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Theories of Revolution
Author(s): Lawrence Stone
Source: World Politics, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Jan., 1966), pp. 159-176
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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 THEORIES OF REVOLUTION
By LAWRENCE STONE*

IN attackingtheproblemof revolution,as mostothersof major

significancein history, we historians shouldthinktwicebeforewe
spurnthehelpoffered by our colleagues in thesocialsciences, who
have,as it happens, beenparticularly activein thelastfewyearsin
theorizing aboutthe typology, causes,and evolutionary patterns of
thisparticular phenomenon. The purposeof thisarticleis not to
advanceany new hypothesis, but to providea summary view and
criticalexamination of theworkthathas beengoingon.
The firstnecessity in anyinquiryis a carefuldefinition of terms:
whatis, and whatis not,a revolution? According to one view,it is
change, effected bytheuseofviolence, in government, and/orregime,
and/orsociety.1 By societyis meantthe consciousness and the
mechanics ofcommunal solidarity,whichmaybe tribal, peasant, kin-
ship,national, andso on; byregimeis meanttheconstitutional struc-
ture-democracy, oligarchy, monarchy; and bygovernment is meant
specificpolitical andadministrative institutions.
Violence,it shouldbe
noted,is notthesameas force;it is forceusedwithunnecessary in-
tensity,unpredictably, and usuallydestructively.2 This definition of
revolution is a verybroadone,and twohistorians oftheFrenchRev-
olution, CraneBrinton andLouisGottschalk, wouldprefer to restrict
theuse ofthewordto themajorpoliticaland socialupheavalswith
whichtheyarefamiliar, the"GreatRevolutions" as GeorgeS. Pettee
callsthem.8
Eventhewiderdefinition allowsthehistorian todistinguishbetween
theseizureofpowerthatleadstoa majorrestructuring ofgovernment
or societyand the replacement of the former eliteby a new one,
and thecoupd'etatinvolving no morethana changeof rulingper-
sonnelby violenceor threatof violence.This latteris thenormin
LatinAmerica, whereitoccurred thirty-one timesinthetenyearsI945-
I955. MerleKlinghasarrived at a suggestive explanationofthisLatin
* I am gratefulto Professors
CyrilE. Black,Arno J.Mayer,and JohnW. Shy for
someveryhelpfulcriticisms of thisarticle.
1 ChalmersJohnson, Revolution and the Social System, Hoover Institution
Studies
3 (Stanfordi964).
2 Sheldon S. Wolin, "Violence and the WesternPolitical
Tradition,"American
journal of Orthopsychiatry,xxxiii (Januaryi963), 15-28.
3 Brinton,The Anatomy of Revolution (New York 1938); Gottschalk, "Causes of
Revolution,"American journal of Sociology, L (July1944), i-8; Pettee,The Process
of Revolution (New York 1938).

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160 WORLD POLITICS
Americanphenomenon of chronicpoliticalinstability, limitedbut
frequent use ofviolence, and almostcomplete lackof socialor insti-
tutionalchange.He arguesthatownership oftheprincipal economic
resources,bothagricultural and mineral, is concentrated in thehands
ofa tiny,verystable,eliteofenormously wealthy monoculture land-
lordsand miningcapitalists. This eliteis all-powerful and cannotbe
attacked byopposition groupswithinthecountry; externally,however,
it is dependent on foreigninterests forits marketsand its capital.
In thiscolonialsituation of a foreign-supported closedplutocracy,
themainavenueofrapidupwardsocialmobility fornonmembers of
theeliteleads,viathearmy, tothecapture ofthegovernment machine,
whichis theonlyaccessible sourceof wealthand power.This polit-
is permitted
ical instability bytheeliteon thecondition thatitsown
interestsare undisturbed. Instability, limitedviolence,and the ab-
senceof socialor institutional changeare therefore all theproduct
of thecontradiction betweentherealities of a colonialeconomy run
and
bya plutocracy the facade of political sovereignty-between the
real,stablepowerof the economiceliteand the nominal,unstable
control ofpoliticiansand generals.4
The looserdefinition of revolution thussuitsbothhistorians of
majorsocialchangeand historians It
of thepalacecoup. does, how-
ever,raisecertain difficulties.
Firstly, thereis a widerangeofchanges
of government by violencewhichare neither a meresubstitution of
in positions
personalities ofpowernora preludeto therestructuring
of society;secondly, conservative counterrevolutions becomealmost
impossible to fitintothemodel;and lastly,it remainshardto dis-
tinguish between colonialwars,civilwars,and socialrevolution.
To avoid these an alternative
difficulties, formulation has recently
beenputforward by a groupof socialscientists workingmainlyat
Princeton. Theyhavedroppedtheword"revolution" altogether and
put "internal war" in its place.5This is definedas any attempt to
alterstatepolicy,rulers,or institutions by the use of violence,in
societieswhereviolentcompetition is notthenormand wherewell-
defined institutional
patterns exist.6Thisconcept seemstobe a logical
consequence of thepreoccupation of sociologists in recentyearswith
a modelof society in a stable,self-regulating stateof perpetual equi-
4"Toward a Theoryof Power and PoliticalInstability in Latin America,"Western
ix (1956).
PoliticalQuarterly,
5Harry Eckstein,ed., InternalWar (New York i964), and "On the Etiologyof
InternalWar," Historyand Theory,iv, No. 2 (i965), 133-63. I am gratefulto Mr.
Ecksteinfor allowingme to read thisarticlebeforepublication.
6 The formulahas been used by a historian, Peter Paret,in InternalWar and
The Vendee,1793-96 (Princeton i96i).
Pacification:

