T.C.

MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ

SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSİTÜSÜ

SİYASET BİLİMİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI

ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER (İNGİLİZCE) BİLİM DALI

ASSESSING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE POLICY OF TURKEY AS A RISING

POWER: MOTIVATIONS, STRATEGIES, INSTRUMENTS

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

ŞÜKRÜ AYDIN

İstanbul, 2017
 T.C.

MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ

SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSİTÜSÜ

SİYASET BİLİMİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI

ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER (İNGİLİZCE) BİLİM DALI

ASSESSING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE POLICY OF TURKEY AS A RISING

POWER: MOTIVATIONS, STRATEGIES, INSTRUMENTS

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

ŞÜKRÜ AYDIN

Danışman: Doç. Dr. EMEL PARLAR DAL

İstanbul, 2017
TEZ ONAY BELGESI

I
 DECLARATION

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and
presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as
required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and
results that are not original to this work.

Name, Surname: Şükrü AYDIN

Signature:

II
 ABSTRACT

Title: Assessing Global Governance Policy of Turkey as a Rising Power: Motivations,

Strategies, Instruments

By: Şükrü Aydın

This work aims to understand the shifts in Turkey’s understanding of global

governance in recent years with a particular focus on its motivations, strategies, and
instruments. In doing so, it will first look at how and under which conditions Turkey’s
current perception of global governance has developed. It then seeks to analyze Turkey’s
changing objectives with regard to global governance and its existing inequalities.
Turkey’s rising interest in taking active part in new groupings such as G-20 and in
developing close relations with BRICS and MIKTA countries needs to be assessed
together with its new global governance activism and its more diversified strategies. In
the final analysis, this study will explore the instruments Turkey has been using in
exerting its rising power in global sphere and the domestic and regional challenges it has
faced in recent years which are apt to negatively influence its rising power status in the
current global governance structure.

Key Words: Turkey, Global Governance, Rising Power, Emerging Power, Middle-range
Power, Turkish Foreign Policy

III
 ÖZET

Başlık: Yükselen Bir Güç Olarak Türkiye’nin Küresel Yönetişim Politikasının

İncelenmesi: Motivasyonlar, Stratejiler, Araçlar

Yazar: Şükrü Aydın

Bu çalışmanın amacı özellikle motivasyonlar, stratejiler ve araçlara odaklanarak

Türkiye’nin son yıllarda küresel yönetişim algılamasındaki değişimin incelenmesidir. Bu
çerçevede, öncelikle nasıl ve hangi koşullar altında Türkiye’nin güncel küresel yönetişim
algılaması gelişim gösterdi konusuna değinilecektir. Sonrasında, küresel yönetişim ve var
olan eşitsizlikler yönünden Türkiye’nin değişen amaçları analiz edilecektir. Türkiye’nin
G-20 gibi yeni gruplar içerisinde artan ilgisi ve aktif rolü ve MIKTA ve BRICS
ülkeleriyle gelişen yakın ilişkileri, yeni küresel yönetişim aktivizmi ve çeşitlenen
stratejileri ile birlikte değerlendirilecektir. Son olarak, bu çalışma Türkiye’nin yükselen
gücünü, geçtiğimiz yıllarda, küresel alanda, mevcut küresel yönetişim yapısında yükselen
güç statüsünü olumsuz etkileyen, yurtiçi ve bölgesel zorlukların üstesinden gelmek için
kullandığı araçları incelemiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Küresel Yönetişim, Yükselen Güç, Orta-ölçekli Güç, Türk
Dış Politikası

IV
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First, I am deeply grateful to my thesis supervisor Assoc. Prof. Emel PARLAR
DAL whose support I always feel since the beginning of my thesis process. I have been
able to complete this process with her guidance, patience, and confidence in me. I am so
grateful to become her student since my bachelor. I am so thankful her countless hours of
reading, encouraging, and most of all patience throughout the entire process. This study
would not have been possible without her support.

Besides my advisor, I would like to thank the rest of my thesis committee: Assist.
Prof. Gonca OĞUZ GÖK and Assist. Prof. Muzaffer ŞENEL for their encouragements
and insightful comments. I am thankful for their contributions to my thesis and for acting
as jury members for my thesis defense.

I am deeply grateful to Assist. Prof. Selma ŞEKERCİOĞLU and Assist. Prof.

Muzaffer ŞENEL for their encouraging me throughout the entire process. I would also
like to thank Prof. Esra HATİPOĞLU, Prof. Beril DEDEOĞLU, Prof. Burak Samih
Gülboy, Assist. Prof. Pelin SÖNMEZ, Assist. Prof. Şükrü YAZĞAN, Selim Han
YENİACUN, Ali Murat KURŞUN, Ferit BELDER, Bahadır SİNANOĞLU and Yunus
YÜNGÜL for their priceless help during the writing this thesis. Besides that, I would also
like to thank Centre for Islamic Studies Library (ISAM) and the librarians for helping
young academicians like me during their studies.

Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to my parents and my brothers whose

unconditional love and understanding always give me strength. They have always been
supported me since my bachelor years. I am grateful for everything they have done for
me in my life. They always believed in me in all the process of my life.

Lastly, I offer my regards and blessings to all of those who supported me in any
respect during the completion of the thesis.

ŞÜKRÜ AYDIN

V
 TABLE OF CONTENT
TEZ ONAY BELGESI ...................................................................................................... I

DECLARATION ..............................................................................................................II

ABSTRACT.................................................................................................................... III

ÖZET .............................................................................................................................. IV

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................. V

TABLE OF CONTENT .................................................................................................. VI

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES ........................................................................... VIII

ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................ IX

1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 1

A. Statement of the Problem ...................................................................................... 1

B. Research Aims and Questions ............................................................................ 11

C. Significance of Study .......................................................................................... 12

D. Scope, Timeframe and Methodology.................................................................. 13

E. Structure of the Thesis ........................................................................................ 14

2. CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ..................................... 16

A. Global Governance ............................................................................................. 16

I. Emergence of Global Governance Concept and Literature Review ................ 19

II. Conceptualization of Global Governance .................................................... 22

B. Rising Power ....................................................................................................... 32

I. Emergence of Rising Power Concept and Literature Review .......................... 32

II. Conceptualization of Rising Power or Middle Range Power ....................... 35

VI
3. ANALYZES OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE SYSTEM ............................................................................................ 47

A. Historical Background of Turkish Foreign Policy .............................................. 49

I. General Shaping Factors of Turkish Foreign Policy ........................................ 49

II. Turkish Foreign Policy until the 2000s ........................................................ 55

a. Inter-war Period ........................................................................................ 55

b. Cold War Period ....................................................................................... 65

c. Post-Cold War Period ............................................................................... 81

B. Turkish Foreign Policy in the Last Decade ........................................................ 89

I. Turkish Foreign Policy Under the Rule of AKP .............................................. 89

II. Changing Dynamics in the Period of AKP ................................................... 96

4. ASSESSING TURKEY’S RISING POWER STATUS IN GLOBAL

GOVERNANCE ........................................................................................................... 102

A. Turkey’s Position in Global Governance.......................................................... 102

I. Motivations of Turkey as a Rising Power in Global Governance ................. 103

II. Strategies of Turkey as a Rising Power in Global Governance ................. 111

III. Instruments of Turkey as a Rising Power in Global Governance .............. 119

B. Evaluation ......................................................................................................... 129

5. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 135

BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................... 139

VII
 LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Tables

Table 1: Group of States in World Politics ..................................................................... 42

Table 2: Comparison of Material Power......................................................................... 44
Table 3: Important Periods and Features of Second World War .................................... 64
Table 4: Aegean Sea Issues between Turkey and Greece .............................................. 73
Table 5: Post-1980 Turkish Governments ...................................................................... 84
Table 6: “Official Development Assistance” and “Official Emergency and Humanitarian
Aid” of Turkey .............................................................................................................. 126
Table 7: Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-2007 Era: Elements of Continuity and
Rupture.......................................................................................................................... 130
Table 8: Turkish Foreign Policy in the Davutoğlu and Post-Davutoğlu Era ................ 133

Figures

Figure 1: Usage of Concept of Global Governance in the Literature ............................. 25

Figure 2: Usage of Concepts of 'Rising Power', 'Emerging Power' and 'Middle Power' in
the Literature ................................................................................................................... 36

VIII
 ABBREVIATIONS
AKP: Justice and Development Party

ASEAN: Association of South-East Asian Nations

AU: African Union

BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa

CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy

CSOs: Civil Society Organizations

EC: European Community

EEC: European Economic Community

ESDP: European Defense and Security Policy

EU: European Union

FETO: Fetullah Terrorist Organization

G7: Group of Seven

G8: Group of Eight

G20: Group of Twenty

GATT: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

IMF: International Monetary Fund

INGOs: International Organizations

IR: International Relations

IX
ISIS: Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

MENA: Middle East and North Africa

MIKTA: Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, Australia

MIST: Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey

MÜSİAD: Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGOs: Non-Governmental Organizations

NSAs: Non-State Actors

OECD: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

PKK: Kurdish Workers Party

PLO: Palestine Liberation Organization

RP: Welfare Party

TEU: Treaty of the European Union

TİKA: Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency

TİM: Turkish Exporters Assembly

TÜSİAD: Turkish Industry and Business Association

UK: United Kingdom

UN: United Nations

UNSC: United Nations Security Council

USA: United States of America

X
USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WB: World Bank

WEU: Western European Union

WTO: World Trade Organization

WWI: World War I

WWII: World War II

XI
 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
A. Statement of the Problem
Compared to other social sciences, the discipline of international relations is
considered as a relatively new area of study. However, in this new area of study,
globalization is not considered as a recent phenomenon. According to some scholars,
particularly in the area of economic globalization or international political economy, the
concept of globalization dated back to the late 19th century, from this point of view they
argue that today’s globalization is more and more deepening or intensifying of
internationalism without significant change since the late 19th century.1 However,
according to David Held and Anthony McGrew, the dramatic changes regarding the
political life particularly in terms of nation-state occurred after 1945.2 Depending on the
globalization, theories of international relations also transformed. However, eventually,
when all the theories remain incapable of explaining the globalized world order, the idea
of governance and global governance emerged. Even though the anarchical world order
in a minimum level still remains in the current world politics, states came together, in a
way unprecedented in the history, for cooperation, security alliances, economic or
environmental common problems, etc. and this situation necessitates to the theoretical
explanation of this new world order. Contemporary global world order is mostly
explained in the context of the concept of global governance. Although, the length of
global governance is still debatable because of the sovereignty of nation-states’ pivotal
role in the international relations, the impact of global governance increases more and
more in every aspect of global politics. Mainly, global governance does not mean to world
government, moreover, it is a much more complex structure, basically, it can be
understood as a collective effort of nation-states, international organizations and non-
governmental actors to deal with the crisis, global threats and challenges, common
problems and so on.

1
Paul Hirst, Grahame Thompson, and Simon Bromley, Globalization in Question, 3rd ed. (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 2009). p. 255-256.
2
Patrick Hayden and Chamsy el-Ojeili, Critical Theories of Globalization (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2006). p.89-91.
 The development of global governance can be clearly seen in the historical
progress of Turkish foreign policy. Since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, the
ruling elites tried to integrate with the world politics gradually, although, the level of
integration decreased time to time.3 Integration with world politics is realized mostly with
the western countries, in the sense of westernization idea.4 Multilateralism in Turkish
foreign policy began with the being a party to Briand-Kellogg Pact in 1929 and
accelerated with the membership of League of Nations in 1932. Just after the end of the
Second World War, the integration escalated quickly with the Turkey’s founder
membership position in United Nations in 1945 and becoming a member of North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952. Furthermore, in spite of Turkey’s
application to European Union (in that time European Economic Community) dated back
in the late 1950s, the membership process still going on and its currently considered as a
deadlock. Besides that, Turkey began to integrate with the Middle Eastern countries in
the first half of the 1980s and during the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been
becoming more visible in the regional organization. Finally, when Turkey’s non-
permanent membership to United Nations Security Council (UNSC) between 2009-2010,
G20 presidency in 2015, Organization of Islamic Community (OIC) Secretary General
between 2005 - 2013 considered in the evaluation, it can be said that, the integration of
Turkey in the global governance escalated more and more in the last decades.

As mentioned above, Turkey has been becoming more visible in regional and
international organizations particularly in the last decade. So, this situation necessitates
investigating AKP policies in the context of Turkey’s rising power position in the global
governance. With the beginning of AKP’s rule, internal and external policies began to
change both as a theoretical and practical way. This was occurred mostly because of the
drastic acceleration in changing motivations, strategies and instruments in the Turkish
foreign policy with regards to the Turkey’s soft power, culture export, public diplomacy,
mediator role, economic and humanitarian aids and so on. AKP’s gradual escalation
found a regional role with the economic and political engagement particularly in the

3
Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach (New York
& London: Routledge, 2003). p. 57-59, 79-81.
4
Ibid. p.4-7.

2
Middle East region, regards to an alternative model of Islam and democracy with the
synthesis of soft power.5

The notion of “rising powers”, “emerging powers” or “middle powers” in the

beginning mostly used for economic sense and described the “emerging markets.”6
However, eventually, they began to be seen as a challenger against the superpowers
(actually against the USA hegemony) in the global world politics with attempting to use
bloc-type coalitions against the major powers.7 Although, Turkey still did not state on the
acronym of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) because of inadequate
political and economic level compared to them, Turkey’s diplomacy efforts, bridging role
between West and East, and also Islamic democracy experience led to its salience and
could not ignore.8 Besides that, Turkey together with Brazil, India, and Indonesia
considered as a “global swing state”9 which share similar position internationally in terms
of growing economies, strategic location in their regions, ruling by democratic
governments and neither fully integrated to current world order, denying it nor offering
alternative order.10

Since, in this work, Turkey’s rising power position will be analyzed in the global
governance with reference to Turkey’s changing motivations, strategies and instruments
which are using in the conduct of Turkish foreign policy particularly since 2002,

5
Kevin Gray and Craig N. Murphy, “Introduction: Rising Powers and the Future of Global Governance,”
Third World Quarterly 34, no. 2 (March 1, 2013): 183–93, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.775778.
p.189-190.
6
Miles Kahler, “Rising Powers and Global Governance: Negotiating Change in a Resilient Status Quo,”
International Affairs 89, no. 3 (May 1, 2013): 711–29, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12041. p.711.
7
Amrita Narlikar, “Introduction: Negotiating the Rise of New Powers,” International Affairs 89, no. 3
(May 1, 2013): 561–76, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12033. p.567.
8
Tom Farer, “Introduction,” Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International
Organizations 17, no. 3 (July 1, 2011): 281–84, https://doi.org/10.5555/1075-2846-17.3.281. p.283.
9
The term of “swing state” originates in U.S. domestic politics which refers to important states to clue
about the presidential elections. Although these, states have not major influence in terms of population and
economic, their mixed political orientation gives them greater impact. For more information, please look
at: Daniel Kliman and Richard Fontaine, “Global Swing States: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Turkey, and the
Future of International Order,” Policy Paper (The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF),
November 27, 2012), http://www.gmfus.org/publications/global-swing-states-brazil-india-indonesia-
turkey-and-future-international-order.
10
Daniel Kliman and Richard Fontaine, “Turkey: A Global Swing State,” Analysis (The German Marshall
Fund of the United States (GMF), April 13, 2013), http://www.gmfus.org/publications/turkey-global-
swing-state.

3
therefore, as an introduction to this thesis, theoretical explanation of formulation of
foreign policy would be better for the further understanding of following sections.

Foreign policy means, since a policy refers a commitment or an action, it is same

with the elements of certain actors and issues holding a position within the state
boundaries and interstate issues.11 Here, obviously, the state is very much in the center of
conceptualization in the foreign policy definition even in contemporary globalized world
politics. On the other hand, foreign policy is highly related to the commitment of internal
and external actions.12 What it means that disturbances can be created by the action of the
state but also due to the transformation of structure in the international system. For
example, when the Soviet Union dissolved, besides the end of the Cold War, it also led
to the emergence of new conditions which were not initial targets during the Cold War
because of the complex interaction of states in the external space. Here, it is essential to
acknowledge that there is a transformation process from social values to the national
interest. Foreign policy making is a kind of triangle started with social values, its
transformation into national interest consequently goals and objectives.13

Foreign policy-making answers the question of how states are responsible for their
policies and how they formulate general principles; because as mentioned before foreign
policy is an action or a commitment serving as a kind of principle. It is important here to
acknowledge that social values and foreign policy are interrelated. “In the contemporary
world, many social aspirations require governmental action to attain even partial
fulfillment, and individuals have come to expect political leaders to act on their behalf.”14
In this regard, there are five dimensions of the set of social values. These are mainly
composed of (i) good of individual citizens (ii) the good of special interest, (iii) good of
society at large, (iv) good of government/administration, (v) good of state (as a political
entity among other states).15 Even, a foreign policy decision makers may have to use

11
K. J. Holsti, International Politics, A Framework for Analysis, 2nd ed. (London: Prentice Hall, 1974).
p.21.
12
Chris Brown and Kirsten Ainley, Understanding International Relations, 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2005). p.69-71.
13
Abdul Aziz Said, Charles O. Lerche, Jr., and Charles O. Lerche III, Concepts of International Politics in
Global Perspective, 4th ed. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1995). p.23.
14
Ibid. p.22.
15
Ibid. p.24-26.

4
different rationalities for different policies since any issue have their own history.
Policymakers must translate those values into objectives before the action. That is why
value synthesis should be transformed because it is composed of state’s set of social
values and this is not constant, rather changeable due to the definition of interest.
Motivations are mostly related to the set of social values because they should be depended
on the features of the set of social values which were mentioned above.

National interest is a general long-term and continuing purpose that the state, the
nation, and the regime would all ideally see themselves as serving at any given time.16 It
includes social consciousness and cultural identity of a people and all elements of public
good. Consequently, national interest necessarily reflects their assessment of the public
good and of the state’s material circumstances: its size, population, wealth, internal
division, geography, major economic activities and so on. 17 There are two features of
national interest. Firstly, it gives a general orientation towards international political
environment to the foreign policy. Secondly and more importantly it serves as a basis for
choosing among alternative actions when the state is faced with a situation demanding an
immediate response.18 In foreign policy, decision-makers should reconcile ends and
means because the effective policy requires whatever means available and with a set of
desirable ends. That is why goals are created by national interest in a foreign policy.
Shortly, national interests are translations of the social values.

Goals are operational for a foreseeable future. As long as the situation remains
fairly constant, the goal will remain relevant.19 Moreover, any drastic change may require
selection of a new goal which is more in harmony with the nature of the problem. To
realize the goal, objectives are required. Those are short-term or intermediate and
attainable at the moment of decision. The relation between ends and means represent the
characteristics of ends and means. In order to create an effective policy, firstly decision
makers should formulate an objective in most precise terms possible. Secondly, the nature

16
İlhan Uzgel, Ulusal Çıkar ve Dış Politika: Türk Dış Politikasının Belirlenmesinde Ulusal Çıkarın Rolü,
1983-1991, 1st ed. (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2004). p.53-55.
17
Faruk Sönmezoğlu, Uluslararası Politika ve Dış Politika Analizi (İstanbul: Filiz Kitabevi, 2005). p.255-
257.
18
Said, O. Lerche, Jr., and O. Lerche III, Concepts of International Politics in Global Perspective. p.28.
19
Ibid. p.29.

5
of the action is to be undertaken. Thirdly, forms and amounts of national resources should
be applied, in the context of state’s priorities. Priority ranking of goals and objectives is
crucial. If the state does not set priority and create a policy, unavoidably it faces with
some consequences. As the last point, decision makers should make compromises over
desirable and possible ends.20

There are some tools in the process of foreign policy making in order to
conceptualize the situation, which are mainly four distinctive techniques as political,
economic, psychological and military ones.21 These are the techniques which are using
as an instrument or tool in the process of conducting foreign policy.

In one sense, all foreign policy techniques are or ought to be political. Foreign
policy orientations and goals are always political in that they seek the maximization of
national values. These techniques are also called as diplomatic techniques because
besides being a technique in its own right it is also an instrument in the utilization of other
techniques. So, it may implement economic, psychological or even military action by
diplomatic maneuvering. Political techniques also called as mixed diplomacy. So, it can
be served as different means such as threats. It means that diplomacy may serve as an
instrument of coercion or it can be used by exerting pressure. Breaking diplomatic
relations or expelling a state from one international organization may be done for that
coercive policy in order to make other states accept what it wants. Diplomacy is also a
technique of persuasion. It is advancing arguments and suggesting mutual concessions as
persuasive devices in order to influence some part of practices of that states foreign
policy. Diplomacy is also a procedure of adjustment. This understanding is well suited to
the task of enabling two states to modify their positions on an issue in order to reach a
stable relationship. Tensions are generally decreased and problems solved through the
diplomatic means. Lastly, diplomacy is also a technique for reaching an agreement.
Diplomacy is an art of negotiation and through this art, states can solve their problems in
an effective way.22

20
Sönmezoğlu, Uluslararası Politika ve Dış Politika Analizi. p.248-252.
21
Said, O. Lerche, Jr., and O. Lerche III, Concepts of International Politics in Global Perspective. p.62-
83.
22
Ibid. p.68-72.

6
 Secondly, after implementation of political techniques generally economical
techniques are applying. Firstly, economical techniques are indirect in their application
in contrast to the directions of diplomacy. Their immediate target is not the decision
makers of other states but states’ societies. Therefore, it generally pressures regimes in
power rather than the state itself. It both urges and coerces to accede the wishes of the
first state. Secondly, it consists of two main categories. It can be both persuasive and
coercive. Thirdly, it evolves directly out of a particular foreign policy situation because
it related with economic relations between states involved. Fourthly, economic techniques
tend to produce resentment, resistance, and retaliation by target states. The fifth one; it
has a limited range of effectiveness. Mainly economic techniques composed of persuasive
and coercive means as mentioned. In persuasive means, foreign aid, assistance, and trade
policy or investments can be counted. In coercive means, restriction of trade, interruption,
cancellation of investment or boycott can be considered.23 In the last decade of Turkish
foreign policy, persuasive means of economic techniques have been used extensively to
increase the Turkey’s position particularly towards the Middle East and North African
countries.

In the third level, there are psychological techniques. In this level, the propaganda
and subversion considered as the two significant foreign policy tools of psychological
technique. Propaganda means that in order to influence the other states, making the
propaganda over some debatable issues such as human rights, promoting democracy and
so on. Subversion is another mean to attempt of a state to overthrow or weaken by another
state according to several means. It is a quite old technique but still used with greater
frequency and intensity in the contemporary era. Subversion generally understands as the
complete overthrow of the government and replacement of it by the revolutionary group.
However, currently, organized subversion can deepen divisions within a society to the
extent that the governments’ integrity is compromised, its vitality weakened and the
course of its foreign policy altered in favor of the intervening state.24 When looking at the
discourse of the government, it cannot really distinguish between the political, economic

23
A. Cooper Drury, Economic Sanctions and Presidential Decisions: Models of Political Rationality, 1st
ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). p.8-32.
24
Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen Jr., Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010). p.97-104.

7
and psychological techniques since the political pressure was mainly designed in line with
the psychological technique.

Lastly, the military techniques mostly associated with the term of conflict or war
in the international relations which refers to armed conflict. Conflict itself is even present
in the international system the condition against which bargaining takes place. In conflict
bargaining, states develop capabilities that give them leverage to obtain more favorable
outcomes than they otherwise would not achieve. Whether fair or unfair, the ultimate
outcome of the bargaining process is a settlement of the particular conflict. This technique
considered as more costly and dangerous compared to the previous techniques.25

When analyzing decision-making process of the foreign policy, the capability is

another crucial factor. Capability is important for foreign policy-making in terms of
capacity to affect changes in the external policy space in its own interests. In other words,
it is having the ability for altering international environment in the desired direction. It
can be done both by persuading with mutual interest based relationships or by a coercive
capability such as overcoming resistance with the army and so on. In this point, it has to
said that any kind of state while formulating its own foreign policy has to be aware of
both its own capability and also other states capability which considered as the capability
judgment.26 The effective power can be considered in two different form. Firstly, the
tangible form of power refers the elements of power which can completely see, easily
measured and its usage could be as well as observable such as advantage or disadvantage
of geographic positions, well-qualified, well-trained population, natural resources,
capacity of industrial and agricultural production and lastly military armed forces.27 On
the other hand, non-material or intangible power refers that elements which are more
abstract and cannot easily measure in terms of contribution to national power of the
country. It is more rest upon the concepts of the perceptions, the relations either human
or social relations among the groups and their contributions to the national power of the
country such as political economic and social institution initiatives to wave time

25
Said, O. Lerche, Jr., and O. Lerche III, Concepts of International Politics in Global Perspective. p.79-
83.
26
Sönmezoğlu, Uluslararası Politika ve Dış Politika Analizi. p.181-182.
27
Ibid. p.183.

8
mobilization, or the educational and technological environment or national characteristics
and morale.28

First of all, decision makers have to be aware of difficulties in making and

implementing of foreign policies. Therefore, decision-maker have to look capabilities of
the states which are trying to realize their goals. Are these goals can be achieved by
current capacity of state or not? Actually, the first difficulty is foreign policy objectives
are frequently expressed in abstract terms. This makes reaching concrete decisions more
or less hard, because of the rational foreign policy has both goals are frequently abstract
and choice of alternatives always as concrete. Thus, the problem of not progressing with
the desired goal can occur. Foreign policy, as secondly, should plan purposes.
Consequences should be estimated, and contingency plan or revising plan should be made
just before then the implementation even against any kind of negative circumstances. The
third one is contradictory or incompatible goals which means that a state may attempt to
achieve two goals that are incompatible with each other such as peace and security. For
instance, security should be goal and peace either the means or subordinate goal.29

In rational decision-making model first point is looking at the steps in the

formulation of foreign policy, first of all, the identification of the goals are required,
because of the calculation of costs and benefits and their calculations differ from on to
another. This goal should be included with the beliefs and perception of the society, their
social values and so on. Ends and means which will be used in the process of reaching
the foreign policy goal should be compatible. Means can be sued for national prestige or
can be sacrificed in order to reach that goal or prevent the unintended consequences.
When looking at the sources of foreign policy objectives, first of all, the survivability and
territorial integrity of the community and state considered as the crucial point. The second
one can be considered as the economic needs of the community and state. The third one
can be political needs of the country. The fourth one can be considered as the capability
requirement and its increase as internal sources. External sources can be considered as

28
Said, O. Lerche, Jr., and O. Lerche III, Concepts of International Politics in Global Perspective. p.63-
66.
29
Mintz and DeRouen Jr., Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making. p.3-10.

9
the threats of interventions and economic ruin as the threat of invasion, subversion or
economic discrimination or blockade by another state.30

There are also limitations of the foreign policy objective formulation in the
identification of the goals. First, internal limitations may be a problem of the capability
which means that having limited ability to mobilize other for that foreign policy
objectives. The second one can be lack of public or elite support for that created objective.
Lastly, there can be domestic and cultural limit over that realization of the objective. It
means that what people value and how much they are willing to pay or risk to achieve a
given objective. As external limitations, capabilities of other states regarded as an
important factor.31

So, in rational decision-making model, the second point is pruning the list. Firstly,
vital interests; the certain objectives and goals must be defined clearly and precisely.
Secondary interests are also important they also should be defined because many times
nations do not want to lose their secondary interests even. After that, public opinion is
the most significant point for a foreign policy formulation. In order to consolidate the
foreign policy goals and even for domestic goals, support of public opinion should be
acquired by decision makers as an obligatory task. After that, implementation of the
foreign policy should be realized. Herewith, if there are some sort of negative calculations
or unintended consequences occurred, it necessitates to re-evaluation of foreign policy,
policy objectives and capabilities. Keeping power and policies in balance is a really
difficult process in the external policy space. In order to realize this, a nation can do
bluffing, modifying policies or modifying powers in terms of external and internal policy
space. Sometimes foreign policy goals and domestic policy goals can be compatible,
however, sometimes it cannot. In foreign policy, social values are not so similar.
Domestic goals of businessman and workers would not be compatible; however, their
foreign policy choices can be compatible. Decision-makers have to consolidate their
foreign policy and domestic policy together. There should be a feedback mechanism to

30
Ibid. p.57-59.
31
Said, O. Lerche, Jr., and O. Lerche III, Concepts of International Politics in Global Perspective. p.48-
49.

10
re-evaluate their foreign policy objectives and goals.32 State’s strategies are somehow
related to all these factors. In the formulation of state strategies regarding with some
situations all these factors (set of social values, national interests, goals, objectives,
capability judgement, instruments, etc.) impact to design the strategy.

B. Research Aims and Questions

Regarding the described context in above, the work will try to fill the gap in the
literature of Turkish foreign policy with regards to Turkey’s rising power status in global
governance. Although, global governance emerged just after the end of the Cold-War, the
concept studied immensely in various areas of social sciences. Because of that, we can
talk about the substantial effect of global governance. Even though, this concept has
studied quite a lot times in different areas of social sciences; it has been quite popular
recently in Turkish literature particularly in Turkish foreign policy. Turkey’s rising power
status considerably influential for the popularity of studying the concept of global
governance. Turkey’s active participation in international and regional organizations has
been one of the most popular subject recently in terms of showing Turkey’s rising power
status in world politics. Herewith, this work will try to analyze the concepts of global
governance and rising power with reference to Turkey and Turkish foreign policy.

The main research question underlying this thesis could be framed as follows:

 What are the driving motivations, strategies, and instruments in the

formulation of Turkish foreign policy particularly in the AKP period that
Turkey has used in the global governance as a rising power?

This main question leads to a number of relevant sub-questions, according to

which the thesis will be structured:

 How the concept of global governance emerged and which factors led to
the emergence of this concept as a new world order and how the concept
of global governance can be conceptualized in the international relations?

32
Ibid. p.38-52.

11
  What are the main factors led to the emergence of the concept of rising
power and in the global politics which states consider as a rising power
and how the concept of rising power can be conceptualized in the
international relations?
 Are there any roots of using old governance understanding of
multilateralism in the historical background of Turkish foreign policy?
 What are the main dynamics or factors during the AKP period different
than the other periods lead to the Turkey’s rising power position in the
global governance?
 How can we evaluate the Turkey’s rising power status in global
governance currently? Are there any changes after the June 7 election?

C. Significance of Study
There are several reasons which make this study substantial not only in terms of
international relations theoretically but also in the sense of Turkish foreign policy
practically. Firstly, the significance of global governance increase day by day in terms of
states’ relations and international organizations’ activities. Even though, the concept
seems new in the literature of international relations, it has been gained a substantial
ground since the James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel’s work of “Governance
Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics” which considered the first
work about the concept of global governance. Besides that, when considering the
remaining acceleration of the concept in the global world politics, it should be evaluated
precisely to guide the future of global world order.

On the other hand, the concept of rising power with the emergence of BRICS in
the world politics as a mutual partnership became the reality and challenger to both USA
hegemony and existing world order. Besides BRICS, the new emerging powers such as
MIST (Mexico, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Turkey) or MIKTA (MIST and Australia)
gave a signal to the new changes or emergence of new challengers in the global order.
When considering the Turkey’s rising influence since the beginning of Arab Spring, UN
non-permanent membership, G20 presidency in 2015, opening the African region, etc.
increase the significance of the study in the literature.

12
 Beside the mentioned theoretical framework of the concepts of global governance
and rising power, the study will also focus on the Turkey’s motivations, strategies and
instruments particularly in the period of AKP’s foreign policy formulation. This led to
the comparison of the historical background of Turkish foreign policy vis a vis the AKP
period to see the policy changes and continues during the AKP period.

When periodization to the history of Turkish foreign policy, the first period start
with the foundation process to the end of the WWII, second period begins with the end
of the WWII to the collapse of the Soviet Union and Cold-War order, the 1990s
considered as an another period and lastly the last decade of Turkish foreign policy since
2002 categorizing as another period under the rule of AKP. Therefore, focusing the AKP
period in the formulation of Turkish foreign policy particularly in the period of
intensifying effect of global governance make more and more significant to study of the
thesis.

This thesis’ novelty is the contribution to the existing Turkish foreign policy
literature with regards to the theoretical framework of global governance and rising power
and also assessing Turkey’s current rising power status in the global governance with
reference to Turkey’s motivations, strategies and instruments which has been using in the
foreign policy formulation particularly in the period of AKP, since 2002. On this basis,
the thesis main contribution seeks to fill the gap with the low-studied concepts of global
governance and rising power in the existing literature on Turkish foreign policy.

D. Scope, Timeframe and Methodology

With regards to the scope of this thesis, it focuses most specifically the
motivations, strategies, and instruments which had been used in the formulation of
Turkish foreign policy, particularly in the AKP period. As mentioned in the previous part
the study will focus mostly on the AKP rule or AKP period in Turkish foreign policy.
Therefore, the timeframe of this study began with November 3, 2002 election which was
the AKP’s coming to power and came to the recent issues, however, the study mostly
focuses on the events between 2002 to June 7, 2015 election. The events and situations
which have been occurred since June 7, 2015 will also be assessed in the study and seek
to investigate the Turkey’s rising power position in the global governance even the worst

13
events such as July 15 coup attempt. When considering the intensifying effect of global
governance in the last decade the scope and timeframe of the study specially selected to
make more visible to show the Turkey’s rising power status in the regional and global
order.

Methodically, the thesis is based on an analysis of various types of sources,

particularly the academic articles and books and also reports which were published by
different scholars, experts, and statesman. For this reason, in the proses of writing this
thesis, various kinds of databases will be used. So the main part of this thesis constitutes
the information and analyzes from these books, article, and reports. Likewise, during the
writing of the thesis is benefited from the speeches and declarations of major actors.
Besides that, interviews with some of the academicians are also significant sources of the
study in the process of writing. Therefore, within the context of the study, the author will
mostly benefit from the primary and secondary sources. As a consequence, this work will
be based on literature research and analyze and use the qualitative research method so
analyzing of the problem became more important than the statistical solution of the
problem.

E. Structure of the Thesis

This thesis divided into five main parts included with a general introduction and
conclusion parts. Introduction section based on the statement of the problem, research
aims and research questions, significance of the study and lastly the scope and timeframe
of study as mentioned above. The second section (Conceptual and Theoretical
Framework) will focus on contemporary popular two concepts which are global
governance and rising power, regarding from these, the section will be emphasized on the
emergence of the concepts, literature review of the concepts and lastly the
conceptualization of these concepts. The third section (Analyzes of Turkish Foreign
Policy) firstly, will focus on the general shaping factors of Turkish foreign policy, and
then, historical background and historical analysis of Turkish foreign policy with the main
events and situations and lastly the changing dynamics in AKP period. The fourth section
(Assessing Turkey’s Rising Power Status in Global Governance) firstly will analyze the
Turkey’s position in the global order with respect to Turkey’s motivations, strategies and

14
the instruments which have been used by Turkish decision makers in the foreign policy
formulation during the AKP period. Furthermore, the fourth section will contain the
evolution part which will focus particularly the current period since June 7 election. In
the conclusion part, I will try to summarize and try to come to a final consequence about
the Turkey’s rising power position in global governance related to the motivations,
strategies, and instruments which are using in Turkish foreign policy.

15
 2. CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Although, the concept of global governance is relatively new in the international
relations’ studies, the concept possesses enormous importance. Since the world system is
still depended on the sovereign nation-states which led to the maintenance of anarchical
world order, the establishment of some kind of a world government become impossible.
From this point of view, the concept of governance emerged to comprehend the inter-
state relations and existing world order. In today’s world, the concept of governance uses
in various areas such as economics, finance, politics and so on. Moreover, when
considering the increase of the numbers of INGOs, NGOs and CSOs, the global
governance system become much more controversial.

Another vital concept related to new world system is rising powers or emerging
powers or middle-range powers. All of them can be explained with the common point of
challenging to existing world order or unipolar world system. After the end of the Cold-
War, USA emerged as a hegemon power in the world politics, so the world introduced
with the unipolar world system. This situation began to change firstly in the economic
field particularly because of the China and India’s economic acceleration in the
international political economy. This situation went further with the establishment of
BRICS and emerging of other regional and global countries. Consequently, this section
firstly will focus on the concept of global governance and then the concept of rising
powers, when conceptualization, the historical development, and literature review will
also analyze.

A. Global Governance
Compared to other social sciences, the discipline of international relations is
considered as a relatively new area of study. In this new discipline, many theories came
into existence to explain the existing international order and construct the covetable
normative international structure. The essential aim of theory explains the old and current
system and then predicts the future, according to the theoretical framework.33 According
to Coser, one of the main functions of the theory is the regulation of experiences, with the

33
Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy, no. 110 (1998):
29–46, https://doi.org/10.2307/1149275.

16
help of concepts.34 In other words, every theory offers some kind of a goggle to look at
the picture of the world in the context of politics. Therefore, they help to explain the
hypotheses behind political rhetoric about foreign policy. Moreover, the theories have
mechanisms to check each other.35 Therefore, within this mechanism, theories’
weaknesses and strengthens became more explicit.

The discipline of international relations established on the basis of great debates

which are known as realism vs. liberalism, behaviouralism vs. traditionalism and
positivism vs post-positivism. From this point of view, in the international relations,
theories can be categorizing under the realist paradigm, liberal paradigm, and post-
positivist theories. Since the end of the Cold War, related with the liberal paradigm and
post-positivist theories, globalization has become one of the vital concepts in the area of
international relations and international political economy.

Globalization can be defined as increasing awareness and interconnectedness not

only within states but also among people’s social life with borderless and distanceless
characteristics so the world became some kind of a global village. There are lots of factors
to increase the influence of globalization. With the increasing interconnectedness, not
only between states but also among peoples and organizations, the change in the global
politics became inevitable. With the globalization, many of developments have been
accelerated by technological improvements, particularly in information and
communication technologies. In the sense of political developments, as a consequence of
the emergence of new actors and institutions such World Trade Union (WTO),
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB) etc., the nation-state based
understanding of global politics began to change. In terms of economic development,
with the collapse of USSR, capitalist based economic liberalization in all over the world
accelerated (with some exceptions), furthermore, economic interdependence among the
countries, flows of capital and labor, the number of multinational corporations and
multinational economic organizations increased. Moreover, related to the developments

34
Neuman W. Lawrence, Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (USA:
Pearson, 2014). p.55.
35
Jack Snyder, “One World, Rival Theories,” Foreign Policy, no. 145 (2004): 53–62,
https://doi.org/10.2307/4152944.

17
which were mentioned above, the concept of “liberal democracy” and the neo-liberal
globalization36 spread all over the world. With these developments and the emergence of
new actors and institutions, the reformulation of “generalized principles of conduct”37 in
the global system became inevitable.

One of the important features of globalization is societal denationalization, in this

regard globalization can be defined as a process of movement which creates integrated
global society and decreased the significance of national borders. Thus, with the causal
effect of social changes led to the political developments among the states. The roles of
international institutions have been accelerated especially after the end of the Cold War,
paralleled with the rise of globalization and interdependence. Global governance mostly
points to denationalized issues which reach beyond the national borders. As globalization
has intensified in every sphere of life, transnational common problems and global
problems also increased and finding the solution to these problems become much more
complex so the states began to establish some international organizations to deal with the
common problems. The first decisions which were taken in these organizations gave the
first impression of the idea of global governance. Related with that, various kinds of
governance, such as financial, environmental, trade, health etc., emerged among states
and organizations and even among multinational corporations. This situation led to the
necessity of comprehensive understanding of global governance which will focus on the
following sub-sections. Therefore, this section firstly will focus on the historical process
of the concept of global governance and with this regards focusses on the literature related
to the concept and then the conceptualization of global governance concept in the studies
of international relations.

36
Robert O’Brien et al., Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global
Social Movements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
37
John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity : Essays on International Institutionalisation, The
New International Relations (London: Routledge, 1998),
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=e000xww&AN=77232&lang=tr&site=eds-
live&scope=site.

18
 I. Emergence of Global Governance Concept and Literature
Review
According to Craig N. Murphy, 1815 can be the most reasonable date for the
beginning of the current global governance system.38 After the end of the Napoleonic
Wars, the major powers gathered with the Congress of Vienna and discussed the common
issues, besides that they led to the establishment of the current global system either
knowingly or unknowingly. Paris Peace Conference in 1919 can be considered the early
emergence of global governance structure because of the establishment of League of
Nations and commonly dealing with the issues which were emerged after the WWI and
also to prevent the future problems. More than 30 countries sent their delegates to
conference however only the winner countries – particularly the United Kingdom and
France – dominated and controlled the process. Nonetheless, League of Nations had never
been a preventative against the emerging problems or crisis even among the member
countries, so with the Italians attack against the Ethiopia, the League of Nations lost all
of its functions before the outbreak of WWII. However, after the WWII with the
establishment of World Bank, IMF and GATT etc. at least in the sense of economy, the
idea of global governance become more prevail.39 However, it could be said that even
these system can be considered the early emergence of global governance structure,
because of the changes and challenges, it was much more different than the contemporary
understanding of the concept.

