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Responsible Conduct
of Research
Responsible Conduct
of Research
Fourth Edition
Adil E. Shamoo and David B. Resnik
1
3
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.
© Oxford University Press 2022
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction
rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above.
You must not circulate this work in any other form

and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.
Library of Congress Control Number: 2021057544
ISBN 978–0–19–754709–0
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197547090.001.0001
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed by LSC communications, United States of America
Contents
Preface to the Fourth Edition vii

Acknowledgments ix
1. Scientific Research and Ethics 1

2. Misconduct in Research 26
3. Data Acquisition and Management 60
4. Collaboration within Academia and with Industry 83
5. Authorship 106
6. Publication and Peer Review 121
7. Intellectual Property 156
8. Conflicts of Interest and Scientific Objectivity 176
9. Mentoring and the Research Environment 193
10. The Use of Animals in Research 208
11. The Protection of Human Subjects in Research 229
12. Science and Social Responsibility 271
13. Conclusion 293
References 301
Index 331
Preface to the Fourth Edition
When the first edition of this textbook went to press in 2002, the field of responsible
conduct of research (RCR) was in its infancy. Since then, there has been a great deal
of change at many different levels—governmental, institutional, and individual. The
Office of Research Integrity (ORI), part of the United States government, has funded
empirical research, conferences, and course development on RCR (ORI 2007a,
2007b, 2011). At the institutional level, universities have developed RCR policies and
implemented RCR training programs; professional societies have drafted or revised
ethics codes and guidelines; and scientific journals have developed rules and policies.
At the individual level, researchers have published numerous books and articles on
RCR and created RCR courses, class materials, and training modules. Researchers,
institutions, and government agencies have also participated in several international
conferences on research integrity.
Although much has been accomplished in the last decade or so, many serious eth-
ical challenges remain. Misconduct continues to be a serious problem in research, as
illustrated by highly publicized fraud cases involving research on stem cells, nano-
technology, women’s health, oncology, and animal behavior. Researchers and insti-
tutional leaders continue to wrestle with ethical issues related to collaborations with
industry and the commercialization of research, such as conflicts of interest and in-
tellectual property rights. Perennial ethical issues, such as research involving animals
or human subjects, as well as new and emerging concerns in fields such as genetics/
genomics, synthetic biology, neuroscience, artificial intelligence, nanotechnology,
pharmacogenomics, nutrition research, microbiology, and virology, have drawn the
attention of the media, the public, and politicians.
Since 1989, the Public Health Service (PHS), which funds National Institutes of
Health (NIH 2009) research, has required trainees (such as graduate students and
postdoctoral fellows) to receive RCR instruction. In 2009, the National Science
Foundation (NSF) began requiring that all recipients of NSF funding have an RCR
education plan for all their students on those grants. Many universities have adopted
RCR training requirements that go beyond the federal conditions. Some require all
doctoral students or all graduate students to receive RCR instruction. Many countries
outside the United States have also begun to consider implementing RCR training
requirements.
We published a third edition of the book in 2015 to consider new developments in
RCR, but the field continues to evolve rapidly, so we have decided to publish a fourth
edition, which includes updated references, case studies, policies, and a new chapter
on mentoring and the research environment, with new material useful to students
and scholars alike. We also discuss revisions to federal regulations for research with
viii Preface to the Fourth Edition
human subjects. The book presents a comprehensive introduction to RCR, with 13

chapters ranging in scope from the broad issues relating to research integrity, social
responsibility, research funding, and freedom of inquiry, to more narrow topics, such
as the ethical aspects of entering data into lab notebooks, designing experiments, cit-
ing published works, and deciding authorship matters.
We apologize for any errors or oversights in this fourth edition. Please feel free to
send your comments and suggestions to Adil E. Shamoo, PhD, at ashamoo@gmail.
com.
Acknowledgments
Dr. Shamoo is grateful for all the guest lecturers for his course since 1994, among
them Jack Schwartz, Stephan Viegus, and Leslie Katzel. Dr. Shamoo also thanks the
students in his Responsible Conduct of Research classes since 1994 for their input and
discussions. For useful discussions and insight about ethics in research, Dr. Resnik is
especially grateful to Loretta Kopelman, Kenneth De Ville, Thomas Feldbush, John
Bradfield, Jeremy Sugarman, Frank Grassner, John Doll, Elise Smith, Zubin Master,
and the students, colleagues and co-instructors he has interacted with in his research
ethics classes and training sessions since 1994. Finally, we thank the many anony-
mous reviewers of the prospectus during the publisher’s review process for their con-
siderable and valued suggestions for improving the textbook in content and style.
Moreover, we thank Patrick L. Taylor, Children’s Hospital Boston, Harvard Medical
School, for his thorough review of the second edition. Research for the fourth edition
of Responsible Conduct of Research was supported, in part, by the Intramural Program
of the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, National Institutes of
Health. It does not represent the views of the National Institute of Environmental
Health Sciences, the National Institutes of Health, or the U.S. government.
1
Scientific Research and Ethics
Ethical (or moral) problems, issues, and dilemmas occur for most people on a daily
basis. Whenever we ask the question, “What should I do?” there is a good chance that
an ethical issue or concern lurks in the background. In everyday life, such questions
frequently arise as we make choices among different interests and commitments,
such as career, family, community, and church. Professional researchers—scientists,
mathematicians, engineers, and humanities scholars—also frequently face ethical
problems, issues, and dilemmas. Consider the following cases:
Case 1
You are a graduate student in pharmacology at a large university working under the
direction of a senior researcher who has circulated a draft of a paper on the effects of a
novel compound in treating liver tumors in mice to your research group. A post-doc-
toral fellow is the first author on the paper, followed by you, another graduate student,
a technician, and your supervisor who is the senior author. After reading the paper
you notice that there is a problem with a diagram representing the dose–response
curve. You cannot reconcile the diagram with the data from your lab notebooks. The
diagram, which was prepared by your supervisor, makes the dose–response relation-
ship appear to be stronger than indicated by the data. You approach your supervisor
with this problem, and he shrugs it off, saying that you do not understand the research
well enough to make a judgment about it. What should you do?
Case 2
You are a graduate student in sociology working on a dissertation on college students’
attitudes toward drug and alcohol use. When you start compiling surveys, you notice
some problems with your data. It appears that about 20 percent of the students mis-
understood the Likert-scale questions, because they answered “1” when they prob-
ably meant “5”, based on their written comments that accompanied these questions. If
you exclude these data from your analysis on the grounds that they are erroneous, this
could affect the statistical significance of your results and the analysis and interpreta-
tion of the data. How should you deal with this issue?
Responsible Conduct of Research. Adil E. Shamoo and David B. Resnik, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press
2022. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197547090.003.0001
2 Responsible Conduct of Research
Case 3
You are a postdoctoral fellow in epidemiology at a university. You have just read an
important paper in your field and have contacted the author about it. The paper is one
of several the author has published from a large, publicly funded database. You ask the
author if you can have access to the database to confirm your own work and develop
new hypotheses. The author says he will share the database with you only if you agree
to a formal collaboration with him and name him as a coauthor in publications that
use the database. What should you do?
Case 4
You are a Professor of Veterinary Medicine and chair of your institution’s animal care
and use committee, which oversees animal research. The group People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals (PETA) has staged some protests against animal research re-
cently at your institution. A local reporter calls you on the phone and wants to in-
terview you about animal research and animal rights. How should you handle this
situation?
Case 5
You are the editor of virology journal and some researchers have submitted a paper
demonstrating how to genetically engineer a dangerous virus (case fatality rate =50%)
so that it can be transmissible by respiratory water droplets between mammals.
Normally, human beings can only become infected by the virus through direct con-
tact with infected birds. The paper makes a significant contribution to virology and
has potential applications for vaccine development and public health, but informa-
tion contained in the paper could be used to make a bioweapon. Also, researchers
who are trying to reproduce the findings might accidentally become infected with the
virus. How should you handle the review of this paper? Should you publish the paper
if the reviewers recommend publication?
Case 6
You are a member of committee that reviews research with human subjects. You are
reviewing a proposed psychology experiment that involves manipulation of news
feeds in a social media website to determine whether the emotional tone of the news
feed that one reads (e.g., happy, sad, angry, hopeful, etc.) influences the posts that
one makes. The study poses almost no risks to the participants, but they will not be
Scientific Research and Ethics 3
informed that the manipulation is taking place to avoid biasing the results. Should
you vote to approve this study?
These cases illustrate some of the complex ethical dilemmas that can arise in scien-
tific research. The purpose of this book is to enhance students’ and scientists’ under-
standing of the ethical, legal, and social dimensions of research, so that they can act
appropriately and make responsible choices.
In recent years, scientists have come to realize the importance of ethics for re-
search in the biomedical, physical, mathematical, and social/behavioral sciences and
the humanities. A few decades ago, many scientists did not understand or appreciate
the importance of ethics for their research. According to a view that has held sway
among scientists, humanists, and the general public for centuries, science is objec-
tive (Bronowski 1956; Snow 1964) and ethics is subjective, so scientists need not deal
with ethical issues and concerns when conducting research. Ethical and social ques-
tions, according to this view, occur in the applications of science, but not in science
itself. Humanists, politicians, and the public can grapple with the ethical (or moral)
aspects of research; the main task of the scientist is to do research for its own sake
(Rescher 1965).
While it is important for scientists to strive for objectivity, this does not mean that
ethical questions, problems, and concerns have no place in research conduct. Indeed,
ethical behavior plays a key role in promoting objectivity because ethical transgres-
sions, such as data fabrication or falsification, and ethical concerns, such as conflict of
interest, can lead to biased or erroneous research.
Scientists need to pay special attention to research ethics in their own work and
in teaching students about how to conduct research for several reasons (Shamoo
and Annau 1987; Sigma Xi 1986; Shamoo and Dunigan 2000). First, modern sci-
ence is a social activity in which researchers, students, and staff work together to
achieve common goals (Merton 1973; Ziman 1984). Many different aspects of sci-
ence, including mentoring, education, collaborative research, data sharing, peer
review, and publication depend upon cooperation and trust based on shared ex-
pectations and understandings. Unethical behavior in science can damage the
research environment and destroy the trust that holds together the social fabric
of research (Hull 1988; Resnik 1998a; Macrina 2013; Steneck 2006; Committee
on Science 2009; National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine
[NASEM] 2017).
Second, most scientists receive considerable public support, such as funding and
access to resources and facilities. Even those researchers who are not funded by
government contracts or grants most likely received their education at a university
that benefited from public support. Public support for research is based on trust
and accountability. The public trusts that scientists will perform ethical research
that is likely to benefit society, and the public may hold scientists accountable for
their conduct. Over the years, political leaders have held dozens of hearings on the
integrity of scientific research and have enacted laws and regulations to ensure that
scientists act responsibly. Unethical and illegal conduct in science can compromise
the integrity of research and generate negative publicity and political fallout that
erode public trust and support for research (Resnik 2011a, 2011b).
Third, some of science’s norms, such as honesty and objectivity, directly promote
the goals of science, such as the acquisition of truth and knowledge. Data fabrication
and falsification, for example, undermine the search truth and knowledge by indu-
cing scientists to accept false or unsubstantiated hypotheses or theories. Conflicts of
interest can undermine the development of scientific knowledge by creating biases
that impact research design, data analysis and interpretation, and publication.
Fourth, all members of society, including scientists, have some basic ethical obliga-
tions and duties (Resnik 1998a). Everyone has an obligation not to lie, cheat, or steal,
for example. In science, the obligation not to lie, cheat, or steal implies duties not to
fabricate or falsify data or plagiarize research. Everyone also has an obligation not to
harm or dehumanize other people. In science, this obligation implies duties to protect
the rights and welfare of human research subjects, as well as a duty to not publish re-
search results that could be used by others to cause significant harm to society.
For these reasons and many others, universities, funding agencies, research insti-
tutions, professional societies, and scientists are now very much aware of the impor-
tance of ethics in research (Committee on Science 2009; NASEM 2017). Responses to
these ethical concerns include the development of laws and regulations, institutional
policies, journal policies, and professional guidelines pertaining to research ethics;
investigations of research misconduct by institutions and the government; govern-
ment hearings on research integrity and oversight; research on research ethics issues,
including the publication of articles and books; workshops and international confer-
ences on research ethics; and mentoring and formal education in research ethics (or
the responsible conduct of research, RCR).
Science as a Profession
Research ethics can be understood according to the professional model (Resnik
1998a; Shrader-Frechette 1994; Steneck 2006). Each profession has its own ethical
standards, which govern practices in the profession. In medicine, physicians abide by
rules such as “do no harm,” “promote the patient’s health,” “maintain confidentiality,”
and “honor the patient’s right to make decisions” (Beauchamp and Childress 2012).
Science also has its own standards, which we discuss below. Professions usually adopt
codes of ethics to communicate to members of the profession and the public the type
of behavior that is expected in the profession (Bayles 1988). Since the 1980s, dozens
of scientific associations and organizations have adopted ethical codes and guidelines
(NASEM 2017). In 2010, over 340 researchers and government and institutional offi-
cials from 51 countries adopted the Singapore Statement on Research Integrity at the
2nd World Conference on Research Integrity (Singapore Statement 2010).
In addition to adopting ethical guidelines, scientific disciplines share several
other characteristics with recognized professions. First, a profession is more than an
occupation; it is a career or vocation (Davis 1995a). The first people to be recognized