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 THEORIES OF REVOLUTION 161
poise.In thisutopianworldofuniversal harmony, all forms ofviolent
conflictare anomalies, to be treated alikeas pathological disorders of
a similarspecies.This is a modelwhich,although it has itsusesfor
analytical purposes,bearslittlerelation to therealityfamiliar to the
historian. It looksto a societywithoutchange,withuniversal con-
sensuson values,withcompletesocialharmony, and isolatedfrom
externalthreats;no approximation to sucha societyhas everbeen
seen.An alternative model,whichpostulates thatall societies are in
a condition ofmultiple andperpetual tension heldin checkbysocial
norms, ideologicalbeliefs, and statesanctions, accordsbetter withhis-
are
toricalfact,as somesociologists nowbeginning realize.7 to
The firstobjection to the all-embracing formulaof internalwar
is that,by covering all formsof physicalconflict fromstrikesand
terrorism to civilwar,it isolatestheuse ofviolencefromthenormal
processes of societaladjustment. Thoughsomeof the usersof the
termexpress theirawareness thattheuseofviolence forpoliticalends
is a fairlycommonoccurrence, the definition theyhave established
in factexcludesall timesandplaceswhereit is common. It thuscuts
out mostsocietiesthe worldhas everknown,includingWestern
Europein theMiddleAges and LatinAmericatoday.Secondly, it
isolatesoneparticular means,physical violence,fromthepolitical ends
thatit is designed to serve.Clausewitz's famousdefinition ofexternal
war is equallyapplicableto internal war,civilwar,or revolution:
"Waris notonlya politicalact,buta realpoliticalinstrument; a con-
tinuation of politicaltransactions, an accomplishment of themby
different means.That whichremainspeculiarto war relatesonly
to thepeculiarnatureof itsmeans."8
It is perfectlytruethatanymeansbywhichsociety exercisespres-
sureorcontrol, whether itis administrativeorganization, constitutional
law, economicinterest, or physicalforce,can be a fruitful fieldof
studyin itsownright, so longas itsstudents remainawarethatthey
are lookingat onlyone partof a largerwhole.It is also truethat
thereis something peculiaraboutviolence, if onlybecauseof man's
highlyambivalent attitude towardsthe killingof his own species.
BarringtonMoore, "The Strategyof the Social Sciences,"in his PoliticalPower
and Social Theory (Cambridge,Mass., 1958); Ralph Dahrendorf,"Out of Utopia:
Toward a Reorientation of SociologicalAnalysis,"Americanjournal of Sociology,
LXIV (September1958), II5-27; C. WrightMills,The SociologicalImagination(New
York 1959); WilbertE. Moore,Social Change (EnglewoodCliffsi963). It shouldbe
notedthatboththeequilibriumand theconflict viewsof societyhave veryrespectable
ancestries.The equilibriummodel goes back to Rousseau-or perhapsAquinas; the
model to Hobbes,Hegel, and Marx.
conflict
8Quoted in Edward Mead Earle,ed., Makersof ModernStrategy(Princeton1943),
104-5.

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162 WORLD POLITICS

Somehow,he regardsphysicalforceas different in kind from,say,

economicexploitationor psychologicalmanipulationas a means of
exercisingpoweroverothers.But thisdistinction is not one of much
concernto the historianof revolution, in whichviolenceis a normal
and naturaloccurrence. The conceptof internalwar is too broad in
its comprehension of all typesof violencefromcivil wars to strikes,
too narrow in its restriction to normallynonviolentsocieties,too
limitedin its concernwith one of manymeans,too arbitrary in its
separationof this means fromthe ends in view, and too littlecon-
cernedwiththecomplexrootsof socialunrestto be of muchpractical
value to him.
The mostfruitful typologyof revolutionis thatof ChalmersJohn-
son, set out in a pamphletthatdeservesto be widelyread.9He sees
six types,identifiedby the targetsselectedfor attack,whetherthe
government personnel,the politicalregime,or the communityas a
socialunit;by thenatureof thecarriersof revolution, whethera mass
or an elite; and particularlyby the goals and the ideologies,whether
reformist, eschatological,nostalgic,nation-forming,elitist,or national-
ist.The firsttype,theJacquerie, is a spontaneousmasspeasantrising,
usuallycarriedout in the name of the traditionalauthorities, Church
and King, and withthe limitedaims of purgingthe local or national
elites.Examples are the Peasant Revolt of i38i, Ket's Rebellionof
1549, in Russiain 1773-1775. The second
and thePugachevrebellion
type,the MillenarianRebellion,is similarto the firstbut with the
added featureof a utopiandream,inspiredby a livingmessiah.This
typecan be found at all times,in all partsof the world,fromthe
Florentinerevolutionled by Savonarolain I494, to the Anabaptist
Rebellionin Miinsterled by JohnMathijsand JohnBeukelsin 1533-
1535, to the Sioux Ghost-DanceRebellion inspiredby the Paiute
prophetWovoka in i890. It has attracteda good deal of attention
fromhistoriansin recentyears,partlybecause the careerof Hitler
offeredoverwhelming proofof the enormoushistoricalsignificance
of a charismatic leader,and partlybecause of a growinginterestin
theideas of Max Weber.10 The thirdtypeis theAnarchisticRebellion,
the nostalgicreactionto progressivechange, involvinga romantic
idealizationof theold order:thePilgrimageof Grace and theVendee
are examples.
9Revolution and the Social System.
10N. R. C. Cohn, Pursuit of the Millennium (New York i96i); Eric J. Hobsbawm,
PrimitiveRebels (Manchester I959); S. L. Thrupp, Millennial Dreams in Action, Sup-
plementII, ComparativeStudiesin Societyand History(The Hague i962); A. J. F.
K6bben, "PropheticMovementsas an Expressionof Social Protest,"Internationales
ArchivffarEthnographie, XLIX, No. i (i960), 117-64.

