Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 163252 July 27, 2011

ABOSTA SHIPMANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIRST DIVISION) and ARNULFO R.
FLORES, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

The petition for review on certiorari 1 before us seeks the reversal of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA),
dated October 20, 20032 and April 6, 2004,3 rendered in CA-G.R. SP No. 66806.

The Facts

Respondent Arnulfo R. Flores entered into a 12-month contract of employment, as radio officer, with the petitioner
Abosta Shipmanagement Corporation (agency) for and in behalf of Panstar Shipping Co. Ltd. (Panstar) of Busan,
South Korea. Under the contract, Flores was to receive a salary of US$728.00/month for a 48-hour work week, a
guaranteed overtime pay of US$439.00 a month, a monthly vacation pay of US$146.00, and a supplemental
allowance of US$33.00 a month.

Flores joined the vessel M/V Morning Charm sometime in June 1997. The Master of the vessel, Captain B.H. Mun,
and Chief Engineer Gowang Gun Lee are from South Korea. Aside from Flores, there were other Filipino workers
on the vessel. On November 29, 1997, Flores was repatriated due to alleged infractions committed while on board
the vessel. In reaction, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal on January 13, 1998 against the agency and Panstar.

The Compulsory Arbitration Proceedings

Before the labor arbiter, Flores alleged that in the course of his employment, he was asked by the Master to
coordinate with several crew members who were requesting that they be allowed to resign or pre-terminate their
employment contracts due to the alleged mismanagement of the vessel. He acted as coordinator as bidden, but was
surprised to learn later that he was one of those whose resignations were accepted. He sought clarification from the
Master, only to be told that he was among the crew members who were considered to have resigned; hence, his
discharge on November 29, 1997.

Upon his return to Manila, he immediately informed the agency that he had been erroneously included among those
who were considered resigned. He was surprised to learn that he was blamed for having instigated the mass
resignation of the Filipino crew. When he tried to explain his side, the agency told him that the action taken by the
Master was final and that it was not interested in his story.

For their part, the agency and Panstar argued that Flores, while in their employ, insistently and rudely questioned the
crew’s working schedule, including the propriety of requiring them to render overtime services. They claimed that
Flores instigated the crew to rebel against the authority of the Master, under the guise of questioning social security
and income tax deductions. As a result, the crew members became unruly, arrogant, and impolite, and were even
violent in expressing their views. They even refused to obey the lawful orders of the Master and the senior officers,
thus causing dissension on board the vessel.
The agency alleged that sometime in September 1997, Flores prepared a petition for five Filipino crew members
from the engine department, demanding the ouster of 1st Assistant Engineer Rodolfo Escarola, reportedly for
incompetence and inefficiency; they threatened mass resignation. To create further unrest and dissatisfaction, Flores
induced Sofronio Tibay, Herman Sebuando, Primitive Ferrer and Raymundo Angel, of the same department, to write
a letter to the ship management that they would be taking their emergency leaves, one after the other, in November
1997. They charged the vessel officers of mismanaging the crew. When confronted about the letter, however, they
denied most of the letter’s contents, pointing to Flores as the author of the letter. At Flores’ instigation, the crew
members threatened to disembark without waiting for their replacements. The Master asked them to work for a less
drastic solution, but they maintained their threat.

In light of the growing unrest on board the ship and Flores’ negative work attitude, the Master, Capt. B.H. Mun,
asked Flores to explain why he should not be administratively sanctioned for (1) disrespecting his superior officers
through his unruly, discourteous, impolite and violent behavior; (2) inciting the crew to commit insubordination and
engaging in an activity which tends to create discontent among the crew or to destroy harmonious relations with the
principal; and (3) inefficiency and other infractions, specifically: (a) staying at his quarters most of the time while on
duty, leaving unattended the messages from the charterer or from the Panstar office; (b) revealing confidential
messages to the crew without the Master’s permission; and (c) insubordination.

According to the agency and Panstar, Flores became enraged after he was informed of the charges, but could only
vehemently deny the accusations. The Master then decided to separate Flores from the service as the former was
convinced that the charges were well-founded. The agency and Panstar claimed that Flores was paid his overtime
pay, salary for November 1997, and accrued vacation leave pay.

In a decision dated August 20, 1999,4 Labor Arbiter Adolfo C. Babiano dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
He found that the evidence the agency and Panstar presented were convincing enough to prove that Flores was a
serious threat to the safety of the vessel and its crew. He noted that Flores failed to refute the agency’s and Panstar’s
allegations that he incited the crew to rebel against the authority of the Master and the vessel’s senior officers. He
also found Flores to have been paid all his monetary entitlements.

On appeal by Flores, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), in its decision of December 29,
2000,5 reversed the labor arbiter’s ruling. The NLRC found that the agency and Panstar failed to prove (1) that
Flores’ termination of employment was for a just or authorized cause and (2) that he was accorded due process. It
opined that the main basis for the dismissal action against Flores was the accusation that he agitated the crew to
rebel against the authorities of M/V Morning Charm, as reported by the Chief Officer (Chief Mate) and the 1st
Assistant Engineer. The reports, the NLRC believe, did not constitute proof of the validity of the dismissal.

Moreover, the NLRC noted that Flores was dismissed immediately after the Master conducted his inquiry on
November 17, 1997. It stressed that the Master’s so called administrative inquiry did not satisfy the due process
requirements, as Flores was not given an adequate time for his defense.

Accordingly, the NLRC declared Flores to have been illegally dismissed. It directed the agency and Panstar to pay
Flores, jointly and severally, US$2,184.00 as salary for the unexpired portion of his contract, ₱50,000.00 in moral
damages, and ₱25,000.00 in exemplary damages, plus 10% attorney’s fees. The agency moved for reconsideration,
but the NLRC denied the motion in its order of July 18, 2001. 6 The agency then sought relief from the CA, through a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

The CA Ruling

In its first assailed resolution (dated October 20, 2003), 7 the CA dismissed the petition due to insufficiency in
substance,8 as the petitioner failed to show that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the labor
arbiter’s decision finding Flores’ dismissal legal. It sustained the NLRC’s conclusion that the dismissal was without
a valid cause and that Flores was denied due process.
The second assailed CA resolution 9 denied the agency’s motion for reconsideration, prompting the agency’s present
appeal10 to this Court.

The Petitioner’s Case

Through its submissions — the petition itself, 11 the reply to Flores’ comment 12 and the memorandum13 — the agency
contends that in affirming the NLRC ruling, the CA deviated from the "substantial evidence rule" in quasi-judicial
proceedings. It argues that Flores’ employer, Panstar, met this standard of evidence through the affirmative
declarations (reports) of Capt. B.H. Mun, Chief Officer Alfredo R. de Luna and 1st Assistant Engineer Rodolfo
Escarola that Flores committed the infractions which led to his dismissal. In the face of these positive statements, the
agency points out that Flores could only offer bare and self-serving denials. It stresses too that, contrary to the
impression of the NLRC and the CA, Flores’ dismissal was not only for inciting members of the crew to rebel
against the ship officers, but also for other causes such as inefficiency and insubordination or disobedience to the
lawful orders of a superior officer, all prejudicial to the interests of the employer.

The agency insists that Flores’ contumacious acts, while on board the vessel, constituted a serious and grave offense
which posed a threat to the safety of the crew and the vessel. It adds that they also reflected Flores’ arrogance and
disobedience to lawful orders/directives of his superiors, punishable by dismissal pursuant to Section 31 of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract.

The agency posits that the CA erred in brushing aside the findings of the labor arbiter. It calls attention to the labor
arbiter’s observation that Flores failed to refute the agency’s allegation that he incited the crew to rebel against the
authority of the Master and the senior officers of the vessel. Flores did not also refute the charge that to pressure the
principal, he induced some members of the crew to take their emergency leaves one by one and to threaten the
principal to an early sign-off.

The Case for Flores

In his comment14 and memorandum,15 Flores asks that the petition be dismissed for raising purely questions of fact
and not of law. He contends that the appellate court’s findings are not to be disturbed as they are binding upon this
Court and, although there are certain exceptions to the rule, the petition does not fall within any of the exceptions. 16

Flores further submits that aside from raising only questions of fact, the agency failed to state any special and
important reasons to justify the exercise by the Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in the case. 17

The Court’s Ruling

The procedural question

We first resolve the procedural issue of whether we should rule on the petition which, as Flores contends, raises only
questions of fact and not of law. While it is true that the Court is not a trier of facts, we deem it proper to re-examine
the evidence in view of the variance in the factual findings of the labor arbiter, on the one hand, and of the NLRC
and the CA, on the other hand.

The substantive issue

After a careful and objective study of the parties’ submissions, we find that there is substantial evidence on record
supporting Flores’ dismissal. "Substantial evidence[, it must be stressed,] is more than a mere scintilla[. It means
such] relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds,
equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise."18

The agency, to our mind, succeeded in showing, by substantial evidence, that its principal (Panstar) had a valid
reason for terminating Flores’ employment. The Master, Capt. B.H. Mun, decided to dismiss him not only for
agitating the crew to rebel against the authorities of the vessel M/V Morning Charm (which the NLRC considered as
the main reason for the dismissal),19 but for several other infractions. As the records show, and as Capt. B.H. Mun
stressed in his letter of November 17, 1997 to the agency management, 20 Flores was also charged with inefficiency
or neglect of duty, insubordination, insolent and disrespectful behavior, and other actuations which made him unfit
for his position and rank.

Capt. B.H. Mun’s letter chronicled the bases of the charges lodged against Flores, and its salient points may be
summarized as follows:

1. Since Flores came on board, he had been complaining about the deduction of US$40.00 from the crew’s
monthly allotment for the Associated Marine Officers’ and Seamen’s Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP)
Fund. To Capt. B.H. Mun’s knowledge, the crew members were aware of the deduction. Despite this,
Flores prepared a letter to the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) and asked the crew
members to sign it. Capt. B.H. Mun asked Flores to explain the contents of the ITF letter to the crew to
avoid any misunderstanding. Instead of pacifying the crew, he stirred them up and made them even more
agitated. Also, despite Capt. B.H. Mun’s instructions to the contrary, he prepared letters for the crew
containing his own complaints and sentiments against the company rather than those of the crew.

2. He revealed to the crew all outgoing and incoming messages, without informing Capt. B.H. Mun.

3. Contrary to Capt. B.H. Mun’s instructions, Flores issued shore-passes to the deck crew without the
permission of the chief mate when the vessel made a port call at Maputo during its last voyage. The deck
crew members were not supposed to go on shore as cargo was being unloaded at the time. It was a rush
operation which had to be supervised and monitored to avoid damage to the cargo and to be on alert for
stowaways. Flores went on shore nevertheless, with some of the crew to whom he had issued shore-passes.

4. Flores entered in his overtime sheet 40-50 hours in excess of the monthly 85 hours, despite the captain’s
instructions to the crew not to go over 85 hours; Flores did this to give the impression that he was doing a
lot of work.

5. Flores stayed most of the time at the crew restroom while on duty instead of the radio room, resulting in
the failure, at times, of the charterer and the Panstar Busan Office to communicate with the vessel by
INMARSAT phone. This gave rise to several complaints, especially from the charterer who was compelled
to use two communication devices — the facsimile machine and the telex — to send the same instruction
or message to the vessel.

Capt. B.H. Mun considered the foregoing infractions and a few more mentioned in his letter as indications of Flores’
efforts to bypass his authority and to act at cross purposes with him.

It is clear that the letters of Chief Officer De Luna 21 and 1st Assistant Engineer Escarola22 to Panstar’s Capt. Chung,
detailing how Flores agitated the crew (with charges of mismanagement of the vessel), and Capt. B.H. Mun’s letter
to the agency all depict a radio officer who undermined the authority of the shipmaster and the other officers in the
guise of raising labor-management issues on board the vessel. Additionally and as an indication of his disrespect for
the vessel’s management, as well as his low regard for his work, he neglected his duties as radio officer and
disobeyed Capt. B.H. Mun’s instructions on several occasions. It is no surprise that his record of service 23 yielded a
very poor assessment or a "no further employment" assessment.

