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Philosophical Studies in Contemporary Culture
Ruiping Fan
Mark J. Cherry Editors
Sex Robots
Social Impact and the Future of Human
Relations
Founding Editor
H. Tristram Engelhardt Jr.{, Department of Philosophy
Rice University and Baylor College of
Medicine, Houston, TX, USA
Volume 28
Editor
Mark J. Cherry, Department of Philosophy, School of Arts & Humanities,
St. Edward’s University, Austin, TX, USA
Assistant Editor
James Stacey Taylor, College of New Jersey, Ewing, NJ, USA
Editorial Board Members

David Bradshaw, Department of Philosophy, University of Kentucky, Lexington,
KY, USA
Peter Jaworski, McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University,
Washington, DC, USA
Terry Pinkard, Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University, Washington,
DC, USA
C. Griffin Trotter, Center for Health Care Ethics & Emergency Medicine, Saint
Louis University, St. Louis, MO, USA
Kevin Wm. Wildes, S.J., President, Loyola University, New Orleans, LA, USA
This series explores the philosophical issues, concerns, and controversies framing
our contemporary culture. The volumes address studies of the perennial philosoph-
ical questions and major thinkers whose works have shaped current intellectual
debates. The series draws on the intellectual heritage of the past in order to illuminate
current concerns. The goal is to offer volumes whose perspective and focus can
contribute through philosophical studies to a better appreciation of the contemporary
human condition.
More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/6446

Ruiping Fan • Mark J. Cherry
Editors
Sex Robots
Social Impact and the Future of Human
Relations
Editors
Ruiping Fan Mark J. Cherry
Department of Public Policy Department of Philosophy, School of Arts &
City University of Hong Kong Humanities
Hong Kong, SAR, PRC St. Edward’s University
Austin, TX, USA
ISSN 0928-9518 ISSN 2215-1753 (electronic)

ISBN 978-3-030-82279-8 ISBN 978-3-030-82280-4 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82280-4
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland
AG 2021
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether
the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of
illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and
transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by
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The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication
does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant
protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this
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claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Acknowledgments
The development of this volume benefited through the kind efforts of many friends
and colleagues. Its origin was a series of papers presented at the Social Impacts of
Sex Robots and the Future of Human Relations conference held at the City Univer-
sity of Hong Kong in the summer of 2019. The editors wish to express our deep
gratitude to the organizer of this conference, Zang Xiaowei, Director of the Global
China Studies program, College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences, City University
of Hong Kong, for his support of this international project. We are deeply thankful to
the contributors, who recast their essays several times over the course of the last two
years, to craft the final versions and commentaries that appear herein.
Ruiping Fan wishes to recognize the following persons’ contribution to the
fruitful discussion at the conference: Ding Chunyan, Yasuo Deguchi, Duan Weiwen,
Hsieh Chih Wei, Yumiko Inukai, Kwan Kai Man, Lam Wing Keung Kevin, Lin Fen,
Liu Bojing, Ryan Nash, Tang Jian, and Xie Wenye. I am grateful to my colleagues in
the Department of Public Policy at CityU, especially Hon S. Chan, Sungmoon Kim,
Richard Walker, and Xiaohu Wang, for their support of my projects. Finally, I
should make a note of special contribution from my wife, Hong, and my children
Liyi, Yueyi and Chengyi. Although none of them is interested in sex robots, they
trust that my work is relevant to the pursuit of valuable human relationships and
flourishing.
Mark J. Cherry wishes to recognize the ongoing generosity of St. Edward’s
University, the School of Arts and Humanities, and the Philosophy Department,
especially Sharon Nell, Peter Wake, and Jack Musselman. Each has been instru-
mental, though in quite diverse ways, to the success of this project. As with all of my
projects, this volume would not exist without the constant support, kindness, and
love of my very human (not at all robotic!) wife, Mollie.
v
Contents
Part I Introduction
1 Sex Robots: A Twenty-First Century Innovation
in the Culture Wars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Mark J. Cherry and Ruiping Fan
Part II Digisexuality, Sexbots, and Other Twenty-First Century

Innovations
2 Sociable Robots for Later Life: Carebots, Friendbots
and Sexbots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Nancy S. Jecker
3 Should We Develop Empathy for Social Robots? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Jue Wang
4 Nudge Nudge, Wink Wink: Sex Robots as Social Influencers . . . . . 57
Mark Howard and Robert Sparrow
Part III Sex: Shifting Cultural and Moral Norms

5 Why Sex? Sex-Bots from a Daoist Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Ellen Y. Zhang
6 Could You Marry a Sex Robot? Shifting Sexual Norms
and the Transformation of the Family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Mark J. Cherry
7 The Moral Significance of Human Likeness in Sex Robots:
A Confucian Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Lawrence Y. Y. Yung
vii
viii Contents
8 What Kinds of Use of Sex Robots Can Be Morally Allowed?

A Confucian Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
Hanhui Xu
Part IV Reponses and Critique

9 Sociable Robots: Technology, Automation, and Human
Relationships in Postmodern Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Kevin W. Wildes, S.J.
10 Sex Robots and Views from Nowhere: A Commentary
on Jecker, Howard and Sparrow, and Wang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
Kelly Kate Evans
11 Sex Robots, Marriage, Health, Procreation,
and Human Image . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
Ruiping Fan
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
Contributors
Mark J. Cherry Department of Philosophy, School of Arts & Humanities,

St. Edward’s University, Austin, TX, USA
Kelly Kate Evans Department of Philosophy, Baylor University, Waco, TX, USA
Ruiping Fan Department of Public Policy, City University of Hong Kong,
Hong Kong, SAR, PRC
Mark Howard School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies,
Monash University, Clayton, VIC, Australia
Nancy S. Jecker Department of Bioethics and Humanities, University of
Washington School of Medicine, Seattle, Washington, USA
University of Johannesburg, African Centre for Epistemology & Philosophy of
Science, Johannesburg, Gauteng, South Africa
Robert Sparrow School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies,
Monash University, Clayton, VIC, Australia
Jue Wang Department of Philosophy, Xidian University, Xi’an, China
Kevin W. Wildes, S.J. St. Joseph’s University, Philadelphia, PA, USA
Hanhui Xu School of Medicine, Nankai University, Tianjin, China
Lawrence Y. Y. Yung Department of Public Policy, City University of Hong
Kong, Hong Kong, SAR
Ellen Y. Zhang Department of Religion and Philosophy, Hong Kong Baptist
University, Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR
ix
Part I
Introduction
Chapter 1
Sex Robots: A Twenty-First Century
Innovation in the Culture Wars
Mark J. Cherry and Ruiping Fan
1.1 Introduction
The recent history of applied moral philosophy discloses a profound shift in com-
mitments within the dominant intellectual culture of the West. These changes have
been especially prominent in ethical evaluation of innovative technology. For
example, long the subject of popular cultural references, movies, and science fiction,
the use of robots for human like interaction, friendship, and sexual gratification has
recently become more technologically possible. Robots can be manufactured with
customizable body styles, eye and hair color, skin tone, facial physiognomy, and
other features. Companies, such as Robot Companion, All Intelligent Technology
Company, Ltd., and Realdoll, advertise advanced artificial intelligence robotics that
allows synthetic personal interaction, hugs, conversation structured around various
personalities, and intimate sexual response designed to permit these robots to behave
like companions, friends, and lovers.1 Claims of companionship and friendship are
1
The Robot Companion company, for example, claims to offer more than just sex: “Our AI Robot
Companion Sex Dolls have the ability to learn with you, the Technology allows her to interact on
everyday level. The Robot Companion can tell you the weather, remember your favourite foods, ask
about your day, answer many questions and most importantly continue to learn along the way.
Along with regular remote updates you are sure to enjoy that mental stimulation you have always
craved. You have the ability to ask the Robot Companion anything and she will respond. You also
have the ability to help your Robot Companion understand what your preferences are. . .Our AI
Robot Companion Sex Dolls are equipped with built in sensors, this means she will react in a
M. J. Cherry (*)
Department of Philosophy, School of Arts & Humanities, St. Edward’s University, Austin, TX,
USA
e-mail: markc@stedwards.edu
R. Fan
Department of Public Policy, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, SAR, PRC
e-mail: safan@cityu.edu.hk
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 3

R. Fan, M. J. Cherry (eds.), Sex Robots, Philosophical Studies in Contemporary
Culture 28, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82280-4_1
4 M. J. Cherry and R. Fan
likely exaggerations given the current state of technological advancement. However,

as artificial intelligence and human likeness improves, robotic sex dolls may become
a more attractive solution to address the challenges of loneliness, companionship,
sexual experimentation, emotional and sexual satisfaction. It is one thing, however,
to customize automation and robotics for efficient and precise manufacturing,2
surgery,3 cleaning,4 and other repetitive, precise, or dangerous tasks, or even to
create specialty carebots to comfort and calm individuals who suffer from dementia,
autism, or other ailments5; it is quite another matter to encourage robot-human
sexual relationships. How should we think about the cultural and social influence
of anatomically correct humanoid robots, with human like movement and interactive
behavior, specifically designed to be used for sexual gratification?
To secure normative claims about sexual activity with artificial humanoids, one
will need first to understand what the meaning of the morality of sexual activity can
be as well as the significance of various practices with robotic partners on such
cardinal social institutions as the family and the relationship between the sexes.
What are the implications of sex robots and related technological innovations for
society and culture? In terms of which ranking of human goods, right-making
conditions, social outcomes, or personal virtues ought we to evaluate the signifi-
cance of sexual relations with robots that look like women, men and children? For
example, do sex robots wrongly objectivize women or men? Do they encourage vice
or reinforce inappropriate sexual attractions and activities, such as pedophilia, when
made to look like young boys and girls? Is it wrong to capitalize on and make money
by exploiting the sexual interests, preferences, and emotions (such as loneliness,
sensual and sexual way when you touch her in certain places. Our Technology allows remote
upgrades, which means once new technology is built, we will be able to upgrade your AI Robot
Companion Dolls with her latest features.” https://www.robotcompanion.ai/our-technology/
2
The technology company Acieta, for example, argues that “Robotics and manufacturing are a
natural partnership. Robotics play a major role in the manufacturing landscape today. Automatic
manufacturing solutions should be a key part of any operation that strives for maximum efficiency,
safety and competitive advantage in the market. Manufacturing robots automate repetitive tasks,
reduce margins of error to negligible rates, and enable human workers to focus on more productive
areas of the operation.” https://www.acieta.com/why-robotic-automation/robotics-manufacturing/
3
As one surgeon described the procedure: “Robotic surgery is not autonomous but is controlled by
us the surgeons. We introduce the ‘arms’ surgically. These have instruments attached, including a
high-definition 3D camera. The surgeons will go to the robotic console, while at least one assistant
will stay by the bedside. We control the arms from the control console, manipulating tissue, much in
the same way a surgeon would when carrying out open surgery, and remove the cancer” (Pratt
2018). https://www.healthline.com/health-news/how-robotic-surgery-is-helping-patients-doctors
4
Robots have become common in household cleaning (e.g., the Roomba produced by IRobot) as
well as in industrial cleaning tasks, such as micro-dredging, the removal of sludge and sediment
from industrial water tanks (see, e.g., Sciphyn.com).
5
Paro, a robotic seal, was designed to calm and comfort patients with dementia or other forms of
loss of cognitive function. Paro is marketed as a therapeutic robot: “PARO is an advanced
interactive robot developed by AIST, a leading Japanese industrial automation pioneer. It allows
the documented benefits of animal therapy to be administered to patients in environments such as
hospitals and extended care facilities where live animals present treatment or logistical difficulties.”
http://www.parorobots.com/
1 Sex Robots: A Twenty-First Century Innovation in the Culture Wars 5
isolation, and poor body image) of men, women, and children? Moreover, if robots
are equipped with well-developed artificial intelligence, at what point do they come
to have moral standing in their own right, such that it would be wrong to use them for
sexual gratification without their explicit permission?6
Critics argue that sex robots present a clear risk to real persons as well as a
degradation of society. They claim that the prevalence of sex robots will increase
sexual violence, immorally objectify women, encourage pedophilia, reinforce neg-
ative body image stereotypes, increase forms of sexual dysfunction, and pass on
sexually transmitted disease.7 Proponents judge robotic sexual companionship as
just another step in the exploration of human desire. Sex robots, and similar
technology, such as virtual reality pornography and other forms of “digi-sexuality,”
are appreciated as providing autonomy affirming companionship, sexual release for
the lonely, and a relatively harmless outlet for sexual fantasies that avoids the use of
human prostitutes and thus reduces sexual victimization. In short, some critics
appreciate sex robots as a social evil that will further degrade moral culture, other
commentators judge such technological innovation as a positive good that will help
preserve human dignity, still others view their use as a more or less harmless
pastime.
The chapters in this volume bring together conceptual, moral, and cultural
concerns carefully to assess a significant public policy issue: the development and
proliferation of sex robots. Some commentators, such as Nancy Jecker, Mark
Howard and Robert Sparrow, argue that social space ought to be made for different
types of humanoid robots, including carebots, friendbots, and even sexbots. Robotic
companions for socially isolated adults and for people without sex partners, they
argue, would likely play important roles for stimulating activities of daily living,
supporting sexual capabilities, enhancing self-worth and dignity. Others, such as
Hanhui Xu, conclude that while it would not be fully virtuous, certain forms of
sexual activities with humanoid robots may be permissible and even perhaps
affirming of basic human goods under some circumstances. Still others, such as
Ellen Zhang, Jue Wang and Lawrence Yung raise foundational questions regarding
the implications of sex robots for Chinese moral and familial culture. Mark Cherry
puzzles whether general secular moral analysis would recognize the marriage of a
human to a sex robot. Finally, chapters by Kevin W. Wildes, S.J., Kelly Kate Evans,
and Ruiping Fan comment on and carefully critique the implications of these various
conceptual arguments and moral perspectives. Together, the chapters in this volume
critically explore the moral questions, political realities, as well as the social and
cultural implication of sex robots.
6
Here one might consider such pop-cultural explorations as the movie Blade Runner (1982), based
on Philip K. Dick’s book: Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep first published in 1968; see the new
edition 1996. Other examples include the popular science fiction television series Humans, see:
https://www.amc.com/shows/humans%2D%2D51
7
See Campaign Against Sex Robots: http://campaignagainstsexrobots.org
1.2 Sex Robots and Important Cultural Shifts
The Western world is currently witnessing a continuing and significant shift in