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 THEORIES OF REVOLUTION 163
The fourth is thatveryrarephenomenon, theJacobinCommunist
Revolution. Thishasbeendefined as "a sweeping fundamental change
in politicalorganization, socialstructure, economicproperty control
and thepredominant mythofa socialorder,thusindicating a major
breakin the continuity of development."1 This typeof revolution
can occuronlyin a highlycentralized statewithgood communica-
tionsand a largecapitalcity,and its targetis government, regime,
and society-the lot.The resultis likelyto be thecreation of a new
nationalconsciousness undercentralized, military authority, and the
erectionof a morerational,and hencemoreefficient, social and
bureaucratic orderon the ruinsof the old ramshackle structure of
privilege,nepotism, and corruption.
The fifthtypeis theConspiratorial Coupd'ftat,theplannedwork
ofa tinyelitefiredbyan oligarchic, sectarian ideology.This qualifies
as a revolutionary typeonlyif it in factanticipates massmovement
and inaugurates socialchange-forexampletheNasserrevolution in
EgyptortheCastrorevolution in Cuba;itis thusclearly distinguished
fromthepalacerevolt, assassination,
dynastic succession-conflict,
strike,
banditry, and otherformsofviolence, whichareall subsumed under
the "internalwar"rubric.
Finally,thereis theMilitarized MassInsurrection, a newphenom-
enonofthetwentieth centuryin thatit is a deliberatelyplannedmass
revolutionary war,guidedbya dedicated elite.The outcomeofguer-
rillawarfare is determined bypoliticalattitudes, notmilitary strategy
or materiel,fortherebelsare whollydependent on broadpopular
support.In all caseson record, theideology thatattracts themassfol-
lowinghasbeena combination ofxenophobic nationalismand Marx-
ism,withbyfarthegreater stresson theformer. Thistypeofstruggle
has occurred in Yugoslavia, China,Algeria,and Vietnam.
Although, likeanyschematization ofthehistorical process,thissix-
foldtypology is concerned withidealtypes,althoughin practice in-
dividualrevolutions maysometimes displaycharacteristics of several
differenttypes, thefactremains thatthisis muchthemostsatisfactory
we haveso far; it is one thatworkinghistorians
classification can
recognize and usewithprofit. The one obviouscriticism is semantic,
an objectionto theuse of thephrase"Jacobin Communist Revolu-
tion."Someof Johnson's examplesare Communist, suchas theRus-
sianor ChineseRevolutions; othersare Jacobin butnotCommunist,
suchas theFrenchRevolution ortheTurkishRevolution ofi908-1922.
It wouldbe better toreverttoPettee's category of"GreatRevolutions,"
U SigmundNeumann,quoted in Chalmers,2.

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164 WORLD POLITICS

and treatCommunistrevolutionsas a subcategory,

one type,but not
the onlytype,of modernizingrevolutionary
process.

Given this classification and definitionof revolution, what are its

rootcauses? Here everyoneis agreedin makinga sharp distinction
betweenlong-run, underlying causes-the preconditions, whichcreate
a potentially explosivesituationand can be analyzedon a compara-
tivebasis-and immediate,incidentalfactors-theprecipitants, which
triggerthe outbreakand which may be nonrecurrent, personal,and
fortuitous. This effectivelydisposesof theobjectionsof thosehistorians
whose antipathyto conceptualschematization takes the naive form
of assertingthe uniquenessof each historicalevent.
One of the firstin the fieldof model-building was Crane Brinton
who,as long ago as I938, putforwarda seriesofuniformities common
to the four great Westernrevolutions:English,French,American,
and Russian.These includedan economically advancingsociety, grow-
ing class and statusantagonisms, an alienatedintelligentsia,a psycho-
logicallyinsecureand politicallyinept ruling class, and a govern-
mentalfinancialcrisis.12
The subjectivity, ambiguity,and partial self-contradiction of this
and otheranalysesof the causes of specificrevolutions-forexample
the FrenchRevolution-havebeen cruellyshownup by Harry Eck-
stein.13He has pointedout that commonlyadduced hypothesesrun
the spectrumof particularconditions,movingfromthe intellectual
(inadequate political socialization,conflictingsocial myths,a cor-
rosivesocial philosophy,alienationof the intellectuals)to the eco-
nomic (increasingpoverty,rapid growth,imbalancebetweenpro-
ductionand distribution, long-term growthplus short-term recession)
to the social (resentment due to restrictedelitecirculation, confusion
due to excessiveelite recruitment, anomie due to excessivesocial
mobility, conflictdue to the riseof new social classes) to the political
(bad government, dividedgovernment, weak government, oppressive
government).Finally there are explanations on the level of general
process,such as rapid social change,erraticsocial change,or a lack
of harmonybetweenthe statestructureand society,the rulersand
the ruled.None of theseexplanationsare invalidin themselves, but
theyare oftendifficult or impossibleto reconcileone with the other,
and are so diversein theirrange and varietyas to be virtuallyim-
possibleto fitinto an orderedanalyticalframework. What, then,is
to be done?
12Anatomy of Revolution. 13 "On the Etiologyof InternalWar."