as professionals were physicians and ministers (Abbott 2012), who viewed themselves
as being “called” to serve and devoted their lives to serving society. Most scientists
view their work as a career and not just an occupation. Second, professionals have so-
cial responsibilities and can be held publicly accountable (Davis 1995a). Physicians,
for example, have professional duties to promote not only the health of their patients
but also the public’s health. As noted above, scientists also have social responsibili-
ties and can be held publicly accountable. Third, society allows professionals to be
self-regulating: Professionals can make their own standards and rules, provided that
they obey the law and fulfill their public responsibilities (Bayles 1988). Physicians,
for example, set their own standard of care and determine what it takes to become
a qualified member of the profession. Scientists are also self-regulating: Scientists
make their own rules for designing experiments, drawing inferences from data, pub-
lishing results, and so on. Scientists determine what counts as “good scientific prac-
tice.” Finally, professionals are recognized as having expertise and are often asked to
give professional advice. Physicians, for example, have expertise when it comes to
diagnosing, treating, and preventing diseases (Bayles 1988). Scientists are recognized
as experts within their domain of knowledge and professional practice and often give
advice about public health, environmental protection, economic development, and
many other matters.
Prior to the Scientific Revolution (ca. 1500–1700 AD), science was more of an av-
ocation than a vocation. Scientists often worked in isolation and financed their own
research. They did not publish very frequently—the printing press was not invented
until the mid-1400s—and when they did, their works were not peer reviewed. There
were no professional scientific societies or journals until the mid-1600s. Universities
taught only a small number of scientific subjects, and many scientists could master
several different subjects. For example, Newton made major contributions to me-
chanics, astronomy, optics, and mathematics (Newton 1687 [1995]). Private busi-
nesses and governments saw little reason to invest in research. Science also did not
have a great deal of social status or impact—the church and the state battled for social
influence and political power (Ziman 1984; Burke 1995).
Science has changed dramatically in the last 500 years. Today, there are thou-
sands of scientific societies and professional journals. Peer review plays a key role in
funding and publication decisions. Scientists now work in research groups, which
may include laboratory assistants and data analysts as well as postdoctoral, graduate,
and undergraduate students. Universities now offer courses on hundreds of different
scientific subjects, and it is virtually impossible to achieve scientific expertise without
specialization. Governments and private corporations now invest billions of dollars
each year in science. Science has become one of the most influential social institu-
tions in society, despite recent anti-science movements (Ziman 1984; NASEM 2017).
Most of the technologies and many of the ideas in our modern world are the direct
or indirect result of scientific research. Scientists publish millions of articles a year,
and the information boom continues to increase. Scientists give expert testimony to
congressional committees and government agencies, and they provide advice to pres-
idents, governors, generals, and corporate executives. Children learn about science
in school, and most professional careers require some type of scientific and technical
knowledge.
Science is now also a sizable part of the world’s economy. In 2020, countries spent
more than $2.4 trillion on research and development (R&D) or about 1.74 percent
of the world’s total gross domestic product (GDP) (Heney 2020). The top six R&D
spending countries were the United States, China, Japan, Germany, India, and South
Korea (Heney 2020).
In the United States, economic activity directly related to scientific research is
estimated to be about six percent of the country’s GDP (Resnik, 2007a). The indi-
rect impacts of research are much larger than the direct impacts because invest-
ments in R&D have led to economically significant innovations, such as computers,
the Internet, airplanes, automobiles, nuclear energy, and radar. As the twenty-first
century economy becomes more dependent on information, investments in R&D
are likely to continue an upward trend that began in World War II (Dickson 1988).
Literally millions of scientists are employed in universities, research institutions,
private laboratories, or other organizations that conduct research (National Science
Foundation 1997). It is estimated that there are more scientists alive today than
all of the scientists who have lived during the past 2,500 years of human history
(Dickson 1988).
Science’s increased economic, social, and political influence carries added eth-
ical responsibilities. Although laws and regulations, institutional and journal poli-
cies, and professional codes of conduct can provide valuable guidance for scientists,
they have significant limitations. First, these legal, professional, and ethical rules do
not cover every situation that may arise in research. For example, authorship polices
adopted by journals have little to say about authorship order on a scientific paper,
which is often important. Second, the rules need to be interpreted and applied to par-
ticular situations. For example, to apply a rule that prohibits fabricating or falsifying
data to a particular study, one must understand the details concerning the study’s ex-
perimental design and methodology and determine how to interpret data fabrication
and falsification in the context of the study. Third, the rules sometimes conflict. For
example, funding agency and journal requirements to share data may conflict with
the duty to protect confidential information concerning human research subjects.
Fourth, the rules themselves often need to be evaluated and critiqued. For example, a
journal revising its policies pertaining to authorship may need to draw insights from
something beyond those policies, such as basic ethical considerations like fairness or
honesty. Policies and other rules do not stand on their own: they must be based on
more fundamental values or standards.
For these and other reasons, it is important for science students and working sci-
entists to have a fuller understanding of research ethics. It is not enough to be fa-
miliar with a list of rules developed by governments, institutions, journals, or other
organizations. To make responsible decisions involving ethical issues, one must also
understand the deeper rationale for ethical rules and standards and how to deal with
ethical dilemmas and problems in a rational way. To help achieve these goals, we pro-
vide an overview of ethics and ethical decision-making.
What Is Ethics?
Ethics can be understood as (1) standards of conduct, or (2) an academic discipline
that studies standards of conduct and ethical decision making. Ethics as an academic
discipline is concerned with answering age-old questions about duty, honor, integ-
rity, virtue, justice, and the good life (Frankena 1973; Timmons 2012). Scholars and
scientists study ethics from a normative or descriptive point of view. The questions
addressed by normative ethics have to do with what one ought to do, how one ought
to live, or how society ought to be structured. These are the traditional questions
addressed by philosophers, theologians, and political theorists. Various disciplines
in the social and behavioral sciences, including psychology, neurobiology, sociology,
and anthropology, take a descriptive approach to ethics and attempt to describe and
explain ethical beliefs, attitudes, emotions, judgments, decisions, and behaviors
(Haidt 2007; Miller 2008; de Waal 2009; Greene 2013).
Although the facts discovered by descriptive ethics have some bearing on norma-
tive questions, they cannot, by themselves, provide complete answers to normative
questions because such questions require normative answers. For example, suppose
that someone is trying to decide whether to cheat on his or her income taxes. That
person’s question might be, “Should I cheat on my income taxes?” Suppose that a so-
cial scientist conducts a study showing that 65 percent of people cheat on their in-
come taxes. This scientific study still would not answer the person’s question. That
person wants to know not how many people cheat, but whether he or she should
cheat. The fact that most people cheat does not justify cheating. The person asking the
ethical questions is requesting a normative justification for a particular course of ac-
tion, but scientific studies do not provide this. Science delivers facts and explanations,
not values and justifications.
The normative study of ethics can be subdivided into theoretical ethics, which
studies general theories, concepts, and principles of ethics; meta-ethics, which studies
the meaning and justification of ethical terms, concepts, and principles; and applied
ethics, which studies ethical questions that arise in specific situations or areas of con-
duct, such as medicine, law, or business (Frankena 1973; Timmons 2012). Research
ethics is a branch of applied ethics that studies the ethical problems, dilemmas, and
issues that arise in the conduct of research.
In this book, we will not explore meta-ethical issues in significant depth, but we
will call attention to one that has some relevance for research ethics. One of the key
questions of meta-ethics is whether ethical standards are universal (Pojman 1995;
Frankena 1973; Timmons 2012). According to one school of thought, the same ethical
(or moral) standards apply to all people at all times. The standards may be interpreted
differently in different situations, but they are still the same standards. A contrasting
school of thought, known as moral relativism, holds that different ethical standards
apply to different people in different situations—there are no universally applicable
moral rules or values. We mention this issue here because in some situations in re-
search ethics one must take a stand on this dispute (Angell 1997a, 1997b; Resnik
1998b; Emanuel et al. 2000). For example, different countries have different views
about human rights, including the right to informed consent. In some countries, a
woman’s husband or older male relative (such as her father) provides consent for the
woman. Scientists from the United States and Europe who conduct research in these
countries must face the question of whether they should follow local customs con-
cerning informed consent or Western standards, which require the individual’s con-
sent (Hyder and Wali 2006).
Returning to our focus on ethics as a standard of conduct, it is important to com-
pare and contrast ethics and the law. Societies have had laws since ancient times. Laws
are like ethical standards in several ways. First, laws, like ethics, tell people how they
ought or ought not to behave. Second, ethical and legal standards share many con-
cepts and terms, such as duty, responsibility, negligence, rights, benefits, and harms.
Third, the methods of reasoning used in law and ethics are quite similar. Both dis-
ciplines give arguments and counterarguments, analyze concepts and principles, and
discuss cases and rules.
However, ethics differs from the law in several important ways, as well. First, the
scope of ethics is not the same as the scope of law. There are many types of conduct
that might be considered unethical but are not illegal. For instance, it may be perfectly
legal to not give credit to someone who makes a major contribution to a research pro-
ject, but this action would still be unethical because it would violate principles of fair-
ness and honesty. We can think of ethics and law as two different circles that overlap
in some areas. Because laws are enforced by the coercive power of government, soci-
eties usually make laws pertaining to a behavior only when there is a social consensus
concerning that behavior. The law usually sets a minimal standard of conduct, but
ethics can go beyond that standard (Gert 2007).
Second, people can appeal to moral or ethical standards to evaluate or criticize
legal ones. People may decide that there needs to be a law against some type of uneth-
ical behavior, or they may decide that an existing law is unethical. If we consider a law
to be unethical, then we may be morally obligated to change the law or perhaps even
disobey it. For example, many people who considered South Africa’s system of apart-
heid to be unethical fought to change the system. Some of them made a conscious
decision to protest apartheid laws and engaged in a kind of law-breaking known as
civil disobedience.
Third, ethical standards tend to be less formal and technical than legal standards.
In many cases, ethical standards are not even written down, but legal standards al-
ways are. Consequently, ethical standards are usually easier to understand than legal
ones, and one does not need any special training or education to make ethical judg-
ments or give ethics advice.
Because ethics and the law may have different implications for conduct, scientists
must consider and weigh both legal and ethical obligations when making ethical
decisions.
It is also important to distinguish between ethics and politics. Politics, like ethics,
deals with standards for human conduct. However, political questions tend to focus
on broad issues having to do with the structure of society and group decision-making,
whereas ethical questions tend to focus on narrower issues pertaining to the con-
duct of individuals within society (Timmons 2012). Many of the controversial areas
of human conduct have both ethical and political dimensions. For instance, abortion
is an ethical issue for a woman trying to decide whether to have an abortion, but it is a
political issue for legislators and judges who must decide whether laws against abor-
tion would unjustly invade a woman’s sphere of private choice. Thus, the distinction
between ethics and politics is not absolute (Rawls 1971). Although this book focuses
on the ethics of research, many of the issues it covers, such as government funding of
science, social responsibility, and research with animal or human subjects, have po-
litical dimensions.
The distinction between ethics and religion is also important for our purposes.
Ethical theories and religious traditions have much in common in that they prescribe
standards of human conduct, endorse moral and social values, and provide some
account of the meaning and purpose of life. Many people use religious teachings,
texts, and practices (e.g., prayer) for ethical guidance. We do not intend to devalue
or belittle the importance of religion in inspiring and influencing ethical conduct.
However, we stress that ethics is not the same as religion. First, people who have dif-
ferent religious beliefs or no beliefs at all can agree on some basic ethical principles
and concepts. Christians, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, and atheists can all
agree on the importance of honesty, integrity, justice, benevolence, respect for human
life, and many other ethical values despite their theological disagreements. Second,
the study of ethics, or moral philosophy, is a secular discipline that relies on human
reasoning to analyze and interpret ethical concepts and principles. Although some
ethicists adopt a theological approach to moral questions and issues, most use secular
methods, concepts, and theories. While our book focuses on research ethics, many of
the issues it addresses have religious aspects, as well. For instance, various churches
have developed opinions on specific issues arising from science and technology, such
as cloning, assisted reproduction, DNA patenting, and genetic engineering.
Moral (or Ethical) Theories

