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RECONSTRUCTING SOCIAL
THEORY, HISTORY AND
PRACTICE
CURRENT PERSPECTIVES IN SOCIAL
THEORY
Series Editor: Harry F. Dahms
Recent Volumes:
Volume Social Theory as Politics in Knowledge, 2005, Edited by
23: Jennifer M. Lehmann
Volume Globalization between the Cold War and Neo-Imperialism,
24: 2006, Edited by Jennifer M. Lehmann and Harry F. Dahms
Volume No Social Science without Critical Theory, 2008, Edited by
25: Harry F. Dahms
Volume Nature, Knowledge and Negation, 2009, Edited by Harry F.
26: Dahms
Volume Theorizing the Dynamics of Social Processes, 2010, Edited
27: by Harry F. Dahms and Lawrence Hazelrigg
Volume The Vitality of Critical Theory, 2011, Edited by Harry F.
28: Dahms
Volume The Diversity of Social Theories, 2011, Edited by Harry F.
29: Dahms
Volume Theorizing Modern Society as a Dynamic Process, 2012,
30: Edited by Harry F. Dahms and Lawrence Hazelrigg
Volume Social Theories of History and Histories of Social Theory,
31: 2013, Edited by Harry F. Dahms
Volume Mediations of Social Life in the 21st Century, 2014, Edited
32: by Harry F. Dahms
Volume Globalization, Critique and Social Theory: Diagnoses and
33: Challenges, 2015, Edited by Harry F. Dahms
Volume States and Citizens: Accommodation, Facilitation and
34: Resistance to Globalization, 2015, Edited by Jon Shefner
 CURRENT PERSPECTIVES IN SOCIAL THEORY
VOLUME 35

RECONSTRUCTING
SOCIAL THEORY,
HISTORY AND
PRACTICE
EDITED BY
HARRY F. DAHMS
Department of Sociology, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN,
USA

ERIC R. LYBECK
Department of Sociology, University of Exeter, Exeter, UK
United Kingdom – North America – Japan
India – Malaysia – China
Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Howard House, Wagon Lane, Bingley BD16 1WA, UK

First edition 2017

Copyright © 2017 Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Reprints and permissions service

Contact: permissions@emeraldinsight.com

No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, transmitted in any
form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without
either the prior written permission of the publisher or a licence permitting restricted copying
issued in the UK by The Copyright Licensing Agency and in the USA by The Copyright
Clearance Center. Any opinions expressed in the chapters are those of the authors. Whilst
Emerald makes every effort to ensure the quality and accuracy of its content, Emerald
makes no representation implied or otherwise, as to the chapters’ suitability and application
and disclaims any warranties, express or implied, to their use.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN: 978-1-78635-470-9
ISSN: 0278-1204 (Series)
CONTENTS

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

EDITORIAL BOARD

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

INTRODUCTION

PART I
PROJECTS OF RECONSTRUCTION IN HISTORY:
NEO-PLATONISM, HEGEL, HONNETH, AND
DERRIDA

THE BIRTH OF THE TRUE, THE GOOD, AND THE

BEAUTIFUL: TOWARD AN INVESTIGATION OF THE
STRUCTURES OF SOCIAL THOUGHT
John Levi Martin

THE CONCEPT OF NORMATIVE RECONSTRUCTION:

HONNETH, HEGEL, AND THE AIMS OF CRITICAL
SOCIAL THEORY
 Andrew Buchwalter

EUPORIA: ON THE LIMITS, HORIZONS AND

POSSIBILITIES OF CRITIQUE (OR: ON
RECONSTRUCTION)
Raymond Aaron Younis

PART II
PROJECTS OF RECONSTRUCTION IN SOCIAL
THEORY: SELF, SUFFERING, AND RELIGION IN
MODERNITY

RECONSTRUCTING THE SELF: A GOFFMANIAN

PERSPECTIVE
Simon Susen

WEBER AND LEVINAS ON MODERNITY AND THE

PROBLEM OF SUFFERING: RECONSTRUCTING
SOCIAL THEORY AS ETHICALLY FRAMED RATHER
THAN EPISTEMOLOGICALLY FRAMED
Stan J. Knapp

ROWAN WILLIAMS AND HANS-GEORG GADAMER

CONTRA JüRGEN HABERMAS: RETHINKING THE
PROBLEM OF RELIGION FOR LIBERALS AS A
PROBLEM OF DIALOGUE
Justin Cruickshank
 PART III
RECONSTRUCTION AND POLITICAL PRACTICE

THEORETICAL RECONSTRUCTION FOR WELFARE

STATE DEMOCRACY: ‘THIRD WAY’ SOCIOLOGY AND
THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE
E. Stina Lyon

RECONSTRUCTIVE SCIENCE AND THE EUROPEAN

CONSTITUTION: HABERMAS, CITIZENSHIP, AND
THE TENSION BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS
William Outhwaite

PART IV
REVIEW ESSAY

TURNING THE CIRCLE: CONSIDERATIONS OF “THE

POSTMODERN TURN” À LA SIMON SUSEN
Lawrence Hazelrigg

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Andrew Buchwalter Department of Philosophy and Religious

Studies, University of North Florida,
Jacksonville, FL, USA
Justin Cruickshank Department of Political Science and
International Studies, University of
Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
Lawrence Hazelrigg Department of Sociology, Florida State
University, Tallahassee, FL, USA
Stan J. Knapp Department of Sociology, Brigham Young
University, Provo, UT, USA
E. Stina Lyon School of Law and Social Sciences, London
South Bank University, London, UK
John Levi Martin Department of Sociology, University of Chicago,
Chicago, IL, USA
William Outhwaite School of Geography, Politics, and Sociology,
Newcastle University, Newcastle, UK
Simon Susen Department of Sociology, City, University of
London, UK
Raymond Aaron School of Philosophy and Theology, University
Younis of Notre Dame, Sydney, Chippendale, Australia
EDITORIAL BOARD

EDITOR
Harry F. Dahms
University of Tennessee (Sociology)

EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS
Joel Crombez
Rhiannon Leebrick

ASSOCIATE EDITORS

Robert J. Antonio
University of Kansas (Sociology)

Lawrence Hazelrigg
Florida State University (Sociology)

Timothy Luke
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Political Science)

EDITORIAL BOARD
Ben Agger
University of Texas – Arlington (Sociology and Anthropology)

Sarah Amsler
University of Lincoln (Educational Research and Development)
Kevin B. Anderson
University of California, Santa Barbara (Sociology)

Stanley Aronowitz
City University of New York – Graduate Center (Sociology)

Molefi Kete Asante

Temple University (African-American Studies)

David Ashley
University of Wyoming (Sociology)

John Bradford
Mississippi Valley State University (Sociology)

Robin Celikates
University of Amsterdam (Philosophy)

Norman K. Denzin
University of Illinois at Urbana – Champaign (Sociology)

Arnold Farr
University of Kentucky (Philosophy)

Nancy Fraser
New School for Social Research (Political Science)

Martha Gimenez
University of Colorado – Boulder (Sociology)

Robert Goldman
Lewis and Clark College (Sociology and Anthropology)

Mark Gottdiener
State University of New York at Buffalo (Sociology)

Douglas Kellner
University of California – Los Angeles (Philosophy)

Daniel Krier
Iowa State University (Sociology)

Lauren Langman
Loyola University (Sociology)

Eric R. Lybeck
University of Exeter (Sociology)

John O’Neill
York University (Sociology)

Paul Paolucci
Eastern Kentucky University (Sociology)

Moishe Postone
University of Chicago (History)

Lawrence Scaff
Wayne State University (Political Science)

Steven Seidman
State University of New York at Albany (Sociology)

Helmut Staubmann
Leopold Franzens University, Innsbruck (Sociology)

Alexander Stoner
Salisbury University (Sociology)

Stephen Turner
The University of South Florida (Philosophy)
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to take this opportunity to thank Cristina Irving Turner,

Commissioning Editor from January 2012 until December 2015 for
the Emerald Sociology portfolio, which includes Current Perspectives
in Social Theory, for her exemplary diligence, responsiveness,
consistent support, and professionalism in ensuring that this series
maintains its position among quality outlets for cutting-edge work in
social theory, critical theory, social philosophy, and sociological
theory, and combinations of those types of theorizing. It was a great
pleasure to rely on her eagerness to help in a wide variety of ways,
to consider and implement strategies for promoting the series, to
collaborate over the course of those years, to broaden the reach,
appeal, and quality of work published in this series, and to amplify
the attention it has been receiving around the world. I wish her
great success and the best of luck in her future endeavors.
In addition, I welcome the new Commissioning Editor, Kimberley
Chadwick, whose tenure began in January of this year, along with
her Editorial Assistant, Charlotte Hales, as well as Emma Stevenson,
Associate Commissioning Editor since summer 2015. I am looking
forward to a period of productive collaboration with Current
Perspectives in Social Theory’s Emerald team, to further strengthen
and solidify the series’ place in the landscape of social theory as an
outlet that continues to enable authors to publish excellent,
innovative, and important work. This is especially so, as the need for
the kinds of analytical and interpretive frames and tools that social
theorists labor to develop, refine, and provide to a public concerned
with the challenges of the present age appears to keep intensifying
rapidly.
INTRODUCTION