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 THEORIES OF REVOLUTION 165

Fundamental to all analyses, whether byhistorians likeBrinton and

Gottschalk or bypoliticalscientists likeJohnson and Eckstein, is the
recognition of a lack of harmony betweenthesocialsystem on the
one handand thepoliticalsystem on theother.This situation John-
son callsdysfunction, a wordderivedfromthestructural-functional
equilibrium modelofthesociologists. Thisdysfunction mayhavemany
causes,someof whichare merelycyclical, suchas maydevelopbe-
causeof personalweaknesses in hereditary kingships or single-party
regimes.In thesecases,therevolution will nottakeon seriouspro-
portions, andwilllimititselfto attackson thegoverning institutions,
leavingregimeand societyintact.In most cases, however,in-
cludingall thoseof realimportance, thedysfunction is theresultof
somenew and developing process, as a resultofwhichcertainsocial
subsystems findthemselves in a condition ofrelative deprivation. Rapid
economicgrowth, imperialconquest, new metaphysical beliefs,and
important technological changesare thefourcommonest factors in-
volved,in thatorder. If the of is
process change sufficiently slow
and sufficiently moderate, thedysfunction maynotriseto dangerous
levels.Alternatively, theelitemayadjustto thenew situation with
sufficientrapidity and skillto rideoutthestormand retainpopular
confidence. But if the changeis bothrapidand profound, it may
causethesenseofdeprivation, alienation, anomieto spreadintomany
sectors of societyat once,causingwhatJohnson callsmultipledys-
function, whichmaybe all butincurable withintheexisting political
system.
In eithercasethesecondvitalelementin creating a revolutionary
situation is thecondition and attitude oftheentrenched elite,a factor
on which Eckstein rightly laysgreat stress.
The elite may lose its
manipulative skill,or its military superiority,or its self-confidence,
or itscohesion;it maybecomeestranged fromthenonelite, or over-
whelmedby a financial crisis;it maybe incompetent, or weak,or
brutal.Anycombination of two or moreof thesefeatures will be
dangerous. Whatis ultimately fatal,however, is thecompounding of
itserrorsbyintransigence. If itfailsto anticipate theneedforreform,
if it blocksall peaceful, constitutional meansof socialadjustment,
thenit unitesthevariousdeprivedelements in single-minded oppo-
sitionto it,and drivesthemdownthenarrowroadto violence.It is
thisprocessof polarization intotwocoherent groupsor alliancesof
whatare naturally and normally a seriesof fractional and shifting
tensions and conflicts withina societythatbothPeterAmmanand
WilbertMooresee as theessential preliminary to theoutbreak of a

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166 WORLD POLITICS

JacobinRevolution.14 To conclude,therefore, revolutionbecomespos-

siblewhen a conditionof multipledysfunction meetsan intransigent
elite:just sucha conjunctionoccurredin the decadesimmediately be-
forethe English,the French,and the Russian Revolutions.
Revolutiononly becomesprobable(Johnsonmightsay "certain"),
however,if certainspecial factorsintervene:the "precipitants"or
"accelerators." Of these,the threemost commonare the emergence
of an inspiredleaderor prophet;the formationof a secret,military,
revolutionary organization;and the crushingdefeat of the armed
forcesin foreignwar. This last is of criticalimportancesince it not
onlyshattersthe prestigeof the rulingelite,but also underminesthe
moraleand disciplineof the soldiersand thus opens the way to the
violentoverthrow of the existinggovernment.
The firstdefectof Johnson's model is thatit concentrates too much
on objectivestructuralconditions,and attemptsto relateconditions
directlyto action.In fact,however,as Ecksteinpointsout,thereis no
such directrelationship;historianscan point to similaractivityaris-
ing fromdifferent conditions, and differentactivityarisingfromsim-
ilar conditions.Standingbetween objectiverealityand action are
subjectivehuman attitudes. A behaviorist approachsuch as Brinton's,
which lays equal stresson such thingsas anomie,alienationof the
intellectuals,frustrated popular aspirations,elite estrangement, and
loss of elite self-confidence,is more likelyto produce a satisfactory
historicalexplanationthan is one that sticksto the objectivesocial
reality.Secondly,Johnsonleaves too littleplay for the operationof
the unique and the personal.He seemsto regardhis accelerators as
automatictriggers, ignoringthe area of unpredictable personalchoice
thatis alwaysleftto the rulingeliteand to the revolutionary leaders,
evenin a situationof multipledysfunction exacerbatedby an accelera-
tor.Revolutionis neverinevitable-orratherthe onlyevidenceof its
inevitabilityis that it actuallyhappens.Consequentlythe only way
to provethispointis to indulgein just thekind of hypothetical argu-
mentthathistorians prudently tryto avoid. But it is stilljust possible
that modernizationmay take place in Morocco and India without
revolution. The modernization and industrialization of Germanyand
Britaintookplacewithoutrevolution in thenineteenth century (though
it can be arguedthatin thelattercase the processwas slow by twen-
tieth-century standards, and that,as is now becomingall too apparent,
the modernization was farfromcomplete).Some thinkthata poten-
14 Amman,"Revolution:A Redefinition,"
PoliticalScienceQuarterly,
LXXVII (i962).

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 THEORIES OF REVOLUTION 167

tiallyrevolutionary situationin the United Statesin the i930's was

avoidedby politicalaction.
Lastlyit is difficult
to fitintotheJohnsonmodelthefactthatpolitical
actions taken to remedydysfunctionoften themselvesprecipitate
change.This producesthe paradoxicalhypothesisthat measuresde-
signedto restoreequilibriumin factupsetequilibrium.Becausehe be-
gins with his structural-functional equilibriummodel, Johnsonis a
victimof the fallacyof intendedconsequences.As oftenas not in
historyit is the unintendedconsequencesthatreallymatter:to men-
tion but one example,it was Louis XVI's belated and half-hearted
attemptsat reformthatprovokedthe aristocratic reaction,which in
turnopenedtheway to thebourgeois, thepeasant,and thesans-culotte
revolutions. Finallythe dysfunction conceptis not altogethereasy to
handle in a concretehistoricalcase. If societiesare regardedas being
in a constantstateofmultipletension,thensomedegreeofdysfunction
is alwayspresent.Some groupis alwaysin a stateof relativedepriva-
tiondue to the inevitableprocessof social change.
Recognitionof thisfactleads Ecksteinto pointout the importance
of forcesworkingagainst revolution.Historians,particularlythose
formedin the Westernliberaltradition,are reluctantto admit that
ruthless,efficient repression-as opposed to bumbling,half-hearted
repression-involving the physicaldestruction of leading revolution-
ariesand effective controlof the media of communication, can crush
incipientrevolutionary movements. is
Repression particularly effective
when governments know what to look for,when theyhave before
theireyesthe unfortunate exampleof othergovernments overthrown
by revolutionaries elsewhere.Reaction,in fact,is just as infectiousas
revolution. Moreoverdiversionof energyand attention to successful-
as opposedto unsuccessful-foreign war can ward offseriousinternal
trouble.Quietist-as opposed to activist-religiousmovementsmay
serveas the opiateof the people,as Halevy suggestedabout Method-
ism in England. Bread and circusesmay distractpopular attention.
Timely-as opposedto untimely-politicalconcessionsmay win over
moderateopinionand isolatethe extremists.
Basing himselfon this suggestiveanalysis,Ecksteinproduces a
paradigmforuniversalapplication.He sees fourpositivevariables-
elite inefficiency,disorientingsocial process,subversion,and avail-
able rebelfacilities-andfournegativevariables-diversionary mech-
anisms,availableincumbentfacilities,adjustivemechanisms,and ef-
fectiverepression.Each typeof internalwar, and each step of each
type,can, he suggests,be explainedin termsof theseeightvariables.

