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Peace and Security in Indo-Pacific Asia is for the informed, the interested, and the
engaged. Sorpong Peou brings together the skills of the pedagogue with the
knowledge of the scholar.
–Dr. David Dewitt, University Professor Emeritus, Senior Scholar, York University,
Toronto, Canada.

Peou’s excellent book provides both the lay reader and the specialist with six important
theoretical frameworks which should provide the basis for better appreciation of what a
security community in Indo-Pacific Asia means in our world today. There are very few
scholars who understand the region like Peou.
–Dr. W. Andy Knight, Professor of Political Science,
the University of Alberta, Canada.

Sorpong Peou’s extraordinary breadth of knowledge, of both International

Relations theory and the key trends in Indo–Pacific Asia, shines through in this
authoritative analysis.
–Dr. Richard Stubbs, Professor of Political Science
McMaster University, Canada.

A pedagogical approach of the textbook that is appreciated is how the author

respectfully engages with the theories of IR and is not pushing an agenda of
denouncing some theories and trying to persuade the reader of others. We live in
such polarizing times that it is truly refreshing to read scholarly work that avoids
sensationalistic attacks on theories that have been debated for decades. Each
theory in this manuscript is explored on its own terms, and the reader is
encouraged to figure out where they stand on these enduring debates in the
context of Indo–Pacific security. The approach will lead to compelling classroom
discussions of the theories and the politics of the region.

This book is a must-read for any student or observer of security trends in the
region.
–Dr. Mark Williams, Chair and Professor of Political Studies, Vancouver Island
University, B.C., Canada

This book is well-written, sound, sophisticated, and authoritative. It makes a fine

textbook. Although focused on Indo-Pacific Asia, it covers all the theoretical
bases.
–Dr. Carlyle A. Thayer, Professor, School of Humanities and Social Sciences
Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra.

This is a magnum opus: it examines how a wide range of theories in international

relations are used by scholars to analyze Asia-Pacific security affairs. Its coverage is
comprehensive and its analysis quite penetrating.
–Dr. Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, Associate Professor of Political Science, Simon Fraser
University, Canada
Peace and Security in
Indo-Pacific Asia

Sorpong Peou is Full Professor in the Department of Politics and Public

Administration and a member of the Yeates School of Graduate Studies,
Ryerson University, Toronto, Canada. He is a Member of the Eminent Persons
Group, the Asian Political and International Studies Association (APISA), and a
College Fellow at McLaughlin College, York University, Toronto. His former
administrative and academic positions include Chair of the Politics and
Governance Department (Ryerson University) and Chair of the Political
Science Department (University of Winnipeg). He also served as President of
Science for Peace, based at the University of Toronto, and Manitoba Chair on
Global Governance Studies (University of Winnipeg/University of Manitoba).
From the mid-1990s to 2010, he was Professor of Political Science, Sophia
University (Tokyo, Japan), Canada-ASEAN Fellow, and Fellow, the Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore).
Peace and Security in
Indo-Pacific Asia
IR Perspectives in Context

Sorpong Peou
First published 2022
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
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© 2022 Sorpong Peou
The right of Sorpong Peou to be identified as author of this work has been
asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in
any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing
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Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
registered trademarks and are used only for identification and explanation
without intent to infringe.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

A catalog record has been requested for this book

ISBN: 978-0-367-67743-5 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-0-367-67744-2 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-13264-6 (ebk)

DOI: 10.4324/9781003132646

Typeset in Bembo
by MPS Limited, Dehradun
For my beloved family: Chola, Sophia, and Josephine –

May your world be much better than what I have seen!

Contents

Preface and Acknowledgements xi

Foreword xii

Introduction: Peace and security in Indo-Pacific Asia 1

PART I Realist tradition 21

1 Classical and neoclassical realist perspectives 23

2 Offensive and defensive realist perspectives 36
3 Realist institutionalist perspectives 49

PART II Liberal tradition 65

4 Functionalist and neofunctionalist perspectives 67

5 Neoliberal institutionalist and domestic politics
perspectives 81
6 Commercial and democratic liberal perspectives 96

PART III Pacifist tradition 113

7 Perspectives on negative peace and human security 115

8 Perspectives on positive peace and human security 131
9 Nonviolence and peace movements 144
x Contents
PART IV Culturalist and critical theory traditions 159

10 Culturalist and social constructivist perspectives 161

11 Historical materialist perspectives 175
12 Post-Marxist and postmodernist perspectives 191

PART V Feminist tradition 205

13 Essentialist and liberal feminist perspectives 207

14 Socialist and cultural feminist perspectives 220
15 Postcolonial and postmodern feminist perspectives 235

PART VI Transnationalist tradition 251

16 Transnational organized crime 253

17 Economic and environmental security in Indo-Pacific Asia 270
18 Migration, population, and pandemics 285

Conclusions: Toward a new Indo-Pacific Asian order 298

Bibliography 320
Index 364
Preface and Acknowledgements

My goal for writing this book, a substantially revised version of my Peace and
Security in the Asia-Pacific: Theory and Practice (Praeger 2010), is quite modest:
to review critically major theoretical perspectives relevant to security and
peace studies with the aim of stimulating further discussion, dialogue, and
debate among scholars, especially students. Space limits preclude a com-
prehensive review of the academic literature and require that references be
held to a minimum. However, I did my best to ensure fair coverage of the
academic material representative of the different major theoretical traditions.
I am a defender of academic freedom. As a survivor of the Khmer Rouge
killing fields, I know what it is like to live under a totalitarian regime whose
existence depended on violent suppression of dissent. One of the lessons I have
learned is that any efforts to silence dissenting views one does not like is not only
political but extremely dangerous. In the name of an ideology, the killing fields
took up to two million human lives and left countless trails of suffering and tears.
I lost many family members (including my father and grandparents). During those
years of forced labor, I lived in fear every day. Anything I said about the pre-1975
period could mean immediate death. In my work, therefore, I always caution
against any quest for a correct theory. The following is my position: Ask not
which theory is correct but what each theory can teach us.
I would like to thank my dear colleagues and other individuals for their
encouragement and valuable comments. They include Miriam Anderson, Alice
Ba, Mely Caballero-Anthony, David Dewitt, Paul Evans, James Farrer, James
Gormez, Carolina Hernandez, Maiko Ichihara, Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, Andy
Knight, Richard Sandbrook, Jingyan Shi, Sergey Smolnikov, Richard Stubbs,
Carlyle Thayer, and Mark Williams. I also would like to thank Sydney Pothakos
for her helpful research assistance. However, I alone take full responsibility for
any errors of fact or judgment that may still be evident in this book or any sins of
commission and omission I have committed.
Sorpong Peou
Email: speou@politics.ryerson.ca
Official Blog: https://www.sorpongpeou.com,
Toronto, Canada February 1, 2021
Foreword

Peace and Security in Indo-Pacific Asia is for the informed, the interested, and the
engaged. Sorpong Peou brings together the skills of the pedagogue with the
knowledge of the scholar. This book forces the reader to critically consider a
number of theoretical perspectives drawn from international relations scholarship.
The ensuing framing leads to a configurative comparative examination of contem-
porary peace and security for two-thirds of the global population. Using this
method, Peou engages the reader by bringing competing theories on peace and
security to the forefront, offering the student an insider’s critique of how concepts
and approaches construct our ideas and understanding, and may well then affect
behavior. Drawing upon his at times sharp critique of theory and his deep
knowledge of the disparate region, Peou provides strong conclusions about what
must happen if regional peace and security are to emerge and to be sustained within
Indo-Pacific Asia. He leaves the reader with a guarded optimism of the scholarly
efforts of theory building while a somewhat more pessimistic view on the human
enterprise of regional peace and security. As with most serious scholarship, this is a
book with which one argues does not always find comfortable and yet emerges
better for all that.
Dr. David Dewitt
University Professor Emeritus
Senior Scholar York University, Toronto, Canada
Introduction: Peace and security in
Indo-Pacific Asia

The end of the Cold War saw a temporary reduction in the likelihood of
global war; however, security experts began to note right away that the sources
of threat to peace and security also grew more numerous, including un-
conventional or nonmilitary ones, and more complex because of globalization.
The sovereignty of states was being undermined and the United Nations still
proved ineffective in the maintenance of international peace and security.
According to David Dewitt (1993: 7–8), regional organizations took on more
responsibility in the form of subcontracting but quickly exhibited their lim-
itations. After three decades, not much has changed. The threat of nuclear war
remains and great-power politics has not been rendered obsolete.
The stark reality of world politics today helps shed light on the fact that
post-Cold War peace and security studies as academic subfields are still alive
and well and even demand more of our attention than ever before.
Unfortunately, scholars still disagree on how to achieve peace and security and
their struggles for theoretical dominance have yet to be resolved. Academic
literature sheds light on the fact that the concepts of peace and security are
increasingly contested, and the ongoing search for ways to build a more
peaceful and more secure world remains elusive. Part of the problem in the
study of peace and security is that scholars have not yet come up with agreed-
upon definitions and how to achieve these two public goods.
The concepts of peace and security have been redefined and expanded.
Traditionally, peace means the absence of war (measured in terms of death tolls
with 1,000 or more) or its threat to the survival of states. This type of peace has
been defined as “negative.” The concept of “positive peace” was subsequently
formulated to make the case that peace encompasses more than negative peace
(Galtung 1975, 1969). Proponents of positive peace also examine indicators
like democracy, human rights, development, justice, and nonviolence. The
term “quality peace” has recently been coined to promote the idea of peace
based on gender equality (Diehl 2019).
More can be said about the concept of security. There is a broad consensus
among scholars on the need to study security, which is generally defined as
freedom from threat; however, their disagreement emerges when the fol-
lowing questions are raised: What is being secured? What is being secured
DOI: 10.4324/9781003132646-101
2 Introduction
against? Who provides for security? How is security provided? (Terriff et al.
1999). The first question is about the referent object of security. Some scholars
only focus their analyses on the security of states, while others give their at-
tention to other types of security: human, regime, international, regional, and
global. Another point of contention between scholars is the question of how
each type of security can be achieved. Some think that national security can be
achieved through military means (defense systems and alliances). Others think
that other means must be used instead (i.e., diplomacy, disarmament, inter-
national law, economic development, and democracy promotion).
At the end of the day, how scholars answer questions about peace and
security depends much on their favorite perspectives within different theo-
retical traditions. Therefore, students or scholars should study the two con-
cepts with their eyes open to what different theoretical perspectives say about
the past, present, and future of our world. As will become more evident, this
book argues that political realism is making a comeback. Even critical scholars
with normative commitment recognize the new reality of geopolitics.
However, other theoretical traditions are far from being subdued. Although
democratic liberalism appears to enjoy the most empirical support, most states
in Indo-Pacific Asia remain undemocratic. Overall, evidence shows that the
region remains far from prone to peace and security. This book will advance a
theoretical perspective labeled as democratic realism.

Peace and security in realist tradition

The realist tradition in peace and security studies dates back to centuries before
the birth of Christ. This tradition covers strategic studies (Brodie 1949; Gray
1982), which can be traced back to the works of Kautilya of ancient India,
Thucydides of ancient Greece, Sun Tzu of ancient China, and Karl von
Clausewitz of Prussia. These pioneering thinkers have influenced strategic
studies in different ways.
Strategic studies is broader than military science but narrower than security
studies, which covers “everything that bears on the safety of a polity” that is
“potentially boundless” (Betts 1997: 9). Military science is concerned with
military statecraft and is related to the conduct of war rather than its causes and
consequences. As the study of “how technology, organization, and tactics
combine to win battles,” it has traditionally been an area in which military
personnel specialize. Strategic studies, which emerged out of debates over the
definition of security, is the study of “how political ends and military means
interact under social, economic, and other constraints” (Ibid: 9). Clausewitz
provided insight into the relation between war and politics, which dominated
security literature during the Cold War through its emphasis on military sta-
tecraft and the primacy of military security.
Strategic studies focus on the concept of force which includes a variety of
topics including arms, including arms racing, nuclear proliferation, defense,
deterrence, arms control, and disarmament. This field “is concerned with the
 Introduction 3
darker side of human nature in that it examines the way in which military
power is used by governments in pursuit of their interests” (Garnett 1975: 3).
For Barry Buzan (1987), the two most crucial variables in strategic studies are
the political structure and military technology. International anarchy, generally
defined as the absence of a single overarching authority in world politics, is
another key variable that explains the security affairs of states seen as primarily
responsible for their survival.
Strategic studies also deal with the question of how to prevent war. About
2,300 years before Clausewitz, Sun Tzu of ancient China wrote The Art of
War, in which he discusses the avoidance of war through strategic advantage.
For him, war was the result of political failure (Sun 1988). Clausewitz, best
known for his modern strategic thinking, also viewed war as an unwanted but
sometimes necessary extension of politics. Although he has often been re-
garded as a strategist who glorified warfare, Clausewitz insisted that war should
be waged only when absolutely necessary and justifiable. Bernard Brodie, the
post-World War II American strategic thinker often regarded as the
Clausewitz of his day, not only advised the military establishment on how to
win wars but also made the following famous statement in 1946: “Thus far the
chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now
on its chief purpose must be to avert them” (cited in Howard 1992: 110).
Although it is associated with the war doctrine of nuclear deterrence, often
misleadingly labeled, the work of military strategists is not solely about how to
fight wars. Their work is also about how to prevent them (Howard 1992).
In recent decades, there has been a shift from the study of strategy to that of
security (Krause and Williams 1997) and more scholars have sought to broaden
our understanding of insecurity. Laurence Freedman (1998: 53) notes that the
shift of targets from “strategic” to “security” studies “reflected the revival of
the idealist tradition and notions of multilateral cooperation, thereby serving to
delegitimize force as a primary tool of statecraft.” Stephen Walt (1991: 229)
further points out that the 1980s saw “a partial convergence between the sub-
fields of security studies, peace research, and international political economy”
and further states that “the end of the Cold War will reinforce this trend by
removing some of the substantive divisions between these fields.” Walt re-
cognizes a broader agenda for security studies that includes the role of do-
mestic politics, peace research, the study of security regimes, the power of
ideas, and the relationship between economics and security. Security theorists
in general examine actors to determine not only how and why they use
violence or threaten to use it but also how and why they choose strategies that
transform hostility into cooperation, eschew force or violence, and offer
peaceful solutions to their conflicts. All this also requires theoretical ex-
planation. Edward Kolodziej (2005: 25) wisely contends that “to limit our
search [and research] to war and violence as a scholar or analyst in security is
not enough.” Thus, he includes the following theoretical perspectives: realism,
neorealism, liberal institutionalism, economic liberalism, Marxism, behavior-
alism, and constructivism. Although some theoretical perspectives on peace
4 Introduction
and security are more optimistic than others, “the starting point for the field is
insecurity” (Terriff et al. 1999: 11).
Security studies as an academic subfield can be located within the aca-
demic field of International Relations (IR) in which realism remains one of
the most enduring theoretical traditions. According to Ken Booth (2005: 2),
“[t]he study of security has always been a central concern in the academic
discipline of international relations.” Security remains the central problem of
IR whose history can be traced through to the influential works of classical
thinkers, the 17th century emergence of the Westphalian system, and, with
increased intensity, World Wars I and II (McSweeney 1999; Terriff et al.
1999: 11). Gwyn Prins (1998: 785–786) further argues that “[t]he single
pivot around which most debates in security studies have turned for a
generation has been what Robert Keohane calls ‘Classical Realism’.”
According to Edward Kolodziej (2005: 48–76), Thucydides, Thomas
Hobbes and Clausewitz laid the classical-realist foundations of contemporary
security studies. Niccolò Machiavelli was also an important early influence
with his notion of a permanent and professional army (Gilbert 1986). Steve
Smith (2005: 31) comments that neoclassical works “constitute a powerful
reworking of realist security studies.”
In general, contemporary realists are security theorists. A leading political
realist, Kenneth Waltz (1988: 624–625) notes that “[r]ealist theory, old and
new alike, draws attention to the crucial role of military technology and
strategy among the forces that fix the fate of states and their systems.” He
contends that “[s]tatesmen and military leaders are responsible for the security
of their states,” but not for that of humanity (Waltz 1959: 416). National
security remains the primary goal of states since threats remain permanent
considerations in international politics (Keohane and Nye 1985: 238). In
general, realists define insecurity “primarily as being vulnerable to being ser-
iously harmed by others’ deliberate use of force” and security as “the nation’s
freedom from rule by ‘others’ who are not part of it” (Terriff et al. 1999: 39,
43). Another leading realist, Stephen Walt (1991: 212), makes these remarks:
“The main focus of security studies is easy to identify…it is the phenomenon
of war. Security studies assumes that conflict between states is always a pos-
sibility and that the use of military force has far-reaching effects on states and
societies.” In his view, “security studies may be defined as the study of the threat,
use, and control of military force” (italics original) and much of the literature fits
“comfortably within the familiar realist paradigm.” Ken Booth (2005: 2, 3)
thinks that “[t]he subject of security studies as it developed in the orthodox
form during the Cold War was constructed in the image of political realism”
and “out of political realism.”
Like strategists, realists also do not glorify war. In fact, they study war in
order to help prevent it from erupting. Leading realists like John Mearsheimer
and Stephen Walt have been critical of the United States’ aggressive foreign
policy toward other states and its excessive use of force to defeat terrorists
(Mearsheimer 2014; Walt 2015a, 2015b). Also, they do not advocate the
 Introduction 5
killing of innocent civilians in the name of war. According to Walt, for in-
stance, “trying to bomb it [the Islamic state] into submission will inevitably kill
innocent civilians, strengthen anti-American sentiment, and bolster the Islamic
State’s popularity” (Walt 2015a: 50).
As will be discussed at greater length, realism is a distinct theoretical tra-
dition in that its adherents share similar assumptions about the role of states,
their leaders, their desires to compete and dominate each other by either
seeking glory, pursing ambitions, maximizing security or power through
military and economic means (hard power). Realists do not argue that war or
armed conflict always breaks out or that the world is always in total chaos, but
the possibility remains a potential outcome due to human nature, nationalism,
and international anarchy. Peace and security can be maintained if there are
stable balances of power (roughly equal distributions of power among states) or
balances of terror. Some realists think that multipolar structures are stable, but
other realists think that unipolar structures are better at maintaining peace and
stability. Offensive and defensive realists, in contrast, think that bipolar
structures bring about peace and stability. What bring realists together as part
of their theoretical tradition is the fact that they share similar assumptions
about states as principal actors in international politics, their struggles for
survival under anarchy and their pursuit of security through self-help and
military means because the international system remains anarchical.
This book shows that political realism is making a comeback but far from
achieving the dominant theoretical status it enjoyed during the Cold War.
Recent tensions between or among major powers like China, India, Japan,
Russia, and the United States help renew the realist conviction that geopolitics
persists and that war among them is still a possibility (Walt 2018; Mead 2014;
Mearshiemer 2014, 1990).