Over the course of the last three decades or so, developments in

social theory have been accompanied and influenced by persistent
efforts at deconstruction, in a multiplicity of ways. Strictly speaking,
deconstruction was introduced as a mode of analysis by Jacques
Derrida in the 1960s, to delineate the need to illuminate the
relationship between text and meaning (Derrida, 1973, 1976, 1978).
It was not until the 1980s, however – after the 1970s’ “discovery” of
French theory, especially poststructuralist and postmodernist
approaches – that deconstruction spread and revolutionized the
humanities disciplines, particularly in the United States; less so and
at a slower pace, the social sciences (see Cusset, 2008). Influenced
by Derrida’s writings on deconstruction, even if only by
acknowledging their existence and the increasing attention being
paid to them, social and political theorists, social philosophers and
critics working in different traditions of social and critical theory –
such as neo-Marxist critical theory, feminist theory, critical race
theory, postcolonial studies, queer theory, science studies, and other
approaches – expanded the use and application of deconstruction.
In social and critical theory, deconstruction thus began to play a role
in efforts to illuminate the entwinement between social structures,
institutions, practices, processes, on the one hand, and political and
cultural traditions and interpretations of modern societies, on the
other (e.g., Agger, 1993, 2013; Calhoun, 1995).
In one way or another, all these traditions and approaches have
in common a critical stance with regard to western modernity, and
more or less explicitly with the darker side of modernity (e.g.,
Alexander, 2013; Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002 [1947]; Mignolo,
2011). In particular, such efforts have been directed at identifying
the latent as well as manifest ideological aspects and precepts of
both historical and meta-narratives (Lyotard, 1984 [1979]). Social
and critical theorists have made explicit and scrutinized assumptions
about the purported inherent superiority of modern western societies
over other forms of social organization and forms of collective life
(Allen, 2016; Bhambra, 2007, 2014; Jalata & Dahms, 2015). Such
efforts also have identified and criticized the social, political, and
cultural costs that must be squared with the benefits, desirability,
and inevitability of capitalist enterprise and market processes
(Larsen, Nilges, & Robinson, 2014; Reichelt, 2001, 2008). Finally,
they have questioned the single-minded fixation on liberal
democracy as the best, or singular, legitimate form of political
organization and institutional context for making just laws and for
defining rights (Jappe, 2014; Kurz, 2012). In addition, theories
pursuing and influenced by deconstructive agendas have revealed
and highlighted the class, race, and gender biases at work in the
construction and maintenance of social, political, and economic
structures, institutions and processes. As a consequence, since the
1980s, social theories that have been oriented normatively,
diagnostically, or analytically, increasingly have recognized,
explicated, and integrated viewpoints and/or standpoints into the
canon, purview and outlook of social thought that previously had
been excluded. The central, overriding concern within traditions
influenced by deconstruction may well be “critique,” in the sense of
critical epistemology, literary criticism, and normative political and
social critique (Kilminster, 2013).
By contrast, the thrust and impetus of mainstream approaches in
sociology and philosophy never ceased to be inspired and guided by
positive agendas of construction and reconstruction. In their efforts
to technically refine theories and analyses of delimited scope,
mainstream sociologists and philosophers often neglected, ignored,
or dismissed hermeneutically and critically-oriented scholarship. For
instance, there is a long tradition of rejecting references to the
concept of “totality” or to social “totalities” on the basis that they are
intangible and “unknowable,” with critics of qualities of modern
social life that totality refers to in turn running the risk of being
criticized as illogical, “unfalsifiable,” and elitist. Further, controversial
discussions over deconstruction in the social sciences were and
continue to be in perpetual danger of being drawn into the wider
“culture wars” in the context of which humanities disciplines were
being charged with contributing to the demise of Western culture at
the hands of postmodernist academics bent on studying themselves
(esp. Bloom, 1987). At the same time, Marxist critics challenged the
ideological role deconstruction and related approaches played within
“late capitalist” modernity (esp. Harvey, 1991; Jameson, 1991).
Deconstruction has informed, deepened, and refined our
understanding of the role of discourse, difference, and expertise in
determining and sustaining relations of power and inequality, and
amplified our ability to recognize related patterns, especially
inasmuch as they are problematic and fraught with myriad kinds of
social costs, from the individual to the national level, and even
comprising the global level. At the same time, there appears to be a
baffling disjuncture between the high level scrutiny applied in
academic discourse to ever more subtle forms of injustice and
discrimination, and the intensifying resistance in the social and
political world to confronting related issues and phenomena. On the
one hand, the understanding and analyses in academia of forms of
marginalization, exclusion, discrimination, and deprivation are
becoming ever more sophisticated, focused, and sensitive to the
pathologies hidden in everyday practices and large-scale
transformations.1 On the other hand, efforts to translate such
understanding into the social world appears to incite growing
segments of populations in many modern societies to intensify their
resistance to continue practices of respect and recognition of
difference represented by less powerful segments of those
populations, from minorities to women. This mounting resistance not
only appears to be directly detrimental to the goals of those who try
to transpose and apply growing sensitivity and awareness to social,
political, and cultural life, but to the pursuit of other forms of
qualitative social change as well, for example, with regard to rising
economic inequality as described by Thomas Piketty, and strategies
to slow or combat climate change. This despite what appeared to
have been levels of economic justice, tolerance, and progress
reached years or decades ago that many assumed could be taken for
granted, expanded further, and solidified.
This growing tension between theoretical refinement and
sensitivity and the conspicuous empirical erosion (if not active
rejection by growing segments of the population in various
countries) of corresponding standards for how to interact with, treat,
and relate to “others,” presents both theorists and practitioners with
a major problem. Evidently, greater refinement “in theory” does not
necessarily or directly translate, “in practice,” into greater willingness
among growing numbers of people, for example, in Europe or the
United States, to recognize and treat respectfully those not
considered as equals or as part of “mainstream” society. It may not
be coincidental, then, that at the current historical juncture,
reconstruction is taking on a different, additional meaning.
Is it possible that deconstruction has gone as far as the present
constellation of social structure, power politics, and neoliberal
economics is capable of taking it? Would further deconstruction
necessitate the vision and construction of a different kind of society,
a different kind of modernity? Are we reaching a point where
pushing for further deconstruction of the interpretations and
ideologies that have been sustaining the stability of societies,
including especially modern societies, along with greater sensitivity
across different groups of people, could threaten the achievements
that have been made in recent decades, in terms of social justice,
political participation, and economic opportunities? Are there limits
to the deconstruction project, and have these limits been reached?
What are the possibilities for the “reconstruction” of narratives of
long-term historical change? Is it possible to include and integrate
the insights and contribution of various critiques of knowledge, while
at the same time developing new forms of knowledge? Can, or must,
we submit the project of deconstruction itself to deconstruction?
Essential to such a project of “deconstructing deconstruction”
would be a return to history – acknowledging its continuing
importance as a social-theoretical category and frame, considering
its persistent utility after decades of sobering realizations about the
nature of social, political, and cultural life, and the entwinement of
the latter with capitalist processes and forms of organization. Such
an acknowledgment would entail acceptance of the fact that,
according to various accounts, history neither has stopped, nor
reached its end, although it may be at the cusp of going into
reverse, at least in some regards (Fukuyama, 1992; Ghitis, 2016;
Taylor, 2016). How would social science disciplines – for example,
economics – benefit from new understandings of long-term change?
What might a new philosophy of history, subsequent to so many
“turns,” look like? What are the possibilities for practice in addressing
social justice, with and without long-term historical consciousness?
In this volume, different kinds of tension between social and
critical theory, on the one hand, and sociological and analytical
approaches, on the other, as well as the well-established practice of
social diagnosis that is located between both, are on display. Most of
the papers compiled in this volume are based on papers that were
submitted for and/or presented at the annual conference of the
International Social Theory Consortium at Cambridge University, UK,
on June 17–19, 2015. The title of this volume is identical with the
theme of the conference. The essays that were based on conference
papers are book-ended here by papers written independently of the
conference, but closely related to its theme. The papers in this
volume are organized into three parts addressing projects of
reconstruction in social theory, in history, and in practice. In addition,
the final paper is an essay on a recently published book on one of
those turns alluded to earlier – the postmodern turn.
The first part, on reconstruction in history, begins with a paper by
John Levi Martin, two-time recipient of the American Sociological
Association’s Theory Section’s book award, on the origins of the triad
of “the True, the Good, and the Beautiful,” before it became one of
the underpinnings of social-theoretical development in Europe. As it
turns out, this triad early on began to play a key role in the rise of
Neo-Platonism, alongside an emerging interest in analyzing “taste.”
Relating to the latter, “the Beautiful” became associated with “the
True” and “the Good,” in a manner that became linked with the
notion that tripartition applied to the soul. In terms of social theory,
the link between patterns at work in the triad and the soul prepared
the later interest in values. In the second paper, Hegelian
philosopher Andrew Buchwalter provides an assessment of
Honneth’s (2014) work on Hegel’s theory of normative
reconstruction. Comparing Honneth’s approach to Hegel’s
reconstructive project in terms of methodology, the underlying logic
of the Philosophy of Right (Hegel, 1952 [1821]) and analyses of
modern market societies as delineated in Hegel’s rendering of civil
society reveals that Honneth’s normative reconstruction reworks
modes of social rationality that are embodied in modern institutions,
whereas reconstruction according to Hegel conceives of social
rationality as engendered in the process of reconstruction itself.
Compared to Honneth, Hegel’s approach to normative reconstruction
thus turns out to be on more solid ground in both regards –
reconstructively and normatively. The third paper, by philosopher
Raymond Aaron Younis, is dedicated to providing a deeper and
clearer understanding of the dichotomy between aporia and euporia,
by showing how Derrida’s and other deconstructive readings, for
example, with reference to Plato and Aristotle, are in need of
rigorous scrutiny. In the process, it becomes apparent that we need
to reconstruct our perspective on aporetic and euporetic thinking if
we are to recognize it more clearly in its classical manifestations and
contexts.
The second part, on reconstruction in social theory, first presents
a paper by Simon Susen on Erving Goffman’s work. (Susen will make
a second appearance later in this volume, as it were, as the final
paper is a review essay of his recent book on the postmodern turn.)
In The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1971 [1959]), Goffman
provided an account of the formation of social selves and a
conception of personhood whose underpinnings and socio-
ontological implications have been unduly neglected. His approach is
widely regarded as an eclectic narrative that drew on different
sociological traditions, which did attain the level of universal validity.
Supporters as well as detractors of his work were inclined to agree
that his numerous studies examining interaction between self and
society did not amount to be a foundational framework for inquiry.
Yet, Goffman did in fact present a rather systematic account of
human personhood that added up to an outline of a general theory
of the human self. Stan J. Knapp’s paper starts out from an
examination of Weber’s social theory as a basis for understanding
suffering in modernity and an attempt to demonstrate that Levinas
and Weber pursued numerous complementary concerns. Yet, both
theorists differed in how they judged the status of ethical encounters
with suffering and in their suggestions for how to confront the
ongoing presence of suffering in human life and modern society.
Following Levinas, Knapp advocates the need for reconstructing
social theory in the interest of promoting knowledge as serving to
enhance responsiveness to the persistent presence of suffering. An
adequate appreciation of suffering as a problem for social theorists
will be conducive to reaffirming both the need for a dynamic
dialogue among competing viewpoints regarding the link between
life and suffering, and the prospect of reconstructing the practice of
social theory itself. In the paper by Justin Cruickshank, Habermas
addresses and endeavors to solve the liberal problem of religion,
regarding the putative opacity of religious arguments and the
possibility of conflict stemming from marginalization or dogmatism.
Habermas insisted that for religious citizens to be able to influence
democratic legislation, their arguments must be “translated” into
“generally accessible language.” Presumably, incorporating religious
citizens into politics will increase solidarity and thwart the dominance
of instrumental rationality. By contrast, Rowan Williams provided a
basis for conceptualizing religion so as to acknowledge the finitude
of being, in order to encourage individuals to transcend the
“imaginative bereavement” of objectifying and dehumanizing others
as means. From this perspective, Habermas turns out to reinforce
the prevalence of instrumental rationality, with religion being
employed as a means rather than being understood on its own
terms. Moreover, according to Gadamer’s work, secular citizens are
capable of recognizing their finitude, due to their embeddedness in
traditions, and thus of engaging in dialogue with religious citizens
speaking as religious citizens.
 The papers of part three address issues relating to reconstruction
and practice, again from a sociological perspective. E. Stina Lyon
contends that theoretical reconstruction for the sake of practical
political relevance is inherently resistant to theorizing a rigorous
sociological discipline. Yet, especially during times of social and
economic crisis, such theoretical reconstruction recurs when social
reconstruction of damaged, fractured, and conflict-ridden societies
was perceived to be urgently needed by applied sociologists and the
general public. Toward this end, Lyon examines the intellectual and
political origins of the Swedish, egalitarian, democratic welfare-state
ideology in the 1930s, and its theoretical definition in opposition to
the dichotomy between “conservative” capitalism and “progressive”
Marxist socialism. The “third” or “middle way” compromise between
opposing interests has evolved over time and will continue to do so,
for the sake of progress. Finally, how was the concept of social
planning as a “third way” practical strategy employed by both neo-
liberal and Marxist theorists as a means to attack “third way”
democracy? In the other paper, William Outhwaite takes a step
towards delineating the political philosophy of a united Europe.
Toward this end, he examines how the ways in which Habermas’
model of reconstruction has been applied, by him and others, to the
European Union, especially with regard to the development of EU
law and European democracy. As it turns out, a metatheory of social
science has the potential of illuminating and pertaining to political
and constitutional legitimacy. Habermas’ model is conducive to
discerning how the double character of EU citizenship, allowing
citizenship both in the Union and in one if its member states,
facilitates a creative tension between these two levels of
governance.
The last paper of the volume is a review essay by sociologist and
philosopher of science, Lawrence Hazelrigg, who also, once again,
fulfilled the role of associate editor in exemplary fashion, not merely
by providing a careful review of Simon Susen’s book, The
“Postmodern Turn” in the Social Sciences (2015), but also by
reviewing most of the manuscripts submitted and providing helpful
advice regarding the framing of this volume and organization of the
papers, and by encouraging submission and inclusion of the lead
essay.
Harry F. Dahms
Eric R. Lybeck
Editors