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168 WORLD POLITICS

Whilethismaybe true,it is fairto pointoutthatsomeof thevari-

ablesare themselves theproductof moredeep-seated factors, others
merequestionsof executive actionthatmaybe determined by the
accidents ofpersonality. Disruptive socialprocess is a profound cause;
eliteinefficiency a behavior pattern;effective repression a function of
will;facilitiestheby-product ofgeography. One objection to the Eck-
steinparadigm is thereforethatitembraces different levelsofexplana-
tionand failsto maintainthefundamental distinction betweenpre-
conditions and precipitants. Secondly, it concentrates on the factors
working foror againstthesuccessful manipulation ofviolencerather
thanon theunderlying factors workingto producea revolutionary
potential. This is becausetheparadigmis intendedto applyto all
formsof internal war ratherthanto revolution proper,and because
all thatthevarious forms ofinternal warhavein common is theuseof
violence. It is impossible to tellhow seriousthesecriticisms areuntil
theparadigmhas beenappliedto a particular historical revolution.
Onlythenwill itsvaluebecomeapparent.
If we takethebehaviorist approach, thena primary causeof revo-
lutionsis theemergence of an obsessive revolutionary mentality. But
how closelydoes thisrelateto the objectivematerialcircumstances
themselves? In everyrevolutionary situation one findsa groupof
men-fanatics, extremists,zealots-so convinced of theirown righ-
teousness and of the urgentneed to createa new Jerusalem on
earth(whetherformally religiousor secularin inspiration is irrele-
vant)thattheyareprepared to smashthrough thenormalrestraints
of habit,custom,and convention. Such menwerethe seventeenth-
century EnglishPuritans, theeighteenth-century FrenchJacobins, the
twentieth-century RussianBolsheviks. But whatmakessuchmenis
farfromcertain. Whatgenerates suchruthlessness in curbingevil,
suchpassionfordisciplineand order?Rapid socialmobility, both
horizontal and vertical, and particularly urbanization, certainly pro-
of
ducesa sense rootlessness and anxiety. In highly stratifiedsocieties,
evensomeof thenewly-risen elements mayfindthemselves under
stress."Whilesomeofthearrivistes arehappilyabsorbed in theirnew
strata,othersremainuneasyand resentful. If theyare snubbedand
rebuffed by the oldermembers of the statusgroupto whichthey
aspireby reasonof theirnewwealthand position, theyare likelyto
becomeacutely conscious oftheirsocialinferiority, andmaybe driven
15Emile Durkheim,Suicide (Glencoe I95I), 246-54; A. B. Hollingshead,R. Ellis,
and E. Kirby,"Social Mobilityand Mental Illness,"AmericanSociologicalReview,
XIX (954) a

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 THEORIES OF REVOLUTION 169

eithertoadopta poseplusroyalists que le Roi ortodreamofdestroy-

ing thewholesocialorder.In thelattercase theymaytryto allay
theirsenseofinsecurity byimposing theirnormsand valuesbyforce
uponsociety at large.This is especiallythecaseif thereis available
a moralistic ideologylike Puritanism or Marxismto whichthey
can attachthemselves, and whichprovidesthemwithunshakable
confidence in theirownrectitude.
Butwhydoestheindividual reactin thisparticular wayrather than
another?Somewouldarguethatthecharacter of therevolutionary
is formed by suddenideologicalconversion in adolescence or early
adultlife(to Puritanism,Jacobinism, or Bolshevism) as a refuge from
thisanxiety state."Whatis notacceptable is thefashionable conserva-
tiveclichethatthe revolutionary and the reformer are merelythe
chanceproductofunfortunate psychological in childhood.
difficulties
It is possiblethatthisis themechanism by whichsuchfeelings are
generated, thoughthereis increasing evidenceof thecontinued plas-
ticityofhumancharacter untilat anyratepost-adolescence. The main
objection to thistheory is thatit failsto explainwhytheseparticular
attitudesbecomecommononlyin certainclassesand age groupsat
certaintimesand in certainplaces.This failurestrongly suggests
thatthecauseofthisstateofmindliesnotin thepersonal maladjust-
mentof theindividuals or theirparents, butin thesocialconditions
thatcreatedthatmaladjustment. TalcottParsonstreats disaffection or
"alienation" as a generalized phenomenon thatmaymanifest itself
in crime,alcoholism, drugaddiction, daytime fantasies, religiousen-
thusiasm, orserious politicalagitation.To useRobertMerton's formu-
lation,Ritualism andRetreatism aretwopossible psychological escape-
routes;Innovation and Rebelliontwoothers."7

Evenifwe acceptthisbehaviorist approach(whichI do), thefact

remains thatmanyoftheunderlying causesbothofthealienation of
therevolutionaries and of theweaknessof the incumbent eliteare
economic in origin;and it is in thisareathatsomeinteresting work
has centered. In particular
a freshlookhas beentakenat thecontra-
dictory modelsof Marxand de Tocqueville, the one claimingthat
popularrevolution is a productof increasing misery,theotherthat
it is a productof increasing prosperity.
MichaelL. Walzer,"Puritanism
16 as a Revolutionary
Ideology,"Historyand Theory,
No. i (i963), 59-90.
iII,
Parsons,The Social System(Glencoe I951); Merton,Social Theoryand Social
17
Structure(Glencoe I957), chap. 4.