The concept of global governance began to use in a variety of areas particularly

related to the global politics, furthermore, it began to use and study by researchers and
scholars frequently so the content of the concept began to ambiguous. By the end of the
Cold War era, the changes in terms of states’ using their powers and authorities
necessitated a reordering of the existing system. In 1992, thanks to the James N. Rosenau
and Ernst-Ottawa Czempiel’s theoretical work of “Governance without Government:
Order and Change in World Politics”, the concept of global governance started to be a

38
Craig N. Murphy, “The Last Two Centuries of Global Governance,” Global Governance: A Review of
Multilateralism and International Organizations 21, no. 2 (April 1, 2015): 189–96,
https://doi.org/10.5555/1075-2846-21.2.189. p.189.
39
James M. Boughton and Colin I. Bradford, Jr., “Global Governance: New Players, New Rules, Why the
20th-Century Model Needs a Makeover,” Finance and Development 44, no. 4 (December 12, 2007): 10–
14.

19
new phenomenon in the international relations academic literature. Just after the
publication of this work, Commission on Global Governance was established by
Switzerland Government on the administration of Sonny Ramphal and Ingmar Carlsson
in 1995 and this commission was published their first report under the name of “Our
Global Neighborhood”.40 Additionally, in the same year, Academic Council on the United
Nations System (ACUNS) initiated the first volume of “Global Governance Journal”41,
therefore the concept of global governance began to discuss at the academic level in the
vital global governance institution which is UN. Therefore, in this period, the concept of
global governance began to discuss as an alternative to existing world order. In the time
of 1990s, particularly the effect of globalization, international organizations, new
alliances, resolution of new kind of international crisis at the global level etc. originate to
discuss around the concept of global governance.42 Likewise, as the Rosenau has pointed
out in his article “Globalization and Governance: Sustainability Between Fragmentation
and Integration” which was published by Global Governance, world politics is changing
rapidly therefore, this necessitates to re-examine our conceptual tools that will facilitate
the analysis of how to use it in a decentralized world.43

During this time, especially with the Robert W. Cox project which was sponsored
by United Nations University, “Multilateralism and the United Nations System (MUNS)”
initiated a new discussion with the idea of new realism which differs from the Cold-War
understanding of neorealism, so he focuses on global economy, non-state actors and
social movements which are necessary for the future of world order. Beside this, Cox’s
“The Crisis in World Order and the Challenge to International Organization” (1994) and

40
For detailed information please look at: “Our Global Neighborhood,” accessed August 1, 2017,
http://www.centerforunreform.org/?q=node/243.
41
For detailed information and the volumes of journal please look at: “Global Governance Journal,”
ACUNS (Academic Council on the United Nations System), accessed August 1, 2017,
http://acuns.org/category/publications/global-governance-journal/.
42
Robert W. Cox, “The Crisis in World Order and the Challenge to International Organization,”
Cooperation and Conflict 29, no. 2 (June 1, 1994): 99–113,
https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836794029002001.
43
James N. Rosenau, “Globalisation and Governance: Sustainability Between Fragmentation and
Integration” (Conference on Governance and Sustainability: New Challenges for the State, Business and
Civil Society, Berlin: Greenleaf Publishing, 2002). p.21.

20
“An Alternative Approach to Multilateralism for the Twenty-first Century” (1997) should
also be highlighted in the sense of focusing new world order.

Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkonson’s work of “Rethinking Global

Governance? Complexity, Authority, Power and Change” which was published in
International Studies Quarterly in 2014, is important to understand the history, evaluation,
and development of global governance. Furthermore, Thomas G. Weiss, in his article
“Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance: Conceptual and Actual
Challenges” attributed the emergence of concept of global governance with researchers
and scholars from the international relations studies were not satisfied with realist and
liberal-institutionalist domination in world politics and international organization studies
in the 1970s and 1980s.44 Once more, Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson’s work
of “Global Governance to the Rescue: Saving International Relations?” can be considered
as relatively new and they see the concept of global governance as a savior to
fragmentation in the international relation studies, so they argue that with the concept of
global governance in a way to understand the world around us much more clear. In the
sense of global governance, Weiss’ contributions in the field of international relations are
so much, some of his other works namely “Global Governance: Why? What? Whither?”,
“Thinking about Global Governance: Why People and Ideas Matter”, “Global
Governance and the UN: An Unfinished Journey” (together with Ramesh Thakur) and so
on. As he sees global governance as a savior of international relations, he studied the
concept in various ways.

Klaus Dingwerth and Philipp Pattberg’s work of “Global Governance as a

Perspective on World Politics” which was published by Global Governance Journal in
2006 focuses on the different uses of the concept and clarifying the confusion about the
differentiates about the uses of the concept. Craig N. Murphy’s work of “The Last Two
Centuries of Global Governance” which was published by Global Governance Journal in
2015 is one of the best work to show the historical progress of global governance. Last
but not the least important work about global governance is the Gerry Stoker’s article of

44
Thomas G. Weiss, “Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance: Conceptual and Actual
Challenges,” Third World Quarterly 21, no. 5 (2000): 795–814,
https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/713701075.

21
“Governance as Theory: Five Propositions” in which he explains the different uses of
concept in the literature. As the concept of global governance has been studied
extensively in different areas of social sciences, the number of books, articles, and reports
on the concept of global governance can be further multiplied, however, the most
significant studies in the international relations literature have been tried to be mentioned
above.

II. Conceptualization of Global Governance

Before going into detailed analyses of global governance, defining the
management of global affairs according to the theories would be much better for further
understandings. According to realist theory which based on the anarchic international
system, nation-states reflect their national interests in the world politics which led to the
zero-sum game in the global politics. Besides that, in the sense of collective system such
as League of Nations system, although nation-state sovereignty and anarchy is also
important in this system, states came together to find a solution to common problems, but
as seen in the inter-war period the system itself was so complex and also accommodating
between anarchy and cooperation was so problematic which means the collapse of system
was inevitable.

On the other hand, even neoliberal institutionalism theory believes today’s world
live in the anarchic society, but here the economic interdependence and related with that
using economic ties rather than national interest or war much more effective for managing
global affairs. Positive sum through cooperation and all countries benefit from it.
Functionalism of system increases through rules. The more interdependence and
specialize of institutionalizing of rules and norms led to the solution of global issues.

According to the system of international organizations in which the UN system of

states is the most obvious example, has some features. Firstly, in the sense of collectivity
principle, to maintain international peace and security, taking effective collective
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace. Secondly, regarding
equality principle, to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. Thirdly, as a problem-solving
institution, to achieve international cooperation in solving, international problems of an

22
economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character so the UN acts like problem-solving
organization through promoting cooperation among member countries. Yet, although the
system of international organizations considered as more stable in the history of world
politics, it has some problems in itself. Firstly, responding or finding a solution to threats,
wars or humanitarian crisis are taking too much time. Secondly, the veto power of some
states as seen UN Security Council permanent members (USA, Republic of China,
France, Soviet Union and the United Kingdom) considered as the creation of inequality
among the members of the international organization, because of some states domination
on the decision-making process.

Here, the most important question should be asked: why the global governance is
so important in contemporary world politics? The answer is basically because of the
“global risks” particularly because of the new emerging risks, the concept has gained a
much more significant point in the current world politics. Global risks can be categorizing
with common issues such as climate change, global health issues or spreading diseases
quickly, technological developments and threats like cyber-security, human security
because of wars, civil wars, genocide, failed states, migration etc. Therefore, in
contemporary global politics, states and individuals are sharing the same interests and
risks compare to the previous periods. From this point of view, taking serious precautions
collectively to against these problems is the most significant point which led to the
emergence of the idea of global governance. Because these kinds of global problems can
only be resolved through international cooperation. As Thomas G. Weiss stated
contemporary problems requires “actions that are not unilateral, bilateral, or even
multilateral, but rather global.”45 On the other hand, there are also some challenges in the
idea of global governance, firstly the state-centrism in the global affairs is still valid and
prevent the more integrated world, for example, the state sometimes tries to find a solution
locally to global problems which is contrary to the idea of global governance. Secondly,
the global inequality in the international organizations such as UN, IMF, IRBD etc. causes
the less integration among member countries. Because of the voting power mechanism in

45
Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson, “Rethinking Global Governance? Complexity, Authority,
Power, Change,” International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 1 (March 1, 2014): 207–15,
https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12082. p.213.

23
these organizations, rising powers cannot influence the global affairs like great powers.46
Lastly, because of the collective action problem and its structure which is mostly known
as the large-scale version of prisoner-dilemma in which participators tried to maximize
their interests with individual movement but lost in the process such as global climate
change problem in current world and states unwillingness to be a part of the pacts and
agreements about reducing carbon emissions because of the influence of economy
negatively.

The concept of global governance tries to define the contemporary condition of

global society, but because of the traditional forms of global affairs, mostly limited to
describe even existing world order. Although, there is not an exact definition of the
concept of global governance this section of work seeks to clarify discussions about the
concept, in order to find a much more meaningful definition of the concept. Indeed, there
is not yet a uniform definition of the concept of global governance. Resultantly, this
section of paper seeks to clarify the ontology, structure, and entities that compose global
governance, in order to give meaning and value to the concept. As mentioned above, the
concept of global governance is relatively new in the social sciences and the concept
mostly points to denationalized issues which reach beyond the national borders. Figure 1
shows the usage of the concept according to years in the titles of academic works. As seen
clearly, with the acceleration of global issues usage of concept in the literature increased
more particularly since the 2000s.

46
For more information please look at: “Voting Powers,” The World Bank, accessed August 14, 2017,
http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/leadership/votingpowers.; “IMF Members’ Quotas and Voting Power,
and IMF Board of Governors,” International Monetary Fund, accessed August 14, 2017,
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx.

24
Figure 1: Usage of Concept of Global Governance in the Literature

1200

1000
Number of Publications

800

600

400

200

0
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Year

Global Governance

Source: ISI Web of Knowledge, Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), 1992-2016

As mentioned above, in 1992, with James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Ottawa

Czempiel’s work of “Governance without Government: Order and Change in World
Politics”, the concept of global governance came into existence. According to James N.
Rosenau, the concept of governance is more inclusive than government as it embraces
“governmental institutions and informal, non-government mechanisms whereby needs
and wants are fulfilled.”47 For him, governance is a system of rules accepted by the
majority. The key components of governance are rules, roles, responsibilities and
accountabilities and the processes.

Robert W. Cox, in his work of “The New Realism: Perspectives on

Multilateralism and World Order” takes the concept of global governance as a starting
point for the idea of multilateralism. Moreover, according to Robert W. Cox:

“‘Global governance’ means the procedures and practices which exist at

the world (or regional) level for the management of political, economic and social

47
James N. Rosenau, “Governance, Order and Change in World Politics,” in Governance without
Government: Order and Change in World Politics, by James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 1–29.

25
 affairs. One hypothetical form of governance (world government or world
empire) can be conceived as having a hierarchical form of coordination, whether
centralized (unitary) or decentralized (federal). The other form of coordination
would be non-hierarchical and this we would call multilateral.”48

The idea behind the global governance is a cooperative leadership to provide the
commonly accepted solution of problems, common purpose etc. among national
governments, multilateral agencies (UN, WB, Greenpeace, IMF, WTO etc.) and civil
society. As Martha Finnemore stated that:

“governance may be done through political delegation arrangements, as

when the UN delegates problems to regional or state authorities, or through legal
and business contracting arrangements, as when the World Bank or USAID
contracts out its development programs to NGOs or to private firms.”49

To increase the effectivity of governance all around the institutions and states,
dynamism and inclusivity are the significant elements because of that using soft power
rather than hard power requires. Moreover, this mechanism should be more democratic
than authoritarian, more politically open than bureaucratic and more integrated to
specialized.50

While the arguments about the origins of the concept are still ongoing, with the
end of the Cold-War, states’ willingness to international cooperation accelerated the
spread of global governance in the world politics. Length of governance still debatable if
we consider the sovereignty of nation-states has a central role in international relations,
but the Cold-War triggered some important changes. The roles of international
institutions have been accelerated especially after the end of the Cold War, paralleled
with the rise of globalization and interdependence. Related with that, global governance

48
Robert W. Cox, ed., The New Realism: Perspectives on Multilateralism and World Order (Tokyo: United
Nations University Press, 1997). p.xvi.
49
Martha Finnemore, “Dynamics of Global Governance: Building on What We Know,” International
Studies Quarterly 58, no. 1 (March 1, 2014): 221–24, https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12095. p.223.
50
Boughton and Bradford, Jr., “Global Governance: New Players, New Rules, Why the 20th-Century
Model Needs a Makeover.”

26
has accelerated to deal with denationalized issues which reach beyond the national
borders.

Global governance means not to world government, moreover it is much more

complex structure, however, basically, it might be understood as a collective effort of
nation-states, international organizations and non-governmental actors to deal with the
crisis, global threats and challenges etc. In fact, global governance would not be
necessary, where there would be a world government. Domestic governments have
monopolies on the use of force, however, in the global scale, the monopoly of the use of
force is impossible, because of the lack of hierarchical government structure. Compare to
the local governance or domestic governance, global governance ambiguous concept.51
Global governance refers to the political interaction which is required to solve problems
that affect more than one state or region when there is no power to enforce compliance.
In domestic politics there is an actual hierarchy and actual government and in global
governance there is an anarchic structure which means that every sovereign state equal,
however, there is also some superpowers like USA, UK, Russia, China, and France, who
are the members of UN Security Council and who have more rights in UN decision-
making process.

Rosenau described the global governance as a system of rule which consists all
activities from family to international organizations and in this system using control
mechanisms to executing the purpose of this system bring about beyond nation results.52
Undoubtedly, Rosenau’s extensive definition shows that their aim to perception and
understanding of the concept of global governance together with internal politics. In
addition, as the Rosenau has pointed out in his article “Globalization and Governance:
Sustainability Between Fragmentation and Integration” world politics is changing rapidly
therefore, this necessitates to re-examine our conceptual tools that will facilitate the
analysis of how to use it in a decentralized world.53

51
Stewart Patrick, “The Unruled World,” Foreign Affairs, December 6, 2013,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2013-12-06/unruled-world.
52
James N. Rosenau, “Governance in the Twenty-First Century,” Global Governance 1, no. 1 (1995): 13–
43. p.13.
53
Rosenau, “Globalisation and Governance: Sustainability Between Fragmentation and Integration.” p.21.

27
 Governance is much more complicated phenomenon than government and not a
synonym of government. As Rosenau stated that:

“both refer to purposive behavior, to goal-oriented activities, to systems

of rule; but government suggests activities that are backed by formal authority,
by police powers to ensure the implementation of duly constituted policies,
whereas governance refers to activities backed by shared goals that may or may
not derive from legal and formally prescribed responsibilities and that do not
necessarily rely on police powers to overcome defiance and attain compliance.”54

With respect to this, as Czempiel argued that governance, contrary to government

implies “the capacity to get things done without the legal competence to demand that they
be done.”55 According to Adil Najam, global governance simply can be defined as “the
management of global processes in the absence of global government.”56

According to Gerry Stoker, as he pointed out in his article “Governance as Theory:

Five Propositions” although, governance’s outputs are not so different from the
governments’ outputs, the process and the tools differentiate.57 Related with this, as
Finkelstein pointed out government-like events, decisions, actions occur in the world
politics even in the absence of world government which can be identified by the global
governance.58

Gerry Stoker argues that there are five propositions in the idea of governance
which are:

“(i) Governance refers to a set of institutions and actors that are drawn
from but also beyond government. (ii) Governance identifies the blurring of
boundaries and responsibilities for tackling social and economic issues. (iii)

54
Rosenau, “Governance, Order and Change in World Politics.”
55
Ernst-Otto Czempiel, “Governance and Democratization,” in Governance Without Government: Order
and Change in World Politics, by James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (Cambridge University
Press, 1992).
56
Saba Riazati, “A Closer Look: Professor Seeks Stronger U.N.,” October 17, 2006,
http://dailybruin.com/2006/10/17/a-closer-look-professor-seeks/.
57
Gerry Stoker, “Governance as Theory: Five Propositions,” International Social Science Journal 50, no.
155 (March 1, 1998): 17–28, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2451.00106.
58
Lawrence S. Finkelstein, “What Is Global Governance?,” Global Governance 1, no. 3 (1995): 367–72.
p.368-369.

28
 Governance identifies the power dependence involved in the relationships
between institutions involved in collective action. (iv) Governance is about
autonomous self-governing networks of actors. (v) Governance recognizes the
capacity to get things done which does not rest on the power of government to
command or use its authority. It sees government as able to use new tools and
techniques to steer and guide.”59

Global governance is generally defined:

“as the complex of formal and informal institutions, mechanisms,

relationships, and processes between and among states, markets, citizens and
organizations, both inter- and non-governmental, through which collective
interests on the global plane are articulated, rights and obligations are established,
and differences are mediated.”60

Governance can be defined as a process of interaction and decision-making

process among the subjects of common problem which led to the new kind of social norms
and institutions.61

The need of reform in global governance bodies is a necessity as the former US

President Obama suggested: “today it’s become fashionable to disparage the United
Nations, the World Bank, and other international organizations. In fact, reform of these
bodies is urgently needed if they are to keep pace with the fast-moving threats we face.”62
So, the global governance structure needs fundamental transitions. However, in spite of
the Obama administration’s avowed ambition to integrate rising powers as full partners,
there has been no movement to reform the composition of the UN Security Council to
reflect new geopolitical realities.

59
Stoker, “Governance as Theory.” p.18.
60
James N. Rosenau, “Toward an Ontology for Global Governance,” in Approaches to Global Governance
Theory, ed. Martin Hewson and Timothy J. Sinclair (Albany: State Unicersity of New York Press, 1999).
61
Marc Hufty, “Investigating Policy Processes: The Governance Analytical Frame-Work (GAF),” in
Research for Sustainable Development: Foundations, Experiences, and Perspectives, ed. Urs Wiesmann
and Hans Hurni, vol. 6 (Bern, Switzerland: Geographica Bernensia; NCCR North-South, 2011), 403–24,
http://www.north-south.unibe.ch/content.php/publication/id/2663.
62
“Remarks of Senator Barack Obama to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs - Council on Foreign
Relations,” accessed May 16, 2017, http://www.cfr.org/elections/remarks-senator-barack-obama-chicago-
council-global-affairs/p13172.

29
 Thomas G. Weiss in his article “Governance, Good Governance and Global
Governance: Conceptual and Actual Challenges” attributed the emergence of the concept
of global governance with researchers and scholars from the international relations
studies were not satisfied with realist and liberal-institutionalist domination in world
politics and international organization studies in the 1970s and 1980s.63 In other words,
the scholars find a way to express their opinion much more clear with the concept of
global governance. In fact, as an emerging concept in theories of international relations
global governance is some kind of a tool or instrument to explain contemporary
transformations in the global order.

In his article “Toward an Ontology for Global Governance” Rosenau points out
that the global governance perspective reflects the emergence of new authority centers
which are independent from the nation-state in the world politics.64 According to
Biermann the global governance has followed with some developments and focused on
the emergence of international governance regimes and norms setting and therefore,
developments in the number of international regimes during the 1980s and 1990s.65

The main issue about the global governance in the contemporary world is the
diversity of governance.66 In addition to United Nations, which is the significant
institution for global governance, there are various kinds of regional institutions, security
alliances, multilateral alliances, ad-hoc working groups, issue-specific coalitions,
transnational professional networks global action networks, and so on.67 Although,
sovereign states still seems as the most important actor in the international arena, non-
state actors and international organizations have accelerated their power over the time
especially after the end of the Cold War thanks to the borderless and distanceless
characteristics of globalization.

63
Weiss, “Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance.”
64
Rosenau, “Toward an Ontology for Global Governance.”
65
Frank Biermann, “‘Earth System Governance’ as a Crosscutting Theme of Global Change Research,”
Global Environmental Change 17, no. 3–4 (August 2007): 326–37,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2006.11.010.
66
Patrick, “The Unruled World.”
67
Ibid.

30
 Thus, the concept of global governance may be defined as:

“the complex of formal and informal institutions, mechanisms,

relationships and processes between and among states, markets, citizens and
organizations, both inter- and non-governmental through which collective
interests on the global plane are articulated, rights and obligations are established
and differences are mediated.”68

Here, the consensus is the most significant element for better governance in the
global scale. According to Dingwerth and Pattberg, global governance can be
conceptualized as an observable phenomenon, through social movements, works of
international organizations, evolving of states’ organizing capacity, public and private
networks and organizations and transnational norms etc.69

According to Hout and Robinson, there are three significant phases in the
evolution of idea of governance: (i) emphasizing the “technocratic measures to improve
government effectiveness and provide a legal framework for market-based development”,
(ii) “a broader concern with the organization of political and social life, stressed
participation and inclusion of society”, (iii) more related with current world “an
increasing awareness of the importance of power and social conflict in shaping
development outcomes and the difficulties of addressing these through existing
institutional and governance programmes.”70 Therefore, governance considered as a new
form of authority that reflects the dispersal of power in social and economic life. It also
incorporates the neoliberal idea of authority in the outside politics and traditional kind of
management a means to claim autonomy for technocratic authority.

According to Thomas G. Weiss, many scholars and researchers are using the
concept of global governance in a variety of areas even in public space and non-public

68
Thomas G. Weiss and Ramesh Thakur, Global Governance and the UN : An Unfinished Journey
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2010).
69
Klaus Dingwerth and Philipp Pattberg, “Global Governance as a Perspective on World Politics,” Global
Governance 12, no. 2 (2006): 185–203.
70
Wil Hout and Richard Robison, “Development and the Politics of Governance: Framework for Analysis,”
in Governance and The Depoliticisation of Development, ed. Wil Hout and Richard Robison (London:
Routledge, 2009). p.2.

31
areas71, additionally, some people have a tendency to use the concept for the synonym of
government, which is totally wrong. Since Rosenau’s work, the concept of global
governance has been one of the vital concepts in the various areas of social sciences such
as finance, economy, politics, business, environments etc. Moreover, the concept has
been much more debatable and popular with the recent events in world politics, such as
Arab Spring, UN effectivity debates, global rising powers, new emerging powers,
declining of American power or hegemony in global politics etc. Recent crisis and debates
led to the find a more comprehensive solution in the world politics, subsequently, global
governance became more and more popular. In other words, currently, as mentioned
above with reference to Weiss, global governance seen as a savior or regulator to order
in the new global system.

B. Rising Power
The concept of rising powers, likewise the concept of global governance,
considered as the newly emerging concept in the field of international relations. Emerging
of the concept began with the economic area when the BRICS countries particularly
China’s growth rate become higher and higher. Although, considered as a new concept
since the early times of the 2000s, the concept has been occupying a vital place in the
current world politics because of their challenger status to unipolar world order and
hegemony of USA. From this point of view, in the subsections of this part, firstly the
emergence of the concept of rising power will be analyzed and the rising powers’ position
in the global governance will be investigated related to the significant academic literature
in international relations studies. Afterwards, in the second subsection, the concept of
rising power try to conceptualize and the works related to the Turkey’s position as a rising
power will be examined.

I. Emergence of Rising Power Concept and Literature Review

Likewise, current politics, cultural, social life etc. current world economy is much
more different than the previous periods. In this transition period, rising powers of Third
World began to enter or integrate to global economy compared to the previous periods.
BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) countries are the most obvious example of the

71
Weiss and Thakur, Global Governance and the UN : An Unfinished Journey.

32
rising countries. The BRICs acronym came into existence with the Goldman Sachs’
economist Jim O’Neill’s report in 2001 in which he makes a comparison between BRICs
and G6 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the
United States) in terms of GDP growth rate.72 Moreover, economically emerging states
began to consider as a challenger to the existing world order, so therefore in the near
future, they may have a greater effect in the world politics especially in terms of
economics. Besides that, when these new emerging powers increase their capacities in
the global economy and global politics, developed countries relatively lost their influence
and power. Therefore, in the near future, rising powers might have a significant influence
on the world economy and global politics.

In 2003, with the Goldman Sachs’ calculations about the China’s growth rate
which was 8% per year led to the China’s economy will be three times bigger than the
US, in 2030 and twenty-five times larger in 2050 in terms of US dollars.73 Furthermore,
according to Goldman Sachs’ 2005 report, BRICs countries total GDP size will be larger
than the G6 countries by 2041.74 2008 global economic crisis led to the rising powers
desire to have a voice in the global economy and global politics. Besides that, when the
superpowers especially based on the Western states began to relatively lose economic
power with the economic crisis and the rising of new powers necessitate to the
investigation of this situation in conceptual-theoretical and empiric level in the context of
order-system and global governance concepts. In the literature, especially after 2010,
analyzing of the middle-range powers’ process of acceleration, structure, capabilities etc.
become plentiful with lots of articles reports, journals, books etc. However, a limited
number of studies within this literature chose to analyze the contribution of these
emerging powers to global governance.

Hongying Wang and Erik French’s article of “Middle Range Powers in Global
Governance” which was published in Third World Quarterly in 2013 is one of the most

72
Jim O’Neill, “Building Better Global Economic BRICs,” Global Economics (Goldman Sachs, November
30, 2001), http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/build-better-brics.pdf.
73
Dominic Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman, “Dreaming With BRICs: The Path to 2050,” Global
Economics (Goldman Sachs, October 1, 2003), http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-
thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/brics-dream.pdf. p.6.
74
Jim O’Neill et al., “How Solid Are the BRICs?,” Global Economics (Goldman Sachs, December 1, 2005),
http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/how-solid.pdf. p.3.

33
significant and the latest work which is analyzing this subject. Besides, Ann Florini’s
work of “Rising Asian Powers and Changing Global Governance” which was published
in International Studies Review in 2011, focuses on China and India among the rising
powers and also analyzing the rise of these two powers according to international relations
theories and global governance in a changing world order. Alan S. Alexandroff and
Andrew F. Cooper edited book of “Rising States, Rising Institutions: Challenges for
Global Governance” focuses on different models of international cooperation and the
different states which have most actively challenged the existing world order, and
involving international institutions such as the G-20. Miles Kahler’s “Rising Powers and
Global Governance: Negotiating Change in a Resilient Status Quo” published by
International Affairs in 2013 mostly focusses on Brazil, India, and China with respect to
their integration into the global economy with the aim of larger regional and global role.
Andrew F. Hart and Bruce D. Jones’s article of “How Do Rising Powers Rise?” published
by Survival in 2010 which considered the rise of emerging powers as another shift in the
international politics against the US supremacy.

In the international politics, the works related to assessing Turkey as a rising

power is quite a few. One of these works Paul Kubicek, Emel Parlar Dal and H. Tarık
Oğuzlu’s edited book of “Turkey’s Rise as an Emerging Power” which was published by
Routledge in 2014. In this book’s introductory article which name is “Decoding Turkey’s
rise: An Introduction”, authors Tarık Oğuzlu and Emel Parlar Dal accepting Turkey as a
rising power and also when considering the Turkey’s long-lasting relationship with
Western powers locating Turkey more advantageous compared to other emerging powers.
From this point of view, Turkey has a different kind of rising power status. Another work
which analyzes Turkey as a rising power is Soner Çağaptay’s book of “The Rise of
Turkey: Twenty First Century’s first Muslim Power” which was published in 2014, argue
that Turkey under the leadership of former Prime Minister, current President Recep
Tayyip Erdogan and his Islamic-oriented Justice and Development Party (AKP)
accelerated the Turkey’s trade, diplomatic links, and culture exports transformed the
Turkey from an economically disadvantaged secular state into the first large Muslim
nation with a middle-class majority.

34
 Ziya Öniş and Mustafa Kutlay’s article of “Rising Powers in a Changing Global
Order: The Political Economy of Turkey in the Age of BRICS” published in 2013 by
Third World Quarterly and in this article authors assessing Turkey as a near-BRICS
country and in this context analyzing Turkey’s political economy. Additionally, Richard
Fontaine and Daniel M. Kliman’s article of “International Order and Global Swing
States” published in 2013 by The Washington Quarterly and in this article authors
locating Turkey one of the global swing states together with Brazil, India, and Indonesia.
Concordantly, Meltem Müftüler Baç analyzed Turkey’s regional and international
security governance as a report for RSCAS/European University Institute Florence in
2014 with the name of “Turkey as an Emerging Power: An analysis of its Role in Global
and Regional Security Governance Constellations”. Emel Parlar Dal and Gonca Oğuz
Gök’s article of “Locating Turkey as a ‘Rising Power’ in the Changing International
Order: An Introduction” published by Perceptions in 2014 is another work categorizing
Turkey as a rising power in the global order. Last, but not the least important work is the
Emel Parlar Dal's TÜBİTAK 1001 project of “The Contribution of Rising Turkey and the
BRICS Countries to Global Governance: A Comparative Analysis” in which I also
involved as a research assistant, makes a comparison between Turkey and the BRICS
countries in terms of their personnel, financial and ideational contribution to the pivotal
global governance organizations. It is possible to extend and diversify this literature
containing many articles and reports rather than books.

II. Conceptualization of Rising Power or Middle Range Power

With the collapse of Soviet Union, the world realized with the global
transformation with respect to the end of the state-centric view of global politics.
Therefore, on the one hand, when particularly in the first decade of post-Cold War US
hegemony dominated the world politics, on the other hand with the end of the bipolar
system, some states began to gain importance in terms of their geographical locations,
economical developments, etc. So, the concepts of “rising power”, “emerging power” and
“middle power” came into existence to explain the how these states rise in the world
politics? and more significantly what will be their aim in the future? All these concepts
more or less have the same meaning to define the rising status of particular states in the
international system. Although, these concepts are still considered as a controversial in

35
the literature of international relations, this section will try to conceptualize these
concepts as much as possible. Similarly, with the concept of global governance, the
concept of rising power also relatively new in the social sciences. Although, some
scholars claim that the concept of rising power, emerging power or middle power dated
back to 15th-century Italian city-states historically, numerous works take the emergence
of BRICS as a starting point of these concepts in the contemporary international system.
Since Goldman Sachs’ economist Jim O’Neill’s report in 2001, the usage of these
concepts increased enormously. As seen in Figure 2 these concepts in the early times of
the 2000s did not study so much, yet when the influence of rising powers in the global
politics increased, academic works related to the concepts also increased to explain the
rising powers influences and aims. Particularly, after 2008 global economic crisis the
related academic works increased drastically, because of their stable economic growth
rates (except Russia) even during the global economic crisis.

Figure 2: Usage of Concepts of 'Rising Power', 'Emerging Power' and 'Middle

Power' in the Literature

900

800

700
Number of Publications

600

500

400

300

200

100

0
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2016
Year

Rising Power Emerging Power Middle Power

Source: ISI Web of Knowledge, Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), 2001-2016

Canada and Australia should be the first states come to mind as a rising power in
the sense of their involvement and contribution to the international organizations and their

36
influence in the world politics. Secondly, particularly since the early times of the 2000s,
BRIC countries began to seem as an emerging power with respect to their economic
growth rates and developing economic activities. When the BRIC countries summits
meetings began in 2009, the political dimension of BRIC also accelerated. With the South
Africa involvement into BRIC countries in 2010, the acronym become changed as a
BRICS. Moreover, MIST (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey) or MIKTA
(MIST and Australia) and also some other Asian states such as Taiwan, Malaysia,
Singapore, Japan etc. began to consider as a middle power in the international society.
Furthermore, as Richard Fontaine and Daniel M. Kliman pointed out that Brazil, India,
Indonesia, and Turkey considered as a “swing states” with their similar position in terms
of growing economies, strategic location in their regions, ruling by democratic
governments and neither fully integrated to current world order, denying it nor offering
alternative order.75

These emerging powers with the new multilateral formats, such as the BRICS
summit meetings, and new institutions such as Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
shows their activism in the contemporary world politics as a rising powers. Although,
there is not a universal agreement about which states should be considered as a rising
power, scholars of international relations and the international political economy mostly
emphases on the BRICS, MIST, and MIKTA countries. Besides rising activism, on the
one hand, some scholars argue that these countries try to shape or change the existing
world order, on the other hand, some scholars claim that these countries seek to reform
the world order rather than completely changing it. In the sense of their populations,
geographical location, trade relations, the rising powers have begun to be a crucial actor
in the global governance system. Moreover, these globally rising powers are also playing
a vital role in their respective regions such as China in East Asia, Brazil in South America,
India in South Asia, South Africa in southern Africa, Turkey in the Middle East. As a
regional power, these countries shape politics in their regions by promoting regional
governance, democracy, trade relations etc.

Richard Fontaine and Daniel M. Kliman, “International Order and Global Swing States,” The Washington
75

Quarterly 36, no. 1 (February 1, 2013): 93–109, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2013.751653.

37
 Here, undoubtedly, the concept of rising power closely connected as an “emerging
markets”. 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis consequently “opened up space for rising
powers of the global South to play an increasingly active role in the reform of global
economic and political governance, to the extent that a ‘regime change’ in global
governance is now at least a distinct possibility.”76 According to Amrita Narlikar, “rising
powers are defined as those states that have established themselves as veto-players in the
international system, but have still not acquired agenda-setting power.”77 Without
exception of 2008 global economic crisis effect, rising powers’ growth rates have been
always on the top. Even during the global economic crisis, only Russia influenced
negatively, all the other rising powers continue to grow economically.

Although, previous Third World Movements such as Non-Alignment Movement

also considered as a rising power in the global world politics, they did not affect the
international political economy like current global South cooperation.78 This situation led
to think about is current global South cooperation try to establish much more stable
economic and political power without depending on the Western powers. In the age of
globalization, it is not possible to grow of state without interdependence, so current rising
powers economic growth rates and their desire to the reformation of global governance
should be highlighted.

Cooper et al. stated that middle powers “are defined primarily by their behavior:
their tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, their tendency
to embrace compromise solutions to international disputes, and their tendency to embrace
notions of ‘good international citizenship’ to guide their diplomacy.”79 Andrew Hurrell
in his “Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-Be Great
Powers?” emphasizes four similar features of rising powers. Firstly, in addition to their
growing economies, all have potential military and political power to influence the
international affairs and ability to seek reform in the global order. Secondly, each rising
powers seek to gain more and more influential role in global affairs. Thirdly, relations

76
Gray and Murphy, “Introduction: Rising Powers and the Future of Global Governance.” p.184.
77
Narlikar, “Introduction: Negotiating the Rise of New Powers.” p.561-562.
78
Gray and Murphy, “Introduction: Rising Powers and the Future of Global Governance.” p.184.
79
Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: Australia
and Canada in a Changing World Order (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1994). p.19.

38
among the rising powers both deepened and increasing in terms of bilaterally and in the
regional and international institutions. Fourthly, there can differentiate between the
obvious emerging powers and other second-tier states and middle-sized powers.80
Motivations of rising powers in the global politics are still evolving, even the BRICS
countries have not established common motivations in the international arena. Rising
powers, with the revisionist tendency, “use distributive negotiating strategies with the
established powers and integrative negotiating strategies with smaller allies and other
rising powers; attempts to form balancing coalitions against the major powers…”81

Because of the rising powers, the power transition in the international arena came
to the agenda. Power transition is important because of rising powers seek to modify
existing international system. Rising powers influence the global order in a number of
ways. Besides economic challenges, the increasing military expenditure of these states
led to take some precautions of great powers.82 Narlikar categorizes the actors of
international politics and according to her great powers can be defined with their influence
for shaping the rules and norms of global governance. Even though their declining power
because of the emerging powers, these states “still have enough power to act as
gatekeepers to the inner sanctums of international regimes.”83As Kevin Gray and Craig
N. Murphy pointed out “this has been characterized as a transition from a unipolar US
hegemony to one of ‘emancipatory multipolarity’, in which the countries that represent
the majority of the world’s peoples now have a position at the head table, or even as a
broader underlying ‘global centre shift’ or ‘hegemonic transition’.”84 Actually, there are
two important approaches in terms changing global world order from unipolarity to
multipolarity, firstly the pessimists believe that this situation led to the rise of crisis,
insecurity, rivalry, arms race etc. Secondly, according to optimists, the transition led to

80
Andrew Hurrell, “Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-Be Great Powers?,”
International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 82, no. 1 (2006): 1–19,
https://doi.org/10.2307/3569127. p.1-3.
81
Narlikar, “Introduction: Negotiating the Rise of New Powers.” p.567.
82
James Manicom and Jeffrey Reeves, “Locating Middle Powers in International Relations Theory and
Power Transitions,” in Middle Powers and the Rise of China, ed. Bruce Gilley and Andrew O’neil
(Georgetown University Press, 2014), 23–43. p.35.
83
Narlikar, “Introduction: Negotiating the Rise of New Powers.” p.563.
84
Gray and Murphy, “Introduction: Rising Powers and the Future of Global Governance.” p.185.

39
the improvement of existing liberal order and the great powers and rising powers came
together to find a more stable way for global governance.85

The most significant point about the transition in the world politics related with
the decreasing role of US hegemony in the world politics. In this respect, Eleni
Vezirgiannidou argues that on one hand, US does not want to accept its diminishing role
in the international arena which would necessitate reformation of global governance, on
the other hand, although its relative decline, US do not integrate or cooperate with other
actors, particularly with the rising powers.86 Besides the US, as another Western great
power EU also effected from the rising powers but developed a strategic partnerships
relation with these countries as integrative bargaining strategies.87

Not only great powers but also smaller countries influenced from the rising
powers. There are many examples of showing rising powers interests towards smaller
countries particularly African countries. As Brendan Vickers explain that rising powers’
motivations towards African countries, he states that “the rising powers indeed purport to
support African countries as they seek to restructure their post-colonial external relations,
diversify and industrialize their economies, and integrate more strategically into the world
economy on more flexible policy terms than those sanctioned by the West.”88 He points
out four important sources of bargaining power for African countries to integrate with
rising powers which are “the commodities boom”, “Africa’s potential market power”,
“collective continental agency” and “normative and ideological framings”.89 The rising
powers particularly China, India, Brazil and South Africa recently became so active in
terms of global aid which creates the question of are these states try to establish new
global aid structure. This aid “referred to as a form of South-South cooperation, which
differs from Western aid because of its lack of conditionality and its ‘untied’ nature.” This

85
Randall Schweller, “Emerging Powers in an Age of Disorder,” Global Governance: A Review of
Multilateralism and International Organizations 17, no. 3 (July 1, 2011): 285–97,
https://doi.org/10.5555/1075-2846-17.3.285. p.285.
86
Sevasti-Eleni Vezirgiannidou, “The United States and Rising Powers in a Post-Hegemonic Global
Order,” International Affairs 89, no. 3 (May 1, 2013): 635–51, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12037.
87
Narlikar, “Introduction: Negotiating the Rise of New Powers.” p.573.
88
Brendan Vickers, “Africa and the Rising Powers: Bargaining for the ‘Marginalized Many,’” International
Affairs 89, no. 3 (May 1, 2013): 673–93, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12039. p.676.
89
Ibid. p.676-683.

40
form of aid differentiates “from the Western norms and potentially more conducive to
development in the global South…”90 Lastly, great powers or smaller countries are not
the only actors influenced by rising powers and the power transition in this process.
NGOs, INGOs and Multinational Corporations (MNCs) also affected from the power
transition.91

According to Miles Kahler, China, India, and Brazil which are the world’s largest
emerging economies give a sign that their desire to reform in the global governance
structure.92 As much as rising powers integration with global economy and international
institutions grew, they became more outspoken reformers, displaying “a more assertive
policy pursued through engagement and negotiation: pressing for reform but operating
very much within the system”93 Brazil, India and China desire to export their national
models of development, yet they encountered with other powers including the incumbents
(according to Kahler, incumbents are the United States, the European Union, and Japan)
“in attempting to defend national policy autonomy while extracting maximum benefit
from global economic integration.”94 “This generally benign scenario of accommodation
and reform does not mean that the rising powers will be pliable negotiating partners. Nor
does it eliminate the risk of conflict between rising powers and incumbents with the
potential to disrupt global governance.”95 According to Stuenkel, Brazil’s strategy to
create a regional leadership and stability integrated with the democracy promotion.96
Likewise, Turkey’s active democracy promotion and supporting the social movements
during the Arab Spring, towards the Middle East and North African countries, should be
considered as the same way.