The NLRC grossly erred in rejecting the letters as proof of the validity of Flores’ dismissal. It misappreciated the
contents of the letters, especially that of Capt. B.H. Mun. They did not contain "a mere accusation of
wrongdoing."24 The letters made direct affirmative statements on Flores’ transgressions, all of which only elicited
angry denials from him. More significantly, he failed to refute the charges in the compulsory arbitration
proceedings, as the labor arbiter emphasized in his decision. This aspect of the case should have been given due
consideration by the NLRC.
In a different vein, Flores questioned the probative value of Capt. B.H. Mun’s statements, contending that they are
self-serving. He regarded them as pure hearsay which cannot be considered as evidence. It bears stressing in this
regard that under the law, technical rules of evidence are not binding in administrative proceedings, and the NLRC
and the labor arbiters "shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process." 25

Hearsay or not, and by way of reiteration, Capt. B.H. Mun’s statements cannot just be ignored, for Flores himself
admitted in his position paper, as noted by the labor arbiter, that the shipmaster asked him to be the coordinator or
go-between for several crew members who wanted to pre-terminate their contract. 26 It is not disputed that Flores
acted as such coordinator between the crew and Capt. B.H. Mun. Thus, Capt. B.H. Mun specifically asked him to
explain to the crew the deduction of US$40.00 from their monthly allotment for the AMOSUP Fund so that they
would understand and would not to be agitated; instead of doing this, he stirred up the crew further. In fractured
English, Capt. B.H. Mun stated:

Notwithstand he should if necessary take all his way be persuaded and kindly explained to the crew about
misunderstanding ITF contents, but he did has to say nothing of crew persuasion, more excite with big voices and
stir up to the crew to mischief. Two anhalf months ago, I asked him that don’t be helping to crew to be sent
company their letters specially, because his prepared it for crew had writ down his own complaining with unless and
reactive stories thru their letter. He didn’t still follow to master instruction that’s why help to nice preparing crew
letter according to his say.27

The fact that Flores acted as coordinator or liaison between the crew and the vessel’s officers signifies that Flores
did interact with the crew, and had the opportunity to sow discontent among them towards the shipmanagement.
Flores’ infractions, as mentioned in the letters, could not have been just pigments of the imagination of Capt. B.H.
Mun and the other officers as Flores insinuated; they were reporting on Flores’ actual transgressions while on board
the vessel.

Still on the probative value of the letters, Flores wondered why the agency did not present in evidence the vessel’s
logbook28 — the official records of a ship’s voyage that the master is required by law to keep and where he records
the decision/s he made during the voyage, including all happenings on board. 29 The existence of a logbook, however,
does not at all preclude the admission and consideration of other accounts of what was happening on board the
vessel, such as, in this instance, the shipmaster’s report. In Abacast Shipping and Management Agency, Inc. v.
NLRC,30 the Court explained -

The [logbook] is a respectable record that can be relied upon to authenticate the charges filed and the procedure
taken against the employees prior to their dismissal. Curiously, however, no entry from such [logbook] was
presented at all in this case. What was offered instead was the shipmaster’s report, which was later claimed to be a
collation of excerpts from such book.

xxxx

At that, even if the shipmaster’s report were to be admitted and considered, a close reading thereof will show that
the private respondents have not committed any act that would justify the termination of their services before the
expiration of the contracts.

While the shipmaster’s report was not considered in Abacast Shipping, the reason behind the rejection was the
Court’s conclusion that the separated employees had not committed any act that would justify their dismissal, as
their dismissal was based on mere apprehension. This situation does not obtain in Flores’ case. As mentioned earlier,
Capt. B.H. Mun’s report made affirmative statements regarding Flores’ infractions that led to his dismissal. These
infractions involved not only instigating several crew members to rebel against the vessel’s authorities and to
disrespect their superiors, but also other transgressions that made him unfit to continue in employment.

Even as he assailed the reports of Capt. B.H. Mun and the other officers as hearsay and self-serving, Flores failed to
controvert the affirmative statements made in the reports. The reports were submitted on compulsory arbitration. He
did not refute the charges, thus leaving them unrebutted. Capt. B.H. Mun’s statements, corroborated by the reports
of Chief Officer De Luna and 1st Assistant Engineer Escarola, should have therefore been admitted as sufficient
support for the charges.1avvphi1

On the whole, we are convinced that Flores’ dismissal was justified on the following grounds:

1. Sowing intrigue and dissension on board the vessel M/V Morning Charm;31

2. Inefficiency and neglect of duty;32 and

3. Insubordination or disobedience of the lawful orders of the shipmaster.33

The NLRC’s rulings, disregarding these grounds, do not only constitute errors in the appreciation of evidence; they
were gross errors as they practically disregarded the petitioner’s evidence. Hence, the CA erred in not recognizing
these errors for what they were — grossly abusive acts that affected the NLRC’s exercise of its jurisdiction.

The procedural due process issue

The records bear out that Flores was not given a reasonable opportunity to present his side vis-à-vis the charges at
the time he was dismissed. As the NLRC noted, Flores was immediately dismissed after Capt. B.H. Mun conducted
his inquiry on November 17, 1997. Although Flores merely issued a vehement denial, Capt. B.H. Mun should have
given him a reasonable time to explain, if necessary, in writing. While this lapse in procedure cannot negate the
existence of a valid cause for Flores’ dismissal, as discussed above, the violation of his right to procedural due
process warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages, as we held in Agabon v. National Labor
Relations Commission.34 Given the circumstances in the present case, we deem an award of nominal damages to
Flores in the amount of ₱30,000.00 to be appropriate.

In sum, we find the petition meritorious.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the resolutions dated October 20, 2003 and April 6, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals are SET ASIDE. We DECLARE the dismissal of respondent Arnulfo R. Flores LEGAL, but AWARD him
nominal damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00 for the violation of his procedural due process rights.

No cost.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Rodolfo M. Agdeppa
(Agdeppa) assailing the Resolution[1] dated July 31, 2000 and Order[2] dated September 28, 2000 of respondent
Office of the Ombudsman. The Office of the Ombudsman dismissed OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470, the administrative
complaint initiated by Agdeppa against respondents Marydel B. Jarlos-Martin (Jarlos-Martin), Emmanuel M.
Laurezo (Laurezo), and Iluminado L. Junia, Jr. (Junia).

OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470 arose from OMB-0-99-1015, another administrative complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman.

Junia, then Group Manager for the Project Technical Services Group of the National Housing Authority (NHA),
filed on May 25, 1999 a Complaint[3] before the Office of the Ombudsman against several NHA officials, together
with Agdeppa and Ricardo Castillo (Castillo), resident auditors of the Commission on Audit (COA) at the NHA.
Junia's Complaint was docketed as OMB-0-99-1015. Junia alleged that Supra Construction (SupraCon), the
contractor for the NHA project denominated as Phase IX, Packages 7 and 7-A in Tala, Caloocan City (NHA
Project), was overpaid in the total amount of P2,044,488.71. The overpayment was allegedly facilitated through the
dubious and confusing audit reports prepared by Agdeppa and endorsed by Castillo, to the detriment, damage, and
prejudice of the Government.

Junia also mentioned in his Complaint that Agdeppa had initiated several cases, arising from the same NHA project,
against Junia and other NHA officials. While the other cases had already been dismissed for lack of merit, the Office
of the Ombudsman endorsed OMB-0-94-2543 to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City where it was
docketed as I.S. No. 99-1979.

Notably, the Complaint in OMB-0-99-1015 was signed by Junia, and certified and verified by him, but not under
oath.[4]

On June 10, 1999, Jarlos-Martin, then Graft Investigation Officer II of the Office of the Ombudsman, issued an
Order[5] in OMB-0-99-1015 giving the following directives: (1) for Agdeppa and Castillo to file their respective
counter-affidavits, witnesses' affidavits, and other supporting evidence in answer to Junia's Complaint within 10
days from notice; and (2) for Junia to file his reply within five days from receipt of copies of Agdeppa's and
Castillo's counter-affidavits.

Agdeppa filed his Answer[6] on July 26, 1999, denying Junia's allegations against him and praying for the dismissal
of the Complaint in OMB-0-99-1015 for utter lack of merit. According to Agdeppa, Junia's claims that Agdeppa had
manipulated audit reports of overpayments to SupraCon to create confusion and defraud the Government, were
unfortunate, irresponsible, and malicious. Agdeppa also clarified that I.S. No. 99-1979, against Junia and other NHA
officials, was now Criminal Case No. Q-99-81636 before the Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 86,
and a Warrant of Arrest[7] had already been issued on March 15, 1999 for Junia and Evaristo B. Macalino.

Junia immediately filed his Reply[8] to Agdeppa's Answer on July 30, 1999.

On September 6, 1999, Castillo filed his Answer[9] likewise denying the allegations in Junia's complaint in OMB-0-
99-1015. Castillo contended that Junia's claims of overpayment were the result of the latter's erroneous appreciation
of existing documents; that the computations by the COA audit team assigned at the NHA were issued with
complete transparency and after undergoing the process of check and countercheck; and that he had no participation
in the computation and payment made to SupraCon after his reassignment on July 6, 1987.
Junia filed a Reply[10] to Castillo's Answer on September 20, 1999.

At around the same time the foregoing events were unfolding, Agdeppa wrote a letter [11] dated March 3, 1999
addressed to Senator Renato S. Cayetano (Sen. Cayetano), who was then the Chairperson of the Senate Committee
on Justice and Human Rights. Agdeppa requested Sen. Cayetano to conduct an investigation of incumbent officials
of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and COA who purportedly committed irregularities in the resolution of the
administrative case against the government officials and employees involved in the reconsideration of the
disallowed money claims of SupraCon in the NHA Project. Agdeppa attached to said letter his Sworn
Statement[12] dated March 3, 1999, detailing under oath his accusations against the COA and CSC officials. In a 1st
Indorsement[13] dated April 23, 1999, Atty. Raul M. Luna, Sen. Cayetano's Chief of Staff, referred Agdeppa's letter
dated March 3, 1999 to Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto (Desierto) for appropriate action.

Agdeppa then wrote a letter[14] dated July 12, 1999 addressed to Ombudsman Desierto inquiring as to the status of
the 1st Indorsement from Sen. Cayetano's office. Failing to receive any reply, Agdeppa wrote another letter [15] dated
August 19, 1999 addressed to Ombudsman Desierto, pertinent parts of which are reproduced below:

This is to inform you Sir, that I have not yet receive[d] any kind of communication from you or from your good
office concerning my letter dated July 12, 1999 (Annex "A" hereof) which was received by your Dibisyon ng
Rekords Sentral on July 14, 1999 inquiring on the status of my letter with its accompanying Sworn Statement, dated
March 3, 1999, to Senator Renato L. Cayetano, which was instead endorsed to you by his Chief of Staff, Atty. Raul
M. Luna, in a 1st Indorsement dated April 23, 1999 for appropriate action.

xxxx

One of the reasons why I am writing to you again, Sir, is to be sure that I will not be remiss in reminding you that
your good office has still to act on my letter of July 12, 1999.

I also want you to know, Sir, that I am now being harassed by certain elements in your honorable office. This is
manifest in the hasty evaluation of the counter-complaint (Annex "E" hereof) (now OMB-0-99-1015) filed by one of
the respondents in OMB-0-94-2543 (now Criminal Case No. Q-99-81636 before QC RTC Branch 86), which
complaint was received by your Dibisyon ng Rekords Sentral on May 23, 1999, and which was given due course by
MARYDEL B. JARLOS-MARTIN, Graft Investigation Officer II, through her ORDER dated 10 June 1999 (Annex
"F" hereof) directing me to answer OMB-0-99-1015.

Please note, Sir, that the ORDER of June 10, 1999 was served only on July 15, 1999 or the day after your office had
received my letter of July 12, 1999, giving the impression that the said order was issued as an after-thought and
meant as a leverage, if not a veiled warning, to stop me from pursuing the endorsement of my letter of March 3,
1999 to you.

Please be informed too that the above-mentioned counter-complaint could not be the basis of the Order dated June
10, 1999 because the said complaint was not an affidavit-complaint, contrary to what was indicated in the said order.
Hence, there must be compliance first with Section 4 and 4(A) of Administrative Order No. 07 dated April 10, 1990
(Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman) before Atty. Jarlos-Martin could issue her order of June 10,
1999, x x x:

xxxx

Notwithstanding a clear violation of my substantive right, I had nevertheless opted to answer OMB-0-99-1015 on
July 26, 1999 without raising the issue on procedural due process and without disturbing the deadline set by Atty.
Jarlos-Martin because I wanted the said case to be resolved for lack of merit.

The fact, therefore, that there was great haste in the commencement of the preliminary investigation of OMB-0-99-
1015 while my letter of July 12, 1999 remains un-answered until now could not but evoke my suspicion that your
honorable office is being used for other purposes.
xxxx

x x x I would like to request that you require Atty. Jarlos-Martin to resolve OMB-0-99-1015 with the same dispatch
by which she had given due course to the counter-complaint of Mr. Iluminado L. Junia, Jr., on one hand, and to
direct the graft investigation officer handling the endorsement of my letter of March 3, 1999 to inform me about the
status of the said endorsement.