In this chapter we will briefly review some influential moral theories that provide a
deeper justification for ethical norms in science and can be applied to ethical dilem-
mas and questions that arise in scientific research.
Moral theories are systems of thought we use to make sense of our moral beliefs,
judgments, concepts, and feelings. Moral theories include standards of conduct, such
as rules like “don’t lie,” “don’t steal,” “don’t kill,” and justifications of those standards;
for example, “don’t kill because killing violates human dignity.” Moral theories may
also include methods or procedures for applying standards to particular cases and
meta-ethical claims concerning moral truth, knowledge, psychology, or metaphysics
(Timmons 2012).
Philosophers classify moral theories as teleological, deontological, or a combi-
nation of the two (Timmons 2012). Teleological theories hold that moral conduct
should promote things that we regard as inherently valuable, such as happiness,
knowledge, virtue, or health. Deontological theories, by contrast, hold that what
makes an action right or wrong depends on the nature of the action, not its conse-
quences (Timmons 2012).
Moral theories differ from scientific theories in two ways. First, as mentioned pre-
viously, moral theories are normative and prescriptive, while scientific theories are
descriptive, explanatory, and predictive. A psychological theory may describe, ex-
plain, and predict human behavior, but it does not tell us how we ought to behave.
Most philosophers hold that it is a logical fallacy (known as the naturalistic fallacy)
to draw normative conclusions from descriptive premises (Timmons 2012). For ex-
ample, from the fact that most people disobey speed limit laws we cannot logically
conclude that most people ought to disobey speed limit laws.
Second, moral theories, unlike scientific ones, cannot be confirmed empiri-
cally by means of observations, tests, or experiments because moral properties
and objects are not observable by means of our senses or scientific instruments
(Harman 1977). To form a judgment as to whether an action is right or wrong, we
do not observe a property of rightness or wrongness in the action and form a judg-
ment. Instead, we form a moral judgment based on our wholistic impression of the
action and its social context. For example, if we see a person cutting another person
in the arm, we need to know something about the context of the cutting to deter-
mine whether it is moral. The difference between a wrongful action (such as an as-
sault) and a morally praiseworthy action (such as surgery) depends on the context
of the cutting (Resnik 2018).
To confirm moral theories, we do not appeal to empirical evidence but to our judg-
ments of right/wrong or good/bad in particular cases. For example, suppose that a
moral theory includes a principle like “promote human life.” The theory should be
able provide a satisfactory account of judgments concerning the ethics of killing in
particular situations, such as murder, self-defense, and war, and the importance of
saving human lives. To test this theory, we could consider a situation (real or hypo-
thetical) where a doctor has an opportunity to use the organs from a patient to save
the lives of five people. The patient is now in a persistent vegetative state as a result
of a massive stroke. Before the patient had the stroke, he told the doctor that he did
not want to donate his organs because he believes that the human body is sacred and
should not be desecrated. Should the doctor use the organs from the patient, against
his previously expressed wishes, to save the five people, or should he allow the patient
to die without damaging his body? The principle of promoting human life implies that
the doctor should take the patient’s organs because this would promote human life. If
we judge that this would be the wrong thing to do in this situation because we think
the patient’s wishes should be respected, then this would constitute evidence against
this simple theory. If enough evidence of this sort emerges, we may reject the theory
or develop a different one that does a better job of handling this and other cases. Over
time, our theories can become better at systematizing our ethical judgments. This
method for testing ethical theories is known as reflective equilibrium (Rawls 1971;
Timmons 2012).
Another important difference between moral theories and scientific ones is that
scientific theories have more objectivity than moral theories. Although controversies
concerning scientific theories abound, scientists have made considerable progress
over the years and have produced many theories that are widely accepted on the basis
of substantial evidence, such as the ideal gas theory, plate tectonics, general relativity,
quantum mechanics, natural selection, and so on. Philosophers have been arguing
about moral theories since the time of Plato (427–347 BCE) and no consensus has
emerged. One reason why consensus is so difficult to achieve in philosophy is that
moral judgments are strongly influenced by social, cultural, economic, and religious
biases. While there is some rough agreement on basic ethical principles (such as
“don’t lie, cheat, or steal”) there is little agreement about theories. The method of re-
flective equilibrium may help philosophers move toward some consensus on ethical
theories, but there is no guarantee that this will happen, because biases can be difficult
to detect and eliminate.
Given the lack of consensus about moral theories, we will not recommend any par-
ticular theory as the “correct” or “best” one. Instead, we will describe several prom-
inent theories for students and scientists to consider when making ethical decisions
and reflecting on the philosophical basis the ethical guidelines for the conduct of
research. (See Timmons 2012 for discussion of other important moral theories.)
These theories capture different insights about the nature of morality (Hinman 2002;
Timmons 2012).
Utilitarianism
English philosopher/reformists Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and John Stuart
Mill (1806–1873) (Mill 1979) developed an approach to morality known as util-
itarianism, which holds that the right thing to do is to maximize good/bad con-
sequences for the most people (Pojman 1995; Timmons 2012). Utilitarianism is
a teleological theory because it implies that we should seek to produce good out-
comes or consequences from our actions and policies. Different utilitarian the-
orists emphasize different types of consequences. Mill and Bentham focused on
pleasure or happiness. According to Mill’s Greatest Happiness Principle, actions
are right insofar as they tend to produce happiness and wrong insofar as they tend
to produce unhappiness (Mill 1861 [1979]).
Due to problems with defining the term “happiness,” some modern utilitari-
ans hold that one should maximize preferences, welfare, or other values that are
more easily defined (Brandt 1998). Different utilitarian theorists also stress dif-
ferent ways of evaluating human conduct. For instance, act-utilitarians argue that
we should apply the principle of utility to particular actions when deciding what to
do, whereas rule-utilitarians argue that we should apply the principle of utility to
rules for society, and that we should follow rules that maximize utility.
A number of different approaches to social problems are based on utilitarian
thinking because they evaluate actions and policies in terms of their outcomes.
In economics, cost-benefit analysis emphasizes making business and govern-
ment decisions that maximize economic benefits and minimize economics costs.
In medicine, an approach to allocating scarce medical resources during an emer-
gency, known as triage, holds that we should make best use of resources by allo-
cating them first to those who are in urgent need of medical care and can benefit
from it, followed by those who are not in urgent need medical care and can ben-
efit, followed by those who are likely to die soon even if they receive medical care
(Beauchamp and Childress 2012). In this book, we will discuss how the utilitarian
perspective applies to many important ethical questions in research and science
policy.
Although utilitarianism has had considerable influence over moral theorizing
and social policy, one of the key objections to the theory is that it does not pro-
vide sufficient protections to the rights and welfare of individuals. For example,
consider a well-known philosophical thought experiment known as the Trolley
Problem (Thomson 1985). Suppose that an evil person has subdued six people and
tied them down on some trolley tracks: five people are tied on the main line and
one is tied on a divergent path. There is a runaway trolley heading down the tracks.
You do not have enough time to remove anyone from the tracks, but you can pull
a lever that will divert the trolley so that it will kill the person tied on the sidetrack
but save the other five. What should you do? Utilitarians hold that you should
pull the lever so that you maximize overall good consequences by minimizing loss
of life. Psychologists have conducted research that shows that most people would
pull the lever (Greene 2013). However, suppose we change the situation a bit and
you are on a pedestrian bridge that spans the tracks and there is a very large person
(large enough to stop the trolley) on the bridge with you. You could push the very
large person onto the tracks to save lives. Should you? While utilitarianism implies
that you should push the large person onto the tracks to save more lives, most
people would say that you should not for various reasons, most of which pertain
to protecting individual rights, dignity, and welfare (Green 2013). Some philos-
ophers argue that rule-utilitarianism does not imply that you should push the
person onto the tracks to save lives because a rule that had this implication would
produce more overall harm than good. However, rule-utilitarianism might still
endorse rules that do not adequately respect individual rights and welfare if those
rules promote the social good.
Kantianism
Kantianism is a theory developed by the German Enlightenment philosopher
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), which has been interpreted and fine-tuned by modern-
day Kantians (Korsgaard 1996). The basic insight of Kantianism is that ethical con-
duct is a matter of choosing to follow moral principles or rules. The concept of a moral
agent plays a central role in Kant’s theory. A moral agent is a self-governing (or au-
tonomous) person who can formulate and deliberately follow moral rules. For Kant,
the motives of agents (or reasons for action) matter a great deal. One should per-
form the right action for the right reason, or one’s duty for duty’s sake (Pojman 1995).
Kantianism is a deontological theory because it holds that the rightness or wrongness
of an action depends not on its consequences but on its motives.
To decide what’s the right thing to do is in a particular situation, one must apply
a principle known as the categorical imperative (CI) to that situation (Kant 1753
[1981]). According to one version of the CI, the right thing to do is to follow a rule
for action that could become a universal law for all people. For example, suppose that
I am thinking about lying on grant application so that I can obtain the grant and con-
tinue my important medical research. The CI implies that I should not lie on the grant
application because lying could not become a universal rule for all people. If people
routinely lied to obtain their goals, then truth-telling would have no meaning and
communication between people would break down.
According to the respect-for-humanity version of CI, one should treat humanity,
whether in one’s own person or in another person, always as an end in itself and never
only as a means to another end. Lying to someone to achieve a goal would be wrong,
according to this version of the CI, because it would treat a person merely as a means
to obtaining a goal. The basic insight in this version of the CI is that all human beings
have intrinsic, equal moral dignity or worth and we should not abuse, manipulate,
harm, exploit, or deceive people in order to achieve specific goals. Kantianism implies
that we should not push the large person onto the trolley tracks to save six lives be-
cause we would be treating that person as a mere means and not respecting his or her
moral dignity and worth. As we discuss later in this book, the idea of respecting moral
dignity has important applications in the ethics of human research.
Kant distinguished between perfect and imperfect duties. Perfect duties are duties
that we should never disobey, while imperfect duties are duties we may disobey,
depending on our circumstances. We have perfect duties to not lie, break promises,
or murder, but imperfect duties to help others. Perfect duties trump imperfect ones
when conflicts occur.
One of the objections to Kantianism is that it seems to imply an absolutist morality
that is at odds with our commonsense moral intuitions and judgments about par-
ticular cases. Suppose that you live in the Netherlands during World War II and that
you have agreed to help a Jewish family escape from Nazi persecution. The family is
hiding in a secret compartment in your attic. A Nazi officer comes to your door and
asks you if there are any Jewish people in your house. Kantianism seems to imply that
you should not lie to the Nazi official because lying would violate the CI. You have
a perfect duty not to lie which takes precedence over your imperfect duty to help
others. However, most people would agree that it is ethical to lie for a good reason,
such as saving human life. Some scholars have tried to interpret Kantianism to avoid
the counter-intuitive implication that we should not lie to the Nazi official, but these
interpretations imply that Kantian moral rules have numerous exceptions, which
goes against the spirit of Kantianism.
Virtue Ethics
The virtue ethics approach has a long history dating to antiquity. Virtue theorists,
unlike Kantians and utilitarians, focus on developing good character traits rather
than following moral principles or rules. Their key insight is that ethical conduct has
to do with living a life marked by excellence and virtue (Aristotle 330 BCE [1984];
MacIntyre 1984; Pojman 1995). One develops morally good character traits by prac-
ticing them; that is, a person who acts honestly repeatedly develops the virtue of hon-
esty. Although virtue theorists do not emphasize the importance of moral duties, they
recognize that one way of becoming virtuous is by honoring one’s moral obligations
or duties. For example, a person who follows the rule “be honest” will become honest.
Some of the frequently mentioned virtues include honesty, loyalty, integrity, courage,
benevolence, fairness, humility, kindness, fairness, temperance, and wisdom. An
approach to moral theory derived from feminist philosophy, known as the ethics of
care, emphasizes the importance of care as a virtue in human relationships (Timmons
2012). We will mention the virtue ethics approach later in this book when we discuss
scientific mentoring because good mentors should model scientific virtues, such as
honesty, courage, flexibility, and fairness (Pellegrino 1992; Resnik 2013).
The main criticism of virtue ethics is that it does not provide one with adequate
guidance for dealing with ethical dilemmas (Timmons 2012). For example, suppose
you have promised to attend your daughter’s soccer game. Just before you leave for
the game, you notice that your neighbor has just collapsed in the yard. You could stay
with your neighbor and help her receive medical attention by taking her to the hos-
pital or possibly calling an ambulance. Either of these choices will result in missing
the game. Different virtues would favor different choices. The virtues of integrity and
loyalty would favor going to the game because you promised you would go, but the
virtue of benevolence would favor helping the neighbor. Some virtue ethicists have
argued that you can solve ethical dilemmas by following the example of a wise and
virtuous person and doing what they would do. However, this suggestion does not
solve the problem. The person one has in mind may never have encountered this par-
ticular ethical dilemma. Moreover, knowing what the virtuous person would does not
provide us with the knowledge needed to be accountable for our actions because we
would still not know how the virtuous person would think about and solve the ethical
dilemma. As we shall stress several times in this book, being accountable (i.e., being
able to give a coherent justification for one’s actions) is an important part of what it
means to be ethical.
Integrity
Integrity has become a frequently used buzzword in research ethics (Macrina 2013).
Scientists, scholars, and government or institutional officials frequently talk about
“threats to scientific integrity,” “promoting research integrity,” and so on. People use
this word often without defining it clearly. What does integrity in research mean? We
will distinguish between two different senses of “integrity”: a rule-following sense
and virtue sense. According to the rule-following sense, to act with integrity is to act
according to rules or principles. Integrity in science is a matter of understanding and
obeying the different legal, ethical, professional, and institutional rules that apply to
one’s conduct. Actions that do not comply with the rules of science threaten the integ-
rity of research. According to the virtue approach, integrity is a kind of meta-virtue.
We have the virtue of integrity insofar as our character traits, beliefs, decisions, and
actions form a coherent, consistent whole. If we have integrity, our actions reflect
our beliefs and attitudes; we “talk the talk” and “walk the walk” (Whitbeck 1998). We
think both senses of integrity can play an important role in discussions of research
ethics, and we will use them both throughout this book.
Justice
Justice (or fairness) is often an important issue in the ethics of research. Justice has dif-
ferent meanings, depending on the situation. When it comes to ethical choices made
by individuals, justice can be defined as giving a person what they are due (Miller
2017). For example, if a student has earned an “A” in the course, then justice requires
the professor to give the student a grade of “A.” If the evidence does not show beyond
a reasonable doubt that a person has committed a crime, then justice requires jurors
to vote “not guilty.” Justice includes distributive justice (i.e., distributing benefits/
opportunities and risks/burdens fairly), retributive justice (i.e., punishing people for
wrongdoing fairly), compensatory justice (i.e., compensating people for the harms),
and procedural justice (i.e., following fair procedures for making decisions relating to
matters of justice). Issues of distributive justice can arise in several areas of research
ethics, such as allocation of credit, treatment of colleagues, and inclusion of human
subjects in research. Some of the basic approaches to distributive justice include
distributing resources on the basis of merit (e.g., distribution of grades in school),
on the basis of need (e.g., medical triage, discussed above), on the basis of equality
or equality of opportunity (e.g., access to public education), on the basis of market
forces (e.g., distribution of consumer products, such as automobiles); or on the basis
of how the distribution affects the social good (e.g., utilitarianism, discussed above).
We will not discuss theories of justice in depth here (for further discussion see Miller
2017) but encourage students to think about questions of justice when making ethical
decisions.
Ethical Principles
In addition to these different theories, moral philosophers and theologians have
developed a variety of ethical principles (or general rules), which can be useful in
thinking about ethical questions, problems, and decisions. There are several advan-
tages of using ethical principles to frame ethical questions and problems and to make
ethical decisions. First, principles are usually easier to understand and apply than are
theories because they are not as abstract or complex as theories (Fox and DeMarco
1990). It is much easier to understand and apply a rule like “Don’t kill innocent
human beings” than Kant’s moral theory. Second, many ethical principles have wide-
spread theoretical and intuitive support (Beauchamp and Childress 2012). The prin-
ciple, “Don’t kill innocent human beings” is implied by many different moral theories,
including Kantian ethics, rule-utilitarianism, and virtue ethics. Different societies
around the world accept some version of this principle. In this book, we will defend a
principle-based approach to ethics in research.
We will now consider some principles pertaining to a particular area of conduct—
scientific research. To understand these principles, it is important to distinguish
between general ethical principles and special ethical principles. General ethical
principles (or morals) apply to all people in society. For example, the rule “be honest”
applies to everyone, regardless of their social role. Special ethical rules, however,
apply only to people who occupy specific social roles. Social roles include professions
(such as doctor or lawyer), positions (such as mayor or legislator), and relationships
(such as parent or sibling) (Bayles 1988). The rule “do not fabricate data” applies to
scientists but not necessarily to other social roles. As noted earlier, people who enter
a profession agree to abide by the special ethical rules of the profession. Special eth-
ical principles systematize our ethical judgments concerning particular social roles.
Special ethical principles are not simply an application of general ethical principles
to particular social roles. Instead, special principles consider the unique features of
social roles. In making judgments of right and wrong pertaining to social roles, we
draw on our understanding of the general principles of ethics and our understanding
of that social role. Special ethical principles should take into account the unique fea-
tures of that social role; that is, what it is, what it does. For example, a principle of
honesty in science takes into account the unique features of science that require hon-
esty, such as recording, reporting, or analyzing data. As a result, honesty in science
may be different from honesty in a different social role. For example, a scientist who
exaggerates the truth when reporting data would be acting unethically, but a person
who exaggerates the truth when describing a fish he caught might be acting ethically
(or at least acceptably!). Though both have a duty to be honest, honesty in science is
different from honesty in daily life interactions.
We now briefly describe some principles for ethical conduct in research and some
subsidiary rules.
Principles for Ethical Conduct in Research