Peace and security in nonrealist traditions

The nonrealist perspectives can be identified within the liberal, pacifist, critical
and transnationalist traditions. Unlike political realism which tends to assume
that states are most concerned about military threats to their national security,
nonrealist scholars broaden the concept of security to include nonmilitary
sources of threat and recognize other referent objects of security such as in-
dividual human beings. National security is not the only concept in security
studies since scholars in this field focus more than the use of military force and
alliance politics. Security is no longer viewed as “merely in the stark traditional
terms of military defence” (Dewitt 1993: 8). Other concepts include collective
security, common security, comprehensive security, cooperative security,
human security, and nontraditional security (Peou 2014). Nonrealist scholars
also place more emphasis on the possibility of positive change or transfor-
mation based on cooperation rather than conflict or the possibility of building
a better world through both violent and nonviolent means, such as
confidence- and security-building measures (Capie and Evans 2002).
6 Introduction
Whether liberalism as a theoretical tradition should have a place in peace
and security studies is a matter of debate. Some realists, for instance, resist
inclusion of neoliberal institutionalism (Mearsheimer 1998a), which they re-
gard as belonging to the study of international political economy that is not
about war and peace or military security. But as Joseph Grieco (1988: 486)
puts it, “[t]he major challenge to realism has been…liberal institutionalism.”
Robert Keohane (1993: 271) also defends the point that “[i]nstitutionalist
thinking has focused its critical fire on realism.” Robert Keohane and Lisa
Martin (1998: 389) further claim that “the logic of institutionalist theory is
directly applicable to security problems as realists define them” and that their
theory “will ‘gradually invade’ the study of security issues.”
The end of the Cold War also gave rise to liberal optimism, which was
inspired by the hope that the world would become more peaceful, marking
the end of history (Fukuyama 1989, 1992). Francis Fukuyama was best known
for his work that celebrates the triumph of liberalism when the 1990s ended
with the collapse of communism and the demise of the Cold War. The liberal
tradition addresses the question of war and peace, as well cooperation and
conflict since the time of the Enlightenment. From Immanuel Kant and
Jeremy Bentham (two of the leading Enlightenment thinkers) to Richard
Cobden (in the mid-19th century) to leading thinkers in the early 20th
century such as Woodrow Wilson and John A. Hobson, however, this tra-
dition waxed and waned. It declined when the world witnessed the Japanese,
Italian and German aggressions in the 1930s, World War II, and the Cold War
waged between two blocs led by the United States and the Soviet Union.
Someliberals still make the case for the resilience of the liberal international
order and the need to maintain it (Ikenberry 2014).
Popular liberal perspectives include neofunctionalism, neoliberal in-
stitutionalism, commercial liberalism, and democratic liberalism. Unlike rea-
lists who paint a grim picture of human nature, the persistence of international
anarchy and power/security maximization, liberals place emphasis on the
goodness of human nature and humanity, universal values and the possibility
of progress, as well as peace through international institutions, democratic
governance, free markets, free trade, and global/regional integration. In spite
of their different perspectives, liberal scholars share several general assumptions
about war, peace and security, which are distinct from those of realism. States
are still primary actors, but nonstate actors are factored in as important players
in peace and security politics. By and large, liberals are optimistic because of
their theoretical emphasis on cooperation rather than on conflict. States and
nonstate actors engage in cooperative efforts to prevent war, promote peace
and security for various reasons, such as welfare rather than warfare, prosperity
rather than power, and justice as more crucial than order. As such, hard power
(military and economic) receives less emphasis and soft power (social, cultural,
and ideological) receives more attention from liberals than from realists.
Human nature is treated in a positive light (human beings are not bad or evil).
International anarchy exists but can be mitigated by the desire of states and
 Introduction 7
their peoples as well as nonstate actors to pursue prosperity, build institutions,
and promote democracy as well as human rights around the world. With the
Cold War over and international institutions gaining in importance, liberal
security studies rests on a renewed sense of optimism. National and interna-
tional institutions mitigate war-prone state behavior. With that said, states are
not alike: trading and democratic states are more institutionally advanced and
provide more benefits than protectionist and dictatorial ones.
As a theoretical tradition, pacifism has some of its intellectual roots in
liberalism but can be distinguished from the latter. During the 20th century,
pacifism was reinvigorated by the termination of World Wars I and II and
the Cold War, as well as the threat of nuclear weapons (Fiala 2018). It should
be noted that pacifism is not the same as pacificism. Both reject militarism,
but pacificism allows room for violent action under certain circumstances,
such as a revolutionary fight against capitalism. On the other hand, pacifists
advocate the nonuse of force to achieve peace and security. This does not
suggest that everyone who supports pacifism rejects the use of force, but
pacifists remain committed to nonviolence. The pacifist tradition has some
religious roots that can be identified by examining religious teachings for
millennia from Judaism to Christianity in the West and to Buddhism,
Taoism, and Confucianism in the East. Much of this tradition goes to the
extreme by rejecting any form of political violence which can be traced back
to at least the time of Christ who urged his disciples to “turn the other
cheek.” In East Asia, major religions also teach their followers to pursue
nonviolence.
By and large, the pacifist tradition is about the search for peace through
nonviolent solutions, including arms control, disarmament, and international
law (after World War I), international peacekeeping (after World War II), and
peacebuilding (after the Cold War). Disarmament (conventional and un-
conventional) remains a dominant topic in peace studies and peace research,
which seek to address the question of war and peace, acknowledging the
brighter side of human nature and the possibility of international cooperation.
According to David Dunn (1991: 67, 68), “peace research exists as a legitimate
approach to the study of war and peace in the 1980s.” Peace can be pursued
through different means and methods. The UN Agenda for Peace (Boutros-
Ghali 1992), which focuses on peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-building
and preventive diplomacy, could be observed through the lens of Quincy
Wright’s 1942 peace program (Beck 1996).
Perspectives in peace studies can also be grouped together and compared
with those in human security studies (Peou 2014) by virtue of their similarities,
despite their conceptual distinctions. Similar to the concept of negative peace,
the protection-based approach to human security defines security as freedom
from fear associated with direct or physical violence in the forms of armed
conflict and serious or gross human rights violations, especially the most ser-
ious atrocity crimes like war crimes, genocide, ethnic cleaning, and crimes
against humanity. Somewhat similar to the concept of positive peace, the
8 Introduction
development-based approach to human security stresses the importance of
freedom from structural or indirect violence, such as premature death due to
lack of medical care, poverty, and economic underdevelopment. Thus, some
scholars argue that instruments like disarmament, peacekeeping, international
law and peacebuilding are not only about negative and positive peace but also
about human security (Howe, Peou, and Uesugi 2020).
The 1990s further witnessed the rise of alternative perspectives critical of
realism, liberalism, and pacifism. This development gave rise specifically to a
critical tradition that includes culturalism, social constructivism, historical
materialism, postmodernism, and feminism. Andrew Linklater (1998: 15)
notes that “All such approaches – critical-theoretical, postmodern, feminist
and liberal – have defined their identity through a series of challenges to
realism.” This book treats these perspectives as belonging to the critical tra-
dition (Kraus and Williams 1997). But feminism is presented as belonging to a
separate tradition, which includes a variety of distinct perspectives based on
insights from other theoretical traditions. Feminist perspectives include the
following: essentialist feminism, liberal feminism, cultural feminism, socialist
feminism, postcolonial feminism, and postmodernist feminism.
Culturalism may not be considered a critical perspective by some, especially
when it refers to the work of such scholars as Samuel Huntington (1996), who
is critical of realist, liberal, and pacifist traditions. His perspective, however, is
not state-centric because of its emphasis on civilizations, not states, as the unit
of analysis. Different major civilizations engage in the struggle for domination
and control as well as inter-civilizational conflict, whereas states within each
civilization also engage in the process of integration despite evidence of in-
tracivilization conflict. Regional integration as a force for peace is possible
when states share the same civilization. Religion as part of civilization plays a
crucial role in this culturalist thinking. Until 2001, religion had played little
prominent role in peace and security studies largely because there was a shared
understanding that the Westphalia Peace Treaty signed in 1648 gave rise to the
secular modern state. After the terror attacks on the United States on
11 September 2001, however, religion was given renewed attention and has
since been regarded as a major source of war and insecurity.
Social constructivism is a social theory that aims to challenge both political
realism and other rationalist theories in the field of IR. This theory emerged in
the early 1990s to make the case that what goes on in international relations is
socially constructed (or based on what people do or their practices, rather than
natural or material). Social constructivists focus their analytical attention on
states and nonstate actors, as liberals tend to do, but reject the liberal as-
sumption about rational interest. Actors are social and their interests are shaped
by nonmaterial factors. Leading constructivists like Alexander Wendt drew
their attention away from the materialist concepts of power, wealth and se-
curity by posing the questions of history, culture, identity, norms, values, and
other nonmaterialist factors. Unlike realism, social constructivists do not view
anarchy as determining what states do or what their leaders act upon. Simply
 Introduction 9
put, “anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt 1992). There are different
logics of the way states act: some act according to the Hobbesian logic of self-
help; others, according to the Lockean logic of mutual help; still others, ac-
cording to the Kantian logic of other-help. These different logics allow the
possibility of change, such as from the state of warfare to security community.
The historical materialist approach within critical-theoretical tradition
(Coburn 2014), rooted in Marxism, remains an important approach to the
study of war and peace, primarily because of its challenge to realism (Davenport
2011) and liberalism. Michael Doyle’s work on war and peace (1997) includes
not only realism and liberalism but also socialism. Fred Halliday (1999: 2), a
scholar who has chosen to rely on Marxism’s “great insights” rather than its
“great illusions,” even make a forceful argument that liberal triumphalism is
premature. For him (and others), “the agenda of the revolutions of modern
history is still very much with us” and any “picture of the contemporary
world…that ignores this unfinished agenda is not only incomplete, but fun-
damentally distorted” (Ibid: 3). Scholars who embrace Marxism/socialism share
broad assumptions about war, peace, and security. Instead of focusing their
analyses on states, they give attention to unequal social-economic classes: the
bourgeois (or capitalists, regarded as greedy, exploitive through profit max-
imization, and imperialistic), workers (proletariat), and social forces.
Those who follow the socialist tradition include Leninists, Maoists, de-
pendency theorists, world-systems theorists, and neo-Gramcianists (seen as
“the most influential Marxist theory in contemporary international relations”)
(Teschke 2008: 173). Although they are better known as theorists of global
political economy, their perspectives have much to say about war, peace, and
security. Scholars who embrace dependency and world-systems theories do
not just talk about asymmetrical power relations among rich and poor states.
They also give attention to conflict (armed and unarmed) between states in the
Core/North and the Periphery/South, as well as geopolitical transitions (the
rise and fall of global hegemons), and super-calamities under global anarchy.
Neo-Gramscianists, such as Robert Cox (1986), not only directly challenges
political realism but also seek to transform the world on the basis of their vision
for a “just world order.”
Postmodernism, also known as poststructuralism, also has something to say
about peace and security. Postmodernists like Richard Ashely (1989, 1986)
advance arguments that challenge realism. Like other critical perspectives,
postmodernism seeks to deconstruct realism and other rationalist theories such
as liberalism and socialism. The state is not a rational actor driven by the realist
logic of self-help under international anarchy and cannot be treated as fixed
because it is simply produced and reproduced by states and their leaders. The
state is not the best agent of change and the best provider of security because of
its oppressive structure. State sovereignty as a concept can be deconstructed to
allow room for nonstate actors, stateless people and those people who are
persecuted or oppressed by their “own” states. Postmodernists’ ultimate goal is
to see “a just world peace” established.
10 Introduction
Another theoretical challenger to realist and other traditions is known as
feminism, which has been regarded as “critical theory” because of feminist
scholars’ “greater interest in historically contingent interpretive theories” than
in “mechanistic causal explanations” (Tickner 1999: 45). But Ann Tickner
(1995: 190) notes that “women have seldom been recognized by the security
literature, yet women have been writing about security since at least the be-
ginning of the [20th] century.” Feminism as an academic discipline, which
grew out of a movement in the 1960s and 1970s, has long experienced dif-
ficulties gaining acceptance as part of International Relations (Tickner 1997).
Beginning in the late 1980s, feminist perspectives began to draw scholarly
attention from students in the field. They “have proliferated in the post-Cold
War era” (True 2001: 231). According to two scholars, “women’s issues, so
long ignored in security studies, could well become a central focus of security
scholars in the 21st century” (Hudson and den Boer 2004: 264).
As part of a theoretical tradition, according to Ann Tickner (2004: 43),
“[m]ost IR feminists are closer to what in IR is called “critical security studies
than they are to more conventional IR security scholarship.” Critical of
realism (and liberalism), she writes that “Hobbes’ description of human
behavior in the state of nature refers explicitly to that of adult males,” but
“contemporary realism has taken this behavior as constitutive of human nature
as a whole” (Ibid: 47). Feminist security studies as an academic field focusing
on the study of war (its causes and consequences) has emerged (Sjoberg 2013).
There is a relationship between gender and militarism or war (Khalid 2015).
Peace and security are defined in terms of not only interstate war but also
violence and oppression or the end of unjust gender relations. According to
Tickner (1992: 128), “The achievement of peace, social justice, and ecological
sustainability is inseparable from overcoming social relations of domination
and subordination. Genuine security requires not only the absence of war, but
also the elimination of unjust social relations, including unequal gender rela-
tions.” Although feminists agree on the fact that women are subordinate to
men, they disagree on the reasons for this subordination and on how to
achieve gender equality.
Last but not least, other scholars have in recent years broadened the concept
of security to include a variety of nontraditional threats. Nontraditional threats
include those that are human-initiated (such as transnational organized crime,
economic and environmental security, transnational migration, and demo-
graphic changes) and nonhuman (such as pandemics). These threats know no
borders and cannot be effectively contained by military means. Some scholars
resist attempts to broaden the scope of security to include nonmilitary sources
of insecurity (Walt 1991: 213). Others argue specifically that environmental
degradation should not be a security issue (Deudney 1990: 463). Whether one
chooses to include or exclude nontraditional security issues is a matter of
theoretical preference. The fact remains: nontraditional security as a new
component of security studies has become a growth industry. Climate change,
for instance, has been regarded a cause of violence and a potential cause of
 Introduction 11
interstate conflict. Pandemics also pose a serious challenge to security at dif-
ferent levels: human, societal, regime, regional, and global. Not only do they
kill humans but also have the potential to drive people out of work, destabilize
societies, threaten political regimes, create tensions between states, shift
military balances of power, and potentially determine war outcomes. By and
large, scholars in nontraditional security studies are predominantly transna-
tionalists because of their focus on the need for local/regional cross-border
cooperation.