Realizing from Agdeppa's letter dated August 19, 1999 that Junia's Complaint in OMB-0-99-1015 was not under
oath, Jarlos-Martin issued an Order[16] on September 23, 1999 with the following directive for Junia:

You are hereby ordered to appear before the undersigned at the Office of the Ombudsman, Room 210, located at the
2nd Floor, Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau, immediately upon receipt hereof, in order to swear to
your complaint dated May 18, 1999, pursuant to Section 4(a), Rule II, Administrative Order No. 07, otherwise
known as the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.

Pursuant to the aforequoted Order, Junia personally appeared before Laurezo on October 6, 1999 to swear to his
Complaint.[17]

Also on October 6, 1999, Jarlos-Martin issued another Order[18] addressed to Agdeppa and Castillo that reads:

You are hereby directed to file your counter-affidavit, the affidavit/s of your witness/es and other supporting
evidences, if any, in answer to the hereto attached copy of the Complaint-Affidavit dated May 18, 1999, which is
now under oath, within TEN (10) DAYS from receipt hereof, with proof of service upon the complainant who may
file a reply thereto within FIVE (5) DAYS from receipt, if he so desire/s.

Your failure to do so within the aforesaid period shall be deemed a waiver of your right to submit controverting
evidence and this preliminary investigation shall proceed accordingly. Thereafter, this case shall be deemed
submitted for resolution on the basis of the evidence presented by the parties whose presence may be dispensed
with, unless otherwise required for clarificatory hearing.

Agdeppa, in a Motion to Resolve[19] submitted on November 8, 1999, opposed Jarlos-Martin's Order dated October
6, 1999, asserting as follows:

25. With due respect, [Agdeppa] finds the order of October 6, 1999 directing him to answer OMB-0-99-1015 anew
and for [Junia] to reply if he so desires as a blatant disregarding of Section 4, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman (Annex "18" hereof) or of Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court (Annex "18-A"
hereof);

26. From either of the above-mentioned rules relative to the procedure in the preliminary investigation of criminal
cases, x x x the next step after the filing of the respondent's counter-affidavit is the setting of a hearing for
clarificatory questioning by the investigating officer if there are matters that need to be clarified, and/or the
investigating officer shall forward the records of the case together with his/her resolution to the designated
authorities for their appropriate action thereon;

xxxx

27. With due respect, the new order is no longer a means to carry out the so-called due process of law in the
preliminary investigation of the above-entitled case, which is a criminal case falling within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and/or Regional Trial Court;
28. Rather, the new order became a tool to enhance or modify the substantive rights of [Junia] to the injury of
[Agdeppa] for giving the former unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence;

29. This is manifest because of the records of OMB-0-99-1015 (the above-entitled case) is already complete as of
September 6, 1999, which was the date of receipt of the answer of [Castillo] by this honorable office, a copy of its
first and last page are hereto attached as Annex "19" hereof and it would be, therefore, anomalous to further delay
the evaluation of the said case by directing [Agdeppa] to answer OMB-0-99-1015;

30. To reiterate with stress, [Agdeppa] already answered OMB-0-99-1015 through his answer which was executed
on July 26, 1999 and filed with this honorable office'[s] DIBISYON NG REKORDS SENTRAL on even date;

31. It is likewise reiterated that [Junia] had even furnished [Agdeppa] with his reply dated July 30, 1999 (Annex
"O");

32. What will happen to the priceless effort and money that went with the preparation and submission of the
aforementioned pleadings vis-à-vis the service of the order dated October 6, 1999 to [Agdeppa] only?

33. It appears that it was only [Agdeppa] who was targeted by the Order dated October 6, 1999 because [Castillo],
who lives a block from [Agdeppa's] residence at Roque Drive, declared in his Affidavit executed on November 4,
1999 (Annex "20" hereof) that he had received only one order relative to OMB-0-99-1015 and that was the Order
dated June 10, 1999 and nothing more;

34. For another, was the reply of [Junia] not enough to find probable cause to warrant the filing of a criminal
information against [Agdeppa] that is why he was given another chance, through the Order dated October 6, 1999, to
do a clinching one;

35. Furthermore, it is not difficult to deduce from the complete records of OMB-0-99-1015 that [Junia] is on a
fishing for evidence expedition because he included [Castillo] as a respondent in the above-entitled case even if the
latter was no longer the auditor of COA at NHA when the 14-page Memorandum dated February 19, 1988 (Annex
"M" Complaint) came into being, as his (Castillo) tenure as chief auditor of the said government agency ended on
August 7, 1987 as per Reassignment Order No. 87-3210 dated July 6, 1987;

xxxx

44. It is not difficult to see that the actual primary purpose of [Junia] in filing OMB-0-99-1015 is for him to get a
relief from this honorable office in order that he could stop his arraignment in Crim. Case No. Q-99-81636 before
Judge Teodoro A. Bay of the QC RTC Branch 86 arising from OMB-0-94-2543 by spicing Crim. Case No. 16240,
which is still pending with the Sandiganbayan's Second Division, with [Junia's] so-called "evidence" against
[Agdeppa and Castillo] in their alleged participation in, and/or allowing, the illegal payment of PHP1,861,945.28[.]

At the end of his Motion, Agdeppa prayed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that the Order dated 6 October 1999 be set aside and
that the above-entitled case be now resolved and dismissed on the basis of the records which were already complete
as of September 6, 1999, with the same dispatch as the giving of due course to the complaint dated May 18, 1999 by
the Order dated June 10, 1999.[20]

On November 25, 1999, Castillo filed a Manifestation and Compliance with Submission,[21] acknowledging that the
Complaints and Annexes, subject of the Orders dated June 10, 1999 and October 6, 1999 were one and the same;
adopting and incorporating by reference his Answer dated September 1, 1999 previously filed in the case; and
praying that his latest pleading be considered sufficient compliance with the Order dated October 6, 1999. On
December 6, 1999, Junia, in turn, filed a Manifestation[22] in which he adopted his Reply dated September 20, 1999
to Castillo's Answer dated September 1, 1999, including Annexes.

Eventually, on June 14, 2000, Jarlos-Martin issued a Resolution[23] in OMB-0-99-1015, concluding as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding probable cause to indict respondents RODOLFO M. AGDEPPA and
RICARDO B. CASTILLO for violation of section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act relative to the
overpayment of the amount of P182,543.43 to SUPRA Construction, let, therefore, an information be filed against
them in the proper court.

The charge of overpayment to [SupraCon] of the amount of P1,861,945.28, representing the additional escalation
cost for the subject contract is hereby DISMISSED, for insufficiency of evidence.

Pursuant to Jarlos-Martin's foregoing Resolution, an Information[24] dated June 14, 2000 was filed before the Quezon
City RTC-Branch 91, docketed as Crim. Case No. 01-100552, charging Agdeppa and Castillo with violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Quezon
City RTC-Branch 91 issued a Warrant of Arrest[25] for Agdeppa and Castilllo on May 10, 2001.

Meanwhile, as his Motion to Resolve in OMB-0-99-1015 was still unacted upon by April 7, 2000, Agdeppa filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman an Affidavit-Complaint against Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and Junia, docketed
as OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470. Agdeppa accused Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and Junia of violating Section 3(a), (e),
(f), and (j) of Republic Act No. 3019; and Rule II, Section 4(a), (b), and (g) of Supreme Court Administrative Order
No. 07, dated April 10, 1990, otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman Rules of Procedure), based on the following averments:

20. That the act of respondent Jarlos-Martin in issuing the Order dated 6 October 1999 when she was supposed to
have already resolved OMB-0-99-1015 a long time ago, thus giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
to respondent Junia to the damage and injury of [petitioner Agdeppa], constitutes a violation of Section 3(e) of Rep.
Act 3019, as amended "causing any undue injury to any party xxx, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
function through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross unexcusable negligence."

21. That respondent Jarlos-Martin caused damage and injury to [Agdeppa] because she set aside the records of
OMB-0-99-1015, which was already complete when she issued her Order, dated 6 October 1999 and, thus, re-started
the preliminary investigation of the case all over again.

22. That the re-starting of the preliminary investigation on OMB-0-99-1015 gave unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference to respondent Junia because, in the Order dated 6 October 1999, [Junia] was given another chance to file
his reply to any answer or counter-affidavit submitted after 6 October 1999, on one hand, or gave respondent Jarlos-
Martin a basis to resolve the said case in favor of respondent Junia in case of non-compliance of [Agdeppa] to the
said Order.

23. That the act of respondent Laurezo on 6 October 1999 of subscribing to OMB-0-99-1015 was to provide
respondent Jarlos-Martin with a basis, albeit unlawful, to issue her Order dated 6 October 1999 (of even date) which
act constitute corrupt practices act of any public officer under Section 3(a) of Rep. Act 3019, as
amended "persuading, inducing or influencing another public office to perform an act constituting a violation
of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the
official duties of the latter or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such
violation or offense."

24. That the rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority that was violated by respondent Jarlos-
Martin are Section 4(a)(b) and (g), Rule II, Administrative Order No. 07 dated April 10, 1990 (Section 3, Rule 112
of the Rules of Court). x x x.
25. That respondent Laurezo could have not escaped noticing that the complaint dated May 17, 1999 he was about to
subscribe on 6 October 1999 was already docketed as OMB-0-99-1015 as indicated by the big bold letters at the
bottom of the first page of the said complaint.

26. That when respondent Laurezo subscribed to OMB-0-99-1015 after it was already docketed as such, he had,
therefore, knowingly granted a privilege or benefit in favor of respondent Junia who was not qualified for or not
entitled to such a privilege or advantage on 6 October 1999, which act is a violation of Sec. 3(j) of R.A. 3019, as
amended "knowingly x x x granting any x x x privilege or benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or
not entitled to such x x x privilege or advantage x x x."

27. That the failure of respondent Jarlos-Martin to resolve OMB-0-99-1015 notwithstanding the Motion to Resolve
dated November 8, 1999 on the basis of the Order dated 10 June 1999 constitutes a violation of Section 3(f) of R.A.
3019, as amended "Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within
a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any
person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for purpose of favoring his own
interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party."

28. That respondent Jarlos-Martin refused to resolve OMB-0-99-1015 even after due demand or request because she
will obtain pecuniary benefit from doing so from respondent Junia as it would delay the arraignment of the latter,
who is a respondent in Crim. Case No. Q-81636 before Quezon City Regional Trial Court Branch 86, with Judge
Teodoro A. Bay presiding.

29. That her obtaining of some pecuniary benefit from respondent Junia, as well as for the purpose of discriminating
against [Agdeppa] are manifest because the un-resolved OMB-0-99-1015 is practically the same as the Motion for
Reconsideration dated May 17, 1999 filed by respondent Junia before QC RTC Branch 86 to stay his arraignment in
Crim. Case No. Q-81636 and that she has only to blame herself for being accused of such corrupt practices acts
because [Agdeppa] had categorically manifested to her the un-holy symbiotic connection of OMB-0-99-1015 with
the Motion for Reinvestigation on Crim. Case No. Q-816[3]6 through the Manifestation dated August 9, 1999. x x x.

30. That as a consequence of respondent Jarlos-Martin's refusal to resolve the preliminary investigation of OMB-0-
99-1015, which refusal is manifest through her Order dated 6 October 1999, respondent Junia's arraignment in Crim.
Case No. Q-81636 is being reset for many times already, the latest of which is on May 10, 2000.

31. That this is so, and will remain to be so, because the resolution of the above-mentioned Motion for
Reinvestigation filed by respondent Junia, who is one of the accused in Crim. Case No. Q-[8]1636, is waiting for the
resolution of OMB-0-99-1015.[26]

Acting on Agdeppa's Affidavit-Complaint in OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470, Director Rudiger G. Falcis II (Falcis) of

the Criminal Investigation, Prosecution & Administrative Adjudication Bureau, Office of the Ombudsman, issued an
Order[27] dated June 6, 2000, directing only Jarlos-Martin and Laurezo to file their counter-affidavits and other
evidence within 10 days from notice.

Laurezo, in his Counter-Affidavit[28] dated June 22, 2000, asseverated that:

7. Any Lawyer-Investigator in the Office of the Ombudsman, worthy of his salt knows that in administering oath
and subscribing affidavit-complaint, merely assures himself that the person to be sworn by him is the same person
who executes the complaint-affidavit and that the contents thereof are true of his own knowledge. He is not
oblige[d] to inquire into the merit and/or status of his complaint.