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170 WORLD POLITICS

Two economists, Sir ArthurLewis and MancurOlson,have pointed

out thatbecauseof theirbasic social stability, both preindustrial and
highlyindustrializedsocietiesare relativelyfreefromrevolutionary
disturbance." In theformersocieties, peopleacceptwithlittlequestion
the acceptedrightsand obligationsof family,class,and caste.Misery,
oppression,and social injusticeare passivelyendured as inevitable
featuresof lifeon earth.It is in societiesexperiencing rapideconomic
growththatthetroubleusuallyoccurs.Lewis,who is thinkingmostly
aboutthe newlyemergingcountries, primarilyof Africa,regardsthe
senseof frustration thatleads to revolutionas a consequenceof the
dislocationof the old statuspatternsby the emergenceof fournew
classes-the proletariat,the capitalistemployers, the urban commer-
cial and professional middle class,and the professional politicians-
and of the disturbanceof the old income patternsby the sporadic
and patchyimpactof economicgrowth,which createsnew wealth
and new povertyin close and conspicuousjuxtaposition.Both phe-
nomena he regardsas merelytransitional, since in a countryfully
developedeconomically thereare strongtendenciestowardthe elim-
inationof inequalitiesof opportunity, income,and status.
This model matchesfairlywell the onlydetailedanalysisof a his-
toricalrevolutionin whicha consciouseffort has been made to apply
modern sociologicalmethods.In his recentstudy of the Vendee,
Charles Tilly argues that a counterrevolutionary situationwas the
consequenceof specialtensionscreatedby theimmediatejuxtaposition
of, on one hand,parishclergycloselyidentified with the local com-
munities,great absentee landlords,and old-fashioned subsistencefarm-
ing,and,on theother,a large-scaletextileindustry on the putting-out
systemand increasingbourgeoiscompetition.'9 Though the book is
flawedbya tendency to takea ponderoussociologicalhammerto crack
a simplelittlehistoricalnut,it is nonetheless a suggestiveexampleof
theapplicationofnewhypotheses and techniquesto historicalmaterial.
Olson has independently developeda moreelaborateversionof the
Lewis theory.He arguesthat revolutionaries are declasseand freed
fromthe social bonds of family,profession, village or manor; and
that these individualsare the productof rapid economic growth,
whichcreatesbothnouveauxrichesand nouveauxpauvres.The former,
usuallymiddle-classand urban artisans,are betteroffeconomically,
18W. ArthurLewis, "Commonwealth Address,"in Conference Across a Continent
(Toronto i963), 46-60; Olson, "Rapid Growthas a DestabilizingForce,"Journalof
Economic History, xxiii (December i963), 529-52. I am gratefulto Mr. Olson for
drawingmy attention to Sir ArthurLewis's article,and forsome helpfulsuggestions.
19 The Vendee (Cambridge,Mass., i964).

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 THEORIES OF REVOLUTION 171

butare disoriented, and restless;

rootless, thelattermaybe workers
whosewageshavefailedto keeppacewithinflation, workers in tech-
nologically outdated and therefore declining industries,or theunem-
ployedin a society in whichtheold cushions of theextended family
and thevillagehavegone,and in whichthenew cushionof social
security has notyetbeencreated. The initialgrowthphasemaywell
causea declinein thestandard of livingof themajority becauseof
theneedforrelatively enormous forcedsavingsforreinvestment. The
resultis a revolution causedby thewideninggap betweenexpecta-
tions-socialand politicalforthe new rich,economicforthe new
poor-and therealities of everyday life.
A sociologist, JamesC. Davis,agreeswithOlson thatthefunda-
mentalimpetustowarda revolutionary situationis generatedby
rapideconomic growth buthe associates suchgrowth witha generally
risingratherthana generally fallingstandard of living,and argues
thatthe momentof potential revolution is reachedonlywhenthe
long-term phase of growthis followedby a short-term phase of
economicstagnation or The
decline.20 result of this "J-curve,"as he
calls it, is thatsteadilysoaringexpectations, newlycreatedby the
periodof growth, shootfurther and further ahead of actualsatis-
factionof needs.Successful revolution is the workneitherof the
destitute norof thewell-satisfied, butof thosewhoseactualsituation
is improving lessrapidlythantheyexpect.
Theseeconomicmodelshavemuchin common, and theirdiffer-
encescanbe explained bythefactthatLewisandOlsonareprimarily
concerned withthe long-term economicforcescreatinginstability,
and Daviswiththeshort-term economic factors thatmayprecipitate
a crisis.Moreover theiranalyses applyto different kindsof economic
growth, ofwhichthreehaverecently beenidentified byW. W. Rostow
and BarrySupple:thereis the expansionof production in a pre-
industrial whichmaynotcauseanyimportant
society, technological,
ideological, social,or politicalchange;thereis the phaseof rapid
growth, involving majorchangesofeverykind;and thereis thesus-
tainedtrendtowardtechnological maturity.2' Historians have been
quickto see thatthesemodels,particularly thatof Rostow,can be
appliedonlyto a limitednumberof historical cases.The trouble
is not so muchthatin any specificcase the phases-particularly
the last two-tendto mergeintoone another, but thatchangesin
20 "Toward a Theoryof Revolution," American Sociological Review, xxvii (Feb-
ruaryi962), i-i9, esp. thegraphon p. 6.
21 Rostow,The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge,Mass., i960); Supple,
The Experience of Economic Growth (New York i963), II-I2.