NOTE
1. See, for example, the proliferation of social movements in recent years that have been
dedicated, more or less explicitly, to the extirpation of controversial works, discussions, and
themes form curricula in institutions of higher learning; for example, Novotny, Pham, and
Schmidt (2016).

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Agger, B. (2013). Critical social theories (3rd ed.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Alexander, J. (2013). The dark side of modernity. Malden, MA: Polity Press.
Allen, A. (2016). The end of progress: Decolonizing the normative foundations of critical
theory. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
Bhambra, G. (2007). Rethinking modernity: Postcolonialism and the sociological
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Bhambra, G. (2014). Connected sociologies. London: Bloomsbury.
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Calhoun, C. (1995). Critical social theory. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
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Chicago Press.
Fukuyama, F. (1992). The end of history and the last man. New York, NY: The Free Press.
Ghitis, F. (2016). Freedom going into reverse. CNN.com, January 30. Retrieved from
http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/30/opinions/freedom-world-reverse/. Accessed on July
28, 2016.
Goffman, E. (1971 [1959]). The presentation of self in everyday life. Harmondsworth:
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 PART I
PROJECTS OF
RECONSTRUCTION
IN HISTORY: NEO-
PLATONISM, HEGEL,
HONNETH, AND
DERRIDA
THE BIRTH OF THE TRUE, THE GOOD,
AND THE BEAUTIFUL: TOWARD AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE STRUCTURES
OF SOCIAL THOUGHT

John Levi Martin

ABSTRACT
Purpose – To determine where, when, how, and wherefore
European social theory hit upon the formula of “the True, the
Good, and the Beautiful,” and how its structural position as a
skeleton for the theory of action has changed.

Methodology/approach – Genealogy, library research, and

unusually good fortune were used to trace back the origin of
what was to become a ubiquitous phrase, and to reconstruct
the debates that made deploying the term seem important to
writers.

Findings – The triad, although sometimes used accidentally in

the renaissance, assumed a key structural place with a rise of
Neo-Platonism in the eighteenth century associated with a
new interest in providing a serious analysis of taste. It was a
focus on taste that allowed the Beautiful to assume a position
 that was structurally homologous to those of the True and the
Good, long understood as potential parallels. Although the
first efforts were ones that attempted to emphasize the
unification of the human spirit, the triad, once formulated,
was attractive to faculties theorists more interested in
decomposing the soul. They seized upon the triad as
corresponding to an emerging sense of a tripartition of the
soul. Finally, the members of the triad became re-understood
as values, now as orthogonal dimensions.

Originality/value – This seems to be the first time the story of

the development of the triad – one of the most ubiquitous
architectonics in social thought – has been told.

Keywords: Neo-Platonism; transcendentals; values; triad;

Shaftesbury; Diderot

PREFACE
A recurring feature of many, though by no means all, productions of
social theory and the philosophy of action is the development of a
core architectonic – an orientating analytic scheme that partitions
the subject at hand in ways that are not merely theoretically
relevant, but perhaps even in some senses, that determine the range
of possible thinking. Consider the impressive work of Habermas
(1984 [1981], 1987 [1981]), which has involved a dogged attempt
to systematize the relation between a number of past architectonics.
Most fundamental has been his assumption that there is a triadic
structure of human engagement with the world, a “trisection” of
reason (Bernstein, 1997 [1989]) for which he has been criticized, as
if, prior to his work, reason remained whole and entire. Yet the
notion of such a tripartition was built into most of the analytic tools
that were available to Habermas … as it is to us.
 This structure now is refracted in a number of different ways, but
its most fundamental – and earliest – incarnation is that of the True,
the Good, and the Beautiful. (The second key structure is a
tripartition of the faculties, which must be left to the side for now.) It
may be that we do not understand our own thought – what we can
and cannot do with it – until we understand our position in the space
of possibilities established by this architectonic. That thought
motivates a larger study in progress, for which this serves as
prolegomenon. It can be seen as an initial attempt to do for social
thought what Levi-Strauss hoped to do for myth: to see the outlines
of the most basic structures that are used in the production of
thought, how they map onto one another, and the possible
transformations that may connect them.
Strangely enough, it appears that the origins of this structure
have never yet been explicated, perhaps because of an incorrect
assumption that they go back to ancient Greece. (Habermas himself
at one point 1990 [1983], pp. 2f, 18, misattributed this structure to
Weber, as well as suggested that it was fundamental to Kant’s
approach.) Here I wish to sketch a preliminary genealogical
exploration of this basic structure of the True, the Good, and the
Beautiful.

