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UNIT 11: SINO- RUSSIAN RELATIONS

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What’s Behind Sino-Russian nuclear tests and ballistic missile program,

Cooperation on North Korea?1 both countries have consistently opposed a
Russia and China have different military intervention to disarm North Korea
rationales, but both are alarmed by the of its nuclear capabilities. As the Trump
United States’ confrontational approach administration has expressed its willingness
toward North Korea. to use military force to resolve the Korean
peninsula security crisis, Moscow’s and
On April 15, 2017, Chinese Foreign
Beijing’s concerns about an imminent U.S.
Minister Wang Yi made an emergency
military strike against Pyongyang have
phone call to Russian Foreign Minister
become more pronounced than during
Sergey Lavrov to discuss the
previous phases of heightened North
burgeoning security crisis on the Korean
Korean belligerence.
peninsula. During their correspondence,
Cooperation between Russia and
Wang Yi requested Russia’s help in
China against a unilateral U.S. military
preventing a conflict between the United
strike on North Korea has consisted of
States and North Korea from taking place.
systematic violations of international
Even though Russia and China are North
sanctions and military activities aimed at
Korea’s most important international allies,
deterring a U.S. military intervention. As
collaboration between Moscow and Beijing
the 2003 Iraq War and 2011 Libyan
on the Korean security crisis has historically
intervention demonstrated Washington’s
been confined to a multilateral rather than a
tendency to use stringent economic
bilateral framework. The recent upsurge in
isolation as a precursor to forceful regime
bilateral cooperation between Moscow and
change, Moscow and Beijing have violated
Beijing on North Korea can be explained by
carte blanche UN sanctions against the
two factors. First, both Russia and China
North Korean economy, and supported
stridently oppose a unilateral U.S. military
more limited punitive measures against the
strike against North Korea’s nuclear
DPRK’s military-industrial complex.
facilities. Second, Russian and Chinese
Data released by the Chinese
officials believe that Moscow-Pyongyang
government on April 13 revealed that North
and Beijing-Pyongyang bilateral diplomacy
Korea’s trade with China grew by 37.4
can pressure Kim Jong-Un to transition
percent compared to the first quarter of
towards a more peaceful foreign policy
2016. This increase in trade between
course.
Beijing and Pyongyang is a striking
Joint Sino-Russian Opposition to U.S.
repudiation of Trump’s calls for increased
Unilateralism Against North Korea
Chinese economic pressure against the
Even though Russia and China have
DPRK, and highlights Beijing’s opposition
rhetorically criticized North Korea’s