1. Honesty: Honestly report data, results, methods and procedures, publication
status, research contributions, and conflicts of interest. Do not fabricate, fal-
sify, or misrepresent data in scientific communications, including grant pro-
posals, reports, publications, and curriculum vitae.
2. Objectivity: Strive for objectivity and reproducibility in experimental design,
data analysis, data interpretation, publication, peer review, personnel deci-
sions, grant writing, expert testimony, and other aspects of research where ob-
jectivity is expected or required.
3. Carefulness: Avoid careless errors and negligence. Carefully and critically ex-
amine your own work and the work of your peers. Keep good records of re-
search activities, such as data, research methods and designs, consent forms,
and correspondence with agencies or journals.
4. Credit: Allocate credit fairly on publications, patents, and other scientific and
scholarly works. Do not plagiarize.
5. Openness: Share data, results, ideas, tools, materials, and resources. Be open
to criticism and new ideas.
6. Transparency: Disclose materials, methods, experimental designs, conflicts of
interest, and other types of information needed to understand and evaluate
research.
7. Accountability: Take responsibility for your roles in research projects. Be pre-
pared to answer questions about what you did and why and cooperate with
audits and investigations of your research.
8. Confidentiality: Protect confidential communications, such as papers or
grants submitted for publication, personnel records, proprietary information,
and records that identify individual research subjects or patients.
9. Respect for colleagues: Treat scientific colleagues (e.g., collaborators, peers,
students, trainees, and research staff) with respect and professionalism. Do not
physically or psychologically harm, threaten, abuse, or intimidate colleagues.
10. Non-discrimination: Do not practice favoritism; treat colleagues fairly. Do
not discriminate against colleagues on the basis of sex, gender, sexual identity,
race, ethnicity, religion, disability, or other characteristics not related to scien-
tific qualifications.
11. Safety: Ensure that the research environment is safe. Take appropriate steps to
prevent, minimize, or mitigate physical, chemical, biological, and psychoso-
cial risks, including risks related to harassment or inappropriate conduct.
12. Respect for intellectual property: Honor patents, copyrights, and other forms
of intellectual property. Do not use unpublished data, methods, or results
without permission.
13. Intellectual freedom: Do not interfere with freedom of thought and inquiry,
and support the free expression of scientific information and ideas.
14. Protection of animals used in research: Protect the welfare of animals used in
research. Do not conduct animal experiments that are scientifically unneces-
sary, poorly designed, or needlessly cruel and inhumane.
15. Protection of human research subjects: Protect the rights, dignity, and wel-
fare of human research subjects. Obtain informed consent from competent,
adult subjects; minimize research harms and risks and maximize benefits; take
special precautions with vulnerable populations; and distribute the benefits
and burdens of research fairly.
16. Stewardship: Make good use of human, financial, and technological resources.
Take care of materials, tools, samples, populations, and research sites.
17. Respect for the law: Understand and comply with relevant laws and institu-
tional policies.
18. Professional responsibility: Maintain and improve your own professional
competence and expertise through lifelong education and learning. Take steps
to promote competence in science through mentoring, education, or leader-
ship. Report misconduct and illegal or unethical activities that threaten the
integrity of your institution or profession.
19. Social responsibility: Promote good social consequences and avoid or prevent
bad ones through research, consulting, expert testimony, public education,
and advocacy.
A few words about these principles are in order. First, many of these principles
may seem familiar to readers who have some experience with professional codes of
ethics in research (Shamoo and Resnik 2006a), government funding requirements,
oversight agencies, sponsors, or journal policies. Our principles complement but do
not undermine existing ethics codes and policies. Some readers may wonder whether
these principles are redundant or unnecessary because other rules and guidelines
have already been stated publicly. However, we think these principles have several
important uses. Because they may cover problems and issues not explicitly covered by
existing rules or guidelines, they can be helpful in interpreting or justifying existing
rules and guidelines, and they can apply to new and emerging disciplines or practices
that have not yet established ethical codes.
Second, the principles we describe here, like the other ethical principles, may con-
flict with each other or other rules or values in some circumstances. For example,
the principles of openness and confidentiality conflict when a researcher receives a
request to share data pertaining to private human data or biological samples. When
conflicts like this arise, researchers must prioritize principles in light of the relevant
facts. We discuss conflict resolution in greater detail below. Researchers who work
for private industry or the military may face restrictions on information sharing that
conflict with the principle of openness. In these situations, researchers must choose
between honoring their professional responsibilities and loyalty to the organization
and its goals and rules.
Third, the principles imply many different subsidiary rules. We have already stated
some of the rules above, and we will discuss others in this book. Subsidiary rules play
an important role in connecting general principles to specific decisions or actions
(Richardson 2000). For example, the principle “protection of human research sub-
jects” implies many different rules pertaining to informed consent that apply to par-
ticular situations involving consent (Richardson 2000).
Ethical Decision-Making
Having described some ethical theories and ethical principles for scientific research,
we are now ready to discuss ethical decision making (also known as moral reasoning).
Ethical decisions involve choices that have ethical implications. For example, choos-
ing between different flavors of ice cream is probably not an ethical decision because
the choice is a matter of personal preference, with almost no impact on other people.
However, purchasing an automobile probably is an ethical decision because the
choice can have a significant impact on other people and the environment. Because
many of our choices have some impact on other people, many of the choices we make
in life have ethical dimensions.
Ethical decisions that are particularly challenging are known as ethical dilemmas.
An ethical dilemma is a situation where two or more options appear to be equally
supported by different ethical theories, principles, rules, or values (Fox and DeMarco
1990). A person facing an ethical dilemma may find it difficult to decide what to do.
The six cases described at the beginning of this chapter all involve ethical dilemmas.
In the first case, the student is attempting to decide whether to do anything about
problems she has noticed with a diagram in a senior investigator’s published paper.
She suspects there may be an error or possibly something worse, such as data fabrica-
tion or falsification. What should she do?
The student has many different ways of making decisions that she could use: she
could consult an astrologer, psychic, a pollster; she could read tea leaves, flip a coin, or
pray; she could look for an answer on the internet using Google. A rational approach
to ethical decision-making is different from all these methods. A person who is using
a rational approach to make an ethical decision uses his or her judgment and intel-
lect to carefully examine the different options in light of the relevant facts and ethical
values. He or she considers the interests of all the affected parties and examines the
choice from different points of view. A rational, ethical decision need not be perfect,
but it should represent a sincere attempt to do the right thing for the right reason.
Making rational, ethical decisions is part of what it means to have integrity and ac-
countability in research.
Philosophers, ethicists, and other scholars have debated about three distinct
approaches to rational, ethical decision making: (a) a top-down, theory-based ap-
proach; (b) a bottom-up, case-based approach known as casuistry; and (c) a mid-
range, principle-based approach known as principlism (Beauchamp and Childress
2012). According to the top-down approach, to make a decision about what to do in
a particular situation one must appeal to a moral theory and infer a course of action
from the theory. If the theory says to choose a particular option instead of the alterna-
tives, then one should choose that option and implement it. The top-down approach
has been popular among moral philosophers for many years. While we agree that
theories can be an important part of an ethical analysis of a decision, they have signif-
icant limitations, as we have discussed earlier. Therefore, we do not recommend this
approach.
In response to problems with theory-based approaches to ethical reasoning, some
philosophers have defended a case-based approach known as casuistry (Johnsen and
Toulmin 1988; Strong 2000). According to this method of ethical decision making,
one should make decisions about particular cases by comparing those cases to pre-
vious cases. If cases are similar in relevant ways, then the decisions that one reaches
should be the same. If cases are different, then one should reach different decisions.
The method is like the case-based approach used in legal reasoning (known as stare
decisis), in which past cases set precedents for future ones. For example, to decide
whether one should exclude five data outliers from a data set, one should compare
this situation to previous cases in which the scientific community judged it was eth-
ical to exclude data outliers. If the current situation is similar to those other cases,
then excluding the data outliers is ethical and one may exclude them. If the current
situation is different from those previous cases or is similar to cases in which ex-
cluding outliers was regarded as unethical, then excluding the five outliers may be
unethical (Penslar 1995).
The casuist approach offers many useful insights for ethical decision making. First,
it emphasizes the importance of understanding and appreciating the facts and cir-
cumstances concerning cases. In ethics, the details matter. For example, the differ-
ence between appropriate exclusion of outliers and falsification of data often depends
on the details concerning methodology, analysis, and communication. The difference
between plagiarism and proper citation may come down to the placement of quo-
tation marks. Second, the casuist approach emphasizes the importance of learning
from the past and other cases. If we are to make any progress in ethics, we must learn
from past good decisions (and bad ones) (Strong 2000).
However, the casuist approach also has some flaws that hamper its ability to guide
ethical decision-making. First, the casuist approach has no systematic way of com-
paring cases (Resnik 2018). We need some method or procedure for determining
which features of a case are relevant for ethical analysis. For example, if we compare
two cases where authors have excluded data from a publication, what aspects of data
exclusion should we focus on? The percentage or amount of data excluded? The type
of data excluded? The effect of the data exclusion on the results? The date the data
were collected? To answer questions like these, we need ethical principles, rules, or
methods for comparing cases, but the casuist approach does not provide these.
Second, the casuist approach does not offer satisfactory justifications for ethical
decisions. People are frequently asked to justify (or be accountable for) their ethical
decisions to colleagues, supervisors, governmental officials, or the public. To jus-
tify his or her conduct, a person should be able to do more than explain how he/she
examined cases—the person should also be able to explain how the decision followed
from a rule or principle that transcends those cases (Gibbard 1992). For example, a
researcher who wants to defend herself from the charge of plagiarism should be able
to do more than say that her conduct is similar to other cases that were not regarded
as plagiarism; she should also be able to explain why her conduct does not fit the defi-
nition of plagiarism and therefore does not violate any rules against plagiarism.
Some proponents of casuistry have responded to objections like those mentioned
above by admitting that casuistic reasoning needs to be supplemented with rules or
principles. But making this admission changes the approach from a pure case-based
method to one that appears to be principle-based. Indeed, there would seem to be
very little difference between casuistry that includes rules or principles and principle-
based approaches (Iltis 2000).
We therefore favor the principle-based approach for many of the reasons noted
above. Ethical principles are less controversial than ethical theories. They are also
easier to interpret and apply. Ethical principles provide a framework for comparing
different cases. So, the principle-based approach does not have the same problems as
the other two approaches. One of the most influential books in bioethics, Beauchamp
and Childress’s Principles of Biomedical Ethics (2012), takes a principle-based ap-
proach to ethical problems in medicine and health care. We are following their ex-
ample by articulating a principle-based approach to ethical problems in scientific
research (Shamoo and Resnik 2006b).
The principle-based approach is not flawless, however. Because it straddles the
fence between theory-based and case-based approaches, it is susceptible to attacks
from both sides. Proponents of theory-based approaches argue that principle-based
approaches are nothing but a hodgepodge of different standards. Principle-based
approaches have no way of settling conflicts among principles—they lack philosoph-
ical unity and coherence (Gert 2007). Proponents of case-based approaches argue
that principle-based approaches are too abstract and general to provide sufficient
guidance for ethical decision making. Principle-based approaches are not practical
enough (Strong 2000). We acknowledge these problems but think the principle-
based approach can overcome them (for further discussion, see Beauchamp and
Childress 2012).
Having made these general comments about rational, ethical decision making,
we now describe a method for making ethical decisions. We do not claim to be the
originators of this method, because many other writers have described methods very
similar to this one (Beauchamp and Childress 2001; Swazey and Bird 1997; Fox and
DeMarco 1990; Whitbeck 1996; Shamoo and Resnik 2006a). Nevertheless, it will be
useful to review the method here and make some clarifying comments.
A Method for Ethical Decision-Making

Our method for ethical decision making involves six steps:
Step 1: Define the problem, question, or issue.

Step 2: Gather relevant information.
Step 3: Explore the viable options.
Step 4: Apply ethical principles, institutional policies, or other rules or guidelines
to the different options.
Step 5: Resolve conflicts among principles, policies, rules, or guidelines.
Step 6: Make a decision and take action.
For an illustration, consider the first case study. The student’s problem, question, or
issue is to decide whether to do anything about the discrepancy she noticed between
the diagram and the original data. She is not sure whether she should report this as
possible misconduct or who she should contact about this. The information she could
gather would be more information about the research: how it was conducted; the
methodology; how the data were gathered, reported, analyzed, etc. She could obtain
this information by talking to her supervisor or other people involved with the re-
search project. She would have several options, including doing nothing, talking to
the investigator more about it, talking to other students or researchers, talking to the
department head, and possibly making an allegation of misconduct. The ethical prin-
ciples that apply include professional responsibility (i.e., here duty to report conduct
that violates laws, ethical standards, or institutional policies) and self-protection (she
could experience adverse career consequences, such as retaliation or loss of her posi-
tion or funding, if she takes some action against the investigator). The student’s pro-
fessional responsibility conflicts with her interest in self-protection because she may
face adverse consequences if she takes action against her supervisor. To resolve this
conflict, she will need to decide whether taking some action against the investigator is
worth the price she may pay. It may turn out that she has misunderstood the problem,
or it is an innocent mistake, it which case she may face no adverse consequences. But
it is also possible that some harm could come to her if she blows the whistle on her
supervisor. She could also face adverse consequences if she does nothing about the
situation because she is an author on the paper and might be implicated if someone
else makes a misconduct allegation.
Resolving conflicts is often the most difficult part of this method because it involves
balancing different principles, policies, rules, or guidelines and deciding which one
should have greater weight. Sometimes conflicts can be resolved when a legal require-
ment conflicts with other principles, rules, policies, or guidelines. If a particular op-
tion would require one to violate the law, then that option should not be pursued
unless one has a very strong ethical reason for breaking the law, such as protecting
people from harm. Sometimes one can resolve conflicts by obtaining additional in-
formation or exploring options one has not considered. In Case 1, the conflict might
be resolved if the student obtains more information and discovers that she perceived
a discrepancy between the data and the diagram because she did not fully under-
stand the method of data analysis described in the paper. The conflict might also be
resolved if the student contacts someone at the institution who provides advice on
ethical or legal issues in research, such as a research compliance officer or a research
integrity official.
However, it is frequently the case that conflicts persist even when one has con-
sidered legal requirements and one has examined all the relevant information and
viable options. One strategy for resolving a difficult conflict would be to consider how
ethical theories might suggest a resolution. If the student in Case 1 takes a Kantian
perspective on her dilemma, she could ask whether any of the options could become a
universal rule for all researchers. The option of doing nothing would probably fail this
test, because if everyone decided not to do anything about problems they discover
with research, the entire research enterprise would collapse. Science is a self-correct-
ing process that depends heavily on peer review, criticism, and debate. For science
to be self-correcting, scientists need to call attention to problems they discover with
research. So, a Kantian perspective would favor doing something about the problem.
If the student takes a utilitarian perspective on the problem, she could consider the
different consequences for all those impacted by the different options, such as her-
self, the investigator, the institution, the scientific community, and society. While the
option of doing nothing might protect her from harm, it would probably yield more
bad consequences than good ones; the scientific community could be harmed if erro-
neous research is published, and society could be harmed if the erroneous informa-
tion leads to medical decisions that place patients at risk. If the student takes a virtue
ethics approach to the issue, she could ask herself what a good (or virtuous) scientist
would do in the situation. The virtue ethics approach probably also would not favor
the option of doing nothing because this option would reflect a lack of courage and
integrity.
Before concluding our discussion of this ethical decision-making procedure, a few
comments are in order. First, this procedure is an idealization. Real-world decisions
sometimes deviate from this stepwise progression. For example, a person may for-
mulate a problem and then start gathering information, only to realize that they need
to reformulate the problem; a person may apply ethical principles and resolve con-
flicts simultaneously, and so on. Second, this method has limitations. This method
requires decision-makers to use their reasoning skills to make decisions, but other
factors often play a key role in decision making, such as emotion, intuition, culture,
and religion (NASEM 2014, 2017). Although we believe that people should try their
best to use reasoning to solve ethical dilemmas, we recognize that human reasoning
has limitations. If one cannot make a decision after diligently following the method
we have outlined here, then it may be appropriate to appeal to some other source of
guidance. Third, using this reasoning method to analyze a choice does not preclude
one from bringing other reasoning methods to bear on the choice, such as economic
or legal analysis. Ethics does not have exclusive dominion over practical choices.
This concludes our first chapter. Although we may not specifically address else-
where in this book many of the topics included in this chapter, we expect that students
and teachers will be able to use the foundational material in thinking about and ana-
lyzing the cases, rules, and applications discussed in the remainder of the book.
Questions for Discussion