Peace and security in Indo-Pacific Asia

Peace and security studies has in recent decades become more region-specific.
Based on Ken Booth’s observation that the field “divorced from area studies is
largely thinking in a void,” Joseph Nye and Sean Lynn-Jones (1988: 23)
contend that “[s]cholars in the field should seek greater expertise in the politics
of particular regions.” Since the end of the Cold War, attention in this field has
also shifted from Europe and America toward Indo-Pacific Asia. This book,
thus, provides a critical review of the various theoretical perspectives on peace
and security in the region.
One common term used to analyze regional peace and security is Asia-
Pacific (Capie and Evans 2002), which refers to a group of states that has also
been variously referred to as Pacific Rim and Asia and the Pacific. The Asia-
Pacific as the regional focus of research is broader than East Asia, which in-
cludes only the Asian states in Northeast and Southeast Asia. Northeast Asia
includes China, Japan, North and South Korea, Taiwan, and possibly Russia,
while Southeast Asia includes Cambodia, Myanmar, Brunei, Indonesia, Laos,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam. In
addition to East Asia, the Asia-Pacific includes Australia, Canada, Chile,
Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, and the United States.
In recent years, some policymakers began to broaden their policy frame-
works to focus on the Indo-Pacific (Harding 2019; Medcalf, 2019; Mukherjee
2019; Satake 2019). Historically, the term was coined and promoted by a
handful of policymakers and scholars in Australia, Japan, India, and the United
States. The term has been referred to by Australians since 2005 and “began to
feature from 2012 onwards, when the Labor government’s ‘Asian Century’
White Paper explored the topic as an alternative to the Asia-Pacific” (Medcalf,
2019: 56). In 2016, Japan’s Prime Minister Abe declared that his country
would pursue a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy” (Satake 2019). When
Donald Trump came to power in 2017, his administration also adopted a
“Free and Open Indo-Pacific” policy (Harding 2019).
The general understanding of the Indo-Pacific is broader than the Asia-
Pacific: the former equals the latter plus the Indian Ocean. Rory Medcalf
thinks that the region is “a single strategic system what were hitherto seen as
two very separate Asian regions: East Asia, centered on China and lapped by
the Pacific Ocean, and South Asia, centered on India and abutting the Indian
12 Introduction
Ocean” (Medcalf 2019: 54). From this perspective, “the Indo-Pacific power
narrative is…not only about China and India,” since it also “involves the
intersecting interests of at least four major powers – China, India, Japan and
the United State” and also “many significant middle players” (Ibid.). Thus, the
term Indo-Pacific seems to be more appropriate when relations among the
major and middle powers are examined.
Although the shift of focus in the study of peace and security to the Indo-
Pacific away from Asia-Pacific is innovative and noteworthy, this book prefers
a slightly different term, Indo-Pacific Asia, for several reasons. Firstly, the
concept of Indo-Pacific is relatively new, when compared to that of Asia-
Pacific, but there is no clear consensus on how it should be defined. The
countries that advocate this new concept have different policy agendas. Even
the governments that advocate for this region disagree on what the policy
objective should be. For the United States, it is more about countering or
balancing China, based on notions of “open markets, free societies, rule of law,
sovereignty for all, and American leadership” (Harding 2019: 65). Australia
views this region as “an alternative to both China-centric and US-led versions
of regional order” (Medcalf 2019: 54). Japan has a different vision: to develop a
“regional order-building strategy aimed at establishing a pluralistic, inclusive
and rules-based regional order” (Satake 2019: 78). Thus, these states have not
yet succeeded in creating a cohesive regional alliance against China.
Secondly, the term Indo-Pacific could give the impression that India is
more central than China, when in fact some proponents of this term think that
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) remains the central
focus. The centrality of ASEAN has been recognized by policymakers using
the terms Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific. From India’s perspective, Southeast
Asia is “the heart” and the “central pillar” of its Act East Policy in terms of
geopolitics, economics and diplomacy (Mukherjee 2019: 47). For “Australian
policymakers, the Indo-Pacific is about shaping a regional order in which
China is not the only Asian power that matters. This will elevate the im-
portance of ASEAN” (Medcalf 2019: 58). Japan also treats ASEAN as “the
heart” of its policy on “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (Satake 2019: 77–78).
Indonesia has unveiled its version, based on “an attempt to keep the grouping
relevant” by emphasizing “the centrality of ASEAN and ASEAN-related
mechanisms, as well as the importance of encouraging bilateral and plurilateral
cooperation…” (Sambhi 2019: 131). Geographically, Southeast Asia lies in
between the Pacific and Indian Oceans and, thus, it makes more sense to use
the term Indo-Pacific Asia.
Thirdly, Indo-Pacific Asia is a term that can be regarded as more appropriate
than Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific for the simple reason in that the word Asia
is the central focus. The term can be defined as regional, connected by the two
vast oceans but still open to other major powers as noted earlier, most notably
the United States. Indo-Pacific Asia effectively captures the complexity and
vastness of a region that connects the Pacific and Indian Oceans with Asia as
the center of focus. Regional organizations such as the Asia-Pacific Economic
 Introduction 13
Cooperation (APEC) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) include states
in Indo-Pacific Asia in various ways. India, for instance, joined the ARF as a
full member in 1996. Although it is not a member of APEC, India has enjoyed
its status as an observer state since 2011.
Whether the 21st century would still be “American” is a matter of debate,
but some argue in defense of the broader “Asia-Pacific century.” Some declare
the end of Amerian World Order because of the United States’ declining
power and the rise of other powers such as China and India (Acharya 2018).
One may agree with the contention that the United States “is not an East
Asian state” because “it is external to the region,” but the same argument
concedes that security development in this region cannot “go forward without
US participation” and that “many of the East Asian states trust the United
States more than they trust each other” (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 176). The
leadership role of the United States in the region and the ascent of China are
most likely to be a central focus of peace and security studies in the decades to
come. We cannot, therefore, understand peace and security issues or dynamics
by simply looking at what states in Southeast or Northeast Asia or South Asia
do. What happens in these subregions often depends on the activities of great
powers inside and outside them.
There are several important reasons why we still need to study peace and
security in Indo-Pacific Asia. Firstly, this region witnesses many wars, in-
cluding those that broke out from the late 19th to the late 20th centuries: two
Sino-Japanese wars (1894–1895 and 1937–1945), a Russo-Japanese war
(1904–1905), several Japanese colonial wars, three wars in Indochina
(1946–1954, 1955–1975, and 1979–1989), a Sino-Vietnamese war (1979),
four Indo-Pakistan wars (1947, 1965, 1971, and 1999), a Sino-Indian war
(1962), and a Korean war (1950–1953). During and after World War II,
moreover, countless mass atrocities were committed in this region. The
communist regimes in Cambodia, China, North Korea, the Soviet Union, and
Vietnam alone were responsible for some 90 million human deaths.
Secondly, this vast region has enriched security studies. During the Cold
War, research on the region was empirically rich but not theoretically well-
informed. Studies lacked methodological sophistication, largely based on the
“rational-actor” or ahistorical model that ignored organizational, psychological,
and domestic factors. Much of what was written on Southeast Asia during the
1960s, for instance, was “permeated with implicit realist assumptions regarding
the nature of the international system,” but “seldom referred directly to the
work of international relations theorists” (Huxley 1996: 231). With that said,
the Golden Age of security studies emerged after the Korean War (1950–1953),
which “confirmed the militarization of the East-West conflict,” and “strategy
became big business” (Betts 1997: 13). The war also helped establish the new
rules of the Cold War game (Jervis 1980). The Vietnam War and US–Soviet
détente further called into question the utility of military force and emphasized
the role of domestic politics and economic issues.
14 Introduction
More serious theoretical thinking about peace and security in general are still
necessary. Many of the most serious flashpoints in the world today have the
potential to defy the contention of John Mueller (1989) about the “ob-
solescence” of war between great or major powers. Today, the major flash-
points stretch from eastern Russia to Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and the
Indian subcontinent. Elsewhere in the world, the threat of major war appears
less serious. Peace in the westernWestern world has been established, even if it
is temporary. Africa remains a volatile region, but most of the armed conflicts
are intrastate. Corrupt leaders, war criminals and greedy marketeers are pre-
dominantly the ones who commit violence. The Near East and Middle East is a
region with major flash points, but the regional rival states are not great powers.
Tensions on the westernWestern front of Russia borders contain the hallmark
of a Cold War between Moscow and NATO, though they are still contained as
the rival powers have been restrained by nuclear weapons and the decline of
Russian power. However, major flashing points today can be found in Indo-
Pacific Asia: the Taiwan Strait (where China and Taiwan are still rivals, having
produced several major crises, and their rivalry is still without any end in sight);
the East and South China Seas (where overlapping territorial claims remain
unresolved); the Korean Peninsula (where North Korea continues to be pro-
vocative and risking a nuclear war). Out of the nine nuclear powers in the
world today, six rival states are in the region (China, India, North Korea,
Pakistan, Russia, and the United States). Tensions between these nuclear states
continue unabated, such as China vs. India, India vs. Pakistan, Russia vs. the
United States, and North Korea vs. South Korea and others.
Thirdly, peace studies as an academic subfield has been given growing at-
tention in Indo-Pacific Asia and thus deserves close scrutiny. Japan was among
the first countries to witness the post-World War II development of peace
studies, such as the Peace Research Group established in 1964, the Peace
Studies Association of Japan founded in 1973, and the introduction of uni-
versity courses in peace studies at a university in 1976. After that, peace studies
in Japan continued to expand. By 2005, more than 40 Japanese universities,
including Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, International Christian
University, and Waseda University, had offered courses in peace studies. In
addition, ten peace research institutes have been established. Peace studies also
has recently penetrated China. The first course in this field began in 2003 at
Nanjing University. In 2005, peace studies as an academic discipline was es-
tablished (Hunter 2006; Cheng 2006: 200) and the university has recently
assumed the role as United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization’s or UNESCO’s Peace Studies Program Chair. In India, where
the Gandhian tradition of nonviolence first developed, peace studies programs
have been offered at different universities and institutes, such as the University
of Mysore, the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, and the Tata Institute of
Social Sciences. Peace studies has spread to other developing countries like
Cambodia where the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies was established.
 Introduction 15
Fourthly, Indo-Pacific Asia now witnesses a healthy growth of theoretical
diversity. Muthiah Alagappa (1998a: 10–11) is correct when writing that “Asia
can be said to be more broadly representative of the world than either North
America or Western Europe” and that “[t]he study of Asian security can
provide insights applicable to many other countries and regions.” Scholars
who have studied peace and security in the region have embraced different a
wide range of theoretical perspectives. This book provides a critical review of
the competing perspectives on peace and security in the region based on the
various theoretical traditions, including critical security studies (Dalby 2007).

