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RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY
This fully updated new edition empirically assesses the relationship between religion
and democracy, looking at global, regional, and individual countries’ perspectives.
Using a wide range of quantitative data, the author tests the validity of Huntington’s
claim that democracy and religion are tightly connected, and that Western Christianity
is the only religion capable of supporting democratic institutions. He evaluates both
the broader assumptions that the introduction and the stability of a democratic
form of government is dependent on the dominating religion in the country at the
macro level, and the suggestion that, at the individual level, religious adherence is
related to pro-democratic values. Examining religions including Christianity, Islam,
Buddhism, Hinduism, Chinese folk religion, and Judaism, this book demonstrates
that geographical and political contexts are more important than religious affiliation
for explaining levels of, and attitudes towards, democracy.
As well as offering a broad empirical picture of the relationship between religion
and democracy, this new edition delves deeper into the religion– state nexus,
focusing particularly on events that have taken place during the last decade. The
author explores how religion is used instrumentally by political leaders in different
parts of the world. He also discusses the extent to which religious minorities are
under increasing pressure in secularized environments; prospects for democracy
in the MENA region a decade after the Arab Spring; the growing influence of
evangelical Christianity in Latin America; and how increasing levels of religious
conflict in Asia and the Pacific as well as in Sub-Saharan Africa pose a threat to the
emergence and survival of democracy.
This book will be of great interest to students, academics, and researchers within the
field of comparative politics, as well as journalists and various theological associations.
Carsten Anckar is Professor of Political Science at Åbo Akademi University,

Finland. He has published widely in the field of comparative politics and is the
author of Determinants of the Death Penalty: A Comparative Study of the World (2004).
Routledge Studies in Religion and Politics
Edited by Jeffrey Haynes, London Metropolitan University, UK
This series aims to publish high-quality works on the topic of the resurgence of
political forms of religion in both national and international contexts. This trend
has been especially noticeable in the post-cold war era (that is, since the late 1980s).
It has affected all the ‘world religions’ (including Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism,
Islam, and Judaism) in various parts of the world (such as the Americas, Europe, the
Middle East and North Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa).
The series welcomes books that use a variety of approaches to the subject,
drawing on scholarship from political science, international relations, security
studies, and contemporary history.
Books in the series explore these religions, regions and topics both within
and beyond the conventional domain of ‘church–state’ relations to include the
impact of religion on politics, conflict and development, including the late Samuel
Huntington’s controversial –yet influential –thesis about ‘clashing civilisations’.
In sum, the overall purpose of the book series is to provide a comprehensive
survey of what is currently happening in relation to the interaction of religion and
politics, both domestically and internationally, in relation to a variety of issues.
A Quarter Century of the “Clash of Civilizations”

Edited by Jeffrey Haynes
Religion and Democracy (2nd edition)

A Worldwide Comparison
Carsten Anckar
For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/

Routledge-Studies-in-Religion-and-Politics/book-series/RSRP
RELIGION AND
DEMOCRACY
A Worldwide Comparison
Second Edition
Carsten Anckar
Second edition published 2022
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2022 Carsten Anckar
The right of Carsten Anckar to be identified as author of this work has been
asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized
in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or
hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information
storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks,
and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.
First edition published by Routledge 2011
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Anckar, Carsten, 1969– author.
Title: Religion and democracy: a worldwide comparison / Carsten Anckar.
Description: 2nd edition. | Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2022. |
Series: Routledge studies in religion and politics |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2021024229 (print) | LCCN 2021024230 (ebook) |
ISBN 9780367714611 (hardback) | ISBN 9780367721343 (paperback) |
ISBN 9781003153566 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Democracy–Religious aspects.
Classification: LCC BL65.P7 A49 2022 (print) |
LCC BL65.P7 (ebook) | DDC 201/.72–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021024229
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021024230
ISBN: 978-0-367-71461-1 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-0-367-72134-3 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-15356-6 (ebk)
DOI: 10.4324/9781003153566
Typeset in Bembo
by Newgen Publishing UK
For Oxana, Nadine, Beatrice, and Richard
CONTENTS
List of tables ix
Preface to the first edition xiii
Preface to the second edition xv
1 The research design 1

Introduction 1
Defining and measuring religious dominance 3
Defining and measuring democracy 9
Controlling extraneous variance 14
Religious affiliation and democratic values 20
2 Relating religion to democracy 25

Introduction: Religion and politics 25
Christianity 26
Judaism 45
Islam 50
Buddhism 60
Hinduism 68
Chinese folk religions 77
Ethnoreligions 82
Knitting the threads together 85
Secularism and religious constellations 88
viii Contents
3 Macrolevel findings 98
Bivariate patterns 98
Multivariate patterns 105
Regional patterns 120
Conclusion 134
4 Microlevel findings 141

Introduction 141
Global patterns 142
Regional patterns 154
Conclusion 162
5 Religion and democracy 167

What have we learnt? 167
How much do numbers tell us? 169
What numbers do not tell us: Religion and democracy 2010–2020 174
Conclusion 190
Appendix 193
References 196
Index 210
TABLES
1.1 Theoretical contextual settings for survey analyses of the impact of

religious affiliation on democratic values 23
3.1 Religion and degree of democracy in 1972 and 1985. Arithmetic
means and median values 99
3.2 Religion, degree of democracy in 2009, and level of democratic
stability, 1972–2019. Arithmetic means and median values 100
3.3 Associations between proportions of adherents of various religions
and degree of democracy/democratic stability. Pearson’s correlation
coefficients 103
3.4 Associations between secularism and democracy. Pearson’s
correlation coefficients 104
3.5 Share of adherents of different religions, GDP/cap., insularity,
British colonial heritage, linguistic fragmentation, and democracy 106
3.6 Religion, GDP/cap., insularity, British colonial heritage, and
linguistic fragmentation as determinants of the degree of
democracy in 1972 and 1985, applying four criteria of religious
dominance 107
3.7 Religion, GDP/cap., insularity, British colonial heritage, and
linguistic fragmentation as determinants of democracy in 2009 and
democratic stability, 1972–2019, applying four criteria of religious
dominance 108
3.8 Religion, secularism, GDP/cap., insularity, colonial heritage,
and linguistic fragmentation as determinants of the degree of
democracy in 2009 and democratic stability, 1972–2019 111
3.9 Religious fragmentation, degree of democracy, and democratic
stability. Pearson’s correlation coefficients 112
x List of tables
3.10 Religion, secularism, religious fragmentation, GDP/cap., insularity,

and colonial heritage as determinants of the degree of democracy in
1972 and 1985 113
3.11 Religion, secularism, religious fragmentation, GDP/cap., insularity,
and colonial heritage as determinants of the degree of democracy in
2009 and democratic stability, 1972–2019 114
3.12 Dominant religion (plurality criterion) and second largest religion
related to the degree of democracy in 1972 and 1985. Arithmetic
means and median values 116
3.13 Dominant religion (plurality criterion) and second largest
religion related to the degree of democracy in 2009 as well as the
level of democratic stability, 1972–2019. Arithmetic means
and median values 117
3.14 Dominant religion (plurality criterion) and second largest religion
related to the degree of democracy and the level of democratic
stability in Christian and Muslim countries. Arithmetic means and
median values 119
3.15 Religion, GDP/cap., insularity, and colonial heritage as
determinants of the degree of democracy in 1972 and 1985 in
Sub-Saharan Africa. Multiple regressions 123
3.16 Religion, GDP/cap., insularity, and colonial heritage as determinants
of the degree of democracy in 2009 and the level of democratic
stability, 1972–2019, in Sub-Saharan Africa. Multiple regressions 123
3.17 Religion, GDP/cap., and colonial heritage as determinants of the
degree of democracy and democratic stability in the Americas.
Multiple regressions 126
of the degree of democracy in Asia and the Pacific in 1972 and 1985.
Multiple regressions 128
of the degree of democracy in 2009 and the level of democratic
stability, 1972–2019, in Asia and the Pacific. Multiple regressions 129
3.20 Religion, religious fragmentation, GDP/cap., and insularity as
determinants of the degree of democracy and the level of
democratic stability in Europe. Multiple regressions 131
4.1 Approval of EVS/WVS (1990–2008) question E117/V151: Having
a democratic political system according to respondents’ religion in
various contexts determined by political system and religious
dominance (plurality criterion of dominance) 143
4.2 Approval of EVS/WVS (1990–2008) question E114/V148: Having
a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections
according to respondents’ religion in various contexts determined
by political system and religious dominance (plurality criterion of
dominance) 146
List of tables xi
4.3 Approval of EVS/WVS (2017–2020) question E117: Having a

democratic political system according to respondents’ religion in
various contexts determined by political system and religious
dominance (plurality criterion of dominance) 150
strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections
according to respondents’ religion in various contexts determined
by political system and religious dominance (plurality criterion of
dominance) 152
4.5 Response rates to Afrobarometer question: Support for democracy
in three categories of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 155
4.6 Approval of one-man rule in three categories of countries in
Sub-Saharan Africa (Afrobarometer) 156
4.7 Religious affiliation and democratic values in Latin America 157
4.8 Approval of Asian Barometer question Q130: We should get rid of
parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things 159
strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections
according to respondents’ religion in Europe 161
4.10 Response rates to Arab Barometer V questions: Dis/agreement:
democracy and preference: Sharia vs. will of people 162
A.1 Countries and number of surveys included in the joint European
Values Study/World Values Survey datasets according to dominant
religion and Freedom House status at time of survey 193
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION
Like many other social scientists, my interest in the role of religion as a determinant
of democracy arose when I read Samuel P. Huntington’s seminal works The Third
Wave (1991) and The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996).
Admittedly, the idea of linking religion to democracy is not a highly innovative
one. Especially in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks against the USA on 11
September 2001, the compatibility of certain religions (Islam in particular) with
democracy has been discussed at length by a great number of scholars. However,
despite the fact that the relation between religion and politics is a highly debated
subject, there is still a shortage of comprehensive empirical studies where the two
phenomena are linked to each other without resorting to value judgments. In most
large-N empirical studies, the theoretical links between religion and democracy
receive very little attention; in the empirical analyses the standard formula appears
to be to throw in the percentage of Protestants, Christians or Muslims in regression
analyses. By contrast, authors with a keen interest in discussing the compatibility of
different religions with democracy are rarely interested in reducing the complex
phenomenon of religion into sheer numbers in order to explain the variation in a
dependent variable.
The aim of the present book is to fill a lacuna in this field of research. It is
founded on the premise that good science rests on foundations which are solid both
in a theoretical sense and in an empirical one. I have therefore made an extensive
effort to theoretically discuss the compatibility of each of the major religions with
democracy. Admittedly, such a task would be difficult for any specialist in religions
and for a political scientist it might even be insurmountable. By necessity then, far
from all aspects of the religions have been dealt with, and to a scientist of religion
the treatment of the religions might occasionally appear quite shallow.
A number of colleagues have read through the manuscript, or parts of it, and
provided detailed comments. Among them I wish in particular to thank Professor
xiv Preface to the first edition
Jeffrey Haynes, who also gave me the opportunity to publish the book in Routledge’s
series on religion and politics. I would also like to thank Professor Thomas Denk,
Professor Lauri Karvonen and two anonymous reviewers for their valuable advice
for improvements of the original book proposal. Ms. Maria Hjerpe is exceptional in
the sense that she holds an academic degree both in political science and in com-
parative religion. I sincerely thank her for many useful comments and corrections
to the part of the manuscript where the religions of the world are theoretically
linked to democracy. I would also like to express my gratitude to my colleagues
and friends at the department of political science at Åbo Akademi University for
providing me with a stimulating and supportive research environment. In particular,
I want to thank Markus Wanamo and Mattias Karlsson who have compiled large
parts of the empirical material.
Finally, I wish to express my thanks to my wife Oxana, and my daughters Nadine
and Beatrice, who have had to put up with my physical and mental absence during
the completion of this book. I dedicate this book to them.
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION
A decade after the publication of the first edition of the book, much water has
flown under the bridge. The research field of religion and politics has expanded
quite dramatically and at present, there is no shortage of empirical studies in which
religion is related to various aspects of politics. Today, the importance of religion is
obvious not only to scholars working in the field of democratization, but also to
the public at large. Since the publication of the first edition, the world has witnessed
an Arab Spring, the rise and fall of The Islamic State, increasing tensions between
Sunnis and Shias in the Middle East, decreasing levels of secularism in Turkey and
India, and clashes between liberal values and religious tenets in Western Europe.
In this second edition, the empirical analyses have been updated and the study
now covers the time period 1972–2019. In addition, I have increased the qualita-
tive element of the book by focusing on recent developments in the religion–state
nexus in different parts of the world. A great deal of attention is directed towards
the question of how religion is used instrumentally by political leaders such as
Donald Trump,Vladimir Putin, and Xi Jinping.
I thank the series editor, Prof. Jeffrey Haynes, for encouraging me to undertake
the project. I also wish to express my gratitude to Hannah Rich and Emily Ross
at Taylor and Francis for providing professional assistance throughout the produc-
tion. On a personal level, the most important thing that has happened since the
publication of the first edition is the birth of my son Richard, who is added to the
dedicatees of the book.
newgenprepdf
1
THE RESEARCH DESIGN
Introduction
Political scientists are most at home when they describe states –how states
make their decisions, how they interact, and who influences them. They are
far less nimble with religions, which are far older than the state, make claims
far larger than the state, entail a membership far wider than most states, and
indeed often accept the legitimacy of states only conditionally, according to
their deepest commitments.
Philpott (2007: 506)
Ever since Samuel P. Huntington published his famous works The Third Wave (1991)
and The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996), the discussion
of the role of religion as a determinant of democracy has erupted. In The Third
Wave, Huntington noted that religion played a crucial role as a determinant of the
spread of democracy during the ‘third wave of democratization’, i.e. the process of
democratization that started in 1974 with the fall of the Estado Novo regime in
Portugal. In comparison with the two earlier waves of democratization (the first
one occurred between 1828 and 1926 and the second one between 1943 and
1962), he discovered an important change regarding the relation between religion
and democracy. During the two earlier waves (and particularly during the first one),
democratization was strongly related to Protestantism, whereas an overwhelming
majority of the countries that democratized during the third wave were Catholic
(Huntington 1991: 72–85). Along with socioeconomic development, Christianity
(with the important exception of Orthodox Christianity) had now emerged as a
powerful requisite of a democratic form of government and Huntington (1991: 85)
accordingly proclaimed that ‘[t]‌he logo of the third wave could well be a crucifix
superimposed on a dollar sign’.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003153566-1
2 The research design
Huntington’s argument was further developed in his The Clash of Civilizations