1. Do you think that most scientists and science students are ethical?
2. When, how, and why are scientists tempted to violate ethical standards in
research?
3. What situations in science present the most difficult ethical problems and
dilemmas?
4. Do you think researchers should adhere to the same ethical standards that
apply to other professions, such as medicine or law? Why or why not?
5. Do you think researchers have ethical duties and responsibilities “over and
above” the ethical obligations of ordinary people?
6. Can you think of any principles to add to our list of principles for ethical re-
search conduct? What would they be, and how would they be justified? Do you
think our list contains some principles that should be omitted or reworded?
7. Is reasoning the best method for making an ethical decision? Why or why not?
8. Do you think that ethical theories and principles have some bearing on prac-
tical choices and decisions? Why or why not?
9. How should one resolve conflicts among ethical principles? Do you agree with
our approach to conflict resolution?
10. What ethical principles are most important in society? In science? Why?
Cases for Discussion

Case 1: The Trolley Problem (Variations)
Would you not pull the lever if the person on the sidetrack were an important scien-
tist, medical professional, or community leader, or a close family member? Suppose
the large man on the footbridge is a convicted murderer who recently escaped from
prison. Would that make any difference to how you think about this situation? Would
it make any difference to how you think about this situation if the people on the tracks
were close family members? If they were convicted murderers?
Case 2: The Lifeboat
Suppose you are the first mate on a ship that has sunk and 10 people, including your-
self, were able to escape on a lifeboat. The other people are presumed dead. You are
hundreds of miles away from the shore and the chances of immediate rescue are slim.
You are in charge of the lifeboat. There is only enough food and water for nine people
for one week. One person must exit the lifeboat (with a lifejacket) to give the others a
good chance of surviving. No one wants to volunteer to leave the lifeboat. The people
on the lifeboat besides you are a 12-year-old boy and his father, a six-month old infant
girl and her mother, an 70-year-old biomedical researcher, a 45-year-old doctor, a 22-
year-old crewman from the ship, a 35-year-old unemployed actor, and a 50-year-old
lawyer. Should you order someone to leave the boat? If so, who should leave? How
would the different theories of ethics or justice approach this decision?
2
Misconduct in Research
In the previous chapter we provided a general overview of the ethical conduct of research,
including a review of some theories, principles, and a decision-making procedure. In
this chapter, we begin our discussion of specific ethical issues in research by focusing on
research misconduct in the United States and to a lesser extent in other countries. We
believe it is important to discuss misconduct in research before considering other topics
because misconduct has more of an detrimental impact on the research enterprise than
any other type of behavior. Misconduct has also received considerable scrutiny from pol-
iticians and the public. To promote the ethical conduct of research, it is important to un-
derstand what misconduct is, how it is caused, and how it can be prevented.
Although breaches of scientific integrity have happened for many years, a book
written by two science journalists over 40 years ago, William Broad and Nicholas
Wade’s Betrayers of the Truth: Fraud and Deceit in the Halls of Science (1982 [1993]),
played an important role in increasing public awareness of research misconduct. The
authors recounted both historical and current cases of scientific fraud and criticized
the scientific community for its indifference to the problem. According to the authors,
Galileo made the data for falling objects appear better than they really were; Isaac
Newton made his experimental results fit his theories better by fudging his predic-
tions on the velocity of sound, the procession of equinoxes, and gravitational forces;
John Dalton cleaned up his data on the ratios of chemical reactions, which remain
hard to replicate; Gregor Mendel manipulated the heredity ratios on his experiments
with peas; Robert Millikan selectively reported oil drop data on his calculation of
electronic charges; and even Louis Pasteur was guilty of announcing the efficacy of his
anthrax vaccine before he completed his experiments (Broad and Wade 1982 [1993];
Geison 1978, 1995; Shamoo and Annau 1987).
In this chapter, we discuss some contemporary and historical cases of research mis-
conduct or alleged misconduct that have impacted the scientific community and the
public. Some of these cases have been widely publicized by the media, while others have
appeared only as footnotes (Broad and Wade 1982 [1993]; Shamoo and Annau 1987).
Some Famous Cases of Misconduct or