The book’s organizational structure and a word of caution

Due to the fact that recent trends appear to indicate that Indo-Pacific Asia is
likely to be at the center of attention in the 21st century, this book covers a
variety of different perspectives on peace and security. This does not mean all
perspectives discussed in this book deal with all region-wide peace and security
issues. The academic literature gives attention to peace and security within
Indo-Pacific Asia. What this means is that certain perspectives focus on the
domestic aspects of some countries, while others focus on subregions like
Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia.
The book is divided into six major parts, based on six broad theoretical
traditions, each of which contains similar perspectives on peace and security.
The term tradition, instead of paradigm, is used for the reason that certain
perspectives share similar ideas, assumptions, concepts, units and methods of
analysis, and instruments and actions (policy or otherwise) for the promotion
of peace and security that are consistent for a long period of time. Theoretical
traditions never stand still; however, they evolve and are continually sub-
scribed to by scholars, thus reflecting both continuity and the possibility of
revision and refinement.
Part I covers several realist perspectives within Indo-Pacific Asia. At present,
the region still provides rich empirical ground for political realism. There has
been no shortage of realist scholars painting a grim picture of the region. East
Asia once proved to be a region where wars of conquest continued unabated,
but the end of the Cold War has not silenced political realists either, especially
those who still see realpolitik at work. These realists include neoclassical, of-
fensive, and defensive realists. However, some realist-inclined scholars who
have studied this region remain dissatisfied with realist pessimism. Some with
more optimistic views advocate the concept of collective security and can be
labeled as realist institutionalists because of their emphasis on the role of great
powers in the maintenance of regional peace and security. They have taken
interest in entertaining the possibility of a Concert of Asia (made up of four
great powers: China, Japan, Russia, and the United States). They differ on
how such a regional security arrangement would eventually be established.
The ideal end of collective security is tied to the vision for international peace
16 Introduction
and security, with the UN Security Council (dominated by five permanent
members) standing at the pinnacle of power bestowed with the privilege of
ensuring collective action against aggression.
Part II covers perspectives in the liberal tradition within the field of security
studies. Functionalism and its offspring (neofunctionalism and neo-neo-
functionalism) made a comeback after the Cold War. Policymakers and
scholars alike showed more interest in the process of regional integration
through trade and institution building. After the end of the Cold War, neo-
liberal institutionalists, political domesticists, and commercial and democratic
liberals also started to pay attention to new security challenges in the region.
Neoliberal institutionalists paint a rosy picture of security relations among
states that have both deepened economic interdependence and engaged in
institution-building. Those who focus on domestic politics tend to argue that
this level of analysis remains the key to understanding regional peace and
security. Commercial liberals have their reason for optimism because of
economic interdependence and trade liberalization. Based on the process of
post-Cold War democratic development in East-Asian countries such as South
Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia, democratic liberals pin their
hopes for peace and security on further democratization in China and Russia.
Part III covers various pacifist perspectives on peace and security. In Indo-
Pacific Asia, as noted earlier, the number of scholars and academic institutions
focusing on peace studies continues to expand. Although they have ac-
knowledged that interstate war has been receding after the Cold War, they still
consider armed conflicts among and within states worthy of their research
agenda. They have also studied nonviolent methods for peace and security,
such as international peacekeeping and peacebuilding (including international
criminal justice, democratic institution building, and economic reconstruc-
tion). Peace teachings or education, both religious and secular, and peace
movements in the region also remain a long tradition (Hunter 2006). The big
question is whether these peace instruments and methods have pacifying
effects.
Part IV covers critical perspectives. Culturalists place emphasis on cultural
norms and values as the key independent variable explaining regional conflict
and cooperation (Huntington 1996). Some scholars view the fear of com-
munism, the role of strong leaders, geopolitical luck, market-oriented eco-
nomic policies, and regional networks as part of the ecosystem of peace
(Mahbubani and Sng 2017). Others urge us to understand the “long peace” in
East Asia based on non-Western elements such as developmentalism, non-
interference, and face-saving (Kimiväki 2016). Social constructivists give
further attention to the process of socialization and the strategy of engagement.
Some, including those of Asian descent, question Euro-centric theories of
security, especially rationalist ones. They ask us to add ideational variables
based on Asia’s diverse experiences, instead of European and American ex-
periences (Alagappa 1998a, 1998b). Others urge us to “rethink security” (Suh
et al. 2004) and “reassess security cooperation” (Acharya and Goh 2007).
 Introduction 17
Other critical perspectives have also made inroads into Indo-Pacific Asia
(McDonald 2017). They include those within historical materialism (Marxism,
dependency/world-systems theory, and neo-Gramscianism, all of which can
be grouped together as socialist perspectives) and postmodernism (post-
structuralism), all of which have something to say about peace and security in
the region. The socialist perspectives experienced major setbacks after the
Soviet disintegration in the early 1990s, but Marxist scholars have not lost
hope that they will someday see a world not afflicted by capitalist violence and
war. East Asia still has the largest number of states in the world that officially
cling on to socialism: China, North Korea, Laos, and Vietnam. Modern so-
cialism (which stems from revolutionary thinkers and practitioners such as
Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin, and Mao Zedong) poses a direct challenge to
realism and liberalism. Lenin’s theory of imperialism sought to abolish capit-
alism and build a communist state in Russia after the 1917 revolution. Mao did
the same in China, where he predicted the eventual arrival of an “eternal
peace.” His “Thought” has made a global impact on Western intellectuals
(including Jean-Paul Sartre, Louis Althusser, Michael Foucault, and radical
feminists) and those in the Third World (Kang 2015: 21). Maoist insurgencies
still cause trouble in India, Nepal, and the Philippines. The rise of pro-socialist
forces among young people in the United States is now increasingly evident,
especially those on university campuses, and their battle against pro-capitalist
forces appears to be intensifying (Zitelmann 2020). Postmodernists have given
their scholarly attention to relations among states in the region, especially
relations between the United States and other major powers.
Feminist perspectives are covered in Part V. In Indo-Pacific Asia, feminists
have paid growing attention to the role of women in society, militaries and
national politics, as well as in peace education and other peace activities. They
have studied the role of women in revolutions, such as those in China and
Vietnam, the problem of militarization and prostitution in East Asia, the US
military bases located in military allies like Japan and South Korea, and the
protests staged by locals against the US military presence in the region. The
region has also received growing consideration from feminists whose interest
in peace and security issues continues to generate new insights on the re-
lationship between gender inequality and peace/security, especially in the field
of peacebuilding (Davies et al. 2017).
Transnationalist perspectives on nontraditional security are the focus of
Part VI. Indo-Pacific Asia has now received more attention on various types
of transnational threat to the region, such as transnational organized crime
(which includes drug and human trafficking, piracy, terrorism), economic
and environmental problems, population growth, transitional migration, and
pandemics (Caballero-Anthony and Cook 2013; Emmers et al. 2006).
Evidently, international cooperation within the region remains limited, due
in large part to the fact that states remain staunch defenders of sovereignty.
Efforts have been made to ensure effective collective action; however, weak
18 Introduction
political regimes and limited resources are still among the major challenges
that limit successes in addressing nonmilitary threats.
This book presents and critiques competing perspectives on peace and se-
curity in Indo-Pacific Asia that belong to different theoretical traditions but
does not aim at incorporating everything written on the subject for the simple
reason that it would be impossible to do so. The perspectives are discussed and
critiqued on the basis of their assumptions and arguments in light of empirical
evidence. It must also be pointed out that it is often difficult to label scholars in
the field. Some consider themselves realists, but others question whether they
are (Legro and Moravcsik 1999). Some scholars have been labeled differently
by different scholars. Gideon Rose (1991), for instance, considers Fareed
Zakaria a “neo-classical realist,” but Stephen Walt (1998: 37) calls him an
“offensive realist.” John Mearsheimer has been widely known as an offensive
realist, but Theodore Cohen calls him a “neomercantilist” (Cohen 2016: 261).
Perhaps more than any other theory, postmodernism/poststructuralism is quite
complex and confusing to many scholars. Part of the problem is that many
scholars themselves do not always make their statements of theory crystal clear
and often do not identify themselves as such.
This book also seeks to determine whether any perspective has now
emerged as the “hegemon” in the struggle for theoretical supremacy. If none
has, then it may be wise for us to aim at building innovative theories based on
the strengths of several theories. If this academic field was initially concerned
with the question of war and political realism served as the intellectual pioneer,
other theoretical approaches should be included as long as they directly
challenge this once-dominant tradition. The objective, however, should not
simply be to reject political realism but to see if any of its challengers can do
much better. If none has, then it may be wise for us to aim at building in-
novative theories based on the strengths of existing theories.
The conclusion of this book makes a tentative or preliminary attempt to
show that democratic realism, despite its apparent shortcomings, still has the
best potential to help shed light on whether Indo-Pacific Asia is prone to
either war and insecurity or peace and security. Useful insights from other
theoretical traditions, however, will be incorporated to make the case for the
quality of peace and security.
This book rests on several standards of judgment. It evaluates how well
peace and security theorists answer their questions and how much empirical
support they provide. What states and nonstate actors actually do (and why
they do it and whether they succeed in their endeavors) also matters more than
what theorists think in abstract terms. Moreover, no one sigle theory can
explain everything. Robert Cox (1986: 207) whose theory will be discussed
later i may be right in stating that “[t]heory is always for someone and for some
purpose.” Another way of trying to make sense of our large and extremely
complex world is that a theory embraced by someone can only explain one part of it.
The Indian parable about the six blind men (each of whom touches a different
part of the elephant) illustrates the point that no one single theory can explain
 Introduction 19
the whole world. Moreover, a good theory must go beyond normative
commitment. Few people would normatively disagree with anyone who
develops a bold vision for a utopia on earth, but the question is always about
how to get there and at what cost. We must always be aware of the moralistic
fallacy. More can be said specifically about intentions, which are never good
enough without empirical validation. In fact, as someone said it, “The road to
hell is [often] paved with good intentions.” There is a historical example: the
revolutionary regimes in the 20th century sought to build a just world based
on egalitarianism but were collectively responsible for some 100 million
deaths.
Thus, in my view, a theory that does not stand up to any historical or
empirical scrutiny must be questioned. The fact that we live in one world but
have many theories suggests that none of them is perfect or flawless. With that
said, this book does not aim to discredit any perspective but rather to identify
all perspectives’ strengths and weaknesses so that their proponents might wish
to lower their expectations and keep their big claims in check. The following
words by the world-renowned physicist Albert Einstein help guide my social
science reasoning: “No amount of experimentation can ever prove me right; a
single experiment can prove me wrong.”
In short, a constructive way of thinking about peace and security must give
heed to this admonition: Ask not which theory is correct but what each theory
can teach us. This book thus calls for humility among those of us in this field of
study. All of us should be reminded of these words of wisdom from an old Jew
of Galicia: “When someone is honestly 55 percent right, that’s very good and
there’s no use wrangling. And if someone is 60 percent right, it’s wonderful…
But what’s to be said about 75 percent right? Wise people say this is suspicious.
Well, and what about 100 percent? Whoever says he’s 100 percent right is a
fanatic…” (Cited in Kolodziej 2005: 307).
Part I

Realist tradition
1 Classical and neoclassical realist
perspectives

This chapter reviews classical and neoclassical realist perspectives on war,

peace, and security in Indo-Pacific Asia. By and large, these theoretical per-
spectives paint a grim picture of major states struggling for control and
domination; thus, regional peace and security are fragile or temporary. They
share with other realist perspectives some general propositions. Firstly, nation-
states are the principal actors in international politics. Secondly, national
survival remains states’ ultimate policy objective. Thirdly, self-help is the logic
that applies to all states. Classical realism still has some influence on security
thinking in Indo-Pacific Asia, but neoclassical realism seems to have more
influence since the 1990s. What makes classical and neoclassical realism distinct
from other realist perspectives is that human nature plays a central part in their
analyses, although neoclassical realism departs from classical realism by placing
less emphasis on human nature as an explanatory variable. According to
neoclassical realists, states are led by their leaders whose perceptions and
abilities to mobilize domestic support for policy action vary. Moreover, their
analyses give attention to the dynamics of domestic politics and political elites’
perceptions. In general, they regard unipolar systems or hegemony as more
prone to international and regional stability and security than multipolar ones.
Neoclassical realists tend to stress inititially the rise of Japan and recently
China, as well as the decline of the United States, but disagreement continues
among scholars on the question of American decline. American neoclassical
realists tend to view regional peace and security as dependent on American
supremacy over the region. This argument has stimulated debates and raised
questions about the future of peace and stability in Indo-Pacific Asia.

Classical and neoclassical realism in a nutshell

Classical realism has been influenced by Thucydides’ The Peloponnesian War
(1972) and Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527), a public figure much like Henry
Kissinger of the United States or Tony Lake of the Florentine Republic. E. H.
Carr (1939: 63) characterizes Machiavelli as “the first important political
realist,” who revolted against utopianism. Machiavelli’s greatest works include

DOI: 10.4324/9781003132646-1
24 Realist tradition
The Prince (1513) and The Art of War (1521). Neoclassical realism, however,
draws more insights from Thucydides’ work.
Machiavelli’s enduring influence on realism is based on the belief in the
selfishness of human nature. The interstate system is anarchical, but anarchy as
a variable explaining princes’ warlike behavior is less important than human
nature. As noted by Alan Ryan, “the staying power of The Prince comes from
its sweeping statements about human nature…” (Ryan 2012: 364). Most men
cannot be trusted because of their ingratitude, fickleness, fear of danger, and
covetousness (Patrick 2014). To keep their states safe and secure, princes must
thus be like “lions” and “foxes.. In his view, “it is much safer to be feared than
to be loved,” if one cannot command both love and fear at the same time. In
spite of all the dangers, men seek war in order to augment their glory and
honor by also putting the interests of their states before those of individuals.
Princes must reject the renaissance belief that they would remain helpless toys
in Fortuna’s hands and must do all they could (“the ends justify the means”) to
make themselves as strong and powerful as possible by not joining forces with
others more powerful because doing so would only bring ruin on themselves.
They must, therefore, expand and conquer by being skilled in the art of
warfare, prepared to use deception, ruthless, and capable of commanding
generals with unlimited authority as in the Roman tradition. Machiavelli drew
lessons from ancient Rome: he “wanted Rome’s battalions and legions and
cohorts” (Boesche 2003: 37) that once gained power and glory and thus
preferred imperialisms to balances of power and believed that republics with
permanent and professional armies were best for imperial expansion. A mili-
tary thinker who laid the foundations for a permanent and professional army,
he thought that the goal of the professional army is to ensure a complete defeat
of the enemy in wars that should be “short and sharp” rather than long or
protracted (Gilbert 1986: 24).
A more recent classical realist thinker was Hans Morgenthau (1985) whose
line of theoretical thinking appears to be quite similar to that of Machiavelli in
terms of emphasis on human nature. Moral codes may influence individuals
but do not make states moral agents. There are no universal moral standards on
which states can agree. State leaders are driven by an innate desire to dominate
others. Unlike Machiavelli, the state (not the prince) remains the primary actor
in international politics. The state remains the referent point for security, and
the sources of threat are of a political and military nature rooted in human
nature, which “has not changed since the classical philosophies of China,
India, and Greece endeavored to discover [the law of politics]” (Ibid: 4). States
continuously prepare for and engage in organized violence or war. Permanent
peace is impossible to achieve without a world state, but world government
cannot exist without a world community, which “is unattainable under the
moral, social, and political conditions prevailing in the world of our times”
(Ibid: 361). A sense of world community can still develop but only if national
decision-makers work to “ameliorate world tensions through a return to a
wise diplomacy” (Speer 1968).
 Classical and neoclassical realist 25
But until the nation-state disappears and gives way to a world state, the
political struggle for power among states to ensure their national survival rests
on the logic of self-help that requires that they arm themselves and/or join
military alliances with other states that face the same enemy. International
stability based on balance-of-power politics alone, however, remains pre-
carious. The systems “are essentially unstable” (Morgenthau 1985: 89). When
a state becomes powerful and pursues imperialist policies, other states either
yield or seek to balance it “or war decides the issue.” Effective balance-of-
power systems are multipolar. Multipolarity (multiple centers of power) invites
caution from state leaders: numerous poles create a higher degree of un-
certainty, making it more difficult for active players to take decisive action.
Neoclassical realism can be traced back to the work of Greek war historian
Thucydides. Colin Gray makes the following observation about the historian:
“It is not at all obvious that eighty years of careful scholarship in the 20th
century, from the aftermath of the First World War to the present day, have
produced guidance on the causes of war noticeably superior to that offered by
Thucydides” (Gray 1999: 162). Robert Gilpin (1981: 227–228) makes this
point: “In honesty, one must inquire whether or not 20th century students of
international relations know anything that Thucydides and his 5th-century
[BC] compatriots did not know about the behavior of states.”
Contemporary neoclassical realists do not ignore the importance of human
nature, nor do they argue that ideas do not matter. Gilpin (2001: 17), for
instance, argues that non-material factors also matter. For neoclassical realists,
however, non-material factors do not explain everything. Moreover, human
nature still matters. Gray (1999: 175), who argues that “Clausewitz [still] rules”
and that “the future is the past,” writes: “I fight, therefore I am human.” From
his perspective, “we humans are so gripped by some of the less attractive
features of our nature as to be obliged to function according to a notion of
prudence that has to include a willingness to fight” (Ibid: 181).
Overall, however, neoclassical realists have become less concerned with
human nature as the main source of ambition and aggression than classical
realists but more attuned to the impact of relative material power, domestic
politics, and state leaders’ perceptions. Relative power is central to neorealist
thinking. Thucydides provides one of the most enduring realist statements on
power as the key variable in the study of war: “the strong do what they have
the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept” (Thucydides
1972: 402). The real cause of the Peloponnesian War (431–415 BC),
Thucydides writes, was “the growth of the power of Athens and the fear
which this caused in Sparta.” The growth of their power led the Athenian
leaders to see their city-state as superior to other city-states in Greece and to
seek hegemony as the way to guarantee its security, and this logic also applied
to Sparta, which was compelled to fight back for its survival. Relative power
matters to neoclassical/neomercantile realists a great deal, especially those who
think not only about land and population sizes and military power but also
about national wealth and international economic competition based on the
26 Realist tradition
idea of developing and commercializing new technologies, manufacturing
products, and exporting them (Krasner 1983: 320–321).
The concept of revisionism is also central to neoclassical realist thinking. As
their economic and military power grows, states are expected to become
expansionist. Nazli Choucri and Robert North (1975: 1) put it forcefully: “a
growing state tends to expand its activities and interests outward – colliding
with the spheres of influence of other states – and finds itself embroiled in
international conflicts, crises and wars…. The more a state grows, and thus the
greater its capabilities, the more likely it is to follow such a tendency.” Robert
Gilpin’s political law of “uneven growth” of national power leads to a similar
conclusion: as the power of a state increases that state will be tempted to try
“to change the international system in accordance with its particular set of
interests” (Gilpin 1981: 94–95). Fareed Zakaria (1998: 19) makes a similar
argument: “increased resources give rise to greater ambitions.” Rising states
seek to build large armies, entangle themselves in politics beyond their borders,
and seek international influence. Revisionist states lust for empire and seek to
expand power by being on the bandwagon, coveting far more than what they
possess, taking great risks, or pursuing reckless expansion (Schweller 1995:
278–281). Rising or emerging powers “seek to change, and in some cases to
overthrow, the status quo and to establish new arrangements that more ac-
curately reflect their own conception of their place in the world” Friedberg
(1996b: 13). The Cold War ended in the early 1990s, but newly rising states
will not be forever content with the international status quo (Mead 2014). In
general, neoclassical realists remain skeptical about peaceful power transitions,
primarily because of the fast-growing challenger’s revisionism or the hege-
monic power’s preventive actions against revisionist states.
Neoclassical realists/neomercantilists add two key intervening variables to
classical realism: domestic politics and state leaders’ perceptions. States are not
treated as the “black boxes” that other realists assume they are. “Statesmen, not
states,” argues Zakaria (1998: 42), “are the primary actors in international
affairs.” State leaders seek to protect or promote their national interests by
mobilizing domestic support for their initiatives (Christenson 1996: 11). But
they cannot behave aggressively if constrained by domestic burdens like
welfare costs (Wohlforth 1999: 40). In short, neoclassical realism “places do-
mestic politics as an intervening variable between the distribution of power
and foreign policy behavior” (Walt 2002b: 211). Also, according to neo-
classical realism, perceptions of relative power also matter. States behave ac-
cording to leaders’ perceived realities of objective power. The distribution of
power can also be miscalculated or misperceived (Wohlforth (1995). Zakaria
also takes perception into account: “statesmen will expand the nation’s poli-
tical interests abroad when they perceive a relative increase in state power, not
national power” (Zakaria 1998: 35, 38, and 42). In short, political leaders do
not operate in the same way under the same objective conditions.
Neoclassical realists advocate hegemony or unipolarity. Hegemonic stability
theory is relevant. International regime formation depends on a hegemon both
 Classical and neoclassical realist 27
willing and able to enforce rules. Regimes weaken when their hegemons
decline (Gilpin 1987: 345). Wohlforth (1999: 9) also regards unipolarity as
durable and peaceful, especially “when one state’s capabilities are too great to
be counterbalanced” or when the preponderant power remains undisputed.
Schweller (1995: 281) also argues that the international system remains stable
when the pro-status quo states (likened to “the kings of the jungle”) “are far
more powerful than revisionist states.” The end of the Cold War and the
emergence of the United States as the world’s sole superpower thus led
neoclassical realists to claim that the unipolar world is likely to bring world
peace. By implication, a region dominated by one power is likely to remain
stable and peaceful.