and the Remaking of the World Order (1996), where his main concern was on
interactions between different types of civilizations, of which he identified
seven: Sinic, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Orthodox, Western, and Latin American. In
addition, a separate African civilization could ‘possibly’ be detected (Huntington
1996: 40–48). Although his main focus was on civilizations, not religions, Huntington
(1996: 47) still regarded religion as ‘a central defining characteristic of civilizations’
and there was indeed a strong linkage between his seven types of civilizations and
the world religions, since each of the five major religions was associated with spe-
cific civilizations. The only exception was Buddhism, which never laid the basis for
a distinct civilization (Huntington 1996: 47–48).
In a nutshell, Huntington paints a gloomy picture of the future and reaches
the conclusion that democracy has already reached its natural boundaries. His
main argument is that Western Christianity is conducive for democracy, whereas
the opposite is true for Orthodox Christianity, Confucianism, and Islam. It should
nevertheless be emphasized that Huntington’s world view is not totally determin-
istic. Although he finds that ‘Islamic and Confucian cultures [conceivably] pose
insuperable obstacles to democratic development’, he also admits that ‘[s]‌everal
reasons exist … to question the severity of these obstacles’ (Huntington 1991: 310).
Following the publication of Huntington’s above- mentioned monographs, a
number of works where religion is related to democracy have been put forward.
In his Arguing Comparative Politics, one of Huntington’s foremost challengers, Alfred
Stepan, rejects Huntington’s assertion that democracy cannot take root in coun-
tries situated outside the boundaries of Western civilization. According to Stepan,
the central teachings of the world religions (he restricts himself to Protestantism,
Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Islam, and Confucianism) do not contain elements
that unequivocally conflict with a democratic form of government. Concerning
the much-debated issue of the compatibility of Islam with democracy for instance,
Stepan (2001: 236) notes that ‘contemporary Islamic leaders have “usable” elements
to draw from in their doctrine, culture, and experience with which to construct a
nondemocratic vision of a desired future polis’ but goes on to add that ‘there are also
other contemporary leaders who have “usable” elements of Islamic doctrine, cul-
ture, and experience with which to attempt to support, or construct, a democratic
vision of their desired future polis’ (Stepan 2001: 236). Stepan suggests that what is
crucial for the prospects of democracy is the establishment of the ‘twin tolerations’.
This concept denotes, on the one hand, that there is a clear line separating the pol-
itical authorities and the religious leaders, and, on the other hand, that the relation
between the political and the religious leadership is characterized by mutual respect.
Stepan is by no means the only one who has challenged Huntington’s world
view; particularly after the terrorist attacks on the United States of 11 September
2001, authors have given due consideration to the compatibility of Islam with dem-
ocracy. In their most extreme forms, these contributions bear many similarities to
pamphlets. Like lawyers, scholars argue their case, i.e. they either defend the com-
patibility of Islam with democracy or claim the opposite: that Islam and democracy
The research design 3
do not mix (Whitehead 2002: 170). In the heated climate following the terrorist
attack on the United States and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria,
this is perhaps understandable but it is no doubt surprising to learn that that there is
still a scarcity of comprehensive empirical studies where religion is related to dem-
ocracy without resorting to value judgements. In essence, the ‘big picture’ of the
relation between religion and democracy still remains to be painted and the aim of
the present monograph is indeed to fill this lacuna in the literature on the requisites
of democracy.
In the study at hand, the association between religion and democracy will be
approached from a macro perspective as well as from a micro perspective. At the
macro level, religion is regarded as a system-characteristic, which permeates the
whole society and also affects the building and functioning of political institutions.
Empirically, the first step is to give a bird’s-eye view of the association between reli-
gion and democracy at the global level. Previous studies have shown that there is a
strong negative correlation between Islam and democracy and a strong positive one
between Christianity and democracy (e.g. Hadenius 1992; Barro 1999; Anderson
2004; Minkenberg 2007: 893–94).
Within the framework of the present study, the main ambition is to study to
what extent bivariate relationships between religion and democracy are altered
when analyses are conducted in different points in time and space, when oper-
ating with different indicators of religious dominance, and when controlling for
the impact of various external factors. The dependent variable, democracy, will be
measured with regard to two dimensions. On the one hand, the purpose is to study
if and to what extent religion helps to bring about democracy. On the other hand,
the ambition is to assess to what extent different religions facilitate the maintenance
of a democratic form of government.
The relation between religion and democracy can also be apprehended from
a micro perspective. It is quite remarkable that until recently, microlevel studies of
the association between religion and democracy were very difficult to come across.
Although the number of studies which relate religion to politics at the individual
level has increased markedly during the last years, there are still many questions
which remain unanswered regarding the relation between religious affiliation and
political values.Within the framework of the present study, the analysis conducted at
the system level will therefore be complemented with a comprehensive assessment
of the relation between religious affiliation and democratic values at the individual
level. This part of the study will primarily be based on findings of the World Values
Surveys, complemented with data from several regional surveys.
Defining and measuring religious dominance

Mapping the religions of the world
A natural starting point for a study on the relation between religion and dem-
ocracy is to specify the two concepts. Although it has generally been argued that
democracy is a concept hard to define, it is probably safe to say that it is even

more difficult to grasp the notion of ‘religion’. The following quote from a highly
authoritative source is illuminating:
So many definitions of religion have been framed in the West over the years
that even a partial listing would be impractical. With varying success they
have all struggled to avoid, on the one hand, the Scylla of hard, sharp, par-
ticularistic, definition and, on the other hand, the Charybdis of meaningless
generalities.
The Encyclopedia of Religion (1987: vol. 12: 283)
Ninian Smart (1989: 10–21) has suggested that the nature of religions is best under-
stood by means of a scheme encompassing seven dimensions. The practical and ritual
dimension refers to practices such as regular worship, preaching, and prayers. The
experimental and emotional dimension encompasses bewildering experiences by men
and women which have had a profound impact on the emergence and develop-
ment of religious traditions. As examples of such experiences, Smart (1989: 13)
mentions ‘the visions of the Prophet Muhammad, the conversion of Paul, [and] the
enlightenment of the Buddha’. In many cases, stories (true or false) and myths play
a crucial role in the characterization of a religion.This is the narrative or mythic dimen-
sion. The doctrinal and philosophical dimension, again, is connected to the narrative of
mythic dimension but refers to more intellectually developed, integrated dogmas (as
an example Smart (1989: 16) mentions the doctrine of the trinity in Christianity).
Another central feature for a religion is the existence of moral guidelines or law-
like rules (e.g. the Torah in Orthodox Judaism or the Sharia in Islam) that have to
be obeyed. This is the ethical and legal dimension.
The last two dimensions, the social and institutional dimension as well as the material
dimension, are different in the sense that they are related to the incarnation of reli-
gion. The former dimension concerns both the institutional organization as well
as informal patterns of interaction in the group of people belonging to a specific
religious group. The latter one, finally, refers to material expressions, such as church
buildings and monuments, but also to important or even sacred landmarks such as
‘the river Ganges, the Jordan, the sacred mountains of China, Mount Fuji in Japan
… and so forth’ (Smart 1989: 20–21).
Smart’s above-mentioned scheme clearly illustrates the fact that the concept of
religion is complex and multifaceted. Within the present framework of research it
is not, for practical purposes, possible to formulate a definition of religion and then,
with this definition as a point of reference, collect data for all countries in the world
for the relevant period of time. Instead, we are to a very large extent compelled to
rely on existing databases. One of the most comprehensive databases on religious
adherence is the World Christian Database, which is linked to three volumes of the
World Christian Encyclopedia, edited by Barrett (1982), Barrett et al. (2001), and
Johnson and Zurlo (2019). In the second edition of the World Christian Encyclopedia,
religion is given the following meaning:
A religion is defined … not in the first instance by its dogmas but primarily
by its adherents. This means that a religion is defined by its adherents’ loyalty
to it; by their acceptance of it as unique and superior to all other religions,
which they in practice ignore (though not necessarily deliberately), even
those closely related in beliefs; by its relative autonomy (freedom to manage
its own affairs); by its use of its own language, culture, customs, property; and
by its adherents’ ability in practice to get along without depending on any
other religions or their adherents.
Barrett et al. (2001: 3)
Since the religions of the world are not internally homogeneous, their classification
and subclassification is a cumbersome task.Throughout the centuries, most religions
have developed their own branches, sub-branches, or heretical sects. Most of us
know that there are two competing branches of Islam, Sunni and Shia, and that it
sometimes makes sense to treat them as different types of religions. However, a sig-
nificantly lesser proportion of us have heard about the Hanafite, Hanbalite, Malikite,
and Wahhabite sects (or rather schools of jurisprudence) of Sunni Muslims, or the
Alawite, Ismaili, Itna-Ashari, and Zaydi branches of Shia Muslims (see Barrett et al.
2001: 5–7). When conducting empirical studies on the relation between religion
and democracy, we immediately have to confront the issue of determining which of
these sects should be regarded as religions in their own right. Should each of these
(and analogous branches of other religions) be treated as separate religions in the
empirical analyses or lumped together in broader categories?
Elsewhere (Anckar 2002: 83–84) I have argued that in situations where the clas-
sification of a phenomenon is problematic and controversial, the best way to define
an object is by its expected consequences on the phenomenon to be explained.This
means that a difference between two sub-layers of a religion should be regarded as
relevant only if the difference is likely to affect the outcome on the dependent vari-
able. In other words, if Islam in both its Shia and its Sunni variant is likely to result
in an autocratic state, then it makes little sense to treat them as separate religions in
the empirical analysis. This, of course, means that even a relatively small fraction of
a religion can be regarded as a separate category if its implications for democracy
are different from those of the main religion from which it has emanated. Similarly,
a large fraction of a religion can be grouped together with other large fractions of
the same religion if their expected consequences on the dependent variable are
the same.
Let me nevertheless stress that when we have to make a choice between narrow
and broad categorizations, I choose the latter option. In a global study like the
present one, the ambition is to make generalizations about the relation between
religions and political systems. In the end, very fine-g raded categories should be
avoided; otherwise, we risk ending up with a scheme of classification with more
religions than there are countries in the world. A quick glance at the data presented
in Barrett et al. (2001: 5–7) immediately reveals the necessity to put up a threshold
for the inclusion of the smaller religious fractions in the study. The authors list no
less than 270 religions and ‘parareligions’, each encompassing more than 500,000
adherents in the world in the year 2000.
A useful way to come to grips with the problem is to use the classification
scheme provided by Barrett et al. (2001: 4). Based on their ascending complexity,
the religions of the world are classified into ten layers: local religion (e.g. a tribal
religion), cluster of related religions (e.g. Australian Aboriginal religion), tradition (e.g.
Quakers), megadenomination (e.g. Selfreligionists), macrodenomination (e.g. Uniatism
and Tijaniya), communion (e.g. Pentecostalism, Bantu religion), megacommunion (e.g.
Hanafites, Orthodox Jews, Reformists), megareligion (e.g. Taoism, Confucianism,
Judaism, Lutheranism), macroreligion (e.g. Sunnis, Shias, Mahayana, Hinayana,
Catholicism, Protestantism), and, finally, cosmoreligion (e.g. Christianity, Islam,
Hinduism, Buddhism).
For the purpose of the present study, the nine religions classified as cosmoreligions
(Atheists, Buddhists, Chinese folk religionists, Christians, Ethnoreligionists, Hindus,
Muslims, New Religionists, and Non- religious), will, with one exception, be
treated as religions in their own right. The exception concerns the categories
Atheists and Non-religious, which will be combined into a common category. In
addition, religions classified within the categories macroreligion (35 religions, usu-
ally with 20–100 million adherents) and megareligions (150 religions, usually with
a number of adherents ranging from 1 to 20 million) are also eligible for inclusion
in the study.
In the theoretical part of the study, the ambition is to assess the compatibility
of each of the religions with democracy. For practical purposes, however, it is not
possible to theoretically link all these religions to democracy. Instead, this will be
done only with regard to cosmoreligions, macroreligions, and megareligions which
are or have been in a dominant position (a plurality of adherents) in at least one
country in the world during the time period covered by the study. This require-
ment means that the heterogeneous group ‘New Religions’ will not be discussed
in the theoretical part of the study. Also, the relation between atheism/agnosticism
and democracy will be incorporated into a general discussion of the theoretical link
between secularism and democracy.
Measuring religious dominance