cultural and moral commitments regarding sexual behavior and family life. Tradi-
tionally, the family has been understood as structured around the marriage of
husband and wife, together with their own biological (and perhaps adopted) chil-
dren, as well as grandparents and other close biologically related kin. Since at least
the 1960s, however, the contemporary culture wars have sought to deflate and
demoralize the importance of traditional forms of family life (see Cherry 2016).8
8
As James Davison Hunter notes: “The family is the most conspicuous field of conflict in the culture
war. Some would argue that it is the decisive battleground. The public debate over the status and
role of women, the moral legitimacy of abortion, the legal and social status of homosexuals, the
increase in family violence, the rise of illegitimacy particularly among black teenagers and young
adults, the growing demand for adequate day care, and so on, prominently fill the headlines of the
nation’s newspapers, magazines, and intellectual journals” (1991, p. 176).
One might also consider the statement of the “Black Lives Matter” political action group of the
need to destroy the traditional nuclear family: “We are committee to disrupting the Western-
prescribed nuclear family structure requirement. . . .” (www.blmphilly.com).
It is worth noting that the traditional nuclear family is not a Western phenomenon; various forms
and variations of the biologically-based nuclear family exist throughout the world (see Cherry
2016). Children raised within such traditional family structures enjoy an internationally and cross-
culturally well documented wide range of statistical advantages (social, emotional, psychological
and economic) compared to children raised in other environments. Children raised in single parent
homes, for example, are more likely to experience poverty, criminality, and school delinquency, to
fail to finish school, to become pregnant while still an unmarried teenager, as well as to experience
poor psychological health (see Defoe 2003; Noval et al. 2002; Weithoff et al. 2003). Learning to
function as a responsible adult is a slow and challenging process. Children typically need close
parental guidance into their mid to late twenties. Outside of close biological family connections
there is often significantly less support. For example: “. . .stepfathers, on average, are less attached
to the unrelated children of their partners than genetic fathers to their own children. From an
evolutionary perspective, men’s investments in children are influenced by genetic links. . . . In
addition, stepfathers and children may compete for mothers’ time, energy, attention, or affections.
All of these suggest that genetic fathers may make higher quality investments in children than
stepfathers; accordingly, stepfathers have a higher probability of physically abusing children”
(Alexandre et al. 2010, p. 960). Similar cross-cultural data is available. In rural China, for example,
data suggests that children of divorced parents are much more likely to experience abuse or violence
than children who live with their biologically related mother and father (Mengtong and Ling 2016).
A study in Britain found stepfathers to be the offender in fatal child abuse cases approximately 62%
of the time. In the Netherlands, data from all seventeen of the country’s child-protective service
agencies concluded that families with a stepparent have an elevated risk of child abuse (van
Ijzendoorn et al. 2009). In Brazil, a study found that child physical abuse was 2.7 times more likely
in a household that included a stepfather than in a household with two biological parents. The
elevated risk included additional alleged abuse by the mother (Alexandre et al. 2010, p. 960; see
also Berger et al. 2008). As Charles Murray summarizes: “No matter what the outcome being
examined – the quality of the mother-infant relationship, externalizing behavior in childhood
(aggression, delinquency, and hyperactivity), delinquency in adolescence, criminality as adults,
illness and injury in childhood, early mortality, sexual decision making in adolescence, school
problems and dropping out, emotional health, or any other measure of how well or poorly children
do in life – the family structure that produces the best outcomes for children, on average, are two
Unlike traditional religious and cultural worldviews that recognize marriage and
family life as possessing an ontological reality to be rightly lived, the now dominant
secular culture of the West behaves as if there are no significant differences between
traditional forms of marriage and family life and other types of sexual lifestyles, so as
to consider the meaning of sexuality and intimate human relationships in ever more
nominalistic terms. Marriage and family life, for example, are no longer judged as
having any important reality of their own; instead, each particular example of the
family is seen as created by and thus fully reducible to the collaboration of its
members. Sexual relationships exist only to realize a particular lifestyle choice that is
found by specific persons to be enjoyable, desirable, or otherwise personally fulfill-
ing. As a result, where once the marriage of man and woman was recognized as the
usual practice for normalizing sexual relationships, with families understood as the
proper social unit for providing instruction regarding rightly ordered sexuality, in the
Western world, such traditional social expectations have by-and-large given way to
social acceptance of significant extramarital sexual activity with one or more
partners.
Popular culture in the West has disconnected sex from marriage and traditional
family life. This worldview is characterized by assumptions against moral norms that
require chastity outside of the marriage of man and woman. There is, as Jecker,
Howard, and Sparrow reflect, a presumption in favor of sexual freedom. Heterosex-
ual normativity has likewise been rejected. In the dominant secular culture of the
Western world, sexual relationships are to be based on personal attraction, the
pursuit of pleasure, and self-satisfaction. For those who live embedded within this
cultural milieu, there has by-and-large ceased to be any meaningful context aside
from consent of the parties involved through which to differentiate appropriate from
inappropriate sexual relationships. With only the authority of individual free choice
to guide sexual decision making, experimentation to find one’s own preferred sexual
niche in many quarters has become the taken-for-granted social norm. The import of
Western secular liberalism into parts of East Asia is starting to drive similar cultural
phenomena in Hong Kong and mainland China. Where Confucianism remains a
significant focus for morality in China, as many of the authors in this volume note
(see, for example, Wang, Yung, Fan, and Xu) the liberal secular sexual morality of
the West has begun to have an impact on Chinese social and moral culture. Among
the risks in both China and the Western world is that individuals will become ever
more isolated from the rich social connections of family life. The normalization of
sex robots, and other forms of digi-sexuality, further the secular goal of reshaping the
relevant background cultures away from support for traditional forms of family life
and sexual mores.
Within traditional religions and cultures the lifeworld of the human family is very
frequently the central component of an all-encompassing moral and cultural
biological parents who remain married (2012, p. 158). The roles that male and female biological
parents play in raising children cannot be easily reproduced in other types of social arrangements.
Arguing against the traditional nuclear family inevitably leads to significant harms to children.
enterprise. It is a normative category of social life. It instills moral discipline and

embodies appropriate expression of the virtues, such as honesty, humility, love,
charity, and chastity. Children are taught what it means to have an appropriate prayer
life or to show filial piety towards their ancestors. They learn the importance of
caring for brothers and sisters, parents, grandparents and other close relations, as
well as what it means to submit to parental authority. Families provide instruction
regarding rightly ordered sexuality and the (im)morality of sexual relations outside
of the marriage of husband and wife. While understandings of proper familial
lifeworld vary by culture and religion, successful families nurture their children
through particular ways of life, inculcating significant elements of religious and
cultural knowledge, orienting members towards particular understandings of human
flourishing. Such families seek to embody foundational religious and cultural under-
standings as well as to communicate these commitments to future generations. They
recognize themselves as the core community through which children are taught how
to seek the good. Such families embody particular religious and cultural norms as
well as appropriate sexual activities and lifestyles.
There are strong resemblances between how traditional Christianity shapes the
family and how the family is experienced and lived in Confucianism. Each under-
stands important differences between men and women, and recognizes that the
family is directed towards social traits associated with supporting the flourishing
of its members. Each affirms an ideal form of the family towards which one should
orient oneself and others. Each also tends to be organized in ways that affirm the
authority of parents over their minor children, underscoring the importance of
parental guidance to orient children towards human flourishing. Confucian virtue
ethics, for example, in significant ways revolves around the biological family,
embodied within concerns for filial piety and proper familial relationships (see Fan
2010, 2011, 2012). Persons are obliged to cultivate particular forms of family-based,
differentiated, and graded love, rather than generalized egalitarian social obligations
(Fan 2016, p. 195). The robust, content-full visions of human flourishing available
within such traditional religious and cultural ways of life, together with the morality
such a perspective supports, cannot be adequately captured or recreated within a
general secular vision of individual equality. Yet, such forms of the family are
central to an experiential, embodied, living account of human flourishing into
which one is born.9
9
As Hong Kong scholar Y. C. Richard Wong points out, traditional families have been empirically
proven to be the most beneficial to the growth of children and their development. “Since children
take a long time to grow up and must be cared for intensively, and since children in modern societies
tend to take an even longer time to grow to independence as a result of the much larger investments
in human capital parents make in them, the traditional family continues to be the best available
institution for producing ‘quality’ children. The term ‘quality’ is used in a very general and broad
sense covering cognitive, behavioral, health and other characteristics.” However, he is significantly
worried about the decline of the family along with the rise of the increasingly omnipresent state in
the contemporary time: “The family was by far the most important institution in society. But today it
is in decline with the state acting as a powerful competitor for the loyalty of its members. Its impact
is in contrast to that of the market and technology, which are not competitors but instead encourage
To speak of the family in such traditional terms, however, as a foundational social