Classical/neoclassical realist perspectives on

Indo-Pacific Asia
Indo-Pacific Asia has in recent decades attracted the attention of neoclassical
realists. Some Asian strategists are regarded as Machiavelli’s children. Richard
Samuels (2003), for example, examines Japanese policy elites who were eager
to work toward placing their state among the great powers. They were am-
bitious to the extent that they sought to establish parity with the rest of the
world by striving to eliminate the “unequal treaties” imposed upon them by
the West, by thriving to become a “first-class” nation, and by being de-
termined to “catch up” and surpass the West (Samuels 2003: 12).
But long before Machiavelli and Morgenthau, Sun Tzu (545–470 BC) and
Kautilya (317–293 BC) had already given their advice to state leaders and
military strategists. The key advisor to the Indian king Chandragupta Maurya,
Kautilya has been compared to Machiavelli by Western historians. His mandala
theory (theory of omnipotence) on war and diplomacy is found in Arthashastra
(“the science of worldly gains”), which reveals his wish to see his king become
a world conqueror, his distrust of moral pleas when faced with a superior
force, his approval of secret agents willing to kill enemy leaders and sow
discord among them, his view of women as a weapon of war, and his belief in
the spread of disinformation and the use of religion and superstition to de-
moralize enemy troops and to bolster the morale of his own (Boeshe 2003).
Kautilya’s offered six foreign policy options to the king whom he regarded
as a role model who would want to be conqueror (Vijigishu): war, marching,
peace, neutrality, alliance, and double policy (Karad 2015: 328–330). A king
wages war against another when he is more powerful than the latter. He
marches against his enemy when he is in a position of strength. He makes
peace when he is in relative decline compared to another king but meanwhile
prepares for war and waits for his enemy to weaken before launching an attack
on the latter from the position of strength. He remains neutral when both sides
are equal in terms of strength or when neither can defeat the other. He builds a
politico-military alliance with his enemy’s enemy. This checkerboard pattern
in Kautilya’s thinking is based on this geopolitical reasoning: “the enemy of
28 Realist tradition
my enemy is my friend.” He made the observation that states on the Indian
subcontinent understood this option when they allied with others far away in
order to protect themselves against those near them. Double policy means
seeking the help of another king who is as strong as the enemy while attacking
the latter. There are two elements in his strategic thinking: self-preservation in
times of weakness and expansion in times of strength. Kautilya’s strategy is
similar to Machiavelli’s imperialism and that of Thucydides with emphasis on
the importance of relative power among states.
But much better known than Kautilya among strategists and security
scholars is Sun Tzu who was a military general and produced his influential
work, The Art of War, which describes the seven states in the “Warring States”
period (475–221 BC), perhaps the bloodiest era in Chinese history. He at-
tacked moral reasoning and advised leaders, faced with armed and dangerous
neighbors, to take action that would help them to survive in an era where
warfare became an instrument of power politics (McGreal 1996: 30–33). His
strategic thinking placed strong emphasis on human nature, material power,
and cost-benefit calculations. For him, “war is a natural aspect of the political
and social environment of man…an expected, if unwelcome, mark of human
behavior” (McGreal 1996: 32). Somewhat like what Hans Morgenthau said,
Sun Tzu reasoned that human beings disregard morality. Human nature must
be controlled by force. When asked if he could turn two platoons of con-
cubines into troops, he demonstrated a simple logic of power. He divided
them into different units, commanded by the king’s two favorites. When the
“troops” chuckled instead of doing as commanded, he ordered the two “of-
ficers” beheaded on the spot. The next most senior concubines were put in
their places, and the “troops” flawlessly obeyed his commands.
Sun Tzu’s political tactics include his advice to state leaders that they should
assess their power as accurately as possible (Sun 1988). Power can be defined in
material terms. When it came to preparing future battles, military leaders were
prohibited from using superstitious rituals of prediction. They also had to be
prudent by not trusting the intentions of other state leaders and had to pay
attention to their material capabilities (especially military ones, such as the
strength of the opponent and the number of troops). State and military leaders
would thus be wise not to assume that other states will not attack them and
should thus prepare for war. They are also urged to show an ability to calculate
the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action and to pay attention to
the consumption of economic resources in warfare. For instance, Sun urges
generals and leaders to ask such questions as: “Whose troops are stronger?
Whose officers and soldiers are the better trained? Whose system of rewards
and punishments is clearer?” and adds that this “is how you can know who
will win” (Ibid: 46).
With that said, Sun Tzu did not think that war must always be fought in
order to defeat the enemy. In fact, he advised leaders to wage war and win
quickly with minimal bloodshed but without always having to fight. Unlike
Machiavelli (but like Kautilya), he “did not care a whit for glory and fame,”
 Classical and neoclassical realist 29
but just “wanted to win at all costs and to keep casualties – on both sides – to a
minimum” (Boesche 2003: 37). What this means is that “those who win every
battle are not really skillful – those who render others’ armies helpless without
fighting are the best of all” (Sun 1988: 67). If possible, non-military means
(such as intimidation, spying, deception, and the disruption of enemies’
military alliances) should be pursued. Based on experiences from the “Warring
States” period, he concluded that disrupting or splitting the military alliances
of enemy states was the most cost-effective way to win a struggle for power.
For example, spying on enemies helps leaders gain strategic advantage: “only a
brilliant ruler or a wise general who can use the highly intelligent for espionage
is sure of great success” (Ibid: 172).
Both Kautilya and Sun Tzu have contributed to strategic thinking in their
own respective countries. Not only was Kautilya’s thinking popular among
statesmen but also influenced postcolonial India’s foreign policy (Zarman
2007) and offers insights to help us understand two neighboring enemy states
in South Asia: Pakistan’s policy choices vis-à-vis India, with universal ap-
plicability (More 2014). Kautilya’s thinking can also be used to help explain
the rise of China, as well as the struggle for power and domination among
other states. China’s preparations for war (through military modernization)
against more powerful states such as the United States, its positive relations
with states weaker than the United States such as Russia and Pakistan, which
has adversarial relations with India, appear to validate Kautilya’s perspective.
Sun Tzu’s strategic thinking also remains influential in China today. Some
Chinese military officers have even proposed a strategy of “unrestricted war”
as the way to stand up to the United States because China’s military power
would not be enough to take on US military power. Two Chinese colonels,
for instance, wrote a book arguing that, “Unrestricted War is a war that
surpasses all boundaries and restrictions…It takes nonmilitary forms and
military forms and creates a war on many fronts. It is a war of the future”
(Pomfret 1999). According to Pomfret (1999), the Chinese strategy of un-
restricted war is a marriage between Sun Tzu’s Art of War and modern military
technology as well as economic globalization. This strategy is based on the idea
that states like China, which are weaker than their enemies lke the United
States must not comply with the rules set by the latter and must adopt their
rules to ensure victory. It is thus possible to combine terrorism, drug traf-
ficking, environmental degradation, and computer virus propaganda with Sun
Tzu’s Art of War.
The work of Sun Tzu also has had intellectual influence on some Western
and Asian writers. Robert Kaplan, who wrote Warrior Politics (2003), for in-
stance, draws on the wisdom of past strategic thinkers such as Sun Tzu (and
others like Machiavelli) and makes the case that we live in a world of unstable
states and face an uncertain future. For Kaplan, Sun helps state leaders to avoid
war by thinking strategically. To ensure their security, states must do what
they can to avoid bloodshed by concentrating efforts on gaining strategic
advantage through tactics that include deception, spying, and intelligence
30 Realist tradition
gathering. Sun ’s work has now been cited to shed light on China’s political
ambitions. Beijing has been accused of “encouraging a wave of ultra-
nationalism across China as the country pits itself against the US to become the
world’s dominant power” (McGleenon 2020). Chinese leaders, moreover,
have been accused of deceptively seeking world domination through military
and nonmilitary means and tactics such as higher military spending, cyber-
attacks, intellectual property theft, unfair trade practices, currency manipula-
tion, thus posing the “existential threat” to American national security (Gertz
2019). China’s strategy of unrestricted warfare has been interpreted by some
observers as using the Covid-19 pandemic to gain strategic advantages, a
“classic war case,” after allowing at least 175,000 people to leave China on 1
January 2020 (Mishra 2020).
Neoclassical realists tend to see or predict potential conflict in Indo-Pacific
Asia. They regard multipolarity as prone to conflict because of rising powers:
“Europe’s past could be Asia’s future” (Friedberg 1996a: 5). The post-Cold
War international system was “unipolar” and “likely to remain so for some
time to come” (Friedberg 2000, 2005), but it will likely become dangerously
multipolar. In the late 1970s, neoclassical realists tend to regard the fast rise of
Japan as a potential problem in world affairs. In the late 1980s, the United
States was viewed as being on the decline, whereas Japan was then regarded as
being on the road to great power status in pursuit of a Pax Nipponica. Japan
sought to strengthen its technological, industrial, and economic position in the
world. It also competed with other major industrial powers and deepened
economic ties with less industrialized states. Richard Samuels notes that
Japanese revisionists sought to transform Japan into a normal great power with
a grand strategy based on both the military threats from China and North
Korea and the old ambitions of their forebears. Japan modernized and ex-
panded its Coast Guard’s “power projection capabilities” and its “ability to
project influence” (Samuels 2007/2008: 85). Japan still behaves as expected by
neoclassical realists, because of China’s rise and other variables such as national
beliefs and domestic political interests (Zakowski 2019; Ichihara 2018).
More recently, neoclassical realists shifted their focus to Russia and China
with new political ambitions. More powerful than Iran but weaker than
China, Russia has emerged as “the middling revisionist state,” challenging the
dominant power of the United States. President Vladimir Putin has been
regarded as having the political ambitions to restore the glory of his state by
“frustrating Western projects on former Soviet territory,” “rebuilding the
Soviet Union” and dreaming of “building a real Eurasian bloc” (Mead 2014).
Evidence shows that China has a long history of hegemonic ambitions and
expansion. During the Song dynasty (960–1279) and the Ming dynasty
(1368–1644), for instance, used force to settle disputes and expanded power
when in a position of preponderance. Evidently, “Ming China launched
several rounds of military attacks on the Mongols, invaded and annexed
Vietnam as a Chinese province, and dispatched maritime expeditions to spread
the tribute system” (Kang 2015: 52–53). In the early 15th century, China
 Classical and neoclassical realist 31
conducted several military operations led by Zheng He to Southeast Asia, the
Indian subcontinent, the Middle East, and East Africa. The demonstration of
Chinese massive naval power (backed by a fleet of 26,803 soldiers on 250
ships) allowed the Chinese to pursue its political ambitions by “spreading the
tribute system and enforcing tributary rules.” “Through its overwhelming
naval power,” moreover, “Ming China was able to discipline unruly political
units unreachable by land and awe others into accepting Chinese supremacy”
(Ibid: 61).
According to Aaron Friedberg (1996a: 18), “China is both the single biggest
factor and the single largest question mark in the Asian geopolitical equation…
and “the struggle for mastery in Asia” continues because China wants to
displace the United States as the preponderant power in the region, even
though the United States is unwilling to abandon its present dominant position
(Friedberg 2000). China continues to be seen be seen as a rising power that is
fast-acquiring military capabilities, which will allow it to contest the United
States’ long-standing preponderance in the Western Pacific. More recently,
Friedberg (2007: 39) writes: China “is fast acquiring military capabilities that
will allow it to contest America’s long-standing preponderance in the Western
Pacific.” He then adds that, “In East Asia and beyond, Beijing is working
assiduously to enhance its own influence, while at the same time seeking
quietly to weaken that of the United States.” China has become more
powerful, more assertive and increasingly revisionist, especially in the East and
South China Seas (Mead 2014).
The proliferation of neoclassicalist thinking about China’s drive for world
supremacy has become more evident in recent years. China’s “Belt and Road
Initiative,” covering almost 70 countries by land and sea, has been regarded as its
most ambitious geopolitical initiative to remake the global economy and turn
China into a superpower at the center of world capitalism and globalization
(Maçães 2019). Beijing has sought to build a “world-class military” by 2049
(Fravel 2019). China has now been likened to Thucydidean Athens, imperial
Germany and the Soviet Union, thus as a world superpower that threatens the
United States and its military allies. In his Destined for War (2017), Graham
Allison also observes that “China and the US are currently on a collision course
for war” and asks whether they will escape from “Thucydides’ trap.”
Neoclassical realists, however, do not believe material power alone drives
state behavior. National economic culture and ideology matter as well.
According to Robert Gilpin (2003: 299), for instance, Japan and the United
States remain “uneasy trading partners,” primarily because their “modes of
capitalism” are “inherently incompatible.” The two national economies are
fundamentally different and thus prone to conflict. The United States has what
Gilpin calls “managerial capitalism,” whereas Japanese capitalism is one
characterized as “collective capitalism.” Now that China has been presented as
the existential threat to the world, especially the United States, neoclassical
realists often refer to the fact that China is a communist dictatorship
(Gertz 2019).
32 Realist tradition
Domestic politics has also been observed as having an impact on Chinese
leaders’ ambitions. According to Christensen (1996: 6), “Mao in 1958…
decided to mobilize [China]…around long-term strategies designed to re-
spond to…shifts [in the balance of power].” He adds that, “The manipulation
or extension of short-term conflict with the other nation, while not desirable
on straightforward international or domestic grounds, became useful in
gaining and maintaining public support for the core of grand strategy.” After
the Cold War, Chinese elites have relied on the need to mobilize popular
support for their grand strategy. The Communist Party has relied on na-
tionalism as an important element of its political legitimacy, often manip-
ulating Chinese public resentment toward past Japanese imperialism in order
to do so.
Perceptions also matter in strategic calculations/miscalculations. They have,
for instance, prevented Chinese leaders from getting soft on both Taiwan and
Japan. Christensen (2001) demonstrates that China is not a status quo power in
that it does not accept a de facto territorial condition associated with Taiwan’s
stance on its independence. Even if Taiwan only acquired defensive weapons,
Chinese leaders would still perceive them to be of an offensive nature capable
of legitimizing the territorial status quo or of reasserting Taiwanese leaders’
irredentist designs on China. Chinese leaders might find it justifiable to act
against a recalcitrant Taiwan. Moreover, to the Chinese leadership, Japan still
has the potential to become a great military power with old aggressive in-
tentions. This kind of fear is rooted in their perception of Japanese military
capabilities in that Chinese leaders have more historical reason to distrust Japan
than the United States. Other neoclassical realists also see trouble in Sino-
American relations. China’s mainstream strategy analysts “overall perceived a
consistent and malign U.S. strategy of global domination” and their “views on
the enduring and predatory nature of the US hegemony were reinforced after
the NATO military intervention in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”