Let me now turn to the question concerning the operationalization of the inde-
pendent variable, religious dominance. First, let it be clearly spelled out that the
present book is founded on the premise that there is no objective criterion of meas-
uring dominance, and the purpose of this study is therefore not to come up with a
generally acceptable definition of religious dominance. Indeed, I would argue that
such an attempt is useless since we cannot expect there to be a magic threshold
of dominance, the surpassing of which would have far-reaching consequences for
all kind of political phenomena. What we can do, however, is to try to establish the
relevant way of operationalizing religious dominance with regard to the phenom-
enon we seek to explain, in this case democracy. The present work, then, sets out
to establish the threshold at which different religions give rise to democracy, or,
alternatively, give rise to autocracy. Accordingly, it is necessary to operate with sev-
eral criteria for defining religious dominance. Hopefully, it will then be possible to
give an assessment of the kind of religious dominance that is crucial for the success
of democracy.
A natural starting point for the assessment of the relation between religion and
democracy is to assume that the two phenomena are linearly related. A number of
authors have chosen to rely on the most straightforward quantitative measure of
religious dominance, namely the percentage of adherents of the major religions
(e.g. Hadenius 1992; Muller 1995: 975–77; Barro 1999: 175–76; Ross 2001: 338–
39). This measurement is of course handy for statistical purposes but it should
be acknowledged that it suffers from shortcomings as well. Simply applying the
fraction of, for instance, Protestants, when measuring the degree of ‘Protestantism’
can be highly misleading since we neglect to consider the distribution of other
religious denominations in the countries. In other words, we would assume that all
countries where 34 percent of the population adheres to Protestantism score the
same value on the dependent variable. However, it is more than likely that the dis-
tinction between Protestantism and all other religions is not the only relevant one
with regard to the level of democracy. In one country, the rest of the population
(66 percent) might consist of Muslims and in another country of Catholics. If, for
instance, Huntington’s view, that Catholicism is (almost) as conducive to democracy
as Protestantism, whereas the opposite is true for Islam, is valid, the two countries
would score quite different values on the dependent variable due to the fact that
we have neglected to consider the distribution of Catholics and Muslims in our
statistical model.
Using the percentage points of adherents has another drawback as well in the
sense that it does not capture the essence of the concept of ‘dominance’. A linear
model, where, for instance, the level of democracy is regressed on the percentage of
Protestants, is based on the assumption that an increase in the number of Protestants
of, say, five percentage points, will result in the same increase in the level of dem-
ocracy regardless of at which point of the scale the increase in the proportion of
Protestants occurs. With regard to the level of democracy, then, the assumption is
made that it is irrelevant if the increase occurs from twenty to 25 percent or from
47 to 52 percent. However, since a change in the proportion of Protestants from
47 to 52 percent means that Protestantism gains status as a majority religion it is
not unlikely that this increase in the number of Protestants has more far-reaching
consequences for the prospects of democracy than an increase from twenty to
25 percent.
It is therefore necessary to complement the strict quantitative measure of reli-
gious dominance with qualitative indicators of the phenomenon in question.
Within the framework of the present study, I shall make use of three qualitative
thresholds of dominance. The first, and mildest, criterion is the plurality criterion,
which means that the religion with the largest number of followers is considered
to be in a dominant position in a country. The choice of the second qualitative
threshold is based on the assumption that the difference between plurality and
majority is crucial with regard to dominance. When the proportion of adherents
exceeds 50 percent it means that a religion is not only the largest one in a country
but also larger than all other religious denominations together.The second criterion
of dominance is therefore the majority criterion, which denotes situations where
the number of adherents of the major religion exceeds 50 percent of the popula-
tion. Finally, it makes sense to define dominance as a situation where one religion
really permeates the society, and followers of other religions than the largest one can
feel uneasy about manifesting their religious affiliation. This could arguably be the
case when the number of adherents exceeds 70 percent of the population, and this
figure will accordingly serve as my third threshold of dominance.
When discussing the operationalization of the independent variable we should
also pay regard to other religious constellations. First, it is reasonable to suspect
that prospects for democracy are better in situations where there are no conflicts
between adherents of different religions. A necessary (but certainly not sufficient)
requirement for such conflicts to erupt is of course that the country incorporates
several religious groups. It therefore makes sense to study if religious homogeneity
is associated with high levels of democracy and vice versa.
Simply focusing on the overall level of religious fragmentation is, however, not
enough. It can be readily assumed that the possibility of the adherents of the lar-
gest religion dominating the political scene is affected by whether ‘the religious
opposition’ is homogeneous or fragmented. For instance, if the largest religion in
a country encompasses 55 percent of the population whereas the second largest
religion is backed by 45 percent of the population, we can expect the situation
between the two religions to be polarized and tense. However, in a situation where,
again, 55 percent of the population adheres to the dominant religious affiliation
whereas the rest of the population is split up among four religious groupings, each
encompassing around ten–fifteen percent of the population, the dominance of the
largest religious group is much more difficult to upset.
In addition to the relative strengths of the minor religions, we should also con-
sider which religions are represented in the ‘oppositional forces’. The prospects for
democracy should be quite good if both the largest religion and the second largest
religion fit well with democratic principles. If, on the other hand, the largest reli-
gion is compatible with democracy whereas the opposite is true for the second
largest religion, the conditions for democracy should be less favourable. In other
words, under the assumption that Huntington is correct, we would suspect that in a
country dominated by Catholics, democracy has a better chance to emerge and sur-
vive if Protestants rather than Muslims make up the largest minor religious group.
Finally, it is quite possible that the success or failure of democracy is not
dependent on religion but religiosity. To a certain extent, all religions (at least the
monotheistic ones) are incompatible with popular government. This presumption
is based on the simple assertion that if a supreme being is almighty, then it follows
logically that the laws are given by him alone and cannot be changed by man.
Thereby we would expect that the prospects for democracy increase in cases where
the religious sphere is separated from the political sphere and/or the overall level of
religiosity is low.Therefore, I include the level of secularism among the explanatory
factors in the study.
The discussion conducted above can thereby be summarized accordingly:Within
the framework of the present study the following aspects of religion will be related
to democracy: percentage of followers of each of the major religions; religious
dominance defined by three thresholds of dominance; level of religious fragmenta-
tion; combinations of religions; and level of secularism.
Defining and measuring democracy

It has been suggested that ‘[t]‌here are almost as many theoretical definitions of
democracy as there are scholars who study democratic politics’ (Lipset and Lakin
2004: 19). In another context (Anckar 2008: 437–38), I subscribed to the view that
definitions of democracy fall within three categories. A first category consists of
authors who, following Schumpeter (1947), operate with minimal definitions of
the phenomenon in question (e.g. Riker 1982; Przeworski et al. 1996; Vanhanen
1990). For proponents of the minimalist approach, elections constitute the essen-
tial feature of democracy. According to an often-quoted definition by Schumpeter
(1947: 269), democracy was simply a system ‘for arriving at political decisions in
which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle
for the people’s vote’. A second category is made up of scholars who champion the
view that in addition to the electoral dimension, attention should be directed to
civil liberties. If the people is to exercise meaningful control of its representatives
and formulate alternative policy proposals, the power holders should not have the
ability to infringe on crucial political freedoms such as freedom of expression,
organization, or opinion (e.g. Hadenius 1992: 28–32; Sartori 1987: 86–130). A third
category, again, consists of authors who choose to include indicators of democratic
output into the definition of democracy. In line with this view, mainly advocated
by Marxist political theorists, the quality of democracy can be assessed in terms of
the goods it produces (e.g. Macpherson 1984).
Definitions falling under the first and third categories suffer from serious
shortcomings. The problem with the minimal definition is precisely that it is too
minimalistic. True, popular elections are an essential feature of democracy but in
order to be meaningful from a democratic point of view the elective element
needs to be complemented with basic freedoms such as freedom of expression and
freedom of organization. In other words, simply focusing on the electoral element
without paying attention to the environment in which parties and voters function
is clearly insufficient and Hadenius’ (1992: 30) notion that ‘[a]‌popular government
without liberties is only a sham democracy’ is therefore hard to refute. Regarding
definitions falling within the third category, again, they all revert to the fallacy of
incorporating (possible) effects of democracy into the defining characteristics of
the phenomenon in question (e.g. Elvander 1975: 33–38; 116–23; Sartori 1987;
Boström 1988: 182; Anckar 2007: 10–12). The basic criticism that can be launched
against such content-based definitions is that they include among democracies

governments which have not been popularly elected but provide, say, high levels of
GDP or low levels of infant mortality.
Within the framework of the present study, I use, as a point of departure,
Hadenius’ (1992: 9) basic formulation of ‘political democracy’, which states that
‘[p]‌ublic policy is to be governed by the freely expressed will of the people whereby
all individuals are to be treated as equals’. This definition includes three essential
features of democracy: self-determination, the principle of freedom, and the principle of
equality. Admittedly, these three principles conflict with each other to some extent.
For instance, carried to its extreme, the principle of self-determination means that
the population of a political unit is free to make any political decision it desires.
In other words, if 51 percent of the population voted in favour of law which
obligated all persons of a certain colour to serve as slaves for the rest of their lives,
this law would be fully in concordance with the principle of self-determination
(provided, of course, that we accept majority rule as the principle of exercising
self-determination).
In order to remedy this shortcoming, Hadenius (1992: 29) introduces the pro-
tection of rights into the defining characteristics of democracy, remarking that ‘in
order to safeguard the principle of democratic freedom, the principle of popular
sovereignty is waived’. Certain political decisions (Hadenius explicitly mentions
restrictions in freedom of expression) are thereby ‘off-limits’ for the government of
a democratic polity. Since democratic decision-making in practice is equated with
majority rule, it is of particular importance that the rights of minorities are secured
and the risk of the tyranny of the majority is reduced.
In the theoretical part of the study, where the ambition is to link religion to
democracy, I will therefore pay attention to what extent the different religions
are compatible with the three fundamental principles of democracy, namely self-
determination, egalitarianism, and liberalism. In addition, I shall pay regard to the
extent to which the religions in question relate to the protection of the funda-
mental rights of the citizens.
Now, each of the criteria outlined above comprises a wide variety of features which
can be used in order to assess the level of democracy in society. When operational-
izing democracy, I once again follow the strategy applied by Hadenius (1992: 36–
71), whose operational indicators of democracy fall within two important arenas,
elections and political liberties. One of the most widely used sources that account
for the existence of political freedoms and elections is Freedom House’s annually
conducted survey on political rights and civil liberties (www.freedomhouse.org).
This source combines the quantitative approach with a qualitative one. In terms of
political rights as well as civil liberties, countries are graded on an ordinal scale ran-
ging from 1 to 7, where low values express high levels of rights or liberties whereas
high values denote a lack of these qualities. In addition, , countries are classified into
three categories, namely ‘free’, ‘partly free’, and ‘not free’.
In the present study, democracy will be treated as both a qualitative and a quan-
titative phenomenon. With regard to the qualitative dimension, Freedom House’s
three categories of ‘free’, ‘partly free’, and ‘not free’ will be used as such. Countries
classified as ‘free’ are classified as democracies and countries classified as ‘not free’
are considered to be autocracies. Countries labelled ‘partly free’ are situated within
the category semi-democracies. Concerning the quantitative dimension, Freedom
House’s values on political rights and civil liberties will be added, whereby an index
of democracy ranging from 2 to 14 will be obtained. However, in order to facilitate
the interpretation of the statistical analyses I shall, in all correlation and regression
analyses, make use of a reversed scale of political rights and civil liberties, ranging
from 0 to 12 where low values denote low levels of democracy and high values high
degrees of democracy.
Since it is evident that the association between religion and democracy can vary
over time, it is necessary to conduct the empirical analyses in different time settings
and thereafter compare the results obtained within these periods. When choosing
the time settings I have been compelled to consider both theoretical and practical
circumstances. In the first edition of the book, I measured the association between
religion and democracy in the year 2009 (religious adherence rates reflected the
situation in 2005). When choosing the other points in time I first paid attention
to the fact that democracy had gained widespread popularity during the last three
decades in particular. It is not an overstatement to say that democracy is currently
gaining (many would argue has already gained) status as the only legitimate form
of government by the world community. Today, both international organizations
as well as individual countries tend to engage in actions promoting democracy in
Third World countries to an extent not foreseeable three decades ago. Also, the
granting of foreign aid to these countries is more and more being made conditional
on democratic reforms being taken in the same countries (Decalo 1992; Green and
Kohl 2007).
Based on the discussion conducted above, it seemed reasonable to choose as
another point in time a year that preceded what has been referred to as ‘the fourth
wave of democratization’ (e.g. McFaul 2002: 212–44), i.e. the process of democ-
ratization that began with the fall of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe.
I therefore chose to conduct empirical analyses for the year 1985. The reason for
this was an expectation that diffusion patterns explained a significantly lesser part
of the variation in the degree of democracy in 1985 than in 2009. The empir-
ical evidence at hand (Anckar 2006) shows that a well-established determinant of
democracy like socioeconomic development lost a great deal of its explanatory
power between 1985 and 2004. This is, no doubt, a consequence of the fact that
democracy during the last decades has been ‘exported’ to poor countries such as
Benin and Namibia, and thus planted in soil, which, according to the moderniza-
tion theory, should be infertile. Finally, I chose, as the earliest point in time, the year
1972, which is the first year for which Freedom House data exist. In addition, this
point in time nicely precedes Huntington’s (1991) third wave of democratization
that began in 1974. In the present version of the book, these points in time will be
complemented with statistical analyses of the relation between the latest figures of
religious affiliation used in the first edition (2005) and the level of democracy in
2019. However, in order to restrict the number of tabular presentations, results of

these analyses will mostly be discussed in text excerpts and notes.
Let us then turn to the second dependent variable, democratic stability, which
naturally must be measured over time and in order to do so, I shall make use of
an index of democratic stability. When assessing the level of democratic stability,
the first question we have to tackle concerns the period of time during which
the level of democratic stability should be measured. In the first version of the
book, I measured the degree of democratic stability during the whole time period
covered by Freedom House, i.e. from 1972 to 2009. In the present version, the time
period is extended and now covers the years 1972 to 2019. As a point of departure,
I have taken into account the number of changes between the three categories
Freedom House apply, namely ‘free’, ‘partly free’, and ‘not free’, that each country
has undergone in the period between 1972 and 2019.
Two aspects are of particular importance when we discuss democratic stability.
The first one concerns the length of the period during which a democratic regime
has been in power in a country. Evidently, a country that has been listed as free in
Freedom House’s survey for the whole time period covered by Freedom House
(48 years) should be regarded as a more stable democracy than a country that has
only been a democracy for, say, 15 years. This is not enough, however. Additionally,
it is necessary to also account for the difference between semi-democracies and
autocracies. A country which has been democratic for a period of 15 years and
semi-democratic for a period of 33 years should be considered a more stable dem-
ocracy than a country which has been democratic for 15 years but autocratic for
33 years. I therefore make use of a measure of democratic longevity, which will be
calculated according to the following formula:
Number of years during which a country has been democratic within the time
period 1972–2019 +
number of years during which a country has been semi-democratic within the
time period 1972–2019 * 0.5.
When assessing the degree of democratic stability, it is necessary to also take into
account the number of regime changes that have occurred during the relevant time
period. Imagine, for instance, a situation where two countries, A and B, both have
had a democratic regime for 15 years during the time period 1972–2019. Let us
further assume that in country A there has been one change of regime, namely from
autocracy to democracy in 1995, whereas country B has experienced four regime
changes, from semi-democracy to autocracy in 1973, from autocracy to democracy
in 1975, from democracy to autocracy in 1981, and from autocracy to democracy
in 2001. In this case, it clearly makes sense to regard the situation in country A as
more stable than in country B.
Of course, if our ambition was to measure the degree of regime stability in a given
country, every change in the political regime would be of equal importance. Here,
however, I am only interested in assessing the degree of democratic stability, which