Alleged Misconduct
Among the most famous historical examples of misconduct is the story of the
Piltdown Man. In 1908, museum curator Charles Dawson discovered a skull in at
Responsible Conduct of Research. Adil E. Shamoo and David B. Resnik, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press
2022. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197547090.003.0002
Misconduct in Research 27
Piltdown gravel bed near Surrey, UK. The skull appeared to be the fossilized remains
of a species in between humans and apes; that is, “a missing link.” This sensational
scientific discovery was soon reported in major newspapers. At the time of the dis-
covery, the curator’s colleagues had accepted his findings without critical appraisal,
largely because “the researchers [had] shaped reality to their heart’s desire, protecting
their theories, their careers, their reputations, all of which they lugged into the pit
with them” (Blinderman 1986, 235). However, a controversy surrounded the skull
for decades and many scientists believed it to be a fake. Chemical analyses performed
in 1953 confirmed these suspicions by showing that the skull is a combination of a
human skull and orangutan jaw, which had been treated with chemicals to make
them appear old. The identity of the forger is still unknown, though most historians
suspect Dawson (Barbash 1996; Shreeve 2009).
Skipping ahead to 1974, William Summerlin admitted to fabricating data in
skin transplant experiments he was conducting at the Sloan Kettering Institute in
New York. Summerlin joined the transplantation immunology laboratory of Robert
Good at Sloan Kettering in 1973. Good was one of the country’s top immunologists.
Summerlin hypothesized that growing tissues in culture for several weeks prior to
transplantation could prevent tissue rejection. In an experiment designed to answer
critics of his work, Summerlin “transplanted” cultured skin patches from black-
haired mice onto white-haired mice. While cleaning the mice, a laboratory assistant
observed that alcohol could wash away the black hair color on the white mice. The
assistant reported this to Good, who suspended Summerlin and initiated an inves-
tigation. Summerlin soon confessed that he had drawn patches of black hair on the
white mice with a black felt-tip pen. The committee conducting the investigation of
Summerlin also found that he had fabricated data relating to several other “transplan-
tation” experiments. The committee required Summerlin to take a medical leave of
absence (for mental health problems), publish retractions, and correct irregularities
in his work. The scandal ruined Good’s career even though he was innocent of any
wrongdoing (Hixson 1976).
Between 1980 and 1983, Dr. Stephen Breuning of the University of Pittsburgh pub-
lished 24 papers funded by a National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) grant to
study powerful neuroleptic antipsychotic drugs for the treatment of retarded patients.
The overseer of the grant was Dr. Robert L. Sprague, director of the Institute of Child
Behavior and Development. Breuning’s results questioned the use of neuroleptics
in intellectually disabled children and led to a change in their clinical management
nationally (Garfield 1990). In a renewal application for a four-year extension to the
grant, Breuning submitted additional new data. Sprague questioned these data and
informed NIMH of his concerns. According to Sprague, NIMH’s first response was
slow and accusatory. Ultimately, Sprague’s frustration with NIMH spilled over to the
media and led to congressional hearings, led by Representative John Dingell. Dingell’s
hearing investigated numerous cases of fraud in U.S. government-funded research.
Meanwhile, Breuning remained active and funded. Finally, a NIMH panel in 1987
found that Breuning had committed scientific misconduct by reporting nonexistent
patients, fabricating data, and including falsified results in a grant application. The
panel recommended barring Breuning from receiving any grants from the U.S. Public
Health Service (PHS), including NIMH, and referred him for criminal prosecution.
Breuning was convicted in 1988—the first scientist to receive such action. He was
sentenced to 60 days of imprisonment, five years of probation, and was ordered to pay
$11,352 in restitution to the University of Pittsburgh. During this process, Sprague
lost all funding for his grants and was investigated by the NIMH. He was ultimately
cleared of wrongdoing (Shamoo and Annau 1989; Monson 1991; Sprague 1991,
Wilcox 1992).
During the early 1980s, Robert Gallo, from the National Cancer Institute of NIH,
and Luc Montagnier from the Pasteur Institute in France, were both working on iso-
lating a virus thought to cause acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). They
cooperated at first and exchanged cell samples infected with different strains of the
virus. They agreed to publish their articles on the human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV) together in Science in 1984, but Gallo started to receive top billing. Later,
when tests revealed that the two different strains were nearly genetically identical,
Montagnier accused Gallo of stealing his strain and claiming it as his own. Gallo was
investigated for misconduct but exonerated. Apparently, a third, vigorous strain from
Montagnier’s lab had contaminated both of their samples, which explains their ge-
netic similarity. Failure to keep good laboratory notebooks and maintain good lab-
oratory practices contributed to the difficulties related to the resolution of this case.
The U.S. and French governments also reached an agreement naming both scientists
as co-discovers and sharing patent rights between both institutes for the HIV blood
test (Cohen 1991; Culliton 1990).
In 1986, Thereza Imanishi-Kari and four co-authors at the Whitehead Institute
(operated by Tufts and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology), published a now
famous paper in the journal Cell (Weaver et al. 1986). Among the authors was the
winner of the 1975 Nobel Prize in Medicine, David Baltimore. The paper claimed to
show that foreign genes had stimulated the production of large amounts of antibodies
by the genes in normal mice, which was considered to be a remarkable achievement at
that time. However, Margot O’Toole, a postdoctoral fellow working in Imanishi-Kari’s
laboratory, was not able to reproduce a key part of the experiment, and she asked to
see Imanishi-Kari’s laboratory notebook. When O’Toole could not reconcile data re-
corded in the notebook with what was reported in the paper, she accused Imanishi-
Kari of fabricating data. An internal investigation found no misconduct, but Dingell’s
Congressional committee began looking into the case, as did “fraud busters” Walter
Stewart and Ned Feder. Stewart and Feder’s analysis of the case triggered an investiga-
tion by NIH’s Office of Scientific Integrity (Stewart and Feder 1987, 1991). The story
made the front pages of the New York Times. NIH found that Imanish-Kari com-
mitted misconduct, but this finding was later overturned by a Department of Health
and Human Services (DHHS) appeals panel in 1996, which said there was not enough
evidence to prove misconduct. Though Baltimore was not implicated in misconduct,
his reputation was damaged, and he resigned as President of Rockefeller University.
During the Congressional hearings, he defended Imanishi-Kari and described the
whole matter as a witch hunt. Imanishi-Kari has maintained she did nothing wrong,
except poor record-keeping (Friedly 1996a, 1996b; Kevles 1996; Baltimore 1991;
Eisen 1991; Hamilton 1991; Imanishi-Kari 1991; Kuznik 1991).
In 1993, Roger Poisson, a Professor of Surgery at the University of Montreal,
admitted to fabricating and falsifying data for patients enrolled in NIH-funded
National Surgical Adjuvant Breast and Bowel Project (NSABP) between 1977 and
1990. For over a decade, NASBP statisticians noticed some irregularities in Poisson’s
records, but they did not realize that he had been fabricating and falsifying data until
an audit of Poisson’s research found that he had altered the records of 117 patients to
allow them to qualify for the study. Poisson had altered his patients’ medical data to
ensure that they would meet the enrollment criteria for the study. He defended his
actions by claiming he was altering records so that patients could get access to ex-
perimental therapies, which he believed would benefit them. NSABP investigators
reanalyzed the data after removing Poisson’s patients from the dataset and found that
his misconduct had no impact on the overall results. The Poisson case spurred efforts
to reform Canada’s research ethics policies (Angell and Kassirer 1994).
In the late 1990s, editors of Chinese scientific journals became concerned about
widespread plagiarism and other types of misconduct in papers published in their
journals. At that time, however, China did not have adequate procedures for re-
porting and investigating research misconduct. In 2001, to provide a means for
Chinese researchers to make misconduct accusations, Shimin Fang, a Chinese bi-
ochemist living in San Diego, launched a Chinese website known as New Threads,
where he posted allegations, including anonymous ones. The website included allega-
tions against many top Chinese scientists, including Xiaoqing Qiu and Yuquan Wei
from Sichuan University and Jin Chen from Shanghai Jiaotong University. Although
the website performed a valuable service by exposing misconduct and corruption in
science, it was controversial in China because it did not follow adequate due pro-
cess procedures and ruined the reputations of researchers who were falsely accused
of misconduct. In 2006, the Chinese government responded to this scandal by adopt-
ing rules and procedures for reporting and investigating research misconduct and
developing programs for educating students in research integrity (Zeng and Resnik
2010). However, research integrity remains a serious concern in China due to factors
in the research environment that encourage misbehavior, such as intense competition
for jobs, quantitative assessments of research productivity, and financial incentives to
publish in high-impact journals (Yang 2013).
In 2002, Jan Hendrik Schön, a rising star in the fields of condensed matter physics
and nanotechnology at the world-renowned Bell Laboratories, was found by a group
of independent investigators to have faked data in at least 17 publications (Service
2002). His publication rate was astounding—he published a paper every eight days.
His publications appeared in most highly prestigious journals, such as Science, Nature,
and Physical Review Letters. Since 2002, 28 of his papers have been withdrawn from
journals. In 2004, the University of Konstanz withdrew Schön’s PhD, after finding that
his dissertation was also fraudulent. This large-scale fabrication and falsification of
data is considered the most extensive scientific misconduct in the physical sciences in
recent memory (Reich 2009).
In 2004 and 2005, Woo Suk Hwang, a Professor at Seoul University in South Korea,
published two papers in the journal Science reporting the derivation of human em-
bryonic stem (HES) cell lines by therapeutic cloning (Hwang et al. 2004; Hwang et al.
2005). The papers claimed that the HES cell lines produced by this process were ge-
netically identical to the donor somatic cells. Hwang had assistance from numerous
colleagues at Seoul University and other collaborators. The two papers, especially
the second one, had a tremendous impact on the stem cell research field. Hwang
attainted international recognition for his work and became a national hero. Hwang,
a veterinarian by training, had published previous papers on cloning dogs and cows.
In November 2005, one of Hwang’s collaborators on the 2005 paper, University of
Pittsburgh scientist Gerald Schatten, accused Hwang of misleading him about the
source of the eggs used in the experiments. Hwang admitted that some of the eggs
had been provided by women working in his laboratory, a practice that was legal in
South Korea but is regarded by many as unethical because using research subjects
who are subordinates can be coercive. Hwang later admitted that egg donors were
paid as much as $1,400 (Resnik et al. 2006).
In December 2005, the editors of Science received an anonymous tip that two of
the images of HES cells published in the 2005 paper were duplications. Later, one of
Hwang’s co-authors, Sung Roh, told the media that Hwang had fabricated nine of
the 11 cell lines presented in the paper. Hwang asked for the article to be withdrawn
from Science, and a committee from Seoul University began investigating the 2005
paper and Hwang’s other publications. The committee determined that none of HES
cell lines were genetically identical to somatic donor cells. The committee also found
that Hwang had used 273 eggs, not 185 as reported, and that the cell lines in the 2004
paper were also fabricated. The committee also found that Hwang had been involved
in the egg procurement process—Hwang had helped donors fill out forms and had
escorted them to clinics for egg removal—and that authorship on the 2004 and 2005
papers had been granted for minor contributions to the research. Hwang resigned
his position at Seoul University at the end of December 2005. In May 2006, Hwang
and five collaborators were convicted of charges of fraud, embezzlement ($3 mil-
lion), and breach of bioethics laws, but their sentence was suspended (Whon and
Normile 2006).
In 2006, a committee at the University of Pittsburgh examined Schatten’s collab-
oration with Hwang. The committee found that Schatten played no role in the data
fabrication but that he had shirked his authorship responsibilities by failing to care-
fully review the data and the manuscript. The committee also found that Schatten had
accepted unusually large consulting fees ($40,000) for his role in assisting Hwang’s
research group (Resnik et al. 2006).
Following the Hwang affair, the editors at Science decided to review their peer-
review policies to try to prevent similar scandals from occurring in the future.
Although peer review is not designed to catch fraud, the editors were embarrassed
that an obvious problem (two duplicate images) had slipped through their peer-re-
view process. The editors decided to start giving high-impact papers extra scrutiny,
and to pay greater attention to digital images (Kennedy 2006). Other journals have
also revised their peer-review (Committee on Publication Ethics 2020) and miscon-
duct policies in response to the Hwang affair. The Committee on Publication Ethics
(COPE) has also developed some guidelines and rules to help journals deal with mis-
conduct (Committee on Publication Ethics 20013.
In 2006, a group of graduate students at the University of Wisconsin, after much
soul-searching, accused their doctoral adviser, geneticist Elizabeth Goodwin, of fal-
sifying data on three grant applications. Although many faculty members did not be-
lieve these allegations, an investigation by the university confirmed the allegations
and the university referred the matter to the Office of Research Integrity (ORI). ORI
barred Goodwin from receiving federal funding for research for three years. Goodwin
was also prosecuted for fraud and was ordered to pay the U.S. government $100,000
and was sentenced to two years of probation. The scandal had a devastating impact
on the careers Goodwin’s graduate students. Three of the students with many years in
graduate school quit the university. One student moved to a different university, and
two others started their graduate education anew (Couzin 2006). This case illustrates
the importance of protecting whistleblowers not only from retaliation but also from
negative career consequences (Allen and Dowell 2013).
Eric Poehlman was a tenured professor at the University of Vermont (1987–1993;
1996–2001), a professor at University of Maryland (1993–1996), and held an endowed
chair at University of Montreal (2001–2005). He resigned his position in Canada in
2005 after a lengthy investigation by the University of Vermont and ORI found that
he had falsified or fabricated data on 15 federal grant applications (totaling $2.9 mil-
lion) and 17 publications (Office of Research Integrity 2005a, 2005b). On March 17,
2005, Poehlman admitted his guilt and accepted a comprehensive criminal, civil, and
administrative settlement. Under the terms of the settlement, he agreed that he com-
mitted scientific misconduct, that he would pay $180,000 in restitution and $16,000 to
the lawyer of the whistleblower, that he would be barred for life from receiving federal
grants, and that he would correct the scientific literature. On June 29, 2006, he was
sentenced to serve one year and one day in federal prison. The University of Vermont
investigation was prompted by allegations made by his research assistant, Walter
F. Denino, who became suspicious when Poehlman made inappropriate corrections
in Excel spreadsheets. During the investigation, Poehlman destroyed evidence, fal-
sified documents, and presented false testimony (Office of Research Integrity 2005a,
2005b).
In 1998, the journal The Lancet published a paper by British surgeon and researcher
Andrew Wakefield and authors claiming that 12 normal children developed gastro-
intestinal disease and developmental regression after receiving the measles, mumps,
and rubella (MMR) vaccine. The paper speculated that exposure to the MMR vac-
cine is a possible cause of autism (Wakefield et al. 1998). The anti-vaccine commu-
nity seized on the paper as proof that vaccines can cause autism and other problems,
and vaccination rates in the UK and other countries declined significantly. In 2004,
journalist Brian Deer began investigating Wakefield’s work. In February 2004, he
published an article in the Sunday Times accusing Wakefield of not disclosing a signif-
icant conflict of interest and not obtaining ethics board approval for the study. Deer
found that Wakefield’s research was financially supported by a law firm preparing a
lawsuit against MMR manufacturers and that a lawyer from the firm helped to recruit
research participants (Godlee et al. 2011). In 2010, the UK General Medical Council
(GMC) investigated Wakefield and concluded that he had acted dishonestly by failing
to disclose a significant conflict of interest, and that he had ordered risky medical
procedures, such as colonoscopies, colon biopsies, and lumbar punctures, without
appropriate pediatric qualifications or approval from his hospital’s ethics committee.
The GMC revoked Wakefield’s medical license. In 2010, The Lancet retracted the
paper. In 2011, the British Medical Journal published an article by Deer alleging that
Wakefield had falsified data in the study. He reviewed the medical records and found
that in nine cases, unremarkable pathology results were changed to colitis. Three of
the children did not have autism at all and only one had regressive autism. Five of the
children had developmental problems prior to the study (Deer 2011). Wakefield con-
tinues to maintain his innocence and has sued Deer and the British Medical Journal
for libel. He also advises anti-vaccine groups.
Anil Potti, a researcher at Duke University Medical Center (DUMC), and 16 other
authors published a paper in Nature Medicine in 2006 that described a statistical
model for using the genomic characteristics of tumors to predict responses to chemo-
therapy. Joseph Nevins, also at DUMC, was the senior author on the paper and prin-
cipal investigator on the NIH-funded project. The researchers had submitted patent
applications on Potti’s method to the U.S. Patent Office. The patents, if awarded, would
be assigned to DUMC, and the researchers would receive a share of the royalties.
In 2007, three biostatisticians, Kevin Coombes, Jing Wang, Keith Baggerly, pub-
lished a commentary in Nature Medicine claiming that the paper contained numerous
errors and problems with the software used in the statistical modeling. They discov-
ered these problems when they could not reproduce Potti’s results. Potti submitted a
correction to the journal but did not withdraw the paper (Resnik 2018).
In 2008, Braford Perez, a third-year medical student who was working with Potti
and Nevins, began questioning Potti’s research after he received critical comments
from peer reviewers on a paper he had submitted to a journal, which was based on
Potti’s work. Perez found problems with Potti’s data and statistical model and brought
his concerns to Nevins and DUMC administrators, who discouraged him from
bringing a misconduct allegation against Potti. They said that the problems Perez
had discovered amounted to a scientific disagreement, not misconduct. They also
warned Perez that making an allegation would harm his career and DUMC’s reputa-
tion (Resnik 2018).
Meanwhile, DUMC had started clinical trials using Potti’s statistical model to guide
cancer treatment decisions. When Coombes and his coauthors learned about this,
they informed the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at DUMC about their concerns
with the research. The IRB temporarily suspended the clinical trials but restarted
them again after a review found no problems with the research (Resnik 2018).
In 2010, The Cancer Letter reported that Potti had falsely claimed he was a Rhodes
Scholar on grant applications to the NIH and the American Cancer Society and his
curriculum vitae. DUMC then initiated a misconduct investigation against Potti and
found that he had fabricated and falsified data reported in the Nature Medicine paper.
ORI concurred with DUMC’s findings and ordered Potti to retract the paper. DUMC
also terminated Potti’s employment and settled a lawsuit with patients who claimed
they were harmed as a result of participating in the clinical trails. In 2011, the North
Carolina Medical Board reprimanded Potti but did not take away his license to prac-
tice medicine (Resnik 2018). The patent office denied Potti’s patent application.
On August 20, 2010, an investigation by Harvard University determined that psy-
chologist Marc Hauser (ORI 2012) fabricated and falsified data in three published
papers. The investigation became public after the Boston Globe reported the story.
Investigations are supposed to be confidential until a federal agency has made a de-
termination, but this story was leaked to the public (Wade 2010). Hauser resigned
from Harvard on August 1, 2011. ORI concluded its investigation in 2012 and deter-
mined that Hauser had fabricated data in a published paper and falsified results in an
unpublished study. ORI said that his misconduct was reckless but not intentional or
knowing. This is one of the few cases where an investigator has been found to have
committed misconduct recklessly. Hauser’s papers have been corrected or retracted
(Office of Research Integrity 2012). Hauser has only admitted that he made mistakes
and regrets what happened. Hauser’s disputed experiments involved inferring a mon-
key’s thoughts or expectations from observations of how the monkeys react to sensory
stimuli. Hauser videotaped the monkey’s behavior and developed a coding system for
interpreting it. His graduate students accused him of misconduct after they reviewed
the videotapes and determined that they did not match the data entered into Hauser’s
data spreadsheets (Wade 2010).
Joachim Boldt, an anesthetist at Klinikum Ludwigshafen, an academic teaching
hospital in Germany, published hundreds of articles (about one per month) during
the 1990s and early 2000s. Boldt’s research on using colloids to boost blood volume
during surgery was highly influential. In 2009, readers raised some issues with the
data reported in an article Boldt had published in Anesthesia and Analgesia. The read-
ers were concerned that the data may have been fabricated because they did not ex-
hibit the type of variation one usually sees in real data. The journal’s editor, Stephen
Shafer, contacted Boldt about these concerns, but Boldt did not respond. Because
Shafer did not have the legal authority to launch a research misconduct investiga-
tion against Boldt, in 2010 he brought these concerns to the state medical association,
Landesärztekammer Rheinland-Pfalz. The medical association formed a committee
to investigate Boldt’s research. The committee found that Boldt had fabricated data
in the disputed study and had forged copyright signatures for coauthors and had not
obtained ethics board approval for numerous studies. After the committee made its
initial findings, Klinikum Ludwigshafen terminated Boldt’s employment and journals
began retracting his articles. In 2012, the committee concluded its investigation and
referred the matter to the criminal prosecutor, but Boldt fled the country (Wise 2013).
To date, a total of 118 Boldt’s articles have been retracted (Retraction Watch 2020a).
In January 2011, Milena Penkowa, a professor of neuroscience at the University
of Copenhagen in Denmark, resigned her position after being found guilty of re-
search misconduct and financial fraud. The university returned two million kroner
to a research foundation which had funded her work. Nine of Penkowa’s papers were
retracted. The University of Copenhagen also retracted her doctoral degree after
finding that she had claimed to have performed animal experiments that never took
place. Penkowa’s students brought misconduct allegations against her after they were
unable to reproduce her work (Callaway 2011; Marcus 2020).
In March 2014, Haruko Obokata, a biochemist at the RIKEN Center for
Developmental Biology in Kobe, Japan, published two “ground-breaking” papers in
Nature (with coauthors), which described a process for using chemical stimulation
and physical stress to convert adult spleen cells in mice into pluripotent stem cells.
Researchers at the RIKEN Center accused Obokata of misconduct when they were
unable to reproduce the results. An investigation by the RIKEN center found that
Obokata had fabricated and falsified data in both papers. Shortly after the investiga-
tion concluded, Obokata resigned her position and Nature retracted the papers. Later
that year, Obokata’s advisor, Yoshiki Sasai, committed suicide (Cyranoski 2015).
Although misconduct continues to occur in science, most scientists are aware of the
importance of dealing with the problem and are taking steps to prevent it. Scientists
and public officials have responded to these and other highly publicized misconduct
cases in several ways. In the United States, Congressional committees have held hear-
ings on integrity in federally funding research; funding agencies have developed pol-
icies on misconduct, conflict of interest, and other integrity issues (discussed below),
required instruction in responsible conduct of research (RCR) (discussed below),
and supported research on research integrity; research institutions have adopted in-
tegrity policies (discussed below) and developed RCR programs of instruction; scien-
tists have conducted research on research integrity and have educated and mentored
students in RCR; and professional societies have developed codes of conduct. In
1992, PHS consolidated the Office of Scientific Integrity and the Office of Scientific
Integrity Review into ORI. ORI oversees the integrity of research in PHS-funded
studies (NIH-funded research is supported by PHS). The office reviews misconduct
reports made by PHS-funded institutions, conducts its own investigations, supports
research on research integrity, provides guidance for investigators and institutions,
and publishes educational materials (Office of Research Integrity 2011). The Office of
Inspector General (OIG) oversees research integrity in National Science Foundation
(NSF)-funded research.
Although the U.S. has taken the lead on research integrity issues, other countries
have also developed policies and implemented educational and oversight programs
(Ana et al. 2013; Resnik et al. 2015b). In 2010, 340 individuals from 51 countries
signed the Singapore Statement on Research Integrity (2010), an ethical code for the
Another random document with
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Mountaineering in Dauphiné
1894
Wet weather at Kandersteg—Fly-fishing there—The fisherman’s fear of a precipice
—Birrenhorn ascent—Ascent of the Blümlis-Alphorn—Chateau at Vizille—La
Bérarde in the Dauphiné—Accident to a guide’s tongue—Traverse of the
Pointe des Ecrins—Guide’s hand benumbed—Wild and impressive scenery—
Ascent of the Grande Aiguille—A frost-bitten porter—My ascent of the Meije
with a broken rib—The heel spikes of the district.
The Alps of Dauphiné, which may be said to lie in France between

the Mont Blanc range and the Mediterranean Sea, would be best
approached by Paris, Lyons, and Grenoble, but as my climbing
friend, A. B., was at Kandersteg, I went there to meet him and a
guide, and to stretch my legs on the Swiss mountains. On the first
day after my arrival we inspected, with a view to attack the steep
south face of the Birrenhorn, and surmounted the only difficulty of
the climb, a steep chimney where a rope is useful to avoid risk. We
planned to complete the ascent on the first fine day. On this little
mountain I found the most perfect snake’s cast I ever saw, which I
gave to Professor Newton. Its head end was in the hole where its
owner got rid of it. The films over the eyes were present, and by
blowing into the mouth I could inflate the cast to a lively resemblance
of the creature it had covered.
MAP OF THE HIGHEST MOUNTAINS IN THE DAUPHINÉ.
Walker & Bontall sc.
The weather in the Bernese Oberland was very bad, every day it
rained in the valleys and snowed on the peaks; on any expedition
one was sure to get wet, and mountains of any magnitude were
impossible. With a Surgeon-Major on leave from India I took a turn at
fly-fishing, not in the glacier water of the Kander, but in a pretty
stream with pools, where the trout, though small, would rise to a fly.
His Himalayan experience made the Surgeon-Major anxious to stock
the glacier torrents of Switzerland with Mahsir, a fish more powerful
than the salmon, whose first wild rush on tasting the hook gives such
a fierce joy to the sportsman.
My companion, who was a strong walker, described to me his
horrible sensations at the sight of a precipice. He told me that his
father, though he had shot game in the Himalayas, could never
overcome this fear. If the idea of space was absent my friend could
climb well, but I gathered that horizontal as well as vertical distance
was concerned, because he could not comfortably eat his lunch on a
flat platform of an acre of grassland when there were miles of
country far distant below and beyond. Mountain climbing for him was
out of the question, his condition was almost that of one suffering
from agoraphobia or la peur des espaces.
We engaged Joseph Truffer as guide, and as soon as he joined us
we completed the Birrenhorn expedition. It was a satisfaction to me
to find that he did not climb the couloir easily or at the first attempt,
but we had a good scramble on an interesting arête rather like the
Portjengrat, in which there is a rock hole or window to crawl through.
We went home by a long route up by way of the Ober-Oeschinen
Alp, and got thoroughly wet as usual.
To climb the Blümlis-Alphorn, the highest point of the range, we
slept out at a hut, which was unluckily occupied by workmen, who
were building another hut close by. Our night in dirty straw was not
so pleasant in dirty company, and the early morning was dark and
threatening; we started however at 4.30, led by Joseph Hari, a local
man. After crossing the glacier he took us over some smooth slabs
of rock arranged like a slated roof and coated with ice to make us
careful. These safely crossed, Truffer took the lead, and up the final
steep everything was ice wherein steps had to be laboriously cut to
the summit. We stood on the top at 10 o’clock, but saw little of our
surrounding glories, except occasionally a brief glance round through
the mists while standing perched in an ice step. The weather ended
up in snow, which shut us in on the glacier below, and made us
thankful to be well off the ice, and safely quit of a mountain which,
though usually an easy climb, could assert itself seriously in a storm.
Taking Truffer with us, A. B. and I travelled to Dauphiné; we spent
a few hours at Grenoble to see the old church and the Bayard
statue. While at lunch at the Hotel Monnet I admired the oak wine
jugs, which are called there “Brocs.” There is a charming old chateau
at Vizille, with a lovely trout stream in the grounds full of big fish. The
tennis court no longer stands in which in 1788 a memorable meeting
took place to protest against the tax. The late President Carnot
unveiled a statue in 1888 in memory of this Revolutionary event and
slept at the chateau as the guest of Madame Casimir-Périer. The old
soldier who took us round showed an oubliette in the old part of the
building—beneath its horrible shaft he had seen armour-coated
skeletons dug up.
LES ECRINS FROM THE GLACIER BLANC.