8. It is clear from the aforestated facts and provisions of law, rules and regulations that my official action in
administering oath and subscribing the complaint of Iluminado Junia on October 6, 1999, is in accordance with law,
done in good faith and without any unlawful motive.
9. It must be stated that Section 3(a) of R.A. 3019 is premised on a public officer['s] act of persuading, inducing or
influencing another public officer to violate the rules and regulations with the unlawful intent of deriving personal
gain and advantage. As the facts established in the instant case has shown, there is no opportunity for me whatsoever
to derive any personal gain or pecuniary advantage from the mere act of administering and subscribing the
complaint-affidavit of Iluminado Junia. Neither was there any evidence presented to demonstrate that I intended to
derive any benefit from administering and subscribing the affidavit-complaint of Junia. Neither did I act for
consideration. There is no evidence presented to demonstrate that I received any pecuniary advantage in
consideration of my administering oath and subscribing the affidavit-complaint of Junia.

10. Moreover, there was no damage caused to complainant herein. The authentication of the complaint-affidavit is in
compliance with the procedural requirement which the parties to the case at bar have to comply.

11. I did not persuade, induce nor influence any public officer to violate any rules and regulations duly promulgated
by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter. When the provision speaks
of "persuading, inducing, or influencing", it means that there must be an active persuasion, inducement, or influence
on the part of the public official sought to be held liable. Active persuasion, inducement, or influence cannot be
presumed, much less established, by the mere subscribing of an affidavit which is required by law. It must be noted
that there has been no evidence whatsoever presented by [Agdeppa] to show that I actually and personally
persuaded, induced or influenced other public officers, specifically [Atty. Jarlos-Martin] to disobey any law.

12. Complainant Agdeppa was in the state of hallucination in alleging that when I subscribed the complaint in
OMB-0-99-1015, after it was already docketed, I knowingly granted a privilege or benefit in favor of [Junia] who
was not qualified for or not entitled to such privilege or advantage on October 6, 1999. A complaint-affidavit is not a
license, permit, privilege or benefit.[29]

Agdeppa retorted in his Reply-Affidavit[30] filed on July 12, 2000:

9. That Par. no. 5, in so far as it concerns [Laurezo's] reference to Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 6770 as the authority
from which he derived his administration of an oath to Mr. Junia's [complaint] dated May 18, 1999, is denied
as: (a) he was a usurper of the authority reserved to his co-respondent Graft Investigation Officer Atty. Jarlos-Martin
in OMB-0-99-1015, (b) it was already too late in the day, so to speak, for him to administer an oath to OMB-0-99-
1015 as the said case was already submitted for resolution as of September 20, 1999 which date is the last day of the
preliminary investigation of the said case on the basis of [Jarlos-Martin's] Order dated 10 June 1999, and (c) he
should have asked questions why Mr. Junia is asking him to administer an oath to his aforesaid complaint which was
already more than four (4) months old on 6 October 1999, to say the least.

10. That Par. no. 5, in so far as it pertains to [Laurezo's] claim that he merely assured himself of the true/correct
identity of Mr. Junia and that the contents thereof are true of his own knowledge, is admitted but with the
qualification that he, as a graft investigation officer of this Honorable Office, to reiterate, should have at least
inquired why the document he was about to subscribe already bear the big bold marking "0 99 1015."

11. That Par. no. 6, in so far as it relates to [Laurezo's] quoting of paragraph (a) of Section 4 of A.O. No. 07
(Procedure in the Preliminary Investigation of cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and
Regional Trial Courts) as his authority in administering the oath to OMB-0-99-1015, is denied because [Laurezo] is
not the "investigating officer" referred to in the aforesaid paragraph of Section 4. This is so because, OMB-0-99-
1015 is under his co-respondent Atty. Jarlos-Martin and that on 6 October 1999, the preliminary investigation of the
said case was already completed. Thusly, [Laurezo] had no lawful authority under Sec. 4, Rule II, A.O. No. 07 to
intervene in OMB-0-99-1015.

xxxx

16. That Par. no. 9, in so far as it relates to the claim of [Laurezo] that there must first be a showing of an intent of
deriving personal gain or benefit in order that Section 3(a) of Rep. Act No. 3019 applies, is denied as the said
provision of the said law (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) merely states

"Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and
regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the
latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense."
Nothing more. Nothing less. Hence, [Laurezo] should not add anything to it.

17. That Par. no. 10 is denied because, when [Laurezo] administered an oath to Mr. Junia on 6 October 1999, it
triggered the second preliminary investigation of OMB-0-99-1015. It is to be noted that the preliminary
investigation of the said case was already completed on September 20, 1999 so there was no more basis for
[Laurezo's] co-respondent Atty. Jarlos-[M]artin to issue another Order dated September 23, 1999 to enable her to
subscribe to the complaint dated May 18, 1999. It follows, therefore, that, when [Laurezo] subscribed to the said
complaint, he caused the suspension of the resolution of OMB-0-99-1015 as he "legitimized" the illegal second
preliminary investigation of the said case, thereby prolonging the agony of the respondents concerned in terms of
prolonged anxiety, aggravation, humiliation and expense inherent in a criminal investigation. If there is no damage
to [Agdeppa], as claimed by [Laurezo], then what will [Laurezo] call the prolonged anxiety, aggravation,
humiliation and expense which [Agdeppa] is being made to bear until now in OMB-0-99-1015?

xxxx

19. That [Laurezo's] contention in Par. no. 12 that [Agdeppa] was in a state of hallucination in charging [Laurezo]
for violation of Section 3(a) of Rep. Act No. 3019 allegedly because he could not be liable thereof as he did not
grant any license, privilege or benefit when he subscribe to the stale Complaint-Affidavit dated May 18, 1999,
deserves no consideration. This is so because, in Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-51065-72, June 30, 1987,
the Honorable Supreme Court, ruling on the issue raised by the petitioner that "inasmuch as he is not charged with
the duty of granting licenses or permits or other concessions, then he is not an officer contemplated by Section 3(e),"
held that:

"Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt practices of any public officers declared
unlawful. We agree with the view adopted by the Solicitor General that the last sentence of paragraph (e) is
intended to make clear the inclusion of officers and employees of offices or government corporations which,
under the ordinary concept of "public officers" may not come within the term. It is a strained construction of
the provision to read it is applying exclusively to public officers charged with the duty of granting licenses or
permits or other concession.
It follows, therefore, that the only determination left for this Honorable Office is to find out if [Laurezo] is a public
officer or not in order for him to be held liable under Rep. Act No. 3019.[31]

Jarlos-Martin, for her part, avowed in her Counter-Affidavit,[32] dated June 23, 2000, thus:

4. I vehemently deny the said accusations, the truth of the matter being as follows:

a. On June 7, 1999, OMB Case No. 0-99-1015 entitled "Iluminado L. Junia, Jr. vs. Rodolfo M. Agdeppa and
Ricardo Castillo, For: Violation of R.A. No. 3019", was assigned to me.

b. Upon receipt thereof, I made an evaluation report on the said case. I requested for an authority to conduct a
preliminary investigation, which was granted on June 10, 1999. On even date, an order was issued directing the
respondents (of OMB 0-99-1015) to file their counter-affidavits.

c. On July 26, 1999, Rodolfo M. Agdeppa filed his answer. Thereafter, on August 2, 1999, Iluminado L. Junia, Jr.
filed his reply to the said answer. Upon the other hand, Ricardo Castillo filed several motions for extension of time
until he finally filed his answer on September 6, 1999. The reply on Castillo's answer was filed by Junia on
September 20, 1999.
d. On September 23, 1999, I made a study of the records of the subject case to determine if there is a need for
clarificatory hearing or other documents to be presented, since the issues in the subject case are complicated and
involve technical matters.

e. It appears from the records that a letter was sent by Rodolfo Agdeppa, manifesting before this Office that there
must be compliance first with section 4 and 4(a) of Administrative Order No. 7 dated April 10, 1999 before an order
to file counter-affidavit could issue, copy of the said letter is hereto attached as Annex "1".

f. Upon confirmation, I noticed that although the complaint looks like as if it was sworn to, since it was signed by
Iluminado Junia, Jr. and that there is verification and certification written thereat, still, the same was not under oath.

g. While it is my honest belief that I have performed my duty in accordance with the provision of law which
provides that "The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed
in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government" (see section 13, R.A. 6770), yet, to put
things in order, the matter can be best rectified by complying with the provisions of section 4(a) and (b) of A.O. No.
7. Thus, on the same date, or on September 23, 1999, I immediately issued an order directing Iluminado Junia, Jr. to
appear before the Office of the Ombudsman to swear to his complaint pursuant to section 4 and 4(a) of A.O. No. 7,
copy of the said order is hereto attached as Annex "2".

[h.] On October 6, 1999, Junia personally appeared before the Office and his complaint was sworn to before Atty.
Emmanuel M. Laurezo, an officer authorized to administer oath under section 31 of R.A. No. 6770. Subsequently,
an order to file counter-affidavit was issued in accordance with section 4(b) of A.O. No.7.
5. Under the circumstances, it is very clear that there is absolutely no basis in filing this case:

5.1. [Agdeppa's] claim that my act of issuing the Order dated October 6, 1999 when I was supposed to have already
resolved OMB 0-99-1015 a long time ago, finds no place. How could I resolve a case, which is not yet ripe for
resolution? At the time the said order was issued, preliminary investigation was still ongoing.

5.2. The charge that I caused damage and injury to [Agdeppa] because I set aside the records of OMB-0-99-1015,
which was complete when I issued the order dated October 6, 1999, is likewise devoid of merit.

5.3. I did not set aside the records of the case. I was evidently inspired by utmost good faith to comply with
procedural matters, of which I was authorized.

5.4. There is no basis on complainant Agdeppa's allegations that the records of the case [were] already complete
when I issued the October 6, 1999 order. The last pleading that I received before I issued the aforesaid order was the
reply to Castillo's answer filed on September 20, 1999 by Junia before the Records Divisions of the office. I was not
aware when Castillo personally received the said reply, since the proof of sending is by registered mail. What if he
files a rejoinder? It is to be noted that the purpose of preliminary investigation is to give opportunities to the parties
to expound their respective sides.

5.5. Even assuming, arguendo, that the parties have already submitted their respective pleadings, this cannot be
made as basis to terminate the preliminary investigation and jump into the conclusion that the records [were] already
complete. It bears emphasis that, during the study of the case, if the investigating officer finds that there are matters
which need to be clarified, he/she may set a clarificatory hearing, or if there are documents which need to be
produced, subpoena duces tecum will issue.

5.6. The allegation that the "re-starting of preliminary investigation on OMB-0-99-1015 gave unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference to respondent Junia because, in the Order dated 6 October 1999, the said respondent was
given another chance to file his reply to any answer or counter-affidavit submitted after 6 October 1999" (see par.
22, Complaint) was unfounded.

5.7. The said order was intended to both parties and not only to Junia. Granting that the preliminary investigation
restarted by reason of compliance with A.O. No. 7, this will not put into waste the efforts already exerted by the
parties. The complaint that was attached to the second order to file answer is the very same complaint that was
attached to the first order, only that it was put under oath. This means there is nothing new in the subject matter of
the complaint, which the respondent therein had already studied. Needless to say, respondents must adopt their
previous answers and the complainant, his reply thereto, which is exactly what Ricardo Castillo and Iluminado
Junia, Jr. did, copies of their respective Manifestations dated November 24, 1999 and December 6, 1999 are hereto
attached as Annexes "3" and "4".

5.8. The allegation that the order dated October 6, 1999 will give me basis to resolve the case in favor of Junia in
case of non-compliance of Agdeppa to the said Order (see par. 22, Complaint) is totally absurd and malicious.