INTRODUCTION
In 1853 Victor Cousin published his Lectures on the True, the Good,
and the Beautiful, a compelling statement of his eclectic philosophy,
one that he believed could be summarized as a pursuit of these
three values. This allowed him to attempt to wed a somewhat neo-
Kantian theory of knowledge and action to his religious sensibilities,
and was to perhaps be the most important influence on French
social thought since Descartes.
A number of wonderful ironies lie here in his adoption of what I
will henceforward call “the” triad – the True, the Good, and the
Beautiful. First, Cousin used it to organize his theory of the human
faculties, when the triad developed by severing the pursuit of the
excellences from the adumbration of faculties (also see Guyer, 2014,
Vol. 1: 27; cf. 34). Second, Cousin used it to preach a sentimental
theism, when this triad was formed only through the rejection of
theism. Finally, this was used to finalize a division of the human soul
into orthogonal dimensions, a project that dovetailed with the
emerging value theory of neo-Kantians in Germany, while the triad
was first used to oppose any such decomposition.
Here, I will briefly trace the key processes that led to the
development and consolidation of this triad, which has had a
remarkable holding power over Western thought since the mid-
eighteenth century. I will speed quite quickly through the work that
is preparatory to my story; my glosses will be simplistic, but not, at
the level of specificity intended here, contested. I then move more
carefully where I am constructing the argument about the
development of the triad.

TRANSCENDENTALS AND TASTE

Greeks and Medievals

It is often assumed that there is some precedent for the triad in the
works of the ancient Greek philosophers, which is quite untrue.
There was, however, an intellectual nugget that was to play a major
role in the development of the triad, namely the idea that some
persons might have a certain type of beauty/nobility and goodness –
kalos kai agathos, or kalos kagathos for short (here see Norton,
1995, on the history of this concept).
It is also often assumed that the triad harks back to the medieval
doctrine of the transcendentals, but this is equally untrue. The
“transcendentals” were terms that were coextensive with Being –
thus to say that Good is a transcendental is to say that Being, in so
far as it is being, is good (e.g., Aquinas, Truth Qu 21, art. 1 1954,
pp. 3–6). “Goodness” and “Truth” only appear as different because
Being enters into different relationships with the human soul and
mind. Although Beauty might appear along with Truth, Goodness,
and a whole host of positive terms (as in the works of Pseudo-
Dionysius, 1987), the triad of transcendentals was always that of the
One, the True, and the Good, and claims made by Eco (1986 [1959],
p. 21) as to the status of the Beautiful as a transcendental have
been shown by Aertsen (1991, 2012) to be without merit.
Further, the triad did not arise from the Beautiful being swapped
in for the “One” in the set of transcendentals – rather, there was a
more indirect route, for it was a deliberate return to the principles of
kalos kagathos that first brought the Beautiful to assume a place of
equality with the Good and the True, and this then proved
interconnected with further changes in the understanding of the
human faculties and virtues.
At the level of sweeping generality necessary in these prefatory
remarks, it is accurate to say that at the end of the medieval period,
the great distinction was that made between the intellect and the
will – what Ficino (see Platonic Theology Book II.1.1, 1.14 V.8.8,
IX.1.3, XIV.2.2, XIV.3.5.6; 2001, pp. 93, 97; 2002, p. 85; 2003, p.
11; 2004, pp. 227, 229, 247) called the “two Platonic wings” on
which the soul ascends to the Divine – though this bifurcation was
often mapped onto two different triads.1 One was the
transcendentals (leaving “the One” without a human correlate), and
the other was the more orthodox triad of the attributes of God as
being Wise, Good, and Powerful. Here it was God’s power that
lacked a comfortable analogue in the human constitution.
But in any case, there was a general reliance on a division
between intellect and will (with senses, judgment, and so on
occupying more particular positions) that reinforced a distinction
between the True and the Good, a template that had no place for
Beauty. The centrality of this bifurcation was in no way shaken by
the new materialism associated with Hobbes, or the less dramatic
form of Descartes. The most important change for our story came
from a most unlikely source – the analysis of manners.
 Taste and Neo-Platonism

What destabilized this system were two new, related, concerns that
swept the writing classes of European society. The first was a new
focus on taste. Inspired by reflections on a new cosmopolitanism
that belied the self-assurance of previous courtly visions of the
perfect life, Europeans, starting with Baltasar Gracian, began to
puzzle over the nature of taste. Taste could not be approached with
the same underlying search for certainty that characterized not only
the theological philosophies, but even that of Descartes, with its
search for “clear and distinct” conceptions. Most important, taste
required a capacity to orient to variations in quality that had a
certain amount of irreducible and unpredictable incommensurability.
It thus implied the introduction of a kind of horizontal differentiation
in a world view that had tended to revolve around vertical
differentiations.
This early literature on taste was not wholly revolutionary, for it
built upon themes common in earlier advice-type books. Yet we shall
see that the idea of taste brought with it different implicit emphases,
and, as others have argued, suggested a new relation between the
intellect and sensibility. Like the later works on taste, many medieval
works had counseled discretion, though as part of a nexus turning
on reserve, caution, and self-control (Arditi, 1998, p. 57). But in the
fourteenth century, such reserve and suspicion were increasingly
connected to a fascinating theoretical problem: the mere presence of
variation across persons. Adovardo Alberti in Florence wrote, “The
world is so full of human variety, differences of opinion, changes of
heart, perversity of customs, ambiguity, diversity, and obscurity of
values. The world is amply supplied with fraudulent, false,
perfidious, bold, audacious, and rapacious men. Everything in the
world is profoundly unsure. One has to be far-seeing, alert, and
careful in the face of fraud, traps, and betrayals.” As McLean (2007,
p. 42, from whom I take this quotation) emphasizes, what was
looked for in others was an honest constancy, and so the Florentines
worked carefully on faking this whenever it proved advantageous.
But note that Alberti lumped differences in human constitution and
custom with the vices like fraud and dissimulation, as all of these
made it difficult to read another person.
In the Renaissance, the proliferation of stage metaphors
accompanied a shift from an apparent mood of paranoia and
defensiveness to a focus on skilled playing (Arditi, 1998, p. 86).
Frustration with the accomplished duplicity encouraged thereby
seems to have inspired the famous work of Baldesar Castiglione,
who emphasized the greatest skill of all – the art of appearing
artless, what Castiglione (2002 [1528], pp. 28f [1.21], 34 [1.28])
called “grace” and “nonchalance” (Sprezzatura).
This work – nominally about the perfect “courtier” – ends with a
Platonic analysis of the relation between truth, goodness, and
beauty (Castiglione, 2002 [1528], pp. 246 [4.53], 248f [4.57, 58]).
Yet here Castiglione (2002 [1528], p. 257 [4.69]) clearly turned to
Ficino, and, despite a predilection for triadic thinking,2 posed no new
structural understanding of the relation between truth and the
beautiful-and-good. Nor did his turn to transcendent Platonism, with
its lofty rhetoric and fervid deification of beauty, solve the practical
question of how to account for differences in taste.
The beginnings of a new approach were found in the work of the
seventeenth century writer Baltasar Gracián. As had earlier writers,
Gracián saw the variety of persons to be a challenge to the actor,
and “discretion” as the central trait to be developed. Yet the way this
problem was solved was to involve “taste.” This understanding of
“taste” was a new one. (Previously, in the sixteenth century, “taste”
generally was used to mean a “small bit of something that
familiarizes us with it,” as in “to have just a taste of philosophy,”
Schümmer, 1955, p. 122.) Gracián’s notion of taste was a
nonreasoning faculty that could complement the dictates of reason.
Gracián himself did not determine where taste might fit in to
previous adumbrations of the human faculties, most importantly the
division of intellect and will (or desire), nor did he arrange it in
regard to the excellences or virtues.3 Rather, Gracián (1992 [1647],
p. 89) relied on the earlier transcendentals to suggest values
(“friendship has the three qualities of anything good: unity,
goodness, and truth”), and otherwise picked up and dropped
different systems as they served his purpose.
Why, then, did this interest in taste destabilize previous
understandings of the human constitution? Because attempting both
to accept the diversity of men and manners, and to find some core
principles across this range, required rejecting or at least adapting
the largely deductive and top-down conceptions that dominated
scholastic thought. Here I will leave the fascinating story of the
development of new partitions of the faculties to the side, only
noting where the two developments split off from one another, and
where they reunited.
The second major development (in addition to the new focus on
taste) was a reinvigorated, poetic neo-Platonism that fundamentally
destabilized previous architectures. It is not that Platonism had
disappeared, nor that earlier forms lacked poetic elements. (I have
mentioned Ficino’s two “Platonic wings” above, which indicate some
of the flights of the spirit that Platonism eagerly anticipated.) Yet it
seems that the general scholastic orientation toward framework
building and toward consistency had led to a convergence of Platonic
with more Aristotelian modes of theorizing, and, in particular, an
emphasis on the role of the intellect in determining the True, and
even, in many cases, an emphasis on the will as finding the Good
(often rooted in discussions of Augustine).
To anticipate, the fusion of these two concerns (taste and neo-
Platonism) led to an emphasis on moral sensibility, as has been well
adumbrated by Norton (1995) among others. But in the hands of
some writers, this also led to an expanded notion of taste which
could encompass not only beauty, nor even goodness as moral
beauty, but even truth as an intellectual beauty. The flattening of the
True and the Good into something that would be accessible to an
embodied empirical sensibility then allowed Beauty to be seen as
comparable enough to the others for the triad to appear as a set of
three comparable excellences. As the tide of enthusiasm for such
sensibility receded, it left these three as co-equals, now to be
matched, each to its own faculty.
 But I anticipate too much. Let us begin where all subsequent
writers would begin: with the Earl of Shaftesbury.