means that changes in the direction from autocracy to democracy ought not to be
considered. In other words, we are solely concerned with democratic failures, not
autocratic failures.
The magnitude of the regime change must also be taken into consideration. Now,
I operate with three categories of political systems and it is consequently pos-
sible to identify six theoretical combinations of regime change.These combinations
are presented below. As mentioned above, when calculating the number of regime
changes, I pay regard only to paths 1, 2, and 3. It is clear that the second path, a direct
change from democracy to autocracy, is a more fundamental change of regime than
variants 1 and 3, i.e. a change from democracy to semi-democracy, or, alternatively,
from semi-democracy to autocracy. Therefore, a regime change from democracy to
autocracy will be weighted in relation to the other two variants of regime change.
1. Democracy → Semi-democracy
2. Democracy → Autocracy
3. Semi-democracy → Autocracy
4. Semi-democracy → Democracy
5. Autocracy → Semi-democracy
6. Autocracy → Democracy
We must, however, be aware of the fact that a significant proportion of the coun-
tries of the world became independent later than 1972 and for these countries it
is natural to only consider the years during which the countries in question have
been independent.When calculating the degree of democratic stability I have made
use of the following formula:
 Democratic longevity 1972 − 2019 

 years of independence 1972 − 2019 
 Number of non-democratic regime changes 
 Years of independence 1972 − 2019  + 1
When applying the formula, a regime change directly from democracy to autocracy
is calculated as two regime changes. The index ranges between 0.00 and 1.00. The
maximum value, 1.00, refers to a situation where a country has been a democracy
during its whole period of independence and has experienced no non-democratic
regime changes. Similarly, a country which has never received the classification ‘free’
or ‘partly free’ on Freedom House’s scale during the relevant period of time receives
the value 0.00.
When using the formula above, countries which have been independent for
a very short period of time and classified as ‘free’ during this whole time period
receive the highest possible value on the degree of democratic stability. Of course,
it is doubtful to consider a country like Lithuania, which has been independent
since 1991 and classified as ‘free’ during the whole time period, as stable a democ-
racy as Sweden, which has received the same classification since 1972. Still, I would
argue that it is even more dubious to consider Lithuania as less stable a democracy
than Sweden with reference to Lithuania’s past as an (unwilling) Soviet republic.
Classifying Lithuania as democratically less stable than Sweden also makes it diffi-
cult to reach correct conclusions regarding the relation between religion and dem-
ocracy since the dominating religion in Lithuania (Catholicism) is another than
the dominating religion in the country from which Lithuania emerged as an inde-
pendent state. In other words, we would reach the conclusion that Protestantism
(Sweden) yields higher levels of democratic stability than Catholicism (Lithuania)
but this conclusion would disregard the fact that Catholicism was not the dominant
religion in the political entity of which Lithuania formed a part before 1991. Let it
nevertheless be clearly stated that in practical terms, the problem is not very serious
since there are very few young nations which have been classified as ‘free’ during
the whole period of their existence.
Controlling extraneous variance

Although the purpose of the present book is to link religion to democracy, we
cannot escape the fact that a number of external factors can intervene in the relation
between religion and democracy. Throughout the years, a number of explanations
of democracy or democratization have been put forward and within the frame-
work of the present study, it is necessary to include these as control variables. In the
following section I shall introduce a number of factors which have been introduced
as plausible determinants of democracy in the literature (see also Anckar 2008: 433–
37). Admittedly, since space does not allow a thorough exposition of the theoretical
arguments that link these phenomena to democracy, the presentation will be rather
scanty and readers with a keen interest in how the causal mechanisms are thought
to operate in detail are consequently advised to turn to the sources mentioned in
the texts.
Socioeconomic development
Of all the explanations for democracy that have been put forward throughout the
decades, Lipset’s (1959) study, in which he related democratic stability to socio-
economic development, is, without any doubt, the most influential one. According
to Lipset, economic wealth is a prerequisite for a democratic form of government.
In this causal chain, the link between economic prosperity and the level of edu-
cation is crucial. An economic surplus makes it possible to enhance the level of
education for the great masses, which, in turn means that a large proportion of the
population develops the capacity to make rational decisions and also enhances the
level of tolerance for other people’s divergent opinions. Also, as the general level of
education among the population grows, the elite becomes more receptive towards
the opinion of the masses.
Lipset further claimed that the risk of oligarchy and tyranny diminishes with
growing wealth.
[O]‌nly in a wealthy society in which relatively few citizens lived in real pov-
erty could a situation exist in which the mass of the population could intelli-
gently participate in politics and could develop the self-restraint necessary to
avoid succumbing to the ideals of irresponsible demagogues.
Lipset (1959: 75)
Modernization also affects the class structure in society. The emergence of a broad
middle class is of foremost importance, since this group in particular is expected
to cherish factors such as security and stability and also have a moderate political
outlook (Lipset 1959: 83; Karvonen 1997: 30). The growing wealth makes group
identification more complex, which, in turn, is likely to promote democracy since
‘[m]‌ultiple and politically inconsistent affiliations and loyalties are stimuli that
serve to reduce the emotion and aggressiveness involved in political choice’ (Lipset
1959: 96).
Lipset also touched upon today’s so popular link between a functioning civil
society and democracy. According to Lipset (1959: 84–85), ‘men who belong to
associations are more likely to hold democratic opinions on questions concerning
tolerance and party systems, and are more likely to participate in the political pro-
cess’. It is, however, important to emphasize that Lipset regarded the voluntary
organizations as an intermediate variable in the causal chain between development
and democracy. With the growing wealth in society, resources (time, money) are
released, thus making it possible for the population to engage in voluntary organ-
izational work.
The link between democracy and various measures of development has sub-
sequently been retested a number of times in varying contexts (Cutright 1963;
Needler 1967; Olsen 1968; Bollen 1979, 1983; Vanhanen 1990; Hadenius 1992;
Diamond 1992; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Barro 1999;Teorell 2010; Knutsen
et al. 2019). To make a very long story short, the empirical evidence tends to
support Lipset’s thesis, although his general theory has been qualified and improved
in a number of respects. For instance, it has been argued that economic develop-
ment enhances democratic stability, but does not in itself bring about a democratic
form of government (Przeworski and Limongi 1997); that the relation between
economic development and democracy is of a non-linear nature (Arat 1988); and
that not economic development per se but rather an egalitarian income structure is
crucial for democracy (Muller 1995).
We can then turn to the question of how socioeconomic development should
be operationalized. Within the framework of the present study I have chosen to
make use of one of the most widely applied indicators of development, namely
GDP per capita. Admittedly, the phenomenon of socioeconomic development also
incorporates dimensions that are not purely economic and a number of other
indicators of development could be used as well. GDP per capita, however, has
one crucial advantage in comparison with many other indicators, namely that data
are fairly well comparable across time and space. In contrast with many other pos-
sible measures of socioeconomic development, data are available for all countries
in the world at all points in time. Substituting GDP with another widely used
measure of socioeconomic development, the Human Development Index, would,
for instance, reduce the number of cases and thereby render comparisons across
time difficult.
Ethnolinguistic fragmentation
As is well known, Stein Rokkan, in particular, argued that the formation and struc-
ture of divisions help to explain a wide variety of social and political phenomena
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Although migration has increased tremendously during
the last century, there are still huge differences with regard to the ethnic structures
of societies. Whereas some countries, like Japan and the two Koreas, are ethnically
highly homogeneous, others, like Belgium, Brazil, and Malaysia, incorporate many
different ethnic groups.
The theoretical reasoning underlying the causal link between ethnolinguistic
fragmentation and democracy is based on a rather simple assumption that kin
groups favour group members over non-members. It is not unreasonable to argue,
as does van den Berghe (1981: 7–19), that the assumption could be extended to also
cover ethnic groups. If this is indeed the case, the ethnic structure is likely to affect
the level of political stability in a country. In countries marked by ethnic division,
every ethnic group will at first hand promote its own interest and as a consequence
thereof, conflicts based on ethnic lines are likely to break out.There is, indeed, some
evidence to support the view that ethnic diversity and political violence are linked
to each other (Powell 1982: 51, 154–61).
Based on the aforesaid, it is reasonable to suspect that democracy faces an upward
struggle in societies marked by ethnic tensions. A necessary basic requirement for
democracy is that the inhabitants feel affinity towards each other and express loyalty
to the political unit in which they live (Rustow 1970: 350–52; Hadenius 1992: 112).
This is far from always the case in ethnically divided societies. Cleavages along
ethnic (or religious) lines are particularly harmful from a democratic point of view
since they tend to bring about a situation where group loyalties surpass loyalties to
the state. In ethnically divided societies the ethnic cleavages are often politicized.
Political parties are formed on the basis of ethnic cleavages instead of ideological
differences, thus giving rise to ‘an increasingly intransigent political culture where
compromises and coalitions between groups are well-nigh impossible to attain’
(Hadenius 1992: 113).
The negative link between ethnic fragmentation and democracy has been veri-
fied in a number of studies (Hannan and Carroll 1981; Vanhanen 1990: 104–17;
Hadenius 1992: 112–18, 143–44; Clague et al. 2001: 28–29, 31) but there is also
empirical evidence that contradicts these findings (e.g. Gerring et al. 2018). It
should be asserted, however, that ‘ethnicity’ is concept which is extremely difficult
to operationalize. For a long time,‘ethnicity’ and ‘race’ were synonymous, but during
the last decades ‘ethnicity’ has been stretched and now often incorporates language,
national origin, and even religion as well. Since it is more or less impossible to come
up with a universal definition of ‘race’, I have chosen to focus on linguistic cleavages
only. Admittedly, it is far from always easy to separate a language from a dialect, but
on the whole, the task is much easier than trying to define ethnicity in terms of
race. The level of ethnic fragmentation has been calculated with reference to Rae
and Taylor’s (1970: 24–27) widely applied index of fractionalization, which varies
between 0 (maximal level of homogeneity) and 1 (maximal level of heterogeneity)
and is calculated according to the following formula:
F = 1 − Σpi 2
Where pi is the share of persons belonging to category i.
Colonial heritage
The vast majority of the countries that exist today received their independence
during the twentieth century. To some extent, then, most nations bear a legacy of
another state and it is evident that the countries in question to varying extents have
adopted the norms, values, culture, and traditions of their former mother coun-
tries. This should also be the case regarding the political system and it consequently
makes sense, within the framework of the present study, to also control for the
impact of colonial heritage.
The process of decolonization did not begin until after the Second World War
and by that time, both of the great European colonial powers, Britain and France,
had been stable democracies for a quite a while. However, Britain and France took
different approaches with regard to democracy in their respective colonies.The British
encouraged native participation in the governing process, meaning that the local
elites were made familiar with popular government (Bell 1967; Bollen and Jackman
1985: 445; Weiner 1987: 19–20). In the French colonies, again, local organizations
existed as well but their powers were quite limited (Betts 1991). It should also be
pointed out that whereas the process of independence went smoothly in the British
colonies, this was far from always the case in the French colonies (Hadenius 1992: 130).
Finally, with regard to the main purpose of the study, it is of particular importance to
stress that the British tended to require that their colonies adopted a democratic form
of government before independence was granted (Ghai 1988: 3–4).
The importance of a British colonial legacy for a democratic form of govern-
ment has been verified in a number of studies (Weiner 1987; Muller 1995, 975–79;
Olsson 2009). Results from other studies, however, point in a different direction
(Bernhard et al. 2004; Teorell 2010: 43–45).
Some authors have also maintained that the link between a British colonial heri-
tage and democracy is far from straightforward. Huntington (1984: 206) argued that
not British rule per se but rather the length of the British colonial period was crucial
for the success of democracy. Hadenius (1992: 131–33), too, has put forward the
claim that the length of the colonial period is critical for the success of democracy.
However, his findings indicate that it matters little if the colonial power was Britain
or any other democratic country.Yet another finding suggests that British colonial
heritage alone contains little if any explanatory value when explaining the level of
democracy. Instead, the combination of British or American colonial legacy and
insularity gives rise to high levels of democracy (Anckar 1997).
The operationalization of colonial heritage is not as easy as it might seem at first
hand. Since the bulk of the theoretical and empirical evidence support the view
that a British colonial heritage in particular is likely to pave the way for democ-
racy, it makes sense to operate with a dichotomous variable where countries that
have been under British (or American) colonial rule are given the value 1 and all
other countries the value 0. When classifying countries into these categories, we
should nevertheless also pay attention to the length of the colonial period and the
time that has elapsed since the end of colonial rule. I consequently stipulate that
countries that have been under British or American rule for at least ten consecu-
tive years from the year 1920 to present are regarded as former colonies. A number
of countries, notably the colonies of the defeated European countries in the two
world wars, have been under the rule of several colonial powers during the relevant
time period. In these cases, I have considered the last colonial power as the relevant
one. Finally, regarding the rare cases which have been administered by more than
one country at the same time (e.g.Vanuatu, Libya, and Cameroon), I have relied on
qualitative assessments when deciding whether the country’s British colonial heri-
tage outweighs that of the other colonizing power or not.
Size and insularity

