rice of Rhode Island, with the silence of his colleagues
marking their approval, answered the Court that the new Article
could not be constitutionally made. Why they did not make the
challenge will be emphasized when we read the leading brief against
the new Amendment. Over fifty times it will admit and state that the
Fifth Article is a “grant” of power to state legislatures from American
citizens and claim the “granted” power is a limited power and does
not include ability to make an Amendment like the Eighteenth
because such Amendment takes away the reserved power of a state
or political entity. Then, to emphasize what it does not know about
the “conventions” of the Fifth Article and the reserved powers of the
citizens of America, this brief will go on to tell us that there is no
constitutional mode in which can be made an Article which takes
more power away from any state; that such an Article may only be
made, outside any constitutional mode, by having the people
themselves rescind “the social compact” which is their American
Constitution and having them make “such new compact as they
please”; but that such new compact, such new Article of that kind,
cannot “be validly and legally made to come to pass against the
objection and protest of any state.” All this clearly explains why none
of the briefers were able to answer correctly the question asked by
the Court. How could they tell the Court in what way the Eighteenth
Amendment could be constitutionally made, when all of them “knew”
that there was no constitutional mode in which the “conventions” of
the American citizens could make it, and when they “knew” that it
could not be made, even outside the Constitution, without the
consent of the citizens of every state? The most important words in
the Fifth Article, “in conventions in three fourths thereof,” did not
mean to these briefers what they meant to the Americans who made
the Fifth Article or to Madison and Hamilton who wrote the Fifth
Article and suggested it at Philadelphia. In the word “conventions,”
they did not recognize the Seventh Article “conventions” of the
American citizens describing themselves by exactly the same word,
“conventions,” in the Fifth Article. In the words “in three fourths
thereof” after the word “conventions,” they did not recognize the
great security to human freedom which we have learned with the
Americans who wrote and who made the Fifth Article. They did not
recognize how the American people, by these words, made it their
constitutional command that they themselves, again assembled in
their conventions, by a “Yes” from three fourths of their “conventions”
and without the consent of the Americans in the other “conventions,”
might withdraw any power granted in the First Article and might add
any new power to its enumerated grants, whenever they deemed
such withdrawal or such addition would better secure and protect
American individual liberty.
That not one of the briefers did make our challenge is our certain
knowledge when we read the four challenges they did make and
which are negatived in the first four conclusions of the Court.
The first two relate to the manner of the proposal that
governments create government of men in America. Who cares how
one government makes a silly proposal? The one important thing is
that no governments shall attempt to act upon a proposal which
denies the most important legal fact in America, that governments
cannot constitute new government ability to interfere with individual
liberty.
The fourth challenge that was made is the absurd challenge that
the Fifth Article does not mention a constitutional mode of
procedure in which the citizens of America may again directly grant
to their government new power to interfere with their own individual
liberty and in which—far more important to the “conventions” which
named themselves (the “conventions”) in their Fifth Article—the
American citizens can directly take back any part of the granted
power of the First Article which they find oppressive to their
individual liberty. This challenge neither knows nor makes any
distinction between the state “legislatures” and the “conventions” of
the American citizens or the mention of either in the Fifth Article. It is
a challenge which has not the knowledge we bring from the first
“conventions,” the knowledge that “legislatures” are mentioned on
account of their existing ability to make federal or declaratory Articles
and that “conventions” are mentioned on account of their exclusive
ability to make Articles of any kind. It is a challenge which assumes
and asserts and is based wholly upon the absurd assumption that
the Fifth Article is a “grant” of power to make Articles. On this absurd
assumption of this patently absurd “grant,” this fourth challenge,
frankly stated in our own words, is as follows: “In the Fifth Article, the
‘conventions’ grant to the two grantees—the grantors and the state
legislatures—an identical ability to make new Articles. We admit that,
if the ‘conventions’ of the Fifth Article could constitutionally make the
Eighteenth Amendment, the state legislatures can also
constitutionally make it. But our challenge is that the ‘grant,’ in the
Fifth Article, is limited in extent and that neither the ‘conventions’ nor
the state legislatures can constitutionally make the Eighteenth
Amendment.”
To the “constitutional” lawyers who make this challenge, to all who
support such challenge, we commend many hours’ study of the
statements of Madison, who wrote the Fifth Article; of Hamilton, who
supported its introduction at Philadelphia; of Wilson, Pendleton,
Henry, Iredell, MacLaine, Jarvis, Lee, Mason, and the many others,
with whom we have sat in the “conventions” which made the Fifth
Article. Particularly do we commend a careful reading of the
reasoning which led to the decision at Philadelphia, in 1787, that the
First Article, because it constituted government of men, must go to
the “conventions” named alike in the Seventh and the Fifth Articles
and could not be validly made by the state “legislatures” named in
the Fifth Article. That decision was based upon the unrepealed
Statute of 1776, a statute well understood in 1787, only eleven years