THE BRITISH CONTRIBUTION

Shaftesbury and the Triad

Rarely in intellectual history is it this easy to identify a single pivotal

work: Anthony Ashley-Cooper, the Earl of Shaftesbury (third of
twelve identically named Earls), published in 1711 his
Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, which rapidly
became one of the most influential works of the century. A hodge-
podge of letters, dialogues, and reflections, Shaftesbury attempted
to found ethics in a way that would support an enlightened,
gentlemanly, liberal state. Further, as the title suggests, Shaftesbury
attempted to help his reader understand the diversity of
temperaments as a practical issue.
Shaftesbury noted (2001 [1732], pp. I.56/89)4 that “an able and
witty Philosopher of our Nation [that is, Hobbes (1909/1651, p. 95)]
was, we know, of late Years, so possess’d with a Horror of [political
unrest], that both with respect to Politicks and Morals, he directly
acted in this Spirit of Massacre” – to forbid letters, learning, and
liberty as the only sure road to peace. Shaftesbury meant to counter
the Hobbesian perspective by rooting it out at the source – the
refusal to imagine that all competent people could simply know the
good.
This knowledge is possible because goodness is an observable
and intersubjectively valid quality of action. Just as “there is in
certain Figures a natural Beauty, which the Eye finds as soon as the
Object is presented to it,” so too there is a natural beauty of actions
(ibid. III.135/238; III.231/414; 234/419). Such a valid sense of
“moral beauty” could explain our capacity to form stable groups and
pursue perfection, and this was what readers found most exciting in
Shaftesbury’s work.
Thus Shaftesbury’s (2001 [1732], p. II.223/399) main point was
perhaps simply “that BEAUTY … and GOOD … are still one and the
same.” And this, in starkest form, was the lesson that the Platonism
of the eighteenth century was to drive home. This emphasis was, as
we see, different from Ficino’s, in which the good was necessarily
paired with the true, because of our dual faculties. Shaftesbury was,
rather, proposing a unified aesthetic-rational capacity to see good
and beauty, and for this reason, at times made clear that he was
thinking of kalos kai agathos (the beautiful and good) (e.g., note to
I.38). I call this capacity aesthetic-rational because Shaftesbury
(2001 [1732], p. II.237/424f) also followed Plato in thinking that the
beauty in question was not mere physical beauty, but something
reached by reason. Perhaps as a result, Shaftesbury’s (2001 [1732],
pp. II.232/416, 233/418) aesthetic principles were simplistic and
confused. On the one hand, he dismissed the idea that beauty was a
mere matter of opinion, claiming that all could see beauty, at least in
the abstract, but on the other hand, he admitted that people might
disagree because it is hard to apply these principles to particularities,
which seems to beg the question.
Thus Shaftesbury’s confidence in the unity of beauty and
goodness seemed to promise an answer to the contemporary
problem of whether the variation of taste could be any other than
good and bad taste (Dennis, 1701). Shaftesbury’s platonic
conception suggested that one might be able to stand in the
absolute – in Beauty and in Goodness.
But the most important thing about Shaftesbury’s understanding
was not simply that beauty and goodness “are one and the same.” It
was that practically everything was “one and the same” (one of his
favorite phrases). Everything ultimately reached back to “the Whole
of Nature” (2001 [1732]: II.200/357). And it is because of this – that
Shaftesbury was not overly hesitant to equate any two things – that
I believe that he was the first important writer to actually use the
terms, the true, the good, and the beautiful not only together, but
with an indication that the three claimed comparable places in his
system. He asked rhetorically (ibid. III.111f/182f) “Will it not be
found in this respect,” above all, “That what is BEAUTIFUL is
harmonious and proportionable; what is harmonious and
proportionable, is TRUE; and what is at once both beautiful and true,
is, of consequence, agreeable and GOOD?” And in a note he clarified
by that by “the beautiful,” he meant “the HONESTUM, the
PULCHRUM, τὸ καλόν ….”
This triad was not, however, a key structural element for
Shaftesbury. And this is because, in large part, he had no structural
elements, as his method in many ways was (and admitted by his
fictional characters in his Dialogue to be) to wind himself up so that
he could wax florid with enthusiasm for the All.
This gave his writing not merely an analytic looseness, but
something that later generations – including writers like Adam Smith
– would, anachronistically, think of as downright girly.5 But
Shaftesbury (2001 [1732]: II.106/186) understood his own work
quite differently, indeed, criticizing his peers for just this: “Our
Sense, Language, and Style, as well as our Voice, and Person, shou’d
have something of that Male-Feature, and natural Roughness, by
which our Sex is distinguish’d ….” Without judging who was most
macho, we cannot deny that Shaftesbury’s work encouraged an
accumulating avalanche of sentimentalism, especially in the
influential work of Samuel Richardson (see Alderman, 1931, p. 158).
Even at the time, this had its ridiculous aspects (hence Fielding’s
wicked and wonderful parodies of Richardson). Yet it was this very
feature – the graceful, enthusiastic, and florid writing – that led to
Shaftesbury’s widespread appeal in the continent, and the spread of
his thoughts to French and German circles. Most important for us (as
we shall see), Diderot (who had loved Richardson) translated
Shaftesbury’s Inquiry Concerning Virtue and Merit, which is part of
the third volume of the Characteristics. In Germany, Shaftesbury’s
ideas were taken quite seriously by Wieland, Goethe, Schiller, and
Herder (among others). This emphasis on moral beauty was a
powerful vision for many of the more poetic thinkers, but it also
suggested the solution of some of the problems posed by the new
empiricist philosophy, and was therefore of interest to some of the
more sober minded and scholastic minds. Most important of these
was Francis Hutcheson.

The Codification

Although he was in many ways a Lockean, Hutcheson tried to give

Shaftesburian ideas of moral beauty a clearer foundation. Like
Shaftesbury, Hutcheson argued that this quality was available to
direct perception. Yet he differentiated this from our perception of
physical beauty, thus backing away from Shaftesbury’s Platonic
interpretation. If it were not sensibly pleasing, how could such
beauty be intuited? Hutcheson (2004 [1726]: I.VIII.5, 80)6 argued
that for both physical and moral beauty, we could assume that God
was “so kind as to connect sensible Pleasure with certain Actions or
Contemplations.” Just as we fortunately have a taste for things that
will help us survive, so we have a taste for actions that lead us
collectively to thrive. Thus even though he posited two different
faculties (and possibly subjectivized beauty; see Savile, 1982, p.
118), by making a coherent argument for a moral perception,
Hutcheson furthered the attempt to make Beauty something that
was parallel to, but separable from, the Good.
Thus Hutcheson attempted to secure the notion of a moral
perception by moving away from the concepts of “taste” that had
seemed central to the notion. On the other side, Edmund Burke soon
attempted to reject the widespread assumption that to ground
judgments on taste was to accept irreducible subjectivity (also see
Hume, 1985 [1777], p. 227). “On the whole,” Burke (1937 [1756], p.
23) wrote, “one may observe that there is rather less difference
upon matters of taste among mankind, than upon most of those
which depend upon the naked reason; and that men are far better
agreed on the excellence of a description in Virgil, than on the truth
or falsehood of a theory of Aristotle.” Taste and judgment were
implicitly divorced from the intellect as being fundamentally
cultivated and implicitly informal faculties. Thus – just as we can see
emerging in Germany at roughly the same time (Nivelle, 1971) – a
split between analytic approaches associated with philosophy and
appreciative approaches associated with critique.
The most impressive (and, for German thinkers, influential)
British attempt to reconcile these positions came from Thomas Reid.
Known as the father of Scottish common sense realism, he
continued the Hutchesonian tradition but returned it, at least in part,
to a reliance on taste.
By “taste” Reid (1969 [1785], p. 753) meant “That power of the
mind by which we are capable of discerning and relishing the
beauties of nature, and whatever is excellent in the fine arts.” That
is, the quality sensed is an objective one: but it “depends no doubt
upon our constitution, whether we do, or do not perceive excellence
where it really is: but the object has its excellence from its own
constitution, and not from ours.” This capacity could be applied to
moral and intellectual, as well as aesthetic, matters.
I mentioned above that Reid, like Shaftesbury, allowed a
connection of taste to moral and intellectual matters (Reid, 1969
[1788], p. 226). Indeed, it is precisely because there can be a taste
for the good and the true (just as for beauty), that the three emerge
as comparable.7 Thus Reid (1969 [1785], p. 756; also see 1970
[1764], p. 6) wrote, “There are moral beauties as well as natural;
beauties in the objects of sense, and in intellectual objects; …” And it
is for this reason that what might seem an awkward insistence on
the objectivity of the qualities appreciated by taste was critical; Reid
(1969 [1785], p. 758) understood that given his approach to the
faculties, any argument that we cannot dispute about taste, if not
qualified, could also be used against any standard of truth.
In sum, Reid, perhaps more than any other thinker previously,
moved to establish a clear and plausible grounding for the
parallelism of the members of the triad, though he did not himself
use it any point.8 And here, he promised a possible codification of
the Shaftesburian notion of the interchangeability of truth,
goodness, and beauty. Yet there was a different branch of this
Shaftesburian impulse, one that rejected the move toward
parallelism inherent in the Hutchesonian, and began from aesthetics,
and not philosophy. And it was here that the triad first emerged as a
structural element.