In general, physical factors have played a subordinate role in empirical studies of
democracy or democratization. This is indeed surprising, given the fact that the
theoretical link between size and democracy can be traced back to Ancient Greece,
where Plato (cited in Bratt 1951: 17; Tarkiainen 1959: 76) and Aristotle (1991: 282)
made the claim that small size was a prerequisite for a democratic form of govern-
ment. People living in small units were thought to share a common basis of interest
and also, by necessity, a common destiny. Only in small units, therefore, could a
feeling of interdependence arise and only in small units was it possible for the
population to get together for the purpose of political debating. During the Age
of Enlightenment, similar arguments were raised by Montesquieu (cited in Dahl
and Tufte 1973: 7) and Rousseau (1968: bk. 1, 64) whereas in modern times, Arend
Lijphart (1977: 65–70) has championed the view that small size is conducive for a
consociational form of democracy.
Based on the aforesaid, we would reach the conclusion that smallness should be
intimately linked to democracy. However, the argument that democracy has a better
breeding ground in small units than in large ones does not stand unchallenged. The
prominent figure for the opposing view, that largeness is a virtue and smallness a
vice, is James Madison (Hamilton et al. 1961: 83–84), who maintained that the
threat of the tyranny of the majority is far greater in small units than in large ones,
since the heterogeneity of large units would counteract the emergence of a per-
petual, inconsiderate majority.
Although authors have pondered on the relation between size and democracy
for many centuries, the seminal work in this field of research is Dahl and Tufte’s
Size and Democracy (1973) in which size was linked to democracy through a number
of theoretical connections. It is important to point out, though, that Dahl and
Tufte consistently found arguments both in favour of the view that democracy is
enhanced by small size as well as the ‘Madisonian’ view, that largeness is favourable
for democracy.
Empirical studies of the relation between size and democracy are still surpris-
ingly rare. Although the evidence is far from convincing, it is nevertheless fair to
say that the bulk of the empirical studies that have been conducted support the
view that smallness goes hand in hand with democracy (see Hadenius 1992: 126–
27; Diamond and Tsalik 1999: 117–19; Ott 2000: 115–21; and for contradictory
findings Barro 1999: 167; Gerring and Veenendaal 2020: 339–46).
However, although smallness has been found to correlate with democracy it
appears as if this association to a large extent is explained by another physical factor
which is closely linked to smallness, namely whether the political unit is an island
state or not. In his above-mentioned study, Hadenius (1992: 126) noted that ‘the
effect of the size variables [was] drastically curtailed when an island state (or not)
[was] simultaneously included in the regression’, whereas Ott (2000: 128), on her
part, established that ‘[i]‌slands are found to be significantly associated with every
measure of political democracy’.1
Why, then, would island states in particular exhibit high levels of democracy?
One plausible explanation is that island states share the attribute of being remote and
that remoteness enhances cohesion. All inhabitants of an island share the problems
caused by remoteness and these problems are often considered to be of greater
importance than internal cleavages based on ideology or ethnicity, etc. Therefore,
the decision-making mechanisms of island states can be presumed to reflect a spirit
of solidarity and mutual understanding (Anckar and Anckar 1995).
Islands are also related to democracy through a number of other features. It has,
for instance, been argued that the combination of insularity and smallness is cru-
cial for the emergence and survival of democracy (Lowenthal 1987: 29; Newitt
1992: 16; D. Anckar 2002: 386; Anckar 2003: 380). Yet another line of argument
emphasizes the fact that island states often exhibit two other features which are
likely to enhance the levels of democracy, namely a British colonial heritage and
the dominance of Protestantism (Hadenius 1992: 126–27).
Now since size and insularity are heavily intertwined (a very large share of
the smallest countries in the world are islands) we cannot, due to problems of
multicollinearity, include both size and insularity among the explanatory variables.
Since the bulk of the empirical evidence has suggested that the distinction between
island states and mainland states is more important than size per se, I choose,
within the framework of the present study, to include insularity among the con-
trol variables. The variable is dichotomous; mainland states receive the value 0 and
island states the value 1.
Religious affiliation and democratic values

If, indeed, religion affects the degree of democracy at the system level, we would
expect similar patterns to be discernible at the individual level as well. Given the
lively debate generated by Huntington’s work, it is indeed surprising to learn that
until recently, surprisingly few authors had attempted to measure the association
between religious adherence and democratic values at the lowest possible level of
analysis. In a pioneering effort, Esposito and Mogahed (2008) used survey data from
more than 35 countries dominated by, or with a substantial proportion of, Muslims.
The results indicated, among other things, that although few Muslims lived in
democratic countries, Muslims in general held democracy in high esteem (Esposito
and Mogahed 2008: 29–63). Similar results were reached by Jamal and Tessler (2008)
in a study made up of Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, and Palestine.
In their book Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide (2004), Norris
and Inglehart also paid attention to the relation between religion and democ-
racy. Although the main concern of the authors was to identify determinants and
consequences of secularization, they also discussed the relation between religion
and political values to some extent. In order to measure the dependent variable,
the authors made use of data from the World Values Survey and European Values
Study. Based on the questionnaires, they created four variables: democratic perform-
ance, democratic ideals, religious leadership, and strong leadership (Norris and Inglehart
2004: 142–44).
Following Huntington (1996), Norris and Inglehart categorized the countries
of the world into the following religious cultures: Western Christianity, Muslim,
Orthodox, Central European, Latin American, Sinic, Sub-Saharan African, Hindu,
and Japanese. The independent variable reflected whether or not the respondents
lived within each of the above-mentioned religious cultures or not (Norris and
Inglehart 2004: 139–42). The results clearly contradict Huntington’s assumption of
a clash of civilizations. The authors found ‘no significant differences between the publics
living in the West and in Muslim religious cultures in approval of how democracy works in
practice, in support for democratic ideals, and in approval of strong leadership’ (Norris and
Inglehart 2004: 146, italics in original). However, people living in Muslim settings
showed stronger support for religious authorities than people living in the West
(Norris and Inglehart 2004: 146–47). The authors further noted that support for
democracy was low in Central and Eastern Europe and in Latin America, whereas
support for strong government was high in Sinic/Confucian states (Norris and
Inglehart 2004: 146).
Analysing data from the fourth wave of the World Values Survey, Thorleif
Pettersson (2009: 256) reached the conclusion that, on the whole, Muslims were
more critical towards democracy than Christians. However, he also noted that Arab
Muslims were considerably more positively disposed towards a religious impact on
politics than European Catholics, European Protestants, and non-Arab Muslims.
Furthermore, he noted that religious involvement was positively linked to critical
attitudes towards democracy among European Catholics but not among Muslims
or European Protestants. Finally, he was able to show that religious commitment
was positively linked to a favourable view of a religious impact on politics among
Christians, whereas among Muslims, the relationship between religious involve-
ment and preferences for a religious impact on politics was negative (Pettersson
2009: 256–57).
In yet another study encompassing Palestine, Morocco, Algeria, and Egypt,
Mark Tessler (2002) assessed the effects of Islamic attachment on attitudes towards
democracy. His conclusion was that pro-democratic attitudes were insensitive to
variations in Islamic attachment (also Tessler et al. 2012). In a binary comparative
study incorporating Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, Richard Rose (2002), on his part,
accounted for both the impact of religious adherence and the degree of religious
observance on democratic values. His results showed that in both countries, neither
dimension of religion had any significant impact on the attitudes towards dem-
ocracy. These results were subsequently confirmed by Hofmann (2004), who in a
study encompassing eight countries rejected the hypothesis that Muslims supported
democracy to a lesser extent than Christians. Instead, he found that democracy was
more highly esteemed among Muslim respondents than among Eastern Orthodox
respondents.
One of the lessons that can be learnt from Hofmann’s study is the importance
of paying regard to the context in which individuals live when assessing the impact
of religious adherence on democratic values. When Hofmann (2004: 662–63)
introduced country-dummies into his regression model, the t-value for the variable
religious denomination decreased markedly, from 11.81 to 3.23.2 In other words,
his results showed that country-specific variables carry more importance than reli-
gion when explaining pro-democratic sentiments. Accordingly, when assessing the
relation between religion and democracy at the individual level it is extremely
important to pay regard to the context in which the respondents are situated.
It must be emphasized though that this is not accomplished simply by the use
of country labels as variables (Przeworski and Teune 1970). If, for instance, we note
that the best predictor for a political phenomenon is the variable ‘France’, this
finding remains theoretically uninteresting until we can pinpoint the relevant char-
acteristic hidden behind the country label that accounts for the explanatory power
of ‘France’.
The aforesaid is of high relevance for the present study. I argue that the choice of
the contexts in which religious affiliation will be related to democratic values must
be grounded in theory. In other words, we should have a well-justified notion that
the relation between the independent and the dependent variable takes different
forms in different contextual settings. One obvious contextual factor that should
be accounted for is the religious environment in which the individual lives. It is
reasonable to suspect that the dominant religion in a country plays an important

role in shaping political attitudes also for persons of smaller religious groupings in
the same country. In other words, we would, under the premise that Huntington
is correct, expect that a person of Christian faith, living in Protestant-dominated
Norway, holds democratic values in high esteem, whereas a Christian living in
Muslim-dominated Iraq does not hail the principles of democracy to the same
extent. Similarly, for a Muslim living in Syria it is much less complicated to live in
accordance with the guidelines of Islam than it is for his or her coreligionist living
in Belgium.
Another contextual factor that is likely to affect the values of the individuals
is the political system of the country in which respondents live. It is reasonable
to expect that democratic values are more firmly rooted among persons living in
democracies than among persons living in autocratic or semi-democratic states.
The democratic transitions in Eastern Europe have shown that democratic values
take a long time to root (Diamond 1999: 174) and similar conclusions have been
reached in Latin America as well (Diamond 1999: 179–83). We would therefore
expect that an individual who has lived all of his or her life in a stable democracy
holds this form of government in high esteem, whereas, for instance, a disillusioned
person, living in a young semi-democracy, might long for the old familiar authori-
tarian rule.
It is important to emphasize that my approach is different from that of Norris
and Inglehart (2004) and similar to Hofmann’s (2004). In other words, when oper-
ationalizing the independent variable I shall not make use of the religious setting
in which the respondent lives. Instead, the religious affiliation of the respondent is
used as a measure of religious adherence. This approach makes it possible to empir-
ically assess the effects of both the religious affiliation of the respondent and the
context in which he or she lives on democratic values.
Therefore, the assessment of the influence of religion on democratic values will
be conducted with reference to two contextual settings, religious dominance and
political system. Theoretically, both of these contexts are multidimensional and the
question is therefore how each of them should be broken down to best suit the
purpose of the study. Regrettably, it is not possible to conduct the categorization
only with regard to theoretical considerations. The most serious problem we are
faced with is the scarcity of survey data for many countries of the world. Luckily
enough, the World Values Survey in particular nowadays covers a sufficiently large
number of countries to allow comparisons across political systems and continents.
At the same time it should be clearly spelled out that for the majority of the coun-
tries of the world, data are still lacking, or at best hard to find. Combining the two
dimensions of interest, dominant religion and political system, yields a number of
possible constellations, shown in Table 1.1.
In the religious settings I have included all religions which have a plurality of
adherents in at least one country during the time period covered by the study. The
categories can, in principle at least, be further split up among the branches of the
different religions. Analyses of available survey data could then take place within
TABLE 1.1 Theoretical contextual settings for survey analyses of the impact of religious
affiliation on democratic values
Dominant religion Autocracy Semi-democracy Democracy
Christianity
Islam
Buddhism
Hinduism
Ethnoreligions
Chinese folk religions
Judaism
each of the cells. For instance, in the uppermost cell on the left, we would assess
the attitudes towards democracy of Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, and so on in
authoritarian countries where the plurality of the population adheres to Christianity.
Similar analyses among the same religious groups would then be conducted within
all cells and the results could thereafter be compared across the cells.
Now, this is what we would do in a perfect world. In reality, many of the cells are
empty (there are, for instance no authoritarian or semi-democratic countries where
the plurality of the population adheres to Judaism). Another problem concerns
the fact that within many categories the countries are highly heterogeneous in a
number of respects. This, of course, means that systemic factors other than religion
and political system can influence the outcome of the analyses. To take an extreme
example, if the plurality criterion is used to define Protestant domination, the cat-
egory of Protestant democracies would include countries like Sweden, Bahamas,
Papua New Guinea, and the Marshall Islands. A sensible solution would therefore
be to also include the regional dimension in the categorization.The drawback with
this strategy, however, is that the number of categories is increased to such an extent
that the majority of the cells will be empty.
We should not, however, exaggerate the problems associated with this strategy
of analysis. A thorough exposition of the data available reveals that when data from
the World Values Survey are complemented with various regionally conducted
surveys, the variation in terms of religion, political system, and geography is quite
satisfactory. Admittedly, the socioeconomically developed democracies are over-
represented in the material, but the number of non-democracies in the developing
world is sufficiently large to render possible meaningful statistical analyses.
In the empirical analyses conducted at the individual level, I shall primarily
make use of aggregated data from the European Values Study (EVS) and World
Values Surveys (WVS), conducted between 1995 and 2020. In the first edition of
this book, I used data from the second and third wave of the EVS and from the
third, fourth, and fifth waves of the WVS. Here, I add a separate analysis based on
data from the fifth (EVS) and seventh (WVS) round of surveys, conducted between
2017 and 2020. The operationalization of the independent variable is relatively
unproblematic. Question FO25 is framed in the following form: Do you belong to a

religion or a religious denomination? If yes, which one?. This categorical variable will be
used to determine the religious affiliation of the respondents. In order to account
for the difference between non-believers and believers, I have made use of question
F034, which is framed accordingly: Independently of whether you attend religious ser-
vices or not, would you say you are (1) a religious person, (2) not a religious person, (3) an
atheist?. In the analyses, respondents who state that they are not religious or atheists
are classified as secular.3
The dependent variable is somewhat more problematic to operationalize.
Norris and Inglehart (2004: 142–43) have emphasized the importance of separ-
ating questions concerning the ideals of democracy from questions that relate to
the performance of the democratic system. Since the theoretical discussion has
focused on the compatibility of different religions with democratic ideals, it is nat-
ural to pay regard to those questions in the survey that measure the extent to which
respondents adhere to the ideals of democracy. Accordingly, I make use of response
rates to question E117, which measures the extent to which respondents approve
of ‘having a democratic political system’. Now, since democracy is a particularly
problematic concept in the sense that it is emotionally charged and respondents
presumably give very different meanings to it, I have complemented this question
with a more concrete question which measures preference for authoritarian power
structures, namely question E114, where respondents are asked if they approve of
‘having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections’
(see also Norris and Inglehart 2004: 143–44).
Notes
1 For further evidence of the importance of insularity as an explanatory factor of democ-
racy, the reader is referred to Anckar (2008) and Gerring and Veenendaal (2020: 344–46).
2 Hofmann does not present t-values in his tables but they can be calculated by dividing the
B-coefficient by its standard error.
3 In the earlier waves, the questions were formulated somewhat differently.
2
RELATING RELIGION TO DEMOCRACY
Introduction: Religion and politics