unity naturally constituted around the ideal of the monogamous, married, heterosex-
ual couple and their own children, has become highly controversial in the Western
world. The West has, for example, experienced a significant breakdown of the family
as a central social and moral institution. Increased cohabitation without marriage and
the normalization of extramarital sexual activity, ease of divorce and remarriage
have all played a role (Cherry 2016). Adults in the United States, for example, are
much less likely to marry than in past decades. According to the Marriage Project,
“the marriage rate has declined dramatically from about 16 marriages per 1,000
people in 1946 to about 7 marriages per 1,000 in 2017” (Wilcox et al. 2019, p. 15).
Marriage rates have also fallen in China. Some studies place the marriage rate in
China as having fallen nearly 30 percent in the past five years (Schmitz 2018). The
total fertility rate10 is also declining. For example, the United States has a fertility
rate of just 1.84 per woman, mainland China’s fertility rate is 1.60; by way of
comparison, the fertility rate of Germany is 1.47, Italy: 1.47; Hong Kong: 1.21;
Taiwan: 1.14; Macau: 0.96 and Singapore: 0.87 (CIA World Factbook).11 Such a
declining fertility rate, together with easier access to ultrasound technology and
abortion, in some parts of the world has led to a significant disparity between the
numbers of men and women in the population.12 Families grounded in more
the substitution towards more quality and less quantity and indeed have brought hugely beneficial
economic effects. I am not at all concerned about the effects of the market on family choices
because market choices are always made on a voluntary basis. The state, however, has coercive
powers to enforce legislation and regulations that seek to impose its will on the family, often with
little room for choice” (available: http://www.wangyujian.com/?p¼1997&lang¼en).
10
The CIA World Factbook defines Total Fertility Rate as “the average number of children that
would be born per woman if all women lived to the end of their childbearing years and bore children
according to a given fertility rate at each age.” (See the World Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/the-
world-factbook/field/total-fertility-rate)
11
“Much of this decline is due to delaying the age at marriage. At the turn of the twentieth century,
median age at first marriage was 26 for men and 22 for women. By the mid-1950s, these numbers
had declined to about 22.5 (men) and 20 (women). Since that time, age at first marriage has
increased dramatically: in 2018, men’s median age at first marriage was 29.8 and women’s was
27.8. Other key factors explaining declining marriage rates are the growth of unmarried
cohabitation. . .shifting economic fortunes among those with less than a college degree, and some
increase in lifelong singlehood” (Wilcox et al. 2019, p. 16).
12
In China, for example, abortion of girl babies has significantly contributed to the imbalance
among the numbers of men and women. “In January 2010 the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
showed what can happen to a country when girl babies don’t count. Within ten years, the academy
said, one in five young men would be unable to find a bride because of the dearth of young
women—a figure unprecedented in a country at peace. . . . China in 2020 will have 30 m-40 m more
men of this age than young women” (The Worldwide War on Baby Girls 2010, p. 77). Other
countries, such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, and India, similarly have an off balance of boys over girls.
Technologies which detect the child’s sex before birth, such as ultrasound, together with easy access
to abortion have contributed to the killing of girl babies. “Until the 1980s people in poor countries
could do little about this preference: before birth, nature took its course. But in that decade,
ultrasound scanning and other methods of detecting the sex of a child before birth began to make
their appearance. These technologies changed everything. Doctors in India started advertising
traditional religious or cultural points of view are those that tend reliably to produce
children beyond a replacement rate (see Longman 2004a, b).13 Social shifts towards
later marriages, fewer children, an imbalance between the numbers of men and
women, and the functional separation between sexual activity, marriage and child
rearing, are having a significant impact on family life.
1.3 Significant Cultural Changes and Cross-Cultural

Disagreements
Several of the chapters in this volume embrace, perhaps celebrate, the role that sex
robots will likely play within this continuing cultural shift. Nancy Jecker, for
example, argues in favor of not only carebots and friendbots, but also sexbots. A
carebot, as she describes in her contribution, is a robotic caregiver that assists with
the day to day activities of living, such as eating, bathing, walking and toileting. A
friendbot is much like a carebot, but is programed to promote friendship-like bonds
between robots and humans, including activities such as singing and playing games,
smiling and offering encouraging words. A sexbot is essentially a friendbot that is
also engineered to provide an outlet for sexual gratification. Outfitted with sufficient
artificial intelligence, it might learn sexual preferences, engaging in cuddling activ-
ities as well as various forms of simulated sexual intimacy and intercourse. Jecker
argues that sexbots would permit individuals to function sexually and feel intimate.
Such activities might be useful for those who have not yet found a suitable partner,
lost a spouse, are socially awkward, feel less confident in their body image, perhaps
due to disease or disability, or who are otherwise socially isolated.14 Such robots
ultrasound scans with the slogan ‘Pay 5000 rupees ($110) today and save 50,000 rupees tomorrow’
(the saving was on the cost of a daughter’s dowry). Parents who wanted a son, but balked at killing
baby daughters chose abortion in the millions. The use of sex-selective abortion was banned in India
in 1994 and in China in 1995. It is illegal in most countries (though Sweden legalised the practice
in 2009). But since it is almost impossible to prove that an abortion has been carried out for
reasons of sex selection, the practice remains widespread” (The Worldwide War on Baby Girls
2010, p. 79).
13
Phillip Longman documents the implications of the falling birth rate throughout much of the
world, as well as which social and religious groups tends to have significant numbers of children
(2004a, 2004b).
14
Ezio Di Nucci similarly argues that sex is a candidate for a good to which persons have a basic
right, and that sex robots could provide an important avenue for sexual interaction for socially
isolated, unwanted, or disabled individuals: “It is at least plausible to hold that sexual satisfaction is
an important part of a fulfilled life: indeed, the fact that some people renounce it cannot imply that it
is not important, and that’s not because those people may be just wrong. Hunger strikes do not make
food less important just as celibate priests do not make sex less important. . . .the point is just that –
given important benefits in terms of welfare, self-fulfillment and even mental health – it is at least
not implausible to hold sex and sexuality to be, if not necessary, at least important elements in a
fulfilled life such that their nonvoluntary absence from someone’s life would be morally relevant.
. . .So sex is at least a candidate for membership of the set of things that are the appropriate objects of
would support a range of central human capacities, she argues, including sexual
intimacy. Societies, Jecker concludes: “ought to make reasonable efforts to support
these and other central human capacities at a floor level.” When a society omits or
otherwise limits such support, including sexbots, this “not only harms older adults
but poses threats to their dignity” (2022, p. 27). She argues that society ought to be
open to the possibility that sexbots might, on balance, create positive opportunities,
especially for older or disabled individuals, or those who are socially isolated and
lonely, so that they can experience an augmentation of sexual pleasure, thereby
affirming this human capacity.
While not judging sex robots in an altogether positive light, Hanhui Xu allows
that they might be used therapeutically to address certain forms of sexual dysfunc-
tion, such as sexual desire or arousal disorders, and so forth. In such cases, the use of
sex robots might be justified as a therapeutic tool, designed to help identify and treat
underlying physical and psychological difficulties, such as depression, performance
anxiety, and fear of sex. Moreover, insofar as one is single and cannot find a suitable
partner, Xu concludes that it would not be unreasonable for sex robots temporarily to
fill the gap. This would be less than ideal, but perhaps permissible given the
circumstances.
Stepping beyond benefits for those who are socially isolated, elderly, or unable to
find a sex partner, Mark Howard and Robert Sparrow embrace the possibility that
sex robots will likely be shaping personal relationships, social realities, and influenc-
ing our most intimate activities in the near future. While they acknowledge that sex
robots may discourage individuals from seeking out actual human companionship,
and recognize feminist concerns that sex robots might reinforce undesirable power
relationships between men and women, as well as unfortunate gender stereotypes,
nonetheless they embrace the possibility that sex robots might be programed to
reinforce what they judge to be socially positive behaviors. For example, sex robots
might function as sex therapists to improve sexual response and technique, or to
educate users regarding the importance of respectful attitudes in sexual relationships.
Howard and Sparrow foresee a future in which sex robots are effective in shaping
positive socialization by mimicking human capacities for persuasion and social
influencing. “Ideally, sex robots will also be continually updated and agile in their
responses to the intimate needs of individuals, aware of specific trends and patterns
in sexual preferences across cultural and social groups, and will be capable of
sharing this knowledge through instruction, fulfilling a role as ‘educators’” (2022,
p. 63). Sex robots could train users on the techniques of the Kama Sutra, the
appropriate use of condoms, or the importance of consent to sexual activity. In
general, they judge sex robots as a positive method for expanding sexual horizons
and improving sex with even one’s human partner. Howard and Sparrow raise
rights (if there are to be rights at all); but there is a more pressing point: that it would be good –
morally good – to provide sexual satisfaction for the severely physically and mentally disabled. . .”
(Di Nucci 2018, pp. 76-77). Given that no particular person would be obliged to provide such
sexual satisfaction, sex robots might be a useful solution.
concerns that using such robots as marketing tools, might unduly influence human
behavior for the benefit of mere commercial purposes, encourage experimentation
with rape, exploitation, abusive, or pedophilic fantasies. However, they judge such
morally inappropriate outcomes as properly subject to regulatory activity so that
anthropomorphic robots may interact with their users in ways that will improve
sexual socialization rather than reinforce negative stereotypes.15
The challenge, however, as Cherry argues in his contribution, is to secure a
particular account of exploitation, abuse, inappropriate social relations, or positive
socialization characteristics regarding sex robots to guide public policy without
simply assuming the moral content that needs to be proven. While such a goal
might be possible in China, given deep moral pluralism such a challenge may be
insurmountable in the West. For example, in terms of which ranking of human
goods, right-making conditions, social outcomes, or personal virtues ought we to
evaluate the significance of sexual relations with robots that look like women, men
and children? After all the Western world is awash in sex. The moral importance of
sexual relationships has been demoralized and deflated in importance. Instead of
encouraging restraint, one finds the glorification of sexual experimentation. As
Theodore Dalrymple once put it:
If there is one thing of which modern man is utterly convinced, it is that he has reached a
state of sexual enlightenment. Gone forever are the days of unhealthy concealment, of
absurd Victorian taboos that led to the application of cruel and cumbersome devices to
children to prevent masturbation, to prudish circumlocutions about sexual matters, to the
covering of piano legs to preserve the purity of the thoughts of men in the drawing rooms. . . .
for the first time in history we can now enjoy sexual relations without any of the unnecessary
social and psychological accretions of the past that so complicated and diminished life. . .
[Yet] Evidence of sexual chaos is everyone. (2005, pp. 234-235)
The dominant Western liberal worldview is characterized by an assumption against