The new international balances because of the rising powers caused to shift global
governance to more inclusive platforms, such as G7 (involvement of only the developed

90
Gray and Murphy, “Introduction: Rising Powers and the Future of Global Governance.” p.190-191.
91
Narlikar, “Introduction: Negotiating the Rise of New Powers.” p.573.
92
Kahler, “Rising Powers and Global Governance.” p.726.
93
Alan S. Alexandroff and Andrew F. Cooper, eds., Rising States, Rising Institutions: Challenges for
Global Governance, 1st ed. (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010). p.136; Kahler, “Rising
Powers and Global Governance.” p.719.
94
Kahler, “Rising Powers and Global Governance.” p.726.
95
Ibid. p.726.
96
Gray and Murphy, “Introduction: Rising Powers and the Future of Global Governance.” p.191.

41
countries) to the G20. As seen in Table 1, as much as emerging powers increased their
influence their positions in the global governance organizations become more visible. The
importance of G20 summits is to be the first international platform whose structures
reflect the distribution of economic powers in the current world. The G20 summits were
not created only for solving the problems of great powers’ economies with the help of
emerging economies, moreover, it was created to maintain the stability in the global
economy by universal management. Because G20 members are representing the 85% of
the global economy in today’s world. There are also other economic organizations such
as WTO, IMF, WB etc. in which emerging countries involvement highly relevant to
future of the global economy and the global governance. As newly emerging members of
the global system, rising powers desire to increase their voice in the global governance
structure to reflect their perspectives and interests, therefore with the emergence of the
G20 summits, the old system of G5, G7 structure lost their dynamics, because it was much
more unequal with the involvement of only developed states.

Table 1: Group of States in World Politics97

United States
Japan
Germany G5 G7 G8+5 G20
France
United Kingdom
Canada
Italy
Russia
Brazil
China
India
Mexico
South Africa
Australia
Indonesia
Saudi Arabia
Turkey
South Korea
Argentina
European Union

97
Andrew Hurrell, “Rising Powers and the Emerging Global Order,” in The Globalization of World
Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, 6th
ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 80–94. p.86.

42
 As Andrew F. Cooper stated that:

“the G20 itself was created to accommodate the rise of emerging markets
in the world economy; it provides an open stage where major emerging and
advanced nations discuss pressing global issues on an equal footing, unlike
international organisations with either a two-tiered arrangement or weighted
voting system. In an international system increasingly divided between large
developed and large developing countries, middle powers are likely to hold
casting votes to break frequent deadlocks in multilateral negotiations.”98

Besides economical involvement to global governance, personnel and ideational

contribution to the global governance organizations also important to see the rising
powers’ increasing activism in the international system. One of the most important works
investigating this subject is Hongying Wang and Erik French’s article of “Middle Range
Powers in Global Governance” which was published in Third World Quarterly in 2013.
They make their analysis according to “personnel contributions, financial contributions
and ideational contributions to multilateral organisations and initiatives.”99 For personnel
contribution, they are taking the states involvement personnel to peacekeeping operations
(PKOs) and nationals working as UN staff members. In the sense of financial
contribution, authors looking at the states’ “donations to various funds, programmes and
organisations dedicated to major global governance issue areas, such as poverty relief and
global health” which are mostly consisting of the voluntary contributions and these
contributions evaluated relative to the GNI and GNI per capita. 100 Lastly and more
intricatelly, “ideational contributions refer to the ideas a country effectively puts on the
agenda of global governance.” Here, two important factors taking into the evaluation,
firstly the countries’ sponsored or proposed of initiatives, norms, ideas; secondly the
evaluation of “number of NGOs from each state involved with the UN Department of
Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) through consultative status with the UN Economic
and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the number of NGOs from each state with

98
Andrew F. Cooper, “Squeezed or Revitalised? Middle Powers, the G20 and the Evolution of Global
Governance,” Third World Quarterly 34, no. 6 (July 1, 2013): 963–84,
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.802508. p.980.
99
Hongying Wang and Erik French, “Middle Range Powers in Global Governance,” Third World Quarterly
34, no. 6 (July 1, 2013): 985–99, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.802509. p.987.
100
Ibid. p.987-988.

43
memberships in the Conference of NGOs in Consultative Relationship with the UN
(CONGO).”101 A study of this kind of extensive analysis is much more useful for showing
the ratio of rising powers involvement in the global governance structure. Based on
Hongying Wang and Erik French’s analysis, Emel Parlar Dal's TÜBİTAK 1001 project
of “The Contribution of Rising Turkey and the BRICS Countries to Global Governance:
A Comparative Analysis” in which I also involved as a research assistant, makes a
comparison between Turkey and the BRICS countries in terms of their personnel,
financial and ideational contribution to the pivotal global governance organizations with
the aim of accommodating Turkey’s position in the global governance structure.102

Table 2: Comparison of Material Power

Power
International Military
Population GDP
Trade Expenditure
Countries
Million Ratio Billion $ Ratio Billion $ Ratio Billion $ Ratio
G20 4,685 63% 65,546 86% 14,248 88% 1,400 85%
G7 762 10% 35,439 46% 5,201 32% 845 51%
BRICS 3,110 41% 16,836 22% 2,904 18% 367 22%
MIKTA 543 7% 5,451 7% 1,346 8% 90 5%
World 7,442 100% 75,543 100% 15,955 100% 1,646 100%

Source: Population: The World Bank, Population Data, 2016

GDP: The World Bank, GDP (Current US$), 2016
International Trade: WTO, International Trade and Market Access Data, 2016
Military Expenditure: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 2016

To show the rising power position in the world politics, looking at the material
powers and comparison with great powers would be much better. In this regard, as
material power, the article focuses on the population, GDP, international trade and the
military expenditure. In terms of demographic realities when western countries

101
Ibid. p.988.
102
For more information please look at: “About the Project,” Rising Powers in Global Governance,
accessed August 12, 2017, http://risingpowersproject.com/about-the-project/.

44
particularly G7 countries are holding only around 10% of world population the BRICS
countries are holding more than 40% of world population.103 As mentioned, G20 more
inclusive compared to other groups and this inclusive structure show itself in terms of
population because G20 contains more than 60% of world population. On the other hand,
in today’s world, as Table 2 shows that G20 accounts for 86 percent of the global GDP,
88 percent of world’s total exports and 85 percent of global arms expenditures. From this
point of view, the inclusive structure of G20 could be seen clearly, by integrating a larger
number of actors in the organization. Besides that, in the post-global financial crisis
process, BRICS and MIKTA countries began to play a greater role in the decision-making
process of G20, particularly in terms of global economic governance. Here, the vital point
is that G7, BRICS, and MIKTA countries are all part of the G20, nevertheless, they
sometimes give the impression of being rather autonomous or independent entities.
Therefore, G20 contains these groups in itself and acts like a higher structure to organize
their actions in the global governance.

Finally, as Turkey's rising power position in global governance will be evaluated

in the following sections, this section is not overemphasized this subject. However,
related with the accommodating Turkey’s position as a rising power in the global
governance system, it would be better to give a couple of examples. Ziya Öniş and
Mustafa Kutlay’s article of “Rising Powers in a Changing Global Order: The Political
Economy of Turkey in the Age of BRICS” in which authors assessing Turkey as a near-
BRICS country and in this context analyzing Turkey’s political economy. 104 As Randall
Schweller stated that “when India, China, Brazil, the European Union, Russia, Japan, and
possibly Turkey join the United States as members of the great-power club, we will have
entered the first truly global epoch of world politics.”105 When considering Turkey’s
position in MIKTA and G20, we can clearly accommodate Turkey as one of the rising
powers in the global governance system. Consequently, as Emel Parlar Dal and Gonca
Oğuz Gök indicates that, in 2009-2010, Turkey’s UNSC (United Nations Security

103
“Population, Total Data,” The World Bank, accessed August 12, 2017,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.
104
Ziya Öniş and Mustafa Kutlay, “Rising Powers in a Changing Global Order: The Political Economy of
Turkey in the Age of BRICS,” Third World Quarterly 34, no. 8 (September 1, 2013): 1409–26,
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.831541.
105
Schweller, “Emerging Powers in an Age of Disorder.” p.295.

45
Council) non-permanent membership, hosting the fourth conference of the LDCs (Least
Developed Countries) in 2010, application for the UNSC’s non-permanent membership
for the period of 2015-2016, presidency of the G20 for the year 2015, obviously illustrate
the acceleration of willingness and activism on Turkey’s side to have an active role in the
world politics.106 So, the Turkey’s rising power position has accelerated Turkey’s
activism in the global politics.

106
Emel Parlar Dal and Gonca Oğuz Gök, “Locating Turkey as a ‘Rising Power’ in the Changing
International Order: An Introduction,” Perceptions 19, no. 4 (2014): 1–18. p.8-13.

46
 3. ANALYZES OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE SYSTEM
To analyze the rising power status of Turkey in the global governance related to
the motivations, strategies, and instruments, looking the previous periods much more vital
than it looks. Therefore, this section will be emphasizing on the historical background of
Turkish foreign policy from the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. Besides that, the
first sub-section will focus on general shaping factors in Turkish foreign policy which
still have a vital point in the decision-making process. Before going into detailed analysis
of Turkish foreign policy, that would be better to the elaboration of fundamental
principles, especially the Ataturk’s foreign policy principles, which have shaped the
foreign policy decisions since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey.

During the first period of the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, one of the
most significant targets in foreign policy was the introduce the state in the international
arena. With the Lausanne Conference, Turkey gained the legitimacy of nation-state
structure as a modern understanding in the global arena.107 However, before introducing
the state in the global arena, the main goal was survival and full independence of state
which makes the first period of Turkish foreign policy more realistic. From this point of
view, important principle during the foundation of Republic was full independence.
Especially, during the War of Independence, Ataturk’s and the ruling elites’ main
principle was non-compromise of the independence under any circumstances. This
independence consists political, economic, military, financial and cultural areas, which
should non-compromise issues. As declared in the National Pact (Misak-ı Milli), the
essential principle was the fully independent nation-state.108 The two articles of National
Pact are particularly important in terms of creation of Turkish nation: first article was at
the time of signing the Mondros Armistice Agreement (October 30, 1918), the whole of
the Turkish homeland within the boundaries which were protected by Turkish troops

107
Nevin Yurdsever Ateş, “Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türk Dış Politikaları,” in Türk Dış Politikası : Cumhuriyet
Dönemi 1, ed. Mustafa Bıyıklı, vol. 1 (İstanbul: Gökkubbe, 2008), 53–91. p.55.
108
Mehmet Gönlübol, “Atatürk’ün Dış Politikası: Amaçlar ve İlkeler,” in Atatürk Yolu, ed. Turhan
Feyzioğlu, 2nd ed. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1987), 233–79. p.242-45.

47
could never be disintegrate, and secondly, political, judicial and financial restrictions
(capitulations) that prevent national and economic development must be abolished.109

Peace has become one of the most significant themes from the beginning of
Republic of Turkey. As Ataturk pointed out “Peace at home, peace in the world” have
been the main motto in Turkish foreign policy. Even in the hardest times of the
Independence War, the new government attempted to establish a peace with the
negotiations. Because of these, Turkey signed a Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality with
neighbor states such as Soviets, France and so on.110 With regards to “Peace at home,
peace in the world” principle, new founded Republic of Turkey signed a 26 friendship
agreements between 1923 to 1937.111

Security politics was another important principle in the foreign policy during the
first period of the Republic of Turkey. Because of that, military expenditures and
modernization of army conducted with the modernization of state’s economic
restructuring synchronously. When categorizing Ataturk’s Foreign Policy, dividing two
periods could be logical to see the peace and security orientation during the first period
of Republic. The period between 1923 and 1932 was mostly based on the motto of “peace
at home, peace in the world”. However, the second period between 1932 and 1938 was
more security oriented, particularly because of the rising threat of radicalism in the
Europe.112

Westernization was another fundamental principle not only in the foreign policy
but also in the cultural, societal, economic areas. Even fighting against the Western
Powers since the beginning of WWI, the new Republic was using convergence policy
towards the Western Powers at every opportunity. The main idea behind that was the
Ataturk’s desire and attempt to reach the level of developed countries and go beyond
them. Therefore, Ataturk used the idea of Westernization as a modernization of state and

109
Mehmet Gönlübol and Cem Sar, “1919 - 1938 Yılları Arasında Türk Dış Politikası,” in Olaylarla Türk
Dış Politikası (1919-1995), ed. Mehmet Gönlübol (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1996), 1–133. p.12-13.
110
Gönlübol, “Atatürk’ün Dış Politikası: Amaçlar ve İlkeler.” p.269-273.
111
Metin Toker, “Atatürk ve Barış,” in Atatürk Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası (Makaleler), ed. Berna
Türkdoğan (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2000), 49–61. p.60.
112
William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy : 1774-2000, 3rd ed. (London and New York: Frank Cass
Publishers, 2013). p.41-45.

48
institutions.113 Ataturk argued that Turkey must be Westernized in order to be able to take
its place in a civilized world.114 Westernization reflects Atatürk’s own vision and it is
supported by the role of intellectuals. The geographical proximity to West is an advantage
for this principle.

A. Historical Background of Turkish Foreign Policy

To understand the Turkish foreign policy during the AKP period, elaboration of
Turkey’s foundation and progress of evolution up until 2000 is a necessity. Thanks to
this, we can clearly see the changes and continuities. In every state, in the decision-
making process of policies, some influential factors affect the outcome of policies. These
factors mostly came from the foundation of the state which are vital for the state.
Although, these factors can be anything mostly the geographical importance or location,
natural resources, trade roads, historical heritage, founder ideology, long-lasting alliances
or hostilities etc. affect the process of decision-making.

The first part of this section will be emphasized on the general shaping factors of
Turkish foreign policy since the beginning of the Republic of Turkey. The second part in
this section will be emphasizing on the main events and chronological background of
Turkish foreign policy. The main purpose of this part is the short evaluation of inter-war,
Cold War and post-Cold War periods with the preferences of Turkish foreign policy until
the beginning of the 2000s. As mentioned, these periods are beyond the study’s subject,
the section will not focus on details of every event. On the other hand, every section will
firstly focus on mentioning period’s general events and dynamics with regards to global
politics and then look for their influences in the Turkish foreign policy.

I. General Shaping Factors of Turkish Foreign Policy

First major factor that shaped Turkish foreign policy is the geo-strategical location
of Turkey. Halford Mackinder, as one of the most influential figures in geopolitics, called
the region including Africa, Asia, and Europe as the “World Island” meaning that
whoever controls this world island controls the world.115 This is why it is very important

113
Gönlübol, “Atatürk’ün Dış Politikası: Amaçlar ve İlkeler.” p.251.
114
Ibid. p.252-54.
115
Idris Bal, Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold War Era (Brown Walker Press, 2004). p.113-116.

49
to understand that Turkey just at the crossroads of continents. As both of former Foreign
Ministers (Cem and Davutoglu) stated more or less the same sentence; with both its
historical and cultural build up and two-dimensional identity originate being privileged
from being both Asian and European, Turkey is in a strong position in terms of forming
the stance of Eurasia. Calling Turkey as the “central state” is one of the most important
things in Ahmet Davutoglu’s thinking, however, it cannot be told that it has been invented
by Davutoglu himself. Not only one of the influential former Foreign Minister İsmail
Cem, but also former politicians and diplomats also used this metaphor as the centre or
the central country. Here, the significant point to stress is the similarities in their thinking.
Ahmet Davutoglu said that in the sense of geography, Turkey occupies a unique space as
a large country in the midst of Afro-Eurasia.116 Turkey may be defined as a central
country with multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to one unified character.
In terms of geo-strategical location, neighbor countries and relations with these countries
also important. Turkey currently has eight neighbors, it was six during the Cold War
period, when sea-border neighbor countries also included, the number of these neighbors
increase to twelve.117 Accordingly, it is also important that to feel secure from these
neighbor countries, which is contrary in terms of Turkey. Russia and Greece considered
as the historical enemies. During the 1990s, Syria and Iraq also considered as another
threat in terms of Turkish foreign policy. Because of the different understanding of Islam
and becoming an influential power over the region, relations with Iran have never been
so good. In other words, Turkey always has some kind of hostilities with neighbor states.
Furthermore, since the Ottoman Empire even since the Byzantium time Istanbul and
Dardanelle Straits’ significance in the foreign policy is another important geo-strategical
point. The Turkish Straits link between the Black Sea and Mediterranean.

Geographical location character itself has three dimensions and the first one is the
geopolitical, the second one is geo-economic and the third one is geo-cultural. Geopolitics
in the context of Turkey would probably entail why Turkey has always been considered
as a geopolitically important country because of the location of the country in a very

116
Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007,” Insight Turkey 10, no. 1
(2008): 77–96. p.78.
117
Baskın Oran, ed., Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 1:
1919-1980, 15th ed. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009). p.25.

50
strategic space in the middle of important regions of the world such as the Middle East,
Caucasus, Balkans, Mediterranean etc. This has been instrumentally used by Turkish
policymakers. In addition to locational importance, geopolitics includes states political
relations or political influence on all these regions. Therefore, when evaluating Turkey’s
geopolitical importance, political relations with regional actors and the Turkey’s political
influence over the region should be considered. In Grand Chessboard book, Zbigniew
Brzezinski’s major idea was the competition over Eurasia and the competition between
US, Russia, China over natural resources and strategic locations. The theory of Grand
Chessboard reflects Turkey as an influential and vital country.118 According to William
Hale “its geographical situation increases Turkey’s international weight, but historically
it also increased the chances of an attack by any of the great powers with ambitions in
these regions, making it quite unrealistic for it to adopt a passive policy of opting out of
international politics.”119 As scholars express that Turkey possesses pivotal location in
the world politics and this situation effect on the process of formulation Turkish foreign
policy since the Ottoman times.

Geo-economic factor mostly considering natural resources particularly natural gas

and oil resources and pipelines. This emerged in the post-Cold War period. During the
Cold War, in the East of Turkey, there was not an independent state, so they did not have
decision-making capabilities and power on their national natural gas and oil resources.
The Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan and all the littorals around the Caspian Sea
have plenty rich natural gas and oil resources. Especially at the beginning of the 1990s,
the question was how these new rich resources could be transported to the West. To do
this pipelines is the only way, for that and one of those pipelines has been so-called Baku-
Ceylan pipeline which has started operating in 2006.120 Moreover, behind that, there are
struggles among European states, Russia, and Turkey as the major players. Because these
pipelines’ significance is not only about the transportation. If the country in the center of
pipelines, this means that state has rights to control and secure politically the energy road

118
Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy And Its Geostrategic Imperatives, 1S
ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1998). p.47.
119
Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy : 1774-2000. p.5.
120
“Boru Hattı Projeleri,” Türkiye Petrolleri, accessed July 29, 2017,
http://www.tpao.gov.tr/tp5/?tp=m&id=30.

51
which is substantial leverage especially in terms of today’s conditions.121 Because of this,
Russia is still called as a superpower in terms of its energy resources. On the other hand,
the recent understanding of geopolitical vision gives value to geo-economic awareness in
terms of Turkey’s rising economic power and neo-liberal economic world order.122
Turkey, especially starting with the beginning of the 1990s, initiated to itself as an energy
terminal meaning that all these pipelines could be passing through Turkey, so that also
increased to Turkey’s strategic importance. In addition to Baku-Ceylan pipeline,
nowadays regional countries discussing another pipeline called Nabucco pipeline, but that
was canceled and now the trans-Adriatic pipeline is on the agenda. Both of these pipelines
considered as a way to European countries to bypass Russia. In 2009, Russia and Ukraine
had a huge dispute over natural gas prices. That’s why Russia stopped supplying natural
gas to Ukraine and this gas was going to Europe through Ukraine. Even today, European
Powers seek to bypass Russia by transporting gas through Turkey from the Caucasian
countries. Nowadays, obviously most of the pipelines going to Europe through Ukraine.
There are also other pipeline projects including Samsun-Ceyhan (Trans-Anatolian) oil
pipeline, Blue Stream (Mavi Akım) project, Turkish Stream project, Kerkuk-Yumurtalık
pipeline.

The third dimension is geo-culture. In this region, there are various kinds of
cultural differences. Turkey has various kinds of links and cultures which are coming
from Asia, Middle East and West.123 For instance, starting with religion, Islam has
different kinds of sects and every one of them takes place in the region. In other words,
not only Sunni Islam but also Shia Islam (which is opposed sect) represented by people
and countries in the region. Sunni Islam represented by Turkey and Shia Islam
represented by Iran which are two most influential countries in the region. It is clear that
Turkey is in the heart of the Sunni world. Moreover, there are Orthodox, Catholic, and
Protestant Christians not only in Turkey but also neighbor countries, and lots of them

121
Meltem Müftüler-Baç and Deniz Başkan, “The Future of Energy Security for Europe: Turkey’s Role as
an Energy Corridor,” Middle Eastern Studies 47, no. 2 (March 1, 2011): 361–78,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2010.481176.
122
Murat Yeşiltaş, “The Transformation of the Geopolitical Vision in Turkish Foreign Policy,” Turkish
Studies 14, no. 4 (December 1, 2013): 661–87, https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2013.862927. p.682.
123
Oran, Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 1: 1919-1980.
p.20.

52
have link with Turkey because of the holy places. Therefore, it is clear that Turkey is at
the crossroad of different religions and cultures. Each religion has its own culture, the
own way of thinking, the own way of life etc. This is why Turkey appears as a model for
many Middle Eastern countries as well as with its capability to preserve a culturally
diverse society. Additionally, there are also many ethnic groups in Turkey, particularly
after the Syrian crisis, this situation enormously changed. Furthermore, Turkey has a
geographic connection with Judaism and Israel. This overall pictures also gives an idea
about the geographical significance of Turkey, not only in political and economic terms
but also in cultural terms. In the book of the Clash of Civilizations by Samuel Huntington,
Turkey is as one of three “torn countries” together with Russia and Mexico. Meaning that
Turkey’s location between Western civilization and Islamic civilization turns it into a torn
country, therefore Turkey would be collapsed one day according to Huntington’s theory,
because of the clash of civilizations within the country.124

Following the geographic location or geographic importance, the historical factor

is another shaping factor of Turkish foreign policy. There is a very significant historical
factor that came to the fore. Not only shaping foreign policy but also politics, culture,
social life and everything, which is the Ottoman Empire and Byzantium Empire but
mostly the Ottoman legacy. This historical legacy influences not only foreign policy but
also political culture, internal politics and so on. Founder leaders of the Republic of
Turkey ignored this historical legacy because of that days’ circumstances, however,
history is still remaining. Starting with the 1950s, with Democrat Party political heritage
more or less has been a significant contribution to Turkish politics. The new Republic’s
foreign policy was based on the Ottoman foreign policy being aware of the balance of
power politics and evaluating the status-quo to use it for survival and the avoiding wars
involving unless it became directly threatened the Turkey. Because of the well-evaluated
status-quo and balance politics even after they weakened, they could live for a long
time.125 Legacy of Ottoman Empire is maintenance of status-quo, as Ataturk’s defined
with “peace at home peace in the world” regionally it is the preservation of existing

124
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1996).
125
Oran, Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 1: 1919-1980.
p.23.

53
borders, globally it is the preservation of existing balances between West and the East
and between different actors in the West and also making use of balance of power politics
for survival, a relatively secular outlook towards the world. That was based on the
historical understanding of security culture of realpolitik.126

Turkic origins people and nationalities in Caucasus and Central Asia another
significant dimension in terms of both shaping factor and historical factor. Moreover,
Caucasian and Central Asian nationalities share the same religion with the majority of
Turkey. Even today, religion and nationality are crucial instruments for states in their
foreign relations. This situation is not only valid for Turkey, for instance, Russia’s Balkan
policy, during the Bosnian Crisis was based on the supporting Serbs additionally in the
case of Cyprus Crisis, Russia supported Southern Cyprus instead of Northern part. All
these policies show that religion and nationality still play a substantial role on states’
foreign relations. In the case of Turkey’s relations with regional countries especially with
the Middle Eastern Islamic countries religion is significantly important. Definitely, the
basis of these circumstances dated back to Ottoman heritage. Even in Balkans the power
of historical legacy consciously used by the Turkish government for promoting Turkey’s
influence in the region.

Last but not the least important factor is the institutional links with regional and
global powers particularly via the multilateral organizations. That is mostly based on
Turkey’s membership in international organizations and multilateral alliances. In this
regard, the most important international organizations are the United Nations, European
Union, and NATO which clearly shows the Turkey’s links with Western powers. With
the NATO membership, Turkey became part of the Western bloc during the beginning of
Cold War. Becoming a part of NATO was not only about the security. Moreover, in the
sense of regional organizations, Turkey also plays a vital role with the position of OIC’s
Secretary General between 2005 – 2013, and an observer position in the African Union.

126
Mustafa Aydın, “The Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy, and Turkey’s European Vocation,” The
Review of International Affairs 3, no. 2 (Winter 2003): 306–31,
https://doi.org/10.1080/1475355032000240720.

54
 II. Turkish Foreign Policy until the 2000s
The course of Turkish foreign policy can be examined in four periods: the first
one is the inter-war period which contains the period of foundation of Republic of Turkey
(1923) to the end of WWII (1945), second period began with the end of the WWII and
the beginning with the bipolar world politics between Western bloc against the Eastern
bloc and eventuated with the collapse of USSR as an entity, third period mostly focuses
on the events in the 1990s especially with the end of the Cold War reformulation of
economic life and global politics, last period is the contemporary world which was began
with the AKP’s coming to power in 2002. In this section, the first part will focus on the
general events during the foundation of Republic which was mostly shaped according to
Kemalist principles by Atatürk and then Inonu. The second part will focus on the Cold-
War period which usually based on the alliances with West against the Soviet threat.
Lastly, the third part will focus on the post-Cold-War period related to Turkey’s struggle
to find a place in the new world order.

a. Inter-war Period
With the Lausanne Agreement, Turkey was known in the international arena and
became the neighbor between USSR in Caucasus, United Kingdom in Iraq and France in
Syria. When struggling with the establishment of a new nation-state, Turkey also tried to
resolve uncompromised issues of Lausanne, and the application of Lausanne decisions.
Mosul issue with the United Kingdom127, population exchange with Greece128, Ottoman
debt issue especially with France and the Hatay Prominence issue129 were the main
agenda topics in the beginnings of Turkish Foreign Policy.

The Conference of Lausanne negotiations were done in two sets: the first one was
between November 1922 and February 1923 and the second one was between April 1923
and July 1923.130 Three commissions conducted the negotiations: First commission was
run by Lord Curzon and was about the territorial and military issues; namely, Mosul, the
Straits and so on. The second commission was run by an Italian representative and was

127
Oran, Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 1: 1919-1980.
258.
128
Ibid. 329-334.
129
Ibid. 277-280.
130
Hüseyin Avni Çavdaroğlu, Öncesi ve Sonrası Ile Lozan (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2011). 65-84.

55
about the issues related to privileges of foreign nations in Turkey; namely, the
capitulations and minorities. Third commission was run by a French representative and
was about the economic and financial issues; namely, the Ottoman debt. 131 Three sets of
documents were the result of the conference: a peace treaty; 17 annexes to the treaty; and
the letters exchanged between Turkey and Western states. Treaty of Lausanne was signed
on 24 July 1923 and consisted of 143 articles.132

With Treaty of Lausanne, the frontier with Iraq was left to be determined in
bilateral talks between Turkey and Britain after the conference. If talks would fail in nine
months, the issue would be resolved by the mediation of the League of Nations. 133 All
capitulations were removed. Only non-Muslim people and groups considered as the
minorities.134 Three major beneficiaries were Greeks, Armenians, and Jews. These
minorities have had equal rights and have a right to use their mother languages and build
and manage their own educational institutions. On the other hand, Convention Relating
to the Regime of the Straits was founded and determined to use of Turkish Straits with a
neighbor and non-neighbor countries of Black Sea.135

Importance of Lausanne can be categorized under the three theme. The first theme
is the equality, among all the treaties signed after the First World War, Lausanne is the
only treaty which was not dictated by the victors, but was signed equally by the parties;
and which remained valid until today. Secondly political independence, Lausanne was
the treaty that made Turkey be recognized internationally. Lastly, economic
independence, Lausanne was the treaty that granted Turkey economic independence as it
removed all capitulations.136

According to Treaty of Lausanne, in terms of Mosul dispute, the parties could

settle an agreement within nine months, if not, to consult the League of Nations. The

131
Oran, Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 1: 1919-1980.
218-219; Çavdaroğlu, Öncesi ve Sonrası Ile Lozan. p.71.
132
Faruk Sönmezoğlu, İki Savaş Sırası ve Arasında Türk Dış Politikası (İstanbul: DER yayınları, 2011).
p.211.; Çavdaroğlu, Öncesi ve Sonrası Ile Lozan. p.87.
133
Sönmezoğlu, İki Savaş Sırası ve Arasında Türk Dış Politikası. p.213.
134
Ibid. p.213-215.
135
Baskın Oran, Tukish Foreign Policy: 1919-2006, Facts and Analyses with Documents, trans. Mustafa
Akşin (Utah: The University of Utah Press, 2010). p.137.
136
Ibid. p.131.

56
dispute over Mosul was concluded in three stages. Firstly, between May 1924 to June
1924, the bilateral talks started but ended with failure.137 So the dispute went to the
League which was the second stage. In the League meetings, Turkey wanted plebiscite in
the region while Britain wanted to settle the issue according to an independent
commission. The plebiscite was denied and a commission was formed, which submitted
its report in July 1925.138 The report was defending British interests and was rejected by
Turkey due to the claim that the League of Nations had no legal authority to resolve the
issue. The case was taken to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court
announced its decision in November 1925 which rejected Turkish thesis once again,
according to the Treaty of Lausanne.139 In December 1925, the Assembly of the League
of Nations unanimously decided that Mosul will be a part of Iraq. Eventually, The Mosul
dispute was settled with a treaty between Turkey and Iraq and signed in Ankara on June
5, 1926.140 After the Mosul dispute, the relations between Turkey and Britain tended to
improve, especially in the 1930s because of the rise of the extremism in the Europe.141

Relation with France was another issue during the Ataturk’s presidency and there
was two fundamental issue regarding the relations with France which were payment of
Ottoman debt and more importantly Hatay issue.142 Payment of Ottoman debt to France
was settled by a treaty in 1928 and re-organized in Turkey’s favor in 1933 because of the
Great Depression.143 However, the Sancak (Hatay) issue lasted until 1938. In 1921, with
the Treaty of Ankara, Sancak was left to Syria with the condition of autonomy.144 In 1936,
with the Franco–Syrian Treaty of Independence, France left Syria, but the status of
Sancak remained disputed as Atatürk wanted Sancak to be independent as well.145 In
August 1938, elections were held in Hatay and ended in Turkish majority in the

137
Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy : 1774-2000. p.43.
138
Ibid. p.43.
139
Ibid. p.43.
140
Ibid. p.43.
141
Oran, Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 1: 1919-1980.
p.272.
142
Ibid. p.277.
143
Ibid. p.279.
144
Hamit Pehlivanlı, Yusuf Sarınay, and Hüsamettin Yıldırım, Türk Dış Politikasında Hatay (1918-1939)
(Ankara: Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi (ASAM) Yayınları, 2001). p.35-36.
145
Adnan Sofuoğlu, “Belgeler Işığında Bağımsız Hatay Devleti’nin Kuruluşu ve Türkiye,” T.C
Başbakanlık Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu, accessed July 6, 2017,
http://www.atam.gov.tr/dergi/sayi-62/belgeler-isiginda-bagimsiz-hatay-devletinin-kurulusu-ve-turkiye.

57
parliament. In September 1938, Hatay became independent. Eventually, in February 1939
a plebiscite took place for participation to Turkish territory as a result of plebiscite Hatay
joined Turkey.146

In the sense of relations with Italy, especially after 1924 Turkey became uneasy
with Mussolini’s policies, before that Mussolini was not seeing as a big threat.147 In 1927,
Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüstü Aras meet with Mussolini and in 1928 they signed a Treaty
of Neutrality which was affected almost a decade.148 Before 1936, Italy was Turkey’s one
of the biggest trade partners, however, with the occupation of Ethiopia by Italy, League
of Nations decided to sanctions against Italy. Economically, Italy was one of the biggest
trade partners of Turkey, despite that, Turkey also supported these sanctions because of
the rising threat.149

In the sense of relations with Germany, in 1924 Turkey signed a Turco - German
Friendship Treaty.150 At the time, Germany was feeling very isolated from international
politics just like the Soviet Union in a way. So in the meantime, they are both isolated
states, it was easy to make a move towards Germany and the Soviet Union. In 1929
Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras visited Germany and economic relations have
improved very rapidly between 1923 and 1932.151 Particularly, after 1932, after the rise
of Hitler, in the sense of economic relations, some changes began to emerge because of
the Germany’s internal dynamics which reflects the external policies.152 The emergence
of Nazi Germany, just like Mussolini’s policies, led to Turkey concern about Hitler’s
revisionist policies.153 Besides that, Germany was not happy about the inclusion to Balkan
Pact and Montreux Convention just like Italy.

146
Hasan Kösebalaban, Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). p.58.
147
Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy : 1774-2000. p.44-45.
148
Ibid. p.45.
149
Gönlübol and Sar, “1919 - 1938 Yılları Arasında Türk Dış Politikası.” p.112.
150
Oran, Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 1: 1919-1980.
p.298-299.
151
Ibid. p.300.
152
Ibid. p.300-301.
153
Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy : 1774-2000. p.48.

58
 Another important state in terms of Turkish foreign policy during that time was
the relations with USSR. Between 1919 and 1939, the relations with SU was some kind
of a honeymoon for both states. Especially, in the international arena, when one side
becomes a part of an alliance gave information to the other side and took some kind of an
approval from the other side. Moreover, after Montreux Treaty, relations between two
side improved more because of the Turkey’s insistence to Soviets entrance to the meeting.
After Montreux Treaty to until 1939, there were not any major problem between two
states and moreover, they support each other in almost every international issue including
disarmament conferences.154

The last but not the least important relations during that time was with the Greece.
With the Treaty of Lausanne, the border was decided and the Aegean Islands were
demilitarized. However, population exchange between Turkey and Greece was not
decided until 1930. The main dispute was because of the “Etabli Issue” (settled
people).155 The major problems were which groups will be included in exchange (Greek,
Greek-Orthodox, Catholics, and Muslims), the second one was Greeks in Istanbul and
Muslims in Western Thrace were excluded but what are these limits of this. Another issue
was the Greek Patriarchate which represents the Orthodox community.156 In this case,
Turkey’s thesis was letting Patriarchate stay in Turkish territories but only if its deals with
religious affairs, before that patriarchy had economic, social and political dimensions. In
1930, with the Greek-Turkish Agreements, Établi Issue, economic problems related to
the population exchange was resolved and Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality, Conciliation,
and Arbitration was signed.157

During Atatürk’s presidency, international environment experienced two periods,

first one was the temporary peace period because of the focusing on the internal dynamics
(1919–1930), and the second one was continuous crises period and seeking an alliance
period (1930–1938).158 In the first period, the Treaty of Rapallo (1922), Locarno Treaties

154
Oran, Tukish Foreign Policy: 1919-2006, Facts and Analyses with Documents. p.187-191.
155
Ateş, “Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türk Dış Politikaları.” p.56.
156
Oran, Tukish Foreign Policy: 1919-2006, Facts and Analyses with Documents. p.198-200.
157
Ali Balcı, Türkiye Dış Politikası: İlkeler, Aktörler, Uygulamalar (İstanbul: Etkileşim Yayınları, 2013).
p.44-47.
158
Oran, Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 1: 1919-1980.
p.254.

59
(1925), and Kellogg–Briand Pact (1928) was the most important treaties in the
international environment to show the peace efforts. However, during the continuous
crises period with the Great Depression, Japanese invasion of Manchuria, Adolf Hitler’s
rise to power, Italian occupation of Ethiopia, emergence of Berlin–Rome axis in 1936,
Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) and the Spanish General Francisco Franco’s taking
control of Spain, the international environment turned back to the security and potential
war politics again.

When Turkey tried to resolve problems with neighbor countries, besides that tried
to establish good relations with major powers.159 As mentioned above, Turkish foreign
policy during Atatürk’s presidency was conducted with the principle of “peace at home,
peace in the world”. Accordingly, Turkey took part in bilateral agreements with France
(1927), Italy (1928), and Greece (1930). In this regard, Treaty of Friendship and
Neutrality was signed between Turkey and USSR on 17 December 1925. On the other
hand, after the resolution of Mosul issue, relations between Turkey and UK improved.
Additionally, Turkey participated to Briand – Kellogg Pact in 1929 which was proscribed
the war.

Related with the League of Nations membership, Turkey had recognized the
authority of the League by signing the Treaty of Lausanne. After the resolve the dispute
of Mosul, Britain wanted Turkey to access to the League, but Turkey was reluctant due
to the League’s role in the Mosul Dispute and to the Soviet stance about the League.160
In 1928, Turkish approach started to change as Turkey participated in the League of
Nations’ disarmament conference in Geneva. In the 1930s, Turkey became more
interested in joining the League due to the rise of revisionism in Europe and to the change
of Soviet stance about the League. Therefore, Turkey was invited in 1932, and this
invitation was accepted by Turkey with several reservations concerning the USSR.161
Officially, Turkey became the member of League of Nations in 1932. After becoming a
member, Turkey actively participated in the League affairs. It agreed on the sanctions

159
Sönmezoğlu, İki Savaş Sırası ve Arasında Türk Dış Politikası. p.259-263.
160
Gönlübol and Sar, “1919 - 1938 Yılları Arasında Türk Dış Politikası.” p.95.
161
Ateş, “Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türk Dış Politikaları.” p.56.

60
against Italy and became a non–permanent member of the League Council between 1935–
1937.162

Furthermore, Balkan Pact (1934) was signed by Greece, Turkey, Romania and
Yugoslavia, aiming at maintaining the geopolitical status quo in the region following
World War I. The signatories agreed to suspend all disputed territorial claims against each
other and their immediate neighbors following the aftermath of the war and a rise in
various regional ethnic minority tensions. Other nations in the region that had been
involved in related diplomacy refused to sign the document, including Italy, Albania,
Bulgaria, Hungary, and the Soviet Union. Non–signatories were mostly those
governments with territorial expansion in their minds.163

Montreux Convention (1936) was one of the major successes in Turkish Foreign
Policy. With the Montreux Convention, the agreement that gives Turkey control over the
Bosporus Straits and the Dardanelles and regulates the transit of naval warships. On the
one hand, it gives Turkey full control over the Straits and guarantees the free passage of
civilian vessels in peacetime. On the other hand, it restricts the passage of naval ships not
belonging to Black Sea states. Therefore, straits began to militarized by Turkey and also
Lausanne Strait Convention was abolished. Compare to Lausanne’s Convention Relating
to the Régime of the Straits, Montreux was definitely an improvement in the case of
Turkish National Security. Montreux Convention was established in 1936 and still
valid.164

Another important point before the Second World War was the establishment of
Mediterranean Pact (1936) that was mostly established because of the Italian threat over
the Mediterranean, among the Britain, Turkey, France Yugoslavia and Greece. Another
significant pact was the establishment of Saadabad Pact (1937) between Turkey, Iran,
Iraq, and Afghanistan, this was mostly a non–aggression pact among the member
countries.165

162
Sönmezoğlu, İki Savaş Sırası ve Arasında Türk Dış Politikası. p.309-310.
163
Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy : 1774-2000. p.31-56.
164
Kösebalaban, Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization. p.56; Sönmezoğlu, İki
Savaş Sırası ve Arasında Türk Dış Politikası. p.372-383.
165
Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy : 1774-2000. p.46.