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172 WORLD POLITICS

the varioussectorsoccur at irregularand unexpected places on

thetime-scalein differentsocieties.Insofaras thereis anyvalidityin
thedivisionof thestagesof growthintothesethreebasictypes,the
revolutionarymodelof Olsonand Lewisis confined to thesecond;
thatofDavisis applicable to all three.
The Davis modelfitsthehistory of WesternEuropequitewell,
forit looksas ifin conditionsofextreme institutionaland ideological
rigidity thefirsttypeof economicgrowthmayproducefrustrations
ofa veryseriouskind.Revolutions brokeoutall overEuropein the
i640's, twenty
yearsaftera seculargrowth phasehadcometo an end.22
C. E. Labrousse hasdemonstrated theexistenceofa similareconomic
recessionin Francefromi778,23and fromI9I4 the Russianeconomy
was dislocatedby the war effortaftermany yearsof rapid growth.
Whateverits limitationsin any particularsituation,the J-curveof
actual satisfactionof needs is an analyticaltool that historianscan
usefullybear in mind as theyprobe the violentsocial upheavalsof
the past.
As de Tocqueville pointedout, this formulaof advance followed
by retreatis equally applicableto othersectors.Trouble arisesif a
phase of liberalgovernmental concessionsis followedby a phase of
a of
politicalrepression; phase fairlyopen recruitment channelsinto
the elitefollowedby a phase of aristocraticreactionand a closingof
ranks;a phase of weakeningstatusbarriersby a phase of reassertion
of privilege.The J-curve is applicableto otherthan purelyeconomic
and the apex of the curveis the pointat which under-
satisfactions,
lyingcauses,the preconditions, merge with immediatefactors,the
precipitants.The recipe for revolutionis thus the creationof new
expectations by economicimprovement and some social and political
reforms, followedby economicrecession,governmental reaction,and
aristocraticresurgence, which widen the gap betweenexpectations
and reality.
All theseattemptsto relatedysfunction to relativechangesin eco-
nomic prosperity and aspirationsare hamperedby two things,of
whichthe firstis the extremedifficulty in ascertainingthe facts.It is
nevereasyto discoverpreciselywhat is happeningto the distribution
of wealth in a given society.Even now, even in highlydeveloped
Westernsocietieswith massivebureaucraticcontrolsand quantities
data, thereis no agreementabout the facts.Some years
of statistical
22
Hobsbawm,"The Crisisof the Seventeenth in T. H. Aston,ed., Crisis
Century,"
in Europe, 1560-1660 (London i965), 5-58.
23 La Crise de l'1conomie franfaise2 la fin de l'Ancien Regime et au debut de la
Revolution (Paris 1944).

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 THEORIES OF REVOLUTION 173

ago it was confidently believedthatin bothBritainand theUnited

Statesincomeswerebeinglevelled, and thatextremes ofbothwealth
and poverty werebeingsteadilyeliminated. Today,no one quite
knowswhatis happening in either Andifthisis truenow,
country.24
stillmoreis ittrueofsocieties in thepastaboutwhichtheinformation
is fragmentary and unreliable.
Secondly, eveniftheycanbe clearly demonstrated, economic trends
areonlyonepartoftheproblem. Historiansareincreasingly realizing
thatthepsychological responses to changesin wealthand powerare
notonlynotprecisely relatedto,butare politically moresignificant
than,thematerial changesthemselves. As Marx himself realizedat
one stage,dissatisfaction withthe statusquo is not determined by
absoluterealitiesbut by relativeexpectations. "Our desiresand
pleasures springfromsociety; we measure them,therefore, bysociety,
andnotbytheobjectswhichservefortheirsatisfaction. Becausethey
areofa socialnature, theyareofa relative nature."25 Frustration may
possibly resultfroma riseand subsequent relapsein realincome.But
itis perhaps morelikelytobe causedbya risein aspirations thatout-
stripstherisein realincome;or by a risein therelativeeconomic
positionin society of thegroupin question, followedby a periodin
whichitsrealincomecontinues togrow,butlessfastthanthatofother
groupsaroundit.Alternatively itmayrepresent a riseandthendecline
ofstatus,largely unrelated torealincome;orifstatusandrealincome
arerelated, it maybe inversely. For example, socialscientistsseeking
to explaintheriseof theradicalrightin theUnitedStatesin the
earlyi950's andagainin theearlyi960's attribute it to a combination
ofgreateconomic prosperity and an aggravated senseofinsecurity of
Whetheror not thisis a generalformulaforright-wing
status.26
rather thanleft-wing revolutionary movements is notyetclear.
Moreover theproblemis further complicated by an extension of
thereference-group theory.27Humansatisfaction is related nottoexist-
ingconditions buttothecondition ofa socialgroupagainstwhichthe
individualmeasures his situation.In an age of masscommunications
and thewidedistribution of cheapradioreceivers evenamongthe
impoverished of
illiterate the world, knowledge of high consumption
standards elsewhere spreadsrapidly,and as a resultthe reference
groupmaybe in another, morehighlydeveloped, country or even
24Gabriel Kolko, Wealthand Power in America(New York i962); RichardM.
Titmuss, Income Distributionand Social Change (London i962).
25 Davis, 5, quoting Marx, Selected Works in Two Volumes (Moscow I955), I, 947.
26Daniel Bell, ed., The Radical Right (Garden City i963).
27Merton,chap. 9.

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174 WORLD POLITICS

continent.Under thesecircumstances, revolutionaryconditionsmay

be createdbeforeindustrialization
has got properlyunderway.