moral norms that would require chastity outside of heterosexual marriage. Sex robots
15
Consider, for example, Litska Strikwerda who argues that at least in some circumstances it might
make sense to treat pedophiles with child-like sex robots. Much like entirely computer-generated
child pornography, sex with a child-like sex robot would mimic an immoral and criminal act, but
there would be no victim. Entirely computer-generated child pornography and child-like sex robots
“are similar, because both lack a legal or moral victim; both are so-called victimless crimes. But
they are also different because child sex robots are interactive and entirely computer-generated child
pornographic images are not. This difference gives rise to two assumptions. On the one hand, one
could suspect that child sex robots may provide a safer outlet for feelings that otherwise could lead
to child sexual abuse than entirely computer-generated child pornographic images, because engag-
ing in sexual explicit conduct with a child sex robot is a better substitute for child sexual abuse than
watching entirely computer-generated child pornography. If this turns out to be true, then child sex
robots should not be prohibited, but instead be used to treat pedophiles the way methadone is used
to treat drug addicts . . . On the other hand, the step from engaging in sexually explicit conduct with
a child sex robot to child sexual abuse seems smaller than the step from watching entirely computer-
generated child pornography to child sexual abuse. If it could be proven that child sex robots
encourage or seduce pedophiles to commit child abuse, there would be reason to prohibit them on
the basis of legal paternalism. There is no scientific evidence available yet to confirm or reject these
assumptions, however. Thus, they remain speculative” (2018 p. 146; see also Prigg 2014).
that come in various sizes and shapes, mimicking different genders and ethnicities,
would likely be just one additional avenue of sexual exploration. Consequently, it is
unclear on what grounds such a liberal culture could in a consistent fashion
denounce sex robots as impermissible, provided that such robots are only used by
consenting persons.
Even questions regarding whether sex robots would immorally objectify women
and children do not have simple and straightforward answers in our pluralistic
society. As Cherry notes, for example,
Answers to this question will depend on one’s background moral, cultural, religious, and
social point of view. One will need to determine what it means to objectify women and why
it is wrong to do so. Some cultures encourage women to dress very conservatively to avoid
being lusted after or otherwise treated as objects merely for sexual gratification; other social
groups shun such traditionalism in favor of string bikinis and “barely there” outfits, engaging
in public nudity as a matter of sex equality. (Cherry 2022, p. 105)
There are also significant cross-cultural disagreements about age of consent to sexual
activity, the wrongness of simulated rape fantasies, and whether robots that enhance
sexually promiscuity, would inculcate vice or support virtue. Cherry recognizes that
particular moral communities, such as traditional Christians or Confucians, will be
able to understand and articulate content-full moral claims regarding sex robots and
their negative impact on persons and family life. For general secular morality,
however, matters are quite different. Without the ability to appeal to a canonical,
binding and fully objective, moral perspective, it is unclear that engaging in simu-
lated sexual relations with anthropomorphized robots is much different than other
ways that sex outside of the marriage of husband and wife has been normalized. So,
while Cherry recognizes the real dangers in further isolating individuals from the
rich social connections of traditional family life, deflating the meaning of sexuality
and sexual relationships, he argues that such harms cannot be adequately appreciated
in general secular terms. As he concludes: “In the starkly limited terms of general
secular morality, it is unclear why [even] marriage to a sex robot would be implau-
sible” (Cherry 2022, p. 111).
1.4 Chinese Commitments and Realities
Despite Western influence on China, Confucianism and its understanding of the

centrality of the family continue to play a significant role in Chinese culture. As
Hanui Xu notes, Confucianism orients individuals towards the ideal of a virtuous life
embedded within significant family relationships. Indeed, many of the virtues central
to a morally flourishing life can only be developed through intimate personal
interactions among parents and children, between spouses, and among one’s wider
circle of blood-related relatives. Filial piety, for example, requires the development
of certain types of proper relationships with one’s parents, while they are alive, as
well as paying respect to one’s already deceased ancestors. This framework shapes
much of Confucian reflections on morality. For example, procreation, Xu argues, is
not merely the satisfaction of a personal preference for children but an important
duty of filial piety: the failure to produce children destroys the continuance of the
family. Duties to one’s spouse forbid extra-marital affairs and other forms of
fornication. Incestuous sexual activities undermine the filial relationships, respect
and piety, that ought to exist between parents and children, or among other closely
related family members. Sexual relations with sex robots, Xu argues, ought to be
evaluated within this same ethical and cultural framework.
For example, the use of sex robots simply to indulge in sexual pleasure or to
mimic inappropriate or violent interaction is impermissible. Similarly, it would be
inappropriate to design sex robots that look like one’s sister or brother, mother or
father. Insofar as sex robots contribute to social isolation from traditional family life
this would also hinder the development of key Confucian virtues. As Xu argues, for
example:
Thus, a person may indulge in such sexual experiences presented by a sex robot and be
reluctant to enter marriage to have a regular sexual partner. Predictably, such use of sex
robots would contribute to an isolated society, since one’s material needs, sexual needs and
emotional needs would be met without another’s involvement. (2022, pp. 138–139)
Or, as Lawrence Yung makes a similar point, Confucianism recognizes the serious
wrong in utilizing sex robots to represent particularly problematic forms of sexual
harms:
Sex with a childlike sex robot is a representation of an underage child being involved in an
act of sexual intercourse. Sex with a robot that explicitly refuses consent to sex is a
representation of rape. Sex with a robot that always consents to sex is a representation of
sexual objectification and degradation. These representations are due to the transfer of a
human physical form, appearance and demeanor to what is essentially an electronic device
embedded in silicone. (2022, p. 116)
Is the representation of immoral acts in itself sufficient to find robotic sex dolls
impermissible? Mainstream movies and pornography routinely glorify violence,
including sexual violence, for the sake of entertainment. Confucianism, Yung
argues, recognizes the impermissibility of treating persons as if they have no
moral worth. As a result, mimicking violence and vicious sexual behaviors likely
leads to the incorporation and development of such vice, as it fails to appreciate the
centrality of respect for humanity and reciprocation in human relationships.16
16
As John Danaher notes, objections to the use of sex robots often lies in the symbolic nature of the
behavior. The “objection can be spelled out in terms of the symbolic-consequences argument. The
problem with switching off a robot and having sex with it lies not in the harm it does to the robot,
but rather in what it symbolizes – a general disregard and/or contempt for norms of consent in
interpersonal sexual relationships – and the potential negative effects of that symbolism – harm to
real women and/or harm to the user of the robot” (2018, p. 126). Such objections face a number of
hurdles, not the least of which is that it is consequentialist – the force of the objection depends on
there being actual empirical harms to persons. Moreover, in modern pluralistic societies, not all
experience such symbolism the same way. Such an argument might, however, work well within
particular morally coherent groups including traditional religions and cultures, such as
Confucianism.
Building on Daoist foundations, Ellen Zhang concludes that even if they are seen
as mere sex toys, sex robots should not be welcome by Daoist practitioners. She
notes, for example, the existence of a wide variety of sex toys used to spice up a
couple’s love life in ancient China. The central moral challenge, she argues, is
preventing such digi-sexuality from leading one to objectify one’s human partner
as a mere sex toy. Humanoid sex robots may make it more difficult to maintain such
a conceptual and moral distinction. The meaning and function of sexual relations,
she argues, should not be reduced to the pure sensation of pleasure in contrast to the
essential cultivational aspects. There are key spiritually uniting aspects of sexual
intercourse that one can never achieve with a machine, no matter how sophisticated.
Sex robots have no intrinsic masculinity or femininity, nor is there any actual
reciprocal interaction. There is only a preprogramed response. Sex with a robot is
essentially one-directional. Properly accomplished, “the sexual act is intrinsically
meaningful not only for personal growth but also for interpersonal development”
(2022, p. 93). Over-emphasizing such sex toys would risk reducing sexual inter-
course to the search for mere pleasure devoid of spiritual transformation or the
essential unification of married couples. Even a sex robot designed to resemble one’s
spouse, who then controlled the robot, would impede the essential physical unifica-
tion of the couple. Improperly or overly utilized, Zhang concludes, sex robots could
be deeply toxic for human relationships.
Voicing similar concerns, Jue Wang argues that society ought to be cautious of
promoting programed artificial machines designed to take advantage of human
emotions, needs and desires that may distract persons from the valuable pursuit of
empathy with other humans. Sex robots would inevitably be intimately integrated
into the social world of some persons and would, in that sense, become more than
mere tools. Yet, one must not fail to draw a distinction between robotic companions
and human persons. Robots are machines, things designed and programed for
particular uses; they can be replaced; they do not possess the unique value of
persons. It would be an error to confuse the depth and value of human companion-
ship with the programed pseudo emotions of robotic interaction. There is, she
concludes, a significant ontological-existential gap between humans and robots
however sophisticated the programming. Confucianism, she argues, recognizes the
impropriety of encouraging sexual relations with robots, as well as the significant
potential for social harms, especially the ways in which such technology would very
likely undermine the traditional Confucian family.
As noted, the dominant secular sexual ethos of the West, which has come to have
a growing impact on China, does not encourage marriage or reproduction. Sex
robots would be another step in this anti-familial and anti-natal direction. As Ruiping
Fan has argued in another context, once traditional cultural rituals are socially
undermined, the background moral norms of the underlying culture will not be
kept in good order for long (2012). For example, once individuals no longer
recognize the traditional practices of marriage, family life and filial piety, they
cease to be nurtured regarding morally appropriate sexual relationships. As a result,
an increasing percentage of adults find there to be little justification to be bound by
the traditional moral and cultural expectations of marriage. As Cherry documents in
his contribution to this volume, sexual satisfaction has become just another avenue
for individual autonomous exploration. This liberal progressive vision appreciates
itself as standing openly in opposition to traditional forms of marriage and the
family, such as the lifeworlds embodied by traditionally religious and Confucian
families. Sex robots merely present one additional example in the cultural shift away
from marriage and family life.
1.5 Moral Pluralism and Proper Forms of Sexual

Expression
Among the challenges for assessing the morality of sex robots is that there exists
significant moral pluralism regarding proper forms of sexual expression. As the
contributors to this volume demonstrate, Orthodox Christianity, Roman Catholi-
cism, Daoism, Confucianism, and Western secular liberalism simply do not agree
regarding when it is permissible, obligatory, or forbidden to engage in sexual
relations. For example, where Orthodox Christianity recognizes all sexual activity
outside of the marriage of husband and wife as sinful, Western secular liberalism
affirms sexual activity as permissible provided that it is consensual, supports the
dignity of the parties involved, and does not lend itself to what it judges to be
undesirable social consequences. While Daoism distinguishes permissible from
impermissible sexual activity in terms of its own understandings of health, Confu-
cianism approaches these concerns in terms of the role of such behaviors in
supporting proper family-oriented virtues. Moreover, judgments in such matters do
not always line up easily into neat moral and social categories, drawing instead on
broad themes of friendship, empathy, dignity, social utility, and the centrality of
certain forms of family life. Consequently, as the authors illustrate, there exists a
great diversity of viewpoints regarding the proper use and treatment of robots that
are designed for sexual activity. Kelly Kate Evans, Ruiping Fan, and Kevin
Wm. Wildes, S.J. explore these diverse perspectives in their commentaries.
Evans, for example, critiques Jecker, Howard and Sparrow for assuming that
there is a sufficiently common view of appropriate forms of sexual expression
to justify having society regulate sex robot use, much less to utilize taxpayer funds
to provide sex robots for the impecunious. Evan responds, in part, that our ability to
reflect on the moral and social implications of sex robots is highly circumscribed and
conjectural. Actual human-robot sex is currently very rare and the so-called sex
robots in use have very limited functionality. This means that we do not have any of
the most relevant facts necessary to draft significant public policy. Moreover, since
moral analysis is always socially and culturally conditioned, divergent groups are
already coming to quite different moral conclusions regarding such technology – a
conclusion that is supported throughout this volume. On what grounds then, would
governments be in a good position effectively or properly to regulate such
technology? To be clear, Evans is decidedly against the development and use of sex
robots. She argues that the comparison of such objects to real women is absurd:
At best, the product represents an amalgamation of some base-level physical and responsive
properties, like preferred genital forms, youthful appearance, and programmed body lan-
guage, that create an interesting masturbatory experience for the user. These properties are
neither necessary nor sufficient to represent the important realities of real women. To assert
otherwise would be tantamount to claiming that properties like a set of large breasts, a small
vaginal opening, and a coy flirty attitude is sufficient adequately to represent women, which
is absurd. (2022, pp. 173–174)
Evans suggests looking to content-full moral communities, such as traditional