The present work started with a reference to Philpott (2007), in which he expressed
concerns that the relationship between religion and politics had received only mar-
ginal interest among political scientists. A decade and a half later, it is safe to say that
the topic is no longer a neglected one. The growing interest in the field of research
is a reflection of the increasing role religion has come to play in politics in recent
years. In Haynes’ (2016: xv) words, ‘religion is now much more socio-politically sig-
nificant today compared to half a century ago’. What is especially remarkable is the
fact that the increasing role of religion in politics coalesces with decreasing levels of
religiosity. It is easy to concur with Tepe’s (2008: 2) observation that ‘this remark-
able capacity of religion to maintain its influence … at a time when the conditions
would seem to be the most inimical constitutes one of the most puzzling aspects of
world politics today’.
The so-called secularization paradigm postulated that as the process of modern-
ization went on, the importance of religion was expected to gradually wither away
and its role was to be restricted to the private sphere. As we know, a number of
occurrences that have taken place in different corners of the globe during the last
40 years contradict this paradigm. Let me here only mention the Islamic revolution
in Iran in 1979, the increasing importance of Christian evangelicalism in US pol-
itics, the growing influence of Hindu nationalism in India, and last but certainly not
least, various examples of violent Islamic extremism in all continents of the world.
As secularization theory has lost its dominant position, authors have focused
more attention towards the role religion plays in explaining political outcomes
in different parts of the world. Accordingly, there has been a ‘religious resurgence’
in the research field of international relations, ‘reflected not only in the prolifer-
ation of studies focusing on the rise of religious violence … but also in efforts
DOI: 10.4324/9781003153566-2
26 Relating religion to democracy
more generally to locate religion in IR itself as one of the constitutive elements

of the discipline’ (Shani 2016: 307, emphasis omitted). A similar trend is observ-
able in comparative politics as well. Here, a popular way to approach the relation
between religion and society has been to focus on secularization. By applying a
constitutional perspective, it has, for instance, been possible to compare countries
on the basis of the extent to which religion is separated from the public sphere
(Fox 2008). Another possibility is to make use of an individual perspective, and, for
instance, account for political effects of variations in shares of non-believers among
the countries of the world (Norris and Inglehart 2012).
With regard to the religion–democracy nexus, the role of political parties is
often crucial and it is therefore natural that the role of religious parties has begun
to attract wide attention. Ozzano (2013) identifies five ideal types of religious
parties, namely Conservative, Progressive, Nationalist, Fundamentalist, and Camp parties.
As it turns out, prospects for successful democratization is strongly dependent on
how religious interests are articulated through the party system. Whereas progres-
sive and conservative religious parties tend to be favourable to democracy, the
opposite holds true for nationalist and fundamentalist religious parties (Ozzano
and Cavatorta 2013).
In the contribution at hand, focus is explicitly on the relation between reli-
gion and democracy. The aim is not only to test the proposition that religion per se
matters for democratization, but also, and primarily, test the argument that different
religions create different conditions for a democratic form of government. With
the erosion of the secularization theory, Huntington’s view that cultural (mainly
religious) cleavages will become more relevant for explaining conflicts has become
more topical than ever. Consequently, it is necessary to dwell deeper into the
question of whether there are dogmatic differences between the religions in terms
of their compatibility with democratic fundaments; the rest of this chapter will be
devoted to this exercise.
Christianity
Origin, dispersion, and central teachings
Christianity originates from Judaism, from which it departed as a separate religion
during the first century. With the number of adherents exceeding 2 billion and
represented in all the corners of the world, it is the largest of the world religions.
The holy scripture of Christianity is the Bible, which consists of two parts, the Old
Testament and the New Testament. The Old Testament corresponds more or less
to the Jewish Tanakh, whereas the New Testament narrates the life and teachings
of Jesus Christ, who is said to have been conceived by a holy spirit and born
by a Jewish virgin named Mary. Jesus is estimated to have lived in what today is
known as Israel/Palestine between about 4 bce and about 29–32 ce (MacCulloch
2009: 82–83). During his life, Jesus preached his central message, the restoration
of God’s kingdom, and also performed a number of miracles. However, he also
Relating religion to democracy 27
managed to provoke the anger of the rulers of Israel and was crucified by the
Romans in his early to mid-thirties.
The two most important Scriptures of Christianity differ in many respects. The
texts of the Old Testament were originally compiled in Hebrew between the fourth
century bce and c.100 ce, whereas the New Testament was written in Greek and
dates back to the first century (Bailey 2006: 25–27; Reichert 2006: 170). The life,
death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ are described in the four gospels of the New
Testament. The Apostle Paul (Saul), whose writings, consisting of thirteen ‘letters’,
are included in the New Testament, is generally regarded as the most important
interpreter of Christianity.
The doctrine of the trinity, according to which God is one totality but takes
the shape of father, son, or holy spirit, is a central feature of Christianity. This, how-
ever, does not mean that Christians worship three different gods. Christians make
an important point in stressing the fact that Christianity, like Judaism and Islam, is
monotheistic; in other words, there is only one God but he can appear in different
shapes. The monotheism of Christianity is, however, sometimes challenged by Jews
and Muslims, who claim that the principle of oneness of God is violated by the
doctrine of the trinity.
Christians believe that Jesus Christ was the son of God and the prophesied
Messiah of the Old Testament. The concept of salvation is central for Christians,
who believe that Jesus, by his death, took upon him all the sins of mankind and
thus saved humanity from eternal damnation. According to Christian belief, Jesus
was resurrected from death and ascended into heaven, but will return to earth to
judge the living and the dead and restore the kingdom of God. Christians believe
that after death, human souls will have access to heaven (eternal life) or hell (eternal
death).
The picture Jesus painted of God radically differed from the one described in the
Old Testament.Whereas the God of the Old Testament is exacting, jealous, and vin-
dictive, the God of Jesus, as described in the New Testament, is merciful and loving.
Especially within the context of the present study, it is also important to emphasize
that Jesus’ kingdom of God was not an earthly, geographically limited kingdom but
a spiritual one.The embryo of this spiritual kingdom, the Christian community, was
formed by Jesus and his twelve disciples.
After the crucifixion of Jesus, Christianity started to spread geographically,
although initially at a rather slow pace. Christians were persecuted from the very
beginning, but when the Roman emperor Nero blamed Christians for the great
fire of Rome in the year 64 ce the persecutions became particularly intensive. The
great turning point for Christianity came in the year 312 ce when the Roman
emperor Constantine I, following his victory at the battle of the Milvian Bridge,
embraced Christianity. Constantine subsequently founded a Christian capital,
Constantinople, for his Roman empire and also summoned the Council of Nicea
in 325 ce. For what it is worth, however, he himself refused to be baptized until he
lay on his death bed (Bowden 2005: 280). The dominant position of Christianity
in the Roman empire was finally assured in 381 ce, when Emperor Theodosius
28 Relating religion to democracy
I established Christianity as the state religion and outlawed all other religions in the
Roman empire.
Branches of Christianity
Categorizing the branches of Christianity is not an easy task. Barrett et al.
(2001: 5) split up Christians into the following four ‘major ecclesiastico-cultural
global megablocs’: Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Anglican, and Protestant. They
go on by adding two categories of Christians, namely Marginal Christians and
Independents (also known by the terms Postdenominationalist and Neo-Apostolic).
The first- mentioned category is made up of Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses,
Christian Scientists, ‘and a host of other bodies characterized by one or both of
these traits: anti-trinitarian or non-trinitarian christology, and the claim to have a
second source of divine revelation in addition to the Bible’ (Barrett et al. 2001: 5).
The latter category consists of those traditions that are ‘separated from, uninter-
ested in, and independent of historic denominationalist Christianity’ (Barrett et al.
2001: 28). Since space is limited it is not possible to account for all the various
branches of Christianity and I therefore only discuss the compatibility of the three
main subdivisions of Christianity, namely Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, and
Protestantism (including a short note on Anglicanism), with democracy.
Roman Catholicism
Although the term ‘Catholicism’ is popularly equated with ‘Roman Catholicism’
there are also a number of Christian sects which fall under the label ‘non-Roman
Catholicism’. Barrett (1982: 70) defines non-Roman Catholics as ‘[o]‌ld Catholics
and others in secessions from the Church of Rome since 1700 in the Western
world, and other Catholic- type sacramentalist or hierarchical secessions from
Protestantism or Anglicanism’. However, since the overall number of non-Roman
Catholics is very small indeed, I shall, within the framework of the present study,
only discuss the relation between Roman Catholicism and democracy.
Roman Catholics form the largest group of Christians and according to the
Catholic view, all Christian denominations are to be regarded as offspring branches
of Catholicism. The apostolic succession, meaning that the lineage of Christian
bishops should be traceable back to the original twelve apostles, plays an important
role in Catholicism. Saint Peter in particular is revered and he is generally regarded as
the primus inter pares among the twelve apostles.The bishop of Rome, the pope, who
functions as the leader of Catholics all over the world, is directly traceable to Saint
Peter. The seven sacraments (baptism, marriage, confirmation, Eucharist, penance,
anointing of the sick, and ordination) also occupy central roles in Catholicism.
The veneration of saints in general, and Mary, the mother of God in particular, is
another distinct feature of this branch of Christianity and deceased persons can be
declared saints by the Holy See through a long process of canonization (e.g. Walls
1997: 135–40).
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an annoying way after the wound is closed. If the operation be
performed for fracture of the skull, should there be an opening
already made by the depression of fragments, it may not be
necessary to use the trephine, but with suitable bone forceps
fragments may be removed or detached. In this case, however, there
are often sharp points of bone which will require removal by cutting
bone forceps, for the surgeon should leave the margin of the bone
opening comfortably round and smooth. Should there be no opening
into which the point of an elevator or of bone forceps can be
inserted, then one should be made; it is for this purpose that the
trephine is mainly used in cases of fracture of the skull. It should now
be applied upon a firm and undetached surface of bone, one which
will bear the pressure necessary in the process of perforation. As
used for this purpose it should be so applied that at least two-thirds
of the circle cut by its teeth will be upon unbroken skull; the
remaining segment of the circle may be over the fractured area. After
it has begun to cut a distinct groove the centre pin should be
withdrawn and the instrument maintained in its position during its
work by a firm and steady hand, which will force it evenly through the
bone and not exercise undue pressure. As the diploë is perforated
the bone-dust becomes soft and bloody and the resistance is
diminished. As the instrument sinks deeper the operator should
frequently intermit its use, and determine his position by means of
the irrigator and of the probe or other instrument. The nearer the
inner surface is approached the more caution must be exercised,
remembering that the bone is likely to be of unequal thickness.
When the skull has been completely perforated at one or two points
around the little circle the operator should introduce the point of an
elevator and pry up the disk of bone, or by rocking the handle of the
trephine he may be able to remove the button with that instrument.
When the operation is performed in the ideal manner the dura is
scarcely touched, certainly not raggedly injured by the teeth of the
instrument (Figs. 386, 387 and 388).
Fig. 386 Fig. 387
Construction of an osteoplastic flap; Division of bone by use of hammer and

bone is exposed; first openings are chisel. (Marion.)
made with a hand trephine or burr.
(Marion.)
Before opening the dura every loose particle of bone and every
splinter should be removed, depressed fragments should be picked
out, and those which are semidetached should be raised to their
proper level. Through the opening thus made the dura is carefully
examined; extradural collections of blood are recognized instantly,
while some idea as to the amount of intracranial tension may be
secured, even through a small opening. Absence of pulsation means
probably the presence of cyst, tumor, or abscess deeper. Edema of
the membranes usually subsides after nicking or opening them. A
yellowish discoloration of the dura often indicates the existence of a
tumor beneath. Nothing abnormal being discovered outside of the
dura, should brain tension be great or should the dura be discolored,
as by blood beneath, the membrane should be opened, by a
triangular or horseshoe flap, and the subdural condition accurately
estimated. In some cases of meningeal hemorrhage clots will be
ejected with some force the instant the dura is opened. In other
cases of intracranial pressure, either from tumor or from
intraventricular hemorrhage, the brain will instantly protrude to such
an extent as to make its reposition difficult or even impossible.
Horsley’s dural separator is exceedingly useful, both outside and
inside the dura, for detecting and separating adhesions, and as a
retractor.
Incisions in the dura should be made, so far as possible, parallel
with its vessels rather than across them. When accessible, dural
vessels can always be secured and tied. Vessels of the pia can also
be picked up and secured with fine catgut ligatures. When the brain
tissue itself is diseased it should be carefully excised. The cortex
itself is not so vascular as to afford much trouble. Upon any portion
of the membranes or cerebral surface a sterilized solution of
adrenalin can be sprayed or applied without hesitation. In all
deliberate operations sinuses are avoided. When exposed or when
necessary to attack them they may be ligated and divided, or may be
packed with tampons of sterilized gauze, or may be seized with
serrefines or light hemostatic forceps, which may be left for a day or
two included within the dressings.
Any of the exposed motor areas or centres can be stimulated,
when desired, if the patient be not too deeply anesthetized, by the
faradic current of mild degree, applied to surfaces which have not
been bathed with antiseptics, nor long exposed to the vapor of the
anesthetic, through a double brain electrode made for the purpose,
or by sterilized probes connected with the battery.
Buttons of bone or chips of the skull may be replaced after suture
of the dura, when desired, though this is seldom advisable. When
fragments are thus to be replaced they should be placed in warm
sterile salt solution at once after removal, and kept warm. When a
button is thus put back the periosteum may be sewed over it with
buried catgut sutures.
The dura should be stitched with fine catgut as closely as possible.
I have often placed beneath the dural opening a piece of gold, silver,
or aluminum-foil, carefully sterilized, with a view to preventing dense
adhesions between the dura and the membrane or cortex beneath. I
have never known it to do harm.
Fig. 388 Fig. 389
Exposure of cortex or of cerebellum after Osteoplastic resection after Wagner.