61
 During the Second World War Turkey remained mostly de facto neutral power
despite its alliance with Britain and France.166 That was mostly based on the lessons from
WWI. Moreover, in the proses of war, Turkey mostly used pragmatic policies which were
aimed to not to enter the war via using existing balances.167 During the war, two general
principles were adopted in Turkish foreign policy, firstly a policy of balance between
Axis and Alliance, secondly avoiding war unless Turkey is occupied. Turkish foreign
policy became so difficult in the process of WWII, because of the many different actors
which need to balance including the Soviet Union and Germany. In other words, Turkey
during this process was searching security guarantees against German, Italian and Soviet
threats. Herewith, Turco-British and Turco-French declarations for mutual assistance
were signed and eventually with the Ankara Pact Turkish – French - British Alliance
established.168 The German invasion of Romania, the Italian invasion of Greece forced
Turkey to enter the war, however, Turkey uses Second Protocol of Ankara Treaty and
French defeat as an excuse to avoid war, but one of the main reason was Turkish military
weakness vis-à-vis Germany.169

During that time, Turkey and Soviets declare neutrality in case they are attacked.
Moreover, Turkey signed a Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression with Germany170,
so with this treaty, Turkey became the de facto neutral state between Axis and Allied
Powers. Yet, the treaty was criticized by Britain. During the ongoing process of war, when
Germany began to Operation Barbarossa against the Soviets breathe a sigh of relief 171,
because of the end of the Polish Syndrome which was for Turkey being attacked by both
Germany and the Soviet Union at the same time. Nevertheless, Turkey’s concerns were
not ended, if Germany was defeated, the Soviets may become the dominant power in
Eastern Europe and eventually want to control over the Straits, if Soviets were defeated,

166
Ibid. p.76-77.
167
Hasan Könî, “II. Dünya Savaşı Öncesinde Türk Dış Politikası,” Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Tarihi
Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi 1, no. 1 (1988): 43–63, https://doi.org/10.1501/Tite_0000000078. p.43-53
168
Oran, Tukish Foreign Policy: 1919-2006, Facts and Analyses with Documents. p.163-165.
169
Ahmet Şükrü Esmer and Oral Sander, “İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türk Dış Politikası,” in Olaylarla Türk
Dış Politikası (1919-1995), ed. Mehmet Gönlübol (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1996), 135–85. p.143-144.
170
Fahir Armaoğlu, 20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi (Cilt 1-2: 1914-1995), 11th ed. (İstanbul: Alkım Yayınevi,
n.d.). p.410; Selim Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An “Active” Neutrality
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). p.136; Mustafa Ekincikli, İnönü-Bayar Dönemleri Türk
Dış Siyaseti, 1st ed. (Ankara: Berikan Yayınları, 2007). p.35-36.
171
Esmer and Sander, “İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türk Dış Politikası.” p.157.

62
then Germany may attack to Turkey. In this process, when Germany, with the diplomatic
efforts, try to pull Turkey into the Axis, Allies wanted to the continuation of Turkey’s
neutral status. However, when Germany lost Stalingrad Campaign and began to
withdraw, Allies began to pressure on Turkey for joining the war against Germany.172
Turkey tried to gain as much as possible time to think about the following consequences:
firstly, if Turkey enters the war without adequate military help, Germany might destroy
Turkey very quickly and Stalin may also use this as an excuse to attack Turkey. Secondly,
if Turkey does not enter the war, it can be isolated and left alone against the Soviets.
Thirdly, Britain may offer the Straits to the Soviets in order to keep him in the Allies.
Inonu’s policy during that time was buying as much time as possible, and keeping Allies
satisfied about Turkey’s intentions to join the war.173

In the Casablanca, Adana, Moscow, 1st Cairo and Teheran Conferences British
(Churchill), US (Roosevelt), and SU (Stalin) tried to persuade Turkey to enter the war
against the Germany. In the 2nd Cairo Conference (1943) President Inonu accepted to
enter the war in principle, but asked for military aid and eventually declared to war
(February 1944) against Germany, Japan and Axis Powers.174 At the end of the war,
Soviet invasion of Romania and Bulgaria alarmed Turkey. Furthermore, in May 1945,
Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov declared to Turkish Ambassador Selim
Sarper, Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality would not be extended.175 Moreover, Soviets
demanded to revision of Turkish - Soviet frontier, granting bases to Soviets in the Straits
and revision of Montreux Treaty bilaterally between Turkey and Soviets.176

172
Ekincikli, İnönü-Bayar Dönemleri Türk Dış Siyaseti. p.39-46.
173
Ibid. p.46.
174
Edward Weisband, İkinci Dünya Savaşı’nda İnönü’nün Dış Politikası (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları,
1974). p.133-267.
175
Oran, Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 1: 1919-1980.
p.501-502.
176
Balcı, Türkiye Dış Politikası: İlkeler, Aktörler, Uygulamalar. p.66-69; Sönmezoğlu, İki Savaş Sırası ve
Arasında Türk Dış Politikası. p.479-482.

63
 Table 3: Important Periods and Features of Second World War

PERIOD IMPORTANT FEATURES VITAL POLICY

1939-1941 Search for Help Ankara Pact with German-Turkish Balance Between
Period Against Germany France & Britain Non-Aggression Axis & Alliance
& Italy & Friendship
Treaty

1941-1943 End of Polish Turkish Chromite British-Soviet Turkish-German

Period Syndrome Trade with Fidelity to Rapprochement
Germany Montreux

1943-1945 Allies Victory in Increasing Buying Time,

Period North Africa Pressure to Avoiding War
Turkey to Enter
the War

Turkish Foreign Policy during the inter-war period mostly shaped by the founder
of Republic of Turkey, M. Kemal Atatürk, and the main motto in the external relations
was “peace at home, peace in the world”. When analyzing Turkish Foreign Policy during
the Atatürk period, resolution of problems with neighbor countries, using active and
multi-dimensional diplomacy, preferring conciliation rather than conflict were the main
characteristics of the period.177 To sum up, Turkey in the nation-state building process
also tried to establish security over the region with the Mediterranean, Saadabad and
Balkan Pacts and these pacts led to some positive results among member states. On the
process of Second World War, President Inonu maintained the Ataturk’s policy in some
way and also tried to avoid the war because of the reasons which were mentioned above.
As a consequence, during the inter-war period Turkish leaders and decision-makers, tried
to establish multilateral ties especially with the League of Nations and multilateral
security pacts.

177
Oral Sander, Türkiye’nin Dış Politikası (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 1998). p.147-149.

64
 b. Cold War Period
Turkey after the end of the WWII enter the Cold-War period as a more isolated
country. Even though Turkey successfully adopted active neutrality during the Second
World War, Turkey became unseen and unimportant in global politics after the war.178
According to Selim Deringil, Turkey’s “active neutrality” strategy during the WWII
coming from its weaknesses and Turkey used this strategy excellently to get the economic
and military aid from both sides.179 On the other hand, in terms of relations with the Soviet
Union, Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality did not extend by Soviet side. Until 1945, this
treaty was a symbol of friendship between two countries. Moreover, Soviet claimed Kars
and Ardahan provinces from Turkey. Furthermore, after the Potsdam Conference, Soviets
wanted to revision on Treaty of Montreux to use the straits effectively, however Soviets,
Britain and US leaders did not agree upon the revision of the Treaty of Montreux so there
were diplomatic notes among SU, Britain, US and Turkey about the revision of
Montreux.180 In terms of Cold-War, periodization would be better to highlight the
significant turning points in the foreign policy of Turkey. In the sense of Turkish foreign
policy, this can be categorized 1945 to 1960, 1960 to 1980 and the 1980s. The major
developments in Turkish foreign policy until the end of the 1950s can be summarized as
follows: foundation of the UN (1945) in order to replace League of Nations, Truman
Doctrine and Marshall Plan, Establishment of NATO (1949), joining the Korean War
(1950-1953) joining the NATO (1952).

Potsdam Conference is accepted as the beginning of the Cold War as it was the
last time Truman and Stalin sit on the same table. Iron Curtain speech of Churchill is also
accepted as the beginning of the Cold War. That was the first time a superior official
declared Soviet threat over the West.181 So, with the end of the Potsdam Conference or
Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech, the Cold-War era emerged as a new world order.
Basically, the Cold-War means that the lack of direct war, but the fear of war that emerged
anytime. After the end of the WWII, Turkey tried to participate in the new multilateral

178
Kösebalaban, Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization. p.65-68.
179
Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An “Active” Neutrality. p.136.
180
Oran, Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 1: 1919-1980.
p.421, 474-475.
181
Ibid. p.536; Faruk Sönmezoğlu, II. Dünya Savaşı’ndan Günümüze Türkiye Dış Politikası (İstanbul: DER
yayınları, 2006). p.35-37; Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy : 1774-2000. p.74.

65
organizations and security alliances especially against the Soviet threat. Therefore, Tukey
was one of the founder members of UN, and Turkey became the member of IMF and WB
in 1947. Besides that, Turkey together with Greece benefited from the Truman Doctrine
which was not only economical but also military help towards Turkey and Greece against
the Soviet threat. Apart from sending monetary aid, US also send civilian and military
personnel to Greece and Turkey, in order to assist them in tasks of re-construction and
for supervising financial and material assistance as well as training.182 In Turkish foreign
policy during that time traditional balancing behavior due to lack of different kinds of
blocks ended, because of the fewer options in a strictly bipolar world.183 The major
concern in foreign policy was guaranteeing security against the Soviet threat with the
strategic alignment with West. Until the Korean War, Turkey followed more cautious and
passive policies, but with the Korean War active foreign policy era began and eventually
joined the NATO in 1952.184 Turkey did not have to send soldiers to Korean War, because
not to member of NATO at that time, however, the government did not consult to the
Parliament and send the troops and Turkish troops was the second largest troop in the
Korea after the US. Korean War was the first time of Turkey took military action outside
National Pact borders.185

Another important point was Marshall Plan and the main goal was to strengthen
European economy which was devastated during the WWII. The logic behind that,
Europe should stand on its own economically, in order to keep its political independence
from the Soviet threat. That was an emphasis on economic rehabilitation without
reference to military aid. European countries that participate in the plan decided to
establish Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) which turned into
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) eventually.186 On
the other hand, during this process, although, US was reluctant to give economic aid to
Turkey within the Marshall Plan since it was only designed for countries which were
devastated in WWII, Turkey also included for direct economic help from the US. In

182
Balcı, Türkiye Dış Politikası: İlkeler, Aktörler, Uygulamalar. p.71-73.
183
Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy : 1774-2000. p.78.
184
Sönmezoğlu, II. Dünya Savaşı’ndan Günümüze Türkiye Dış Politikası. p.44-47.
185
Oran, Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 1: 1919-1980.
p.543-550.
186
Ibid. p.539-542.

66
domestic politics, this situation helped DP to win oncoming elections (1954 and 1957)
due to economic relief. However, in 1958 when foreign aid stopped, Turkey entered an
economic crisis and had to sit on the same table with IMF.187

After the death of Stalin, with the Khrushchev, “Peaceful Coexistence” in Soviet
foreign policy began. The discourse of USSR changed when Khrushchev came into
power and de-Stalinization of Soviet politics began.188 By the time Warsaw Pact was
established against the NATO. In the case of Turkey, Stalin’s death and Soviet’s change
of policy was not actually regarded by Turkish policymakers as a very sincere change.
Turkish decision-makers had always been very skeptical about changes in Soviet foreign
policy. Because of that, Turkey was pushing too much effort for the Balkan Pact and the
Baghdad Pact.189 Because of the Soviet threat against Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia and
also the US supported for a NATO-like pact in Balkans. Therefore, ultimately, in 1954
with the Bled Treaty, a military alliance of Balkan Pact was founded. Nonetheless, as
Stalin dies in 1953, in fact, the alliance became meaningless, because, Stalin was more
brutal to keep the Cominform in shape. Balkan Pact dissolved in 1960 because of the de-
Stalinization policies and improvements of relations with among USSR, Yugoslavia, and
Turkey.190

In the 1950s, developments in the Middle East defined the general framework of
Turkish foreign policy. Especially, Menderes governments active policies over the
Middle East was influential on Turkey’s overall foreign policy during that period. There
were good relations with Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. In 1947, Turkey voted against
Palestine’s division in UN. However, in 1949, one of the radical changes in Turkish
foreign policy reflected in Turkey’s recognition of Israel as the only Muslim country, so
Turkey began to located itself with Western Powers, particularly, because of the security
concerns. When the UK failed to achieve Middle East Command due to Egypt’s
reluctance, Eisenhower and Dulles promoted “Containment Policy” with the Bagdad Pact

187
“Stand-By’ların Sonuncusu,” Capital, July 17, 2015, https://www.capital.com.tr/ekonomi/makro-
ekonomi/stand-bylarin-sonuncusu.
188
Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy : 1774-2000. p.88-89.
189
Sönmezoğlu, II. Dünya Savaşı’ndan Günümüze Türkiye Dış Politikası. p.125-129.
190
Ibid. p.89-94; Oral Sander, Balkan Gelişmeleri ve Türkiye (1945-1965) (Ankara: Sevinç Matbası, 1969).
p.83-121.

67
(after 1960 called as CENTO) in the Middle East.191 In addition to Balkan Pact, Turkey
strived to found the Baghdad Pact in the Middle East against the Soviet threat. Similarly,
with Balkan Pact, Baghdad Pact failed because of the lack of the support from the Arab
countries.192 Even worse, Baghdad Pact caused a further divide within the Arab States,
Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia were against the Pact, when Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan
remained neutral.193 In the sense of Turkey, Baghdad Pact led to two implications: firstly,
damaged the relations with Soviets and Arab states except for Iraq, secondly caused anti-
Turkish sentiment in non-aligned movement.194 Turkey was became seen as a Western
Powers’ (Imperial-Colonial Powers for Arabs) agent in the Middle East. Moreover, in
Bandung Conference in 1955, Turkey also isolated from the non-Aligned world.195

In 1954, Turkey have become directly interested in Cyprus, before that since it
was a UK territory did not want to do anything but there was a Turkish population.
Turkey’s interest on the island began because of the Greek Cypriots’ activities for self-
determination from the UK and achieve the unification with Greece (ENOSIS). In 1954,
Greece applied to UN for self-determination for Cyprus both Britain and Turkey rejected
that, through the application, the issue became an international issue.196 Thanks to the
London Conference in 1955, Britain, Turkey and Greece assemble to discuss the situation
of the Cyprus. When Turkey and Britain wanted to preservation of status quo, Greece
wanted to self-determination. Related with that, EOKA was founded in 1955 to fight
against the British forces on the Cyprus by Greek Cypriots.197

6-7 September Pogrom in İstanbul and İzmir changed the course of the Cyprus
issue and also Turkey’s relations with Greece. In August 1955, just a few weeks before
this incident, Menderes made a very tough speech against Greece and he said that the

191
Oran, Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 1: 1919-1980.
p.651-652.
192
Ekincikli, İnönü-Bayar Dönemleri Türk Dış Siyaseti. p.253-255.
193
Ibid. p.248-250.
194
Mehmet Gönlübol and Haluk Ülman, “İkinci Dünya Savaşından Sonra Türk Dış Politikası (1945-
1965),” in Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1995), ed. Mehmet Gönlübol (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi,
1996), 189–335. p.269-271.
195
Armaoğlu, 20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi (Cilt 1-2: 1914-1995). p.625; Hüseyin Bağcı, Türk Dış Politikasında
1950’li Yıllar, 2nd ed. (Ankara: METU Press, 2001). p.58-61.
196
Faruk Sönmezoğlu, Soğuk Savaş Döneminde Türk Dış Politikası (1945 - 1991) (İstanbul: DER yayınları,
2016). p.160-161.
197
Ibid. p.161.

68
Greeks were trying to achieve ENOSIS with the Greek Cypriots. Therefore, Turkey shall
protect its rights over Cyprus. That speech, politically, was regarded as a turning point of
Turkey’s policy about Cyprus. After that, when the news of Ataturk’s house in Solanki
had been bombed, the real turning point comes with the 6 - 7 September incidents and it
is very interesting that they take place simultaneously with the London Conference. 198
After the Conference, Turkey began to support the idea of TAKSIM (division of the
island) against ENOSIS. Moreover, in 1958 Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT)
founded against EOKA.199 In 1959, with the US pressures London Agreements (Treaty
of Establishment, Treaty of Guarantee, Treaty of Alliance) signed among Britain, Greece
and Turkey.200

1960s begin with crisis not only in the sense of Turkish political life, but also in
terms of global politics. Turkey faced first military coup in its history, besides that the
world came to the nuclear war threat with the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Cuba received
military help from the USSR and in 1962 it was understood that SU had been actually
deploying intermediate-range military missiles in Cuba just like Jupiter missiles in
Turkey.201 Cuban Missile Crisis was the only time when two superpowers came on a brink
of war. The crisis showed that how it was easy for the superpowers to start a war between
each other. At the end of the crisis, it was seen as a failure in Soviet policy so Khrushchev
replaced by Brezhnev who opened a new history in the Soviets foreign policy. In 1971,
for the first time two superpowers came together to discuss the possible limit or reduction
of strategic arms. Furthermore, Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
(CSCE) which then become Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE), was established to serve as a multilateral forum for dialogue and negotiation
between East and West.202

Turkey was in a rough time in terms of domestic and foreign policy, because of
the instability in the political climate, coalition governments had been changing so

198
Oran, Tukish Foreign Policy: 1919-2006, Facts and Analyses with Documents. p.360.
199
Ibid. 359-362.
200
Ibid. 363-365.
201
Sönmezoğlu, Soğuk Savaş Döneminde Türk Dış Politikası (1945 - 1991). p.78-80.
202
“The Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE),” Republic of Turkey Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, accessed July 25, 2017, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-and-the-organization-for-security-
and-cooperation-in-europe-osce.en.mfa.

69
quickly. 1960s period in Turkish foreign policy can be described as disappointment,
because of the alliance with the West particularly with the US. Because, beginning with
1964 Johnson’s letter, Turkish policymakers understood that they invested too much
loyalty to Western alliance, so it was a period where Turkey actually began to question
alliance ties with the West and Turkey began to move in two directions in foreign policy,
whether it would be USSR or Arab states or non-aligned movement.203 Options of Turkish
foreign policy were starting to become diversified during the period which is quite
important. As Inonu stated after the Johnson’s letter “if Turkey somehow lost alliance
with West then the new world will be established and Turkey will take its place there”
motto began to use in this period.204

In the beginning of 1960s, US economic and military power began to questioning

due to Vietnam War. Besides that, rise of Charles de Gaulle in French and European
politics and French withdrawal from NATO’s military wing; The Prague Spring of 1968
and Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia; Brezhnev Doctrine in USSR which gave right to
violate the sovereignty of any country attempting to replace Marxist-Leninism with
capitalism; 1968 Six-Day War between Israel and Egypt; rise of the 3rd World (Non-
Alignment Movement) were the other main dynamics during the 1960s period in the
global arena.

During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Soviets demanded to the dismantling of Jupiter
missiles which placed in Turkey. Turkey demanded on the US to keep the missiles. US-
Soviet secretly dealt to dismantle the Jupiter missiles after the Cuban Missile Crisis in
return to dismantle the USSR missiles in Cuba. However, this situation informed Turkey
later and Turkey did not want to lose the defense power of Jupiter missiles. Jupiter
missiles replaced by Polaris submarines which were mostly placed in Europe in 1963.
Jupiter Missiles Crisis had two major implications for Turkey, firstly this situation left
Turkey vulnerable to the Soviet threat, secondly, the nature of the US - Turkish alliance
questioned.205 On the other hand, Johnson’s letter was some kind disaster in Turkish

203
Kösebalaban, Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization. p.94-96.
204
Emre Gönen, “A Decisive Period for Turkey’s Western Alliance,” Daily Sabah, May 17, 2017,
https://www.dailysabah.com/columns/emre_gonen/2017/05/17/a-decisive-period-for-turkeys-western-
alliance.; Şükrü Mucuk, “Johnson Mektubu ve Türk Kamuoyu” (Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi, 2013). p.57-59.
205
Gönlübol and Ülman, “İkinci Dünya Savaşından Sonra Türk Dış Politikası (1945-1965).” p.328-329.

70
foreign policy, when Turkey wanted to intervene to Cyprus, particularly after the “Bloody
Christmas” on 21 December 1963, the US with Johnson’s letter prevented the
intervention.206 As a consequence of both Jupiter Missiles Crisis and Johnson’s letter, a
series of incidents occurred both in foreign policy and domestic policy of Turkey. Briefly,
NATO was becoming questioned for the protection of Turkey against USSR, Turkey
began to improve relations with USSR at the lowest level, Turkey abandoned the pro-
American foreign policy, and anti-Americanism began in the public.207

After Johnson’s letter in terms of the relationship between Turkey and US so-
called multilateral course settled, it was not a very big issue but it was very indicative of
Turkey’s ideas about the changing alliances conditions with the US. Multilateral Force
(MLF) was actually firstly produced by John F. Kennedy and it was actually an aim to
prevent the France as an independent nuclear power.208 In the beginning, Turkey became
the part of the MLF but after Johnson’s letter, Turkey decided to withdraw from the MLF.
This was the first case Turkey found the opportunity to say no to the US.209 In 1969, Joint
Defense Cooperation Agreement established and all the agreements that were signed with
the US were gathered under the single agreement. These would end in 1975 as a result of
the Cyprus intervention and the US arms embargo on Turkey. Yet, at least, for 6 years
the Turkish government has shown its intention to control over the military bases under
the NATO operations.210 From this point of view, The US bases in Turkey could only be
used within NATO framework which was very strict, Turkey did not let the US use bases
for own purposes without obtaining approval from NATO.

The 1970s began with a series of crisis and the most important one was the OPEC
Oil Crisis. In 1973 with the OPEC Crisis, Arab countries for the first time came together
and increased the oil prices and reduced the export of oil, as a result of that Western
economy influence seriously. The reason behind the OPEC Oil Crises came to the last

206
For the full text of Johnson’s letter please look at: http://www.cyprus-
conflict.org/materials/johnsonletter.html
207
Suha Bolukbasi, “The Johnson Letter Revisited,” Middle Eastern Studies 29, no. 3 (1993): 505–25.
208
Oran, Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 1: 1919-1980.
p.691.
209
Gönlübol and Ülman, “İkinci Dünya Savaşından Sonra Türk Dış Politikası (1945-1965).” p.330.
210
Ekavi Athanassopoulou, Strategic Relations Between the US and Turkey 1979-2000: Sleeping with a
Tiger (New York: Routledge, 2014). p.11.

71
stage and emerged because of the 1973 Arab-Israel War.211 Therefore, oil became costly
and that led to some implications for Turkey as well. After 1973, one of the roots of 1980
coup in Turkey was because of the economic hardships that the government and people
were faced.

During the 1970s the most significant issue in Turkish foreign policy was the
Cyprus issue which was escalated since the early 1960s. In the first intervention in 1974,
Turkey had legitimacy, according to Treaty of Guarantee, if order breaks down in Cyprus
then Turkey become one of the countries to restore the order together with Greece and
Britain. Here, the problem was the second intervention that Turkey decides to stay on the
island as a military power. After Turkey’s intervention, UN Security Council came
together with the resolution 353 including a call for an immediate ceasefire and cessation
of hostilities, they say all foreign troops should be withdrawn and peace talks should take
start between Turkey, Greece, and the UK, therefore, Geneva Conference gathered.212
However, during the second talks in Geneva, Foreign Minister Turan Güneş and Prime
Minister Bulent Ecevit thought that Greeks trying to gain time and did not intend to make
a peace with Turkey so they decide to move further. As a result of the second Turkish
intervention, Turkish troops start to control 35%of the island. One of the consequences;
the US embargo on Turkey which took place three years until 1978, that was probably
the biggest shock. Another one was Greece withdrawal from NATO’s military wing as a
protest of Turkey, actually protesting the US and NATO. Besides Cyprus issue, several
problems began to emerge between Turkey and Greece during the period which are
particularly known as Aegean problems, namely these problems are the territorial waters,
continental shelf, airspace zone and the Flight Information Region (FIR), Turkey and
Greece’s claims can be listed in the following table (Table 2):

211
Kimberly Amadeo, “OPEC Oil Embargo: Causes and Effects of the Crisis,” The Balance, July 1, 2017,
https://www.thebalance.com/opec-oil-embargo-causes-and-effects-of-the-crisis-3305806.
212
Sönmezoğlu, II. Dünya Savaşı’ndan Günümüze Türkiye Dış Politikası. p.243-283.; Oran, Türk Dış
Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 1: 1919-1980. p.716-749.

72
 Table 4: Aegean Sea Issues between Turkey and Greece213

Problem Territorial Continental Airspace Flight

Waters Shelf Information
Region
Greece It can be Each Aegean 10 miles 1952 ICAO
extended to 12 Island has its gives control to
miles own continental Greece
shelf
Turkey Casus Belli in Aegean seabed is Airspace cannot 1974 Turkey
case extended a natural be greater than wants to be
more than 6 extension of territorial asked
miles Anatolia waters (6 miles)

As a consequence of US embargo, Turkish reaction was threatening to US

government with closing bases and it had been an effective policy actually. As a result of
that, President Ford came to Turkey and discussed it with Turkish politicians etc. Turkey
also canceled 1975 Treaty and closed facilities of US bases in Turkey. 214 That means
bases are stopped for a big time, as a big reaction. Furthermore, rising anti-Americanist
moves began, particularly by leftist circles. In addition to that, as another consequence,
Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was declared. As a result of Turkish reactions in 1975
October, US Congress lifted the embargo on foreign aid but not the arms and in the
meantime, Turkey and the US signed a new Defense and Economic Cooperation
Agreement (DECA) but it is never ratified by the Congress.215

After the Cuban Missile Crisis, two blocs entered to a period of détente, which
means rapprochement or softening of harsh relations between two blocs. There were
SALT and Arms Reduction and Limitation Treaties, but also at the same time, there was
an increasing focus on human rights, due to the Helsinki Finals Act, the Conference on

213
For more information please look at: Sönmezoğlu, II. Dünya Savaşı’ndan Günümüze Türkiye Dış
Politikası. p.648-660.
214
Oran, Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 1: 1919-1980.
p.707.
215
Ibid. p.708-709.

73
Security and Cooperation in Europe etc.216 In that time, in Turkey’s foreign policy the
most important topic was undoubtedly the Turkish intervention in Cyprus. However, in
the beginning of 1980s with the Iran Islamic Revolution and Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, the depression between two blocs escalated once again, therefore, this
period is called as Second Cold-War.217 The Iranian Revolution, in 1979, has been a major
blow, especially to the US, because Iran was one of the vital allies of US in the Middle
East region. However, after the collapse of the regime, US was regarded as the greatest
enemy of the Iran. The situation escalated more in a few years, with the hostage crisis.
The US embassy in Tehran and workers were taken as a hostage which was a major
incident that deterioration of the relations more and more between US and Iran.218 There
was also a second major development, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which took
place in 1979. Afghanistan has been very important in the geostrategic sense which is
located right in the center of Asia and a vital passage to China, to Russia etc. From this
point of view, Soviet invasion was regarded as a geostrategic attack which was interrupted
all the Cold-War balances of power. This was the main reason why the US response was
so harsh and started the Second Cold-War. Both of these incidents, in the beginning of
the 1980s, changed the course of relations all of a sudden.

The factors that started the Second Cold-War period, the Iranian Revolution and
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan led to the US President Carter and Reagan policies
effectively over the region against the Soviet threat. US President Carter’s policy of so-
called “Green-Belt” was a project developed by Zbigniew Brzezinski as the national
security advisor of President Carter. Moreover, according to him, after the Iranian Islamic
Revolution and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there should be a Green-Belt created
around the Soviet Union which was consisting of the Muslim nations. 219 This was one of
the major points that shaped Turkey’s foreign policy during the 1980s. Furthermore, as
known, even though military junta and the Generals have a Kemalist perspective, they
turned to Islam as a savior to stop Communism. At the time, the US policy was also

216
Oral Sander, Siyasi Tarih: 1918-1994, vol. II (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2009). p.455-473.
217
K. Subrahmanyam, “The Second Cold War,” Strategic Analysis 7, no. 2–3 (May 1, 1983): 73–97,
https://doi.org/10.1080/09700168309431858.
218
Sander, Siyasi Tarih: 1918-1994. p.552-563.
219
Baskın Oran, ed., Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2:
1980-2001, 12th ed. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2010). p.11.

74
towards promoting Islam as a barrier against the Communism after the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan.220

The second very important occurrence was the starting of changes in the Soviet
Union during the 1980s. Here, a political figure, Mikhail Gorbachev, was very important.
What he did gradually changed the Soviet Union and in five years led to the collapse of
the Soviet Union. However, at the time, when Gorbachev came to power, Soviet Union
had a need of huge restructuring. Because, the Soviet system was not able to cope with
the Western capitalist system anymore. There was a decline in military terms, in economic
terms, in technological terms etc. Actually, Gorbachev did not intend to reform the system
for himself, but he wanted to reform the system because it was needed.221 He really did
not think that the Soviet Union would collapse in such a way. However, the change he
initiated had very serious and significant impacts on the Soviet system. A new political
thinking, a new political style in the domestic affairs, the common European home which
meant the integration of the European states and all Gorbachev’s ideas in domestic and
foreign affairs started a great change not only in the Soviet Union but also in the Eastern
Bloc as well, so they declared their independence one by one which was occurred because
of the Glasnost and Perestroika policies. Glasnost and Perestroika; Glasnost means that
transparency and openness in the political system; Perestroika means restructuring,
meaning some changes in the institutions of the Soviet Union.222 But likewise, all these
changes have started an inevitable process for the Soviet Union and in five years, the
Soviet Union has collapsed.

The third major factor during the 1980s was the continuing process of
globalization. Especially, at the end of the 1970s, there were vital changes in the global
system, in the global economy and in the global communication system. The rise of the
multinational companies occurred during this period. Furthermore, the development of
the information technology and the use of computers accelerated the widespread of
globalization and liberal-capitalist understanding of economy all over the world.

220
Ibid. p.21-23.
221
Ibid. p.13.
222
Ibid. p.159-160.

75
 Another significant change was the rise of new right policies in the economy and
in the world politics. The new right was represented by three major figures in the 1980s,
the first one was US President Reagan, Margaret Thatcher in the UK, and in Turkey
Turgut Özal have been regarded as the major representatives of new-right which are
meant excessive or ultra-liberalism in the economic sphere but conservatism in the
political sphere.223 This was also represented by the current Turkish government as well.
The new right idea at that time was more related with this excessive liberalism meaning
that state does not have anything to do with the economy. So, the state does not intervene
in the economy and everything is led by the forces of liberalism which has no place for
social welfare or any socialist ideas. But in the political sphere, conservatism especially
an emphasis on religion rise during this process.

When focusing on the domestic dynamics during the 1980s the most significant
incident was the 1980 military coup. The junta regime declared adherence to Kemalist
principles but they initiated the Islamization of the society, this military coup effected
Turkey’s relations with EU and with all neighbor countries. Furthermore, with January
24 decisions, Özal became the man behind the economic program and this economic
program led to enormous changes in the Turkish economy which until that time was sort
of closed to the world economy.224 Thanks to Özal’s economic program, the economy
started to become integrated into the world economy. At those days, related to these
decisions, Turkey was one of the fastest growing economies in the world. The third major
point was the Turkish Islamic synthesis both in domestic and foreign policies. Here, the
US was trying to promote the Green-Belt policy over the Middle East region and Turkey
was one of the crucial allies in the region. Moreover, at that time, the military was fed up
with the left and right clashes and they were against the left side and they wanted to
promote this so-called Turkish Islamist synthesis to use Islam effectively as a barrier
against the left or communism. The Turkish Islamic synthesis means a blend of the sort
of Kemalist secularism with Islamism. The idea here is to have a Turkish version of Islam
which is more tolerant, liberal and democratic compared to the other Islamic countries,

Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy : 1774-2000.

223

Meliha Benli Altunışık and Özlem Tür, Turkey: Challenges of Continuity and Change (London and New
224

York: Routledge Curzon, 2005). p.77-83.

76
even today, Turkey is shown as a model for Middle Eastern countries. Another important
point in this period was the rise of Kurdish issue particularly through PKK. In 1984 they
started their full-fledged uprising against the Turkish state which was founded in the
1970s but the major guerrilla warfare started in 1984.

After the end of the coup administration, the second period was also known as the
ANAP (Motherland Party) rule began under the rule of Turgut Özal. Moreover, Özal
probably was the most influential figure since the Ataturk and until the Erdogan. He
shaped the foreign affairs according to his own desire. He controlled the government from
the outside even if he was the president. So, he left a heritage behind him. He brought
nationalism, Islamism, conservatism, and liberalism in a very moderate form.225 This was
the period of Özalism in foreign and domestic politics. Özal’s most vital goal in foreign
policy was making Turkey an influential country in its region and the world.226 Therefore,
Turkey started to Middle East opening and started to become more critical about Israel
and became more active in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and they all started
as part of Carter’s Green-Belt policy. The crisis with Bulgaria was a serious problem
because of Turkish minorities living in Bulgaria in that time. In 1989, a huge population
of Turks came to Turkey about 300.000 Turkish people came to Turkey, they tried to take
refuge status in Turkey, although, Turkey was not prepared, Özal invited them and they
came because they wanted to escape from the repressive policies of the Bulgarian state.227
On the other hand, so-called Armenian genocide issue came up on the agenda in the
1980s. ASALA terrorist organization killed almost 24 diplomats abroad when they were
in office. After ASALA terrorism was denounced by the international community then
the Armenian Diaspora has found.228

In the 1980s, two major point was so crucial to see the activism in Turkish foreign
policy. First one was the economic ties with the Soviet Union and relations with the
Middle East. In 1984, Turkey and SU signed a natural gas agreement and that pipelines

225
Ramazan Gözen, Amerikan Kıskacında Dış Politika: Körfez Savaşı, Turgut Özal ve Sonrası (Ankara:
Liberte Yayınları, 2000). p.111-150; Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy : 1774-2000. p.139,148.
226
Sibel Kavuncu, “Turgut Özal’ın Başbakanlığı Döneminde Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri” (İstanbul
Üniversitesi, 2006). p.93-96.
227
Oran, Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2: 1980-2001.
p.179-181.
228
Ibid. p.32, 62.

77
are still working between Russia and Turkey. Moreover, this natural gas field was
definitely a vital policy to improve Turkish-Soviet relations, besides economic relations
between Turkey and Soviet strengthened. Secondly, during the Iran-Iraq war and Özal’s
active policies although, he did not really take sides with any of the parties, he was very
active in diplomatic sphere and in the negotiations etc. That positive neutrality was very
beneficial for Turkey during the Iran-Iraq War.229

After the 1980 military coup and then in the Özal’s rule, when relations with the
US escalated more and more, relations with European Community worsened day by day.
When some members, especially, Denmark, France, and Netherland thought that Turkey
should be condemned and punished because of the coup, but some member especially
UK and Germany wanted to wait and see what would happen. However, initial optimism
lasted a few months and suddenly most of the EC members started to implement visa to
Turkish citizens. EC suspended the financial protocol and at the time Turkey needed a lot
of money from the West, this was a major blown of relations with EC. However, Özal
interested in EC membership and he believed that Turkey should be a part of EC and he
applied for membership. Firstly, the timing was so wrong, because EC was transforming
into a kind of democratic institution in the 1980s. Secondly, Greece became the member
of EC and would be an obstacle for Turkey because of the Cyprus issue. Lastly, Turkey
had a poor human rights records at that time which considered obstacle for EC
membership.230 Therefore, because of the mentioned reasons above EC Commission
rejected Turkey’s membership application.

Related to the relations with the Islamic world, the improvement was so huge
compared to previous periods. Organization of Islamic Conference, now became the
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), in 1981 for the first time Turkey attended the
meetings at the level of prime minister, and in 1984, on the level of president.231 Turkey’s
relations with the OIC were most of the time kept at the low level before the 1980s.
However, through Özal’s activism in foreign policy, OIC importance accelerated in

229
Ibid. p.152-157.
230
Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy : 1774-2000. p.10.
231
Kösebalaban, Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization. p.113; Oran, Türk Dış
Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2: 1980-2001. p.127.

78
Turkish foreign policy. In the sense of Palestinian issue, Turkey’s policy began to be more
and more favorable to the Palestinian side. After the Camp David Agreement, when Egypt
recognized the Israel and excluded from the Arab world, Turkey, particularly because of
the Özal’s desire to improve close relations with Islamic countries, took the position to
support Palestinian side. In 1980, when Israel annexed East Jerusalem, Turkey had
reacted differently and reduced the relations to the lowest diplomatic level with Israel.232
Despite the fact that UN condemned the annexation of East Jerusalem by Israel, it was a
symbolic move made by Turkey to show its support to the Arab cause. Furthermore, in
1986, leader of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Arafat came to Ankara as the
official guest of the Turkish Government.233 In 1987, Jordan abandoned its rights in East
Jerusalem and in the West Bank. For the first time, Palestinians had their own territories.
PLO declared its own state and in November 1988, Turkey recognized the Palestinian
state, officially, Turkey was among the first countries in the world and the only NATO
member to recognize Palestine.234

Second World War (WWII) led to the significant changes in the international
system. USA and USSR became the major powers after the WWII, the most important
reason behind that European states became weak after the war. Germany and the UK were
major powers in Europe before the WWII. However, Germany was defeated and divided
as East and West, even though the UK was on the winning side became weak in terms of
military and economy.235 USSR influence in Baltic countries, Romania, Bulgaria, and
Czechoslovakia was perceived as a threat by European states.

European countries began to seek a common ground among European countries

to establish some kind of a collective security organization against the threat of USSR. In
1948 Western European Union (WEU) was founded by UK, France, Belgium,
Netherland, and Luxemburg and then Italy and Germany participated. However, WEU
was not so strong to stand against the USSR threat, this situation led to the USA patronage

232
Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy : 1774-2000. p.125.
233
Oran, Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2: 1980-2001.
p.129.
234
Sabri Sayarı, “Turkey and the Middle East in the 1990s,” Journal of Palestine Studies 26, no. 3 (1997):
44–55, https://doi.org/10.2307/2538156. p.50
235
Sander, Siyasi Tarih: 1918-1994. p.183-188.

79
over the Western Europe.236 Division of Europe, in the sense of liberal and socialist
ideologies, between USA and USSR led to the bipolarity in world politics, in every aspect.

After the WWII, USSR declared that they did not renew the Treaty of Friendship
and Neutrality with Turkey. Because of the old experiences of Russian desire to gain
access to the warm waters and also current Soviet’s expansionist activities in Caucasus,
Central Asia, and Eastern Europe, Turkey had to approach Western Bloc. This approach
went down well with USA who wanted to stop USSR expansionist activities over the
Middle East and Mediterranean.

With the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan for European Recovery Program,
USA aid also Turkey. These aids found the basis for strategic partnership between Turkey
and USA which come until today. Soon afterwards, Turkey participated to Organization
for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and NATO. However, during the Cold
War, Turkey realized not to trust so much on alliances with the experiment of Cuban
Missile Crisis and Johnson Letter. After 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis there was the
emergence of détente and more or less it maintained until 1979, however, because of
Iranian Islamic Revolution and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the détente period was
over and so-called Second Cold-War period began. During the détente period, at least
there was a sort of balance in terms of peaceful co-existence between two blocks.

With the WWII, the world realized that the end of the normative and idealist
structure. Besides that, with the beginning of WWII, realist paradigm became a major
theory in world politics; therefore, anarchic structure and the power’s importance in
international relations came into prominence.237 In the sense of realism, the most
important concept to understand the world politics is the “national interests” which
defines according to power concept. Moreover, with the concept of “national security”
which mostly base on military power, world politics turn as a “zero-sum game”,
“militarization race” up until 1990. However, with the end of the Cold War and
acceleration of post-positivist IR theories, nation-states began to shape their foreign

236
Abdülkadir Baharçiçek, “Soğuk Savasın Anlamı ve Sona Ermesinin Türk Dış Politikası Üzerindeki
Etkileri,” in 21. Yüzyılın Esiğinde Türk Dış Politikası, ed. Idris Bal (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2001). p.50.
237
Gökhan Koçer, “Savaş ve Barış: Temel Seçenekler,” in Uluslararası Politikayı Anlamak: Ulus-
Devlet’ten Küreselleşmeye, ed. Zeynep Dağı (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2007). p.78-124.