after the Statute itself had been enacted as the command of the
whole American people. Finally, to those who support this fourth
challenge, we commend a thorough reading of the law laid down by
Marshall in the Supreme Court. If they thus educate themselves as
we have educated ourselves, they will be able to say with Marshall:
“To the formation of a league, such as was the Confederation, the
state sovereignties were certainly competent. But when, ‘in order to
form a more perfect Union,’ it was deemed necessary to change this
alliance into an effective government possessing great and
sovereign power and acting directly on the people, the necessity of
referring it to the people and of deriving its power directly from them,
was felt and acknowledged by all.”
And, if all shall complete their education with such men as
Webster and Lincoln, they will never again make the mistake of
ignoring the vital and important distinction in identity between “state
legislatures” and “conventions” of the American citizens, the
distinction that the former are never anything but governments and
each the government agent of the citizens of one state, while the
“conventions” are the citizens of America itself assembled in
“conventions” to issue their commands to themselves, to their
government, to the states and to the state governments. The
completed education will enable these lawyers to win future litigation
against legislative governments who audaciously attempt to usurp
the exclusive and reserved powers of the “conventions” of the
American citizens.
In any of the three challenges negatived by the first, second and
fourth conclusions of the Supreme Court, we have failed to find any
suggestion of our challenge, namely, that state “legislatures” have
audaciously attempted to usurp the exclusive powers reserved to the
“conventions” which are named in the Fifth Article.
And now we examine the only other challenge that was made, a
challenge negatived by the third conclusion of the Supreme Court.
No challenge could more emphatically ignore the protected individual
liberty of the citizen of America. This challenge does not know that
American citizens have no government save the government of
enumerated powers. This challenge frankly admits that the Fifth
Article is a grant to legislatures, each elected by the citizens of some
particular state, and that three fourths of those legislatures have the
omnipotence, which was denied to the British Parliament, over every
individual liberty of the American citizen. Like the other challenges
that were made, like every brief for or against the Eighteenth
Amendment, this challenge knows not that the Constitution is both a
federal and a national Constitution and knows not that the state
“legislatures” never have and never can have aught to do with the
national aspect of that Constitution. Based on this remarkable
ignorance, this is the challenge, frankly stated in our own words:
“The state legislatures can make this Eighteenth Amendment. The
state governments can do what they will, so long as they call their
action a constitutional Amendment, with every reserved right and
power of the citizens of America. But thirty-six state legislatures are
necessary to make anything called a constitutional Amendment. And
our challenge is that thirty-six legislatures have not made this
particular Eighteenth Amendment. In any state, where the
referendum exists, the citizens of that state [we note that even now
the citizens of America are not mentioned] are part of the state
legislature. In some of these referendum states, whose legislatures
are included among your claimed thirty-six ratifiers for the Eighteenth
Amendment, the whole of the state legislature has not yet ratified,
because the citizens of the state, who are part of its legislature, have
not yet acted. For this reason, that you ignore the rights of the
citizens of some states, our challenge is that the Eighteenth
Amendment has not been ratified by the legislative governments of
thirty-six states.”
This particular challenge, like everything in these litigations and in
the whole history of the supposed new Amendment, brings into bold
relief the one monumental error at the bottom of every thought that
the new Amendment is in the Constitution, at the bottom of the
varied absurdities which constantly appear in every brief, either for or
against validity.
Without a single exception, the fifty-seven lawyers on these briefs
base their every argument, no matter how those arguments may
challenge one another, on the ridiculous sheer assumption that the
Fifth Article is a great power of attorney to the state governments
from the citizens of America. All these fifty-seven lawyers ignore the
undeniable fact—mentioned continually in the “conventions” of the
Seventh Article which wrote their own name, “conventions,” into the
Fifth Article—that the Constitution is both federal and national. This
first mistake, this ignoring of that fact, led all of them immediately into
the fatal error of wholly ignoring the vitally important fact that the
Fifth Article distinctly names those who already could make federal
Articles, the state governments, and those whose exclusive right it
always was and is to make national Articles, the people assembled
in their “conventions.” Only because of these two mistakes, the next
step comes in the guise of the absurd concept that the Fifth Article is
a grant of any power of attorney, from the citizens of America, either
to the “state legislatures” or the “conventions.” In this patent
absurdity, all fifty-seven lawyers concur. That each of them does not
see its patent absurdity is due entirely to the fact that not one of
them states the proposition, that the Fifth Article is a grant, in the
frankest mode of stating it. That frankest way is to state the
proposition in these words: “In the Fifth Article the citizens of
America, assembled in the ‘conventions’ of 1788, granted to the
state legislatures and to themselves, the citizens of America,
assembled in their ‘conventions,’ a quantum of power as attorneys in
fact of the citizens of America. We fifty-seven lawyers only differ as