religions and cultures, for guidance regarding the sorts of sexual activities that are
permissible or forbidden.
Ruiping Fan helps readers situate core issues of sexuality, human well-being and
personal flourishing within the contexts of Daoism and Confucianism, neither of
which recognize pleasure-seeking as the primary purpose of sexual activity. In his
response to Zhang, for example, Fan recognizes that Daoism has traditionally been
open to exploring sexual techniques for the purpose of augmenting sexual pleasures.
Daoism, however, regards sexual activity as primary about seeking health through
the exchange of essential “qi-energy”, which is understood as a form of primordial
energy:
constituting the beginning of the universe from which all things emerge and transform. Like
a myriad of things in the universe, life emerges from the Dao, manifesting itself in two types
of qi-energy; namely, the feminine or the yin energy and the masculine or the yang energy.
Through constant interaction, unity and mutual transformation of these two energies, the
universe exists in a process of harmonization that engenders a permanent, dynamic balance
of all things, especially among Heaven, Earth, and human beings in general, as well as
between men and women in particular. (Fan 2022, pp. 181–182)
As a result, the proper focus of sexual activity is the nourishing of life and health
through the essential qi-transformation that occurs through the physical union of
man and woman. But, as Fan notes, robots do not carry essential qi. Sexual union
with a robot, even one designed to resemble or to be controlled by one’s spouse,
would, therefore, frustrate such health-oriented practices. Consequently, there are
good grounds from a Daoist perspective to recognize sex with robots as abnormal
and inappropriate.
Confucianism, in turn, recognizes marriage between a man and a woman as the
proper relationship for sexual activity. Here, the focus is on the intimate relationships
central to the creation and maintenance of a family, as well as of the continuation of
the family line. As Fan notes in his commentary on Xu, insofar as sex robots are
utilized to fulfill inappropriate fantasies, such as pedophilia, incest, or group sexual
encounters, there are good grounds for recognizing them as deeply morally inap-
propriate. Moreover, following Yung’s argument, Fan notes that sex robots do not
consent to sexual activity. Since the robot is a thing rather than a person, lack of
consent may not seem to raise any important moral questions. However, since a
humanoid sex robot is designed to be a close representation of a human being,
engaging in sexual activity with it represents nonconsensual sex with a human being.
As a result, such activity is likely representative of vicious activity, while also

possibly signaling a user’s character defect.
In short, with regard to sex robots, as Kevin Wildes reminds us, we are confronted
with a significant pluralism of moralities, including incommensurable understand-
ings of proper forms of sexual activity and expression. As he notes:
We know, for example, that different religious communities will have differing views on
appropriate and inappropriate sexual behavior depending on the broader context of a
community’s vision and moral commitments. As a result, it should come as no surprise
that various moral and religious communities are likely to come to rather different conclu-
sions regarding the ethical permissibility, implications for personal virtue or vice, or cultural
harms and benefits of sex robots. (2022, p. 146)
We cannot simply assume that others share our values or understanding of proper
sexual conduct. Whose account should governments use as the regulatory model for
programming sex robots? Moreover, why should tax-payers who find such artificial
activity repugnant be forced to purchase sex robots for others? Wildes agrees with
Evans on this point: given the great diversity of moral positions, there is no reason to
assume that governments would be in a good position properly to regulate the use of
sex robots or even that they have legitimate moral authority to so act. Moral guidance
will have to come from particular religions, cultures, and other content-full moral
communities.
1.6 Conclusion
Extramarital sex is by no means a recent discovery or cultural development. What is

new is the openness with which it is practiced and culturally embraced. Liberal
secular moral discourse often describes such sexual activity as free love, having sex,
hooking up, and other much less polite characterizations. Those with whom one
engages in sexual activity have become lovers, partners, friends with benefits,
one-night stands, and other more vulgar designations. Casual recreational sexual
activity is judged permissible, perhaps virtuous, provided that it is consensual.
Within such a culture, sex robots will undoubtably come to play a significant role.
Public affirmation of sex robots will only accelerate and further cement such
underlying changes in taken-for-granted moral assumptions. As explored throughout
this volume, such social and cultural changes will be celebrated by some, abhorred
by others, and quietly accepted as a new social reality by many.
This volume’s historical conception began with a core set of papers written for an
international workshop: Social Impacts of Sex Robots and the Future of Human
Relations organized by Global China Studies, College of Liberal Arts and Social
Sciences, City University of Hong Kong, in the summer of 2019. With participants
from Mainland China, Hong Kong, Japan, Australia, the United States, and Texas,
this workshop critically engaged the foundational challenges of sex robots and
related technological innovations on cardinal social institutions, such as the family
and modern medicine, and the relationship between men and women, as well as for
major cultural concerns, such as the cultivation of personal virtues and basic human
goods, moral precepts and principles, as well as the grounding of morally legitimate
authority for the purpose of incorporating such concerns into public policy.
The authors of these papers continued to dialogue long after the international
workshop, making alterations and additions to their original papers. Their work
resulted in the papers that compose this volume, which together bring out a number
of core issues of moral and cultural concern: epistemological questions regarding the
accessibility of principles of practical reasoning, the challenges of moral pluralism
and our post-modern world, including differing concepts of human dignity, as well
as the limits of rational philosophical analysis to craft morally justified public policy;
metaphysical concerns regarding competing understandings of the nature of the
human good and human flourishing and the role that sex robots might play in
helping humans achieve such goods; as well as the nature and ethical limits of just
social policy. Such conceptual and moral issues have been central to philosophical
explorations of both East and the West since the time of Confucius and the Ancient
Greek philosophers. They continue to be vital to the exploration of the proper
application of science and technology in a just culture. The papers gathered here
help clarify key issues of morality and public policy, while encouraging further
dialogue regarding the dignity of the human person and the obligation to pursue a
more just world.
As the essays in this volume illustrate, attention to this significant literature
discloses the rich counter-balancing interests, epistemological, metaphysical, and
social political considerations, which when gauged against one another permit better
appreciation of the complexities facing moral theory that would provide the foun-
dation for just social and political policy regarding various applications of robots.
The reader deserves to know that neither of the editors of this volume, Ruiping Fan
and Mark J. Cherry, considers sex robots to be a particularly positive social or
cultural technological development, albeit for rather different traditional Confucian
and Orthodox Christian reasons; however, several of the volume’s contributors
rather strenuously disagree, finding there to be much to be said in favor of sexbots,
while others remain more ambiguous, affirming the moral permissibility of sexual
relations with humaniform robots in at least some circumstances. What is clear,
however, is that how we come to terms with such conceptual, cultural, and moral
concerns will have significant implications for society and the future of human
relations. It is a pleasure to present this ongoing intellectual discussion as part of
the Philosophical Studies in Contemporary Culture book series.
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Part II
Digisexuality, Sexbots, and Other
Twenty-First Century Innovations
Chapter 2
Sociable Robots for Later Life: Carebots,
Friendbots and Sexbots
Nancy S. Jecker
2.1 Introduction
How should we design a robot for Mary, a care-dependent older adult who lives
alone? Consider three options.
1. Carebot. Carebot is a robotic caregiver that can assist with activities of daily living,
which include eating, bathing, dressing, toileting, transferring, ambulating, and
continence.
2. Friendbot. Friendbot is a robot that can do everything a carebot does, plus be sociable and
promote human-robot bonding. For example, it looks at Mary with doughy eyes, a sweet
face, and encouraging words; smiles and speaks softly; sings songs Mary likes and invites
her to sing along; offers Mary chances to engage in ways she enjoys, such as going
outside, playing pinochle, and humming songs.
3. Sexbot. Sexbot is a robot that does everything friendbot does, plus behaves sexually and
enables Mary to be sexual. For example, it lifts Mary with soft cushiony fabric arms she
likes to touch and stroke; massages her; invites her to cuddle and sit close; touches and
pats her as it passes by; inquiries about Mary’s sexual feelings; and stimulates her breasts
and genitals while asking what she does and does not like. It can learn Mary’s sexual
preferences and tailor what it offers to match.
All three robots rely on artificial intelligence (AI) to learn individual facts about a
user’s personality and preferences, gathering data while in the user’s presence, then
adapting itself to meet user wishes. Prior to deployment, each is trained using a big
data set with key features expected to resemble the end users. In this case, the data set
would be like Mary: a eighty-two-year-old Caucasian middle class woman who lives
N. S. Jecker (*)
Department of Bioethics and Humanities, University of Washington School of Medicine,
Seattle, Washington, USA
University of Johannesburg, African Centre for Epistemology & Philosophy of Science,
Johannesburg, Gauteng, South Africa
e-mail: nsjecker@uw.edu
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 25