80
policies according to emerging theories rather than according to positivist deterministic
theories. The most significant reason why states chased the new emerging theories is
because of the new world order, the world began to shape according to new theories and
the nation-states could not go ahead with using old theories.

c. Post-Cold War Period

At the beginning of the 1990s, the most significant incident was definitely the end
of the Cold-War with the collapse of USSR. This incident affected not only Soviet Union
countries but all the states around the world, in the sense of both internal and external
policies. Through the ideas of Perestroika and Glasnost policies, the collapse of the
system became inevitable. The Soviet system which was based on a strict regime, when
that regime started to be more open, the regime itself had to collapse because its nature
was not open for transparency. In 1988, Gorbachev decided to withdraw from
Afghanistan besides, he also decided to withdraw major SU troops from Eastern Europe
as well. This gave a political message to Eastern European countries that they were finally
able to get rid of the Soviet rule. Afterwards in 1989, the first time non-communist groups
bargained with the Communist government for freer elections in which they enjoyed great
success which was the major change, because, until that time, Brezhnev Doctrine was
used which gave right to Soviet government to crash the demonstration no matter what
happens if the Soviet country try to replace regime with another regime. This was the end
of the Brezhnev Doctrine, for the first time in the Cold War, a non-communist
government overthrew that country’s Communist government and came to power for
example, which was occurred by the “Velvet Revolution” in Czechoslovakia in 1989.238

In 1990, Warsaw Pact countries and NATO countries came together to sign
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) which is crucial to see the first time an
extensive design during the Cold War period. As a result, all the countries agreed to make
reductions in their non-nuclear, non-chemical and non-biological weapons which are
known as conventional forces. This treaty brought huge reductions in their numbers from

Mark Kramer, “The Collapse of the Soviet Union (Part 2),” Journal of Cold War Studies 5, no. 4 (Fall
238

2003): 3–42, https://doi.org/10.1162/152039703322483747. p.9.

81
Atlantic to the Urals.239 On the other hand, CFE Treaty had a major implication for Turkey
even today, because Southeastern part of Turkey left as an exception, because, Turkey
was in a fight against the PKK terrorist organization240 which means Turkey can keep as
many arms as possible in that territory that give a huge advantage for Turkey.

The second major event, after the collapse of USSR, was the Gulf War and Iraqi
military invasion of Kuwait which marked a new beginning in world politics. Up until
that time, two blocs (USA and USSR or West and East) were in a conflict with each other.
However, Gulf War created a huge opportunity to stand together against the despot rule
of Saddam and his aggressive actions. Gulf War was the second time in the history that
UN decided to intervene into the territory of a country after the Korean War. During that
period “the new world order” was the motto in the world politics. It was promoted
particularly by the George W. Bush which was based on liberal and democratic ideas
related with the Francis Fukuyama’s work of “The End of History”241. Indeed, this was
the end of the history; western liberalism was there to rescue the world, yet, in a few years
this would have changed due to regional developments.

Around this time, Balkans were considered as the new powder keg of Europe
because it was not only Bosnia, actually, throughout the decade, one after another war
exploded all over the Balkans such as Bosnia, Albania, Macedonia, Kosovo etc.242 All
these countries and nations in the Balkans were affected by the war. Western Powers
seemed very incapable of solving those problems. Bosnian crisis was happening in the
heart of Europe, in the center of “new world order” but nobody could do anything to stop
it, even the Dayton Agreement brought not a proper peace, as seen Kosova conflict in
1998-1999.243 Caucasus and Central Asia was another significant region after the end of
the Cold-War and here the tension was rose again in Caucasus because of the Nagorno-

239
“The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and the Adapted CFE Treaty at a Glance,”
Arms Control Association, August 1, 2012, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/cfe.
240
Nasuh Uslu, Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Period (New York: Nova Science Publishers,
2004). p.68-70.
241
For more information please look at: Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New
York: The Free Press, 1992).
242
Oran, Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2: 1980-2001.
p.274-277.
243
Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy : 1774-2000. p.204.

82
Karabakh conflict and in Central Asia because of the nation-building process. All these
regional developments have shown that the world was not in a new world order.
Therefore, another theory has emerged to explain what’s going on in the global politics
which was the “Clash of Civilization”244 by Samuel Huntington. According to him, it is
not a new world order based on peace etc. but he emphasizes the new world would be
based on the clashes not between the countries but between civilizations and there he uses
the motto of “West against the Rest”. According to this theory, there are two major threats
to the western civilization; the first one is Islamic and the other one is Chinese
civilizations economically, politically etc. Furthermore, Turkey is one of the major
countries, in terms of the Huntington's theory. He told that three “torn countries” meaning
that if a clash would take place, it would take place on one of these countries; Turkey,
Mexico, and Russia.245 Turkey was a country between Western and Islamic civilizations.
This situation, in the new world order, shows the transition from Fukuyama to
Huntington.

The decade of the 1990s represents the most turbulent, complicated decade for
Turkey. Regarding with both domestic and foreign dynamics, it was a complicated period
for Turkey. The decade started with the President Turgut Özal. He was elected in 1989
but unexpectedly, he died in 1993. In 1991 elections, Mesut Yılmaz came to the power,
but he refused the direct rule or influence of Özal so he took the country to the early
election which was not a wise move because ANAP and Yılmaz lost to Demirel in that
election in 1991. Yet, just after the election when Özal died Demirel came to the
presidency and in 1993 Tansu Çiller started to lead the coalition. In 1995, there was
extreme political instability because of the coalition failures and the General Assembly
took the country another early election and surprisingly Welfare Party (RP) took the
majority of votes. The first time the Islamic Party received such a vote and made a
coalition with DYP. This political picture was quite interesting, because, in an unexpected
way, Çiller who represented the liberal and Western face of Turkey would make a
coalition with an Islamist movement. From 1996 to 1997 Erbakan government was in

244
For more information please look at: Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World
Order.
245
Ibid. 42-48.

83
power only for eleven months but made a real change in Turkish politics, because of the
February 28 post-modern coup. Therefore, in 1997, Welfare Party was replaced with
ANAP and Mesut Yılmaz founded a new coalition with three other parties, yet in 1999,
Turkey saw another early election and in the result were a bit more significant because
this time DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition founded. Therefore, in 2002, all these parties were
completely punished by the population and a new party, AKP came to power. In 1990s’
Turkey, there were so many elections because political parties and coalitions were so
unstable and this situation influence foreign policy, economy, social life etc.

Table 5: Post-1980 Turkish Governments246

Period Prime Minister Composition of the Government

September 12, 1980, coup

Sep. 1980 – Dec. 1983 Bülend Ulusu Junta

Dec. 1983 – 1989 Turgut Özal ANAP majority
Nov. 1989 – Jun. 1991 Yıldırım Akbulut ANAP majority
Jun. – Nov. 1991 Mesut Yılmaz ANAP majority
Nov. 1991 – May 1993 Süleyman Demirel DYP-SHP coalition
Jun. 1993 – Oct. 1995 Tansu Çiller DYP-SHP coalition
5–30 Oct. 1995 Tansu Çiller DYP minority
Oct. 1995 – Mar. 1996 Tansu Çiller DYP-CHP coalition
Mar. 1996 – Jun. 1996 Mesut Yılmaz ANAP-DYP minority
Jun. 1996 – Jun. 1997 Necmettin Erbakan RP-DYP coalition

February 28, 1997, military intervention

Jun. 1996 – Jan. 1999 Mesut Yılmaz ANAP-DSP-DTP minority (with

CHP support)
Jan. – May 1999 Bülent Ecevit DSP minority
May 1999 – Nov. 2002 Bülent Ecevit DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition
Nov. 2002 – Mar. 2003 Abdullah Gül AKP majority
Mar. 2003 – present Recep Tayyip AKP majority
Erdoğan

Major domestic dynamics during this period, first of all, the economy was very
important. Three major economic crisis influenced highly Turkish economy and all of

246
Kösebalaban, Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization. p.126.

84
them occurred during the 1990s. During Çiller government in 1994, Turkey has become
dependent on the IMF credits and the inflation rate was too high, Turkish Lira did not
mean anything and also unemployment was increased and created a huge poverty of
masses.247 That economic crisis was the major reason why Islamist Welfare Party rose.
In 1998, it was not due to Turkey, it was mostly because of the East Asian Tigers had the
major crisis and it spread to Russia and to Turkey.248 In 2001 Turkey had faced with the
biggest one. This was the hardest economic crisis in the history of Turkey. During that
time a lot of privatizations, new taxes, and IMF credits used as a solution but did not
quickly effect.249 However, people wanted a solution, parties could not do anything about
economic crises, they accused each other. Therefore, this situation led to the rise of
another Islamist party which is AKP. AKP “present itself to wide segments of Turkish
society as a progressive force that could come to terms with the positive aspect of
economic globalization based on active participation and competition in the global
market.”250

The second domestic dynamic was the rise of political Islam in Turkey. Actually,
1980 military coup officers have some sort of Islamic orientation against the leftist-
communist threat because of the Green-Belt policy so political Islam was already on the
rise. During the 1990s because of the economic crises and because of the deadlock in
politics, Welfare Party emerged as a power. And from the beginning of the prime
ministry, Erbakan had a very controversial talk and moves regarding the context of the
Turkish foreign policy and Turkish politics.251 One of them was his invitation of religious
leaders to his office. That was one of its kind in Turkish history. Because the system is
established on strict secularist values and principles. On the other hand, he made his first
abroad visit to Iran which was accused of supporting political Islam. Furthermore,

247
Ibid. p.127.
248
Nazan Bedirhanoğlu Balaban, “Commentary: Global Economic Crisis and Turkey,” The Turkish
Yearbook of International Relations (Milletlerarası Münasebetler Türk Yıllığı) 40 (2009): 123–28,
https://doi.org/10.1501/Intrel_0000000228.
249
Calum Miller, “Pathways Through Financial Crisis: Turkey,” Global Governance 12, no. 4 (2006): 449–
64.
250
Ziya Öniş, “The Political Economy of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party,” in The Emergence of
a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah
Press, 2006). p.209.
251
Metin Heper, Türkiye’nin Siyasal Hayatı (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2011). p.289.

85
Erbakan proposed the Developing-8 (D-8) idea which was quite contrary to the G-7. In
that proposal, Erbakan said, “Turkey is not the Western country”. Therefore, he came up
with the idea of D-8 which is composed of the countries in the Muslim geography.252
Therefore, Erbakan’s personal and political belongings directly showed itself in foreign
policy, but contradictory with the course of traditional Turkish foreign policy. The rise of
the green-capital, pro-Islamic world-integrated businessmen such as the members of
MUSIAD which is represented Anatolian capital started to rise up during Welfare Party
and have accelerated during the AKP period.253

Another major dynamic during the 1990s was the rise of Kurdish separatism
which was reached at the peak in 1990s due to the PKK attacks. It was the most militant
time between Turkey and PKK and the threat of PKK became a serious problem not only
in the internal politics but also in the external policy of Turkey. Because of the PKK
terror, more than 35.000 people died and also almost 400.000 people had to leave their
places.254 The main approach of state’s decision makers about this issue was based on the
military means. Tansu Çiller herself was dedicated to solving this matter in a harsh way,
yet, in today’s Turkey, military considered is the only one pillar of the solution. PKK
issue affected both domestic and international politics because of Turkey’s severe human
rights’ violations against Kurds which was highly criticized by the US, UN, EU and some
other nations. Besides, regarding with this problem, when Saddam attacked Kuwait, a lot
of Kurds feared Halabja Massacre would happen again, so they started fleeing to Turkey.
Almost half million people were waiting at the border for entering to Turkey. Therefore,
Operation Provide Comfort founded under the name of UN which was a free zone in the
Northern Iraq and close to the Turkish border for refugees. The problem was that this free
zone was all of a sudden turned into a safe haven for PKK as well and PKK militants
were protected by the refugees there.255 After the 2003 USA intervention, Kurdish people
in the Northern Iraq did not have the hardship to found a state in that part. This was

252
Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy : 1774-2000. p.228; Kösebalaban, Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam,
Nationalism, and Globalization. p.137.
253
Öniş, “The Political Economy of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party.” p.220-224; Oran, Türk Dış
Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2: 1980-2001. p.219.
254
“30 Yılın Terör Bilançosu: 35 Bin 576 Ölü!,” Radikal, January 28, 2013,
http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/30_yilin_teror_bilancosu_35_bin_576_olu-1118893/.
255
Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy : 1774-2000. p.144.

86
another consequence of the Operation Provide Comfort, because, they were already
governing themselves in this region. Here, another major point was the emergence of a
Kurdish political party in Turkey. However, they were closed several times because of
their links with PKK. Since 1995, this issue has become seen as a Kurdish issue before
that it was seen as a problem of terrorism and underdevelopment of region.

The general dynamics of Turkish foreign policy during the 1990s changed over
time. Between 1991 and 1994 more bureaucratic approach shaped the Turkish foreign
policy. Since 1991, Özal himself directed Turkish foreign policy, yet the Gulf War was
the end of the Özal’s influence in Turkish foreign policy. In 1991, when Demirel came to
the head of government he followed the Hikmet Çetin and Özdem Sanberk as a foreign
policy advisor and mostly they directed Turkish foreign policy so between 1991 and 1994
there was a mostly bureaucratic period compare to Özal’s period. However, between 1994
and 1999, there was a fragmented approach and in this period 9 foreign ministers changed
which tells much about the fragmentation in the foreign policy.256 Furthermore, during
the Erbakan’s period military rose its influence in the foreign policy. Because of the broad
definition of security in the constitution military gained excessive power even in the
foreign policy and governments also had to act simultaneously with the military. For
instance, although governments did not want to extend the duration of Operation Provide
Comfort, it was extended periodically.257

Turkey’s foreign policy was highly dependent on NATO during the Cold-War
period and since Soviet threat and Cold-War ended, it would be the end of NATO and
Turkey’s foreign policy. Therefore, since the Soviet Union collapsed it led to the
questioning of Turkey’s role in NATO. That’s mostly the minds of military officers at
that time, they were fearful that NATO would disappear and Turkey would be left out of
the Western civilization.258 Because of that, 1990s’ Turkey should be considered different
compared to the previous periods. Regarding the relations with EU, it was quite
controversial. On the one hand, in 1996, Turkey entered the Customs Union, on the other

256
Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War (London: Hurst &
Company, 2003). p.64.
257
Oran, Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2: 1980-2001.
p.261-263.
258
Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War. p.19-29.

87
hand, worsening relations with the EU because of the exclusion of Turkey. In 1997, in
the Luxemburg Summit, Turkey was the only country that was left out of enlargement.
EU’s priority was towards Central and Eastern Europe and even Cyprus and Malta were
included. In 1999, in the Helsinki Summit, Turkey was accepted as a candidate with ten
other states.259 In terms of relations with the US, in the period of 1990s, in 1992, enhanced
partnership defines the relations of Turkey with the US. Moreover, that was transformed
into a strategic partnership in 1999.260

For the first time, with the change in the course of Turkish foreign policy, a new
activism adopted rather than wait and see approach. Turkey adopted an activist foreign
policy towards Balkans, Caucasus, Middle East and Central Asia. Turkey was not a Cold-
War country anymore and emerged as an active power in the surrounding region.261 In
the sense of Balkans, Turkey rather than fighting or involving tried to come up with a
solution for those countries. Relations with the Middle East and Central Asia, Turkey
began to be a model for those countries. Here, Turkey had three kinds of activism. First
one was the economic activism in foreign relations which was more in related with Özal’s
stance during his period.262 For example, military cooperation with Israel occurred which
was unthinkable. During that time Israel was in so-called war with Arab nations, so
military cooperation with Israel was a very big shock for the Arab world. Secondly,
Euphoric activism began during this period in Turkish foreign policy.263 At the time,
Euphoric was the feeling of hope, activism, excitement etc. particularly towards Central
Asia and Caucasus. Until the collapse of the Soviet Union Turkey did not have any
relations with these countries but just after the collapse of Soviet Union, Turkey
established relations with these countries. Here, US supported Turkey as a model in the
region against Iran. The multilateral activism was the most appreciated activism by
Turkey’s neighbors and by the international community. During this period, there was an

259
Oran, Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 2: 1980-2001.
p.90.
260
Ibid. p.253.
261
Sabri Sayarı, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: The Challenges of Multi-Regionalism,”
Journal of International Affairs 54, no. 1 (2000): 169–82. p.170.
262
Kavuncu, “Turgut Özal’ın Başbakanlığı Döneminde Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri.” p.93.
263
Mustafa Aydın, “Turkish Foreign Policy at the End of the Cold War: Roots and Dynamics,” The Turkish
Yearbook of International Relations (Milletlerarası Münasebetler Türk Yıllığı) 36 (2005): 1–36,
https://doi.org/10.1501/Intrel_0000000114. p.30.

88
active Turkish participation in peacekeeping and conflict solution issues such as Bosnia,
Kosovo, and Albania.264 In different regions such as Balkans and Caucasus Turkey
became much more active in terms of national institutions and international organizations.

B. Turkish Foreign Policy in the Last Decade

Compare to the previous periods, the last decade of Turkish foreign policy has
become more active not only around the regional scale but also global scale. Regional
activism accelerated particularly with the AKP government because of its Islamic
background. In terms of global activism, Turkey began to be more active in the other
regions such as Africa and Central Asia and international organizations such as UN, G20
etc. In this section, in the first part, the general dynamics of Turkish foreign policy under
the rule of AKP will be analyzed. Then, in the second part, the changing dynamics during
the period of AKP rule in the Turkish foreign policy will be studied and made a
comparison with previous periods.

I. Turkish Foreign Policy Under the Rule of AKP

When looking into general view in world politics during the 2000s, decade started
with 9/11 attack to Twin Towers in the USA which changed people’s perception of
politics, society, culture etc. Related with that, the rise of terrorism or globalization of
terrorism have become the most influential phenomenon since the 9/11 event. The second
major dynamic was the enlargement of EU towards Eastern Europe and so increasing its
influence in the global politics. Thirdly, the intervention to Afghanistan and Iraq was
another major development shaping the decade. Another significant event during the
decade mortgage crisis which influenced all over the world and eventually turned to the
global financial crisis in 2008 and influence all the states around the world. The rise of
China and rise of new global actors such as BRICS and MIKTA countries in world
politics is another fundamental dynamic within the decade. Spread of globalization all
over the world another significant point of the period which was began particularly with
the end of the Cold-War and intensify during the 2000s. The environment, global
understanding of environment became also crucial during the period together with global
warming, climate change, disasters, pollution, endangered species and so on. Another

264
Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy : 1774-2000. p.204.

89
significant point in the period was transforming from unipolar world to multipolar world
particularly with regards to decline of American power with the Afghanistan and Iraq
interventions and also new rising global actors made the questioned the real strength of
US. The rise of religion and culture in world politics has been another fundamental
dynamic since the early times of the 2000s. Another major dynamic of the 2000s’ global
politics which still continues is the wave of freedom and democracy in the world. Color
Revolutions, Arab Spring, governments changes in Latin America etc. can be considered
in the sense of wave of democracy. Another major thing is the continuous conflicts in the
Middle East with regards to the Palestinian issue, US intervention to Iraq, Arab Spring
and new emerging terrorist organizations such as ISIS. All of dynamics and events which
mentioned above form a general frame of global politics during the 2000s and thanks to
the intensity of globalization, all of these dynamics and events, one way or another effect
Turkey and Turkish foreign policy.

The 2000s began with the coalition in Turkish politics which led by Bülent Ecevit
in the period of 1999 - 2002. Ecevit’s period was a hard time for Turkey in every sense
such as economic crisis, natural disasters, etc. and the coalition government was incapable
of dealing with the situations.265 For instance, NGOs, media organs etc. were much more
active than the government about the earthquake disaster. In the sense of 2001 economic
crisis which was the most serious one in the history of Turkey, the government became
unsuccessful to create a solution. AKP took the power during the severest economic crisis
of Turkish history and also dealt with the global economic crises between 2008 and 2011.
Although, Turkey, still have important problems in terms of economy, was the second
fastest growing economy in the world after China in that time.266 Liberal economy,
western values, democracy were the main phenomenons which were promoted by AKP
as a new right party. From coming to the power to 2005 AKP in order to be a member of
the European Union made many changes in the constitution.

265
Kösebalaban, Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization. p.192.
266
“Turkey in 2nd Spot with Growth,” Hürriyet Daily News, April 3, 2012,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-in-2nd-spot-with-
growth.aspx?pageID=238&nID=17503&NewsCatID=344.

90
 In terms of relations with the US, period started with the ongoing effects of 9/11
event. At the end of 2002, Bush administration really desire to invade Iraq. Therefore,
Turkey was the first country come to mind because of opening the border and letting US
soldiers pass to Iraq. However, Turkey had some reservations joining the war on the side
of the US. Firstly, the 1991 Gulf War caused a lot of economic disaster for Turkey and
did not recover in a long time. Secondly, again because of the 1991 Gulf War, PKK found
a safe haven in the Northern Iraq and this led to the very serious security issues in Turkish
foreign policy.267 Although, because of these reasons Turkey hesitate to join the war, AKP
government desire to join the war. Resolution of sending the Turkish army to Iraq
intervention did not pass by the General Assembly, moreover, even almost hundred AKP
representatives did not approve the resolution. Because of the disapproval of resolution,
relations between Turkey and US effected negatively.268 Although, afterward Turkey
allowed to use its airspace, this did not soften the relations. Besides that, during this
process, Turkey’s rapprochement towards Russia and Iran, was not welcomed by the US
side and increased the tension between US and Turkey. The relations with the US began
to soften in 2005 with the allowance of Incirlik base use for cargo transfers and in 2007
the establishment of the tripartite coordination (US, Turkey, and Iraq) against the PKK
actions evaluated as a development in terms of bilateral relations.269

Turkey has a special importance for Obama administration, therefore, Turkey was
the first non-Atlantic country visited by him. The Obama era has been more peaceful
compared to the Bush administration in terms of relations with the US. Obama has
described bilateral relations with Turkey as a “model partnership” which is a value based
permanent partnership.270 Likewise, Davutoglu expressed that “Turkey's foreign policy
preferences and priorities completely overlap with the Obama administration.”271
However, relations with the United States have been somewhat strained because of
Turkey's support for Iran's uranium enrichment activities and not joining to sanctions
against Iran. During the Arab Spring period, Turkey has supported US and NATO

267
Balcı, Türkiye Dış Politikası: İlkeler, Aktörler, Uygulamalar. p.264.
268
Baskın Oran, ed., Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 3:
2001-2012, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2013). p.269-276.
269
Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy : 1774-2000. p.169.
270
Kösebalaban, Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization. p.169.
271
Balcı, Türkiye Dış Politikası: İlkeler, Aktörler, Uygulamalar. p.292.

91
activities and continued its determination to establish democratic regimes after the
collapse of dictatorial regimes. At the end of 2011, the most important issue of Turkish-
American relations was the regime change in Syria. The main problem was the
disagreement over which opposition groups would be supported. Moreover, the military
coup in Egypt was another divide in terms of relations with the US. Overthrowing of the
Morsi administration which was supported by Turkey and the attitude of the West,
particularly the US, was some kind of a disappointment for Turkey. Furthermore, the US
administration's support for the Kurdish people who link with PKK in Syria has increased
the problem in recent years.272

In terms of relations with EU, in the first period of AKP, the new government
showed that more support to EU memberships process compared to previous
governments. In this context, as the first job, the government tried to get a date on the
start of negotiations for full membership in the 2002 Copenhagen Summit. Until the 2004
EU summit, the government brought about five different harmonization packages and two
constitutional changes to fulfill the political criteria. As a matter of fact, the EU's progress
reports about Turkey which were prepared in 2003 and 2004 pointed out Turkey’s
progress as positively.273 Former Prime Minister Erdogan did not neglect to carry out
lobbying activities by visiting EU member countries before the 2004 summit. As a result
of the improvements, in the 2004 summit, EU members decided to start negotiations with
Turkey beginning with October 3, 2005. This has been a big step for Turkey, which has
been trying to integrate with West since the last period of Ottoman Empire. Moreover,
the AKP’s integration efforts with West particularly with EU have found results and have
gained a serious ground against the Kemalist secular ideology. 274 However, after the
beginning of negotiations in 2005, this process has become stagnant and sometimes has
come to a halt. The reasons for this situation was that the rise of rightist parties in Europe,

272
Ayhan Kamel, 1923’ten Günümüze Türk Dış Politikası ve Diplomasi (İstanbul: İnkılap Kitabevi, 2014).
p.226-231.; Balcı, Türkiye Dış Politikası: İlkeler, Aktörler, Uygulamalar. p.291-295.; Kösebalaban,
Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization. p.168-172.
273
Balcı, Türkiye Dış Politikası: İlkeler, Aktörler, Uygulamalar. p.270.
274
Ibid. p.271.

92
particularly in Germany and France, the Cyprus issue and the AKP’s losing enthusiasm
towards EU.275

During the AKP period, one of the most important events in Turkish foreign policy
is that the energy policies which started in the 1990s and continued with increasing
importance in the 2000s. The European powers desire to reduce the dependency on Russia
for energy has put Turkey in a vital position. Besides that, the rapidly growing economy
of Turkey during the 2000s has increased the energy need of the country and directed the
government to search for cheap and safe energy sources.276 Because of the mentioned
reasons, Russia and the Caucasus countries have become one of the most important areas
of Turkish foreign policy in the recent times. In this context, important projects have been
realized, namely the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural
gas pipeline, and the Blue Stream project. The AKP government has also tried to develop
relations with Armenia in the framework of zero problem policy with neighbors since
2007, and for the first time in history, high-level visits were made between two states and
two protocols were signed in 2009. However, this situation severely criticized by both the
opposition parties and Azerbaijan. Armenia suspended the protocols in 2010 and after
that stated that the protocols officially ended in 2011.277 Briefly, zero problem with
neighbors policy was failed in the sense of Armenian relations.

Along with the mutual visits with Syria in 2004, AKP’s Middle East policy has
begun to gain momentum. In this context, the Free Trade Agreement, which entered into
force in 2007, deepened the relations with Syria. Moreover, Turkey's role as a mediator
in the problems between Syria and Israel in these years was recorded as progress in terms
of relations.278 In 2009, these relations deepened and visas were abolished and a more
than fifty different treaties were signed in various areas. On the other hand, from the

275
Ramazan Gözen, İmparatorluktan Küresel Aktörlüğe Türkiye’nin Dış Politikası (Ankara: Palme
Yayınları, 2009). p.474-476; Oran, Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler,
Yorumlar Cilt 3: 2001-2012. p.371-382.
276
Pınar İpek, “The Role of Energy Security in Turkish Foreign Policy (2004–2016),” in Turkish Foreign
Policy: International Relations, Legality and Global Reach, ed. Pınar Gözen Ercan (Cham, Switzerland:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 173–94.
277
Kösebalaban, Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization. p.162-164.
278
Meliha B. Altunişik and Lenore G. Martin, “Making Sense of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East
under AKP,” Turkish Studies 12, no. 4 (December 1, 2011): 569–87,
https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2011.622513. p.573.

93
beginning of the 2000s, the new government has made progress on relations with Iran and
did not participate for Iran's economic and political containment policy which prepared
in the lead of US and Turkey significantly mitigated international sanctions on Iran.279 In
the first period of Middle East relations have made very good progress particularly
relations with Syria shown as the most robust example of “zero-problem with neighbors”
policy.280 However, with the beginning of the Arab Spring, relations with Syria began to
deteriorate. When Turkey asked from the Assad's administration to do some democratic
reforms, the tension increased between two states relations. Thereupon, with a more
radical decision, Turkey expressed that its support to the opposition groups and Assad
regime was illegal for ruling Syria. In 2011, Turkey joined NATO's arms embargo against
Syria and terminated all diplomatic relations in 2012 by closing Turkish embassy. The
Syrian crisis has become a security issue for Turkey, with the fall of the Turkish Air
Force's warplane in 2012 near the Syrian border and dropping one of Syrian bomb to
Turkish side which caused the death of Turkish citizens in the same year. On the one
hand, losing one of the most important trading countries, on the other hand in terms of
the number of refugees coming from Syria, Turkey has been affected adversely by the
Syrian crisis particularly in terms of economically.281

In terms of relations with Middle Eastern countries, another important country in

the AKP era has been Iraq, particularly the Northern Iraq. After 2008 when military lost
its effectiveness in Turkish foreign policy, the AKP government has begun to develop
relations with the Kurdish Administration in Northern Iraq.282 The main aim of this policy
is to find a definite and permanent result for the PKK issue and to maintain a zero problem
policy with neighbors. In addition to the Kurdish Administration in Northern Iraq, Turkey
also tried to develop relations with the Central Iraqi Administration, therefore, in 2009 a
total of forty-eight treaties were signed on various issues. With the withdrawal of the
United States from Iraq in 2011, while Turkey's relations with the central administration
decreased, relations with the Kurdish Administration in Northern Iraq continued to

279
Balcı, Türkiye Dış Politikası: İlkeler, Aktörler, Uygulamalar. p.276-277.
280
Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007.” p.80.
281
Faruk Sönmezoğlu, Son Onyıllarda Türk Dış Politikası (1991 - 2015) (İstanbul: DER yayınları, 2016).
p.576-586.; Balcı, Türkiye Dış Politikası: İlkeler, Aktörler, Uygulamalar. p.307-310.; Oran, Türk Dış
Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 3: 2001-2012. p.156-163.
282
Balcı, Türkiye Dış Politikası: İlkeler, Aktörler, Uygulamalar. p.295-296.

94
develop. In this context, mutual high-level visits were made and Turkey opened a
consulate in Erbil in 2011.283

Relations with Israel was mostly designed under the control of the Turkish Armed
Forces until 2009, and the government could not intervene the process. However, in
Davos in 2009, Prime Minister Erdogan strictly criticized the Israeli President Shimon
Peres about the Israeli invasion of Gaza. As a result of the developments following the
"One Minute" event, relations with Israel have entered a period of tension. Another
development that strained the relations between two countries was the seizure of the Mavi
Marmara ship which carrying aid supplies to Gaza, by Israeli soldiers in international
waters and the death of nine Turkish citizens during this seizure. Thereupon, Turkey,
Turkey lowered its diplomatic relations with Israel to the lowest level in the history and
also announced that it has suspended military agreements. However, since Israel accepted
to apology for Mavi Marmara and paying compensation for the people’s family who lost
their lives in Mavi Marmara, relations began to ameliorate between two states.284

The fact that economic relations are among the priority foreign policy areas has
seriously increased the interests of Turkey towards African continent in the 2000s. The
most important principle in this situation was to create new market opportunities for the
growing Turkish economy. The government has tried to develop relations by opening
embassies and conducting high-level visits. For the first time in Turkish history in 2005,
high-level visits were made to the countries of Ethiopia and South Africa at the prime
minister level, and in the same year, Turkey achieved observer status in the African
Union. In 2008, Turkey became one of the non-regional members of the African
Development Bank and the African Development Fund. In addition to economic progress,
the opening towards Africa led Turkey to become a non-permanent member of UNSC
with the support of African countries in 2008.285 Since the policies of AKP period will be

283
Oran, Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 3: 2001-2012.
p.407-413, 745-746.; Sönmezoğlu, Son Onyıllarda Türk Dış Politikası (1991 - 2015). p.567-576.
284
Altunişik and Martin, “Making Sense of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East under AKP.”; Oran,
Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 3: 2001-2012. p.438-
450.; Kösebalaban, Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization. p.176-181.
285
Sönmezoğlu, Son Onyıllarda Türk Dış Politikası (1991 - 2015). p.749-753.

95
analyzed in the following section related to the motivations, strategies, and instruments,
this section is not overemphasizing every detail of the period.

II. Changing Dynamics in the Period of AKP

AKP victory in the 2002 election led to the Ahmet Davutoglu became one of the
most important figures in the history of Turkish foreign policy. Though he never meant
to be a politician, he used to give political advice to politicians including Recep Tayyip
Erdogan and Abdullah Gül during 1990s. Therefore, when the AKP’s rule began, it was
easy for them to choose Davutoglu as an advisor. Following the November 2002
elections, he was appointed as Chief Adviser to the Prime Minister and Ambassador-at-
Large by the 58th government (2002-2003) of the Republic of Turkey. He continued to
serve in the 59th (2003-2007) and 60th (2007-2011) governments. On May 1, 2009, he was
appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 60th government of the Republic of
Turkey and he served during the 61st government (2011-2014) as well. On August 27,
2014, he was appointed as the Prime Minister of the 62nd government (2014- 2016).

In his work of “Strategic Depth”, he explains the theoretical background of

Turkish foreign policy. Davutoglu established his policies towards according to his book
“Strategic Depth”. According to him, strategic depth is the combination of historical
depth and geographical depth. Historical depth is the Ottoman past of the country.
Without accepting the Ottoman historical past, the country could not go anywhere. It is a
major heritage for shaping the foreign policy. Geographical depth comes from his sincere
interest in western geopolitics and Turkey’s position. According to him, Turkey should
not be a bridge, but it should be a center in the global politics.286 This is the major theme
in his Strategic Depth so the policies established according to this principle. In this regard,
Davutoglu established three methodological and five operational principles287, up until
Arab Spring these principles considered as successful. Davutoglu states that Turkey
should not content itself with being presented as a bridge between regions particularly
between Islamic and the Western countries. Contrary to that, Turkey should perceive

286
Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Türkiye Merkez Ülke Olmalı,” Radikal, February 26, 2004,
http://www.radikal.com.tr/yorum/turkiye-merkez-ulke-olmali-702116/.
287
Ahmet Davutoğlu, “The Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy,” Yeni Şafak, January 18, 2010,
http://www.yenisafak.com/eslesmemis/the-principles-of-turkish-foreign-policy-by-ahmet-davutoglu-
236159.

96
itself as a mere regional power. Because of Turkey’s history, size and geography, Turkey
should act as a central state, with the interests and influence in other regions such as in
the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Black Sea and Mediterranean.288

Methodological principles starting with the visionary approach instead of crisis-

oriented approach. In the Middle East, Turkey began to say I’m the power and provide a
solution for different conflict like in the Iranian case of uranium enrichment or in the
Palestinian conflict. Instead of crisis, Turkey began to focus on the solution of the
problems. Secondly, consistent framework for the foreign policy which means that
Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East should be consistent with the EU policies, so
there is no shift of axis, there is just consistency. Thirdly, a new diplomatic discourse and
a new diplomatic style combined with Turkey’s soft power over the region.289 Hard power
is the power through coercion and mostly through military means. But Turkey’s position
as a model for the Middle Eastern countries contributes to Turkey’s soft power.

Five operational principles were very active in Turkish foreign policy, especially
before the Arab Spring process. Firstly, the balance between the security and democracy
was the main motto of Turkish Foreign Policy until 2007. Turkey tried to keep a balance
between the security and freedoms. However, with the rise of PKK issue after 2007,
security has been more important than the democracy. On the other hand, during the Arab
Spring process, Turkey has always supported the democratic sides without exception.
Secondly, the zero problem with neighbors’ principle is maybe the most important and
highlights the foreign policy of Davutoglu. The basic idea behind this principle is
developing economic interdependence with neighbor countries. Until the Arab Spring,
Syria was considered as the best example of that. Thirdly, with the principle of proactive
and preemptive peace diplomacy, Turkey presented herself as a mediator in many regions,
especially towards Israel – Arabs, the Palestinian issue, and Afghanistan issue and so on.
Fourthly, the multidimensional foreign policy is the other one which entails good
relations with all the major powers not only with the USA. The basic idea behind this
principle, Turkey’s relations with other global actors aim to be complementary, not in

288
Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik : Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu, 10th ed. (İstanbul: Küre
Yayınları, 2002).
289
Davutoğlu, “The Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy.”

97
competition. Fifth and lastly, the principle of rhythmic diplomacy for maintaining the
communication with regional countries and global actors. With this rhythmic diplomacy,
Turkey has become more and more influential in the international organizations.290
Turkey has been more visible in Islamic Cooperation Organization and United Nations
etc. With these principles, Turkey tried to construct new Turkish Foreign Policy and new
structure or order over the region.

Turkey began to rise both in the regional and global scale because of the AKP’s
active foreign policy. Moreover, for many scholars, the move of Turkey towards the
Middle East was considered as a shift of axis in Turkish foreign policy. As a matter of
fact, with the beginning of AKP rule, the shift of axis debate came into the agenda because
of the Turkish foreign policy started to shift towards East, not towards West. Therefore,
particularly after the stagnation period between Turkey and EU in 2005, Turkish foreign
policy analysis literature mostly began to focus on the subjects of “shift of axis”, “Middle
Easternization”, “transformation” etc. Because of the Turkey’s rapprochement with
several the Middle East countries such as Syria, Sudan and Iran which were criticized by
Western powers, led to the rise of the question of “Is Turkey turning its face towards
Middle East?”.291 However, the decision makers of AKP government rejected the shift of
axis in foreign policy, for instance, as Davutoglu explain that Turkey began to follow
more integrated foreign policy compared to previous periods in which the new opening
areas seen as a less important subject.292 Moreover, former Prime Minister Erdogan stated
that “there is no axis shift of Turkey. We are standing where we have been standing at the
beginning of our political power.”293 Furthermore, as former President Abdullah Gül

290
Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Zero-Problems Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy, May 20, 2010,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/05/20/turkeys-zero-problems-foreign-policy/.; Davutoğlu, “The Principles
of Turkish Foreign Policy.”
291
Kılıç Buğra Kanat, “AK Party’s Foreign Policy: Is Turkey Turning Away from the West?,” Insight
Turkey 12, no. 1 (2010): 205–25.
292
Bülent Aras, “The Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy,” Insight Turkey 11, no. 3 (September 2009):
127–42. p.133.
293
Cengiz Çandar, “Turkey’s ‘Soft Power’ Strategy: A New Vision for a Multi-Polar World,” Policy Brief
(Ankara: The SETA (Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research) Foundation, December
2009), http://setadc.org/turkeys-soft-power-strategy-a-new-vision-for-a-multi-polar-world/. p.4.

98
express that “what Turkey is doing is clear. Turkey, surely, is moving simultaneously in
every direction, towards East and West, North, and South.”294

Although, the ruling elites’ statements, Turkey’s activism seen as a shift of axis
in the foreign policy. During this period, Turkey began to seem as a model country for
Arab countries, particularly because of the Turkey’s soft power, economic growth,
promotion of democracy and rule of law over the region countries. Turkey became the
soft power in the region. The friendship and cultural ties and also diplomatic links with
the countries in the region, bring them together. Turkey became a good mediator.295
Starting with 2003, Iraq’s Neighbors Forum, foreign and interior ministers of Iraq came
together for avoiding the disintegration of the country, thanks to Turkey’s lead. Moreover,
in 2005, Turkey convinced Sunni parties to participate in the Iraqi elections. Furthermore,
Turkey participated in the peacekeeping force in Lebanon. Turkish foreign policy was not
about to send troops normally, but this time Turkey started to send. Also, there was
mediation between the Israel and Syria. Another important point, Turkey’s mediation
effort was for the Iranian nuclear issue. In this period, Turkey was promoted herself as
the center of mediation actor in the Middle East.296

According to Davutoglu, Turkey was problematic because of the Kemalist foreign

policy which abandoned the Ottoman type of policies and Islamic identity so the Strategic
Depth is a work of reformation and revitalization of Özal’s principle of Neo-Ottomanizm.
From the beginning of AKP’s rule, Davutoglu’s policies and practices linked with the
Özal’s Neo-Ottomanizm.297 From this point of view, Davutoglu indicates that Turkey
should establish its political identity and political culture in the bases of Ottoman heritage.
Because of rejecting the Ottoman past and Islamic identity of the country, Turkey became
passive in international politics and began to follow defensive behaviors.298 In this regard,

294
Ibid. p.10.
295
Defne Günay, “The Roles Turkey Played in the Middle East (2002–2016),” in Turkish Foreign Policy:
International Relations, Legality and Global Reach, ed. Pınar Gözen Ercan (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2017), 195–216. p.204.
296
Emel Parlar Dal, “Conceptualising and Testing the ‘Emerging Regional Power’ of Turkey in the Shifting
International Order,” Third World Quarterly 37, no. 8 (August 2, 2016): 1425–53,
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1142367. p.1437.
297
Sönmezoğlu, Son Onyıllarda Türk Dış Politikası (1991 - 2015). p.791.
298
Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik. p.70-73, 92-94.