division of dura. (Marion.) (Chipault.)
Drains and drainage are to be avoided when possible, and should

be removed early, except in cases of abscess. They may be made of
catgut, horse-hair, gauze, rubber, or even of glass, like those short
ones which Kocher inserts after extensive operations, their outer
ends flanged to prevent their slipping beyond control.
Opening the skull, or, in general terms, trephining, is at present
resorted to for the following purposes:
1. For relief of compression—
(a) By depressed bone, as in comminuted or gunshot fracture;
(b) By removal of clot or ligation of vessels;
(c) By evacuation of pus, either from the meningeal cavity or
from a deeper abscess;
(d) By the removal of serous effusions, either extraventricular
or intraventricular.
2. For removal of foreign bodies.
3. For relief of intracranial irritation—e. g., epilepsy, the psychoses,
etc.
4. For removal of tumors.
5. To compensate for defective development.
6. For exploratory or purely empirical reasons, including the
making of “relief openings” for relief of pain, etc.
Aside from the ordinary methods of trephining as applied for
common conditions, modern surgery comprises the resort to
essentially new methods for raising areas of skull of considerable
size and then restoring them to their previous position. These are
ordinarily spoken of as osteoplastic resections, and have added very
materially to the art and resources of the surgeon. These consist, in
a general way, of the formation of a window, as it were, in the vertex
or lateral region of the skull by outlining a quadrangular or horseshoe
flap of scalp, which is detached only for a slight distance around the
incision, after which, by use of the revolving saw or by chisel and
mallet, a groove is cut through the bone running parallel with the
margin of the scalp-flap, but perhaps a centimeter within it. After this
bone area is completely cut through on three sides it is then sprung
up or elevated in such a way as to be broken across the base of the
bone-flap. It is not at all detached nor separated from the scalp, and
so when subsequently lowered into position retains its vitality by
virtue of its vascular connections.
When some particular measure seems indicated in order to atone
for a large defect in bone it has become quite customary to insert
some artificial substitute, mainly either celluloid or a thin aluminum
plate, previously absolutely sterilized and cut at the time into such
shape as may be called for, but a trifle larger than the real defect,
being let in or sprung in, as it were, either completely beneath the
bone or into the bony opening, so as not to be easily detached or slip
out of the way. By this heteroplastic method most admirable results
have been achieved. I have used celluloid for this purpose in the
spinal column also, closing with it the defect which remained after
the extirpation of the sac of a spina bifida. It is rarely necessary to
resort to this practice in the skull, as dense fibrous tissue in due time
firmly protects the endocranial contents from external harm (Figs.
386, 387, 388 and 389).
CHAPTER XXXVII.
THE ORBIT AND ITS ADNEXA; THE EXTERNAL
AUDITORY APPARATUS; THE ACCESSORY
SINUSES; THE CRANIAL AND CERVICAL NERVES;
THE ORBITAL CONTENTS AND ADNEXA.
INJURIES OF THE ORBIT.

Intra-orbital hemorrhage is not uncommon after injuries to the head.
It may result from rupture of orbital vessels proper or by escape of
blood from within the cranium, either outside or beneath the dural
prolongation which constitutes the sheath of the optic nerve. When
extensive it may produce a pulsating tumor, and this may, in time,
become practically a traumatic aneurysm. After basal fractures blood
frequently will escape forward so as to appear beneath the
conjunctiva. Collections of blood in the orbit may also interfere with the
return circulation in such a way as to lead to extensive chemosis of
the conjunctiva or edema of the lids and orbital contents. Pressure
may cause temporary disturbance of vision. Should there be absolute
blindness it may be inferred that there has been injury to some part of
the optic tract. Protrusion of the globe is an indication of the degree
and amount of extra-ocular hemorrhage, which may be very
pronounced. When visual symptoms are bilateral, while external
evidences are confined to one orbital region, it may be assumed that
there has been intracranial disturbance as well, with laceration along
the optic tract. Such immediate damage will in time be followed by the
ordinary symptoms of neuroretinitis and atrophy.
The more external the injury the more quickly will it yield to ice-cold
applications. There are times when incisions for relief of tension may
be desirable. An extensive clot in the orbit which seriously displaces
the eyeball, and which does not quickly absorb, should be evacuated
by an incision, either directly through the lid or beneath the lid and
outside of the globe.
Penetrating injuries, like gunshot wounds, are usually easy of
recognition. If vision be instantly and completely lost the harm done to
the optic nerve or the globe will probably prove irreparable. Foreign
bodies penetrate from various directions, and sometimes to such a
depth that they are difficult to find. I have seen a large chip of wood
completely lost within the orbit, and such bodies may enter either from
outside or from within the nasal cavities. A foreign body will nearly
always limit the motility of the globe and usually displace it. If its
presence can be ascertained or revealed before operation it should be
sought and removed at the expense of almost any and every other
indication. If its presence be suspected it may be sought for, even
though a skiagram fail to reveal it. When the usefulness of the eye is
destroyed it will be advisable in such case to remove it in the progress
of this search.
Aside from the traumatic hematomas above mentioned
extravasation occurs, due to constitutional or vascular disease, as
atheroma, especially when coupled with violent straining efforts.
Subconjunctival effusion and exophthalmos, with limitation of motion,
will be unfailing expressions of such damage. Orbital aneurysms,
spontaneous or traumatic, are occasionally seen. They will cause a
more or less pulsating exophthalmos, while, in some instances, a bruit
may be detected with the stethoscope. Cases may be imagined where
it would be suitable to cut away the external wall of the orbit and
expose such a tumor. Ordinarily, however, ligature of the internal or
common carotid will be required. Angiomas occur also in the orbit,
producing exophthalmos, usually without pulsation. Such tumors will
prove compressible and the globe may be gently pressed backward
into the orbit to immediately protrude again when pressure is
removed. These lesions will prove very difficult, usually impossible of
treatment, and no general rule can be made therefor.
Orbital cellulitis, i. e., infection of the cellular and other tissues in the
orbit, may occur, either from without or from within, but usually in
connection with some traumatism. Sometimes this involves first the
cornea or the structures of the globe; at other times infection is by a
more direct method, through the conjunctival sac or the orbital
coverings. It varies in intensity between extreme limits. It may even be
bilateral. While cases occasionally undergo resolution it usually
terminates by formation of abscess. It is met with in the infectious
fevers, in facial erysipelas, by extension upward of infection from
diseased teeth, after primary infection of the ethmoidal or sphenoidal
sinuses, or by extension from external phlegmons. There will be
edema of the lids, usually with chemosis, fixation and protrusion of the
eyeball, commonly with divergence. In proportion to the severity of the
lesion there will be present septic symptoms, with deep-seated pain
and headache. Vision is disturbed in proportion to the pressure upon
the nerve and globe, as well as the involvement of the ocular
structures proper. When the disease is begun within the eye it will
usually terminate by a combination of panophthalmitis with orbital
abscess.
Treatment.—The application of the compound ichthyol or Credé’s
silver ointment, with ice, preceded perhaps by the use of
leeches, will be suitable local treatment unless the presence of pus be
distinctly made out or until tension threaten serious harm. In either of
these events, however, free incisions are required at points of greatest
tension, the knife being so directed as to avoid the globe. These
incisions should be free and sufficiently deep. Should there be
accompanying panophthalmitis the eyeball itself should be freely
incised through its anterior aspect and its contents completely
evacuated. Such emptying of the contents of the sclerotic is called
evisceration of the globe. While theoretically indicated, experience has
shown that it is a disastrous practice to enucleate the eye at such a
time; evisceration first and enucleation later, should it prove desirable.
TUMORS OF THE ORBIT.