The last area in which some new theoretical work has been done
is in theformulation of hypotheses aboutthe social stagesof a "Great
Revolution."One of the best attackson this problemwas made by
CraneBrinton, who was thinkingprimarily abouttheFrenchRevolu-
tion,but who extendedhis comparisonsto the threeother major
Westernrevolutionary movements. He saw thefirst phaseas dominated
by moderatebourgeoiselements;theirsupersession by the radicals;a
reignof terror;a Thermidorianreaction;and the establishment of
strongcentralauthorityunder militaryrule to consolidatethe lim-
ited gains of the revolution.In termsof mass psychologyhe com-
paredrevolution witha feverthatrisesin intensity, affectingnearlyall
partsof thebodypolitic,and thendies away.
A muchcruderand moreelementary model has been advancedby
an historianof the revolutions of i848, PeterAmman.28He sees the
modernstateas an institution holdinga monopolyof physicalforce,
administration, and justiceover a wide area, a monopolydependent
moreon habitsof obediencethan on powersof coercion.Revolution
may therefore be definedas a breakdownof the monopolydue to a
failureof thesehabitsof obedience.It beginswith the emergenceof
two or morefociof power,and ends with the eliminationof all but
one. Ammanincludesthe possibility of "suspendedrevolution," with
theexistence of two or morefocinot yetin violentconflict.
This model admittedlyavoids some of the difficulties raised by
moreelaborateclassifications of revolution:how to distinguish a coup
d'etatfroma revolution;how to define the degreesof social change;
how to accommodatethe conservative counterrevolution,and so on.
It certainlyoffers someexplanationof theprogressof revolutionfrom
stageto stageas thevariouspowerblocsthatemergeon theoverthrow
of theincumbent regimeare progressively eliminated;and it explains
why the greaterthe publicparticipation in the revolution,the wider
the breakwiththe habitsof obedience,and therefore the slowerthe
restoration of orderand centralizedauthority. But it throwsthe baby
out withthebathwater. It is impossibleto fitany decentralizedtradi-
tional society,or any modernfederalsociety,into the model. More-
over,even whereit mightbe applicable,it offersno frameworkfor
analyzing the roots of revolution,no pointersfor identifying the
fociof power,no meansof distinguishing betweenthevariousrevolu-
28 "Revolution:A Redefinition."

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 THEORIES OF REVOLUTION 175

tionarytypes, and itsnotionof "suspended revolution" is littlemore

thanverbalevasion.
Thoughitis setoutin a somewhat confused,overelaborate, andun-
necessarily abstractform,the mostconvincing description of the
socialstagesof revolution is thatoutlinedby Rex D. Hopper.29 He
seesfourstages.The firstis characterized by indiscriminate, unco-
ordinated massunrest anddissatisfaction,theresultofdimrecognition
thattraditional valuesno longersatisfy currentaspirations. The next
stageseesthisvagueuneasebeginning to coalesceintoorganizedop-
positionwithdefined goals,an important characteristic beinga shift
ofallegiance bytheintellectuals fromtheincumbents tothedissidents,
the advancement of an "evilmen"theory, and its abandonment in
favorofan "evilinstitutions" theory. At thisstagethereemergetwo
typesofleaders:theprophet, whosketches theshapeofthenewutopia
uponwhichmen'shopescan focus,and thereformer, workingme-
thodically towardspecific goals.The third,theformalstage,seesthe
beginning oftherevolution proper. Motives andobjectives areclarified,
organization is builtup,a statesman leaderemerges. Thenconflicts be-
tweentheleftand therightof therevolutionary movement become
acute,and theradicalstakeoverfromthemoderates. The fourth and
laststageseesthe legalization of the revolution.It is a productof
psychological exhaustion as the reforming driveburnsitselfout,
moralenthusiasm wanes,and economicdistress increases. The ad-
ministrators takeover,strongcentralgovernment is established, and
societyis reconstructed on linesthatembodysubstantial elements of
theold system. The resultfallsfarshortof theutopianaspirations
oftheearlyleaders, butit succeeds in meshing aspirations withvalues
bypartlymodifying both,and so allowsthereconstruction of a firm
socialorder.

Someofthewritings ofcontemporary socialscientists

areingenious
in
featsofverbaljuggling an esotericlanguage, performed aroundthe
totempoleofan abstractmodel,surrounded as faras theeyecan see
by the arid wastesof terminological definitionsand mathematical
formulae.Smallwonderthehistorian findsit hardto digestthegritty
as ithasbeenaptlycalled.The morehis-
dietofthisneo-scholasticism,
ofthesocialscientists,
torically-minded however, havea greatdeal to
The history
offer. as wellas ofscience,
ofhistory, showsthatadvances
dependpartlyon the accumulation of factualinformation,butrather
moreon theformulation ofhypotheses thatrevealthehiddenrelation-
29 Process,"Social Forces,xxviii (March 1950),
"The Revolutionary 270-79.

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176 WORLD POLITICS

shipsand commonproperties of apparently

distinct
phenomena. So-
cial scientists
can supplya corrective
to theantiquarian
fact-grubbing
to whichhistorians are so prone;theycan directattention
to prob-
lemsof generalrelevance, and away fromthe steriletriviality
of
so muchhistorical research.Theycan asknewquestions and suggest
newwaysoflookingat old ones.Theycansupplynewcategories, and
as a result
maysuggest newideas.30
30See Werner J. Cahnman and Alvin Boskoff,eds., Sociology and History: Theory
and Research(New York i964); H. StuartHughes, "The Historianand the Social
American Historical Review, LXVI, No. I (i960), 20-46; A. Cobban,"His-
Scientist,"
toryand Sociology,"Historical Studies, iII (i96i), i-8; M. G. Smith,"Historyand
Social Anthropology," Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, xcii (i962);
K. V. Thomas,"Historyand Anthropology,"
Past and Present,No. 24 (April i963),
3-i8.

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