THE RISE OF THE TRIAD

Good Taste in France and Germany

In late seventeenth-early eighteenth century France, there was

perhaps less interest than in England in connecting the beautiful to
the good and the true simultaneously. For some, such as the very
influential Nicolas Boileau-Despréaux (1674), the “Good” was
relatively unimportant (also see Kristeller [1990, p. 196] on de
Crousaz). For others, such as the Abbe Du Bos (1748 [1719], pp. 37,
40, 196f), the arts (or at least poetry) could be divorced from
morality (as preachy poems were dull poems) but not from truth
(even fiction should be “probable,” a notion that became central in
Germany). And for still others, such as Batteux, a work of art must
have goodness as well as beauty, but not truth (which, unlike
beauty, is an objective matter) (Dewey, 1920, pp. 5, 31, 34).
But, just as with Shaftesbury, there was interest in France in
comprehending our capacity to appreciate variety in our
understanding of beauty, and its cultivation. One example is the
work of the Jansenist academic Charles Rollin. In his mammoth four
volume work On the Method of Teaching and Studying the Belles-
Lettres, the first volume of which was published in 1726, Rollin
(1770, p. 41) proposed that “Taste … is a clear, lively, and distinct
discerning of all the beauty, truth and justness of the thoughts and
expressions, which compose a discourse” (this emphasis on the
“clear and distinct” is typically French, coming from Descartes).
Although most persons have in them the first principles of such
taste, it often remains dormant for want of instruction, or worse,
because it has been corrupted by bad educations or customs.
 For Germans at the time, the key question was simpler: can there
even be a good taste in Germany that is not simply French taste?
And if not (as many accepted), how can the most tasteful French
sensibility be imported? It was considerations like these that inspired
the key theoretical effort work by Johann Ulrich König, the Saxon
poet laureate (Saintsbury, 1904, p. 22f). And it is König’s (1727)
work (a compendium of translations, poems, and an investigation of
good taste) that is the first of which I am aware to use the triad of
the True, the Good, and the Beautiful. We will see that this focus on
taste was key to a fundamental re-structuring of the understanding
of the excellences and faculties.
König (1727, pp. 283, 285)9 argued that good taste was
something that could be manifested across any realm of choice –
whether of books, of dogs, weapons, and so on – yet it seemed that
one could have good taste in one realm, but lack it in another. This
was one of a number of puzzles that taste confronts us with, and
König’s first task was to clarify our usage. He spent what might seem
retrospectively a humorously long time analyzing different words for
taste, but his purpose was a serious one: he assumed that all
enlightened authors were so under the sway of French culture, that
it was an open question whether one could, in good taste (as it
were), speak of “taste” in one’s own vernacular (as opposed to
borrowing bon goût). Encouraged by English writers in the Guardian
and Tattler, and especially Shaftesbury himself, König (1727, p. 239)
made a case for using the German word Geschmack, noting that in
all languages, the same word was used both for the external tense
of taste associated with the organ of the tongue, and metaphorically
for an inner sense of appropriateness.
It is not that König wanted to reject French influences; he (1727,
p. 238) gave a short history of the development of good taste that,
like Hegel’s spirit of Freedom, has moved from place to place over
time, born in Greece10 and currently comfortably settled in France.
In particular, König pointed to the importance of Boileau-Despréaux
in freeing his people from the tyranny of a corrupted taste (König’s
[133] tenth satire here was a translation of Boileau-Despréaux fifth).
 König’s acceptance of French primacy is seen in his deliberate
mistranslation of Rollin, who we briefly explored above. For it is here
that König implies that he has a predecessor using the triad, and he
clearly treats Rollin as an authority of unusual weight (the quotation
goes on for three pages, uninterrupted). The crucial passage from
his quotation from Rollin is as follows (318f): “Good taste in talented
[sinnreichen] writing is then a fine, finished, precise and authentic
judgment of all the beauty, truth and goodness occurring in a speech
or in a poem, as well as the the thoughts thusly expressed.”11
Now the 1770 English translation of Rollin (1770, p. 41) puts it
this way: “Taste … is a clear, lively, and distinct discerning of all the
beauty, truth and justness of the thoughts and expressions, which
compose a discourse.” And indeed, Rollin’s original (1740, p. liv)
reads: “de toute la beauté, la vérité, & la justesse ….” Although
Rollin in other places joined truth and beauty (thus he speaks [lvii]
of the “immutable rules of truth and beauty [du vrai & du beau]),”
the substitution of goodness for justness (or appropriateness) made
by König is a radical change, allowing him to read a theory of moral
sensibility into Rollin. It may well be that he was unsure of
proceeding with his own ideas without a French aegis to shield him.
Yet König was not content to simply repeat what had already
been done in France, for he (1727, p. 286f) believed that current
thinking on taste was muddied, and that clarifications and
distinctions had to be established. The key commonality in taste was
that “through the internal sensation … we uncover [entdecken],
without knowledge of rules, if a work of art is good or bad ….” (p.
263). Thus an act of taste is an act of judgment, but one that is
instantaneous and does not require the manipulation of concepts (p.
273). At the same time, like many of our other (later) thinkers, König
(1727, p. 276f) saw that in addition to our natural (inborn taste), we
can also have a cultivated taste, which may involve more deliberate
forms of judgment.
This was key to König’s (1727, p. 277) resolution of the puzzle of
the nonunanimity of taste. There was, he argued, a distinction
between a general good taste, shared by all so graced by God, and
then a particular taste that varies by people, temperament, and
custom, but still follows the rules of good taste.
Now what seems retrospectively somewhat interesting is that
König (1727, p. 256) posited that our taste could make the
equivalent sorts of judgments, at least in terms of liking as opposed
to disliking, as did the intellect, but immediately, and without
consideration or investigation. He thus proposed that we could speak
of an “intellectual taste” (Geshmack des Verstandes), which is
“nothing other than the composite power of the soul to perceive
[empfinden] and to judge, mediated through the tools of the senses
to perceive a certain impression, and thereupon express a decision
of liking or disliking” (p. 257f).
Somewhat similarly, argued König (1727, p. 279), there is room
for good taste in ethical theories – that is, we have a mental
sensation (Gemüths-Empfindung) which suggests us taking pleasure
or displeasure in something, but one that has to do with heart and
soul more than the intellect and cognition. “Good taste in its ethical
meaning refers to a subjective sensation, to recognize the truth, to
desire the good, and to choose the noblest and best.”12
It is this capacity for good taste to orient not only to beauty, but
also to truth and goodness that led König to propose the triad: what
brings these three together is not that they are each parallel to a
fundamental (but different) faculty; on the contrary, it is that all are
reachable by good taste. “The general good taste is an intellectual
capacity, derived from sound wits and a keen power of judgment, to
correctly experience the true, good and beautiful” (p. 259; also see
pp. 260, 276, 292).13
The general good taste allows us to reach these three
excellences, but because there is a particular, in addition to a
general, taste, we have to recognize that there must be more than
one way to reach them (p. 296).14 Since the will, intellect, and
external senses vary across people, so will taste. Indeed, wanting
your own taste to triumph over others is itself contrary to the rules
of good taste! Thus, like Shaftesbury, König (1727, p. 322) saw his
theoretical work as a preface that would allow us to understand, and
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
[104]

For description of the Cercocystis-larva see Villot, Ann. Sci. Nat.

(Zool.) (6), xv. 1883, Art 4; and compare Leuckart's criticism of this
paper, "Parasiten," p. 979.

[105]

Moniez, "Sur les Cysticerques," Paris, 1880; Id. "Sur les

Cestodes," 1881; Zschokke, "Recherches sur la structure
anatomique et histologique d. Cestodes," Genève, 1888.

[106]

Schmidt, Archiv f. Naturgeschichte, Jahrg. lx. Bd. 1, 1894, p. 65.

[107]

For example, the genitalia in Dipylidium caninum are duplicated in

each proglottis. Other differences are noted in the following table
(pp. 89-90).

[108]

See Stiles, Centralbl. f. Bakt. u. Parasitenkunde, 1893, xiii. p. 457

(conf. note, p. 90).

[109]

Taken from Neumann, Parasites of Domesticated Animals, 1892,

p. 448.

[110]

µ = 1⁄1000 millimetre.

[111]

For a description of these glands, and for further diagnostic details

and literature, see Stiles and Hassall, U. S. Department of
Agriculture, Bureau of Animal Industry, Bulletin 4, 1893.
[112]

Ed. van Beneden, Bull. Acad. Roy. Belgique, 1876, p. 35.

[113]

Whitman, Mittheil. Zool. Stat. Neapel, Bd. iv.; see also Braun, in
Bronn's Thierreich, Bd. iv. p. 253.

[114]

Braun, loc. cit. p. 281 (with literature).

[115]

Giard, "La Castration parasitaire," Bull. Sci. d. France et de

Belgique, 3 sér. i. 1888, p. 12.

[116]

Schulze, Abh. Akad. Berlin, 1891, p. 1.

[117]

Arch. Naturg. lviii. 1891, p. 66.

[118]

P. Boston Soc. vol. vi. 1848.

[119]

Zeitschr. wiss. Zool. Bd. v. 1854, p. 344.

[120]

Arch. Anat. 1858, p. 289.

[121]

Ibid. 1858, p. 558.

[122]

Mem. Ac. St. Petersb. ser. vii. tom. xiv. 1869.

[123]

Zeitschr. wiss. Zool. Bd. xliii. 1886, p. 481.

[124]

R. von Willemoes-Suhm, Ann. Nat. Hist. ser. iv. xiii. 1874, p. 409.

[125]

Semper, Zeitschr. wiss. Zool. Bd. xiii. 1863, p. 558.

[126]

L. von Graff, Morphol. Jahrb. Bd. v. 1879, p. 430.

[127]

W. A. Silliman, Zeitschr. wiss. Zool. Bd. xli. 1885, p. 48.

[128]

du Plessis, Zool. Anz. vol. xv. 1892, p. 64.

[129]

J. von Kennel, Arb. Inst. Würzburg, Bd. iv. 1877-78, p. 305.

[130]

H. N. Moseley, Ann. Nat. Hist. ser. iv. vol. xv. 1875, p. 165.

[131]

See Hubrecht, in Verh. Ak. Amsterdam, vol. xx. 1880; and in

Quart. J. Micr. Sci. vol. xx. 1880, p. 431.