to the extent of the power which the citizens of America grant to
themselves and to the state governments. We, who support the new
amendment, contend that the citizens of America grant to the state
governments and to the citizens of America all the power of the
citizens of America. On the other hand, we, who oppose validity,
contend that the citizens of America grant to the state governments
and to the citizens of America only some of the unlimited power of
the citizens of America, the very power they were exercising when
they made the grant which is the Fifth Article.”
When the common proposition of all those lawyers, that the Fifth
Article “grants” power to those two grantees, is stated in this frank
way, its patent absurdity is manifest. Every one of those lawyers
knows that a grantor never can or does grant to himself either all or
part of what he already has. Moreover, all those lawyers ought to
know that the Tenth Amendment expressly declares that the entire
Constitution, in which is the Fifth Article, grants no power of any kind
except to the American government at Washington. Alone and
unaided, this simple declaration makes it impossible that the Fifth
Article grants any power to the state governments. Thus, even
without the certain knowledge we bring from the conventions of
1788, the state governments disappear from the scene as attorneys
in fact for the citizens of America in any matter. Each of those state
governments is left with no power it did not have before the Fifth
Article was made. Not one of them even keeps all of the power
which it had before 1788. The citizens of America, the “conventions”
in which they assembled, commanded otherwise. “When the
American people created a national legislature, with certain
enumerated powers, it was neither necessary nor proper to define
the powers retained by the States. These powers proceed, not from
the people of America, [the “conventions” named in the Seventh and
the Fifth Articles] but from the people of the several states; and
remain, after the adoption of the Constitution, what they were before,
except so far as they may be abridged by that instrument.” So spoke
Marshall from the Supreme Court Bench, in 1819, after he had come
from one of those “conventions” in which he himself had stated: “It
could not be said that the states derived any powers from that
system, [the new Constitution then before the convention in Virginia]
but retained them, though not acknowledged in any part of it.” (3 Ell.
Deb. 421.)
Yet every brief of those fifty-seven lawyers bases its every
argument on the sheer assumption, asserted by all, that the Fifth
Article is a “grant” to the state legislatures which makes them
attorneys in fact for the citizens of America. No brief can offer and no
brief does offer the slightest proof in support of the assumption. But
no brief asks for proof of the assumption or challenges the
assumption. On the contrary, every brief makes the assumption and
asserts it and on it rests every argument.
Because of this monumental error, every brief for the Amendment
insists that the state legislatures, as attorneys in fact for the citizens
of America with every power of the citizens of America, validly made
the Eighteenth Amendment.
Because of this monumental error, every brief against the
Amendment asserts that the state legislatures are attorneys in fact
for the citizens of America but insists that the Fifth Article (the
assumed power of attorney in a Constitution which expressly
declares that no power is given to the state legislatures) grants to the
state legislatures (as well as to the “grantors” themselves) only
limited ability on behalf of the principal, the citizens of America. On
this altogether unique argument, it is contended that the limited
power of attorney does not confer ability to make an Amendment like
the Eighteenth.
Because all briefs make the same monumental error, there is no
challenge on the ground that the state legislatures, not a member of
which is elected by the citizens of America, hold no power of
attorney from the citizens of America to interfere in any way, in any
matter, with the individual freedom of the American citizens. Because
all briefs against the Amendment make the same monumental error,
the fourth challenge (which was made and considered by the Court)
is based upon the heretical doctrine—the heresy being clear from
what we have heard in the “conventions” where we sat—that the
Fifth Article does not mention a constitutional mode in which the
citizens of America, again assembled in their “conventions,” can take
back from their American government any enumerated power of the
First Article which they find oppressive to their individual rights and
freedom. And, perhaps most amazing and amusing fact of all,
because all briefs make the same monumental error, the briefs for
the Amendment make no effort to support and the briefs against the
Amendment make no attempt to challenge the clear paradox, on
which the Eighteenth Amendment depends for its existence, that
there never has been a citizen of America if it be true that the Fifth
Article makes the state governments the attorneys in fact for the
citizens of America with unlimited ability to interfere with the
individual freedom of the citizens of America. Where such unlimited
ability is in government, men are not “citizens” but “subjects.”
But we ourselves come from the “conventions” where the
Americans knew that they entered as free men and left as citizens of
America, not as “subjects” of any governments. Therefore, we need
no lawyer to tell us—and no lawyer can deny our knowledge—that, if
the state governments are the attorneys in fact for the American
citizens and have ability either to interfere with or to grant power to
interfere with the individual liberty of the American citizens, or, if any
governments can interfere with that liberty on a matter not
enumerated in the First Article, there never were American citizens
and the early Americans entered their “conventions” free men but left
those “conventions” as “subjects” of an omnipotent government.
CHAPTER XXIV
GOVERNMENTS CLAIM AMERICANS AS
SUBJECTS
“Is the government of Virginia a state government after this