(Deng 2001: 344). This type of perception is one-sided, however. American
leaders, according to neoclassical realists, also perceive China as a competitor.
Their “mutual threat perceptions…have resulted in a competitive relationship
in both economic and military arenas” (He 2017: 148).
Neoclassical realist perspectives’ theoretical popularity or its main strength is
based on the historical fact that ancient empires and modern states have often
sought to dominate others through territorial conquest or economic and
political control. From the Greek states, as evidenced by the Peloponnesian
Wars, to the Roman Empire and the Ottoman Empire, from the Chinese
Empire to the Mongol Empire, from the Dutch and Portuguese Empires to
the British Empire, the United States and the Soviet Union, the pursuit of
imperial power has been a major feature of world politics.
But critics of neoclassical realism still question whether Japan and China
have such ambitions. Postclassical realists call into the question the argument
that Japan is bound to challenge American hegemony. According to Tsuyoshi
Kawasaki (2001: 231), Japan continues to maintain its Cold War alliance with
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außerordentlich geschmeichelt; meine Verkleidung konnte also
entschieden für genügend gelten.
Jetzt wurden alle Hunde angebunden, außer Malenki und
Jollbars, die uns freiwillig folgten. Unsere kleine Karawane wurde
beladen, wir stiegen zu Pferd und ritten ab. Der Abschied rief viele
Tränen hervor; Sirkin wandte sich ab, um seine Rührung zu
verbergen, Hamra Kul aber weinte laut wie ein Kind und begleitete
uns noch etwas zu Fuß, mit seinen großen Stiefeln ganz
unbekümmert durch den Fluß watend.
Das Lager Nr. 44 verschwand hinter den Hügeln, und wir trabten
schnell talabwärts. Würden wir diesen friedlichen Ort je
wiedersehen? Ich zweifelte nicht an der mächtigen Hand, die bisher
stets meine Schritte, durch Wüsten und über Berge, gelenkt hatte.
Schagdur schwelgte förmlich in dem Gedanken an das beginnende
Abenteuer. Der Lama war ruhig wie ein Stoiker, und als ich ihn der
am Kum-köll getroffenen Verabredung gemäß fragte, ob er im Lager
zu bleiben wünsche, wollte er nichts davon hören; jetzt wolle er mich
nicht verlassen, sondern mit mir ziehen, wenn es ihm auch das
Leben kosten sollte.
Schagdur ritt einen Falben, der Lama den kleinen, dreisten
Maulesel, der im vorigen Jahr, bei dem See, wo die Leute die beiden
Denkmale errichteten, beinahe verlorengegangen wäre. Meine
beiden Reisegefährten führten die Lasttiere, und Ordek, der eines
der Pferde ritt, hatte ein Auge auf die Lasten. Er sollte uns die
beiden ersten Tagereisen begleiten, um nachts die Tiere zu
bewachen. Noch drei Nächte würden wir drei Pilger also ordentlich
ausschlafen können, ehe die Aufgabe, unsere Tragtiere zu
bewachen, uns selbst zufiel.
Ein paar Stunden weit begleiteten uns Turdu Bai und Tscherdon.
Dann kehrten auch sie nach einem letzten Lebewohl um. —
Das Flußtal ist eng und zwischen steilen Hügeln eingeschlossen.
Den Fluß überschritten wir schon zu Anfang neunmal. Die ganze
Landschaft leuchtet rot, denn hier haben wir roten Sandstein, der
derartig verwittert ist, daß man ihn selten als anstehendes Gestein
antrifft. Grus und Blöcke sind dafür um so häufiger.
 Am rechten Ufer, wo eine gute Furt durch zwei kleine Steinmale
bezeichnet war, sah man Spuren eines Jägerlagers. Drei rußige
Steine bildeten eine Unterlage für einen Kochtopf. Auch ein noch
nicht lange erlegter, aber jetzt ganz zusammengetrockneter Yak
legte von menschlichen Besuchen Zeugnis ab. Ein Bär war gestern
oder heute hier gewesen und hatte den Kadaver umgedreht.
Nachdem wir den Fluß noch ein paarmal gekreuzt haben,
mündet unser Tal in weites, offenes, nur in der Ferne von Bergen
begrenztes Terrain aus. Der Fluß durchzieht diese Ebene nach
Nordosten, während wir den Weg nach Südosten einschlagen. Im
Norden steht die vor kurzem überschrittene, so schwer zugängliche
Bergkette mit zwei Pässen.
An Wild sahen wir zahlreiche Kulane, Hasen und Murmeltiere,
sowie einen Wolf; später machten die Hunde noch einen Rundtanz
mit einem alten Yak, den sie aufgespürt hatten. An einem offenen
Quellbecken (Namaga), wo das Gras üppig stand, schlugen wir
Lager, denn einer der Maulesel begann bedenklich zu hinken. Ich
zündete Feuer an, indes die Männer die gröberen Arbeiten
besorgten; Pferde und Maulesel wurden mit einem Stricke zwischen
Vorder- und Hinterbein geknebelt, was sie verhindern sollte, sich
allzuweit zu entfernen.
Darauf wurde das einfache Mahl von gebratenem Fleisch, Reis,
Brot und Tee zubereitet; beim Essen bedienten wir uns der Hände,
der chinesischen Stäbchen und einer kleinen mongolischen
Holztasse — Luxusartikel, wie Gabeln und Löffel, enthielten unsere
Kisten nicht. Nur der Lama hatte keinen Appetit; er litt an heftigen
Kopfschmerzen und befand sich wirklich schlecht. Es wäre doch
hart, wenn er jetzt, da wir ihn so weit gebracht hatten, nicht imstande
sein würde, die Reise mitzumachen; es stand aber zu befürchten,
daß er mit Ördek würde umkehren müssen.
Ich lag noch eine Weile auf der Erde und ließ mich von der
Abendsonne bescheinen, doch um 8 Uhr gingen wir zur Ruhe, weil
wir nichts weiter zu tun hatten. Ördek hütete die Tiere, aber die drei
Pilger schliefen zum ersten Male brüderlich zusammen in ihrem
Wallfahrtszelte. Der Mond schien über der stillen Gegend; es war ein
Segen, daß wir während dieser Nächte sein Licht hatten.
In diesem Lager wurde beschlossen, daß Ördek uns noch einen
Tag begleiten sollte, denn dem Lama ging es sehr schlecht; er
schwankte im Sattel und mußte oft absteigen, um eine Weile auf der
Erde zu liegen.
Das Terrain ist in dieser Gegend vorzüglich, und wir legten auf
dem festen Boden mit größter Leichtigkeit beinahe 40 Kilometer
zurück. Die Hügel und Täler, die wir hierbei passieren, sind arm an
Gras, aber desto reicher an Kulanen und Yaken, die bei
verschiedenen Gelegenheiten zu Hunderten auftraten. Sie nehmen
aber auch mit Moosen und Kräutern vorlieb, die unsere zahmen
Tiere nicht fressen würden. Spuren von Menschen fehlen noch. Von
Zeit zu Zeit reitet einer von uns auf den nächsten beherrschenden
Hügel hinauf, um Umschau zu halten. Jetzt würden wir freilich, wenn
wir Reiter oder ein Nomadenlager sähen, als ehrliche Pilger direkt
dorthin reiten, aber wir mußten doch Ördek Gelegenheit geben,
vorher unbemerkt zu verschwinden und nach dem Lager Nr. 44
zurückzureiten.
Die Richtung ist Ostsüdost. Im Osten erhebt sich ein gewaltiges
Schneemassiv, und diesseits desselben liegt ein See von reinblauer
Farbe. Am Seeufer, längs dessen wir nach Südosten hatten ziehen
wollen, stiegen senkrechte, wie immer ziegelrote Sandsteinfelsen,
das gewöhnliche Kennzeichen der tibetischen Landschaft,
unmittelbar aus dem Wasser empor. Sie zwangen uns zu einem
verdrießlichen Umwege nach Südwesten über beschwerliche Hügel,
hinter denen wir wieder ans Ufer gelangen und an ihm auf viel
bequemerem Terrain weiterziehen konnten. Konzentrisch längs des
Ufers geordnete Absätze und Wälle lassen auf den ersten Blick
erkennen, daß dieser Salzsee im Austrocknen begriffen ist.
Allzuweit konnten wir nicht reiten, um unsere schon
angegriffenen Tiere nicht zu ermüden, und es wurde Zeit, ans
Lagerschlagen zu denken. Trinkwasser schien es in der Nähe dieses
Salzsees nicht zu geben. Wir folgten einem Kulanpfade zwischen
zwei Uferwällen in der Hoffnung, daß er uns zu einer Quelle führen
würde.
Im Süden des größeren Sees schimmerte jetzt der Spiegel eines
kleineren Gewässers, das merkwürdigerweise süß war, obgleich
seine Ufer ebenso flach und kahl aussahen. Obschon es hier sowohl
mit der Weide wie mit der Feuerung schlecht bestellt war, wählten
wir hier doch einen Platz für das zweite Nachtlager aus.
Der Lama fühlte sich besser, und die Stimmung war sehr gut. Wir
saßen plaudernd um das Feuer und entwarfen unsere Pläne für die
Weiterreise nach der heiligen Stadt. Ich berechnete die Marschroute
des Tages und teilte den anderen mit, wie lang unser Weg noch sei.
Der Lama erzählte von der Strenge, mit der die Tibeter in Nakktschu
alle Pilger, die aus der Mongolei kommen, untersuchen. Wir hielten
es daher für das Klügste, diesen Ort zu vermeiden und uns auf
gebahnten oder ungebahnten Wegen nach dem Ostende des Tengri-
nor zu begeben, um von dort nach dem Passe Lani-la zu gehen. Wir
würden auf diese Weise die großen Pilgerstraßen zwischen
Nakktschu und Lhasa erreichen und unter den übrigen Pilgern
verschwinden.
Darauf folgte eine komische Szene. Mein Kopf sollte rasiert
werden. Ich setzte mich neben dem Feuer auf die Erde, und
Schagdur hauste mit der Schere wie ein Vandale in meinen Haaren.
Nachdem ich auf diese Weise geschoren war, wurde mein Kopf
eingeseift. Ördek kam mit dem Rasiermesser, und nach einer Weile
glänzte mein Schädel wie eine Billardkugel. Schagdur und der Lama
schauten zu und fanden die Situation höchst interessant. Schließlich
nahm ich selbst den Schnurrbart vor, der ebenfalls ohne Erbarmen
entfernt wurde, obgleich ich es eigentlich für jammerschade hielt,
mein sonst ganz vorteilhaftes Aussehen auf solche Weise zu
verschimpfieren. Ich tröstete mich damit, daß ich die Brauen und
Wimpern behalten durfte.
Nachdem die Verwüstung so über mein Haupt hingegangen war,
sah ich gräßlich aus. Doch hier war ja niemand, mit dem ich zu
kokettieren brauchte, und es war schließlich einerlei, wie man in
diesen ebenso glattrasierten Gebirgsgegenden aussah.
 Meine Behandlung war jedoch noch nicht fertig. Wie ein alter,
geübter Quacksalber begann der Lama mit sachverständiger Miene
unter seinen Papieren, Beuteln und Medikamenten umherzusuchen
und schmierte mir dann das Gesicht mit Fett, Ruß und brauner
Farbe ein. Bald war das Werk getan, und nun glänzte ich wie eine
Kanonenkugel in der Sonne. Ein kleiner Handspiegel überzeugte
mich, daß ich wirklich schön echt aussah. Mir konnte vor mir selbst
Angst werden, und ich mußte eine gute Weile in das Glas starren,
ehe ich völlig davon überzeugt war, daß dieser mongolische Pavian
wirklich mit meiner eigenen Person identisch war. Als die Salbe
trocken war, nahm meine Haut eine mehr grauschmutzige
Schattierung an.
Unser Lagerplatz lag offen auf der schmalen Landenge zwischen
den beiden Seen; nur im Südwesten erhoben sich einige niedrige
Hügel. Die Gegend konnte für vollkommen sicher gelten, denn
weder alte noch frische Menschenspuren waren irgendwo zu sehen,
und die Hunde verhielten sich ruhig. Gegen 5 Uhr erhob sich ein
Nordsturm, der Wolken von Sand und Staub über den Salzsee und
unser Lager jagte. Wir nahmen unsere Zuflucht zu der Jurte, und
bereits um 8 Uhr fanden wir, daß es Schlafenszeit sei, und krochen
auf dem Filzteppiche des Zeltes in unsere Pelze. Ördek bewachte
die Pferde und Maulesel ungefähr 200 Schritte vom Lager entfernt.
Er sollte die ganze Nacht wachbleiben, damit wir noch einmal
gründlich ausschlafen könnten; am Morgen sollte er dann auf einem
der vier Pferde nach dem Lager Nr. 44 zurückreiten.
Um Mitternacht wurde das Zelttuch auseinandergeschlagen.
Ördek steckte den Kopf herein und flüsterte mit angsterfüllter
Stimme: „Bir adam kelldi“ — ein Mann ist gekommen! Seine Worte
wirkten wie ein Donnerschlag. Alle drei stürmten wir mit den Flinten
und dem Revolver in die Nacht hinaus (Abb. 246). Der Sturm tobte
noch immer, und der Mond schien bleich durch zerrissene, schnell
hinjagende Wolken. Ördek zeigte uns den Weg und berichtete, daß
er zwischen den am entferntesten weidenden Pferden eine dunkle
Gestalt habe umherhuschen sehen. Dies hatte ihn so erschreckt,
daß er nach dem Zelte gelaufen war, anstatt Alarm zu schlagen.
 Die Folge davon war natürlich, daß wir zu spät kamen. In dem
matten Lichte des verschleierten Mondes sahen wir gerade noch,
wie einige dunkle berittene Gestalten davonsprengten und zwei
Pferde vor sich herjagten. Einen Augenblick darauf verschwanden
sie hinter den Hügeln. Eine ihnen von Schagdur nachgeschickte
Kugel richtete keinen Schaden an. Er, der Lama und Ördek
verfolgten die Spur, während ich im Lager blieb, das vielleicht von
einer ganzen Bande umringt war. Nach einer Stunde kehrten sie
zurück, ohne etwas Weiteres gehört oder gesehen zu haben.
Jetzt berieten wir uns sofort über die Sachlage. Zunächst zählten
wir unsere Tiere; alle Maulesel und die beiden schlechtesten Pferde
waren noch da und weideten in größter Ruhe. Aber die beiden
besten Pferde, mein lieber Schimmel und Schagdurs Falbe, waren
fort. Aus den Spuren ergab sich, daß die Räuber drei berittene
Männer gewesen waren, die sich, direkt gegen den Wind, an das
Lager herangeschlichen hatten. Sie waren zu Fuß gegangen und
hatten ihre Pferde in einer gut versteckten Bodensenkung geführt, in
der zuzeiten Wasser nach dem großen See strömt. Von dort war
einer der Männer allein auf allen vieren weiter gekrochen, bis er sich
ganz in der Nähe der hintersten Pferde befand. Er hatte sie durch
sein Aufspringen scheu gemacht und nach dem Ufer hinabgejagt,
wo ihm die beiden anderen Männer mit den tibetischen Pferden
entgegengekommen waren. Alle waren im Handumdrehen
aufgesessen und dann über die Hügel gejagt, bei denen sie schon
angekommen waren, als wir, noch ganz schlaftrunken, aus dem
Zelte stürzten.
Ich glaube nicht, daß ich mich in meinem ganzen Leben je so
geärgert habe wie diesmal. Sich seine Pferde vor der Nase der
Nachtwache fortstehlen zu lassen, wenn man obendrein noch zwei
große, bissige Hunde hat! In der ersten Wut wollte ich die ganze
Reise nach Lhasa bis auf weiteres aufschieben und die Diebe ihren
Streich teuer bezahlen lassen. Ich wollte sie wochenlang verfolgen,
bis wir sie in Sicht hätten, und sie dann ebenso überfallen. Den
einfältigen Ördek, der früher stets so tüchtig gewesen war,
auszuzanken, vergaß ich dabei vollständig. Aber sein Mut
beschränkte sich auf die Wüsten und andere unbewohnte
Gegenden, und er mochte gewissermaßen recht darin haben, daß
M e n s c h e n von allem, womit man zu tun haben kann, das
Schlimmste sind, viel schlimmer als Tiger und Sandstürme.
Nach und nach bekämpfte ich meinen Verdruß und erwog mit
wiedergewonnener Ruhe unsere Lage. Wir folgten der Spur noch
einmal bis auf die Höhen der Hügel, wo sie im harten Gruse
verschwand. Schagdur wollte sich durchaus auf die Verfolgung
machen, das Magazingewehr brannte ihm in den Händen. Er wollte
sein Pferd, das er die ganze Zeit wie sein Kind gepflegt hatte, unter
keiner Bedingung einbüßen. Doch auch er beruhigte sich, als ich ihn
daran erinnerte, daß diese Männer, waren sie nun gewerbsmäßige
Räuber oder nur Yakjäger, die sich die Gelegenheit nicht hätten
entschlüpfen lassen wollen, ganz gewiß nicht vor dem nächsten
Abend Halt machen würden. Wir hatten gar keine Aussicht, sie mit
unseren müden Tieren einzuholen; sie hatten unsere besten Pferde,
die ledig liefen, genommen, und ihre eigenen waren ganz gewiß
kräftig und an die Bergluft gewöhnt.
Ferner kannten sie das Terrain, wir aber nicht. Sie konnten den
Flußlauf und Schuttbetten, wo sich keine Spur verfolgen ließ,
benutzen und uns auf diese Weise leicht irreführen.
Und schließlich, wenn zwei von uns die Verfolgung aufnahmen
und zwei zurückblieben, so zersplitterte sich unsere kleine, an und
für sich zu schwache Truppe, und die Klugheit verbot uns
entschieden, einen so abenteuerlichen Plan auszuführen. Wir
mußten froh sein, daß die Diebe sich mit zwei von unseren Tieren
begnügt hatten, und ich tröstete Schagdur mit der Bemerkung, daß
ich, wenn ich einer der Tibeter gewesen wäre, a l l e unsere Tiere
gestohlen hätte, um uns jegliche Verfolgung ganz unmöglich zu
machen.
Wir hatten eine nützliche Lehre und eine Warnung bekommen!
Aus dem Scherz war auf einmal Ernst geworden; hier galt es mehr
als je die Augen offenzuhalten! Mitten zwischen diesen öden, stillen
Bergen war eine Räuberbande, wie Gespenster in der Nacht, aus
dem Schutze der Erde aufgetaucht; nicht einmal die Hunde hatten
etwas gemerkt. Mit den Yakjägern vom Lager Nr. 38 hatten die Diebe
vermutlich nichts gemein, dagegen ist es wahrscheinlich, daß die
von Sirkin in unserem Tale gesehene Spur und der von den
Muselmännern gehörte Schuß auf irgendeine Weise mit unseren
nächtlichen Gästen in Zusammenhang standen. Sie hatten uns
gewiß keinen Augenblick aus den Augen verloren, sie hatten sich
vor der großen Karawane nicht sehen lassen wollen und hatten in
irgendeinem versteckten Tale gelagert, aber stets auf eine
Gelegenheit zum Überfall gelauert, die sich ihnen früher oder später
darbieten mußte. Sodann hatten sie unsere kleine Pilgerschar
beobachtet, waren uns von fern, durch Hügel verdeckt, gefolgt,
hatten uns wie Wölfe umlauert und waren jetzt vom Sturm
unterstützt worden.
Sicher war diese Erfahrung für uns nützlich. Mit einem Schlag
waren wir uns über unsere Lage klar und erkannten, daß wir künftig
auf dem Kriegsfuß leben und jeden Augenblick auf einen Überfall
gefaßt sein mußten.
Ein kleines Feuer wurde vor dem Zelte angezündet; dort ließen
wir uns nieder. An Schlaf war diese Nacht nicht mehr zu denken. Die
Pfeifen wurden hervorgeholt, wir hüllten uns in unsere Pelze und
plauderten, während der Mond von Zeit zu Zeit zwischen
unheildrohenden Wolken hervorguckte. Dann wurde Tee gekocht,
der nebst Reis und Brot unser Frühstück bildete. Beim ersten
Tagesgrauen erhoben wir uns und rüsteten uns zum Aufbruch. Ich
nahm den zweiten großen Schimmel, Schagdur Ördeks Pferd; der
Lama hatte seinen Maulesel behalten.
Als die Sonne aufging, saß der arme Ördek weinend am Feuer.
Er war ganz außer sich vor Angst, jetzt allein und unbewaffnet die 70
Kilometer nach dem Lager Nr. 44 zu Fuß zurücklegen zu müssen. Er
bat und flehte, uns begleiten zu dürfen, und versprach, ein andermal
besser aufzupassen; als ich aber unbeweglich blieb, bat er um den
Revolver. Doch das nächtliche Abenteuer hatte uns gelehrt, daß es
nicht ratsam war, in diesem Land ohne Waffen zu reisen.
239. Eine magere Weide in dem großen Längentale. (S. 151)