R. Fan, M. J. Cherry (eds.), Sex Robots, Philosophical Studies in Contemporary
Culture 28, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82280-4_2
26 N. S. Jecker
alone and recently lost a spouse. If the carebot were selected, its job would involve
becoming well acquainted with Mary’s bodily functions and daily routines in order
to assist her with activities of daily living. A carebot would offer Mary opportunities
to be healthy, exercise bodily integrity, and regulate her environment. If the
friendbot were chosen, it would get to know Mary’s personality and feelings in
order to build rapport, eventually acquiring “interests” of its own that align with
Mary’s and behaving like a dear friend. Friendbot would offer opportunities carebot
could not, such as chances to affiliate and be less lonely, express emotions, and
maintain mental health. Finally, if sexbot were selected, it would add to friendbot’s
offerings the ability to meet Mary’s sexual needs. In Mary’s case, sexbot would offer
chances to renew important parts of her life she may miss, such as her ability to
function sexually and feel intimate. Despite enjoying sex, Mary’s sex life has all but
disappeared since the loss of her spouse. Post-stroke, she might be less inclined to
look for a new partner because her body feels different. She may also be less
confident about her body image, due to hemiplegia (one-sided paralysis), and she
may have trouble speaking clearly, making her self-conscious and less apt to speak.
For these reasons, Mary’s social isolation is unlikely to abate, which makes it
difficult for Mary to meet and get to know a human sex partner.
Which robot would Mary prefer? This might depend on further facts about Mary.
Suppose Mary’s situation is something like the following.
The Case of Mary. Mary is an eighty-two-year-old woman with cardiovascular disease who
had suffered an ischemic stroke two months prior to submitting an application for a home
robot. The stroke left Mary unable to speak coherently, ambulate, and move the right side of
her body. She takes Plavix for secondary stroke prevention. One-month post-stroke, Mary’s
spouse of twenty-three years had a cardiac arrest and died suddenly. Mary was recently
diagnosed with depression and her primary care provided prescribed Prozac.
Mary’s former spouse functioned for many years as Mary’s caregiver, and did so even more
intensely in the aftermath of her stroke. He helped her move from place-to-place, dress, eat,
and bathe, as carebot would do. He also took her outdoors on walks, held her hand, and
hummed music she enjoyed, like friendbot would do. Mary’s spouse was sexually intimate
with her as well, like sexbot would offer. Despite Mary’s functional limitations post-stroke,
he had unflinchingly communicated that she was desirable, which helped Mary to feel good
about her body and derive pleasure from it.
Given Mary’s situation, what would be the best robot for her? It might be to try a
sexbot, because that would come closest to returning her to the baseline she
previously enjoyed. A sexbot would carry a number of advantages. First, it would
treat Mary as more than a body to clean and feed. A smartly designed sexbot could
affirm her emotions, meet her needs for companionship, and invite her to show and
feel intimacy. It would do this by hugging, patting, nuzzling, tickling, rubbing,
massaging, and arousing Mary. While a carebot would keep Mary safe and a
friendbot would offer her company, a sexbot would affirm her sexually, which
was an important source of meaning and value in Mary’s life until recently.
There are many older adults like Mary, who suffer chronic progressive diseases,
experience disabilities, have lost a life-long partner, live alone, and are without sex
partners. Although a great deal of attention has been paid in the scholarly literature to
2 Sociable Robots for Later Life: Carebots, Friendbots and Sexbots 27
the needs of older age groups for long-term supportive care services to assist with
activities of daily living, relatively less attention has been devoted to supporting
other central human capabilities. Yet, clearly, as human beings, older adults have
many central capacities beyond bodily functions. To lead dignified lives, Mary and
others in her situation need more than help dressing, eating and going to the toilet.
They also need support for a range of central human capabilities, such as exercising
senses, imagination and thought; affiliating; feeling and expressing a range of human
emotions; being intimate; and playing, laughing, and feeling good about themselves.
This chapter makes the case that societies ought to make reasonable efforts to
support these and other central human capabilities at a floor level. Its focus is
designing and deploying robotic caregivers (carebots) for care-dependent older
adults; robotic friends (friendbots) for socially isolated older individuals, and sex
robots (sexbots) for older people without sex partners. The chapter’s central argu-
ment holds that omitting such support not only harms older adults but poses threats
to their dignity. Throughout the chapter my focus will be applying a capability
conception of human dignity, rather than defending it, which I have done at length
elsewhere (Jecker 2020a).
The argument unfolds stepwise. (1) First, the chapter establishes that assisting
older adults to perform activities of daily living is integral to respecting dignity. At
stake are central human capabilities such as health, bodily integrity, and control over
the immediate physical environment. Here, the argument establishes the vital role
that carebots-of-the-future might play in aged societies as the supply of working age
adults falls shy of demand. (2) Next, the chapter extends this analysis to designing
friendbots for socially isolated older adults. Friendbots could be made to support
older adults’ floor level central capabilities in areas such as feeling a range of human
emotions, affiliating with others, and playing. Unlike carebots, friendbots offer
friendship. The argument holds that reasonable efforts to provide access to
friendbots for socially isolated adults is a societal responsibility. (3) Finally, the
chapter applies similar reasoning to show that societies ought to make reasonable
efforts to support sexual capabilities for older adults who want to be sexual but are
bereft of sex partners. In these instances, central human capacities at risk include
bodily integrity; intimate relationships; and the use of senses, imagination and
thought. The type of robot needed to respect dignity in a particular case depends
on the particular features and context of the care recipient. For someone who is
physically disabled but has a strong human social network, a carebot may suffice.
For others, social isolation will give strong reasons for favoring a friendbot. Finally,
a person who is socially enmeshed in the lives of others, such as children and
grandchildren, yet sexually alone, might prefer a sexbot.
2.2 The Argument for Carebots
The Case of Adolfo. Adolfo is ninety-four-year-old man who is frail and needs help with
most of his activities of daily living. He was diagnosed with degenerative joint disease ten
years prior. He lacks mobility and requires help ambulating and transferring due to balance
28 N. S. Jecker
problems. Adolfo has had compression fractures that reduce his mobility and cause pain. He
cannot safely bathe or dress without help. He lives in a small village in southern Italy, where
his daughter cares for him, but now she has taken a job and is less available than she was in
the past.
Adolfo might benefit from a carebot to help him perform activities of daily living
that he is unable to perform safely or at all on his own. Although supportive services
for care-dependent older adults like Adolfo have historically been provided by
unpaid female family members, family caregiving is fast becoming unsustainable.
First, as societies age, families age too and there are fewer working age adults to care
for a growing numbers of older family members. Italy is a case in point. It is
currently the third most aged society, with 27% of people sixty-five years of age
or older (United Nations 2017). Second, as more women around the globe gain
opportunities outside the home for education and paid employment, fewer are
available to offer loved ones 24-hour unpaid caregiving support. Third, many
families cannot afford to have a working age adult stay at home. Finally, reliance
on family members is incomplete, because not everyone has children and among
those who do, not all grown children are available to serve as caregivers for aging
parents. All things considered, families alone are inadequate to meet the rapidly
growing demand for caregivers.
One response to such challenges is importing people from low- and middle-
income countries to serve as live-in aides for elderly family members. Migrant
caregivers are common in Italian homes such as Adolfo’s, and across other high-
income regions in northern, southern, and Western Europe, North America, and the
Arab states (International Labour Organization 2018). Should Adolfo employ a
migrant caregiver? One argument that tells against this approach is that it contributes
to the larger practice of global care chains, which involve the transfer of care
workers from one country to another, typically young women traveling from poorer
nations to high-income nations to sell low-wage care services that middle-class
families in high-income countries can afford. While a migrant care force has helped
take the pressure off family members in receiving nations, it is not without draw-
backs. First, it raises ethical concerns because recruiting agencies, family sponsors,
and sending and/or receiving nations often fail to protect migrants’ fundamental
dignities (Jecker and Chin 2019). For example, exclusion from legal protections
afforded citizens may leave migrant workers without official recourse when
employers engage in inhumane practices, such as wage theft (withholding, delaying,
or underpaying wages); demanding round-the-clock work; or not granting time off
for public or religious holidays.
Another worry is that poorer nations are increasingly facing their own population
aging, which is being exacerbated by net emigration of working age people. When
this occurs, the movement of working age adults to richer nations will increasingly
create care gaps in sending nations (Gordon 2011). Although today, the oldest
societies are in places like North America and Europe, by 2050, many more societies
will join the ranks of the aged. This will occur in Latin America, Africa, and Asia
(Adioetomo and Mujahid 2014). Anticipating care gaps in poorer sending nations,
the World Health Organization urges wealthier nations to take steps to avoid
practices that create or exacerbate care gaps (2002). All things considered,
migrant and family caregiving cannot meet the growing demand for caregivers for
care-dependent older adults, even if it might serve well enough for a particular
individual, such as Adolfo.
In the future, a third option might become available to someone in Adolfo’s
situation: a smartly designed carebot. Adolfo might elect this not just because human
caregivers are not readily available, but because carebots carry certain advantages.
First, they are not vulnerable in ways that human caregivers are: they do not burn
out, get sick, feel impatient, act impulsively, need breaks, take vacations, or com-
plain. Second, carebots display assets that human caregivers may lack: they are
unflappable when being yelled at; never grow annoyed dealing with forgetful
people; are endlessly tolerant of demandingness; and do not take advantage of
vulnerable care recipients for personal gain. Third, carebots might be superior to
human caregivers, because they could be designed with super-human strength and a
vaster pool of knowledge to draw on. They could readily sidestep the personal
sacrifices that Adolfo’s daughter (and other human caregivers) would be forced to
make if she took on his care.
Caregiving, whether human or robotic, not only enhances well-being, but is
integral to respecting dignity. Like human caregivers, carebots support dignity by
supporting floor-level central human capabilities – the central things older adults can
do and be as human beings. The ethical argument for furnishing carebots draws on
capability approaches to justice, originally formulated by Nussbaum (2011) and Sen
(1980), and the underlying ethical principle of respect for human dignity, defined as
making reasonable efforts to support central capabilities at a threshold level.
Table 2.1 shows one possible list of central human capacities and their definition.
Table 2.1 Central human capabilities and their definition

Capabilities Definition
1. Life Having an unfinished narrative
2. Health Being able to be healthy, including being emotionally and mentally
healthy
3. Bodily integrity Being able to use one’s body to realize life stage appropriate desires and
goals
4. Senses, imagination, Being able to engage in life stage meaningful ways in imagining,
thought thinking, reasoning and using the senses, and to do so in a truly human
way, informed & cultivated by education
5. Emotions Being able to feel and express a range of human emotions, including
loving and caring for others
6. Practical reason Being able to feel and express a range of human emotions
7. Affiliation Being able to live for and in relation to others
8. Nature Being able to live in relation to nature and other species
9. Play Being able to laugh, play, and recreate
10. Environment Being able to participate in and regulate the immediate physical
environment
30 N. S. Jecker
Table 2.2 Capabilities carebots could support

Capabilities At-Risk Capabilities Carebots Support
1. Life X
2. Health X
3. Bodily integrity X
4. Senses, imagination, thought
5. Emotions
6. Practical reason
7. Affiliation
8. Nature
9. Play
10. Environment X
Table 2.2 identifies four at-risk capabilities that carebots could support in a case like
Adolfo’s: life, health, bodily integrity, and environment.
Below we highlight the capabilities at risk in the case of Adolfo.
Life. Life capability is sometimes interpreted as being able to live an average life
expectancy (Nussbaum 2011). I defend a narrative, rather than a chronological,
rendering of life (Jecker 2020a). If we understand life capability narratively, then
respecting dignity requires reasonable efforts to ensure floor level opportunities for
narrative progression. Carebots can support this capability by doing such things
as helping people move from place to place, be nourished, keep healthy, control
bladder and bowels, or get dressed. This support keeps open opportunities for people
like Adolfo to do other things, such as go outdoors, get together with friends, or feel
at ease.
Health. The ability to be healthy can be understood broadly as encompassing not
only physical health, but mental and emotional health, and the ability to be ade-
quately nourished and sheltered. In the future, adequate support for Adolfo’s might
require a carebot that can lift him out of bed and transfer him to a chair, feed, or
bathe him.
Bodily Integrity. Bodily integrity refers to being able to use one’s body to carry
out one’s desires and wishes. If Adolfo needed help with bowel or bladder, ambu-
lating or transferring, for example, a carebot could provide necessary assistance.
Environment. The ability to regulate the environment refers to the ability to
exercise some measure of control over physical spaces, as well as the social,
political, and cultural environments in which a person lives. By assisting with
activities of daily living, carebot would enable dependent older people, such as
Adolfo, to gain more control over these environments.
Despite these advantages, critics might be reluctant to trust carebots. Perhaps
Adolfo, or his daughter, would be reluctant to trust because carebots use artificial
intelligence (AI) systems that are undecipherable to human users. Thus,
an AI program is a black box, it will make decisions as humans do, but without being able to
communicate its reasons for doing so. The AI’s thought process may be based on patterns
that we as humans cannot perceive, which means understanding the AI may be akin to
understanding another highly intelligent species — one with entirely different senses and
powers of perception (Bathaee 2018, p. 893).
When users cannot tell how decisions were made within an AI system, this creates a
vulnerability that for-profit companies could exploit. For example, Adolfo might
worry that the company selling him a carebot is profit-based and designed the
carebot to maintain his dependence and thereby protect market share. In response,
rather than rejecting carebots outright, we should stress government regulations and
other measures that ensure accountability. If carebots were considered medical
equipment, they would likely be subject to government oversight, which could
increase safety and establish consistent standards. Another reply is that human
caregivers can be black boxes too, yet we trust them. Lastly, as we have seen, the
alternative to carebots may not be a doting family member.
Still, critics might press back, arguing that even if a carebot can be an ethically
viable way of caring for a dependent older adult, introducing them in long-term care
facilities serving older people would risk untoward effects, such as a care environ-
ment entirely devoid of human caregivers. Sparrow and Sparrow envision “a future
aged-care facility where robots reign supreme. In this facility, people are washed by
robots, fed by robots, monitored by robots, cared for and entertained by robots.
Except for their family or community service workers, those within this facility
never need to deal or talk with a human being who is not also a resident” (Sparrow
and Sparrow 2006, p. 152). To avoid such risks, a better investment is hiring human
caregivers.
Yet, as noted, in aged societies where the proportion of older to younger people is
out of synch, human caregivers will not be enough; the alternative of importing low
wage migrant workers has led to exploitation and human rights abuses. Carebots
avoid these difficulties, since they can meet the growing demand and according to
most, but not all (Wareham 2020), accounts of them they do not have moral standing
on a par with humans that needs to be considered.
2.3 The Argument for Friendbots
The Case of Li Wei. Li Wei is an eighty-one-year-old man who lives alone in a newer high
rise building in the Western District of Hong Kong. Li Wei has become increasingly socially
isolated since the death of his spouse seven years prior. His wife had served as a helper with
some activities of daily living, such as getting dressed and bathing. His daughter is his main
visitor, but she started coming less often since the birth of her second child, who is
developmentally disabled and requires intensive support. Li Wei also tends to be introverted,
which makes it difficult for him to reach out and establish new friendships. Most of the male
friends he had during younger years either rarely get out or have moved to long-term care
facilities.
32 N. S. Jecker
Some older people, such as Li Wei, might be accustomed to having a human