government is adopted? I grant that it is a republican government,
but for what purposes? For such trivial domestic considerations as
render it unworthy the name of a legislature.” (3 Ell. Deb. 171.) So
thundered Patrick Henry to the Americans assembled in convention
in Virginia, while these Americans still heard the echo of his charge
that the new Constitution made the state legislatures “weak,
enervated and defenseless governments.”
But these are the governments which all lawyers of 1920 “knew”
had been made the attorneys in fact for the citizens of America,
possessors of the supreme will in America. These are the
governments to which all advocates of the Eighteenth Amendment
contend that the Americans, in the “conventions” with Henry, gave
the entire omnipotence of the American people to be exercised by
these governments, without any constitutional restraint.
The real fact is, although all lawyers of 1920 failed to know the
fact, that these state governments were only named in the Fifth
Article, because they already had an existing limited ability to make
federal Articles, an ability not granted by the citizens of America but
possessed by each of those governments as attorney in fact for the
citizens of its own state. That it was an ability not granted by the
citizens of America, must be apparent when we recall that it was
exercised by those governments in 1781—seven years before there
was such a thing as a citizen of America. That the lawyers of 1920
neither knew nor realized the importance of this fact, is apparent
when we recall that every brief of those lawyers asserted that these
governments get their ability to make Articles by a “grant” in the Fifth
Article.
Our knowledge of the nature of every challenge to the new
Amendment, and our knowledge that each challenge involved the
assumption that the Fifth Article was a “grant” to these state
governments, is a knowledge which is certain from our study of the
conclusions of the Supreme Court which negatived each challenge.
The certainty is emphasized by our memory of the reply of Rice in
that Supreme Court, when, without one dissent from the challengers,
he stated his and their conviction that the “conventions” of 1788—the
challengers all forgetting that those “conventions” named themselves
in the Fifth Article—provided no constitutional mode of procedure
in which their own exclusive power could be again exercised to make
Articles like the First Article and the Eighteenth Amendment.
Let us again emphasize our certainty by a few moments with the
briefs of the challengers.
Root was their leader. A distinguished public leader and
considered by many to be the leader of the American Bar, there was
special reason why he should have known the ability of government
to make national Articles in a Constitution, only when men are
“subjects,” and the inability of governments to make such Articles,
when men are “citizens.”
If his brief, or the brief of any challenger, had urged this real and
invincible challenge, we would have found the mention of that
challenge in the decision and it would not have been a refutation of
that challenge. That we may confirm our knowledge that the brief of
Root, like the brief of every challenger, did not make this challenge,
the challenge that the Fifth Article is no “grant” but a mention of two
existing abilities and a mode of constitutional procedure for the
respective exercise of each, let us read the brief’s own statements of
the three challenges it does make. “The plaintiff contends that this
attempted amendment to the Constitution of the United States is
invalid (1) because it constitutes mere legislation, and is, therefore,
not authorized by Article V of the Constitution, (2) because it impairs
the reserved police or governmental powers of the several States