240. Die Kamele waten durch den Fluß. (S. 152.)

 241. Flußübergang. (S. 152.)

242. Die beiden Eisbänder im Tal. (S. 160.)

 243. Bahnen eines Wegs von der Eisscholle hinunter. (S. 161.)

In aller Eile schrieb ich auf ein ausgerissenes Tagebuchblatt

einen Brief an Sirkin. Ich beschrieb kurz, was geschehen war, und
ermahnte ihn, auf seiner Hut zu sein. Räuber streiften in der Gegend
umher, und da sie offenbar mit unseren Verhältnissen völlig vertraut
seien, müsse Tag und Nacht die strengste Wachsamkeit beobachtet
werden. Vor allem hätten die im Lager Zurückgebliebenen darauf zu
achten, daß nicht noch mehr Karawanentiere gestohlen würden.
Ferner befahl ich ihm, die Diebe durch Tscherdon, Li Loje und noch
einen Mann verfolgen zu lassen; mehr als eine Woche dürfe aber
diesem Versuche nicht geopfert werden. Alle weitere Auskunft werde
Ördek erteilen, der auch die Stelle kenne, von welcher die Spur
ausgehe.
Von der durchwachten Nacht schmerzten mir die Augen, als die
Sonne aufging. Ördek steckte den Brief in den Gürtel und erhielt
noch eine Schachtel Zündhölzer, damit er sich bei seinem
Nachtlager Feuer anzünden konnte. Als wir uns trennten, sah er aus
wie ein zum Tode Verurteilter, der zum Richtplatze geht. Kaum aber
waren wir zu Pferd gestiegen, so sahen wir ihn halb laufend längs
des Ufers verschwinden. Er glaubte natürlich, es werde den ganzen
Tag Räuber regnen und jeden Augenblick könne eine Flintenkugel
durch die Luft pfeifen. —
Später, als alle unsere Sorgen um Lhasa glücklich überstanden
waren, erzählte er selbst, wie sein Rückzug abgelaufen war. Am 29.
Juli hatte er den ganzen Tag nicht eine Minute Halt gemacht. Er
hatte es nicht gewagt, auf freiem Felde unseren Spuren
nachzugehen, sondern sich wie eine wilde Katze in trockenen
Bachbetten und Rinnen, sie mochten gerade oder krumm sein,
weitergeschlichen. Den ganzen Tag über hatte er sich nach der
Dämmerung und der Dunkelheit gesehnt. Doch als diese eingetreten
war und der Regen schnurgerade herniederströmte, erschreckte ihn
auch das nächtliche Dunkel, und er glaubte, überall Räuber zu
sehen. Ein paarmal hatten ihn friedliche Kulane beinahe um den
Verstand gebracht und ihn veranlaßt, sich wie ein Igel
zusammenzurollen.
Endlich erreichte er in pechfinsterer Nacht den Eingang unseres
Tales und beschleunigte seine Schritte noch mehr. Der Fluß
rauschte laut in seinem Bette und übertönte jeden anderen Laut.
Unaufhörlich glaubte Ördek jemand hinter sich herschleichen zu
hören. Jeder Stein war ein lauernder Schurke, der nach seinem
Herzen zielte. Wie er im Regen und in der Dunkelheit über die
steilen Hügel gekommen war, wußte er selbst nicht; er war nur
immer vorwärtsgeeilt, gestolpert, gefallen, wiederaufgestanden und
unzähligemal durch den Fluß, dessen Wasser ihm bis zu den Hüften
ging, gewatet.
Als er schließlich das Lager erreichte, wäre er von der Wache,
die Lärm schlug, beinahe erschossen worden. Er hatte den Mann
jedoch noch rechtzeitig angerufen, wurde erkannt und von seinen
erstaunten Kameraden sogleich mit Fragen bestürmt. Eine gute
Weile konnte er nicht antworten. Vor Müdigkeit erschöpft, brach er
nach Atem ringend zusammen. Den Brotfladen, den er als Proviant
mitbekommen, hatte er nicht angerührt, und sein Appetit kam erst
wieder, nachdem er den ganzen nächsten Tag geschlafen hatte.
 Ördeks Bericht und mein Brief erschreckten natürlich die
Daheimgebliebenen, die das Schlimmste befürchteten, da es schon
die zweite Nacht war, daß unser Lager einem Attentate ausgesetzt
gewesen war. Indessen hatte die Nachricht das Gute, die
Wachsamkeit aufs äußerste zu schärfen, und hätten sich
ungebetene Gäste dort in der Nähe sehen lassen, so wären sie mit
scharfen Patronen empfangen worden.
Gleich am Morgen rüstete sich Tscherdon, um unsere Diebe zu
verfolgen. Er nahm Turdu Bai und Li Loje mit; Ördek konnte nicht
mitgehen. Trotz des Regens war unsere Spur auf dem ganzen Wege
deutlich erkennbar gewesen, und auch die Spur der Diebe wurde
gefunden. Sie hatten am Morgen in einer Entfernung von 30–40
Kilometer vom Salzsee gerastet und waren dort von mehreren der
Ihren mit 15 Yaken erwartet worden. Dann hatten sie den Ritt eine
so lange Strecke auf Grus und im Wasser fortgesetzt, daß die Spur
völlig verschwand und nicht wiederzufinden war. —
Doch kehren wir zu unserer Pilgerfahrt zurück. Nachdem wir von
Ördek Abschied genommen hatten, zogen wir nach Südosten und
Ostsüdosten und legten auch an diesem Tage beinahe 40 Kilometer
zurück (Abb. 247). Die Maulesel hätten noch weitermarschieren
können, aber wir mußten die Pferde schonen. Zwischen dem
Lagertümpel und einem anderen Gewässer, an dessen Ufern wir
ziemlich frische Spuren von Schafherden sahen, zogen wir ein
breites, grasreiches Tal hinauf. Rechts von unserem Wege ließen wir
eine kleine hügelige Paßschwelle liegen, deren Ecke von ein paar
Hundert Yaken rabenschwarz erschien. Wir musterten sie mit dem
Fernglase und erwarteten ihren Wächter zu sehen, denn die Tiere
machten keine Miene zu entfliehen. Vielleicht waren sie zahm. Doch
als wir uns der Herde näherten, ergriff sie die Flucht, und Menschen
zeigten sich nicht. Demnach konnten wir darauf rechnen, noch ein
paar Tage lang keine Nomaden zu treffen, denn die wilden Yake
halten sich nicht in der Nähe menschlicher Wohnungen auf.
In offenem Terrain mit freier Aussicht nach allen Seiten schlugen
wir das Lager an einem kleinen Bache auf, an dem es gutes Gras
und Yakdung zum Feuern in Fülle gab. Jetzt waren wir nur noch drei,
und ich mußte beim Abladen, Zeltaufschlagen und allerlei gröberen
Arbeiten helfen, was ich sonst nie nötig gehabt hatte, außer im Jahre
1886, als ich zweimal fast allein durch Persien gereist war.
Während Schagdur und der Lama die Tiere besorgten und sie
auf der besten in der Gegend aufzufindenden Weide zur Hälfte, d. h.
mit einem Stricke zwischen dem rechten Vorder- und dem linken
Hinterbeine, fesselten, sammelte ich in meinem weiten Mantel
trockenen Yakdung, welche Beschäftigung mir höchst interessant
erschien. Die beiden anderen Pilger sprachen ihre Verwunderung
darüber aus, daß es mir gelungen war, in kurzer Zeit einen so
ansehnlichen Haufen zusammenzubringen.
Jetzt hieß es nicht mehr „Eure Exzellenz“, denn ich hatte
Schagdur und dem Lama strengstens verboten, mir die geringste
Spur von Ehrerbietung zu erweisen. Sie sollten mich im Gegenteil
wie einen Stallknecht behandeln. Schagdur sollte als der
Vornehmste von uns angesehen werden und hatte auf den
Lagerplätzen seine Befehle zu erteilen. Ebenso streng war es
verboten, russisch zu sprechen; von nun an durfte nur noch
Mongolisch über unsere Lippen kommen. Schagdur spielte seine
Rolle ausgezeichnet, und dasselbe dürfte ich auch von mir sagen
können. Anfangs wurde es meinem Kosaken schwer, mich zu
kommandieren, nach ein paar Tagen ging es aber ausgezeichnet!
Der Lama brauchte nicht als Schauspieler aufzutreten; er war,
der er war, und so sollte es sein. Am schlimmsten war es für mich,
der ich in zwei Rollen zugleich auftreten mußte, als Mongole und als
Handlanger. Nachdem ich jedoch mit dem Dungsammeln zur
Zufriedenheit meiner Herren fertig geworden war, aß ich zu Mittag,
trank Tee, rauchte eine Pfeife, ging ins Zelt, legte mich nieder und
schlief wie ein Stock bis 8 Uhr. Ich war da allein, die anderen trieben
die Tiere zur Nacht ein. Noch eine Stunde durften diese in unserer
unmittelbaren Nachbarschaft grasen. Schagdur und der Lama waren
an diesem Abend weniger heiter als sonst. Sie hatten, während ich
schlief, drei Tibeter zu Pferde gesehen, die von einem Passe im
Osten kamen und nach Nordwesten ritten, wobei sie unserem Lager
die Flanke zukehrten, so daß man nur ein paarmal hatte sehen
können, daß es ihrer drei waren. An einem Punkte hatten sie
gehalten, wie um sich zu beraten, worauf sie sich dem Lager
genähert hatten, dann aber waren sie hinter einem Hügel
verschwunden, um sich nicht wieder zu zeigen. Sie erwarteten wohl
die Nacht, und ihr Benehmen kam uns höchst verdächtig vor. Es war
uns jetzt klar, daß wir von Spionen und reitenden Späherpatrouillen
umgeben waren; ob uns diese Reiter aus eigenem Antrieb oder auf
Befehl beobachteten, konnten wir natürlich nicht wissen.
Um 8½ Uhr wurden die Tiere an ein längs der Erde zwischen
zwei Pflöcken straffgespanntes Seil gebunden, und jetzt und in
Zukunft folgender Lagerplan beobachtet. Der eine Eingang des
prismatischen Zeltes war vom Winde abgekehrt und stand weit
offen; unmittelbar davor waren die Tiere angebunden. Nächtliche
Besuche kommen, aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach gegen den Wind,
besonders da, wo sie Hunde vorfinden.
Sobald es dunkelte, ließen wir das Feuer ausgehen und trugen
die draußen noch umherliegenden Sachen, wie Kisten,
Küchengeräte und Sättel, in das Zelt. Der große, schwarze Jollbars
wurde vor den Pferden und Mauleseln angebunden. Von ihm konnte
man das erste Warnungssignal erwarten. Malenki, ein bissiger,
schwarz und weiß gefleckter Karawanenhund, war auf der Windseite
hinter dem geschlossenen schmalen Ende des Zeltes angebunden.
Die Nacht wurde in drei Wachen, 9–12, 12–3 und 3–6 Uhr geteilt;
gewöhnlich übernahm ich die erste, der Lama die letzte.
Jetzt hatte ich meine erste Nachtwache. Es war keine Kunst
wach zu bleiben, denn teils hatte ich schon, während es noch hell
war, ausgeschlafen, teils konnte man sich jeden Augenblick auf
einen Überfall gefaßt machen. Schon vor 9 Uhr schliefen meine von
den Anstrengungen der vorigen Nacht ermüdeten Kameraden und
schnarchten laut.
Ich begann meinen Wachdienst, bald dicht bei dem Zelte, bald
weit von ihm entfernt umherschlendernd. O diese finsteren Nächte,
diese endlosen Stunden! Nie werde ich meine müden Schritte