[132]

"Nemertinen," Fauna und Flora G. von Neapel, 22 Monogr. 1895.

[133]

Beiträge zur Naturgeschichte der Turbellarien, Griefswald, 1851.

[134]

Arb. Inst. Würzburg, Bd. iii. 1876, p. 115.

[135]

Ibid. Bd. iv. 1877, p. 305.

[136]

Zool. Anz. vol. viii. 1885, p. 51.

[137]

Quart. J. Micr. Sci. vol. xxv. 1885, suppl. p. 1.

[138]

Zeitschr. wiss. Zool. Bd. xli. 1885, p. 48.

[139]

Ibid. Bd. liii. 1892, p. 322, and Fauna und Flora G. von Neapel, 22
Monogr. 1895.

[140]

Ann. Sci. Nat. (5) vol. xvii. 1873.

[141]

Zeitschr. wiss. Zool. Bd. iv. 1853, p. 178.

[142]

Our knowledge of British species is mainly due to M‘Intosh (British

Annelids, Ray Society, 4to, 1873) and Riches (Journ. Mar. Biol.
Ass. vol. iii. 1893-1895, p. 1).

[143]

Fauna und Flora G. von Neapel, 22 Monogr. 1895.

[144]
See M‘Intosh, British Annelids, Ray Society, 4to, 1873.

[145]

Loc. cit.

[146]

References to these works are given on p. 101.

[147]

Zitschr. wiss. Zool. Bd. xli. 1885, p. 48.

[148]

Nature, vol. xlvi. 1892, p. 611.

[149]

Zool. Anz. vol. xv. 1892, p. 64.

[150]

Zeitschr. wiss. Zool. Bd. lix. 1895, p. 83.

[151]

Arb. Inst. Würzburg, Bd. iv. 1877-1878, p. 305.

[152]

Journ. Mar. Biol. Ass. vol. iii. 1893-1895, p. 22.

[153]

Quart. J. Micr. Sci. vol. xxiii. 1883, p. 349; Ibid. vol. xxvii. 1887, p.
605.

[154]

Cf. Willey, Amphioxus and the Ancestry of the Vertebrates,

Macmillan, 1894.
[155]

Ann. Sci. nat. 7, sér. vol. xiii. 1892, p. 321.

[156]

E. Rohde, SB. Ak. Berlin, 1892, p. 515.

[157]

R. Hesse, Zeitschr. wiss. Zool. Bd. liv. 1892, p. 548.

[158]

E. Rohde, Zool. Beitr. Bd. i. 1885, p. 11.

[159]

E. Rohde, Zool. Anz. xvii. 1894, p. 38.

[160]

Monographie der Nematoden, 4to, Berlin, 1866.

[161]

Zeit. Physiol. Chem. vol. xiv. 1890, p. 318.

[162]

N. A. Cobb, P. Linn. Soc. N.S. Wales, 2nd ser. vol. vi. 1891, p. 143.

[163]

Monographie der Nematoden, Berlin, 1866, p. 192.

[164]

Zool. Anz. vol. xvi. 1893, p. 432.

[165]

Arch. Naturg. 60 Jahrg. Bd. i. 1894, p. 255.

[166]

SB. Ak. Berlin, 1891, p. 57.

[167]

[Hamann subsequently withdrew these statements.]

[168]

Leuckart, The Parasites of Man, English Trans. by W. E. Hoyle,

Edinburgh, 1886, p. 56.

[169]

O. Bütschli, Zeitschr. wiss. Zool. Bd. xxvi. 1876, p. 103.

[170]

O. Hamann, Centrlb. Bakter. vol. xi. 1892, p. 501.

[171]

Zeitschr. wiss. Zool. vol. xxiii. 1873, p. 402.

[172]

Ibid. vol. xlii. 1885, p. 708.

[173]

Ann. Nat. Hist. 5th ser. vol. ix. 1882, p. 301.

[174]

Macleay Memorial Volume, Sydney, 1893, p. 252; and Proc. Linn.

Soc. N.S.W. 2nd ser. vol. v. 1890, p. 449.

[175]

4th edition, 1880.

[176]
Compendium der Helminthologie, Hannover, 1878, and Nachtrag,
1889.

[177]

A. Heller, "Darmschmarotzen" in v. Liemssen's Handb. d. sp. Path.

u. Ther. vol. vii.

[178]

Cobbold's Parasites, London, 1879, p. 246.

[179]

Arch. Zool. exper. 1 sér. tom. vii. 1878, p. 283.

[180]

Arch. Zool. exper. 1 sér. tom. vii. 1878, p. 283.

[181]

Balbiani, Anat. Physiol. 7th year, 1870-71, p. 180.

[182]

A Treatise on Parasites and Parasitic Diseases. English Trans. by

G. Fleming, London, 1892.

[183]

Journ. Roy. Agric. Soc. 3rd series, vol. iv. 1893.

[184]

Sci. Mem. Medic. Officers, Army of India, vol. vii. 1892, p. 51.

[185]

Shipley, Proc. Phil. Soc. Camb. vol. viii. 1892-95, p. 211.

[186]
"The Distribution, etc., of Filaria sanguinis hominis," Trans. of 7th
Inter. Congress of Hygiene, vol. i. 1892, p. 79.

[187]

v. Linstow, Arch. mikr. Anat. vol. xl. 1892, p. 498.

[188]

zur Strassen, Zeitschr. wiss. Zool. vol. liv. 1892, p. 655.

[189]

Rud. Leuckart, Abh. Sachs. Ges. vol. xiii. 1887, p. 567.

[190]

Macleay Memorial Vol. Sydney, 1893, p. 253.

[191]

Centrbl. Bakter. vol. viii. 1890, p. 489.

[192]

J. Percival, Nat. Sci. vol. vi. 1895, p. 187.

[193]

A. Strubell, Bibl. Zool. Bd. i. Heft 2, 1888, p. 1.

[194]

C. R. Ac. Sci. cxviii. 1894, p. 549.

[195]

Bihang Svenska Ak. Handl. viii. No. 11, 1883.

[196]

Anat. Untersuch. ü. freilebende Nordsee-Nematoden, Leipzig,

1886.
[197]

Cobb, P. Linn. Soc. N. S. Wales, 2nd ser. viii. 1893, p. 389.

[198]

Zeitschr. wiss. Zool. Bd. xvii. 1867, p. 539.

[199]

Panceri, Atti Acc. Napoli, vii. 1878, No. 10.

[200]

Panceri, Atti Acc. Napoli, vii. 1878, No. 10.

[201]

Arch. Naturg. 35 (i.), 1869, p. 112.

[202]

Zeitschr. wiss. Zool. Bd. xlii. 1885, p. 708.

[203]

Arch. Naturg. Jahrg. iii. Bd. i. 1837, p. 52; and van Beneden,
Animal Parasites, p. 91. International Sci. Series.

[204]

F. Vejdovsky, Zeitschr. wiss. Zool. Bd. xliii. 1886, p. 369; Zeitschr.

wiss. Zool. Bd. xlix. 1888, p. 188.

[205]

Arch. mikr. Anat. Bd. xxxvii. 1891, p. 239.

[206]

Arch. mikr. Anat. Bd. xxxiv. 1889, p. 248.

[207]

A. E. Verrill, P. U. S. Mus. vol. ii. 1879, p. 165.

[208]

O. Bürger, Zool. Jahrb. Anat. Bd. iv. 1891, p. 631.

[209]

H. B. Ward, Bull. Mus. Harvard, vol. xxiii. 1892-93, p. 135.

[210]

Mem. Acc. Torino, 2nd ser. vol. xl. 1890, p. 1.

[211]

Centrlb. Bakter. Bd. ix. 1891, p. 760.

[212]

Zeitschr. wiss. Zool. Bd. vii. 1856, p. 1.

[213]

Zool. Anz. vol. x. 1887, p. 602.

[214]

Von Linstow, Hannover, 1878, and Nachtrag, 1889.

[215]

H. B. Ward, P. Amer. Ac. new ser. vol. xix. 1892, p. 260.

[216]

Jen. Zeitschr. Bd. xxv. 1891, p. 113.

[217]

Bibl. Zool. Bd. ii. Heft 7. 1893.

[218]

Jen. Zeitschr. Bd. xxv. 1891, p. 113.

[219]

Zool. Anz. Bd. xv. 1892, p. 195.

[220]

Zool. Anz. vol. xv. 1892, p. 52.

[221]

Zool. Anz. vol. viii. 1885, p. 19.

[222]

Shipley, Quart. J. Micr. Sci. vol. xxxix. 1896.

[223]

O. Hertwig, Jen. Zeitschr. Bd. xiv. 1880, p. 196.

[224]

P. Gourret, Ann. Mus. Marseille, tom. ii. Mem. 2, 1884, p. 103.

[225]

Bibl. Zool. vol. i. 1888-89, p. 1.

[226]

Scott, Annals of Scottish Natural History, 1892 and 1893.

[227]

E. Béraneck, Rev. Zool. Suisse, vol. iii. 1895, p. 137.

[228]

Ann. Mag. Nat. Hist. 6th ser. vol. xiii. 1894, p. 440.

[229]

Archiv Naturg. 58 Jahrg. Bd. i. 1892, p. 333.

[230]

I Chetognati, Flora u. Fauna d. Golfes von Neapel, Mon. v. 1883.

[231]

loc. cit.

[232]

loc. cit.