99
“zero-problem with neighbors” policy initiated which is an approach based on the idea
that abounding the defensive behaviors against the neighbor countries and developing
good relations with all neighbors.299 Related with “zero-problem with neighbors” policy,
the understanding and using the soft power in internal relations also improved. The
concept of soft power has become a method of diplomacy that has been required to push
aside the concept of military power which was expressed in previous years frequently.300
Another major change during this period is taking primacy to the economic relations. The
understanding of giving more importance to economic relations indicates that Turkey's
increasing trade relations particularly towards neighbor countries will provide
interdependency among countries which eventually led to the more peaceful relations
over the region. Besides that, the acceleration of economic relations not only in terms of
regional but also in the sense of global actors led to the transformation of Turkey into a
trading state.301

Compare to the previous periods, the most important policy change during this
period realized in the Cyprus issue with the aim of full membership to the EU.302
However, when EU membership process entered some kind of a deadlock, Turkey has
turned its face towards the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia and Caucasus regions
with the aim of to be a truly global power, because during the AKP period, Turkish
decision-makers understand that the West is not the only way and the other regions keep
much more opportunity for Turkey compare to West. As a matter of fact, with the
stagnation process with EU, after 2005, led Turkey to find alternative ways to cope with
global powers and when Turkey’s development accelerated, because of new openings
towards other regions Turkey more and more move away from West. After 2009 Mavi
Marmara incident, Turkey's efforts about Palestinian issue in the UN and in the global
politics, such as Davutoglu’s visit to Gaza with the foreign ministers of Arab League
member states in 2012, strengthened the image of Turkey’s leadership as a central country
in the Middle East. On the other hand, in terms of public diplomacy thanks to the Turkish

299
Davutoğlu, “Türkiye Merkez Ülke Olmalı.”
300
Balcı, Türkiye Dış Politikası: İlkeler, Aktörler, Uygulamalar. p.259.
301
Kemal Kirişçi, “The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State,” New
Perspectives on Turkey 40 (April 2009): 29–57, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0896634600005203.
302
Sönmezoğlu, Son Onyıllarda Türk Dış Politikası (1991 - 2015). p.799.

100
Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related
Communities (YTB), Presidency for Religious Affairs (Diyanet) and Yunus Emre
Institute, Turkey’s image and profile strengthened in world politics.

The last but not the least important point, Turkey’s increasing influence,
particularly over the region, should not be considered as a revisionist way or challenge to
the existing regional or global order. As Kösebalaban clearly explain that, although the
decline of American hegemony led to the increase of Turkey’s influence area over the
region, the AKP government did not seek a revisionist foreign policy in the world
politics.303 Moreover, as Kösebalaban express that if Turkey wants to move more
independent in the international politics, should reduce its dependence on the West in
terms of security and its dependence on the East in the sense of energy.304

303
Hasan Kösebalaban, Türk Dış Politikası: İslam, Milliyetçilik ve Küreselleşme, trans. Hüsamettin İnaç
(Ankara: BigBang Yayınları, 2014). p.367.
304
Ibid. p.369.

101
 4. ASSESSING TURKEY’S RISING POWER STATUS IN
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
After defining concepts of global governance and rising power and also analyzing
Turkey’s historical background in the international arena, this section will try to focus on
motivations, strategies, and instruments which have been used in the formulation of
Turkish foreign policy in the AKP period. As mentioned in the previous section, during
the AKP period, Turkey became role model country, particularly in the Middle East and
North African regions. Furthermore, Turkey began to open other regions such as Africa,
Latin America etc. Moreover, Turkey has become much more visible in regional and
international organizations. So, in this period, the government improved some new
strategies and instruments based on the AKP’s motivations to face the new challenges
and to help the new activism in the foreign policy. From this point of view, this section
seeks to find the driving motivations, strategies, and instruments in the formulation of
Turkish foreign policy particularly in the AKP period that Turkey has used in the global
governance as a rising power, which is the main question of the thesis. Furthermore, after
detailed analysis of formulation of Turkish foreign policy with respect to motivations,
strategies, and instruments particularly up until June 7, 2015, election; the evaluation part
will focus on the Turkey’s current position in the global governance particularly after the
June 7 election.

A. Turkey’s Position in Global Governance

Since 2002, with the rise of AKP and the decision makers’ foreign policy vision,
activism and new multilateralism accelerated in the formulation of foreign policy which
led to increasing of Turkey’s sphere of influence both regionally and globally. Therefore,
during the last decade of Turkish foreign policy, pro-activism and multidimensionality
have characterized the foreign policy choices in the global governance system.305 Hence,
the new kind of activism and multilateralism together with Turkey’s historical, cultural
and geographical ties with the surrounded regions accelerated Turkey’s regional power
and eventually proceed to show Turkey as a model country particularly in the Middle East

305
E. Fuat Keyman, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Era of Global Turmoil,” Policy Brief (Ankara: The
SETA (Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research) Foundation, December 2009),
https://www.setav.org/en/turkish-foreign-policy-in-the-era-of-global-turmoil/.

102
and North African regions. Since the beginning of AKP rule in 2002, many internal and
external dimensions and dynamics influence the formulation of foreign policy, in the
following subsections, these dynamics will scrutinize within the framework of
motivations, strategies, and instruments.

I. Motivations of Turkey as a Rising Power in Global

Governance
In terms of formulation of foreign policy particularly determining the motivations
or driving factors of foreign policy, the set of social values are significantly important.
As mentioned in the introduction part, basically, there are five dimensions of the set of
social values. These are mainly composed of (i) good of individual citizens (ii) the good
of special interest, (iii) good of society at large, (iv) good of government/administration,
(v) good of state (as a political entity among other states).306 Even, a foreign policy
decision makers may have to use different rationalities for different policies since any
issue have their own history. Policymakers must translate those values into objectives
before the action. That’s why value synthesis should be transformed because, it is
composed of state’s set of social values and this is not constant, rather changeable due to
the definition of interest. Motivations are mostly related to the set of social values because
they should be depended on the features of the set of social values which were mentioned
above. Consequently, the social values or the motivations of state can change time to time
and one situation to another, correspondingly since 2002 with the beginning of AKP rule,
Turkish foreign policy motivations began to change not only ideologically but also
practically.

Foreign policy should not be separated from the domestic policy of the state. In
the global governance system, the influence of domestic preferences shapes the foreign
policy choices and actions of the state. Moreover, the ideas and interests of foreign policy
decision-makers are closely linked to dynamics of domestic politics. In the literature, this
situation defines as a national role conception which is the general behavior of
governments in the formulation of foreign policy. As Holsti’s definition:

306
Said, O. Lerche, Jr., and O. Lerche III, Concepts of International Politics in Global Perspective. p.24-
26.

103
 “A national role conception includes the policymakers' own definitions
of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their
state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis
in the international system or in subordinate regional systems. It is their “image”
of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward, or in, the external
environment”307

Therefore, the current Turkish foreign policy should not clearly understand
without AKP’s main ideology particularly ruling elites’ ideology. As a neo-conservative
party which composes of liberalism in economic arena and conservatism in political life,
AKP began to focus on other regions to find more opportunities for the sake of Turkey’s
competitiveness with Europe and other rising powers in the global governance system.
According to Meltem Müftüler-Baç, in order to fulfill the EU’s accession criteria, AKP
government made some changes in domestic policy308 and eventually these changes affect
the formulation of foreign policy. For instance, the strengthening of democracy and
human rights in the internal space in the framework of EU membership chapters also
influence the foreign policy choices such as explicitly seen in the process of Arab Spring
with the support of demonstrators since the beginning. Besides that, The Islamic ties of
the decision makers of AKP also led to the diversification in the foreign policy.

When during the first Republican era or during the Cold War, the ruling elites
particularly secularist hesitate or did not want to improve relations with Middle Eastern
countries as Islam seen as a threat to the republic. However, the AKP government has not
shared the same fear like the predecessor governments.309 Consequently, the foreign
policy choices changed dramatically firstly towards Middle Eastern countries and then
towards other regions. This shift in the foreign policy can be explained by the rise of
political Islam in domestic politics, when “secularists, lose some of their hold on power,
and as the political Islamists rise in power, the dominant social preferences in the country

307
K. J. Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” International Studies Quarterly
14, no. 3 (1970): 233–309, https://doi.org/10.2307/3013584. p.245-246.
308
Meltem Müftüler-Baç, “Turkish Foreign Policy, Its Domestic Determinants and the Role of the
European Union,” South European Society and Politics 16, no. 2 (June 1, 2011): 279–91,
https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2011.577947.
309
Ibid. p.287.

104
change.”310 Moreover, when considering AKP decision makers’ ties with the Erbakan’s
Welfare Party, AKP’s ideological, societal and political roots in Turkey’s Islamist
political stream might be more understandable.311 When AKP increased the percentage
of votes in every election since 2002 to until June 15, 2015, election, its strengthened
discourse of AKP both in internal and external politics. Besides that, after 2007, with the
diminishing role of the army, particularly in the formulation of foreign policy, decision-
makers began to pursue freer foreign policy choices such as Middle East rapprochement.
Mostly because of the “Ergenekon” and “Balyoz” military’s ability to intervene in politics
decreased gradually. Moreover, there was a considerable pressure from the EU, according
to EU membership chapters, for a division between the military and political spheres in
Turkey, which influence Turkey positively to follow freer foreign policy. As Dietrich
Jung stated that “advocating soft power and zero problems in foreign relations, therefore,
could also be interpreted as a strategy to reduce the military’s influence on Turkish
politics in both the domestic and international realms.”312

Besides that, foreign policy choices can also shape the domestic politics so some
foreign policy actions realized with the interest of domestic gains such as Turkey’s pro-
activism in terms of Palestinian and Syria issues which positioned Turkey as a big brother
to protect Muslims over the region. As Öniş clearly express that “there is no doubt that
the AKP has capitalized on its pro-active foreign policy to maintain and consolidate its
broad electoral success in domestic politics.”313 For instance, Prime Minister Erdogan’s
speech against Israeli President Shimon Peres at the Davos Meeting in 2009 led to the
popularity and sympathy for Erdogan and his party in the following election.314 Besides
that, Turkey’s explicitly support demonstrators during the Arab Spring also influence the
domestic politics to sympathy for AKP government. On the other hand, as Holsti express
that in his study which focuses on the foreign policy choices leadership quality is one of

310
Ibid. p.288.
311
Dietrich Jung, “The Domestic Context of New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy: Does Religion
Matter?,” International Journal 67, no. 1 (2011): 23–38. p.34.
312
Ibid. p.25.
313
Ziya Öniş, “Multiple Faces of the ‘New’ Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique,”
Insight Turkey 13, no. 1 (2011): 47–65. p.62.
314
Güneş Murat Tezcür and Alexandru Grigorescu, “Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy: Balancing
European and Regional Interests,” International Studies Perspectives 15, no. 3 (August 1, 2014): 257–76,
https://doi.org/10.1111/insp.12004. p.262.

105
the fundamental elements to shape the foreign policy actions.315 According to Pew
research in 2012, the former Prime Minister, current President Erdogan was seen as the
most popular leader among the Islamic countries, moreover, Turkey is seen as a
democracy promoter state in the MENA region.316

Related with Turkey’s geopolitical importance and increasing soft power

capability, Turkey began to position itself as a regional power over the surrounded
regions. In the first half of the 2000s, Turkey’s rapid economic development together with
the power of the neo-conservative party, which is AKP has significantly changed the
foreign policy landscape of Turkey. After the 9/11 event and 2008 Mortgage Crisis when
USA’s hegemony become questionable in the world politics, particularly since the
beginning of Arab Spring Turkey’s acceleration both regional and global politics began
to discuss, in the sense of a model state to the Middle Eastern countries. Therefore, Turkey
began to show itself as a role model country to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
countries. That was not so difficult for Turkey particularly MENA region’s historical ties
with the Ottoman Empire, and also thanks to Ahmet Davutoglu’s historical depth idea,
Turkey began to more and more integrated to the MENA region. As André Bank and Roy
Karadag stated that “AKP economic and security policies in Turkey have contributed to
the emergence of a kind of ‘Ankara Moment’317 in the Middle East from the mid-2000s
onwards.”318 Moreover, “gradual domestic consolidation of the AKP government under
the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the face of the pressures from the Kemalist
establishment, and the foreign policy shifts it has initiated, mostly as a result of the
pragmatist ideology and agency of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu.”319 As seen with

315
Bülent Aras and Aylin Gorener, “National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policy Orientation: The
Ideational Bases of the Justice and Development Party’s Foreign Policy Activism in the Middle East,”
Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 12, no. 1 (March 1, 2010): 73–92,
https://doi.org/10.1080/19448950903507453. p.75.
316
“Most Muslims Want Democracy, Personal Freedoms, and Islam in Political Life,” Pew Research
Center Global Attitudes & Trends (blog), July 10, 2012, http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/07/10/most-
muslims-want-democracy-personal-freedoms-and-islam-in-political-life/.
317
The “Ankara Moment” mainly express the Turkey’s emergence as a regional power in the Muslim World
particularly between 2007 and 2011 because of the domestic political and economic dynamics which
potentially seen as a transforming to “Washington Consensus” or the “Beijing Consensus”. For more
information please look at: André Bank and Roy Karadag, “The ‘Ankara Moment’: The Politics of Turkey’s
Regional Power in the Middle East, 2007–11,” Third World Quarterly 34, no. 2 (March 1, 2013): 287–304,
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.775786.
318
Ibid. p.288.
319
Ibid. p.289.

106
the AKP’s economic and political growth, Islamic values can be integrated with the
liberalization in the sense of economics and politics.

Therefore, increasing influence of Turkey’s regional power can be interpreted as

a Turkey’s desire to go further and become a global power.320 Regarding with the same
position, during the Arab Spring and the following process, Turkey’s active involvement
in the Middle Eastern politics was seen as a shift of axis in Turkish foreign policy.321
During the Arab Spring period, Turkey began to be seen as a role model country for Arab
countries, particularly because of the Turkey’s synthesis of Islam and democracy. 322 In
the beginning of the Arab Spring (particularly from late 2010 to the end of 2012),
Turkey’s potential leadership role had a positive perception, not only inside but also
outside the region, led to the emergence of the concept of the “Turkish model”.323

Actually, with the end of the Cold-War, Turkey began to follow more activist
policies. Particularly, the emergence of new states in the Caucasus, Balkans and Central
Asia, on the one hand, offered new opportunities, on the other hand, presented new
challenges for Turkey.324 Moreover, the decline of key actors over the regions such as
Russia in Caucasus and Central Asia; Iran and Iraq in the Middle East enhanced Turkey’s
activism in these regions, just before AKP’s advanced activism.325 As Keyman express
that “It is understandable that the rapid shift from a passive buffer state identity to a
proactive diplomatic activism with greater regional engagement with the Middle East
through the employment of soft power and religious affinities can lead to ambiguity, even
skepticism, in the West”326

320
Davutoğlu, “Türkiye Merkez Ülke Olmalı.”
321
Burak Bilgehan Özpek and Yelda Demirağ, “Turkish Foreign Policy after the ‘Arab Spring’: From
Agenda-Setter State to Agenda-Entrepreneur State,” Israel Affairs 20, no. 3 (July 3, 2014): 328–46,
https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2014.922806. p.333.
322
Paul Kubicek, “Debating the Merits of the ’Turkish Model for Democratization in the Middle East,”
Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations 12, no. 3 (2013): 166–80,
https://doi.org/10.21599/atjir.79361. p.170.
323
Emel Parlar Dal and Emre Erşen, “Reassessing the ‘Turkish Model’ in the Post-Cold War Era: A Role
Theory Perspective,” Turkish Studies 15, no. 2 (April 3, 2014): 258–82,
https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2014.926238. p.269.
324
Sayarı, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era.” p.169-170.
325
Alan Makovsky, “The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy,” SAIS Review 19 (January 1, 1999):
92–113.; Tezcür and Grigorescu, “Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy.” p.259.
326
Keyman, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Era of Global Turmoil.” p.8.

107
 During the rule of AKP, the decision makers understand that the West or Europe
is not the only way, but only one pillar of Turkish foreign policy. When considering
Davutoglu’s idea of “Strategic Depth” related with Turkey’s historical, cultural, ethnic
and religious ties with the Middle East, North Africa, Caucasus, Balkans and Central
Asia; the opportunities of other regions incomparably much more than the Europe. This
motivation related with almost all principles of the set of social values, ruling elites of
AKP governments, particularly since 2005 when the EU membership process entered
some kind of a deadlock, has turned their faces towards other regions. As Öniş and Yılmaz
stated that since 2005, Turkey under the rule of AKP government began to “shift from a
commitment to deep Europeanization to loose Europeanization along with a parallel shift
to what may be classified as ‘soft Euro-Asianism’.”327

As a regional power and pivotal actor in the global politics, the decision makers
adopted a new visionary approach to deal with the foreign policy issues in the new period.
In the last period, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu express that Turkey
has moved to “‘visionary’ approach to the issues instead of the ‘crisis-oriented’ attitude
that dominated foreign policy during the entire Cold War period.”328 Based on the
Davutoglu’s “Strategic Depth” idea and with a new visionary approach, Turkey began to
integrate more and more with the surrounded regions which were seen less important in
previous periods of Turkish foreign policy. This new activism in Turkish foreign policy,
in the context of Strategic Depth, is explained by Davutoglu as below with his words:

“The effects of having diverse Caucasian, Balkan, Middle Eastern, Iraqi

Turcoman and Anatolian elements, even in small groups, are seen in everyday
life in today’s Turkey, where diverse cultural elements meet under the umbrella
of the Turkish state. Turkey’s geography harmonizes these elements. Turkey
occupies a center of attraction in its region; its cultural capital, Istanbul, spans
two continents and is at once a Middle Eastern, Black Sea and a Mediterranean
city. In terms of its area of influence, Turkey is a Middle Eastern, Balkan,
Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf, and Black Sea country.

327
Ziya Öniş and Şuhnaz Yılmaz, “Between Europeanization and Euro‐ Asianism: Foreign Policy
Activism in Turkey during the AKP Era,” Turkish Studies 10, no. 1 (March 1, 2009): 7–24,
https://doi.org/10.1080/14683840802648562. p.8.
328
Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Zero-Problems Foreign Policy.”

108
 Given this picture, Turkey should make its role of a peripheral country part of its
past, and appropriate a new position: one of providing security and stability not
only for itself, but also for its neighboring regions. Turkey should guarantee its
own security and stability by taking on a more active, constructive role to provide
order, stability and security in its environs.”329

Another significant motivation came to the agenda during the AKP period is
opening to the African continent, with the creation of new economic and political ties to
be a truly global power. The fundamental reason for Turkey’s increasing interest in Africa
lies in the reformulation of Turkish foreign policy in the global politics. Turkey has
developed its foreign policy by developing economic and political ties with the Middle
East, Central Asia, Latin America and also Africa. Announcing the year 2005 was an
“African Year” in Turkey and the same year Turkey’s entrance to the African Union's
regular summit with the status of observer member and also declaring Turkey as a
“strategic partner” by the African Union in the same year could be summarize the
Turkey’s increasing activism in Africa.330 In this period, many diplomatic and economic
instruments used by Turkey to accelerate Turkey’s activism in Africa such as opening
new embassies and trade agreements. Moreover, former Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet
Davutoglu introduced new foreign policy discourse called humanitarian diplomacy which
began to use especially towards African region and relations with African countries.
Particularly, with the use of humanitarian diplomacy, Turkey began to operate series of
developments in many African countries.

In the period of AKP in Turkish foreign policy, Turkey’s new multilateralism and
becoming more visible in INGOs has been another significant motivation for enhancing
its power in global governance. Turkey began to share some kind of a common ground
especially in the ideational sense with the BRICS countries in the global governance
institutions such as UN, IMF, WB, WTO and so on. Both Turkey and BRICS countries
seek to change in the IMF quota regime331 and the UN system particularly in the sense of

329
Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007.” p.79.
330
Mehmet Ozkan, “What Drives Turkey’s Involvement in Africa?,” Review of African Political Economy
37, no. 126 (December 1, 2010): 533–40, https://doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2010.530952. p.534.
331
Gökhan Bacik, “Turkey and the BRICS: Can Turkey Join the BRICS?,” in Turkey’s Rise as an Emerging
Power, ed. Paul Kubicek, Emel Parlar Dal, and Tarık Oğuzlu (New York: Routledge, 2015), 142–57. p.151.

109
Security Council. Regarding the IMF quota regime, former Prime Minister Erdogan
stated that “developing states should be given more roles within the IMF and their
administrative representation should be enhanced” and he stated also new currency quota
system within the IMF.332 Moreover, Erdogan criticized the USD based regime in the
IMF and offered to the usage of the gold-based regime as an alternative.333 Another
feature to show the rising power status of Turkey in the global politics can be seen via the
involvement in the MIST countries (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey), which
refers to the newly emerging powers in the global economy and politics like the BRIC’s
emergence in the beginning.334 These improvements show that Turkey’s institutionalism
has become increasingly effective both in the regional and global levels.335

Nevertheless, with these rising status of Turkey in the Middle East and North
Africa or criticisms against the current world order seen as an anti-western ideological
turn or shift of axis in the foreign policy of Turkey, it is mostly because of the “falling
into the framework of a within-system challenge.”336 Compare to the BRICS’s rising
power status in the global order which based on the anti-western ideological basis,
Turkey’s long-lasting links with Western powers and institutions accommodating Turkey
in a very different category as a Western-oriented rising power.337 In terms of institutional
links with Western-based international organizations, Turkey obviously holds a different
position compared to other rising powers particularly with regards to membership in the
NATO, the Council of Europe, the OECD and the EU.338 This institutional links with
western powers were clearly seen at the beginning and ongoing process of Arab Spring

332
Ibid. p.151.
333
Ibid. p.151.
334
Simon Roughneen, “After BRIC Comes MIST, the Acronym Turkey Would Certainly Welcome,” The
Guardian, February 1, 2011, sec. Global development, https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/poverty-matters/2011/feb/01/emerging-economies-turkey-jim-oneill.
335
Richard Falk and Tom Farer, “Turkey’s New Multilateralism: A Positive Diplomacy for the Twenty-
First Century,” Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations 19, no.
3 (July 1, 2013): 353–76, https://doi.org/10.5555/1075-2846-19.3.353. p.353-355.
336
Dal and Gök, “Locating Turkey as a ‘Rising Power’ in the Changing International Order: An
Introduction.” p.2.
337
Tarık Oğuzlu and Emel Parlar Dal, “Decoding Turkey’s Rise: An Introduction,” Turkish Studies 14, no.
4 (December 1, 2013): 617–36, https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2013.861112. p.618.
338
Ibid. p.620.

110
when Turkey act with US and EU countries with the link of NATO and EU particularly
in the case of Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya.339

II. Strategies of Turkey as a Rising Power in Global Governance

Turkey in the current global governance, in order to compete with the rising
powers and global actors in the international system, have adopted some strategies in the
foreign policy under the AKP government. As Keyman argue that, during this period,
Turkey increased its position in some areas such as Kurdish question in Northern-Iraq,
stability in the Middle East region, stability in the Caucasus and Central Asia, rise of anti-
Islamism in the Europe, global democratic governance of EU, Mediterranean politics,
international political economy, global energy politics, UNSC non-permanent
membership,340 democracy promotion, rapprochement to other regions, humanitarian
politics and so on. Therefore, mostly based on the diplomatic efforts, Turkey has
improved some strategies mostly with the base on multilateralism, and besides that
Turkey have involved some existing systems in the global arena.

The most important strategy of AKP in Turkish foreign policy is the use of
geographical importance of Turkey in the external relations which designed by Ahmet
Davutoglu in his work “Strategic Depth”. In fact, in terms of geography, Turkey occupies
a unique space in the world. As Davutoglu express that:

“as a large country in the midst of Afro-Eurasia’s vast landmass, it may

be defined as a central country with multiple regional identities that cannot be
reduced to one unified character. Like Russia, Germany, Iran, and Egypt, Turkey
cannot be explained geographically or culturally by associating it with one single
region.”341

Therefore, the most fundamental theme in the “Strategic Depth” doctrine is the
decreasing Turkey’s dependence on the West and also increasing its visibility in other

339
Kadir Ustun and Kılıç Kanat, “US-Turkey Relations: Arab Spring and the Search for Model
Partnership,” Policy Paper (Washington, D. C.: The SETA (Foundation for Political, Economic and Social
Research) Foundation, May 8, 2012), http://setadc.org/us-turkey-relations-arab-spring-and-the-search-for-
model-partnership/. p.3-4.
340
Keyman, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Era of Global Turmoil.” p.11.
341
Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007.” p.78.

111
regions. To do this, “the “Strategic Depth” doctrine calls for active engagement of Turkey
with all neighboring states of the region.”342 That was not so difficult for Turkey, because
of Turkey’s historical and cultural links with Balkans, Middle East, North Africa,
Caucasus and Central Asia. Moreover, besides mentioned regions, with the Davutoglu’s
multilateral and rhythmic diplomacy understanding Turkey has extended its vision
towards sub-Saharan African countries and Latin American countries. From this point of
view, it can be interpreted that in the last decade, Turkish foreign policy ruling elites’
strategy not only limited to be a regional state but to be a global player in the world
politics via involving as much as possible regions and countries in the world politics.
Therefore, unlike the previous periods’ mono-dimensional strategy, AKP’s foreign policy
vision began to focus on the opportunities of Turkey’s geographical importance “to play
an important role in constructing a new political, economic and cultural system.”343

To be a truly global player, Turkey firstly should ensure the stability of its region,
because of that “zero problems with neighbors” policy came to agenda which has mainly
six elements, these are namely:

“i) equal security for all, ii) economic integration, iii) the coexistence of
different cultures in a respectful manner, iv) high-level political co-operation, v)
a high-level of regional consciousness, and vi) understanding the relationship
between security and stability and development.”344

Therefore, in terms of “zero problems with neighbors” policy, Turkey tried to

develop strong political and economic relations with neighboring countries both for
strengthen Turkey’s regional position and providing the stability over the region.

Even though, this new activism based on the “zero problems with neighbors”
accelerated during the AKP period, according to Meliha Benli Altunışık, the “zero
problems with neighbors” policy or the AKP’s new activism towards Middle Eastern

342
Valerij Špak, “The Model of Turkish Foreign Policy: Opening New Horizons,” Lithuanian Annual
Strategic Review 12, no. 1 (2014): 91–112, https://doi.org/10.2478/lasr-2014-0005. p.101.
343
Ibid. p.101.
344
Murat Yeşiltaş and Ali Balcı, “A Dictionary of Turkish Foreign Policy in the AK Party Era: A
Conceptual Map,” SAM Papers (SAM (Center for Strategic Research), May 2013), http://sam.gov.tr/tr/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/SAM_Papers-7.pdf. p.15.

112
neighbours was based on the Turgut Özal’s “liberal functionalism” and former Minister
of Foreign Affairs İsmail Cem’s “social democratic constructivism”.345 However, AKP’s
activism involves much more than that with the development of not only political and
economic relations but also social and cultural relations in the region. Because of that,
“multi-dimensional foreign policy” initiative began with the complement countries
relations with each other rather than compete with each other. The “multi-dimensional
foreign policy” strategy accelerated in the formulation of Turkish foreign policy with the
belief of Turkey could not single-oriented, inactive foreign policy. The “multi-
dimensional foreign policy” necessitate to the foundation of “simultaneous” relations
with various actors in the external policy. As a result of the multi-dimensional / multi-
layered foreign policy should develop mutual dependency with both regional and global
actors, from this point of view, Turkish foreign policy should not focus on single country
or region or a single problem.346

Besides bilateral and regional relations, with rhythmic diplomacy, AKP

government have enhanced an active diplomacy in regional and international
organizations. The main aim of the rhythmic diplomacy has increased the international
prestige and visibility of Turkey in the international arena through hosting or chairing the
international organizations.347 Firstly, considering as a regional integration with Middle
Eastern countries, the election of Prof. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu for the General Secretary
of Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) was a major attempt to show Turkey's
activism. Besides that, the foundation of “Turkish-Arab Cooperation forum with the Arab
League in 2007 and a strategic dialogue mechanism with the Gulf Arab Countries
Cooperation Council in 2008”348 considered as a Turkey’s intention to deeper integration
over the Middle East region.

345
Meliha Benli Altunışık, “Worldviews and Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East,” New Perspectives
on Turkey 40 (April 2009): 169–92, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0896634600005264.; Jung, “The Domestic
Context of New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy.” p.36.
346
Yeşiltaş and Balcı, “A Dictionary of Turkish Foreign Policy in the AK Party Era: A Conceptual Map.”
p.13-14.
347
Muharrem Eksi, The Rise and Fall of Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy During JDP: The Rise and
Fall of the “Turkish Model” in the Muslim World (LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, 2016). p.50.
348
Ibid. p.51.

113
 On the other hand, Turkey’s emerging activism was not limited to the Middle East
and Middle Eastern regional institutions. Turkey’s foreign policy interests have been
extended to a much larger realm, compare to previous periods’ single focus. As Aras and
Gorener stated that Turkey seeks to integration with other regions:

“Turkey now hosts major summits of international organizations ranging

from the Water Forum and the Least Developed Countries to the Caribbean
Community… Turkey has also acquired a non-permanent seat on the UN Security
Council, and an observer status in the African Union, the Arab League, the
Association of Caribbean States (ACS) and the Organization of the American
States (OAS).”349

Besides that, Turkey accelerated its integration and effectiveness in major

international organizations. As a regional power and pivotal actor in the world politics,
Turkey hosted NATO summit in 2004 with the new proposals towards Afghanistan and
Iraq. Besides that, “in 2006, Turkey hosted World Economic Forum, and in 2008, it
hosted the African summit; in 2009, Turkey hosted the Alliance of Civilizations forum in
April, the International Monetary Fund/World Bank summit in October and the
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in November.”350 After the war between
Georgia and Russia, Turkey initiated the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform.
Moreover, Turkey took command the NATO force in Afghanistan since 2004.351

As one of the founder members of UN in 1945 Turkey served as a non-permanent

member of UNSC in the different periods particularly in 1951–1952, 1954–1955, 1961,
and 2009–2010. Besides that, Turkey’s activism for serving on Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC) much more than the UNSC with the periods of 1997–1999, 2004–
2006, and 2010. Both for UNSC non-permanent membership and ECOSOC seat coming
from the UNGA (United Nations General Assembly) electoral process, so other states

349
Aras and Gorener, “National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policy Orientation.” p.91.
350
Müftüler-Baç, “Turkish Foreign Policy, Its Domestic Determinants and the Role of the European
Union.” p.283.
351
Ibid. p.283.

114
choices on these periods overlap with Turkey which shows “the presumption that the
record is an indicator of the proximity of Turkey’s foreign interests to their own.”352

In 2009-2010, Turkey’s UNSC (United Nations Security Council) non-permanent

membership, hosting the fourth conference of the LDCs (Least Developed Countries) in
2010, application for the UNSC’s non-permanent membership for the period of 2015-
2016, presidency of the G20 for the year 2015, obviously illustrate the acceleration of
willingness and activism on Turkey’s side to have an active role in the world politics.353
During its non-permanent membership in UNSC; Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Gaza were
the Turkey’s priority and in 2010, interested with Iran’s nuclear improvement to find a
peaceful solution.354 On the other hand, Turkey’s dialogue for partnership with the
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in 2012 was one of the most important strategies both
for an alternative to EU and deepening integration with other regions. Another strategy
to show the rising power status of Turkey in the global politics can be seen via the
involvement in the MIST countries (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey), which
refers to the newly emerging powers in the global economy and politics like the BRIC’s
emergence in the beginning.355 These improvements show that Turkey’s institutionalism
has become increasingly effective both in the regional and global levels.356

In terms of activism in other international organizations, during the last decade,

both Turkey and BRICS countries seek to change in the IMF quota regime357 and the UN
system particularly in the sense of Security Council. Regarding the IMF quota regime
former Prime Minister, current President Erdogan stated that “developing states should
be given more roles within the IMF and their administrative representation should be
enhanced” and he stated also new currency quota system within the IMF.358 Moreover,
Erdogan criticized the USD based regime in the IMF and offered to the usage of the gold-

352
Tezcür and Grigorescu, “Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy.” p.264.
353
Dal and Gök, “Locating Turkey as a ‘Rising Power’ in the Changing International Order: An
Introduction.” p.8-13.
354
Müftüler-Baç, “Turkish Foreign Policy, Its Domestic Determinants and the Role of the European
Union.” p.283.
355
Roughneen, “After BRIC Comes MIST, the Acronym Turkey Would Certainly Welcome.”
356
Falk and Farer, “Turkey’s New Multilateralism.” p.353-355.
357
Bacik, “Turkey and the BRICS: Can Turkey Join the BRICS?” p.151.
358
Ibid. p.151.

115
based regime as an alternative.359 Therefore, it can be argued that Turkey tried to establish
a more sustainable system for the developing middle range powers. On the other hand,
for example in the voting process of UN General Assembly, Turkey acts according to
multi-dimensional and rhythmic diplomacy, so when Turkey sided with rising powers in
the sense of some issues and interests, also sided with Western powers on some issues.360
This situation can be interpreted as Turkey have no more followed one-sided diplomacy
even in the international organizations.

On the other hand, one of the most important element to show the rising power
status of Turkey in the regional and global arena is the geopolitical importance of Turkey
as mentioned previous section, particularly in the sense of energy roads. Turkey holds the
pivotal position in terms of geopolitics and geostrategic plans for transferring the
Caucasian, Asian and Middle Eastern countries’ natural gas and oil resources to European
countries. However, as the former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu stated that Turkey
should be more than energy corridor in regional and global relations. Therefore,
increasing influence of Turkey’s regional power can be interpreted as a Turkey’s desire
to go further and become a global power.361 Recently, even though, Turkey does not
possess plenty of oil and natural gas resources, Turkey has become one of the energy hubs
in the international politics, because of the transmission of Middle Eastern, Caucasian
and Central Asian oil and natural gas resources to the Europe. Because of that, lots of
pipeline project developed between Eastern countries and Western countries and Turkey
involves almost all of them. For example, some of the significant pipeline projects can be
listed as follow: Baku-Ceyhan and trans-Adriatic pipelines, Samsun-Ceyhan (Trans-
Anatolian) oil pipeline, Blue Stream (Mavi Akım) project, Turkish Stream project,
Kerkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline. In the current global politics, particularly relations with the
EU countries, Turkey uses its energy routes as a strategy in the foreign policy.

The invasion of Iraq by the US increased the significance of border security and
Kurdish nationalism issues at the instant which was the common threat of Iraq, Iran, and

359
Ibid. p.151.
360
Ali Murat Kurşun and Emel Parlar Dal, “An Analysis of Turkey’s and BRICS’ Voting Cohesion in the
UN General Assembly during 2002–2014,” Global Policy 8, no. 2 (May 1, 2017): 191–201,
https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12405.
361
Davutoğlu, “Türkiye Merkez Ülke Olmalı.”

116
Turkey so these countries get closer to each other because of the common interests. These
three countries afraid of the possible uprisings from the Kurdish population to integrated
with Kurdish Administration in Northern Iraq.362 Because of that, after the Iraq invasion,
the rapprochement policy between Turkey and Iran was initiated. Up until Arab Spring,
Turkey tried to integrate with Middle Eastern and North African countries not only with
the means of diplomacy, trade, and culture but also by regional organizations such as
OIC, Arab League, etc. As Davutoğlu stated that, during this period, Turkey's regional
vision was

“promoting full regional integration, maximising political dialogue,

establishing high-level strategic cooperation councils with each country on a
bilateral basis, finalizing visa exemption and free trade agreements to ensure
economic integration, building energy and trade networks, establishing the most
comprehensive transportation system, protecting cultural diversity, and
respecting ethnic and sectarian pluralism.”363

In the beginning of Arab Spring, when the demonstrations started in the Middle
East countries one by one, many countries were hesitant to do anything, they wanted to
observe and analyze the situations and then decided to do what would they do. From the
beginning of the social movements, Turkey adopted two most important principles.
Firstly, to be the side with the people who want democratic rule and democratic change
in their states. This was expected from the AKP, because of its effort to establish more
democratic legitimacy in Turkish politics according to EU membership criteria.
Therefore, when the social uprisings began over the Arab peninsula, decision makers of
AKP did not hesitate to involve the events and help the people who want democratic rule.
According to Davutoglu, the uprisings were delayed phenomenon in the Middle East
which would be occurred during the 1990s.364 Secondly, Turkey tried to ensure this
transition process to be more peaceful unlikely to Balkan countries.365 For example, from
the beginning, Turkey tried to use diplomatic ways to do some reforms for Assad regime

362
Tezcür and Grigorescu, “Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy.” p.262
363
Ahmet Davutoğlu, “The Three Major Earthquakes in the International System and Turkey,” The
International Spectator 48, no. 2 (June 1, 2013): 1–11, https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2013.796781.
p.9-10.
364
Ibid. p.5.
365
Ibid. p.5-6.

117
in Syria. Because of its modern nation-state building and democratic, a secular system
with the Islamic society Turkey have become the model country to the Middle Eastern
and North African countries. Particularly, in the beginning of the Arab Spring
(particularly from late 2010 to the end of 2012), Turkey’s potential leadership role had a
positive perception, not only inside but also outside the region, led to the emergence of
the concept of the “Turkish model”.366 As a matter of fact, in the current world order,
Turkey is the most successful example of democratic, secular state in the Islamic society.

Besides being a model country in the MENA region, Turkey’s mediation role was
another strategy during this period to construct more peaceful and sustainable system over
the region. Mediation has become a significant dimension of the new Turkish foreign
policy. Turkey’s mediation role, particularly, between Syria and Israel and also Israel and
Hamas; diplomatic efforts during the process of 2003 Iraqi intervention, engagement with
Brazil in the Iranian nuclear activities, all of these efforts show how Turkey engaged in
solving regional crises together with the other regional actors, organizations, and
cooperation.367 Turkey’s increasing mediation role represent its increasing active and
dynamic diplomacy in the bilateral, regional and international relations. Moreover,
Turkey with Finland suggested the project of “Friends of Mediation” in the UN. “The
Friends of Mediation initiative aims to strengthen the idea that mediation is a powerful
means for the peaceful solution of conflicts.”368

On the other hand, as another initiative strategy, in 2004, Turkey improved a

project name with “Alliance of Civilizations”369 in order to promote dialogue among
cultures in the world, which was later adopted by the UN in 2005; the second major forum
of the “Alliance of Civilizations” was held in Istanbul in 2009. The project was first
established between Turkey and Spain. The project’s main aim was to neutralize or

366
Dal and Erşen, “Reassessing the ‘Turkish Model’ in the Post-Cold War Era.” p.269.
367
Emel Parlar Dal, “A Normative Approach to Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy: The
Cosmopolitanism–Communitarianism Divide,” International Journal 70, no. 3 (September 1, 2015): 421–
33, https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702015584306.
368
Bülent Aras, “Turkey’s Mediation and Friends of Mediation Initiative,” SAM Papers (SAM (Center for
Strategic Research), December 2012), http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/SAM_Papers_No.4-
Dec12.pdf. p.8.
369
Ramazan Kılınç, “Turkey and the Alliance of Civilizations: Norm Adoption as a Survival Strategy,”
Insight Turkey 11, no. 3 (2009): 55–75.

118
prevent “possible conflicts and misunderstandings between the Western and Islamic
worlds, and its evolution as an initiative attests to the increased importance of Turkey as
a critical player in this field.”370 The decision makers of AKP considered the Alliance of
Civilization “a platform for the role of strengthening the Muslim identity of Turkey in the
international policy and becoming the voice of the Muslim world.” 371 AKP government
gave special interest to the project with the interest of presenting Turkey’s rising status in
the international system in the context of its model country understanding in the Muslim
world and bridge status of Western and Eastern worlds.

As Keyman’s identity-based perception suggested that Turkey with its increasing

capacity in the regional and global politics enhanced its sphere of influence as a regional
and pivotal state in the world politics with respect to Turkey’s role model in the Middle
East, Inter-Civilization Dialogue Project, fighting against terrorism, deepening relations
of EU relations and emerging market economy.372 As mentioned previously, Turkey’s
regional and global strategies considered as successful until the Arab Spring, particularly
with its increasing soft power. However, the emerging new threats both from internal and
external dynamics have decreased the Turkey’s soft power status, so this situation damage
Turkey’s prestige in the regional and global politics.

III. Instruments of Turkey as a Rising Power in Global

Governance
According to “Strategic Depth” theory, Turkey possesses strategically important
region between Muslim world and West, between Central Asia and Africa. Therefore,
Davutoglu’s “Strategic Depth” theory explains that Turkey can emerge as a regional
power only if it establishes good ties with all these regions and also all neighbors.373 Being
a regional power in the Middle East and North African regions, eventually led to Turkey
as one of the key actors in the world politics. Hence, the new kind of instruments and
tools have adopted in the last period of Turkish foreign policy to accelerate the Turkey’s
rising power in the global governance. As mentioned previous part, AKP government

370
Müftüler-Baç, “Turkish Foreign Policy, Its Domestic Determinants and the Role of the European
Union.” p.283.
371
Eksi, The Rise and Fall of Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy During JDP. p.63.
372
Keyman, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Era of Global Turmoil.” p.12.
373
Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik.

119
developed some strategies in the last decade with the desire to be a regional power and
pivotal actor in the global politics, this section will analyze how these strategies
developed in the bilateral, regional and international relations so this section will be some
kind of a practical side of the previous section.