The orbit is the site of many primary tumors which originate within
its proper tissues as well as those which encroach upon it from
neighboring cavities or from the face. Prognosis is better in the former
than in the latter, but unfavorable in all malignant cases.
Of the primary cystic tumors there may be nearly all the known
varieties, including those of parasitic origin. The pseudocysts of the
cranial cavity sometimes project into the orbit, forming orbital
encepholacele. Dermoid cysts are not at all uncommon. Around the
bursæ of the orbital muscles exudation cysts occur, while the retention
cysts, including the cholesteatomas, are not infrequent. The true
dermoid cysts may contain all the ordinary epithelial products, just as
in any other part of the body. Parasitic cysts include the echinococcus
and the cysticercus, the latter being rare, while the former may extend
into the frontal sinus or cranial cavity. It produces almost constant
ciliary neuralgia. Vascular tumors of all types are found in the orbit and
the various expressions of telangiectasia of the lids and orbit are often
seen. These are always of congenital origin. Of the more simple types
of mesoblastic tumors the osteomas are perhaps as common as any.
These assume all the types described in the chapter on Tumors, and
are of all degrees of hardness. Sarcoma and osteosarcoma,
originating within the orbit, are unfortunately too common. Naturally
they spread to and involve all the adjoining structures. True
endothelioma is rarely recognized as such until after removal and
microscopic examination. Epithelioma commencing upon the surface
of the eye, or about the skin and spreading inward, is also quite
common.
Exophthalmos is an expression of intra-orbital tension common to
all forms, while by the extent of protrusion and its direction the site of
the tumor may to some extent be determined. Other disturbances of
position, with limitation of motion and consequent diplopia, are further
expressions of pressure and dislocation. Ptosis, or drooping of the
upper lid, is a feature of tumors which proceed from the upper part of
the orbit. The vascular tumors, as already mentioned, produce more
or less pulsation. Ocular tension is usually increased, and when
circulation and enervation have been seriously affected necrosis and
even perforation of the cornea may occur. Pain is a variable feature,
but is sometimes pronounced. An exploring needle may be passed
into a tumor which seems to be cystic, but it should be done with
every precaution, both against infection and injury to the eye.
Tumors of the optic nerve proper originate more often in its sheath
than in its true neural tissue. They may occur at any point, but usually
within the orbit. These tumors are usually of the sarcomatous,
gliomatous, or endotheliomatous type. Cystic changes are not
infrequent; they occur usually in the young. All of these tumors will
involve the optic nerve in such a way as to produce signs easily
recognizable with the ophthalmoscope, such as optic neuritis and
nerve atrophy. Moreover, they affect or completely destroy vision.
They are not so painful as most of the other intra-orbital tumors, and,
while causing a direct forward protrusion of the eye, affect its motility
less than other forms. Nevertheless they grow with great rapidity and
evince destructive tendencies. In theory the treatment for all tumors of
the orbit is complete extirpation, while the malignant tumors require
emptying of the orbital contents. Benign tumors and cysts are usually
successfully treated by this method. Of most malignant tumors it may
be said that the prognosis is unfavorable. The lymphatic and vascular
connections are so free, and extension into surrounding cavities so
easy, that recurrence takes place in the larger proportion of cases. Too
often by the time a patient is willing to sacrifice the eye and the orbital
contents it is too late to effect a radical cure.
EXOPHTHALMOS.
The term exophthalmos simply implies protrusion of the eyeball
beneath and even between the lids. Usually it is in a downward and
outward direction. In some cases the displacement is accompanied by
an easily recognizable pulsation, and occasionally by a bruit or
audible sound. The latter instances are spoken of as pulsating
exophthalmos. They are connected in most cases with vascular
tumors or intra-orbital aneurysms, although sometimes the aneurysm
may be primarily intracranial. For instance, arteriovenous aneurysms,
by communication of the internal carotid artery with the cavernous
sinus, will produce pulsating exophthalmos. Whatever be its cause
exophthalmos is an expression of pressure from behind. This is true
even of the ocular symptoms accompanying Graves’ disease or
exophthalmic goitre, only here the protrusion is permitted by general
fulness of the vessels and undue vascularity of the orbital tissues.
In proportion to the amount of projection there will be swelling and
edema of the upper lid, the skin being more or less shiny and the
veins distended. In extreme cases the lids are everted and the
conjunctiva extremely chemotic, while by exposure of the cornea it
becomes vascular, infected, and often necrotic. Should it be possible
to replace the globe by pressure it will protrude so soon as pressure is
removed. In vascular cases a bruit may be heard and pulsation
detected with the finger. Audible sounds are lost by making firm
compression on the common carotid of the same side, and return
instantly when this pressure is removed. By the ophthalmoscope both
arterial and even venous pulsation may be perceived at the fundus.
Vision is only slightly affected by a well-marked protrusion, especially
when the latter has occurred slowly. The pulsating forms will
frequently give subjective symptoms of sound and sense, e. g.,
vertigo.
A history of injury, coupled with external evidences, may give a clue
to some of these cases as an indication of traumatic aneurysm or
communicating vascular tumor. Soft and vascular tumors, without
history of injury, are usually malignant, this being true also of multiple
growths.
Treatment.—The treatment of exophthalmos should depend
entirely on its nature. When due to arteriovenous
aneurysms, or to the consequences of injury alone, a ligation of the
common or of the internal carotid will give the best result. When
compression of the carotid gives temporary relief to at least some of
the features of the case its permanent ligation is indicated. Bilateral
exophthalmos implies a more serious condition, especially in Graves’
disease. When thyroid symptoms are prominent a thyroidectomy is
indicated. When the thyroid participates but slightly such a case may
be treated by excision of the cervical sympathetic on both sides.
INTRA-OCULAR TUMORS.
These tumors may assume most of the known types and may
spring from practically all of the tissues of the eye.
From the iris there may develop cysts of traumatic or even of
congenital origin. In the former such a foreign body as an eyelash may
be found, having entered through an external wound of the cornea.
Vascular tumors are occasionally met with, many of which are full of
pigment, while melanomas, with a minimum of vascular structure, are
also observed. The actively malignant tumors of the iris usually
assume the sarcomatous or endotheliomatous type, and when
melanotic assume an exceedingly rapid and serious phase and
course. In the iris, also, tuberculous or syphilitic granulomas are
occasionally encountered.
In the choroid are seen expressions of tuberculosis, especially the
more acute, as a complication of tuberculous meningitis. The most
common malignant tumor here is sarcoma of the melanotic variety. Of
the retina, glioma is the most common as well as the most malignant
tumor, occurring usually in the young. All of these tumors when
malignant spread from their primary site to the adjoining tissues.
When extremely malignant they kill too quickly to show many
metastatic expressions. At other times they will appear in other parts
of the body.
All intra-ocular tumors tend to impair, and the malignant to quickly
destroy vision. Tension is increased and the natural contour of the
globe may be lost. Fixation to and involvement of the surrounding
orbital tissues depend in some measure on the rapidity of growth and
its location. They occur sooner or later in malignant cases.
A malignant growth of any part of the globe calls for enucleation of
the eye, as well as removal of the orbital contents. When the orbital
tissues are thus involved it is too late to secure more than temporary
benefit. If the eyelids are involved they should also be sacrificed and
the orbital opening covered by some plastic procedure.
PANOPHTHALMITIS.
The term panophthalmitis implies a phlegmonous process involving
the entire contents of the sclerotic, by which the eye is destroyed. It is
usually traumatic in origin, but may occur as an extension of infection
from ulcer and abscess of the cornea, or from thrombotic or metastatic
processes. Its course is usually rapidly destructive, while it is
accompanied by more or less orbital cellulitis. These signs, therefore,
are not confined to the orbit proper, for the lids become edematous,
the conjunctiva chemotic, and there is more or less purulent discharge
from the entire conjunctival sac, which will escape beneath the lids. If
the cornea is at first clear it rapidly becomes cloudy, and to the signs
of intra-orbital mischief are added all those above described under the
heading of intra-orbital cellulitis. The sclerotic is an unyielding
membrane; hence pain in these cases is usually intense, while septic
features are added according to the nature of the cause. When the
lesion has begun in the cornea it usually ruptures early and the ocular
contents may escape in this way.
Treatment.—Panophthalmitis is dangerous to life as well as to the
eye when not promptly treated. The same rule prevails
here as well as elsewhere in the presence of pus. Prompt evacuation
offers the greatest safety and relief. Evacuation of the entire contents
of the eye through a free incision and by means of a sharp spoon, with
antiseptic irrigation, affords the only safe measure in these cases.
As previously remarked, the general consensus of opinion among
oculists and surgeons is that, under these circumstances, enucleation
should never be done, the danger being that of a purulent meningitis
or thrombosis by extension backward along the sheath of the optic
nerve.
SYMPATHETIC OPHTHALMITIS.
This, too, is a matter of interest common to the eye specialist and
the general surgeon. The term refers to lesions of one eye which
follow sooner or later upon injuries or infections of the other. These
expressions of so-called sympathy occur in irritative or inflammatory
lesions. The former are more or less neurotic and include pain, often
referred to the region beyond the orbit, photophobia, blepharospasm,
too free lacrymation, and various subjective phenomena of impaired
vision. These features will be accompanied by more or less
tenderness of the globe, with ciliary neuralgia and injection. These
may subside under treatment, but will recur when the eye is again
used.
Contrasted with these lesions is another form whose features are
most pronounced along the uveal tract, though the retina may also
suffer. Its subjective features are those of uveitis, to which are added
actual exudates in various parts of the globe, some of which may be
seen with the ophthalmoscope, with intra-ocular tension, which
reduces the anterior chamber, and with partial or complete loss of
sight that may end in total atrophy. In some instances these lesions
occur rapidly; in others the course of the disease is chronic.
The oculopathologists have striven hard to explain these
phenomena. Most of them believe in the continuity of the subdural or
subvaginal sheath of the nerve from one orbit around into the other,
and believe that the germs passed along this subway. Involvement of
the yet unaffected eye may follow the entrance of foreign bodies,
occurrence of traumatisms, punctures, existence of corneal lesions as
minute ulcers, constant irritation of the presence of an artificial eye
upon the stump, the performance of some of the common operations
upon the globe, and even the much less frequent conditions of
pathological changes in the choroid, the ciliary body, the optic nerve,
or the existence of intra-ocular tumors. A recognition of the
possibilities in these cases will lead to more radical treatment of the
lesions which may produce them. Even a minute foreign body should
be promptly removed and an ulcer of the cornea should not be
regarded as a trifling lesion. Under all circumstances the surgeon, as
well as the general practitioner, should be alert to the possibilities of
these lesions, quick to recognize the symptoms, and prompt in urging
the only satisfactory relief. It will be seen that the earliest suggestive
features are those of involvement of the uveal tract.
Treatment.—There is usually but one efficient method of treatment
for these cases, and this consists of removal of the
injured or diseased other eye, more particularly if it be more or less
already impaired by the consequences of the original lesion. The
exceptions to this statement occur in the event of well-marked
sympathetic inflammation, as it may be possible that there will be
better vision in the originally injured eye than in that secondarily
infected; but so long as it is a matter of simple sympathetic irritation
enucleation is the proper course. While this is extremely radical there
is no satisfactory substitute for it. The only excuse for delay should be
threatening phlegmonous processes by which communication
posteriorly might be afforded. Bull has laid down the following
indications for enucleation of the first eye before the outbreak of
sympathetic inflammation in the other eye:
1. When the wound is in the ciliary region, and so extensive as to
greatly damage or entirely destroy vision;
2. When the wound is in the ciliary region, and is already
accompanied by iritis and cyclitis;
3. When the eye contains a foreign body, and attempts at its
removal have proved futile;
4. When the eye is atrophied or shrunken and tender on pressure,
or is continually irritated.
ENUCLEATION OF THE GLOBE OF THE EYE.

The conditions which justify enucleation of the eye have been
pointed out. For the operation, which is usually done under general
anesthesia, the lids should be widely separated with the ordinary eye
speculum or by suitable retractors. A circular incision is then made
through the conjunctiva, around the margin of the cornea. This is
carried down to the sclerotic at a little distance from the corneal
margin, by which Ténon’s capsule is opened; then a strabismus hook
is inserted in each direction and the tendon of each muscle raised
upon it and divided close to its insertion. By pressure upon the
surrounding tissues the eye is now made to protrude. Should the
globe have been already collapsed it should be drawn forward with
forceps, one blade of which may be thrust within it. After thus firmly
withdrawing it a blunt-pointed, curved scissors is passed behind and
around it, the blades being made to open in such a way as when
closed to divide the optic nerve at a little distance from the globe. After
this enucleation by pressure is easy, and any further tissues requiring
division may be readily cut. The principal source of hemorrhage is the
artery extending through the nerve, but this is readily controlled by
pressure.
Should there have been any inflammatory or septic condition about
the orbit or the conjunctival sac the parts should be cleansed with
hydrogen peroxide or other antiseptic. Sutures are seldom required. A
compress should be applied outside the eyelids, removing it
sufficiently often to be certain there is no retention of fluid or blood.
Recovery is usually rapid. Granulation tissue sometimes forms at
the bottom of the conjunctival sac and becomes exuberant. In this
case it should be removed with scissors and cauterized, after which it
rarely recurs.
SYPHILITIC AFFECTIONS OF THE EYE AND THE ORBIT.

As already described, many expressions of the various stages of
syphilis pertain to the eye. Thus there may be chancre upon the eyelid
or conjunctiva, or ulceration of the same; syphilitic iritis as a secondary
expression; syphilitic retinitis, neuroretinitis, choroiditis, as tertiary
lesions; and the formation of gummas in the later stages of the
disease, and in almost any imaginable locality, especially the uveal
tract. Syphilitic tumors are seen upon the iris more often than
anywhere else within the eye. Outside of the globe and within the orbit
the ordinary expressions of syphilitic periostitis and of gummatous
tumors occur. These constitute also the more common intra-orbital
expressions of this disease.
The symptoms of syphilitic lesions in this location do not vary from
similar lesions elsewhere, save so far as they involve special tissues
or disturb the special sense of sight. The prognosis in nearly all of
them is relatively good if suitable and active treatment be promptly
instituted. It is, however, too much to expect that annular destruction
of areas of the retina or choroid can be completely repaired.
CATARACT.
Cataract is a subject of primary interest to the general surgeon only
so far as it pertains to the consequences of injury to the orbital region.
The term implies opacity of the lens or of its capsule, or both, which
may be partial or complete. Its pathognomonic feature is slow and
progressive failure of vision. Examination by direct as well as bilateral
illumination will show the opacity to be located behind the iris.
Everyone should be able to recognize it; its excision should be
relegated to the trained specialist, since it is one of the most delicate
special operations.
GLAUCOMA.
The term glaucoma implies a collection of more or less variable
pathological conditions within the eyeball which lead to increased
intra-ocular tension. Because of this increased pressure, with its
disturbance of circulation and the peculiar coloration often given to the
cornea or the pupil, the disease has received this name. Among its
symptoms are pupillary changes, including both size and mobility of
the iris; turbidity of the cornea, as well as the fluid humors of the eye;
pain, corneal anesthesia, impairment or final loss of vision,
engorgement of the visible vessels of the globe, and a peculiar
cupping or excavation of the optic disk. Unless checked by operative
intervention the course of the disease is steadily toward blindness. It
varies in acuteness, the favorable cases being the acute ones, in
which early operation can be practised. It admits of no other
treatment.
Treatment.
—The operation almost universally practised by the oculist is either
iridectomy or sclerotomy. The condition is briefly mentioned in this
place for the double reason that the student may be made aware that
the condition may follow certain injuries to the eyeball or the head, and
that the more chronic forms have been successfully treated by
excision of the cervical sympathetic, on one side or both, the operation
being based upon anatomical and physiological facts pertaining to the
distribution and function of those sympathetic fibers which pass to the
orbit from the cervical trunk. The operation is described in the section
on the Cranial and Cervical Nerves.
AFFECTIONS OF THE IRIS AND THE CILIARY

BODY.
These lesions are frequently the result of blows and of penetrating
injuries, as well as of syphilis. Moreover, motility of the iris is so
essential to the normal function of the eye that where it may possibly
be effected the surgeon should protect against those adhesions
between the iris and the lens or cornea, which are very likely to occur,
by instillation of a sufficiently strong solution of atropine, a ¹⁄₂ to 1 per
cent. solution being usually sufficient for this purpose. These
adhesions are referred to as synechiæ, and are anterior when the iris
becomes affixed to the cornea, or posterior when affixed to the lens.
They occur easily after minute punctures of the cornea, the result
being a limited mobility or a dislocation of the pupil, along with opacity
of the cornea, all of which work to the detriment of vision.
The iris is so visible that the mechanism of an exudate on or in it
can be observed almost from beginning to end when it occurs in the
form of iritis. Occasionally an exudate will merge into an actual
collection of pus which will gradually fill up the anterior chamber, and
which is then spoken of as hypopyon. Under the most favorable
circumstances a disappearance of this pus by absorption may be
noted. It may prove destructive or may necessitate evacuation.
The iris and the ciliary body are intimately connected, and
inflammation beginning in one point may easily spread to and involve
other tissues. These structures with the choroid constitute the so-
called uveal tract, and when they participate in inflammation it is called
uveitis.
The symptoms of iritis consist of pain, lacrymation, photophobia,
which is often intense; increasing turbidity of the aqueous humor, as
well as of the cornea, by which vision is impaired; visible discoloration;
irregularity and sluggishness in movements of the iris, and
circumcorneal injection. A congestion which assumes an annular form
about the cornea and does not involve the conjunctival sac indicates
trouble in the ciliary region, while a true conjunctivitis is limited only by
the extent of the membrane itself.
Iritis due to syphilis, whether assuming the plastic or the
gummatous form, requires the most active antisyphilitic medication, in
addition to local treatment. The non-specific and traumatic forms need
absolute rest in a dark room, with cold applications about the eye and
the free use of atropine, to completely dilate the pupil and prevent the
formation of synechiæ.
THE CORNEA.
The cornea being the most exposed part of the eyeball will be
frequently subjected to minor or serious injury in connection with
violence to the orbital region. It is an exceedingly sensitive membrane,
whose reflex excitability is heightened by the presence of a small
foreign body, this accident being one of frequent occurrence. It is a
lesson in neurophysiology to watch the relatively local and general
disturbances which the presence of a minute speck of foreign material
embedded in the cornea may cause. Every extraneous body should
be removed at once, the procedure being now facilitated by the local
use of cocaine, for any abrasion or serious injury of the cornea
occurring in surgical cases offers a possible source of infection to the
deeper ocular structures. Careful attention should be given to the use
of antiseptics of suitable strength in the conjunctival sac, whenever
this region is involved. This statement cannot be made too positive.
There is danger both to the cornea and to the iris in perforating ulcer
or traumatism of the cornea, and there is as much occasion for the
use of atropine in these instances as in those pertaining to the iris
proper. To the protrusion of the cornea, which is produced by
weakening of its structure and tension from within, is given the name
staphyloma. It is frequently combined with adhesions of the iris and
dislocation of the pupil. It constitutes not only a cosmetic
disfigurement, but a serious impediment to vision.

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Religion and Democracy A Worldwide

Comparison 2nd Edition Carsten

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For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/​

1 The research design 1

2 Relating religion to democracy 25

4 Microlevel findings 141

5 Religion and democracy 167

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INJURIES OF THE ORBIT.

TUMORS OF THE ORBIT.

ENUCLEATION OF THE GLOBE OF THE EYE.

SYPHILITIC AFFECTIONS OF THE EYE AND THE ORBIT.

AFFECTIONS OF THE IRIS AND THE CILIARY

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For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/

3.10 Religion, secularism, religious fragmentation, GDP/cap., insularity,

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against such content-based definitions is that they include among democracies

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