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Operation Bagration The Soviet

Destruction of German Army Group

Tanks in Operation Bagration 1944 The demolition of

Gothic Line 1944 45 The USAAF Starves Out the German

Gothic Line 1944 45 The USAAF Starves Out the German

90th Light Panzer Division Afrika 1941 1943 Illustrated

Operation Market Garden 1944 2 The British Airborne

U S Army Vehicle Markings 1944 1st Edition Jean

U S Army Vehicle Markings 1944 1st Edition Jean

Soviet Motor Gunboats of World War II The Red Army s

Print Edition: ISBN 978-1-61200-9230

© Casemate Publishers 2020

Design by Battlefield Design

CASEMATE PUBLISHERS (US)

CASEMATE PUBLISHERS (UK)

June 22, 1944:

July 13, 1944: Vilnius is captured July 28, 1944: Lvov is

Sd.Kfz. 2s—or what the Wehrmacht called the Kleines Kettenkraftrad HK

A light machine-gunner with his MG 42

The German Infantry Division in 1944

Along the Front

General Field Marshal Walter Model

General Hans Jordan

General Kurt von Tippelskirch

General Georg-Hans Reinhardt

A light MG 34 machine-gunner in a defensive position along the Central Front

Army Group Center Order of Battle

2ND ARMY 9TH ARMY

The Soviet Divisions in 1944

A T-34 tanker standing in front of

Army General Ivan Bagramyan

General Georgy Zakharov

General Ivan Chernyakhovsky

Along the Front

The Eve of Battle

This Heer soldier is armed with the

Preparing for battle

1ST BALTIC FRONT

4TH ASSAULT ARMY Army Artillery

3RD BYELORUSSIAN FRONT

5th Artillery Corps 65th Rifle Corps

11TH GUARDS ARMY 72nd Rifle Corps

The Eve of B attle

2ND BYELORUSSIAN FRONT

33RD ARMY 81st Rifle Corps

69th Rifle Corps 38th Rifle Corps

42nd Rifle Division 110th Rifle Division

222nd Rifle Division 139th Rifle Division

76th Rifle Corps

1ST BYELORUSSIAN FRONT

4TH ARTILLERY CORPS

41st Rifle Corps

80th Rifle Corps

9th Tank Corps

A Soviet rifleman going into battle. He

Army Group Center Order of Battle

2ND ARMY 9TH ARMY

4TH ARMY 3RD PANZER ARMY

Operation Bagration Begins:

The validity of the Eighteenth Amendment (seven litigations being

“Is the government of Virginia a state government after this

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