5.9. It is significant to note that in any case, it does not follow that if there is failure on the part of [Agdeppa] to file
his answer, the case will be resolved in favor of [Junia]. The resolution of the case is based on the evidence on
record. Thus, in the subject case, OMB 0-9-1015, though Agdeppa did not submit a responsive pleading to the Order
dated October 6, 1999 and instead filed a Motion to Resolve, his counter-affidavit which had already form[ed] part
of the records of the case, will be treated as his answer. [33]

In his Reply-Affidavit[34] filed on July 12, 2000, Agdeppa countered:

11. That Par. no. 4(g), in so far as it relates to the claim of [Jarlos-Martin] that the "matter" (a case that was already
subjected for preliminary investigation) is rectifiable by the application of Section 4(a) and (b) of A.O. No. 07 is
denied because that is putting the cart before the horse, so to speak. This is so because, in A.O. No. 07, only verified
complaints undergo preliminary investigations. Hence, when the un-sworn complaint dated May 18, 1999
underwent preliminary investigation up to the time when the last pleading thereof was filed on September 20, 1999,
Section 4(b) of A.O. No. 07 is no longer applicable because, without anymore clarificatory questioning, what
follows next is its resolution, pursuant to Section 4(g) thereof x x x.

xxxx

12. That Par. no. 4(g), in so far as it concerns the claim of [Jarlos-Martin] that she resorted to the issuance of her
aforesaid Order dated September 23, 1999 to put things in order, is denied because, to reiterate, she no longer has
the authority to issue such an Order after September 20, 1999 as there was already a last pleading filed to OMB-0-
99-1015 on the basis of her Order dated 10 June 1999 and, thusly, she was already mandated, by her very own Order
dated 10 June 1999, to resolve the said case pursuant to Section 4(g) of A.O. No. 07.

13. That the first Par. no. 5 (as there are two) is admitted but with the qualification that the appearance of Mr. Junia
before the Office (EPIB) was on the basis of [Jarlos-Martin's] Order dated September 23, 1999. If this is the case,
then [Jarlos-Martin] should have been the one who should have administered the oath on the complaint dated May
18, 1999 as she is also authorized to do so pursuant to Section 31 of RA No. 6770 x x x.

xxxx

14. That the second Par. no. 5 is denied as the record of OMB- 0-99-1015 indicates to the contrary the claim of
[Jarlos-Martin] that there is absolutely no basis for the filing of the above-entitled case. It is to be noted that no less
than Director Rudiger G. Falcis II, of the Criminal Investigation, Prosecution and Administrative Adjudication
Bureau, this Honorable Office, had declared in his Order dated June 6, 2000 requiring [Jarlos-Martin] to file [her]
counter-affidavit to the above-entitled case because "The Affidavit-Complaint filed by [Junia] dated April 6, 2000
xxx is sufficient in form and substance", thus, entirely belying [Jarlos-Martin's] claim of absolute want of basis in
the filing of the instant case.

xxxx

17. That Par. no. 5.2 is denied because it is precisely the Order dated October 6, 1999 which gave [Jarlos-Martin] a
veiled legal basis in postponing, albeit illegally, the resolution of OMB-0-99-1015. This is so because the said Order
changed the proceedings already put and held in place by the Order dated 10 June 1999. Thusly, the preliminary
investigation of OMB-0-99-1015 went beyond the ambit of the Order dated 10 June 1999. x x x.[35]
The Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution dated July 31, 2000 dismissing Agdeppa's complaint in OMB-
MIL-CRIM-00-0470 for the following reasons:

We find for [Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and Junia].

We shall explain the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 which are clearly inapplicable to the instant
case:

1. To warrant the indictment of [Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and Junia] for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019,
it is not enough that the act of [Jarlos-Martin and Laurezo] in the discharge of their official function caused
undue injury to [Agdeppa]. It behooves [Agdeppa] to prove that the assailed act must have been done with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence (Alejandro vs. People, 170 SCRA
400). Moreover, unlike in actions for torts, undue injury in Section 3(e) of RA 3019 cannot be presumed
even after a wrong or a violation of right has been established, its existence must be proven as one of the
elements of the crime, and that the injury be specified, quantified, and proven to the point of moral
certainty. They cannot be based on flimsy and non-substantial evidence or upon speculation, conjecture or
guesswork; mere inconvenience is not constitutive of undue injury (Llorente vs. Sandiganbayan, 287 SCRA
382).

2. Mere neglect or refusal, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a
reasonable time on any matter pending before the office of [Jarlos-Martin and Laurezo] is not punishable
under Section 3(f) of RA 3019. It is necessary that such neglect or refusal must be for any of the following
purposes: a) obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or
material benefit or advantage, b) favoring respondent's own interest, or c) giving undue advantage in favor
of or discriminating against any other interested party. That respondent Jarlos-Martin will obtain pecuniary
benefit from her act or omission is an allegation that must be proven to the point of moral certainty and
cannot be presumed or based on surmises.

3. Section 3(a) of RA 3019 punishes a public officer who persuades, induces, or influences another to perform
an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations or an offense in connection with the official duties of
the latter, as well as the public officer who allowed himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to
commit such violation or offense. Evidence on record, however, is bereft that respondents Junia and
Laurezo had a meeting of minds to commit a violation. Besides, [Agdeppa] miserably failed to show which
particular law, rule or regulation was violated by respondent Laurezo in affixing his signature to the
complaint.

4. Section 3(j) of RA 3019 penalizes a public officer who knowingly approved or granted any license, permit,
privilege, or benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit,
privilege or advantage. However, the terms "benefit" and "advantage" (if at all, the act of respondent
Laurezo in subscribing the complaint of respondent [Junia] gave the latter a bonanza in the form of delay in
the latter's arraignment in another criminal case) should be construed as analogous to the other terms which
precede them, following noscitur a sociis, a rule of statutory construction. For some obvious reasons,
whatever benefit or advantage, if any, was extended to respondent Junia, the same does not come within the
purview of Section 3(j) of the Anti-Graft Law, it not being a license, permit or privilege under the
circumstances.

The dismissal of the instant complaint, is therefore, in order.[36]

The aforequoted Resolution was penned by Ombudsman Investigator Alan R. Cañares (Cañares), with the
concurrence of Director Falcis, recommending approval of Deputy Ombudsman for the Military Orlando C.
Casimiro (Casimiro), and approval of Ombudsman Desierto.
Agdeppa filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated July 31, 2000 but said Motion was denied for
lack of merit by the Office of the Ombudsman in an Order dated September 28, 2000. [37] The Office of the
Ombudsman ruled in said Order that:

[Agdeppa] circuitously argued that something obvious transpired between respondents Laurezo and Junia on one
hand and between Laurezo and Jarlos-Martin on the other hand. We do not agree. [Agdeppa] miserably failed to
adduce any evidence, direct or circumstantial, to prove any concert of voluntary action among [Jarlos-Martin,
Laurezo, and Junia] other than surmises and conjectures. We cannot engage in a mental calisthenics and stretch our
imagination to the possibility that [Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and Junia], with criminal design, hatched a conspiracy to
cause undue injury to [Agdeppa]. We would be committing injustice of cosmic proportions if [Jarlos-Martin,
Laurezo, and Junia] are suddenly swept into a grand conspiracy through presumptions which do not have any basis
in law and in fact.

Dissatisfied, Agdeppa filed the instant Petition before this Court averring grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman in rendering the Resolution dated July 31,
2000 and Order dated September 28, 2000 in OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470, committed as follows:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION WHEN IT RENDERED A RESOLUTION DISMISSING A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT FOR
VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AGAINST ITS OWN
INVESTIGATORS AND A PRIVATE RESPONDENT BY ADOPTING THE RESULT OF THE
(A)
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OBTAINED UPON AN ORDER WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT CONCERNED IN THE JOINT INVESTIGATION IN SHEER
CONTRAVENTION OF THE RULES OF COURT WHICH APPLY SUPPLETORILY TO THE RULES OF
PROCEDURE OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ACTED IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION
WHEN IT ALLOWED ANOTHER INVESTIGATING OFFICER TO RENDER THE RESOLUTION OF A
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT AGAINST ITS OWN INVESTIGATORS IN CONSPIRACY WITH A PRIVATE
(B)
INDIVIDUAL OTHER THAN THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER WHO ISSUED THE ORDER TO
SUBMIT COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT IN UTTER VIOLATION OF THE RULES OF COURT WHICH APPLY
SUPPLETORILY TO THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT RENDERED A RESOLUTION DISMISSING OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470 WHICH
(C) ALLOWED THE REALIGNMENT OF THE RULES OF COURT AND THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN IN THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF A CRIMINAL
CASE TO JUSTIFY ITS DISMISSAL.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT RENDERED A RESOLUTION DISMISSING OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470 BY
(D) TOLERATING THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE RESOLUTION OF OMB-0-99-1015 WHICH
TOLERANCE WAS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE PETITIONER TO
"SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES."
PUBLIC RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT CONSIDERED AS GOSPEL TRUTH THE ALLEGATION IN THE COUNTER-
AFFIDAVIT OF RESPONDENT LAUREZO THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT JUNIA APPEARED
(E)
BEFORE HIM ON OCTOBER 6, 1999 TO HAVE HIS AFFIDAVIT COMPLAINT PLACED UNDER
OATH EVEN IF THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF THE TRUTH OF SUCH AN ALLEGATION COMING
FROM THE SAID PRIVATE RESPONDENT HIMSELF.[38]

However, in his Memorandum, Agdeppa identified and argued the following issues:
 A. THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS OMBUDSMAN AND THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN
FOR THE MILITARY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS IN JURISDICTION WHEN THEY RENDERED A RESOLUTION DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT ENTITLED "RODOLFO M. AGDEPPA VERSUS- MARYDEL B. JARLOS-MARTIN,
EMMANUEL M. LAUREZO, ILUMINADO L. JUNIA, JR." UPON A PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION ON THE CASE DENOMINATED AS OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470 ENTITLED
"RODOLFO M. AGDEPPA -VERSUS- ATTY. MARYDEL B. JARLOS-MARTIN, ATTY.
EMMANUEL M. LAUREZO" IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, THE LAW, AND THE
RULES IN THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINTS

B. THE SPLITTING OF THE SINGLE CAUSE OF ACTION IN OMB-0-99-1015 OF CAUSING AN

OVERPAYMENT OF P2,044,488.71 INTO OVERPAYMENTS OF P182,543.43 AND P1,861,945.28
HAS NO BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW

C. MARTIN, LAUREZO AND JUNIA ARE GUILTY OF FORUM SHOPPING UPON THEIR UNIFIED
STAND THAT JUNIA APPEARED BEFORE LAUREZO AND HAD EFFECTIVELY SUBSCRIBED
TO OMB-0-99-1015[39]

Agdeppa enumerated and discussed more issues in his Supplemental Memorandum, to wit:

THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS OMBUDSMAN, ACTING THROUGH THE OFFICE OF THE
DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE MILITARY, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS IN JURISDICTION WHEN HE APPROVED THE RESOLUTION
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT "RODOLFO M. AGDEPPA -VERSUS- MARYDEL B. JARLOS-MARTIN,
EMMANUEL M. LAUREZO, ILUMINADO L. JUNIA, JR., WHICH IS A COMPLAINT RESPONSIVE IN
BOTH FORM AND SUBSTANCE, WITHOUT FIRST REQUIRING ILUMINADO L. JUNIA, JR. WHO IS A
PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO FILE HIS COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT THERETO

THE FILING OF OMB-0-99-1015 BEFORE THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VIOLATED
SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR NO. 28-91 DATED SEPTEMBER 4, 1991 AND THE FAILURE OF THE SAID
HONORABLE OFFICE TO SUMMARILY DISMISS THE SAID CASE ON THAT GROUND IS GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION

THE FILING OF THE INFORMATION DATED JUNE 14, 2000 IN OMB-0-99-1015 BEFORE THE
HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY ONLY ON APRIL 3, 2001 CONSTITUTES
VIOLATION OF PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO "SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES"

THE INFORMATION IN OMB-0-99-1015 CHARGING PETITIONER OF VIOLATION OF SEC. 3(E) OF REP.

ACT NO. 3019 FOR CAUSING INJURY TO THE GOVERNMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF P182,543.43 IN
OVERPAYMENT ON WORK ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF SUPRA CONSTRUCTION IN PHASE IX,
PACKAGE 7 AND 7-A IS A DISGUISED RE-LITIGATION OF THE AMOUNT OF P169,577.97 YIELDING
PRICE ESCALATION OF P3,088,941.42 WHICH WAS ALREADY PASSED WITH FINALITY IN COA
DECISION NO. 739 DATED JANUARY 10, 1989

COA DECISION NO. 2799 RENDERED BY THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON AUDIT ON APRIL 15,
1993 LACKED TRANSPARENCY AS IT SUPPRESSED THE EXISTENCE OF COA DECISION NO. 739
DATED JANUARY 10, 1989 WHICH PREVENTED PETITIONER FROM MAKING A PROPER
REASONABLE MOTION BEFORE IT OR A DECISIVE TIMELY APPEAL BEFORE THE HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT[40]

After an exhaustive review of the records, the Court finds no merit in the Petition at bar.