caregiver whose care is rooted in love and affection. Spouses and offspring tend not
only to help older people with activities of daily living, but also to show them love
and affection. Many migrant workers develop kin-like relationships with care
recipients too, despite being outsiders and subject to exploitation and abuse
(Baldassar et al. 2017). Smartly designed machines could learn to become experts
at bonding with care recipients in much the same way that human caregivers
do. Rather than offering assistance only with bodily functions, they might serve as
objects of affection for socially isolated older adults.
The need for companionship in the lives of older adult is evident worldwide.
“Elder orphans,” or people living alone with little to no social support, are on the
rise. In the U.S., for example, elder orphans account for roughly 22% of U.S. adults
age sixty-five and over (Carney et al. 2016). According to the WHO, more adults
around the globe are electing not to have children; among those with grown children,
more are living alone (World Health Organization 2015, p. 22). Even in places with
strong traditions of filial piety, such as Japan, this trend is apparent: the percentage of
elderly people in Japan who live alone jumped from 7% in 1960 to 33% in 2005. In
Hong Kong, 91.9% of older persons live in domestic households and of these, 13.1%
live alone (Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Census and
Statistics Department 2016).
Li Wei might hire a carebot in tandem with a robotic dog or seal. There is a good
chance this would help him feel less lonely. Studies show that both living and
interactive robotic dogs are equally effective at reducing loneliness and social
isolation among elderly people in long-term care facilities (Banks et al. 2008).
Robotic seals gradually introduced in an aged care facility helped with rapport-
building for socially and verbally withdrawn residents (Birks et al. 2016); other
robotic pet companions have generated emotional (Bemelmans et al. 2015), behav-
ioral (Sung et al. 2015), and socially positive outcomes (Takayanagi et al. 2014;
Robinson et al. 2016). Yet, despite the advantage of robotic pets, a friendbot would
offer Li Wei more, because it would resemble a human friend and be highly sociable
in human ways. According to one rendering, a friendbot of the future would be able
to
communicate and interact. . .understand and even relate . . . in a personal way. It
. . .understand[s] itself and us in social terms. We, in turn,. . .understand it in the same social
terms. . . .Such a robot must be able to adapt and learn,. . .incorporating shared experiences
with other individuals into its understanding of self, of others, and of the relationships they
share. . . .[I]nteracting with it is like interacting with another person. At the pinnacle of
achievement, [robots] could befriend us, as we could them (Breazeal 2002, p. 1).
The argument for providing Li Wei access to a friendbot rests on the ethical
requirement to respect his dignity discussed already (Jecker 2020b). As noted,
respecting dignity implies reasonable efforts to support central human capabilities,
which are the central things that we can do and be as human beings. Some of
our capabilities, such as life, health, and bodily integrity, are supported by a carebot,
but others, such as affiliating with others, feeling a range of human emotions, and
playing, are not. An intelligently designed friendbot could support a wider range of
Table 2.3 Capabilities friendbots could support

Capabilities At-Risk Capabilities Friendbots Support
1. Life X
2. Health X
3. Bodily integrity
4. Senses, imagination, thought
5. Emotions X
6. Practical reason
7. Affiliation X
8. Nature
9. Play X
10. Environment
central human capabilities. For older people like Li Wei, who do not already have
such support, reasonable efforts to furnish it at a threshold level could be a lifeline.
From the list of central capabilities identified previously (Table 2.1), Table 2.3
shows five at-risk capabilities that Li Wei experiences, followed by a brief summary
of each and how a friendbot could help.
Life. Table 2.3 identifies five central capabilities at risk in the case of Li Wei: life,
health, emotions, affiliation, and play. For most of us, the capability to live a life one
has reason to value depends on being able to have ties to others. Li Wei’s ties have
been whittled down over time, to the point where his daily life does not include
any close relationships, a fact that is unlikely to change for the foreseeable future.
Having the companionship of a friendbot would not only make Li Wei’s life sweeter
but enable him to live the final chapters of his life in ways he would find personally
meaningful.
Health. Related to this, well-designed friendbots would support capabilities for
social and emotional health. A friendbot could make Li Wei laugh, invite him to
share a memory, or coax him to go outside for a walk. These activities are not only
highly valued, but integral to his ability to stay healthy. Supporting health in this
sense extends the reach of robots beyond what carebots offer, which consists only of
assisting with physical functioning and activities of daily living. Friendbots not only
perform these caregiving tasks but also promote Li Wei’s capacity to be healthy in a
broader sense.
The importance of affiliation with others to sustaining health was robustly
documented in a 2020 report from the U.S. National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering, and Medicine, which summarized four decades of research demon-
strating major adverse health outcomes associated with both social isolation
(an objective state of having little social contact with others) and loneliness
(a subjective feeling of being isolated while wanting company) in older adults: a
significant increase in all-cause mortality, 50% higher rate of dementia, 68%
increased rate of hospitalization, 57% increased rate of emergency department visits,
29% increased rate of incident coronary heart disease, and 32% increased rate of
34 N. S. Jecker
stroke (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2020). The

Academies recommend solutions that include integrating user-friendly technologies,
such as social robots, that can function as conversational agents with artificial
intelligence to “engage users in a dialogue either for general companionship or for
meeting specific goals (reminders, health or safety assessment)” (National Acade-
mies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2020, p. 193).
Emotions and Affiliation. Even though carebots do not instantiate human-human
friendship, they can instantiate human-robot friendship and thereby reduce loneli-
ness and support human capacities for bonding and affiliating, enabling socially
isolated older adults, such as Li Wei, to live in relation to something outside
themselves; laugh and enjoy a conversation; and share experiences, thoughts, and
feelings. Older individuals like Li Wei who gain access to high quality friendbots
would better able to live in accordance with who they are as human beings. Meeting
emotional needs of older people requires having others around who can laugh, listen,
sing, reassure, play, and chat in a friendly way; robots can do all of these things, with
skill and emotional intelligence.
Play. The ability to be playful is another central human capability missing from
the lives of socially isolated individuals, such as Li Wei. Friendbots could fill this
gap by inviting Li Wei to play a board game, join a round of cards, or take turns
guessing letters in Ghost (a word game in which players take turns adding letters to a
word fragment while trying not to complete a word). Well-designed friendbots
would be trained on user groups that resemble the older adult they are helping.
They could be tailored to the individual’s interests; for example, playing the games
an older adult enjoys at a skill level that matches theirs. In the case of Li Wei, a
friendbot might learn the songs he likes and invite him to hum along, perhaps
singing slightly off key to make Li Wei laugh.
Critics might worry that friendbots would be false friends, inferior to the genuine
friendship between mature adult human beings (Elder 2017). Classic theories of
friendship in the West, such as Aristotle’s, define friendship in terms of a state of
mutual recognition and goodwill and hold that to be friends, people “must be
mutually recognized as bearing goodwill and wishing well to each other” (Aristotle
2009, Chap. V, Section III.2, line 1156a, at 4–5). Using this yardstick, the relation-
ship between Li Wei and a friendbot would not measure up.
Yet, Danaher has responded persuasively to this challenge by arguing that it is
philosophically reasonable to regard robots as metaphysically possible Aristotelian
friends, even if it is not, for now, technically possible for them to serve in this
capacity (Danaher 2019). To elaborate, Sorrell and Draper set forth a helpful strategy
(Sorrell and Draper 2014, p. 184). They hold that our closest associates tend to be the
sorts of things that can be present to us in a sophisticated way, where sophisticated
presence means not just that something is co-located and brings it about that we no
longer feel alone, but also indicates that capacity to engage by techniques like
moving about, communicating, prompting and responding. Thus, a comfy couch is
co-located, a simple cuddly toy makes us feel that we are not alone, but only a
smartly designed sociable robot can be present in a sophisticated way; e.g., follow
us, show interest in what we do, prompt us to do or not do certain things, react to
commands, and communicate.
A further defense of friendbots is that Aristotelean friendship is arguably only one
form of friendship; namely, the kind that can obtain between mature and cognitively
intact adult human beings. Yet, there are many other kinds of close relationships
possible that we would have reason to value (see Jecker 2020a, chap. 8). Other
examples, include dyadic relationships with varying degrees of reciprocity, such as
relationships with pets that infuse love and warmth into a family, deep bonds
between parent and infants or small children, and associations between people
with intellectual impairments who are devoted to one another.
However, critics like Turkle might push back. Turkle draws a bright line between
human-human and human-robot relationships by appealing to the notion of alterity,
which she describes as the capacity to see the world through another person’s eyes
(Turkle 2017). Even if it is possible to have a friendship with a small child or
someone with intellectual impairment, friendship with inanimate objects lacks a
crucial friendship feature because it is not possible to see the world through a
robot’s eyes.
However, in response to Turkle, we recognize a range of reciprocity that includes
fully reciprocal, partially reciprocal, and non-reciprocal relationships, shown in
Table 2.4 (below).
In each of the relationships shown in Table 2.4, what matters in the end is that
care gets expressed.
Yet, critics might contend that friendbots are inferior because they are replace-
able. Are mass produced friendbots worth less than one-of-a-kind humans? In reply,
even if rarity is a constituent of value, friendbots could be designed as limited
editions, or even one-of-a-kind models, allowing them to be exclusive in ways that
approximate the uniqueness of humans.
A further complaint is that friendbots lack a mental state of caring about users. In
reply, keeping the focus on users aligns with the goal of serving and helping care
recipients. Friendbots should exhibit sufficient emotional intelligence and social
competence to put a user at ease, build rapport, and elicit a feeling of being cared
about. Friendbots, like human friends, can succeed or fail in this respect. Empirical
studies document that even a simple, two-dimensional character on a computer
screen that behaves empathically evokes trust, liking, and a sense of being cared
for (Brave et al. 2005). The simple rendering of a smile by an avatar also leads users
to make more positive assessments of it and feel connected, trusting, comfortable,
and satisfied with the interaction (Guadagno et al. 2011). Studies also show we tend
to more readily confide in computer systems than humans (Lucas et al. 2014),
Table 2.4 A continuum of reciprocity