We walked up to La Bérarde, a mule carrying our baggage.
Immediately on my arrival I was told of an awkward accident which
had just happened. Two parties were ascending a slope of ice when
the last man of the first caravan slipped out of his step and sent his
iron-shod heel into the jaw of the leader of the second caravan, who
was too near. Poor Maximin Gaspard got a bad torn wound of his
tongue, cut by his teeth, which I had to stitch up with silk and horse-
hair. As he was in fine health the wound healed well, and in a few
days, in fact, as soon as ever he could feed, he was climbing again.
Maximin’s father, Pierre Gaspard, is the fine old fellow who has
made so many first ascents in these districts, and still makes the
great climbs.
The highest mountain in the Dauphiné, is the Pointe des Ecrins,
13,462 feet, its summit is a ridge of several beautiful points of snow
and rock. With Hippolyte Rodier to assist Truffer we started to
traverse this peak. We met on the way to the Challeret hut, a native
with a dead sheep on his shoulders; it had been killed by a stone
falling from the height above, and no doubt was to be made into
“precipice mutton.” After sleeping a few hours at the hut we got off at
1.30 in the morning, over the glacier to the Col des Avalanches.
Rodier led us to the couloir on the south face, and we began to crawl
up; this was a rock couloir, which at a steep part was iced and
caused some delay. Our leader, however, got up to a firm position
and I followed, but no one else came, and looking down I saw Truffer
wringing his hands and in distress. He explained that his right hand
was frost-bitten and he could not proceed; nevertheless, he was
pulled up by the help of the rope, and finding from the appearance of
the hand and from the pain, which is really a good sign of reaction,
that recovery was sufficient, we decided to proceed, with some
misgiving on my part. We gained the highest part of the Ecrins about
10 o’clock. There was a great deal of fresh snow on the arête, and in
coming down to the glacier Blanc on the north side we worked hard
for five hours without a halt to reach the Col des Ecrins. Here we
rested and then descended a couloir of 1,000 feet to the glacier de la
Bonne Pierre, with its long and dreary moraine. There is a
measurement station on this moraine to register the movements of
the glacier, and here we found a marmot recently killed, its flesh
almost entirely eaten, the entrails strewn around. An eagle’s feather
on the body suggested the mode of death. The sight of the sheep
killed by a stone, and still more the beautiful furry marmot killed by
an eagle, added in a strange way to the savagery of the scene. In
this wild region stern Nature seems to cry, “I care for nothing, all
shall go.” We had a long walk home, the last half-hour by lantern
light, having been eighteen hours over our expedition.
We wished next to traverse the Meije from La Bérarde to La
Grave, which neither of our guides had ever done, so it seemed best
to let Truffer go back to Switzerland, lest on a serious expedition his
hand should fail him again and its recovery be delayed. His helpless
condition in the iced couloir was explained by the fact that months
before he had been ill with a bad hand, and its vitality had been
impaired by what was probably a previous attack of frost-bite. Before
his departure we had a lovely day on the Grande Aiguille; on the top
we basked and slept in the sun after a lunch of tinned fruits and
bread and butter. There is a little ice and snow requiring care on this
beautiful peak, but we climbed it up and down without a rope, and
here we passed over the slope where the tongue accident occurred.
One evening I was aware of a pain in my chest, especially when I
laughed, and I was reminded that at Easter I had broken a rib—in
climbing to the top of a cromlech on Dartmoor called “The Spinster’s
Rock,” but the bone seemed to have mended in spite of some
neglect, and was forgotten until my compass box in the breast
pocket jammed against the hurt in some scramble and found out the
weak point. I was warned by pains in certain movements of the arms
against any attempt to traverse the Meije, and very sadly I had to
see my friend take off our guides for a successful expedition; for
though with a suitable bandage on my chest I was quite active, yet
could not pull myself up by my arms in climbing.
JOSEPH TURC. PIERRE GASPARD. MATHON. HIPPOLYTE RODIER.
W. HERR VON RATH. A. B. HERR GRISAR.
We had parted from Truffer with mutual regrets, for he was a very
good fellow, and taken on Joseph Turc, a more experienced man
than Rodier, and they worked well together. This Turc had just come
over from La Grave with a porter named Etienne. The latter, a poor
wizened sun-baked little man, had all his finger tips on each hand
blackened with frost-bite; his thumbs had escaped. It appears that a
Frenchman who could not climb well was taken by Turc to traverse
the Meije from La Bérarde. They got no further than the Pic Central,
there they had to spend the night—next day getting into La Grave.
The poor porter was allowed to sleep with his fingers in this bad
state, and come back over a pass to La Bérarde where in the
afternoon I saw him. He had had some pain in the morning of this
day, and this encouraged me to attempt treatment; so during two or
three hours I rubbed him and watched him, and was assisted by my
friend; it was satisfactory to find a considerable improvement,
especially in his right hand, which next morning was even more
apparently improved when the limits of the black dead portions were
more defined—his nails will probably come off, and there will be
ulcerated surfaces on his finger ends, which will be months in
healing. The aspect of this man presented a pitiable combination of
apathy and patience, reminding me of the wolf-bitten Russian
peasants I saw in Pasteur’s laboratory in the Rue D’Ulm years ago.
The guide with the frost-bitten feet, of whom I wrote in my letter last
year, is only now hobbling about with sticks, the wounds of his
amputated toes still unhealed, so much is the process of repair
hindered in tissues damaged by frost-bite.
What I call determination, but my friends describe as obstinacy,
now induced me, after three days’ rest, to climb the Meije, 13,081
feet. It is a serious rock climb, decidedly stiffer than the Matterhorn,
and I did not attempt the traverse, but it was an error of judgment to
have climbed it in my crippled condition. Doubtless the fine air, which
makes a man laugh so easily, and makes the careworn light-hearted,
steals away the reason like champagne—making the old man seem
young—so the poet writes—
“The plague of guide and chum, and wife and daughter
Is Senex who will climb and didn’t oughter.”
LA MEIJE FROM THE VAL DES ETANÇONS.
My friend having returned to rest from his expeditions I took off the
guides for the ascent of the Meije. We walked up the valley and
halted at the hut. Joseph Turc wanted to put his skin of wine,
containing over five bottles, into my rücksack, and we had a
difference, as I objected to his claret leaking into my shirts, so he
had to carry it separately; it was quite an easy matter, as I had a
porter to carry my sleeping bag to a rock gîte where the night was to
be passed, a climb of several hours. On reaching the glacier, Joseph
and I being in front of the others, who carried the rope, he asked me
if I was afraid to go over the glacier. Probably he meant without the
rope. I said it was what I had come for; but when we began to get to
steep ice I found he did not cut steps, and as he had three large
spikes in each of his heels he could go where I could not follow
without using my axe vigorously. He then said he could not cut the
steps because of his wine skin, and thus I was left either to cut on up
all the slopes or carry his skin. After a little hesitation I offered to
carry the wine for fear of hurting my rib, and I carried it up to the
sleeping place, though I did not find the steps cut much better after
his burden was removed.
We went to sleep under the stars on a lovely night, but the day
broke dark and gloomy, so that it was half-past four before we could
start. We roped at once, leaving the porter to take the things back,
and Turc led, but instead of placing me second I was left to the last.
With my own rope of 80 feet long it happened frequently that the
men passed out of sight, and I had no sort of communication with
them unless I chose to pull and shout. But this is well enough when
going straight up. It is a difficult corner or traverse where the position
is a bad one; the experts who have been on their own mountain
before, leave the traveller alone to get round his corner as best he
can. “In medio tutissimus ibis,” is a good motto.
I gained the summit at nine o’clock, but just at the final struggle,
where it is necessary to straddle on a sharp red rock ridge, called the
“cheval rouge,” with fine precipices below, my rib gave way, and
went completely broken through. In spite of firm bandaging, the
coming down was a painful experience, for I could feel and even
hear the ends of the broken bone grating together; but I kept at it,
going down steadily and slowly with groans and grunts. The guides
sang and shouted and drowned my feeble exclamations. They had
had a good feed with tinned peaches and plenty of wine on the top
when we rested, and it seemed to make them very happy. They
carried seven bottles of wine on this expedition, besides each man a
flask of brandy, and as I do most of my climbing on cold tea, they
had a good allowance.
Joseph Turc is a real genius at rock climbing, a truly brilliant
performer; but on ice, as he can’t cut steps, another time I should get
spikes or crampons. The guides here use three spikes in each heel,
driven in, fixed by gomphosis, not like the Mummery spikes with a
screw.
I got to the Inn in time to change for the table d’hôte, not in the
least fatigued, only blaming myself for the painful ordeal I had
passed through. While changing my garments in the small bedroom
we occupied together, my companion could plainly hear across the
room the grating of my fractured rib. So soon as exertion ceased I
was entirely well, and had a good dinner and night’s rest.
No traveller who goes for mountain expeditions to the Dauphiné
district will leave without feeling a debt of gratitude (mixed with envy)
to his own countrymen who have climbed and walked all over this
wonderful country. The maps and climber’s guide by Mr. Coolidge
are marvels of convenience and accuracy, and must be carried by
everyone who wishes to learn his way about these very difficult
regions. Mr. Whymper ought to be as proud of the conquest of the
Pointe des Ecrins as of the Matterhorn.
My friend had a good climb on the Pic Bourcet, but of course I did
not attempt this, returning to England by easy stages, halting at Aix-
les-Bains and at Paris. In London I found laughing at “Charley’s
Aunt” a serious matter for my damaged rib, though I thoroughly
enjoyed this absurd farce, as I enjoyed every day of my vacation,
and there was no day I would not willingly live over again.
Switzerland and Savoy
1893
Begin at Kandersteg—Benighted on the Zinal glacier—Glacier tables and baths—
Wild beasts in the hut—The Col Durand—Guide in a crevasse—Ascent of the
Dent Blanche—A climber exhausted—Ascent of the Weisshorn—A
thunderstorm—Death of Mr. Lucas and Mr. Seiler. The Furggen Joch—Italy
and the Italian side of Mont Blanc—The hut on the Aiguille Grise—The
traverse of Mont Blanc—Anxiety as to weather—The observatory on the
summit—Ascent of Aiguille du Dru. Ascent of the Aiguille Verte—Frost-bitten
guide—Peculiar dangers of a fine season.
When Albert Smith made the ascent of Mont Blanc in 1851, he did
not seem to enjoy himself much; he was thoroughly exhausted and
done up, as well he might be, with sixteen guides, and £20 worth of
provisions. If he did not have a good time our fathers did, in hearing
his lecture, or in reading his dear little book. They listened with the
greatest interest to his serio-comic groans. A hundred bottles of
wine, sixty-seven fowls, joints of meat in proportion, and ten cheeses
carried up the mountain ought to have led to trouble somewhere. On
the other hand I enjoyed myself so much in the ascent of Mont Blanc
that I fear I have nothing left to entertain others. My climbing friend
was with me and two guides, also friends of former years; we had no
certificate and no cannon. Nor was there any pretty Julie down below
to give me a cornelian heart and talk about “une alliance.”
But I will begin at the beginning, and travel first from Cambridge to
Kandersteg, from the land of fen and bog to the land of fine air and
bright mountains—the Bernese Oberland. At Kandersteg my friend
was staying in Egger’s most comfortable inn, and there we made a
plan of campaign. We were fortunate in crossing the Gemmi to
obtain a fine view of the mountains we were about to attack. We
slept at Sierre in the Rhone Valley, and in the morning went up the
Val D’Anniviers, one of the finest valleys in the Alps, a beautiful
journey to Zinal, where we met our trusty guides—Alois
Kalbermatten and Xaver Imseng. We must needs try and reach the
hut high up the glacier that same night, and consequently got
benighted, and arrived very late at the Mountet Cabane, rather cross
and tired. While the daylight lasted I saw on the glacier hundreds of
glacier-tables, like a crop of gigantic mushrooms. The hot weather
this year may have made these more apparent, for on all the glaciers
I walked over they seemed more conspicuous than usual. A stone,
as big as a teacup or a cottage, when it lies upon the glacier,
protects the ice beneath from the sun, so that in time the ice melting
all round leaves the stone perched on a pedestal of ice. The icy
pyramid gradually yields on the sunny side, and allows the stone to
tilt and fall always in the same direction. On the Gorner Glacier I saw
a stone supported by two separate pyramids, but this is unusual. If
the stone which lies upon the glacier be thin enough, it may be so
warmed through by the sun that it makes a hole for itself in the ice,
and is buried in a pit full of water. So may dirt make a bath in the
glacier, or if it be in large quantity, may leave a cone of solid ice all
dirt covered, looking like a large ant heap.
The deep pits full of water are started in the manner indicated, but
the sun-warmed surface water is continually being replaced by the
ice-cold water below, and the warmed water deepens the pit in the
ice, until a large bath is formed, often two or three feet deep, with
steep sides, and no warning ledge or ridge around, so that a
careless walker might go in, and in the dusk they are very difficult to
avoid.
We had a dark experience on the glacier, and had to leave it for
the icy-hearted moraine for fear of accidents, thankful to find shelter
after some hours of weary stumbling along, when there was light
enough to see our dangers but barely enough to permit us to avoid
them. When in the welcome shelter of the hut, we shared with fleas
and rats that rough abode—whether the rats in the straw had guides
to this place is a curious problem; the fleas in the rugs were
unusually fierce and hungry. There was a rat in the hut before its
building was completed; when I called M. Constans’ attention to his
first visitor, he remarked in surprise “Déjà!” but it no doubt migrated
from the old Mountet Cabane near by to the Constantia, as the
present place is called in honour of the architect.
All next day the weather was too bad to climb, and we had to give
up our traverse of the Rothhorn this season, having been beaten in
the same way last year after coming over the Triftjoch. We went to
Zermatt over the Col Durand, which led us to an ice slope of some
steepness up which steps had to be cut, and then over snow. As we
neared the top of the pass, with no suggestion of any crack in the
smooth white surface of snow, we walked along all roped together;
quite suddenly our leading guide disappeared down a crevasse. I
was last on the rope and saw nothing but his hat; however, he was
soon out again by wrigglings on to his back, shook himself free of
snow, and appeared to mind it about as much as a Newfoundland
dog minds water. But it was a good lesson in the use of the rope,
which alone can make such an ordinary journey safe. My first care in