Diplomacy can be persuasive or coercive, during the AKP period, particularly

between 2002 and 2015, Turkey uses effectively the persuasive diplomacy because of its
increasing soft power. As Nye stated that soft power basically means that, “the ability to
shape the preferences of others.”374 Therefore, as continue with Nye’s definition, soft
power is “the ability to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible assets
such as an attractive personality, culture, political values and institutions, and policies
that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority.”375 From this point of view, in the
sense of soft power winning people’s minds and hearts are more valuable or more
significant than winning war. Even though, Turkey used the hard power during the Cold-
War and the post Cold-War, during the AKP period various internal and external
developments have positively increased Turkey’s “soft power”. The increasing influence
of soft power in Turkish foreign policy in various regions and international organizations
positively affect the Turkey’s rising power status which eventually led to the Turkey as
an emerging soft power in the global governance. Turkey’s soft power, in the sense of
diplomatic technique, mostly based on the humanitarian, cultural and public diplomacy
and high-level visits, in the sense of economic technique, mostly based on the foreign aid,
humanitarian aids, lifting visa requirements etc. During this period, Turkey’s state
institutions related to the soft power activism has gained importance.

On the one hand, while other countries have adopted an isolationism in their
foreign policy because of the new emerging threats in the global politics, on the other
hand, Turkey accelerate its position in the global politics via using new proactive and
multi-dimensional foreign policy approach.376 Zero problem with neighbors was the first
element of the activism or soft power of Turkey which was initiated during the AKP

374
Joseph S. Jr Nye, Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics, New Ed edition (New York:
PublicAffairs, 2005). p.5.
375
Ibid. p.6.
376
Davutoğlu, “The Three Major Earthquakes in the International System and Turkey.” p.4.

120
period. Turkey wants to eliminate all problems with its neighbors or at least wants to
decrease them as much as possible. Therefore, Turkey began to use economic
interdependence, religious leadership, and cultural harmony in the neighbors’ relations.
Moreover, the rising economic growth rates of Turkey have increased the Turkey’s
leadership and involvement to the issues in its region.

Besides that, Turkey’s soft power, economic growth, providing rule of law and
democracy over the region enhanced the Turkey’s role model image in the Middle Eastern
countries.377 With the cultural, historical and diplomatic links Turkey has become more
and more influential over the Middle Eastern countries, that was obviously because of the
Turkey’s soft power over the region. Furthermore, Turkey has become more and more
active in the regional organizations such as Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC),
Arab League etc.378 Moreover, as a personal leadership capacity, according to Pew
research in 2012, the former Prime Minister, current President Erdogan is seen as the
most popular leader in the Islamic countries, moreover Turkey seen as a democracy
promoter state in the MENA region.379 On the other hand, during this period, Turkey also
has accelerated its diplomatic efforts in various regions. This situation can be seen in the
figure of Turkey’s diplomatic missions abroad, while the total number of foreign missions
in 2002 was around 160, currently, it has reached 236.380 Turkey’s soft power activism
mostly have consolidated via Turkey’s historical and geographical proximity which led
to the emergence of new areas of influence in the Turkish foreign policy. Because of that,
Turkey gave priority to trade and cultural relations as a soft power, for example, the
establishment of Yunus Emre Institute, improving TİKA activities, the spread of
humanitarian diplomacy related with Turkey’s emerging soft power activism.

Establishment of the Office of Public Diplomacy within the Turkish Prime

Ministry in 2010, was one of the significant signs of institutionalization of “soft power”
in Turkish foreign policy. Public diplomacy activities are conducted in two main contexts

377
Dal and Erşen, “Reassessing the ‘Turkish Model’ in the Post-Cold War Era.” p.258-282.
378
Aras, “The Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy.” p.133-138.
379
“Most Muslims Want Democracy, Personal Freedoms, and Islam in Political Life.”
380
“Brief History of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey,” Republic of Turkey
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed September 27, 2017, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-cumhuriyeti-
disisleri-bakanligi-tarihcesi.en.mfa.

121
which are “state-to-society” and “society-to-society”. The state-to-society activities are
the expression of state about the policies, activities which are doing in the international
arena directly using official means and channels. On the other hand, in terms of the
society-to-society dimension of public diplomacy chooses to use direct communications
channels with the public via using non-governmental means such as NGOs, research
centers, public opinion research companies, press, opinion leaders, universities, exchange
programs, associations, and foundations etc.381 The fundamental aim of public diplomacy
as a soft power instrument in Turkish foreign policy is to increase the visibility of Turkey
in international public opinion. Public diplomacy activities spread a wide range of fields,
such as diplomacy, foreign aid, science, technology, economics, education, tourism,
culture, art, and media, which are providing recognition of the Turkey’s opportunities and
activities in the international arena.382

Turkey’s public diplomacy efforts can be seen mostly in the Middle East, Eurasia,
and Balkans which share common background because of historical and cultural depth.
Turkey’s public diplomacy efforts have focused these regions because of Turkey’s aim
to accelerate its position as a regional power in these regions.383 As Chief Advisor to the
President of Turkey Kalın stated that about the significance of public diplomacy in
Turkish foreign policy “in order for us to achieve success in explaining Turkey’s position
in the face of accusations and problems our country has long endured in the international
arena, it is necessary to use public diplomacy tools and methods to inform accurately the
international community.”384 Moreover, besides the Middle East, Eurasia and Balkans,
with regards to public diplomacy efforts, Turkish government gave importance to EU
countries because of living Turkish citizens around the Europe which considered as an

381
“Kamu Diplomasisine Bakış,” T.C. Başbakanlık Kamu Diplomasisi Koordinatörlüğü, accessed October
6, 2017, https://kdk.gov.tr/sag/kamu-diplomasisine-bakis/21.
382
“Vizyon & Misyon,” T.C. Başbakanlık Kamu Diplomasisi Koordinatörlüğü, accessed October 6, 2017,
https://kdk.gov.tr/kurumsal/vizyon-misyon/8.
383
Ellen Huijgh and Jordan Warlick, The Public Diplomacy of Emerging Powers, Part 1: The Case of
Turkey (Los Angles: Figueroa Press, 2016),
https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/uscpublicdiplomacy.org/files/useruploads/u35361/The%20PD%20of
%20Emerging%20Powers.pdf. p.21.
384
İbrahim Kalın, “Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Turkey,” Perceptions 16, no. 3 (2011): 5–23. p.8.

122
emerging diaspora activity. Turkey maintains to improve itself in the public diplomacy
area with the aim of to be a regional power and global actor.385

On the other hand, to become a regional leader, Alliance of Civilizations Initiative

proposed in the international arena by Turkey and Spain, in order to promote dialogue
among cultures in the world, which was later adopted by the UN in 2005. The project’s
main aim was to neutralize or prevent “possible conflicts and misunderstandings between
the Western and Islamic worlds, and its evolution as an initiative attests to the increased
importance of Turkey as a critical player in this field.”386 Alliance of Civilizations
Initiative can be considered as an instrument of public diplomacy. As Eksi’s expression,
Alliance of Civilizations “is expressed among the public diplomacy initiatives and
activities and it could be argued that it opened space for a mediation role in the Muslim-
Christian conflicts through Turkey’s international image in general, its model country
role and its legitimacy.”387 Therefore, as an instrument of public diplomacy Alliance of
Civilizations made a favorable influence to present Turkey’s identity and image in both
the Islamic world and Christian world.

Besides public diplomacy, humanitarian diplomacy has become a significant

component of Turkish foreign policy during the AKP period. Basically, humanitarian
diplomacy defines as a respecting the human rights and humanitarian values. With
reference to Davutoglu, “the main priority of humanitarian diplomacy is not the state but
citizens, and Turkey, as it follows humanitarian diplomacy, should be interested in urgent
humanitarian crisis in conflict-ridden areas.”388 Even though, Turkey’s humanitarian
diplomacy efforts firstly present the Turkey’s desire to manage crises and issues within
the surrounding regions, it also shows the Turkey’s intention to involve in emerging
global problems.

385
Huijgh and Warlick, The Public Diplomacy of Emerging Powers, Part 1: The Case of Turkey. p.21-22.
386
Müftüler-Baç, “Turkish Foreign Policy, Its Domestic Determinants and the Role of the European
Union.” p.283.
387
Eksi, The Rise and Fall of Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy During JDP. p.64-65.
388
Yeşiltaş and Balcı, “A Dictionary of Turkish Foreign Policy in the AK Party Era: A Conceptual Map.”
p.22.

123
 The activism in Turkish foreign policy can be observed in different periods in the
Turkish history such as the 1950s and the end of the Cold War. 389 However, previous
periods’ activisms mostly based in the Europe, the last period activism under the rule of
AKP not only based on the Europe but also different regions. Turkey’s engagement with
the MENA region attracted the attention in the academic life with the understanding of
Turkey’s rising pro-activism towards the region, in this sense different explanations were
made by various scholars.390 During the AKP period, Turkey accelerated the position of
itself as a ‘benign regional power’ particularly MENA and Africa regions. 391 Currently,
Turkish foreign policy has begun to act with the base on more multidimensional and
regionally oriented compared to the previous Western-oriented policies, therefore,
today’s Turkey shows itself as an “insider” country in the MENA region392 as the time of
Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that Syrian civil war became one of the
concerns of Turkey’s internal affair.393 With this activism, Turkey has shown itself as a
voice of Muslim countries in the international politics. On the other hand, former Turkish
Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu introduced new foreign policy discourse called
humanitarian diplomacy which began to use especially towards African region and
relations with African countries. According to Turkish foreign policy decision-makers,
humanitarian diplomacy had three fundamental dimensions which are citizens of Turkey,
country’s human-oriented attitude in crisis zones and humanitarian perspective at the
global world order, particularly in the UN system.394 As President of the Federal Republic
of Somalia Hassan Sheikh Mohamud declared, Turkey’s activism spread over the Africa:

“The Turkish model in Somalia is very, very clear... They said we want
to do this thing in Somalia, and they do it. They don’t have the restrictions that
many of the Western world has got. They are there. They come there, starting
from their top leadership, the prime minister of the country with his family, the

389
Müftüler-Baç, “Turkish Foreign Policy, Its Domestic Determinants and the Role of the European
Union.” p.280.
390
Öniş and Kutlay, “Rising Powers in a Changing Global Order.” p.1411.
391
Öniş and Yılmaz, “Between Europeanization and Euro‐ Asianism.” p.16-20.
392
Öniş and Kutlay, “Rising Powers in a Changing Global Order.” p.1411.
393
“Erdoğan: Suriye Bizim İç Meselemizdir,” accessed July 13, 2017,
http://www.trthaber.com/haber_yazdir.php?detayID=4907.
394
Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Humanitarian Diplomacy: Objectives, Challenges and Prospects,”
Nationalities Papers 41, no. 6 (November 1, 2013): 865–70,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2013.857299. p.867-868.

124
 rest, deputy prime minister, ministries. There is a deputy prime minister who
come to Somalia every other month just to monitor and see how the projects are
going on. They are building or implementing projects that are really tangible ones
– building one of the most modern hospital in the African continent, as they said
– 200-bed hospital with all the necessary facilities of a modern hospital. There is
a 100-bed hospital for children only, which is also under going. There is another
100-bed hospital for disabled people and people of – have level of disabilities.
These are some of the projects – schools, many other projects are running.”395

The most important institution of Turkey in terms of humanitarian diplomacy is

definitely Turkish International Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA).
Although, the TİKA which is a state institution under the Turkish Prime Ministry since
1992, has gained its effectiveness during the AKP period. TİKA deals with projects in the
fields of education, health, agricultural development, tourism, industry, and restoration.
TİKA projects and activities have been spread all over the world from Balkans to
Caucasus, Central Asia to the Middle East, Africa to Latin America. The TİKA Program
Coordination Offices number was 12 in 2002 and increased the 25 in 2011 and to 33 in
2012. The TİKA currently is operating its activities and projects in 170 countries with 58
Program Coordination Offices which located in 56 countries across 5 continents. While
TİKA’s budget for development aid 85 millions of USD in 2002, the amount increased
3.9 billion USD in 2015. 396 As clearly seen in the following table, Turkey’s humanitarian
aid and development assistance increased gradually.

395
Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, The Future of Governance in Somalia, Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS), January 17, 2013, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/legacy_files/files/attachments/130117_HassanSheikhMahamud_transcript.pdf. p. 18-19;
Cemalettin Haşimi, “Turkey’s Humanitarian Diplomacy and Development Cooperation,” Insight Turkey
17, no. 1 (2014): 127–45.
396
“About Us - TİKA,” Turkish International Cooperation and Coordination Agency, accessed October 6,
2017, http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/page/about_us-14650.

125
 Table 6: “Official Development Assistance” and “Official Emergency and
Humanitarian Aid” of Turkey397

Official Development Assistance Official Emergency and Humanitarian

(Million USD) Aid (Million USD)
2005 601 178,9
2007 602 46,1
2009 707 49,8
2011 1.273 264,4
2013 3.308 1.629
2015 3.919 2.738

Turkey’s Red Crescent Society (Kızılay) also effective in the field of humanitarian
policy, particularly because of responding the disasters all over the world. On the other
hand, since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Kızılay closely interested with the
Syrian refugees in Turkey with the efforts of food aids, health cares, accommodation in
camps and so on. Moreover, as seen in the Russian-Georgian War, the tsunami in Sri
Lanka, earthquakes in Haiti and Chile398 and more currently Rohingya massacre,
Kızılay’s aids have exceeded its regions and Muslim world.

Turkey started to implement culture diplomacy institutionally for the first time
under the AKP government. Foundation of the Yunus Emre Institute is one of the crucial
element of cultural diplomacy which established by the AKP government in 2007.
Institute’s main aim is to present and export Turkish culture and also language via cultural
centers in the abroad. Currently, Yunus Emre Institute is operating its activities via more
than 40 cultural centers abroad.399 Institute presents and promotes the Turkish culture and
art in the abroad. Moreover, Yunus Emre Institute is some kind of a Turkish version
Germany’s Goethe Institute or Spain’s Cervantes Institute. Compare to Germany and Spain,

397
“Turkish Development Assistance Report 2015” (Ankara: Turkish International Cooperation and
Coordination Agency (TİKA), 2016),
http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/2017/YAYINLAR/TKYR%202015%20ENG/KALKINMA%20.pdf.
398
Huijgh and Warlick, The Public Diplomacy of Emerging Powers, Part 1: The Case of Turkey. p.25-26
399
“Yunus Emre Enstitüsü,” Yunus Emre Enstitüsü, accessed October 6, 2017,
http://www.yee.org.tr/en/yunusemreinstitude/.

126
Turkey was institutionally late to integrate cultural diplomacy in foreign policy. During the
AKP period, Turkey realized the importance of cultural diplomacy to become a regional
power in the pivotal actor in the global politics. When the rising powers realized the
importance of soft power with the cultural ties they began to open their cultural diplomacy
centers during 2000s such as the establishment of China’s Confucius Institutes, the
foundation of Russia’s Russkiy Mir Foundation. Besides, Yunus Emre Institute in the fields
of cultural diplomacy, the decision makers of Turkey began to use Muslim identity discourse
to increase the integration with Middle Eastern Muslim countries.400 On the other hand, as a
cultural diplomacy effort, Turkish television series has been spread all over from Balkans to
the Middle East, in which Turkey’s growing regional leadership pointed out.

Another significant instrument during the AKP period is strengthening economic

relations particularly via economic interdependence with regional countries and foreign
aid or humanitarian aid to less developed countries or which suffer from some kind of a
disaster. Although, geographical proximity still the most significant determinant in terms
of international trade, the trade capacity is very limited among Middle Eastern countries
compare to other regions. As Tezcür and Grigorescu’s findings clearly express that “none
of the Middle Eastern countries appear among the region’s top 10 trade partners.”401
However, the AKP government has tried to enhance its economic relations with regional
countries since the beginning of coming to power in 2002. Turkey mostly within the
framework of “zero problems with neighbors” policy accelerated its trade capacity
towards regional countries with the aim of creating an economic interdependence among
regional countries to find peaceful solutions to the issues rather than conflict among each
other. Because of that, AKP government promoted many kinds of policies to increase
Turkey’s trade relations with the Middle Eastern countries including lifting visa
requirements with some countries and high-level visits.402 Davutoglu’s “zero problem
policy” toward Turkey’s neighbors was mostly based on the economic interdependence.
Thanks to the new transportation ways, the economic relations improved with Georgia,
besides that thanks to the lifting visa requirements and free trade agreement with Syria,

400
Eksi, The Rise and Fall of Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy During JDP. p.27-31.
401
Tezcür and Grigorescu, “Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy.” p.269.
402
Ibid. p.269.

127
both states developed their economic ties with each other.403 Turkey used economic tools
towards regional neighbors effectively such as Turkey became the largest trading partner
for Azerbaijan, Georgia and Iraq and also enhanced its investment capacity towards these
countries. For instance, “as of 2009, there were 400 Turkish companies doing business in
various parts of Iraq.”404 The role of the influential business associations such as
TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD, TOBB, and TİM was so significant to develop economic relations
with neighbor states. Moreover, in the global arena, because of its young population,
developing economy and high growth rates, Turkey has become one of the significant
“emerging market economies”, not influential like India and China, in the international
political economy.405 As a matter of fact, with reference to Öniş and Yılmaz “the strength
of the Turkish economy will be crucial for its ability to play a benign regional role based
on ‘soft power’.406

Besides Turkey’s humanitarian diplomacy particularly towards African countries,

another important role belongs to the aid policies which show Turkey’s rising power
status in the global world order. Turkish International Cooperation and Development
Agency (TIKA) is the principal institution for managing aid policies in African
developing countries. Besides that, thanks to the Yunus Emre Institute, Turkey promoting
cultural heritage and cultural exchange in these developing countries. Turkey provided
US$6.0 billion as humanitarian assistance in 2016 and became the second largest
government contributor following the USA which provided US$6.3 billion as
humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, Turkey was listed as the most generous country
for spending 0.75 percent of its gross national income (GNI) on humanitarian
assistance.407 Generally, during the AKP period, the hard power was not desired to use in
the formulation of foreign policy except some security concerns and issues such as Syrian
civil war, emerging new terrorist organizations such as PKK, YPG, ISIS etc. In order to
be a truly regional power and pivotal actor in the global politics, Turkey realized that

403
Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007.” p.80.
404
Müftüler-Baç, “Turkish Foreign Policy, Its Domestic Determinants and the Role of the European
Union.” p.282.
405
Keyman, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Era of Global Turmoil.” p.12.
406
Öniş and Yılmaz, “Between Europeanization and Euro‐ Asianism.” p.19.
407
Charlotte Lattimer and Sophia Swithern, “Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2017” (Development
Initiatives, 2017), http://devinit.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/GHA-Report-2017-Full-report.pdf. p.44.

128
using soft power much more effective than the hard power. However, since the Syrian
civil war in 2012 and after the July 15 coup attempt initiated some hard power policies in
the foreign policy of Turkey which will be scrutinized in the following section.

B. Evaluation
During the AKP period, active, multi-dimensional foreign policy approach
developed in the relationship with states and international organizations. Therefore,
Turkey began to interested in other regions particularly with the rising soft power
capability of Turkey. Detailed analyses of Turkish foreign policy can be seen in Table 7
which shows the main dynamics of Turkish foreign policy in the AKP period up until
2015. As mentioned before and scrutinized in the previous section, the new foreign policy
of Turkey marks a considerable degree of discontinuity compares to previous periods of
Turkish foreign policy. As a matter of fact, because of the AKP ruling elites’ ambitions
to accommodate Turkey in a higher position in the global politics and their Eastern
oriented foreign policy influenced positively to Turkey’s visibility in the major
international organizations. In countries where political polarization and power struggles
are intensely influential like Turkey, election results have the capacity not only to
reinforce domestic political balances but also to influence the orientation of the country
in the regional and global system. During the AKP period, the most important
phenomenon is that the distinction between foreign policy and domestic politics has
ceased to exist and has become a complement to each other. In this framework, the AKP
era has been differentiated from the previous Turkish foreign policy, because of trying to
establish communication with other regions outside the West, which has allowed Turkey
to increase its regional power and led to more prominence in the global governance
system.

129
Table 7: Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-2007 Era: Elements of Continuity and
Rupture408
Elements of Continuity Elements of Rupture
A more independent and assertive style of foreign policy.
There is an unprecedented increase in the scale of
Foreign Multi-dimensional foreign policy diplomatic activity. In line with the underlying global
Policy Style with an emphasis on soft power shifts, notably during the global financial crisis,
following the footsteps of BRICs is seen as an
increasingly attractive option.
A commitment to Western a
orientation and EU membership,
Western Continued commitment to a Western orientation and EU
with the qualification that there is a
Orientation membership in rhetoric. But, in reality, a tendency to act
pronounced decline in enthusiasm
and independently on a number of key foreign policy issues
for EU membership, parallel to the
Commitment has become more visible even though this may result in
striking decline in public support for
to the EU direct confrontation with Western powers.
EU membership which started
between 2005 and 2007.
Turkish foreign policy is more active in regions such as
the Middle East where there is ample scope to play a
regional leadership role. Turkish foreign policy is less
active in regions such as the Balkan and the Central Asia
Attempts to play a more active where the scope for regional leadership is more limited
regional and global role with and would be contested by powerful rivals. This suggests
particular emphasis on helping to that the quest for regional leadership has become a major
Regional and
promote cross-cultural dialogue and motive underlying the new Turkish foreign policy.
Global Role
performing a mediating role in The Middle East (including North Africa) has become a
major regional and international focal point in Turkish foreign policy efforts suggesting
conflicts that there is a strong identity dimension implicit in the
new Turkish foreign policy. Similarly, Turkey has
become a more active actor in peacekeeping operations
and humanitarian interventions, especially in
Afghanistan and in the Balkans.
A tendency to take sides in regional conflict such as a
Zero proplems with all neighbors pro-Palestine position in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
strategy; a serious attempt to “an and a pro-Iranian position in the conflict involving the
Style of
attempt to maintain West over the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear program.
Mediation
neutrality/impartiality” in regional This aspect of Turkish foreign policy arguably places
conflicts limits on Turkey’s role as a reference or mediator in
major international conflicts.
Leadership is important with
Leadership
Abdullah Gül playing an important Even stronger leadership and ownership of foreign policy
Style of
role as the minister of foreign with Ahmet Davutoglu in the driving seat and Abdullah
Foreign
affairs, complemented by Ahmet Gül as an unusually pro-active president in external
Policy and
Davutoglu as the intellectual force affairs.
Ownership
behind the scenes.
Civil society involvement in foreign
Linkages
policy initiatives becomes The linkages between foreign policy and domestic
between
increasingly important and parallel politics have become more striking. The government is
Domestic
to the democratization of foreign much more willing to use foreign policy initiatives as a
Politics and
policy; public opinion assumes strategic tool for consolidating and extending its
Foreign
greater weight in shaping key domestic coalitional base.
Policy
foreign policy decisions.

408
Öniş, “Multiple Faces of the ‘New’ Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique.” p.51.

130
 As mentioned above, in countries where political polarization and power struggles
are intensely influential like Turkey, election results have the capacity not only to
reinforce domestic political balances but also to influence the orientation of the country
in the regional and global system. Therefore, on the one hand, as a result of the political
polarization and the struggle for power in Turkey, on the other hand, the emerging
regional dynamics which were contrary to AKP policies led to the end of the AKP
majority in the government in the June 7 election. Correspondingly, the gap which was
created after the June 7 election brought the slowdown in Turkish foreign policy.
Although the AKP once again took power with a majority in the November 1 election,
with the departure of Davutoğlu from the prime ministry, the idea of Strategic Depth has
interrupted in the foreign policy. Moreover, because of the extreme impact of regional
dynamics in the formulation of foreign policy and the regional dynamics have become
more problematic in terms of security, which was began from the Syrian civil war and
became even more intense with the PKK and ISIS terrors, led to orientation of Turkish
foreign policy towards hard power policies. Furthermore, the coup attempt on July 15 and
the FETO terrorist organization within the state institutions intensified the security
policies of Turkey both in terms of internal and external dimensions.

Although, Turkey’s activism still continues in the foreign policy, since June 7
election and more particularly since July 15 coup attempt some changes began to discuss
in the Turkish foreign policy. When AKP lost its majority to establish government and
the coalition attempts failed in the ongoing process of June 7 election, this situation made
some kind of an interruption in the foreign policy particularly in the sense of stability.
Currently, three features are shaping the Turkish foreign policy dynamics in terms of
security which are FETO terrorist organizations, Syrian civil war and rising PKK and
ISIS terrorist activities. Turkey has had to return hard power because of the security
threats both from internal and external. However, before these events, the process of Arab
Spring particularly the Syrian civil war began to influence negatively Turkey and
Turkey’s soft power. As Ekşi stated that “the real fall of the soft power image of the AKP

131
governments took place during the Arab Spring process when they turned to the hard
power policy.”409

Although, Turkey began to use some hard power policies, the soft power’s
importance did not decrease in the foreign policy. Keyman explains the using smart power
with the combination of soft and hard power as a “moral realism.”410 In order to solve the
unexpected crisis and security threats, Turkish foreign policy has been reformed itself
since 2015. Although, pro-activism has remained since 2002, motivation, strategy and
instrument began to change. Keyman defines the post-Davutoglu era of Turkish foreign
policy since 2015 as a rupture rather than continuity. In Keyman's own words, he states
that:

“over the last two years we have been witnessing not only a foreign policy
reset but also the emergence of a new Turkish foreign policy whose proactive
nature and main principles are shaped by what I call proactive “moral realism,”
which combines hard power-based military assertiveness and humanitarian
norms.”411

Indeed, increasing hard power policies in the Turkish foreign policy was because
of the conjunctural circumstances. To respond the rising security threats from internal and
external dimensions, Turkey redefined its foreign policy choices. However, Turkey did
not break all ties from the previous policies which were established in the period of
Davutoglu since 2002. Therefore, Turkey has been focusing on three strategic choices in
the foreign policy since 2015 which are (i) maintaining pro-activism; (ii) in order to
protect human lives continue to promote humanitarian norms and moral responsibility;
(iii) responding to security risks and challenges in an effective and certain way through
hard power.412 Because of the war against Kurdish terrorist organizations
(PKK/PYD/YPG) and also ISIS and managing the refugee crisis to create stability in the
region have become more vital rather than the soft power capacity of Turkey. Because of
the emerging threats in the region, Turkey has changed some policies in the post-

409
Eksi, The Rise and Fall of Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy During JDP. p.65.
410
E. Fuat Keyman, “A New Turkish Foreign Policy: Towards Proactive ‘Moral Realism,’” Insight Turkey
19, no. 1 (2017): 55–69.
411
Ibid. p.56.
412
Ibid. p.56.

132
Davutoglu period such as seeking strategic alliances rather than multilateralism, regaining
friends rather than zero problems with neighbors etc., these foreign policy changes can
be listed as in the following table.

Table 8: Turkish Foreign Policy in the Davutoğlu and Post-Davutoğlu Era413

Foreign Policy in the Davutoglu Era Foreign Policy in the Post-Davutoglu Era
(2002-2010/15) (2015-Present)
Proactivism/Regional-Global Engagements Proactivism/Selective Engagements
Pivotal State with Strong EU Anchor Pivotal State without a Strong Anchor
Soft Power Hard Power
Active Globalization/Multilateralism Strategic Alliances
Zero Problem with Neighbors Regaining Friends
Idealism/Civilizational Realism Moral/Traditional Realism
General Activism Priority Setting
Trading State/Humanitarian Assistance Humanitarian State
Energy Hub Energy Hub

Finally, after the July 15 coup attempt, Turkey began to focus on internal
dynamics because of the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO) threat. The July 15 coup
attempt and the developments in the ongoing process has taken a major blow to the
military and civil bureaucracy. For the solution of this problem, moving in accordance
with mutual consultations, constructive dialogues, and common interests rather than
debates in domestic politics will make Turkey a better position. In other words, in the
post-July 15 period, the wise strategies which would be implemented in domestic politics
will automatically strengthen Turkish foreign policy. For overcoming this process, AKP
suggested that transition from the parliamentary system to the presidential system as a
vital solution. However, because of the lack of high-level cooperation and a certain level
of mutual understanding between the government party and the opposition parties in this
process led to the interpretation of the fragility of this process. However, as mentioned
above, it is almost impossible to establish this high-level cooperation among parties in

413
Ibid. p.66.

133
countries like Turkey where political polarization and power struggle are intense. The
most important consequence of the July 15 for the Turkish society, particularly for the
nationalist conservative people, was to understand how important the secularism in the
administration of the country. In accordance with this point, in the bureaucratic hierarchy,
any institution or person should be prevented from interfering with the state
administration. Because of the internal and external threats, in the post-July 15 period,
Turkey should increase rapprochement with its neighbors and should gain new
friendships for the sake of both domestic and foreign policy. The best way to achieve this
to ensure internal peace and prosperity through a democratic and legal understanding of
the state. In this way, Turkish foreign policy capability can be established more firmly in
the regional and global environment.

134
 5. CONCLUSION
Throughout this thesis, I have tried to explain the what kinds of motivations,
strategies, and instruments have been used in the Turkish foreign policy in the global
governance system as a rising power. In order to clarify the further understanding of the
motivations, strategies and instruments which has been developed and used in the last
fifteen years of Turkish foreign policy, the study firstly analyzed the concepts of global
governance and rising power as a theoretical way and then analyzed the previous periods
and main turning points of Turkish foreign policy.

Even though, the concept of global governance has been studied so much since
the end of the Cold-War, the literature still growing because of emerging new threats and
challenges. Therefore, establishing a long-standing, stable global order is not visible in
the near future. Therefore, taking serious precautions collectively to against these
problems is the most significant point which led to the emergence of the idea of global
governance. Although, the global actors such as the US, EU still keep their higher
positions in this collective structure, the rising powers such as Canada, Japan and BRICS
began to interfere in the decision making process with their rising capability and emerging
power in the international system. In the last decade, because of the Turkey’s emerging
power both in the regional and global dimension led to the involvement of Turkey among
the rising powers by many academician and politicians. Although, Turkey’s capability is
not as high as BRICS in the global governance system, because of regional dynamics and
Turkey’s involvement into them and also rising activism both in global politics and
international organizations led to the accommodation of Turkey as one of the influential
power in the global governance system. Categorization of rising powers according to their
capabilities would be better to understand their influence in the world politics. From this
point of view, categorization of rising powers in accordance with their influence and
status in the global governance system as lower rising powers, middle rising powers, and
higher rising powers would be wise to see their capacities in the global governance
system.414 Although, there are some quantitative analysis was made by some scholars for
some rising powers to show their influence in the global politics, none of them investigate

414
Special thanks for Assist. Prof. Muzaffer Şenel from İstanbul Şehir University for giving the idea of
categorization of rising power as their capabilities in one of our conversation.

135
all the old (Canada, Japan, etc.) and the new rising powers (BRICS, MIKTA) in a single
work.415 Even though, seeing accurate status of Turkey as a rising power in the global
governance necessitates detailed analysis, as a qualitative level as far as Turkey can be
accommodated between middle rising powers and higher rising powers because of its
influence and involvement in the regional dynamics, increasing soft power in almost all
over the regions and also acceleration of its involvement in international organizations.
However, in the post-2015 period, because of the internal and external rising threats,
Turkey’s influence in the global governance have entered some kind of a stagnation
process and this situation led to the accommodation of Turkey near to the middle rising
powers between middle rising powers and higher rising powers.

On the other hand, in order to establish itself as a legitimate actor in the Turkish
political system, AKP has developed three significant strategies since the beginning:
firstly, the adopting the discourse of democracy and human rights, secondly mobilizing
popular support via referencing with Islamic norms and values, and thirdly, to be a truly
legitimate political actor, AKP tried to establish relations with modern and secular sectors
on the liberal-democratic level.416 All these developments have influenced the
formulation of foreign policy in the AKP period and have accelerated its position in the
regional politics as a model country and global politics as a pivotal actor. Turkey's role
as a regional power has increased since AKP came to power. Moreover, AKP’s regional
leadership led to the increase Turkey’s position in the international system. Therefore,
until the spread of Arab Spring all over the Middle East, Turkey has seen as a “big
brother” and the “voice” of the Muslim society in the global politics. Moreover, Turkey
has increased its “mediator” capacity such as in Syrian-Israeli negotiations and Brazil-
Iranian nuclear issue. Furthermore, with its rising capacity, while Turkey has been
increasing its sphere of influence over its surrounded regions, and also seek to engage
with global emerging powers.

415
The most important works about the quantitative analysis of rising powers: Wang and French, “Middle
Range Powers in Global Governance.”; “About the Project.” Rising Powers in Global Governance,
accessed August 12, 2017, http://risingpowersproject.com/about-the-project/.
416
İhsan D. Dağı, “The Justice and Development Party: Identity, Politics, and Human Rights Discourse in
the Search for Security and Legitimacy,” in The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti,
ed. M. Hakan Yavuz (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2006), 88–106.

136
 Since 2002, with the rise of AKP and the decision makers’ foreign policy vision,
activism and new multilateralism accelerated in the formulation of foreign policy which
led to increasing of Turkey’s sphere of influence both regionally and globally. To increase
its sphere of influence in the global governance, Turkey under the rule of AKP has
initiated some motivations, strategies, and instruments in the formulation of foreign
policy which were differentiated from the previous periods of Turkish foreign policy. In
terms of motivations, the most important point was the rise of political Islam with the
AKP which led to the higher integration with MENA countries. Besides that, in the
framework of Davutoglu’s idea of “Strategic Dept” and visionary approach, Turkey
began to accommodate itself as a center rather than the bridge in the global politics. With
regards to strategies, the rising status in regional and international organizations such as
OIC and UN, democracy promotion towards MENA countries, rapprochement to other
regions, rising humanitarian politics, hosting major summits of international
organizations, such as NATO, LDCs, G20 etc., development of new energy roads and
initiating new international projects such as Alliance of Civilizations are significantly
important to understand the last period of activism in Turkish foreign policy.
Furthermore, in the sense of instruments, improvement of public, humanitarian and
cultural diplomacy with the rising economic capacity led to the emergence of Turkey as
a soft power in the global politics.

To conclude, indeed, Turkey under the rule of AKP was so dynamic in terms of
both domestic politics and foreign policy. As an Islamist party based on the liberal and
democratic values led to the economic growth of Turkey particularly in the Middle East
with the desire of economic interdependence with neighbor countries to achieve zero
problems with neighbors. However, the widespread of Arab Spring all over the region
restricted Turkey’s capacity to influence the events in the region. Although, Turkey
represented itself as a model country to the Middle Eastern countries to overcome this
limitation, its image diminished gradually because of its inability to find a solution to
ongoing Syrian civil war. Moreover, in addition to PKK terrorist activities, the
widespread of ISIS threat in the region and also the FETO threat in the domestic arena
restricted Turkey’s capacity to play more important role in the global politics. To maintain
its rising power in the global governance system, Turkey should find a comprehensive

137
solution to these threats as soon as possible. Even though, all of these misfortunate
domestic and regional dynamics, Turkey is maintaining its involvement to regional and
global politics particularly thanks to its well established soft power capacity.

138
 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books

Akgün, Mensur. Strategizing Turkey : The Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy.
İstanbul: İstanbul Kültür University, 2014.

Alexandroff, Alan S., and Andrew F. Cooper, eds. Rising States, Rising Institutions:
Challenges for Global Governance. 1st ed. Washington D.C.: Brookings
Institution Press, 2010.

Altunışık, Meliha Benli, and Özlem Tür. Turkey: Challenges of Continuity and Change.
London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005.

Armaoğlu, Fahir. 20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi (Cilt 1-2: 1914-1995). 11th ed. İstanbul: Alkım
Yayınevi, n.d.

Art, Robert J., and Robert Jervis, eds. International Politics: Enduring Concepts and
Contemporary Issues. 8 edition. New York: Pearson, 2007.

Ateş, Nevin Yurdsever. “Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türk Dış Politikaları.” In Türk Dış
Politikası : Cumhuriyet Dönemi 1, edited by Mustafa Bıyıklı, 1:53–91. İstanbul:
Gökkubbe, 2008.

Athanassopoulou, Ekavi. Strategic Relations Between the US and Turkey 1979-2000:

Sleeping with a Tiger. New York: Routledge, 2014.

Bacik, Gökhan. “Turkey and the BRICS: Can Turkey Join the BRICS?” In Turkey’s Rise
as an Emerging Power, edited by Paul Kubicek, Emel Parlar Dal, and Tarık
Oğuzlu, 142–57. New York: Routledge, 2015.

Bağcı, Hüseyin. Türk Dış Politikasında 1950’li Yıllar. 2nd ed. Ankara: METU Press,
2001.

Baharçiçek, Abdülkadir. “Soğuk Savasın Anlamı ve Sona Ermesinin Türk Dış Politikası
Üzerindeki Etkileri.” In 21. Yüzyılın Esiğinde Türk Dış Politikası, edited by
Idris Bal. İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2001.

Bal, Idris, ed. 21. Yüzyılın Eşiğinde Türk Dış Politikası. İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2001.

———. Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold War Era. Brown Walker Press, 2004.

Balcı, Ali. Türkiye Dış Politikası: İlkeler, Aktörler, Uygulamalar. İstanbul: Etkileşim
Yayınları, 2013.

Barnett, Michael, and Raymond Duvall, eds. Power in Global Governance. 1st ed.
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

139
Baylis, John, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, eds. The Globalization of World Politics:
An Introduction to International Relations. 6th ed. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2014.

Bazin, Marcel, and Stephane De Tapia. Türkiye Coğrafyası. Translated by Arzu Nilay
Kocasu. 1st ed. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2015.

Biermann, Frank. Earth System Governance: World Politics in the Anthropocene. The
MIT Press, 2014. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262028226.001.0001.

Bilgin, Mert. Türkiye’nin Küresel Konumu: Moderniteden Postmoderniteye Ekonomi

Siyaset Güvenlik ve Kimlik Açılımları. İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık,
2008.

Bıyıklı, Mustafa, ed. Türk Dış Politikası : Cumhuriyet Dönemi 1. Vol. 1. İstanbul:
Gökkubbe, 2008.

———, ed. Türk Dış Politikası : Cumhuriyet Dönemi 2. Vol. 2. İstanbul: Gökkubbe,
2008.

Bozdağlıoğlu, Yücel. Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist

Approach. New York & London: Routledge, 2003.

Brown, Chris, and Kirsten Ainley. Understanding International Relations. 3rd ed. New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy And Its Geostrategic
Imperatives. 1S ed. New York: Basic Books, 1998.

Cagaptay, Soner. The Rise of Turkey: The Twenty-First Century’s First Muslim Power.
Lincoln: Potomac Books, 2014.

Carlsnaes, Walter. Ideology and Foreign Policy: Problems of Comparative

Conceptualization. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986.

Çavdaroğlu, Hüseyin Avni. Öncesi ve Sonrası Ile Lozan. İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi,
2011.

Çelik, Yasemin. Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy. Westport: Praeger Publishers,

1999.

Çomak, Hasret, ed. 21. Yüzyılda Çağdaş Türk Dış Politikası ve Diplomasisi. Kocaeli:
Umuttepe Yayınları, 2010.

———, ed. Dünya Jeopolitiğinde Türkiye. 1st ed. İstanbul: Hiperlink Yayınları, 2011.

Çomak, Hasret, and Caner Sancaktar, eds. Türk Dış Politikasında Yeni Yönelimler: “İki
Kutuplu Sistem Sonrası Türk Dış Politikası.” İstanbul: Beta Basım Yayım
Dağıtım, 2013.

140
Cooper, Andrew F., Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal. Relocating Middle
Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order. Vancouver: UBC
Press, 1994.

Cox, Robert W., ed. The New Realism: Perspectives on Multilateralism and World Order.
Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1997.

Czempiel, Ernst-Otto. “Governance and Democratization.” In Governance Without

Government: Order and Change in World Politics, by James N. Rosenau and
Ernst-Otto Czempiel. Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Dağı, İhsan D. “The Justice and Development Party: Identity, Politics, and Human Rights
Discourse in the Search for Security and Legitimacy.” In The Emergence of a
New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti, edited by M. Hakan Yavuz, 88–106.
Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2006.

Davutoğlu, Ahmet. Stratejik Derinlik : Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu. 10th ed.

İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2002.

———. Teoriden Pratiğe: Türk Dış Politikası Üzerine Konuşmalar. İstanbul: Küre
Yayınları, 2013.