[233]

The Rotifera, two vols, and supplt. London, 1886-89.

[234]

Phil. Trans. vol. xix. No. 220, p. 254 (abridged ed. vol. iii. 1705, p.
651).

[235]

Ibid. vol. xxiii. No. 283, p. 1304 (abridged ed. vol. v. p. 6).

[236]

Ibid. vol. xxiii. No. 295, p. 1784 (abridged ed. vol. v. p. 175).

[237]

Ibid. No. 337, vol. xxviii. 1714, p. 160.

[238]

Employment for the Microscope. London, 1785.

[239]

Paris, 1841.

[240]

Quart. Journ. Micr. Sci. vol. i. 1853, pp. 3-8, 65-76.

[241]

Trans. Micr. Soc. London, vol. i. (n.s.), 1853, pp. 1-19.

[242]

Verh. Ges. Würzb. vol. iv. 1854; Zeitschr. wiss. Zool. vols. iii. vi.
1851-55.

[243]

Zeitschr. wiss. Zool. vols. vii. ix. xii. 1856-58-63.

[244]

London, 1861.

[245]

Zeitschr. wiss. Zool. vol. xxxix. 1883.

[246]

Ann. Nat. Hist. ser. 6, vol. v. 1890, p. 1; viii. 1891, p. 34.

[247]

Jen. Zeitschr. Nat. vol. xix. 1886; and Zeitschr. wiss. Zool. vols.
xliii. xlix. 1886-90.

[248]

Zeitschr. wiss. Zool. vol. xliv. 1886, p. 273.

[249]

Ibid. vol. xliv. p. 396; xlvii. 1888, p. 353; liii. 1892, p. 1.

[250]

For additions see Rousselet, J. Roy. Micr. Soc. 1893 and 1897.

[251]

See p. 228.
[252]

Quart. Journ. Micr. Soc. (n.s.) vol. xxiv. 1884, p. 352.

[253]

The definition of the Orders and systematic position of the genera

and species referred to under this head will be found in a following
section (pp. 220 f.).

[254]

Reprinted in Baker's Employment for the Microscope, 1785, pp.

267 f.

[255]

"Wheel Animals, though found with most Certainty in Leaden

Gutters, etc. are often discovered in the Waters of some Ditches,
and likewise in Water that has stood a considerable Time even in
the House; for I have often met with them, in sufficient Plenty, in a
Sort of slimy Matter that is apt to be produced on the Sides of
Glasses and other Vessels, that are kept long with the Infusions of
Hay or other Vegetables; and probably they are wafted thither by
the Air, when in the Condition of little dry Globules."

[256]

Gosse's account of the "Structure, Functions, and Homologies of

the Manducatory Organs in the Class Rotifera" (in Phil. Trans.
1856) remains as the most complete anatomical account we have,
though his attempt to identify these parts with the modified limbs of
the Arthropod mouth has met with no support from subsequent
workers. Gosse rendered these parts clearly visible by the use of
dilute caustic alkali.

[257]

A modification of this type is seen in the parasite Drilophagus,

where the unci and rami are two-pronged at the end, but the trophi
are not movable on one another, but protrusible as a whole to
serve as an organ of attachment to the Oligochaete Lumbriculus,
to which this Rotifer attaches itself. See Vejdovsky, "Ueb.
Drilophaga bucephalus," etc., in SB. Böhm. Ges. Jahrg. 1882
(1883), p. 390.

[258]

"Zur Rotatorien Württemburgs," in Jahresb. Ver. Würt. vol. l. 1894,

p. 57.

[259]

Similarly Hudson and Zelinka both regard the dorsal antenna as

formed by the coalescence of two antennae. These retain their
distinctness in Asplanchna; in some Bdelloida the single antenna
is supplied by a pair of nerves.

[260]

C. R. Ac. Sci. cxi. 1890, p. 310; cxiii. 1891, p. 388.

[261]

Acta Univ. Lund. xxviii. 1891-92.

[262]

[See, however, Calman, Natural Science, xiii. 1898, p. 43.]

[263]

Zeitschr. wiss. Zool. xxii. 1872, p. 455.

[264]

Arch. Zool. Exp. sér. 2, i. 1883, p. 131.

[265]

Zeitschr. wiss. Zool. xliv. 1886, p. 273.

[266]
Ibid. liii. 1892, p. 1.

[267]

[See further Jennings, Bull. Mus. Harvard, xxx. 1896, p. 1;

Erlanger and Lauterborn, Zool. Anz. xx. 1897, p, 452; and
Lenssen, Zool. Anz. xxi. 1898, p. 617.]

[268]

It does not appear to us that Zelinka is justified by his account of

the development in regarding this cup as other than a part of the
disc.

[269]

The classification we have adopted is a modification of that made

by Hudson and Gosse; we have divided up their first Order
Rhizota into two, and split off from Flosculariidae the family
Apsilidae; removed the Asplanchnaceae from the admittedly
heterogeneous Order Ploima, made distinct families in the Ploima
for Microcodonidae and Rhinopidae, and created a third new
Order for the Seisonaceae. Ehrenberg, Gosse, and Hudson, being
the authors of most of the genera, are designated by their initials
only.

[270]

This second species has also been found in the Northern United
States.

[271]

This Order has been monographed recently by Janson in Abh. Ver.

Brem. Bd. xii. Beilage, 1893, p. 1.

[272]

See Hudson in Month. Micr. Journ. vol. vi. 1871, pp. 121, 215, and
Quart. Journ. Micr. Sci. (n.s.) xii. 1872, p. 333; Lankester, ibid. p.
338; Levander in Act. Soc. Faun. Fenn. xi. 1894.
[273]

In Denk. Ak. Wien, vol. vii. 1854, 2 Abth., p. 15. As has been
suggested by Deby and by Daday, it is not impossible that
Hexarthra is identical with Pedalion (and in this case the latter
name, as newer, should be suppressed in favour of the former);
but we must suppose that Schmarda's figure of the front view is a
combination, more or less from memory or notes, of two sketches
or notes taken some time before publication; the one a side view
somewhat obliquely flattened, showing the two eyes as in
Levander's Fig. 3; the other a front view, showing the two pairs of
lateral limbs in their correct positions under pressure.

[274]

The male of Rhinops vitrea is exceptional in possessing a

complete, functional alimentary canal, with mastax, stomach, and
intestine (Rousselet). That of Proales werneckii has a mastax, but
no intestine (Rothert).

[275]

For a full account of this group see Claus in Festschr. Z.-B. Ges.
Wien, 1876, p. 75; and Plate in Mt. Stat. Neapel, vol. vii. 1886-87,
p. 234; Ann. Nat. Hist. ser. 6, vol. ii., 1888, p. 86.

[276]

[Eighteen more have since been recorded.]

[277]

I have recently found a large species of this genus dwelling in the

shell of the large Cladoceran Crustacean, Eurycercus lamellatus. It
is remarkable for its power of completely telescoping its
extremities within the middle segments, and for its immense foot-
glands, both characters being doubtless correlated with its habitat.
Rousselet identifies it with P. petromyzon.

[278]
Month. Micr. Journ. vol. ix. 1873, p. 287; Journ. Quekett Club, ser.
2, vol. ii. 1884-86, p. 231.

[279]

See Dr. Hudson's very suggestive presidential addresses to the

Royal Microscopical Society, published in their Journal, vols. ix.-xi.
1889-91.

[280]

Euchlanis lynceus.—This is clearly not an Euchlanis, and of the six

names referred to—Ploesoma, Gomphogaster, Gastropus,
Gastroschiza, Bipalpus, and Dictyoderma—the first has priority,
and the other five drop by the laws of zoological nomenclature.

[281]

Journ. Quekett Club, ser. 2, vol. v. 1892-94, p. 205.

[282]

Trans. Micr. Soc. (n.s.) i. 1853, p. 18 (read Dec. 31, 1851): "We
may say, therefore, that the Rotifera are organized upon the plan
of an Annelid larva.... I do not hesitate to draw the conclusion ...
that the Rotifera are the permanent forms of Echinoderm larvae,
and hold the same relation to the Echinoderms that the Hydriform
Polypi hold to the Medusae, or that Appendicularia holds to the
Ascidians."

[283]

Quart. Journ. Micr. Sci. (n.s.) vol. xvii. 1877, p. 399.

[284]

Ibid. (n.s.) vol. xx. 1880, p. 381.

[285]

Arb. Z. Inst. Wien, vols. i. iii. v. 1878-84; Lehrbuch der Zoologie,

part iii. 1891.
[286]

Zeitschr. wiss. Zool. vol. xliv. 1886, p. 1.

[287]

The Microscope (Detroit), 1887-88.

[288]

Zeitschr. wiss. Zool. xlix. 1890, p. 209.

[289]

Ann. Sci. Nat. ser. 3, vol. xv. 1851, p. 158.

[290]

Zeitschr. wiss. Zool. vol. xlv. 1887, pp. 401-467, t. xx-xxii.

[291]

The breadth of the latter is estimated from Reinhard's figure.

[292]

The Echiuroid Gephyrea (see p. 434) are by some authorities

considered to be a division of the Chaetopoda.

[293]

Another worm, Histriobdella (Histriodrilus) homari, which is

parasitic on the eggs of the lobster, and which occurs on our coast,
has been placed amongst the Archiannelida. It is a minute form,
with peculiarities in its anatomy which render its affinities
uncertain.

[294]

Quart. J. Micr. Sci. xxvii. 1887, p. 109.

[295]

J. Mar. Biol. Assoc. vol. i. (n.s.) 1889-90, p. 119.