reaching Zermatt was to have my boots well nailed. English nails are
no good, though Flack’s boots stood me well. My next thought was
to present the local chemist with a prescription which puzzled him for
the moment—Mr. Pulex Irritans—Rx: Pulvis usque ad mortem
pulicibus ferocibus quantum sufficit. My friend said this dog Latin
was appropriate, for dogs and fleas were inseparable. I was soon
supplied with a tin of Keating.
The weather was too good for dawdling, and we proceeded to
attack the Dent Blanche. Taking provisions and rugs to the
Schönbühl rock, our men cut bits of dry trees with their ice axes
before we left the woods below us to cross the glacier, and thus
provided fuel to cook the excellent supper we enjoyed before we
slept. There were two other parties on the rocks that night—the
Stockje hut being in ruins. We crept into a hole and had a good night
there, in a natural cave which was warm and dry. When in the small
hours of the morning we were drinking our chocolate, a cry suddenly
arose from one of the other parties that their rope was missing. We
stirred the fires and searched with lanterns, and it was all very
picturesque, but did not lead to discovery—the rope was lost. So
only two parties started off early and began to climb, and reached
the summit after a hot fatiguing ascent up ice, snow, and rock. The
younger man of this other party climbed in a boating sweater,
appeared to feel the heat exceedingly, and went to sleep whenever
there was a halt. Before the descent was over he was decidedly ill,
but fortunately not utterly collapsed until after the more dangerous
ice slopes had been descended; his “legs” were then quite gone and
he had to be supported by the guides before he reached the
sleeping place, where we left him wrapped in my shawl with his
friend faithfully beside him to pass the night.
The unlucky man whose rope had been lost was a Britisher not
easily beaten. He sent his guides back on their tracks, and by
daylight the rope had been found, where it had been carelessly
dropped, upon the glacier; so that, though rather delayed, his ascent
was made successfully, and the traveller returned by another route
to Ferpècle. We, after having decided that the sick man was safe
enough and fast asleep, found our way with difficulty in the dark,
except for lanterns, across the glacier, whereon we wandered nearly
three hours, and Xaver refreshed himself by falling into a big water
bath. Finally we had to stay at Staffel Alp instead of at our hotel at
Zermatt. But we here enjoyed a sound refreshing sleep all night, and
walked down cheerfully in the sunlight of the early morning.
As the Weisshorn was to be our next peak we took train one
afternoon to Randa and climbed up the Schalliberg some hours to
the rocks below the ruined hut. This was a warm sleeping place,
though rather exposed, where we slept well beneath the stars, woke
up quite fresh, and enjoyed the climb immensely. On the rock arête
at about 12,000 feet up, and while the dawn was lighting the peaks
around, a dense black cloud appeared over Italy slowly moving
towards the Matterhorn; lightning came flashing out of it every few
seconds. It was a strange sight to witness this storm-cloud bursting
over a distant land, while all about us the sky was clear and the stars
were seen fading before the rising sun. A climber has related his
experience in a thunderstorm which stopped him on the Dent
Blanche, when the electric current made his goggles hiss upon his
head. The hissing of the ice axe is generally near enough for an
unpleasant sensation, and is not a rare occurrence, but the snow
glasses being affected makes a more powerful appeal to the
imagination. We had a good day on the Weisshorn (14,804 feet),
and rested at the gîte on the rocks as we descended, then later had
a refreshing tea at Randa, where we heard the first sad news of the
loss of life that morning upon the Täschhorn just opposite us. A party
of four, two gentlemen and two guides, trying to traverse the
Täschhorn from Saas Fée to Randa, got benighted in the descent.
By light of a lantern they got to a point of comparative safety where
all four lay down to sleep, but only three woke up; Mr. Lucas had
wandered off in the night and fallen over a precipice, where his body
was found in the morning.
At Zermatt, though the hotels seem crowded, there are not many
climbers, they go up higher or appear only for a day and off again.
The place is full of people—omnibuses run over you in the streets—
and you may be there some time before you notice that Mdlle. Biner
has now started a cabin near the Monte Rosa and shaves you as
well as ever, advertising herself as a coiffeuse. She is dressed in
black, mourning for her brother, the guide killed this year with young
Seiler on the Matterhorn. Just up the street is a tailleuse, a useful
person sometimes after climbing rocks, and when your wardrobe is
scanty.
Leaving Zermatt we spent one night at the Schwarzsee Hotel,
close to the Matterhorn, intending to cross over into Italy by the
Furgg-joch—this pass skirts the Matterhorn; we climbed to the top in
about two and a half hours; starting from our inn at 4, we arrived at
Valtournanche about 10 a.m. Then taking a carriage after a long rest
and refreshment, our driver just made us miss the train at Châtillon,
when the Italian sun was at its hottest; we had a siesta and dined
there, and so in the evening to Aosta, where we slept the night. We
took places in the diligence to Courmayeur next morning, and saw
Mont Blanc before us in a few hours. The Aiguille Blanche de Péteret
is well seen from the road, a sad reminder to all Cambridge men of
Dr. Frank Balfour, who perished on that mountain in 1882. It has
been climbed by Sir Seymour King, and again this year by Dr.
Güssfeldt with Emile Rey as guide. Six hundred francs is said to
have been paid as fee for guidance.
We were up early for an eight hours’ climb, with a final rock
scramble to the Italian Quintino Sella club hut on the Aiguille Grise
(11,812 feet). Here we had good food and sleep; our men went out
for an hour and cut steps up a steep ice slope, ready for the ascent
of Mont Blanc in the morning. As this ice slope appeared to be
dangerous from falling stones, we began early, and were greatly
helped by the steps already cut; if any stones came down we were
not aware of them, though out of sight is not out of mind in these
steep places.
The weather when we began our climb in the dusk before the day
broke was very threatening, and later on a light fall of snow and hail
gave us anxiety, as we clambered up the steep rocks, lest we should
be driven back to our hut, the difficulty and danger of such a repulse
increasing every hour until it was necessary to go on and make the
ascent whatever befell us.
We passed on the higher rocks an enormous rusty ice axe of an
ancient pattern, which doubtless has a story; we left it on the spot for
others to wonder at. We made the ascent in about eight hours,
including halts, and I stood on the highest point in these Alps—the
great snow summit of Mont Blanc—15,780 feet. But let us not be
proud, the highest mountain in the world, Mount Everest, is nearly
twice as high.
On the curve of snow at the highest point a huge timber skeleton
of a building is erected; heavy beams as thick as my body, strongly
fixed together, make a truncated pyramid with a rectangular base,
which looks as if it might stand the storms, or get buried in snow. At
present the wind whistles through, and it presents no surface to the
blast. M. Vallot, who is building this for an observatory, has had to
plant the foundations in ice, finding no rock after thirty feet
excavation. Whether the ice will move, or piled up snow will displace
the structure, remains to be proved. Snow collects always more on
the north (French) aspect of the summit, and this tendency to collect
may be increased by the obstruction. The workmen stated at
Chamounix that plum stones were found at a depth of twenty feet,
and if this be true it is exceedingly interesting and important as
showing that these stones, which must have been dropped on the
summit by travellers, had maintained their verticalness, and had not
been carried down towards the glaciers below. There the hut stands
at present with a small tricolour flag floating alongside. My vulgar
wish to climb the timbers was unexpressed and unfulfilled. We were
shut in completely by dark fog. Cold wind and the dangers of storm
drove us down to just below the top on the Chamounix side, where
there is a hut built as an observatory. This shelter we feared at first to
leave; wind and darkness kept us there, no tracks were visible, nor
anything to guide us but the snow all round. The wind was not the
dangerous (south) Föhn wind, and presently, after a cold blast, we
were able for a moment to see our direction; then by the advice of
our guides we hurried down over the Grand Plateau, scuttling and
sliding to the Grands Mulets, and safety, in two hours and ten
minutes. After a cup of tea and a rest we continued our journey over
the beautiful glacier des Bossons in bright sunshine. We reached
Couttet’s capital hotel in Chamounix at six o’clock, thus traversing
Mont Blanc from Italy into France in fourteen hours, including halts
by the way. This is a far finer expedition than up and down from
Chamounix, but is not so popular, and the traveller, bringing with him
foreign guides into the place, is not saluted by a salvo of artillery.
Next day we were at Montanvert admiring the Mer de Glace, and
during thunderstorms of many hours we made our arrangements to
climb the Aiguille du Dru. Sleeping out under a rock, where we had
passed a stormy night last year, we began in fine weather our steep
ascent mostly of rocks, with plenty of opportunities for adventures on
the way. There is one place in climbing the rocks where a rope is
hung over a precipice, and by gently swinging on this rope a long
step or giant stride is made across to a foothold beyond. It is only
one of the many positions in mountaineering where imagination
shows you what a slight distance there is between what you are and
what you may become. In the descent a frightful avalanche of stones
fell down just as we cleared the rocks, but it was not near enough to
shake our nerves.
On the 28th of August I slept at the Couvercle to climb the Aiguille
Verte. This sleeping place is a good one where an enormous rock
overhangs the little platform on which the sleeper stretches, and it is
grandly situated above the famous Jardin in the Glacier de Talèfre.
Being roused before midnight in threatening weather, we hesitated
before attacking such a mountain as the Aiguille Verte with a high
wind and storm-clouds in prospect; meantime we had some hot
chocolate, and only set off with some misgivings at one in the
morning. The wind moderated as the day broke, we got over the
bergschrund, and made a successful ascent in about nine hours.
The summit of the Verte is of snow, commanding a fine view of Mont
Blanc and the peaks around. We noted with feelings of annoyance
that the majestic snow curve upon the head of the Monarch is
broken by the erection of Vallot’s wooden building, which looks from
here like a projection of dark rocks. Time may revenge himself, and
play skittles with the timbers.
When I parted from my guides, whose conduct was worthy of all
praise, and came down to Chamounix, I saw there a most piteous
sight, that of a fine young fellow with both feet frost-bitten. All the
toes of both feet were black, and large blisters appeared on the
reddened skin of the foot above the blackened toes. He was a guide
named Maquignaz, and forty-eight hours before my visit had been
exposed during one night on the Italian side of Mont Blanc; he was
with Mr. F. and another guide, a cousin of the same name. The
others of the party put their feet into their knapsacks, and took such
like precautions, and so escaped. On examining this poor fellow’s
boots I discovered that, though sound enough in the soles, they had
the tongues fastened only halfway up the upper leathers, and with no
gaiters or other wrapping except his trousers, he must have got his
feet wet. The latest accounts I heard were not hopeful as to saving
the big toes. Without the great toes he cannot climb again and his
occupation will be gone; the loss of the little toes is not so serious.
The reflection after such a sad sight is forced upon one, that though
over sixty deaths are said to have occurred on Mont Blanc, history
takes small account of the travellers who have lost portions of their
bodies upon the mountains and had their after lives wrecked by their
maimed condition.
The delay caused by an endeavour to help this unfortunate man,
decided me to journey to Geneva with my friend rather than travel
alone over the Tête Noire. It was late next night before I reached
Zermatt again and joined my wife, who had reached the Riffelberg
from Paris ten days previously. We found most comfortable quarters
at the Riffel Alp lower down, in an enormous hotel, where two
hundred and seventy people dined every day, including an
archbishop and forty-five clergymen.
The weather this year has been good for climbers, though there
have been peculiar dangers associated with the sunshine; and as
every season has its own peculiar dangers, so this year the weather
was almost too good. The sun tamed the severity of giant peaks, and
made the descents dangerous from avalanches.
The great rocks have been bared of ice and snow and tempted
attacks, while earth-fast and frost-bound stones were loosened from
the heights above and made the mountains dangerous. The steep
couloirs of the Aiguille Verte were decidedly dangerous from falling
stones, and though I do not pretend to have any hair-erecting story
to tell, it will be understood that we made our way up and down on
the rocks, as much as possible avoiding the tracks of the stones.
The traverses across the couloirs were as rapid as caution could
permit, and only made when absolutely necessary. Great stones
occasionally hurtling down as if shot from a catapult, with enough
force to dash the brains out or hurl to destruction the poor climber
balanced in his ice step. Thus upon the Aiguille Noire a man was
killed by a blow on the head, and many had narrow escapes. On all
great mountains where ice, snow, and rock have all to be climbed
over, it must be difficult to find weather which will suit so as to find
everything in perfect order, but for the true enjoyment of a climb both
the man and the mountain must be in fine condition. The weather of
the day I have described on Mont Blanc, though it gave us some
uneasiness, was just perfect for avoidance of fatigue and mountain
sickness. Absence of sun and presence of wind enabled the
climbers to feel fairly vigorous, though at such a height. In other
conditions of hot, still weather, the strain might have been severe.
These days are now delightful memories for me, and if my
remarks just written do not rise above what Scott called the “ordinary

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Responsible Conduct of Research, 4th

Edition Adil E. Shamoo

The Field Study in Social Psychology How to Conduct

Methodological Issues and Strategies in Clinical

Understanding Experimentation Platforms First Edition

Take Control of Pages, 4th Edition Michael E. Cohen

Research Methods in Psychology 4th ed Evaluating a

Co Creation for Responsible Research and Innovation

Handbook of Personality Theory and Research 4th Edition

Principles and Practice of Clinical Research 4th

Adil E. Shamoo and David B. Resnik

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Preface to the Fourth Edition  vii

1. Scientific Research and Ethics  1

human subjects. The book presents a comprehensive introduction to RCR, with 13

occupation; it is a career or vocation (Davis 1995a). The first people to be recognized

Moral (or Ethical) Theories

Principles for Ethical Conduct in Research

A Method for Ethical Decision-​Making

Step 1: Define the problem, question, or issue.

Questions for Discussion

Cases for Discussion

Case 2: The Lifeboat

Some Famous Cases of Misconduct or

The Alps of Dauphiné, which may be said to lie in France between

LES ECRINS FROM THE GLACIER BLANC.

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Preface to the Fourth Edition vii

1. Scientific Research and Ethics 1

A Method for Ethical Decision-Making