1
The article was written by Samuel Ramani in The
Diplomat on April 27, 2017
to what it perceives as U.S. economic
warfare against Kim Jong-un’s regime.
Russia’s resistance to the economic
isolation of North Korea is equally
noteworthy. In March 2017, the director of
the Migration Department at the Russian
Ministry of Internal Affairs traveled to
Pyongyang to discuss an expansion of
North Korean labor shipments to Russia. As
Russia’s economic situation has improved
in recent months, the demand for North
Korean workers in western Russia and their
traditional destinations in Siberia is likely to
increase, diluting U.S.-led attempts to
economically isolate Pyongyang from
global markets.
In addition to systematic non-
compliance with UN sanctions, Russian and
Chinese policymakers have made military
pledges and maneuvers aimed at foiling a
potential U.S. strike against Pyongyang.
These efforts are likely to be less effective
deterrents to US unilateralism than the
economic levers that Moscow and Beijing
possess. This suggests that policy cohesion
between Russia and China on North Korea
is largely motivated by a desire to express
symbolic solidarity against the Trump
administration’s increasingly belligerent
policies towards the DPRK.
To highlight Moscow’s opposition to
a unilateral strike against North Korea,
Russian officials authorized the movement
of military personnel to the North Korean
border on April 20. Even though leading
experts on Russian military strategy, like
Brookings Institution non-resident fellow
Pavel Baev, believe that a Russian military
escalation has little credibility in the Asia-
Pacific region, Russia’s military buildup
near the DPRK demonstrates its willingness
to assist China’s efforts to deter a U.S.
military intervention against Pyongyang.
Even though reports that the Chinese
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) plans to
amass 150,000 troops near the North
Korean border remain unsubstantiated,
China’s proposed mobilization of bomber
aircraft and live-fire drills near the North
Korean coast demonstrate its opposition to
a US military assault against the DPRK.
The Chinese government’s
willingness to engage in dialogue with the
Trump administration on restraining North
Korea’s nuclear ambitions differs from
Russia’s more confrontational attitude
towards Washington’s DPRK strategy. But
Beijing’s emphasis on deterring a U.S.
military intervention against Kim Jong-
Un’s regime has synergy with Russia’s
intentions, and tangibly underscores the
solidarity against a U.S. military strike on
Pyongyang expressed by Wang Yi and
Lavrov during their April 15
correspondence.
Bilateral Diplomacy and the Russia-China
Axis Against US Unilateralism in NK
In addition to implementing
complementary economic support and
military deterrence strategies, Russian and
Chinese policymakers have simultaneously
highlighted the effectiveness of bilateral
engagement with the DPRK regime in their
attempts to defuse the Korean security
crisis. Coercive diplomacy employed by
Moscow and Beijing towards North Korea
has been characterized by two consistent
themes which undercut the U.S. foreign
policy establishment’s prevailing
assumptions about the DPRK.
First, Russian and Chinese
policymakers have implicitly rebutted the
prevailing notion in Washington that North global economy create a siege mentality in
Korea’s nuclear buildup is an inexorable Pyongyang. This sense of desperation has
process. Instead, they have attempted to encouraged Kim Jong-Un to rally pro-
demonstrate that rhetorical criticisms can regime nationalism around a belligerent
change the DPRK’s conduct. foreign policy. To convince North Korea to
Russia has criticized North Korea’s change course, officials in Moscow and
nuclear and ballistic missile tests on a case- Beijing have advocated targeted, finite
by-case basis, but has refrained from sanctions against the DPRK that can be
overarching condemnations of the North lifted if Kim Jong-Un’s conduct improves.
Korean regime. This balanced approach Russia’s sanctions regime against
was exemplified by Moscow’s April 19 North Korea has targeted the mining sector,
veto of a UN resolution condemning North and associated financial institutions. China
Korea’s nuclear tests. The Kremlin’s has also imposed a targeted sanctions
cautious criticisms of the DPRK can be policy, by implementing an embargo on
explained by Russian President Vladimir critical coal and oil supplies that sustain the
Putin’s belief that constructive engagement North Korean economy. By focusing their
with Pyongyang gives Moscow unique efforts on specific sectors and associating
leverage over North Korea’s conduct, at a sanctions explicitly with North Korean
time when China’s commitment to the aggression, Russian and Chinese
DPRK is waning and U.S.-North Korea policymakers are attempting to convince
tensions are at unprecedented levels. Kim Jong-Un that his regime security is
China’s rhetorical criticisms of North bolstered by defusing tensions on the
Korean belligerence directly counter Korean peninsula, rather than escalating
stereotypes about the irrationality of North them.
Korean foreign policy, by appealing to the Even though Russia and China have
DPRK regime’s self-preservation instinct. different rationales for their alignment with
By emphasizing that China’s support for Pyongyang, the recent uptick in policy
North Korea is conditional on Kim Jong- coordination between Moscow and Beijing
Un’s conduct, Chinese policymakers are on North Korea underscores the alarm both
highlighting state collapse and military countries feel about the Trump
annihilation as real risks associated with administration’s confrontational approach
Pyongyang’s nuclear buildup. According to towards Pyongyang. As diplomatic
Beijing’s logic, these risks and the prospect solutions to the Korean security crisis have
of diminished Chinese support could cause been largely unsuccessful and U.S. foreign
North Korea to stall its nuclear buildup and policy has become increasingly defined by
ameliorate tensions with Japan and South brusque unilateralism, it remains unclear
Korea. whether the burgeoning Moscow-Beijing
Second, Russian and Chinese axis is able to deter a U.S. military strike
policymakers believe that U.S. attempts to against Pyongyang in the months to come.
completely isolate North Korea from the
Guide to Study
A. Pre-reading exercises:
Find out at least 3 keywords to describe Sino – Russia relations
B. Reading for the gist:
Read the article and then write down what it is about in one complete sentence. You do
not need to understand all the words to do this exercise.
C. English-Vietnamese Translation
Translate the article into Vietnamese
D. Vietnamese-English Translation
Quan hệ Trung-Nga ở thời kỳ tốt nhất trong lịch sử
Trả lời phỏng vấn truyền thông Nga trước thềm chuyến thăm cấp nhà nước tới nước này,
Chủ tịch Tập Cận Bình ngày 3/7 đã tái khẳng định quan hệ Trung-Nga đang ở thời kỳ tốt
nhất trong lịch sử, cho rằng hai nước là đối tác chiến lược đáng tin cậy nhất của nhau..
 Theo ông Tập Cận Bình, hai nước đã xây dựng sự tin cậy chiến lược và chính trị cấp
cao cũng như giải quyết hoàn toàn các vấn đề biên giới mà lịch sử để lại, biến đường biên
giới dài 4.300 km thành mối liên kết bằng hữu giữa người dân hai nước.
Ông còn cho hay Trung Quốc và Nga cũng đã thiết lập các cơ chế lành mạnh cho các
hoạt động trao đổi cấp cao và hợp tác trong nhiều lĩnh vực.
Chủ tịch Trung Quốc nhấn mạnh: "Tổng thống Nga (Vladimir) Putin và tôi đã xây
dựng các mối quan hệ làm việc hữu hảo và mối quan hệ cá nhân thân thiết. Tôi sẽ bắt đầu
chuyển thăm cấp nhà nước tới Nga theo lời mời của Tổng thống Putin. Tôi tin rằng chuyến
thăm này sẽ tạo lực đẩy mới cho sự phát triển các quan hệ Trung-Nga".
Trước đó, trong cuộc gặp bên lề Đối thoại Shangri-La lần thứ 16 được tổ chức tại
Singapore, các quan chức Trung Quốc và Nga đã đề cao quan hệ hợp tác quân sự giữa hai
nước.
Lãnh đạo hai nước luôn dành sự quan tâm tới hợp tác quân sự song phương, đề ra
một nền tảng chính trị vững chắc cho sự phát triển lành mạnh và vững vàng của mối quan
hệ quân sự giữa hai bên.
Trong những năm gần đây, quân đội hai nước đã phối hợp thực thi sự đồng thuận
quan trọng mà lãnh đạo hai nước đã đạt được, đồng thời thúc đẩy trao đổi và hợp tác thực
chất giữa hai quân đội với những thành tựu mới.