zwischen Malenki und Jollbars hin und zurück bis ins Unendliche
vergessen! Die Minuten vergingen so langsam! Ich zählte zehn,
zwanzig solche Promenaden, aber nur einige Minuten, höchstens
eine Viertelstunde hatten sie in Anspruch genommen. Ich spielte mit
Jollbars, der vor Freude heulte, wenn ich ihn besuchte, ich klopfte
den Pferden und den Mauleseln den Rücken und ging dann weiter,
um Malenki, der ganz allein hinter dem Zelte lag, zu streicheln.
Der Morgen war warm gewesen, und von Zeit zu Zeit hatte es
tüchtig geregnet, der Abend aber war einigermaßen klar. Um 9½ Uhr
brach ein Höllenwetter los. Der Himmel überzog sich mit
rabenschwarzen Wolken, die von innen heraus durch zuckende
Blitze erhellt wurden, und der Donner rollte mit infernalischer Kraft
ringsumher in den Bergen und über unserem einsamen Lager.
Das Allerschlimmste aber war der Regen, der die Erde peitschte
und wolkenbruchartig herniederströmte. Nie ist mir ein so
entsetzlicher Regen vorgekommen. Er schmetterte und prasselte auf
das Zelt, das einzufallen drohte und durch dessen Tuch ein feiner
Staubregen in das Innere sprühte und sich dabei verteilte wie die
Dusche einer Spritzflasche Eau de Cologne. Alles wurde durchnäßt,
aber die Schlafenden kümmerten sich nicht um den Regen, sondern
krochen nur tiefer unter ihre Pelze und fuhren fort Bretter zu sägen.
Die Regentropfen trommelten lustig auf die mongolische Kasserolle
und ihren Deckel, die wir beim Feuer hatten stehenlassen. Ich setze
den schlüpfrigen Spaziergang zwischen den Hunden noch eine
Weile fort, suche dann aber, naß wie eine ersäufte Katze, in der
Zelttür Schutz. Von dem Mondschein hatte ich keinen Nutzen, denn
die Wolken waren trostlos kompakt, und es sah aus, als wollte der
Regen überhaupt nicht aufhören. Ganz undurchdringlich bleibt
jedoch das Dunkel nicht; der Mond liefert wenigstens eine sehr
schwache, diffuse Helle, in der sich die Umrisse der Karawanentiere
ein wenig schwärzer als die Nacht um sie her abzeichnen, so daß
ich von Zeit zu Zeit ihre Rücken zählen kann.
Ich zünde eine Pfeife und einen Lichtstumpf an, den ich in eine
kleine Holzschachtel stelle; bei seinem Schein schreibe ich meine
nächtlichen Betrachtungen nieder. Immer nur einen Satz, dann
wieder eine Runde um das Lager. Es trieft mir von den Ärmeln, und
die Mütze sitzt wie festgekleistert auf meinem kahlen Schädel. Nach
den Abspülungen erinnerte mein geschminktes Antlitz sehr an das
Fell eines Zebras. Die Temperatur sank nicht unter +4°, und von
Kälte war daher keine Rede.
 Der Regen strömt ohne Unterbrechung nieder, und sein
eintöniges Plätschern übertönt alle anderen Geräusche. Doch was
war das? Ein klagender Ton in der Ferne! Sollten die Tibeter gerade
so ein Hyänenkonzert anstimmen wie 1896 die Tanguten bei
Karascharuin-kubb? Nein, bewahre, es war Jollbars, der vor Ärger
heulte, weil er draußen liegen und sich vollregnen lassen mußte.
Und was war dies wieder für ein Lärm? Nur ein entfernter
Donnerschlag. Der Donner und der Regen täuschen mich
unaufhörlich. Ich eile mit dem Revolver unter dem Mantel ins Freie,
stehe und warte dort eine Weile in der Nässe, horche angestrengt
nach allen Seiten, da aber „im Schipkapasse alles ruhig“ ist, kehre
ich zu meinem Lichtstumpfe zurück; die Pfeife will nicht mehr
brennen, alles ist naß.
Die Stunden vergehen immer langsamer, und der Regen läßt
nicht nach. „Das wird morgen ein schöner Ritt werden!“ dachte ich.
Das einförmige Atmen der halbschlafenden Maulesel wirkt
einschläfernd, und die Lider fangen an mir schwer zu werden. Es
passierte mir aber nie, daß ich auch nur fünf Minuten
einschlummerte. Sollten wir noch einmal überlistet werden, so sollte
es wenigstens nicht während meiner Wache geschehen; ich hätte
mich vor meinen Kameraden wie ein Hund geschämt und mich
selbst verachtet.
Dann und wann schlagen die Tiere mit den Schwänzen, wenn
der Regen ihre Seiten kitzelt. Die Hunde knurren bisweilen dumpf,
und ich mache dann sofort die Runde um das Lager. Um 11½ Uhr
streifte ich in der Dunkelheit umher, fest entschlossen, nicht eher ins
Zelt zurückzukehren, als bis die Mitternachtsstunde geschlagen
hätte und damit die Stunde meiner Befreiung gekommen wäre.
Es war denn auch 12 Uhr vorbei, als ich mich wieder bei meinem
Lichtstumpfe niederließ. Jetzt rieselte es vom Pelze herunter, und
die Stiefeln waren klatschnaß. Schagdur schlief so fest, daß es mir
widerstrebte, ihn zu wecken, und ich hatte mich selbst überredet,
seine Wache um eine halbe Stunde abzukürzen, als beide Hunde
auf einmal wütend zu bellen begannen. Der Lama erwachte und eilte
mit seiner Flinte hinaus, ich folgte ihm mit dem Revolver, das Licht
wurde ausgelöscht, und wir schlichen uns gegen den Wind nach der
verdächtigen Stelle hin. Dort hörte man deutlich Pferdegetrappel,
und in einer anderen Richtung glaubte der Lama Hundegebell zu
vernehmen. Er wollte schießen, aber ich wollte unter keinen
Umständen derjenige sein, der anfing; gefiel es den Tibetern, uns
den Krieg zu erklären, dann sollte ihnen freilich mit gleicher Münze
heimgezahlt werden!
Daß sich einige hundert Meter von uns Reiter aufhielten, unterlag
keinem Zweifel. Ich ließ den Lama beim Zelte bleiben, weckte
Schagdur und ging mit ihm leise und vorsichtig in der Windrichtung,
dann und wann lauschend. Da hörten wir, wie sich das
Pferdegetrappel hastig entfernte; darauf wurde alles ruhig, und die
Hunde stellten ihr Gebell allmählich ein.
Jetzt war die Reihe an Schagdur. Ich hörte seine Schritte
draußen in dem Schmutz, als ich unter meinen feuchten Pelz kroch.
Solche Nächte bringen mehr Spannung als Ruhe und sind mehr
interessant als gemütlich. Aber man gewöhnt sich wohl daran,
dachte ich, und nach einer Weile schlief ich gut und fest.
Schon um 5 Uhr weckte uns der Lama, der die letzte Wache
hatte und es wohl für besser hielt, weiterzureiten als in den Tag
hineinzustarren. Behaglich und vergnügt ist einem nach einer
solchen Nacht gerade nicht zumute, nein, ungemütlich, steif, naß
und frostig! Alles riecht schlecht und sauer; aber das gehört natürlich
zur Sache und trägt dazu bei, den Eindruck der Echtheit zu erhöhen.
Von wohlriechenden Lhasapilgern hat man noch nie reden hören!
Und was mich betrifft, so fand ich, daß das Ganze sich gut anließ.
Unter Verhältnissen wie den unsrigen wird die Stimmung
außerordentlich von der Sonne beeinflußt. Man sehnt sich danach,
sich umsehen zu können; die Nacht mit ihren heimtückischen
Schatten ist auch dem unangenehm, der sich im Dunkeln nicht
fürchtet.
Meine Muselmänner hatten mich entschieden für
unzurechnungsfähig gehalten, als ich auf dieses wahnsinnige
Unternehmen auszog. Es war in der Tat wahnsinnig, das läßt sich
nicht leugnen, so viel zu wagen, ja das Leben zu riskieren, nur aus
Lust, Lhasa zu sehen, das in seiner Topographie und seinem
Aussehen durch Beschreibungen, Karten und Photographien von
Punditen und Burjaten weit besser bekannt ist als die meisten Städte
des innersten Asien. Doch ich muß ehrlich gestehen, daß ich mich
nach den zwei Jahren ruhiger, friedvoller Wanderungen durch
unbewohnte Teile des Kontinents und nach all meiner strebsamen
Arbeit nun einmal nach einem wirklich haarsträubenden Abenteuer
sehnte. Ich fühlte das unwiderstehliche Bedürfnis, meine Person in
eine Lage zu bringen, in der das Leben auf dem Spiele stand, eine
Situation, die Geschicklichkeit und Umsicht erforderte, wenn sie
nicht zu einer Niederlage werden sollte, und in die wir uns so tief
verwickeln würden, daß es noch schwerer wäre, sich mit heiler Haut
wieder herauszuwickeln. Tatsächlich sehnte ich mich mehr nach
dem Abenteuer als gerade nach Lhasa. Der Lama hatte mir die
Stadt so gründlich beschrieben, daß ich sie schon satt bekommen
hatte. Ich wollte die Tibeter sehen, mit ihnen reden und ausfindig
machen, weshalb sie die Europäer so verabscheuen. Ein
unkritischer junger Mann hat vor einigen Jahren erzählt, daß er in
Tibet gefoltert worden sei, aber seine haarsträubenden
Beschreibungen schreckten mich nicht ab — aus dem einfachen
Grunde, weil ich ihnen keinen Glauben schenke. Es wäre wirklich ein
großer Gewinn für die Menschheit, wenn Personen, denen es
schwer wird, bei der Wahrheit zu bleiben, das Bücherschreiben
bleiben lassen wollten!
 Fünfzehntes Kapitel.
Die ersten Nomaden.

D er Appetit ist so früh am Morgen schlecht. Das Frühstück

besteht nur aus Brot und Tee (Abb. 248); doch sobald die Pfeife
angezündet ist und man im Sattel sitzt, geht der Tag seinen ebenen
Gang, obwohl das Zeichnen der Marschroute die Geduld auf die
Probe stellt, wenn man ein Pferd hat, das sich wie eine alte
abgenutzte Dreschmaschine bewegt.
Der Tag war ebenso trübe und düster wie die Nacht. Die Sonne
läßt sich überhaupt nicht blicken; schwere, schwarze Wolken
hängen überall, Vorhängen vergleichbar, und sie sehen so schwer
aus, daß man meint, sie müßten herunterfallen und zerreißen.
Der Lama glaubte am Morgen, im Südwesten ein schwarzes Zelt
zu sehen, und stimmte dafür, daß wir dorthin reiten und
Erkundigungen einziehen sollten; ich zog es jedoch vor, geraden
Weges auf den nächsten Paß in den südlichen Bergen, die jetzt von
Hagel und Schnee kreideweiß waren, loszugehen.
Sobald wir in das Tal, in welchem ein Bach strömte, eintraten,
nahm die Steigung zu und wurde bald steil. Wir verließen das Tal
und ritten über Hügel von rotem, pulverisiertem Sandstein im
Zickzack zum Passe hinauf. Von dort kamen wir einen steilen
Abhang hinunter in ein ziemlich breites, südostwärts führendes Tal.
In einer Talweitung lag der Kadaver eines Schafes mit seiner
Last, die aus Salz in einem zweiteiligen Beutel bestand.
Wahrscheinlich hatte eine tibetische Schafkarawane unsere kleinen