The Court's power of review in the

present Petition is limited to OMB-
MIL-CRIM-00-0470 and the
grounds/issues timely raised and
discussed by the parties.

The exchange of accusations between Agdeppa, et al., on one hand, and Junia, et al., on the other hand, regarding
the NHA Project, had given rise to a number of administrative and criminal cases that are still pending before
several administrative agencies and trial courts.

At the outset, the Court makes it clear that its review herein shall be strictly limited to OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470.
To recall, OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470 involves Agdeppa's complaint against Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and Junia
before the Office of the Ombudsman for corrupt practices under Section 3(a), (e), (f), and (j) of Republic Act No.
3019, allegedly committed by the latter three in the course of the preliminary investigation in OMB-0-99-1015. The
Office of the Ombudsman, in the Resolution dated July 31, 2000 and Order dated September 28, 2000, dismissed
Agdeppa's charges for lack of basis in fact and in law.

The Court underscores that it cannot touch upon the merits of the other cases which, although related and/or arising
from the same set of facts, are proceeding independently from and simultaneously with OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470.
The present Petition is not the proper remedy and, thus, the Court is without jurisdiction to review and annul the
Resolution dated June 14, 2000 of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-0-99-1015, which recommended the filing
of an Information against Agdeppa and Castillo for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019; or enjoin
and dismiss the resultant criminal case, Crim. Case No. 01-100552, against Agdeppa and Castillo, which is now
pending before the Quezon City RTC-Branch 91; or reopen a COA case decided long before in 1993.

The Court will also not rule upon issues which were raised by Agdeppa only in his Memorandum and Supplemental
Memorandum, specifically, issues [B], [C], [E], [G], and [H] thereof. These are issues which the Office of the
Ombudsman, Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and Junia did not have an opportunity to address or argue. The parties were
properly instructed by the Court in the Resolution dated October 22, 2001 that "[n]o new issues may be raised by a
party in his/its Memorandum and the issues raised in his/its pleadings but not included in the Memorandum shall
be deemed waived or abandoned."[41] Relevant herein is the ruling of the Court in Heirs of Ramon Garayes v. Pacific
Asia Overseas Shipping Corp.[42]:

We likewise reviewed petitioners' Reply and we note that the discussion therein referred only to the denial of the
motion for extension. No discussion whatsoever was made as regards the substantial merits of the case. In fact, as
we have mentioned before, it was only in petitioners' Memorandum where they raised for the first time the issue that
their appeal is meritorious.
This is not only unfair to the respondents who were deprived of the opportunity to propound their arguments
on the issue. It is likewise not allowed by the rules. In the June 23, 2008 Resolution, the Court reminded the
parties that "[n]o new issues may be raised by a party in the memorandum." The rationale for this was explained by
the Court in Heirs of Cesar Marasigan v. Marasigan, thus:

This Court significantly notes that the first three issues, alleging lack of jurisdiction and cause of action, are raised
by petitioners for the first time in their Memorandum. No amount of interpretation or argumentation can place them
within the scope of the assignment of errors they raised in their Petition.

The parties were duly informed by the Court in its Resolution dated September 17, 2003 that no new issues may be
raised by a party in his/its Memorandum and the issues raised in his/its pleadings but not included in the
Memorandum shall be deemed waived or abandoned. The raising of additional issues in a memorandum before the
Supreme Court is irregular, because said memorandum is supposed to be in support merely of the position taken by
the party concerned in his petition, and the raising of new issues amounts to the filing of a petition beyond the
reglementary period. The purpose of this rule is to provide all parties to a case a fair opportunity to be heard. No
new points of law, theories, issues or arguments may be raised by a party in the Memorandum for the reason that to
permit these would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.

Petitioners failed to heed the Court's prohibition on the raising of new issues in the Memorandum.
Based on the foregoing, we find no necessity to discuss the second issue which was raised by the petitioners for the
first time only in their Memorandum. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.)

The Court adheres to a policy

of non-interference with the
investigatory and prosecutorial
powers of the Office of the
Ombudsman.

In general, the Court follows a policy of non-interference with the exercise by the Office of the Ombudsman of its
investigatory and prosecutorial powers, in respect of the initiative and independence inherent in the said Office,
which, "beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the public
service."[43] The Court expounded on such policy in M.A. Jimenez Enterprises, Inc. v. Ombudsman,[44] thus:

It is well-settled that the determination of probable cause against those in public office during a preliminary
investigation is a function that belongs to the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is vested with the sole power to
investigate and prosecute, motu proprio or upon the complaint of any person, any act or omission which appears to
be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. It has the discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its
attendant facts and circumstances, should be filed or not. As explained in Esquivel v. Ombudsman:

The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with
the appropriate courts. Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's
exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise.
Said exercise of powers is based upon his constitutional mandate and the courts will not interfere in its exercise. The
rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the
Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will grievously hamper the functions of the office and the
courts, in much the same way that courts will be swamped if they had to review the exercise of discretion on the part
of public prosecutors each time they decided to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.
The Court respects the relative autonomy of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute, and refrains from
interfering when the latter exercises such powers either directly or through the Deputy Ombudsman, except when
there is grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, the Ombudsman's determination of probable cause may only be assailed
through certiorari proceedings before this Court on the ground that such determination is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion defined as such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. For
there to be a finding of grave abuse of discretion, it must be shown that the discretionary power was exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of discretion must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law. (Citations omitted.)

Petitioner failed to clearly demonstrate

grave abuse of discretion by the Office
of the Ombudsman that would have
justified the issuance of a writ of
certiorari by the Court.

It falls upon Agdeppa, as petitioner for the writ of certiorari, to discharge the burden of proving grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman, in accordance with the definition and standards set by law
and jurisprudence.

"Grave abuse of discretion" is well-defined and not an amorphous concept that may easily be manipulated to suit
one's purpose.[45] The Court gave the following comprehensive definition of said term in Yu v. Reyes-Carpio[46]:

The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as
with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an "evasion
of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." Furthermore,
the use of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to "truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or
quasi-judicial body is wholly void." From the foregoing definition, it is clear that the special civil action of certiorari
under Rule 65 can only strike an act down for having been done with grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could
manifestly show that such act was patent and gross. x x x. (Citations omitted.)

Not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.[47] While the prosecutor, or in this case, the investigating officers of the Office of the Ombudsman, may
err or even abuse the discretion lodged in them by law, such error or abuse alone does not render their act amenable
to correction and annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.[48] The requirement for judicial intrusion is
still for the petitioner to demonstrate clearly that the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Unless such a clear demonstration is made, the intervention is
disallowed in deference to the doctrine of non-interference.[49]

Throughout his Petition, Agdeppa presents a grand conspiracy between the Office of the Ombudsman and Junia,
with the Office of the Ombudsman deliberately acting upon and deciding OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470 (as well as
OMB-0-99-1015) contrary to Agdeppa's interest and favorable to Junia's. Agdeppa sees every act or decision of the
Office of the Ombudsman adverse to his interest tainted with capriciousness and arbitrariness. However, other than
his own allegations, suspicions, and surmises, Agdeppa did not submit independent or corroborating evidence in
support of the purported conspiracy. The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to
proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise cannot be given credence. When the complainant
relies on mere conjectures and suppositions, and fails to substantiate his allegations, the complaint must be
dismissed for lack of merit.[50]

Taking away Agdeppa's conspiracy theory, the grounds for his Petition no longer have a leg to stand on. As the
succeeding discussion will show, the Resolution dated July 31, 2000 and Order dated September 28, 2000 in OMB-
MIL-CRIM-00-0470 were rendered by the Office of the Ombudsman in the valid exercise of its discretion.

The exclusion of Junia in the Order

dated June 6, 2000 is effectively an outright
dismissal of the complaint as against him.

In the Order dated June 6, 2000 in OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470, the Office of the Ombudsman required only Jarlos-
Martin and Laurezo to file their counter-affidavits and evidence.

Agdeppa asserts that the Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over Junia, a private individual, who conspired
with Jarlos-Martin and Laurezo, public officers, in the commission of acts violative of Republic Act No. 3019. The
exclusion of Junia in the Order dated June 6, 2000 was in contravention of procedural due process as Junia was an
indispensable party in OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470 and without his counter-affidavit, there could be no complete
preliminary investigation in said case.

Section 22 of Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, explicitly provides:

Section 22. Investigatory Power. x x x.

In all cases of conspiracy between an officer or employee of the government and a private person, the Ombudsman
and his Deputies shall have jurisdiction to include such private person in the investigation and proceed against such
private person as the evidence may warrant. The officer or employee and the private person shall be tried jointly and
shall be subject to the same penalties and liabilities.

There is therefore no question that the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute a
private person who conspired with a public officer or employee in the performance of an illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient act or omission. In this case, though, the Office of the Ombudsman excluded Junia from the Order dated
June 6, 2000, not because it did not have jurisdiction over a private individual, rather, because it found no merit in
Agdeppa's accusations against Junia in OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) as counsel for the Office of the Ombudsman, Jarlos-Martin, and Laurezo
explains that the allegations in Agdeppa's Affidavit-Complaint "basically focused on the purported violations of the
provisions of RA 3019 by public respondents MARTIN and LAUREZO as graft investigating officers" and "[a]
reading of the complaint shows that JUNIA's alleged participation, if ever, was peripheral and secondary[,]" thus,
"the investigating officer, after evaluation, considered the complaint against [Junia] as not warranting further
proceedings."[51] In effect, the exclusion of Junia from the Order dated June 6, 2000 was an outright dismissal by the
Office of the Ombudsman of Agdeppa's Affidavit-Complaint insofar as said Affidavit-Complaint involved Junia.

The Court recognized in Angeles v. Gutierrez[52] that the Ombudsman has the discretionary power to dismiss a
complaint outright or proceed with the conduct of a preliminary investigation:

The determination by the Ombudsman of probable cause or of whether there exists a reasonable ground to believe
that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, is usually done after the conduct of
a preliminary investigation. However, a preliminary investigation is by no means mandatory.

The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman Rules of Procedure), specifically Section 2
of Rule II, states:

Evaluation. Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall recommend whether it may be: a)
dismissed outright for want of palpable merit; b) referred to respondent for comment; c) indorsed to the proper
government office or agency which has jurisdiction over the case; d) forwarded to the appropriate officer or official
for fact-finding investigation; e) referred for administrative adjudication; or f) subjected to a preliminary
investigation.

Thus, the Ombudsman need not conduct a preliminary investigation upon receipt of a complaint. Indeed, we
have said in Knecht v. Desierto and later in Mamburao, Inc. v. Office of the Ombudsman and Karaan v. Office of the
Ombudsman that should investigating officers find a complaint utterly devoid of merit, they may recommend its
outright dismissal. Moreover, it is also within their discretion to determine whether or not preliminary investigation
should be conducted.

The Court has undoubtedly acknowledged the powers of the Ombudsman to dismiss a complaint outright without a
preliminary investigation in The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto.

We reiterate that the Ombudsman has full discretion to determine whether a criminal case should be filed, including
whether a preliminary investigation is warranted. The Court therefore gives due deference to the Ombudsman's
decision to no longer conduct a preliminary investigation in this case on the criminal charges levelled against
respondent Velasco. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted.)

While the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed outright the Affidavit-Complaint as against Junia in OMB-MIL-
CRIM-00-0470, it decided to conduct a preliminary investigation of the charges against Jarlos-Martin and Laurezo
contained in the same Affidavit-Complaint. After the preliminary investigation, the Office of the Ombudsman
likewise dismissed the Affidavit-Complaint as against Jarlos-Martin and Laurezo for reasons that are notably not
dependent upon Junia's non-participation in the preliminary investigation. The reasons for the dismissal of
Agdeppa's complaint against Jarlos-Martin and Laurezo, as well as Junia, were collectively discussed by the Office
of the Ombudsman in its Resolution dated July 31, 2000.

Now as to whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman was correct in not at all investigating Junia is not for the
Court to decide in this Petition. Errors of judgment, as distinguished from errors of jurisdiction, are not within the
province of a special civil action for certiorari, which is merely confined to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion.[53] And, as had been previously discussed herein, without evidence that the Office of the Ombudsman
exercised its discretion capriciously and whimsically or arbitrarily and despotically in excluding Junia from the
Order dated June 6, 2000, there can be no grave abuse of discretion.