Deringil, Selim. Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An “Active”
Neutrality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

Drury, A. Cooper. Economic Sanctions and Presidential Decisions: Models of Political

Rationality. 1st ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

Ekincikli, Mustafa. İnönü-Bayar Dönemleri Türk Dış Siyaseti. 1st ed. Ankara: Berikan
Yayınları, 2007.

Eksi, Muharrem. The Rise and Fall of Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy During JDP:
The Rise and Fall of the “Turkish Model” in the Muslim World. LAP
LAMBERT Academic Publishing, 2016.

Ercan, Pınar Gözen, ed. Turkish Foreign Policy: International Relations, Legality and
Global Reach. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.

Esmer, Ahmet Şükrü, and Oral Sander. “İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türk Dış Politikası.” In
Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1995), edited by Mehmet Gönlübol, 135–
85. Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1996.

Evin, Ahmet. Modern Turkey: Continuity and Change. Germany: Schriften des
Deutschen Orient-Instituts, 1984.

Fırat, Melek M. 1960-71 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu. Ankara: Siyasal
Kitabevi, 1997.

141
Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: The Free Press,
1992.

Fuller, Graham E. The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim
World. Washington, D. C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2008.

———. Türkiye ve Arap Baharı: Orta Doğu’da Liderlik. Translated by Mustafa Acar.
Ankara: Eksi Kitaplar, 2016.

———. Yeni Türkiye Cumhuriyeti: Yükselen Bölgesel Aktör. Translated by Mustafa

Acar. 3rd ed. İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2008.

Fuller, Graham E., Ian O. Lesser, Paul B. Henze, and J.F. Brown. Turkey’s New
Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China. Boulder: Westview Press,
1993.

Gieler, Wolfgang, Kemal İnat, and Claudio Kullmann, eds. Foreign Policy of States: A
Handbook on World Affairs. İstanbul: Tasam Publication, 2005.

Goldstein, Joshua S., and Jon C. Pevehouse. International Relations. 10th ed. New York:
Pearson, 2013.

Gönlübol, Mehmet. “Atatürk’ün Dış Politikası: Amaçlar ve İlkeler.” In Atatürk Yolu,

edited by Turhan Feyzioğlu, 2nd ed., 233–79. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu
Basımevi, 1987.

———, ed. Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1995). Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1996.

Gönlübol, Mehmet, and Cem Sar. “1919 - 1938 Yılları Arasında Türk Dış Politikası.” In
Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1995), edited by Mehmet Gönlübol, 1–133.
Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1996.

———. Atatük ve Türkiye’nin Dış Politikası (1919 - 1938). Ankara, 1990.

Gönlübol, Mehmet, and Haluk Ülman. “İkinci Dünya Savaşından Sonra Türk Dış
Politikası (1945-1965).” In Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1995), edited by
Mehmet Gönlübol, 189–335. Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1996.

Gözen, Ramazan. Amerikan Kıskacında Dış Politika: Körfez Savaşı, Turgut Özal ve
Sonrası. Ankara: Liberte Yayınları, 2000.

———. İmparatorluktan Küresel Aktörlüğe Türkiye’nin Dış Politikası. Ankara: Palme

Yayınları, 2009.

Günay, Defne. “The Roles Turkey Played in the Middle East (2002–2016).” In Turkish
Foreign Policy: International Relations, Legality and Global Reach, edited by
Pınar Gözen Ercan, 195–216. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.

142
Hale, William. Turkish Foreign Policy : 1774-2000. 3rd ed. London and New York: Frank
Cass Publishers, 2013.

Hayden, Patrick, and Chamsy el-Ojeili. Critical Theories of Globalization. New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

Heper, Metin. Türkiye’nin Siyasal Hayatı. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2011.

Hewson, Martin, and Timothy J. Sinclair, eds. Approaches to Global Governance Theory.
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999.

Hirst, Paul, Grahame Thompson, and Simon Bromley. Globalization in Question. 3rd ed.
Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009.

Holsti, K. J. International Politics, A Framework for Analysis. 2nd ed. London: Prentice
Hall, 1974.

Hout, Wil, and Richard Robison. “Development and the Politics of Governance:
Framework for Analysis.” In Governance and The Depoliticisation of
Development, edited by Wil Hout and Richard Robison. London: Routledge,
2009.

Hufty, Marc. “Investigating Policy Processes: The Governance Analytical Frame-Work

(GAF).” In Research for Sustainable Development: Foundations, Experiences,
and Perspectives, edited by Urs Wiesmann and Hans Hurni, 6:403–24. Bern,
Switzerland: Geographica Bernensia; NCCR North-South, 2011.
http://www.north-south.unibe.ch/content.php/publication/id/2663.

Huijgh, Ellen, and Jordan Warlick. The Public Diplomacy of Emerging Powers, Part 1:
The Case of Turkey. Los Angles: Figueroa Press, 2016.
https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/uscpublicdiplomacy.org/files/useruploads/
u35361/The%20PD%20of%20Emerging%20Powers.pdf.

Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.
New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.

Hurrell, Andrew. “Rising Powers and the Emerging Global Order.” In The Globalization
of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, edited by John
Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, 6th ed., 80–94. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014.

İpek, Pınar. “The Role of Energy Security in Turkish Foreign Policy (2004–2016).” In
Turkish Foreign Policy: International Relations, Legality and Global Reach,
edited by Pınar Gözen Ercan, 173–94. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan,
2017.

Iriye, Akira. Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making
of the Contemporary World. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.

143
Ismael, Tareq Y., and Mustafa Aydın, eds. Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century:
A Changing Role in World Politics. USA: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003.

Jongryn, Mo, ed. MIKTA, Middle Powers, and New Dynamics of Global Governance.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

Kaleağası, Bahadır. G20 Gezegeni: Dünya, Avrupa, Demokrasi, İletişim Çağı, Türkiye.
İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2011.

Kamel, Ayhan. 1923’ten Günümüze Türk Dış Politikası ve Diplomasi. İstanbul: İnkılap
Kitabevi, 2014.

Kanat, Kılıç Buğra, Ahmet Selim Tekelioğlu, and Kadir Ustun, eds. Change and
Adaptation in Turkish Foreign Policy. Ankara: SETA (Foundation for Political
Economic and Social Research), 2014.

Karpat, Kemal H. Türk Dış Politikası Tarihi. İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2012.

Keohane, Robert. Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World. 1st ed. London
and New York: Routledge, 2002.

Kireçci, M. Akif, ed. Arap Baharı ve Türkiye Modeli Tartışmaları. Ankara: ASEM
(Ankara Siyasal ve Ekonomik Araştırmalar Merkezi) Yayınları, 2014.

Koçer, Gökhan. “Savaş ve Barış: Temel Seçenekler.” In Uluslararası Politikayı Anlamak:

Ulus-Devlet’ten Küreselleşmeye, edited by Zeynep Dağı. İstanbul: Alfa
Yayınları, 2007.

Köse, Talha, Ahmet Okumuş, and Burhanettin Duran, eds. Stratejik Zihniyet: Kuramdan
Eyleme Ahmet Davutoğlu ve Stratejik Derinlik. 1st ed. İstanbul: Küre Yayınları,
2014.

Kösebalaban, Hasan. Türk Dış Politikası: İslam, Milliyetçilik ve Küreselleşme.

Translated by Hüsamettin İnaç. Ankara: BigBang Yayınları, 2014.

———. Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization. New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

Kubicek, Paul, Emel Parlar Dal, and Tarık Oğuzlu, eds. Turkey’s Rise as an Emerging
Power. New York: Routledge, 2015.

Kupchan, Charles A. No One’s World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global
Turn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Manicom, James, and Jeffrey Reeves. “Locating Middle Powers in International

Relations Theory and Power Transitions.” In Middle Powers and the Rise of
China, edited by Bruce Gilley and Andrew O'Neil, 23–43. Georgetown
University Press, 2014.

144
Mintz, Alex, and Karl DeRouen Jr. Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Nye, Joseph S. Jr. Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics. New Ed edition.
New York: PublicAffairs, 2005.

Nye, Joseph S. Jr, and John D. Donahue. Governance in a Globalizing World. Cambridge:
Brookings Institution Press, 2000.

O’Brien, Robert, Anne Marie Goetz, Jan Aart Scholte, and Marc Williams. Contesting
Global Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social
Movements. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Öniş, Ziya. “The Political Economy of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party.” In The
Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti, edited by M. Hakan
Yavuz. Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2006.

Oran, Baskın. Tukish Foreign Policy: 1919-2006, Facts and Analyses with Documents.
Translated by Mustafa Akşin. Utah: The University of Utah Press, 2010.

———, ed. Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler,
Yorumlar Cilt 1: 1919-1980. 15th ed. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009.

———, ed. Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler,
Yorumlar Cilt 2: 1980-2001. 12th ed. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2010.

———, ed. Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler,
Yorumlar Cilt 3: 2001-2012. 2nd ed. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2013.

Paul, T. V., ed. Accommodating Rising Powers: Past, Present, and Future. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Pehlivanlı, Hamit, Yusuf Sarınay, and Hüsamettin Yıldırım. Türk Dış Politikasında Hatay
(1918-1939). Ankara: Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi (ASAM)
Yayınları, 2001.

Robins, Philip. Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War. London:
Hurst & Company, 2003.

Rosenau, James N. “Governance, Order and Change in World Politics.” In Governance

without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, by James N. Rosenau
and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, 1–29. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

———. “Toward an Ontology for Global Governance.” In Approaches to Global

Governance Theory, edited by Martin Hewson and Timothy J. Sinclair. Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1999.

Rosenau, James N., and Ernst-Otto Czempiel. Governance Without Government: Order
and Change in World Politics. Cambridge University Press, 1992.

145
Ruggie, John Gerard. Constructing the World Polity : Essays on International
Institutionalisation. The New International Relations. London: Routledge, 1998.
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=e000xww&AN=77232
&lang=tr&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Said, Abdul Aziz, Charles O. Lerche, Jr., and Charles O. Lerche III. Concepts of
International Politics in Global Perspective. 4th ed. New Jersey: Prentice Hall,
1995.

Sander, Oral. Balkan Gelişmeleri ve Türkiye (1945-1965). Ankara: Sevinç Matbası,

1969.

———. Siyasi Tarih: 1918-1994. Vol. II. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2009.

———. Türkiye’nin Dış Politikası. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 1998.

Sandıklı, Atilla. Atatürk’ün Dış Politika Stratejisi: Hedefler ve Prensipler. İstanbul:

Bilgesam Yayınları, 2014.

Sönmezoğlu, Faruk. II. Dünya Savaşı’ndan Günümüze Türkiye Dış Politikası. İstanbul:
DER yayınları, 2006.

———. İki Savaş Sırası ve Arasında Türk Dış Politikası. İstanbul: DER yayınları, 2011.

———. Soğuk Savaş Döneminde Türk Dış Politikası (1945 - 1991). İstanbul: DER
yayınları, 2016.

———. Son Onyıllarda Türk Dış Politikası (1991 - 2015). İstanbul: DER yayınları, 2016.

———. Uluslararası Politika ve Dış Politika Analizi. İstanbul: Filiz Kitabevi, 2005.

Sönmezoğlu, Faruk, Nurcan Özgür Baklacıoğlu, and Özlem Terzi, eds. XXI. Yüzyılda
Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi. İstanbul: DER yayınları, 2012.

Stuenkel, Oliver. The BRICS and the Future of Global Order. Lanham: Lexington Books,
2015.

Tepe, Sultan. “A Pro-Islamic Party? Promises and Limits of Turkey’s Justice and
Development Party.” In The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the
AK Parti, edited by M. Hakan Yavuz. Salt Lake City: The University of Utah
Press, 2006.

Toker, Metin. “Atatürk ve Barış.” In Atatürk Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası (Makaleler),
edited by Berna Türkdoğan, 49–61. Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2000.

Türkdoğan, Berna, ed. Atatürk Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası (Makaleler). Ankara: Atatürk
Araştırma Merkezi, 2000.

146
Uslu, Nasuh. Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Period. New York: Nova
Science Publishers, 2004.

Uzgel, İlhan. Ulusal Çıkar ve Dış Politika: Türk Dış Politikasının Belirlenmesinde Ulusal
Çıkarın Rolü, 1983-1991. 1st ed. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2004.

Uzgel, İlhan, and Bülent Duru, eds. AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu. Ankara:
Phoenix Yayınevi, 2010.

W. Lawrence, Neuman. Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative

Approaches. USA: Pearson, 2014.

Weisband, Edward. İkinci Dünya Savaşı’nda İnönü’nün Dış Politikası. İstanbul: Milliyet
Yayınları, 1974.

Weiss, Thomas G. Global Governance: Why? What? Whither? 1 edition. Cambridge:

Polity Press, 2014.

———. Thinking about Global Governance: Why People and Ideas Matter. 1 edition.
Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2011.

Weiss, Thomas G., and Ramesh Thakur. Global Governance and the UN : An Unfinished
Journey. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2010.

Yavuz, M. Hakan, ed. The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti.
Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2006.

Zengin, Gürkan. Hoca: Türk Dış Politikası’nda Davutoğlu Etkisi. İstanbul: İnkılap
Kitabevi, 2010.

147
Periodical Articles

Altunışık, Meliha B., and Lenore G. Martin. “Making Sense of Turkish Foreign Policy in
the Middle East under AKP.” Turkish Studies 12, no. 4 (December 1, 2011):
569–87. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2011.622513.

Altunışık, Meliha Benli. “Worldviews and Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East.”
New Perspectives on Turkey 40 (April 2009): 169–92.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0896634600005264.

Aras, Bülent. “Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy Revisited.” Journal of Balkan
and Near Eastern Studies 16, no. 4 (October 2, 2014): 404–18.
https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2014.938451.

———. “Reform and Capacity Building in the Turkish Foreign Ministry: Bridging the
Gap between Ideas and Institutions.” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies
17, no. 3 (July 3, 2015): 269–85.
https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2015.1063271.

———. “The Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy.” Insight Turkey 11, no. 3
(September 2009): 127–42.

Aras, Bülent, and Aylin Gorener. “National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policy
Orientation: The Ideational Bases of the Justice and Development Party’s
Foreign Policy Activism in the Middle East.” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern
Studies 12, no. 1 (March 1, 2010): 73–92.
https://doi.org/10.1080/19448950903507453.

Arkan, Zeynep, and Müge Kınacıoğlu. “Enabling ‘Ambitious Activism’: Davutoğlu’s

Vision of a New Foreign Policy Identity for Turkey.” Turkish Studies 17, no. 3
(July 2, 2016): 381–405. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2016.1185943.

Aydın, Mustafa. “The Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy, and Turkey’s European
Vocation.” The Review of International Affairs 3, no. 2 (Winter 2003): 306–31.
https://doi.org/10.1080/1475355032000240720.

———. “Turkish Foreign Policy at the End of the Cold War: Roots and Dynamics.” The
Turkish Yearbook of International Relations (Milletlerarası Münasebetler Türk
Yıllığı) 36 (2005): 1–36. https://doi.org/10.1501/Intrel_0000000114.

Aydın, Mustafa, and Sinem Açıkmeşe. “İslam Örneğinde Küreselleşen Dünyada Kimliğe
Dayalı Güvenlik Tehditleri.” Uluslararası İlişkiler 5, no. 18 (2008): 197–214.

Aykan, Mahmut Bali. “The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy from the
1950s to the 1990s.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 25, no. 1
(1993): 91–110.

148
Baba, Gürol, and Murat Önsoy. “Between Capability and Foreign Policy: Comparing
Turkey’s Small Power and Middle Power Status.” Uluslararası İlişkiler 13, no.
51 (2016): 3–20.

Balaban, Nazan Bedirhanoğlu. “Commentary: Global Economic Crisis and Turkey.” The
Turkish Yearbook of International Relations (Milletlerarası Münasebetler Türk
Yıllığı) 40 (2009): 123–28. https://doi.org/10.1501/Intrel_0000000228.

Balcı, Ali, and Nebi Miş. “Turkey’s Role in the Alliance of Civilizations: A New
Perspective in Turkish Foreign Policy?” Turkish Studies 9, no. 3 (September 1,
2008): 387–406. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683840802267355.

Bank, André, and Roy Karadag. “The ‘Ankara Moment’: The Politics of Turkey’s
Regional Power in the Middle East, 2007–11.” Third World Quarterly 34, no. 2
(March 1, 2013): 287–304. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.775786.

Biermann, Frank. “‘Earth System Governance’ as a Crosscutting Theme of Global

Change Research.” Global Environmental Change 17, no. 3–4 (August 2007):
326–37. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2006.11.010.

Bolukbasi, Suha. “The Johnson Letter Revisited.” Middle Eastern Studies 29, no. 3
(1993): 505–25.

Boughton, James M., and Colin I. Bradford, Jr. “Global Governance: New Players, New
Rules, Why the 20th-Century Model Needs a Makeover.” Finance and
Development 44, no. 4 (December 12, 2007): 10–14.

Çavuşoğlu, Mevlüt. “Turkish Foreign Policy in a Time of Perpetual Turmoil.” Insight

Turkey 19, no. 1 (2017): 11–16.

Cooper, Andrew F. “Squeezed or Revitalised? Middle Powers, the G20 and the Evolution
of Global Governance.” Third World Quarterly 34, no. 6 (July 1, 2013): 963–84.
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.802508.

Cooper, Malcolm. “The Legacy of Atatürk: Turkish Political Structures and Policy-
Making.” International Affairs 78, no. 1 (2002): 115–28.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.00241.

Cox, Robert W. “An Alternative Approach to Multilateralism for the Twenty-First

Century.” Global Governance 3, no. 1 (1997): 103–16.
https://doi.org/10.2307/27800157.

———. “The Crisis in World Order and the Challenge to International Organization.”
Cooperation and Conflict 29, no. 2 (June 1, 1994): 99–113.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836794029002001.

Dal, Emel Parlar. “A Normative Approach to Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy: The
Cosmopolitanism–Communitarianism Divide.” International Journal 70, no. 3
(September 1, 2015): 421–33. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702015584306.

149
———. “Assessing Turkey’s ‘Normative’ Power in the Middle East and North Africa
Region: New Dynamics and Their Limitations.” Turkish Studies 14, no. 4
(December 1, 2013): 709–34. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2013.861113.

———. “Conceptualising and Testing the ‘Emerging Regional Power’ of Turkey in the
Shifting International Order.” Third World Quarterly 37, no. 8 (August 2, 2016):
1425–53. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1142367.

———. “The Transformation of Turkey’s Relations with the Middle East: Illusion or
Awakening?” Turkish Studies 13, no. 2 (June 1, 2012): 245–67.
https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2012.685257.

Dal, Emel Parlar, and Emre Erşen. “Reassessing the ‘Turkish Model’ in the Post-Cold
War Era: A Role Theory Perspective.” Turkish Studies 15, no. 2 (April 3, 2014):
258–82. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2014.926238.

Dal, Emel Parlar, and Gonca Oğuz Gök. “Locating Turkey as a ‘Rising Power’ in the
Changing International Order: An Introduction.” Perceptions 19, no. 4 (2014):
1–18.

Davutoğlu, Ahmet. “The Three Major Earthquakes in the International System and
Turkey.” The International Spectator 48, no. 2 (June 1, 2013): 1–11.
https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2013.796781.

———. “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007.” Insight Turkey 10,
no. 1 (2008): 77–96.

———. “Turkey’s Humanitarian Diplomacy: Objectives, Challenges and Prospects.”

Nationalities Papers 41, no. 6 (November 1, 2013): 865–70.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2013.857299.

———. “Turkish Foreign Policy and the EU in 2010.” Turkish Policy Quarterly 8, no. 3
(n.d.): 11–17.

Dingwerth, Klaus, and Philipp Pattberg. “Global Governance as a Perspective on World

Politics.” Global Governance 12, no. 2 (2006): 185–203.

Ehteshami, Anoushiravan. “Middle East Middle Powers: Regional Role, International

Impact.” Uluslararası İlişkiler 11, no. 42 (Summer 2014): 29–49.

Falk, Richard, and Tom Farer. “Turkey’s New Multilateralism: A Positive Diplomacy for
the Twenty-First Century.” Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism
and International Organizations 19, no. 3 (July 1, 2013): 353–76.
https://doi.org/10.5555/1075-2846-19.3.353.

Farer, Tom. “Introduction.” Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and

International Organizations 17, no. 3 (July 1, 2011): 281–84.
https://doi.org/10.5555/1075-2846-17.3.281.

150
Fidan, Hakan. “A Work in Progress: The New Turkish Foreign Policy.” Middle East
Policy 20, no. 1 (March 1, 2013): 91–96. https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12006.

Finkelstein, Lawrence S. “What Is Global Governance?” Global Governance 1, no. 3

(1995): 367–72.

Finnemore, Martha. “Dynamics of Global Governance: Building on What We Know.”

International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 1 (March 1, 2014): 221–24.
https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12095.

Florini, Ann. “Rising Asian Powers and Changing Global Governance.” International
Studies Review 13, no. 1 (March 1, 2011): 24–33.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2486.2010.00995.x.

Fontaine, Richard, and Daniel M. Kliman. “International Order and Global Swing States.”
The Washington Quarterly 36, no. 1 (February 1, 2013): 93–109.
https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2013.751653.

Gray, Kevin, and Craig N. Murphy. “Introduction: Rising Powers and the Future of
Global Governance.” Third World Quarterly 34, no. 2 (March 1, 2013): 183–93.
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.775778.

Hart, Andrew F., and Bruce D. Jones. “How Do Rising Powers Rise?” Survival 52, no. 6
(December 1, 2010): 63–88. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2010.540783.

Haşimi, Cemalettin. “Turkey’s Humanitarian Diplomacy and Development

Cooperation.” Insight Turkey 17, no. 1 (2014): 127–45.

Holsti, K. J. “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy.” International

Studies Quarterly 14, no. 3 (1970): 233–309. https://doi.org/10.2307/3013584.

Hurrell, Andrew. “Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-Be
Great Powers?” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs
1944-) 82, no. 1 (2006): 1–19. https://doi.org/10.2307/3569127.

Jung, Dietrich. “The Domestic Context of New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy: Does
Religion Matter?” International Journal 67, no. 1 (2011): 23–38.

Kahler, Miles. “Regional Challenges to Global Governance.” Global Policy 8, no. 1

(February 1, 2017): 97–100. https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12392.

———. “Rising Powers and Global Governance: Negotiating Change in a Resilient

Status Quo.” International Affairs 89, no. 3 (May 1, 2013): 711–29.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12041.

Kalın, İbrahim. “Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Turkey.” Perceptions 16, no. 3
(2011): 5–23.

151
Kanat, Kılıç Buğra. “AK Party’s Foreign Policy: Is Turkey Turning Away from the
West?” Insight Turkey 12, no. 1 (2010): 205–25.

Keohane, Robert O. “Governance in a Partially Globalized World ‘Presidential Address’,

‘American Political Science Association, 2000.’” The American Political
Science Review 95, no. 1 (2001): 1–13.

Keyman, E. Fuat. “A New Turkish Foreign Policy: Towards Proactive ‘Moral Realism.’”
Insight Turkey 19, no. 1 (2017): 55–69.

Kirişçi, Kemal. “The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading
State.” New Perspectives on Turkey 40 (April 2009): 29–57.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0896634600005203.

Kılınç, Ramazan. “Turkey and the Alliance of Civilizations: Norm Adoption as a Survival
Strategy.” Insight Turkey 11, no. 3 (2009): 55–75.

Könî, Hasan. “II. Dünya Savaşı Öncesinde Türk Dış Politikası.” Ankara Üniversitesi
Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi 1, no. 1 (1988): 43–63.
https://doi.org/10.1501/Tite_0000000078.

Kramer, Mark. “The Collapse of the Soviet Union (Part 2).” Journal of Cold War Studies
5, no. 4 (Fall 2003): 3–42. https://doi.org/10.1162/152039703322483747.

Kubicek, Paul. “Debating the Merits of the ’Turkish Model for Democratization in the
Middle East.” Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations 12, no. 3
(2013): 166–80. https://doi.org/10.21599/atjir.79361.

Kurşun, Ali Murat, and Emel Parlar Dal. “An Analysis of Turkey’s and BRICS’ Voting
Cohesion in the UN General Assembly during 2002–2014.” Global Policy 8, no.
2 (May 1, 2017): 191–201. https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12405.

Makovsky, Alan. “The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy.” SAIS Review 19
(January 1, 1999): 92–113.

Miller, Calum. “Pathways Through Financial Crisis: Turkey.” Global Governance 12, no.
4 (2006): 449–64.

Müftüler-Baç, Meltem. “Turkish Foreign Policy, Its Domestic Determinants and the Role
of the European Union.” South European Society and Politics 16, no. 2 (June 1,
2011): 279–91. https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2011.577947.

Müftüler-Baç, Meltem, and Deniz Başkan. “The Future of Energy Security for Europe:
Turkey’s Role as an Energy Corridor.” Middle Eastern Studies 47, no. 2 (March
1, 2011): 361–78. https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2010.481176.

Murphy, Craig N. “The Last Two Centuries of Global Governance.” Global Governance:
A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations 21, no. 2 (April 1,
2015): 189–96. https://doi.org/10.5555/1075-2846-21.2.189.

152
Narlikar, Amrita. “Introduction: Negotiating the Rise of New Powers.” International
Affairs 89, no. 3 (May 1, 2013): 561–76. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-
2346.12033.

Oğuzlu, Tarık, and Emel Parlar Dal. “Decoding Turkey’s Rise: An Introduction.” Turkish
Studies 14, no. 4 (December 1, 2013): 617–36.
https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2013.861112.

Öniş, Ziya. “Multiple Faces of the ‘New’ Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics
and a Critique.” Insight Turkey 13, no. 1 (2011): 47–65.

Öniş, Ziya, and Mustafa Kutlay. “Rising Powers in a Changing Global Order: The
Political Economy of Turkey in the Age of BRICS.” Third World Quarterly 34,
no. 8 (September 1, 2013): 1409–26.
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.831541.

———. “The Dynamics of Emerging Middle-Power Influence in Regional and Global

Governance: The Paradoxical Case of Turkey.” Australian Journal of
International Affairs 71, no. 2 (March 4, 2017): 164–83.
https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2016.1183586.

Öniş, Ziya, and Şuhnaz Yılmaz. “Between Europeanization and Euro‐ Asianism: Foreign
Policy Activism in Turkey during the AKP Era.” Turkish Studies 10, no. 1
(March 1, 2009): 7–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683840802648562.

Özcan, Mesut. “Turkish Foreign Policy under the AK Party.” Insight Turkey 19, no. 9–
19 (n.d.): 2017. https://doi.org/10.25253/99.2017192.01.

Ozkan, Mehmet. “What Drives Turkey’s Involvement in Africa?” Review of African

Political Economy 37, no. 126 (December 1, 2010): 533–40.
https://doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2010.530952.

Özpek, Burak Bilgehan, and Yelda Demirağ. “Turkish Foreign Policy after the ‘Arab
Spring’: From Agenda-Setter State to Agenda-Entrepreneur State.” Israel
Affairs 20, no. 3 (July 3, 2014): 328–46.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2014.922806.

Plesch, Dan, and Thomas G. Weiss. “1945’s Lesson: ‘Good Enough’ Global Governance
Ain’t Good Enough.” Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and
International Organizations 21, no. 2 (April 1, 2015): 197–204.
https://doi.org/10.5555/1075-2846-21.2.197.

Rosenau, James N. “Governance in the Twenty-First Century.” Global Governance 1, no.

1 (1995): 13–43.

Sayarı, Sabri. “Turkey and the Middle East in the 1990s.” Journal of Palestine Studies 26,
no. 3 (1997): 44–55. https://doi.org/10.2307/2538156.

153
———. “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: The Challenges of Multi-
Regionalism.” Journal of International Affairs 54, no. 1 (2000): 169–82.

Schweller, Randall. “Emerging Powers in an Age of Disorder.” Global Governance: A

Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations 17, no. 3 (July 1,
2011): 285–97. https://doi.org/10.5555/1075-2846-17.3.285.

Snyder, Jack. “One World, Rival Theories.” Foreign Policy, no. 145 (2004): 53–62.
https://doi.org/10.2307/4152944.

Špak, Valerij. “The Model of Turkish Foreign Policy: Opening New Horizons.”
Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 12, no. 1 (2014): 91–112.
https://doi.org/10.2478/lasr-2014-0005.

Stoker, Gerry. “Governance as Theory: Five Propositions.” International Social Science

Journal 50, no. 155 (March 1, 1998): 17–28. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-
2451.00106.

Subrahmanyam, K. “The Second Cold War.” Strategic Analysis 7, no. 2–3 (May 1, 1983):
73–97. https://doi.org/10.1080/09700168309431858.

Tezcür, Güneş Murat, and Alexandru Grigorescu. “Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy:
Balancing European and Regional Interests.” International Studies Perspectives
15, no. 3 (August 1, 2014): 257–76. https://doi.org/10.1111/insp.12004.

Thakur, Ramesh. “How Representative Are Brics?” Third World Quarterly 35, no. 10
(November 26, 2014): 1791–1808.
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2014.971594.

Ülman, A. Haluk. “Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etkenler (1923-1968) I.” Ankara
Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi 23, no. 03 (1968): 241–73.
https://doi.org/10.16987/ausbf.43878.

Ünay, Sadık. “Reality or Mirage?: BRICS and the Making of Multipolarity in the Global
Political Economy.” Insight Turkey 15, no. 3 (2013): 77–94.

Vezirgiannidou, Sevasti-Eleni. “The United States and Rising Powers in a Post-

Hegemonic Global Order.” International Affairs 89, no. 3 (May 1, 2013): 635–
51. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12037.

Vickers, Brendan. “Africa and the Rising Powers: Bargaining for the ‘Marginalized
Many.’” International Affairs 89, no. 3 (May 1, 2013): 673–93.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12039.

Walt, Stephen M. “International Relations: One World, Many Theories.” Foreign Policy,
no. 110 (1998): 29–46. https://doi.org/10.2307/1149275.

154
Wang, Hongying, and Erik French. “Middle Range Powers in Global Governance.” Third
World Quarterly 34, no. 6 (July 1, 2013): 985–99.
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.802509.

Weiss, Thomas G. “Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance: Conceptual

and Actual Challenges.” Third World Quarterly 21, no. 5 (2000): 795–814.
https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/713701075.

Weiss, Thomas G., and Rorden Wilkinson. “Global Governance to the Rescue: Saving
International Relations?” Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and
International Organizations 20, no. 1 (January 1, 2014): 19–36.
https://doi.org/10.5555/1075-2846-20.1.19.

———. “Rethinking Global Governance? Complexity, Authority, Power, Change.”

International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 1 (March 1, 2014): 207–15.
https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12082.

Yeşiltaş, Murat. “The Transformation of the Geopolitical Vision in Turkish Foreign

Policy.” Turkish Studies 14, no. 4 (December 1, 2013): 661–87.
https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2013.862927.

155
Reports, Newspaper Articles, Internet Resources and Other Resources

“30 Yılın Terör Bilançosu: 35 Bin 576 Ölü!” Radikal, January 28, 2013.
http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/30_yilin_teror_bilancosu_35_bin_576_olu-
1118893/.

“About the Project.” Rising Powers in Global Governance. Accessed August 12, 2017.
http://risingpowersproject.com/about-the-project/.

“About Us - TİKA.” Turkish International Cooperation and Coordination Agency.

Accessed October 6, 2017. http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/page/about_us-14650.

Amadeo, Kimberly. “OPEC Oil Embargo: Causes and Effects of the Crisis.” The Balance,
July 1, 2017. https://www.thebalance.com/opec-oil-embargo-causes-and-
effects-of-the-crisis-3305806.

Aras, Bülent. “15 Temmuz Sonrası Türk Dış Politikası.” Darbe Girişimi Sonrası Çatışma
Çözümü ve Demokrasi Fırsatları Projesi. İstanbul: İstanbul Policy Center (ICP),
March 2017. http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/publication/english-turkish-foreign-
policy-after-july-15/.

———. “Turkey’s Mediation and Friends of Mediation Initiative.” SAM Papers. SAM
(Center for Strategic Research), December 2012. http://sam.gov.tr/wp-
content/uploads/2012/12/SAM_Papers_No.4-Dec12.pdf.

“Boru Hattı Projeleri.” Türkiye Petrolleri. Accessed July 29, 2017.

http://www.tpao.gov.tr/tp5/?tp=m&id=30.

“Brief History of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey.” Republic of
Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed September 27, 2017.
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-cumhuriyeti-disisleri-bakanligi-tarihcesi.en.mfa.

Çandar, Cengiz. “Turkey’s ‘Soft Power’ Strategy: A New Vision for a Multi-Polar
World.” Policy Brief. Ankara: The SETA (Foundation for Political, Economic
and Social Research) Foundation, December 2009. http://setadc.org/turkeys-
soft-power-strategy-a-new-vision-for-a-multi-polar-world/.

Dalay, Galip. “What Is Driving Turkish Foreign Policy Today?” Al Jazeera Center for
Studies, February 27, 2017.
http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2017/02/driving-turkish-foreign-policy-
today-170227091853603.html.

Davutoğlu, Ahmet. “The Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy.” Yeni Şafak, January 18,
2010. http://www.yenisafak.com/eslesmemis/the-principles-of-turkish-foreign-
policy-by-ahmet-davutoglu-236159.

———. “Turkey’s Zero-Problems Foreign Policy.” Foreign Policy, May 20, 2010.
http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/05/20/turkeys-zero-problems-foreign-policy/.

156
———. “Türkiye Merkez Ülke Olmalı.” Radikal, February 26, 2004.
http://www.radikal.com.tr/yorum/turkiye-merkez-ulke-olmali-702116/.

“Erdoğan: Suriye Bizim İç Meselemizdir.” Accessed July 13, 2017.

http://www.trthaber.com/haber_yazdir.php?detayID=4907.

“Global Governance Journal.” ACUNS (Academic Council on the United Nations

System). Accessed August 1, 2017.
http://acuns.org/category/publications/global-governance-journal/.

Gönen, Emre. “A Decisive Period for Turkey’s Western Alliance.” Daily Sabah, May 17,
2017. https://www.dailysabah.com/columns/emre_gonen/2017/05/17/a-
decisive-period-for-turkeys-western-alliance.

“IMF Members’ Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors.” International
Monetary Fund. Accessed August 14, 2017.
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx.

“Kamu Diplomasisine Bakış.” T.C. Başbakanlık Kamu Diplomasisi Koordinatörlüğü.

Accessed October 6, 2017. https://kdk.gov.tr/sag/kamu-diplomasisine-bakis/21.

Kavuncu, Sibel. “Turgut Özal’ın Başbakanlığı Döneminde Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri.”

Doktora, İstanbul Üniversitesi, 2006.

Keyman, E. Fuat. “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Era of Global Turmoil.” Policy Brief.
Ankara: The SETA (Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research)
Foundation, December 2009. https://www.setav.org/en/turkish-foreign-policy-
in-the-era-of-global-turmoil/.

Kliman, Daniel, and Richard Fontaine. “Global Swing States: Brazil, India, Indonesia,
Turkey, and the Future of International Order.” Policy Paper. The German
Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF), November 27, 2012.
http://www.gmfus.org/publications/global-swing-states-brazil-india-indonesia-
turkey-and-future-international-order.

———. “Turkey: A Global Swing State.” Analysis. The German Marshall Fund of the
United States (GMF), April 13, 2013.
http://www.gmfus.org/publications/turkey-global-swing-state.

Lattimer, Charlotte, and Sophia Swithern. “Global Humanitarian Assistance Report

2017.” Development Initiatives, 2017. http://devinit.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/06/GHA-Report-2017-Full-report.pdf.

Mohamud, Hassan Sheikh. The Future of Governance in Somalia. Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS), January 17, 2013. https://csis-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/legacy_files/files/attachments/130117_HassanSheikhMahamud_transcri
pt.pdf.

157
“Most Muslims Want Democracy, Personal Freedoms, and Islam in Political Life.” Pew
Research Center Global Attitudes & Trends (blog), July 10, 2012.
http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/07/10/most-muslims-want-democracy-
personal-freedoms-and-islam-in-political-life/.

Mucuk, Şükrü. “Johnson Mektubu ve Türk Kamuoyu.” Yüksek Lisans, Dokuz Eylül
Üniversitesi, 2013.

Müftüler-Baç, Meltem. “Turkey as an Emerging Power: An Analysis of Its Role in Global

and Regional Security Governance Constellations.” EUI Working Paper. Badia
Fiesolana: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, May 1, 2014.
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2434562.

O’Neill, Jim. “Building Better Global Economic BRICs.” Global Economics. Goldman
Sachs, November 30, 2001. http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-
thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/build-better-brics.pdf.

O’Neill, Jim, Dominic Wilson, Roopa Purushothaman, and Anna Stupnytska. “How Solid
Are the BRICs?” Global Economics. Goldman Sachs, December 1, 2005.
http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/how-
solid.pdf.

“Our Global Neighborhood.” Accessed August 1, 2017.

http://www.centerforunreform.org/?q=node/243.

Patrick, Stewart. “The Unruled World.” Foreign Affairs, December 6, 2013.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2013-12-06/unruled-world.

“Population, Total Data.” The World Bank. Accessed August 12, 2017.
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.

“Remarks of Senator Barack Obama to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs - Council
on Foreign Relations.” Accessed May 16, 2017.
http://www.cfr.org/elections/remarks-senator-barack-obama-chicago-council-
global-affairs/p13172.

Riazati, Saba. “A Closer Look: Professor Seeks Stronger U.N.,” October 17, 2006.
http://dailybruin.com/2006/10/17/a-closer-look-professor-seeks/.

Rosenau, James N. “Globalisation and Governance: Sustainability Between

Fragmentation and Integration.” Berlin: Greenleaf Publishing, 2002.

Roughneen, Simon. “After BRIC Comes MIST, the Acronym Turkey Would Certainly
Welcome.” The Guardian, February 1, 2011, sec. Global development.
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-
matters/2011/feb/01/emerging-economies-turkey-jim-oneill.

Sofuoğlu, Adnan. “Belgeler Işığında Bağımsız Hatay Devleti’nin Kuruluşu ve Türkiye.”

T.C Başbakanlık Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu. Accessed July

158
 6, 2017. http://www.atam.gov.tr/dergi/sayi-62/belgeler-isiginda-bagimsiz-
hatay-devletinin-kurulusu-ve-turkiye.

“Stand-By’ların Sonuncusu.” Capital, July 17, 2015.

https://www.capital.com.tr/ekonomi/makro-ekonomi/stand-bylarin-sonuncusu.

“The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and the Adapted CFE Treaty
at a Glance.” Arms Control Association, August 1, 2012.
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/cfe.

“The Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE).” Republic of

Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed July 25, 2017.
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-and-the-organization-for-security-and-
cooperation-in-europe-osce.en.mfa.

“Turkey in 2nd Spot with Growth.” Hürriyet Daily News, April 3, 2012.
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-in-2nd-spot-with-
growth.aspx?pageID=238&nID=17503&NewsCatID=344.

“Turkish Development Assistance Report 2015.” Ankara: Turkish International

Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), 2016.
http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/2017/YAYINLAR/TKYR%202015%20ENG/K
ALKINMA%20.pdf.

Ustun, Kadir, and Kılıç Kanat. “US-Turkey Relations: Arab Spring and the Search for
Model Partnership.” Policy Paper. Washington, D. C.: The SETA (Foundation
for Political, Economic and Social Research) Foundation, May 8, 2012.
http://setadc.org/us-turkey-relations-arab-spring-and-the-search-for-model-
partnership/.

“Vizyon & Misyon.” T.C. Başbakanlık Kamu Diplomasisi Koordinatörlüğü. Accessed

October 6, 2017. https://kdk.gov.tr/kurumsal/vizyon-misyon/8.

“Voting Powers.” The World Bank. Accessed August 14, 2017.

http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/leadership/votingpowers.

Wilson, Dominic, and Roopa Purushothaman. “Dreaming With BRICs: The Path to
2050.” Global Economics. Goldman Sachs, October 1, 2003.
http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/brics-
dream.pdf.

Yeşiltaş, Murat, and Ali Balcı. “A Dictionary of Turkish Foreign Policy in the AK Party
Era: A Conceptual Map.” SAM Papers. SAM (Center for Strategic Research),
May 2013. http://sam.gov.tr/tr/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/SAM_Papers-
7.pdf.

“Yunus Emre Enstitüsü.” Yunus Emre Enstitüsü. Accessed October 6, 2017.

http://www.yee.org.tr/en/yunusemreinstitude/.

159