Agdeppa's assertion that he had been denied due process is misplaced, bearing in mind that the rights to be informed
of the charges, to file a comment to the complaint, and to participate in the preliminary investigation, belong to
Junia, as the following pronouncements on the nature of a preliminary investigation in Uy v. Office of the
Ombudsman[54] show:

A preliminary investigation is held before an accused is placed on trial to secure the innocent against hasty,
malicious, and oppressive prosecution; to protect him from an open and public accusation of a crime, as well
as from the trouble, expenses, and anxiety of a public trial. It is also intended to protect the state from having to
conduct useless and expensive trials. While the right is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a component of due
process in administering criminal justice. The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being
bound for trial and before being exposed to the risk of incarceration and penalty is not a mere formal or technical
right; it is a substantive right. To deny the accused's claim to a preliminary investigation is to deprive him of
the full measure of his right to due process. (Emphases supplied, citation omitted.)

In Cabahug v. People,[55] the Court even directly addressed agencies tasked with preliminary investigation and
prosecution of crimes, which includes the Office of the Ombudsman, reminding them as follows:

We cannot overemphasize the admonition to agencies tasked with the preliminary investigation and prosecution of
crimes that the very purpose of a preliminary investigation is to shield the innocent from precipitate, spiteful and
burdensome prosecution. They are duty-bound to avoid, unless absolutely necessary, open and public accusation of
crime not only to spare the innocent the trouble, expense and torment of a public trial, but also to prevent
unnecessary expense on the part of the State for useless and expensive trials. Thus, when at the outset the evidence
cannot sustain a prima facie case or that the existence of probable cause to form a sufficient belief as to the
guilt of the accused cannot be ascertained, the prosecution must desist from inflicting on any person the
trauma of going through a trial. (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted.)

Clearly, the right to preliminary investigation is a component of the right of the respondent/accused to substantive
due process. A complainant cannot insist that a preliminary investigation be held when the complaint was dismissed
outright because of palpable lack of merit. It goes against the very nature and purpose of preliminary investigation to
still drag the respondent/accused through the rigors of such an investigation so as to aid the complainant in
substantiating an accusation/charge that is evidently baseless from the very beginning.

The Resolution dated July 31, 2000

in OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470 was issued
in accordance with the Rules of Procedure
of the Office of the Ombudsman.

Agdeppa questions the fact that it was Director Falcis who issued the Order dated June 6, 2000 in OMB-MIL-
CRIM-00-0470 requiring Jarlos-Martin and Laurezo to file their counter-affidavits and evidence, but the preliminary
investigation was actually conducted and the Resolution dated July 31, 2000 was penned by Investigator Cañares.
According to Agdeppa, this violates the same-investigating-officer rule under Rule II, Section 4 of the Ombudsman
Rules of Procedure.

Rule II, Section 4 of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure reads in full:

Sec. 4. PROCEDURE. The preliminary investigation of cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
and Regional Trial Courts shall be conducted in the manner prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court,
subject to the following provisions:

a) If the complaint is not under oath or is based only on official reports, the investigating officer shall require the
complainant or supporting witnesses to execute affidavits to substantiate the complaints.

b) After such affidavits have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of
the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondent to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof, his counter-affidavits and controverting evidence with proof of service thereof on the complainant. The
complainant may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after service of the counter-affidavits.

c) If the respondent does not file a counter-affidavit, the investigating officer may consider the comment filed by
him, if any, as his answer to the complaint. In any event, the respondent shall have access to the evidence on record.

d) No motion to dismiss shall be allowed except for lack of jurisdiction. Neither may a motion for a bill of
particulars be entertained. If respondent desires any matter in the complainant's affidavit to be clarified, the
particularization thereof may be done at the time of clarificatory questioning in the manner provided in paragraph (f)
of this section.

e) If the respondent cannot be served with the order mentioned in paragraph 6 hereof, or having been served, does
not comply therewith, the complaint shall be deemed submitted for resolution on the basis of the evidence on record.

f) If, after the filing of the requisite affidavits and their supporting evidences, there are facts material to the case
which the investigating officer may need to be clarified on, he may conduct a clarificatory hearing during which the
parties shall be afforded the opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine the witness
being questioned. Where the appearance of the parties or witnesses is impracticable, the clarificatory questioning
may be conducted in writing, whereby the questions desired to be asked by the investigating officer or a party shall
be reduced into writing and served on the witness concerned who shall be required to answer the same in writing
and under oath.

g) Upon the termination of the preliminary investigation, the investigating officer shall forward the records of the
case together with his resolution to the designated authorities for their appropriate action thereon.

No information may be filed and no complaint may be dismissed without the written authority or approval of the
Ombudsman in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, or of the proper Deputy Ombudsman in
all other cases.

The aforequoted provision lays down the procedure for a preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman. While it consistently refers to the "investigating officer," it does not mandate that only one
investigating officer shall conduct the entire preliminary investigation and resolve the same. It cannot be the basis
for the same-investigating-officer rule that Agdeppa invokes.

While ideally the investigating officer who conducted the preliminary investigation shall be the same one to resolve
the complaint, there may be unavoidable circumstances necessitating a change in investigating officers
(i.e., promotion, transfer, resignation, removal, retirement, or death of the previous investigating officer) during the
course of the preliminary investigation. The position of the Court in instances when the judge who rendered the
decision in a case was not the one who heard and received evidence may be applied by analogy:

[I]t is also axiomatic that the fact alone that the judge who heard the evidence was not the one who rendered
the judgment but merely relied on the record of the case does not render his judgment erroneous or
irregular. This is so even if the judge did not have the fullest opportunity to weigh the testimonies not having heard
all the witnesses speak nor observed their deportment and manner of testifying. Thus the Court generally will not
find any misapprehension of facts as it can be fairly assumed under the principle of regularity of performance of
duties of public officers that the transcripts of stenographic notes were thoroughly scrutinized and evaluated by the
judge himself.

Has sufficient reason then been laid before us by petitioner to engender doubt as to the factual findings of the court a
quo? We find none. A painstaking review of the evidence on record convinces us not to disturb the judgment
appealed from. The fact that the case was handled by different judges brooks no consideration at all, for
preponderant evidence consistent with their claim for damages has been adduced by private respondents as to
foreclose a reversal. Otherwise, every time a Judge who heard a case, wholly or partially, dies or leaves the service,
the case cannot be decided and a new trial will have to be conducted. That would be absurd; inconceivable.
[56]
(Emphasis supplied.)

Similarly, the fact alone that the investigating officer of the Office of the Ombudsman who issued the resolution was
not the one who conducted the preliminary investigation does not render said investigating officer's resolution
erroneous or irregular. The investigating officer may rely on the pleadings and evidence on record and enjoy the
presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties as a public officer, unless disputed by evidence to the
contrary.

In this case, Director Falcis's involvement in the preliminary investigation ended with the issuance of the Order
dated June 6, 2000 directing Jarlos-Martin and Laurezo to submit their counter-affidavits and evidence in OMB-
MIL-CRIM-00-0470. Investigator Cañares was in charge of the preliminary investigation thereafter until the
issuance of the Resolution dated July 31, 2000. Hence, Investigator Cañares was the one who conducted a
substantial portion of the preliminary investigation.

Yet again, Agdeppa's allegation that Director Falcis's outright dismissal of the complaint against Junia and exclusion
of Junia from the Order dated June 6, 2000 influenced Investigator Cañares into subsequently dismissing the charges
against Jarlos-Martin and Laurezo too, is pure speculation and devoid of any substantiation. Besides, the Resolution
dated July 31, 2000 completely passed through the gamut of the review process in the Office of the Ombudsman
before its issuance. After being penned by Investigator Cañares, said Resolution was reviewed not only by Director
Falcis, but also by Deputy Ombudsman Casimiro and Ombudsman Desierto. If Deputy Casimiro and/or
Ombudsman Desierto had noticed any error or irregularity in the Resolution, they could withhold their approval,
make their own findings, and rule differently; but they did not, and they approved the Resolution as it was penned
by Investigator Cañares. There is no reason for the Court to doubt the entire review process in the Office of the
Ombudsman as regards the Resolution dated July 31, 2000 in OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470 and cast aside the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties by Investigator Cañares, Director Falcis, Deputy
Ombudsman Casimiro, and Ombudsman Desierto, without clear and convincing evidence of the alleged irregularity
on the part of the aforementioned officials.

Agdeppa's accusations were mere suspicions

that do not support a finding of probable
cause to criminally charge Jarlos-Martin,
Laurezo, and Junia under Section 3(a), (e),
(f), and (j) of Republic Act No. 3019.

Agdeppa's criminal complaint in OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470 is essentially rooted in two external acts by Jarlos-
Martin and Laurezo in OMB-0-99-1015: (1) Jarlos-Martin's issuance of the Order dated September 23, 1999
requiring Junia to personally appear before the Office of the Ombudsman to swear to his Complaint in OMB-0-99-
1015, followed by the Order dated October 6, 1999 directing Agdeppa and Castillo to file their counter-affidavits to
Junia's Complaint which was then already under oath; and (2) Laurezo's certifying that Junia personally appeared
before him on October 6, 1999 to swear to the Complaint in OMB-0-99-1015. Agdeppa alleged that these acts were
committed by Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and Junia in conspiracy with one another to deliberately benefit Junia and
prejudice Agdeppa and, thus, constituted corrupt acts under Section 3(a), (e), (f), (j) of Republic Act No. 3019.

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019 describes and penalizes the following as corrupt acts:

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized
by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:

(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and
regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the
latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.

xxxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification to act within a reasonable
time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person
interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own
interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party.

xxxx

(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any person not qualified for
or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one
who is not so qualified or entitled.

The pivotal issue for the Office of the Ombudsman to determine in OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470 was whether there
was probable cause to criminally charge Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and Junia with the foregoing corrupt acts. Probable
cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. [57] The Court had
set the standard to support a finding of probable cause in Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan[58]:

It bears stressing that probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on
evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of
guilt. It implies probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion but less than evidence which would
justify conviction. x x x. (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted.)

In its Resolution dated July 31, 2000 in OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470, the Office of the Ombudsman found no
probable cause and dismissed Agdeppa's complaint against Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and Junia. The Office of the
Ombudsman determined that one or more element/s for each corrupt act in Agdeppa's complaint is/are missing
and/or lacked factual basis. Agdeppa's accusations were nothing more than his bare suspicions. As the Office of the
Ombudsman frankly declared in its Order dated September 28, 2000, denying Agdeppa's Motion for
Reconsideration of the dismissal of OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470, "[Agdeppa] miserably failed to adduce any
evidence, direct or circumstantial, to prove any concert of voluntary action among [Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and
Junia] other than surmises and conjectures."

There is no merit to Agdeppa's contention that by dismissing his Affidavit-Complaint in OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470,

the Office of the Ombudsman tolerated the realignment of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure and violation of
Agdeppa's right to the speedy disposition of his case. There is utter lack of evidence presented by Agdeppa that
Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and Junia conspired to maliciously and deliberately conduct the preliminary investigation in
OMB-0-99-1015 to Agdeppa's prejudice.

On the basis of Laurezo's

certification, Junia personally
swore to his Complaint in
OMB-0-99-1015 before Laurezo
on October 6, 1999.

Agdeppa faults the Office of the Ombudsman for giving full faith and credence to Laurezo's allegation in his
Counter-Affidavit in OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470 that Junia personally appeared before him on October 6, 1999 to
verify and swear to the Complaint in OMB-0-99-1015. Agdeppa further challenges the authority of Laurezo to
administer the oath to Junia, when it was Jarlos-Martin, the investigating officer in OMB-0-99-1015, who issued the
Order dated September 23, 1999 directing Junia to appear before her at her office to swear to the Complaint.

According to Laurezo's certification, Junia personally appeared before him on October 6, 1999 to swear to his
Complaint in OMB-0-99-1015. There is no question that Laurezo, as an investigating officer of the Office of the
Ombudsman, has the power to administer oaths.[59] Since Laurezo administered the oath to Junia on October 6, 1999
in the performance of an official duty, his conduct of the same enjoys the presumption of regularity and, hence,
already satisfactory when not contradicted and overcome by evidence. The Court observed that other than raising the
question, Agdeppa did not present an iota of proof that Junia was actually not present before Laurezo on the date and
place as the latter certified.

Moreover, whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, and whether or not
certain documents presented by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests as to their
spurious character by the other side, are issues of fact.[60] Agdeppa wants the Court to look into the propriety of or
error in the appreciation of facts by the Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioner cannot be unaware that the Court is not
a trier of facts, more so in the consideration of the extraordinary writ of certiorari where neither questions of fact
nor even of law are entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. [61]

Lastly, Agdeppa's argument that Junia should have appeared, verified, and swore to his Complaint only before
Jarlos-Martin, who issued the Order dated September 23, 1999, is specious. Rule II, Section 4 of the Ombudsman
Rules of Procedure only provides that, "[i]f the complaint is not under oath or is based on official reports, the
investigating officer shall require the complainant or supporting witnesses to execute affidavits to substantiate the
complaints." Said provision did not expressly state that in such a situation, the complainant or supporting witnesses
are to execute the affidavits only before the investigating officer assigned to the case.

Despite the Order dated September 23, 1999 issued by Jarlos-Martin, there is no explicit rule that only she, to the
exclusion of all other authorized officials, can administer the oath to Junia. Insisting on such exclusivity will serve
no purpose. Junia is only required to subscribe and swear to his Complaint before an official authorized to
administer oath. To subscribe literally means to write underneath, as one's name; to sign at the end of a document.
To swear means to put on oath; to declare on oath the truth of a pleading, etc.[62] The identity of the authorized
official administering the oath, whether Jarlos-Martin or Laurezo, is not relevant and would have had no significant
legal effect on the Complaint in OMB-0-99-1015. In the end, the Complaint became a sworn affidavit just the same.

Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by the Office of the
Ombudsman in the issuance of its Resolution dated July 31, 2000 and Order dated September 28, 2000 in OMB-
MIL-CRIM-00-0470, the Court cannot depart from the policy of non-interference.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concur.

ECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 225808. September 11, 2017 ]

SPOUSES EDGARDO M. AGUINALDO AND NELIA T. TORRES-AGUINALDO, PETITIONERS,

VS. ARTEMIO T. TORRES, JR.,** RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated May 20,
2015 and the Resolution3 dated July 14, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
96014, which (a) affirmed the Decision4 dated January 21, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Trece
Martires City, Branch 23 (RTC), dismissing the complaint for annulment of sale, cancellation of title,
and damages filed by petitioners Spouses Edgardo M. Aguinaldo and Nelia T. Torres-Aguinaldo
(Nelia; collectively, petitioners) against respondent Artemio T. Torres, Jr. (respondent); and (b)
ordered petitioners to execute a registrable deed of conveyance in favor of respondent within thirty
(30) days from the finality of the CA Decision, in accordance with Articles 1357 and 1358 (1) of the
Civil Code.5
 The Facts

On March 3, 2003, petitioners filed a complaint6 for annulment of sale, cancellation of title, and
damages against respondent before the RTC. They claimed that they are the registered owners of
three (3) lots covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-93596, T-87764, and T-87765
situated in Tanza, Cavite (subject properties).7 Sometime in December 2000, they discovered that
the titles to the subject properties were transferred to respondent who, in bad faith, and through
fraud, deceit, and stealth, caused the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale8 dated July 21, 1979
(1979 deed of sale), purportedly selling the subject properties to him, for which he was issued TCT
Nos. T-305318, T-305319, and T-3053209 (subject certificates of title).

Respondent filed his Answer with Counterclaim,10 denying participation in the execution of the
1979 deed of sale, and averring that the subject properties were validly sold by petitioners to him
through a Deed of Absolute Sale11 dated March 10, 1991 (1991 deed of sale).12 He claimed that
petitioners caused the registration of the 1979 deed of sale with the Register of Deeds of Trece
Martires City, and the transfer of title in his name, hence, they are estopped from impugning the
validity of his title. Moreover, the action has prescribed, having been filed beyond four (4) years from
discovery of the averred fraud, reckoned from the registration of the said deed on March 26,
1991.13 He further alleged that petitioners only filed the instant baseless suit to harass him in view
of their acrimonious relationship, and thus, interposed a counterclaim for moral damages and
attorney's fees.14

The RTC Proceedings

On respondent's motion,15 a copy of the 1991 deed of sale was transmitted to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Questioned Documents Department for examination and determination
of its genuineness.16 The NBI thereafter submitted reports concluding that petitioners' questioned
signatures thereon and their sample signatures were written by the same persons.17

Thus, in a Decision18 dated January 21, 2010, the RTC dismissed the complaint, holding that
petitioners failed to establish their claim by preponderance of evidence.19 It found that petitioners
validly sold the subject properties to respondent,20 considering too Nelia's admission of the sale in
her letter21 dated November 12, 1998 (November 12, 1998 letter) to respondent.22

Aggrieved, petitioners appealed23 before the CA.24

The CA Ruling

In a Decision25 dated May 20, 2015, the CA denied the appeal and upheld the RTC's findings
and conclusions.26 While it ruled that the 1979 deed of sale was spurious after conducting its own
examination of petitioners' signatures thereon and on other pertinent documents, and thus, did not
transfer title over the subject properties to respondent, it declared that there was, nonetheless, a
valid sale to the latter,27 considering that: (a) petitioners failed to rebut the authenticity and due
execution of the 1991 deed of sale on account of their genuine signatures thereon as established by
the NBI reports,28 and the CA's own independent examination of their signatures on various
documents submitted before the court;29 (b) Nelia admitted the existence of the sale of the subject
properties in her November 12, 1998 letter to respondent;30 and (c) respondent's religious payment
of real property taxes on the subject properties from 1993 to 2003 supports his claim of ownership,
for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property if he does not claim possession in
the concept of an owner.31
 However, the CA observed that despite its authenticity and due execution, the 1991 deed of sale
was improperly notarized, given that it was signed by respondent and witness Lalaine Bucapal
(Bucapal) in Makati City, and by petitioners in the United States of America (USA), but notarized in
Tanza, Cavite;32 as such, the same could not be properly registered by the Register of
Deeds.33 Accordingly, the CA found it equitable to compel petitioners to execute a registrable deed
of conveyance in favor of respondent within thirty (30) days from finality of the Decision, in
accordance with Articles 1357 and 1358 (1) of the Civil Code.34

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,35 which the CA denied in a Resolution36 dated
July 14, 2016; hence, this petition.
1aшphi1

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA committed reversible error
in ruling that there was a valid conveyance of the subject properties to respondent and directing
petitioners to execute a registrable deed of conveyance in his favor within thirty (30) days from the
finality of the decision.

The Court's Ruling

In the present case, the complaint was filed assailing the validity of the 1979 deed of sale, the
execution of which was denied by both parties. However, while the CA found that petitioners'
signatures on the said deed were manifestly different from their signatures on other pertinent
documents before it, and thus, declared the said deed as spurious and did not validly transfer title to
the subject properties, it failed to nullify the subject certificates of title issued pursuant to the said
deed. Settled is the rule that a forged deed of sale is null and void and conveys no title.37 Notably,
the complaint prayed for the nullification of the said certificates of title based on the spurious 1979
deed of sale.38 Hence, finding the foregoing in order, the CA's ruling must be modified accordingly.

Nonetheless, save for the above modification, the Court agrees with the CA's conclusion that a
valid conveyance of the subject properties to respondent was established.

While respondent denied participation in the execution of the 1979 deed of sale, he claimed that
the subject properties were validly sold by petitioners to him through the 1991 deed of sale.39 On
the other hand, petitioners denied the existence and due execution of the said deed, claiming that
they could not have signed the same as they were in the USA when it was supposedly executed.40

Thus, central to the resolution of the instant controversy is the determination of the authenticity
of the 1991 deed of sale which, however, is a question of fact rather than of law.41 It bears to stress
that it is not the function of the Court to re-examine, winnow, and weigh anew the respective sets of
evidence of the parties,42 absent a showing that they fall under certain recognized
exceptions,43 none of which are present here. 1aшphi1

At the outset, it should be pointed out that the 1991 deed of sale was improperly notarized,
having been signed by respondent and witness Bucapal in Makati City and by petitioners in the USA,
but notarized in Tanza, Cavite,44 which is in violation of the notarial officer's duty to demand that the
party acknowledging a document must appear before him,45 sign the document in his
presence,46 and affirm the contents and truth of what are stated therein.47 As aptly observed by the
CA, the evidence on record amply shows that Nelia could not have been in the Philippines at the
time the said deed was signed.48
 The improper notarization of the 1991 deed of sale stripped it of its public character and reduced
it to a private instrument.49 Hence, it is to be examined under the parameters of Section 20, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court (Rules) which pertinently provides that "[b]efore any private document
offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
proved either: (a) [b]y anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) [b]y evidence of
the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker."50 Emphases supplied.

In relation thereto, Section 22, Rule 132 of the same Rules provides the manner by which the
genuineness of handwriting may be proved, i.e.: (a) by any witness who believes it to be the
handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write; or he has seen writing purporting
to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged; (b) by a comparison, made by the
witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom
the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.

In this case, the CA made an independent examination of petitioners' signatures on the 1991
deed of sale (questioned signatures), and concluded that they are the same signatures found on
other pertinent documents (standard/sample signatures),51 which is the same conclusion arrived at
by the NBI.52 The due execution and authenticity of the said deed having been ostensibly
established by the finding that the signatures of petitioners thereon were genuine, the burden was
shifted upon the latter to prove by contrary evidence that the subject properties were not so
transferred53 - especially in light of Nelia's admission of the sale54 in her November 12, 1998 letter
to respondent, as well as respondent's payment of the real property taxes for the same55 - which
petitioners, however, failed to discharge convincingly.

The Court has held in a number of cases that forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved
by clear, positive, and convincing evidence, and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery
to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which is of greater weight or
more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it.56 In this case, the claimed forgery was
ruled out by a comparison of petitioners' questioned signatures with their standard/sample
signatures, but other than their own declaration that their signatures on the 1991 deed of sale were
forged, petitioners failed to present any evidence to corroborate their claim.

Although the improper notarization of the 1991 deed of sale did not affect the validity of the sale
of the subject properties to respondent, the same, however, rendered the said deed unregistrable,
since notarization is essential to the registrability of deeds and conveyances.57 Bearing in mind that
the legal requirement that the sale of real property must appear in a public instrument is merely a
coercive means granted to the contracting parties to enable them to reciprocally compel the
observance of the prescribed form,58 and considering that the existence of the sale of the subject
properties in respondent's favor had been duly established, the Court upholds the CA's directive for
petitioners to execute a registrable deed of conveyance in respondent's favor within thirty (30) days
from finality of the decision, in accordance with the prescribed form under Articles 135759 and
135860 (1) of the Civil Code. Notably, if petitioners fail to comply with this directive within the said
period, respondent has the option to file the proper motion before the court a quo to issue an order
divesting petitioners' title to the subject properties under the parameters of Section 10 (a),61 Rule 39
of the Rules of Court.

To be sure, the directive to execute a registrable deed of conveyance in respondent's favor -

albeit not specifically prayed for in respondent's Answer with Counterclaim - is but a necessary
consequence of the judgment upholding the validity of the sale to him, and an essential measure to
put in proper place the title to and ownership of the subject properties and to preclude further
contentions thereon. As aptly explained by the CA, "[t]o leave the [1991 deed of sale] as a private
one would not necessarily serve the intent of the country's land registration laws[, and] resorting to
another action merely to compel the [petitioners] to execute a registrable deed of sale would
unnecessarily prolong the resolution of this case, especially when the end goal would be the
same."62 In this relation, case law states that a judgment should be complete by itself; hence, the
courts are to dispose finally of the litigation so as to preclude further litigation between the parties on
the same subject matter, thereby avoiding a multiplicity of suits between the parties and their privies
and successors-in-interests.63

As a final note, it must be clarified that while the Court has declared TCT Nos. T-305318, T-
305319, and T-305320 null and void, the duty to process the cancellation of the said titles devolves
upon respondent's heirs. Likewise, it is the latter's duty to register the new deed of sale as herein
compelled so as to secure the issuance of new certificates of title over the subject properties in their
names.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 20, 2015 and the Resolution
dated July 14, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96014 are AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION

declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 21, 1979, as well as Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. T-305318, T-305319, and T-305320 in the name of respondent Artemio Torres,
Jr. NULL and VOID. Petitioners are DIRECTED to execute a registrable deed of conveyance in
respondent's favor within thirty (30) days from finality of this Decision, in accordance with the
prescribed form under Articles 1357 and 1358 (1) of the Civil Code. In case of non-compliance with
this directive within the said period, respondent has the option to file the proper motion before the
court a quo to issue an order divesting petitioners' title to the subject properties under the
parameters of Section 10 (a), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio,* Acting C. J., (Chairperson), Peralta, Caguioa, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.