Fully Reciprocal Partially Reciprocal Non-Reciprocal
Neurotypical adults Adults on autism spectrum Caregiver & unconscious human
Child friendship Child & pet rat Human & robotic pet
Parent & toddler Child & parent with delirium Present & non-extant future people
36 N. S. Jecker
perhaps based due to a perception that interactions with machines are more private,
less embarrassing, or a safer bet. Close robot-human ties can be encouraged by
leveraging the human tendency to anthropomorphize objects. Finally, despite the
fact that robots do not share human impermanence, frailties, and the life-death cycle,
we can program these experiential features into friendbots, enabling them to behave
as though they had enjoyed “the full depth and breadth of human experience without
having done any such thing” (Levy 2004, p. 111). Eventually, robot-human differ-
ences might be comparable to human-human differences based on culture, race,
income, education and other factors. Even if a large gap remains, there seems to be
no obvious reason why we cannot make friends or find companions with what is very
different from ourselves, and it could be argued that doing so can foster personal
growth.
In the final analysis, it does not matter much if friendbots qualify as friends
proper. Instead, what matters is whether they can offer older adults like Li Wei a
relationship that adds value to their lives (Kaliarnta 2016) and that restores important
human capabilities at a minimal level. If access to a friendbot would help Li Wei to
do and be things he has reason to value, such as affiliating with others, feeling
affection, playing and laughing, then it internal state (or lack thereof) is beside the
point.
2.4 The Argument for Sexbots
If we could befriend a robot, could we fall in love with one? Consider the case of
Antonio.
The Case of Antonio. Antonio is sixty-eight-year-old man who has a strong social network.
Unlike Li Wei, most of his friends are still alive and kicking. However, his wife of thirty-
nine years is disabled and has lost all interest in sex. Antonio has not. He often feels torn
because he wants to be loyal to his wife, yet he also wants a sexual partner. Lately, he finds
himself not only looking at other women, but flirting in ways that he feels guilty about later.
While sex robots are often depicted as a product for younger, able-bodied people, we
might re-imagine them as a way of meeting sexual needs of older people like
Antonio.
Since sexuality is closely tied to central human capabilities, supporting sexuality
at a floor level is integral to respecting human dignity (Jecker 2021). Table 2.5 shows
six at-risk capabilities that sexbots could be designed to support, followed by a brief
summary of each.
Life and Health. For someone in Antonio’s situation, central capabilities for life;
health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination and thought; emotions; and affiliation
are at heightened risk of falling below a threshold level. Sexbots could support the
first capability, life, by expanding older people’s ability to create life narratives that
include sexuality. They could also improve the emotional and mental health of older
individuals like Antonio who lack access to sexual partners. Researchers have
Table 2.5 Capabilities sexbots could support

Capabilities At-Risk Capabilities Sexbots Support
1. Life X
2. Health X
3. Bodily integrity X
4. Senses, imagination, thought X
5. Emotions X
6. Practical reason
7. Affiliation X
8. Nature
9. Play
10. Environment
demonstrated a close tie between general health and sexual partnership, frequency of
sexual activity, a good quality sex life, and interest in sex in a population of middle
and older aged adults in the United States (Lindau and Gavrilova 2010). Critics
might worry that someone in Antonio’s situation might become dependent on and
eventually prefer sexbots to human sex partners. In reply, we should remain open to
the possibility that socially and emotionally healthy relationships with sexual robots
and technologies are possible. History suggests that prejudice against sex robots can
and will be overcome, just as prejudice against homosexuality, oral sex, fornication,
and masturbation have been in more and more places. Some argue that digisexuals,
or people whose preferred mode of sexual experience and relating is via immersive
technologies with or without a human partner, should be accepted, rather than
shunned (McArthur and Twist 2017).
Bodily Integrity. The capability for bodily integrity represents a form of self-
determination by means of the body. It involves the ability to express one’s self
through the body, including expressing sexual feelings and engaging in sexual
behaviors. Antonio’s loss of the ability to express sexual feelings through the body
diminishes his bodily integrity. Sex robots could support bodily integrity by being
tailored to his sexual preferences and needs.
Emotions and Affiliation. It is sometimes held that the goal of erotic desire is not
sex itself, but instead forming and sustaining close relationships. Aristotle, for
example, regarded being loved, rather than having sex, as the ultimate purpose of
sexual desire; similarly, Mill held that loving relationships are preferable to erotic
pleasure alone and represented a higher type of pleasure. When older people like
Antonio lack sexual partnership, they experience diminished capability for feeling
intimately bonded and affiliated with others. Unlike other sex technologies,
future sexbots could create the possibility of sexual relationships, rather than simply
sexual satisfaction. Unlike other sex objects, people could one day come to care
about sex robots, and even feel love for them.
A sceptic might counter that sexbots are “empty” on the inside and the relation-
ships between a person and their sex robot would be unidirectional and inferior
(Elder 2017). Yet, as noted already, caring relationships are best understood as
38 N. S. Jecker
falling along a continuum, with reciprocal dyadic care between mature cognitively
intact human beings at one end, and caring about non-existent future people at the
other. In the interstices between are a multitude of ways of instantiating care,
including human-robot friendship. For older adults, what matters is opportunities
to be sexually connected to others in ways that are personally meaningful. Sociable
sex robots of the future could enable this, suffusing tenderness and intimacy into the
lives of older adults like Antonio who are bereft of human sexual partners or others,
who are unable to use their bodies to carry out their wishes due to chronic disease
and disability or age-related sexual impairments. Steps to improve older people’s
sexual capabilities through sex robots would not only make the world a happier
place, it would give older adults the opportunity to choose to do and be what they
have reason to value; namely: enjoy intimacy and be affectionate with others.
Still a critic might contend that even if there is ethical support for deploying
robots to function as carebots and friendbots, deploying them as sexbots goes too far.
It harms users and undermines, rather than supports human dignity. In reply, we
cannot know in advance what effects sexbots would have if they were widely used
for older adults who are bereft of human partners or who experience chronic disease
and disability. Rather than dismiss them out of hand, we should be open to the
possibility that sexbots might be on balance, a good thing for older people. At the
very least, we can say that if sexbots are available to anyone, they ought to be
available to those for who need them most. Rather than the current approach, which
markets sexbots to predominantly young, able bodied, cisgender men, future sexbots
should be designed with an eye to helping people who need them most. First in line
should be people who are socially isolated and lonely; suffer from chronic disease
and disability that impair sexual function; or experience age-related loss of sexual
capability. From a moral point of view, supporting people’s sexual lives at a
threshold level is more important than augmenting the pleasure of those who already
have sexual opportunities available. It is a way of supporting dignity by affirming
central human capabilities at a threshold level.
2.5 The General Argument and Conclusion
The general argument for reasonable efforts to make carebots, friendbots, and
sexbots available to older adults, who are care-dependent, socially isolated, or
sexually alone, is summarized below.
A Dignity-Based Argument for Affording Access to Carebots, Friendbots, and Sexbots
1. Respecting human dignity requires reasonable efforts to support floor level human
capabilities.
2. In the future, carebots, friendbots, and sexbots could be an integral part of reasonable
efforts to do this.
3. Some older adults, including those who are care-dependent, socially isolated, or sexually
alone, lack alternative ways of maintaining floor level human capabilities.
4. In the future, respecting their dignity may require reasonable efforts to afford access to
carebots, friendbots, and sexbots.
This argument is dignity-based in the sense that it interprets respecting human

dignity as requiring respect for minimal level central capabilities. Carebots,
friendbots, and sexbots can be an integral part of reasonable efforts to respect
human dignity. If we make them well, they can serve as a social good by making
the world a better place: helping care-dependent older people with activities of daily
living, keeping loneliness at bay, and improving physical, emotional and mental
health.
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designs. We will see what we can do to thwart them. Here is a little
silver ball. Throw it on the ground and follow it as it rolls along. It will
guide you to a hut in the forest, the owner of which will be away. Go
in and await his return, and whatever you do, remember that you
must see him before he sees you. Remain at the hut till I summon
you. When you hear me calling you, do not lose an instant, but
hasten to where your father’s palace stood. Your mother will need
you.”
The princess took the ball, threw it down, and followed it as it
rolled along into the forest. At last it stopped before what seemed to
be a woodman’s hut, and she picked up the ball and put it in her
pocket. Then she went into the hut and hid behind the half-closed
door. She peeped out through a crack and presently saw a huge
giant coming carrying on his shoulders a bear he had killed in his
hunting. He pushed open the door, and as he threw down the burden
he beheld the princess.
The giant looked very fierce, but his voice was soft and kind, and
he told her he wanted her to live in the hut with him and cook the
food and sweep the floor and make the beds. All this the princess
promised to do. He then showed her a little inner chamber, and said,
“Here you can sleep, and no matter what noises you hear in my part
of the hut during the night, don’t come out of your room.”
Three days passed. Early each morning the giant went forth from
the hut and did not return until sunset. The princess cooked the food,
made the beds, and kept the hut tidy and clean. At night she heard
frightful noises in the outer room, the walls of the hut shook, and the
earth trembled, and she lay in her bed hardly daring to stir, with the
clothes pulled over her ears to deaden the terrible sounds.
Whenever she fell asleep she dreamed that a handsome young
prince, instead of the giant, was her fellow-dweller in the hut.
On the third evening she retired early, and was scarcely in bed
when she heard, faint and far away, the voice of the little old woman
calling her. Then she knew her mother needed her, and immediately
she jumped out of bed, dressed, and cautiously opened her door. No
one was in the next room, and she ran as quickly as she could to
where her father’s palace had stood. There, before the ruins, she
saw her mother tied to a wooden stake that had been driven into the
ground, and the servants were piling up fagots of wood around her.
She had been condemned to death for having set the palace on fire
during the king’s absence, and for stealing his treasure. In vain she
had pleaded her innocence.
The princess pushed her way through the crowd and threw herself
on her knees before her father. “Oh, stop, stop!” she cried eagerly.
“Dear father, my mother is not to blame. It was I who burned your
palace. I was forced to do so in order to save your life, which was
threatened by the wicked magician, Surtur. Neither did my mother
steal your treasure. That and much else was taken out of the palace
to a place of safety.”
On hearing this, the king ordered the queen to be released, and
she embraced her daughter with many words of affection.
As soon as possible the princess hurried back to the hut of the
giant in the forest. When she approached it she heard the sounds of
a terrific combat. She looked in and saw the giant engaged in a
struggle for mastery with the magician. From her pocket she hastily
took the silver ball the little old woman had given to her and hurled it
at the wicked Surtur. Her aim was true, and the moment the ball hit
him he changed to a hawk, and with a rapid flutter of wings darted
out of the door and disappeared.
The giant picked up the ball, and to the surprise of the princess he
was transformed into the handsome young prince she had seen in
her dreams. They went back together to the king and queen, and
before long there was a great marriage-feast, and the princess
became the wife of the prince she had delivered from his
enchantment. After the death of the king the prince became the ruler
of the kingdom, and he and his queen lived happily all the days of
their life.
The End
Transcriber’s Notes:
This illustration is missing.
Missing or obscured punctuation was silently
corrected.
Typographical errors were silently corrected.
Inconsistent spelling and hyphenation were
made consistent only when a predominant form
was found in this book.
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Ebook Sex Robots Social Impact and The Future of Human Relations Ruiping Fan Online PDF All Chapter

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Ebook Sex Robots Social Impact and The Future of Human Relations Ruiping Fan Online PDF All Chapter

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Sex Robots: Social Impact and the

Future of Human Relations Ruiping Fan

Robots In Care And Everyday Life Future Ethics Social

Beyond Data: Human Rights, Ethical And Social Impact

Quantum Computing and Future Understand Quantum

Primary Mathematics 3A Hoerst

Blood Relations Transfusion and the Making of Human

The Future of Finance The Impact of FinTech AI and

Sport Fans The Psychology and Social Impact of Fandom

The Impact of Caffeine and Coffee on Human Health

Editorial Board Members

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/6446

ISSN 0928-9518 ISSN 2215-1753 (electronic)

Part II Digisexuality, Sexbots, and Other Twenty-First Century

Part III Sex: Shifting Cultural and Moral Norms

8 What Kinds of Use of Sex Robots Can Be Morally Allowed?

Part IV Reponses and Critique

Mark J. Cherry Department of Philosophy, School of Arts & Humanities,

Mark J. Cherry and Ruiping Fan

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 3

likely exaggerations given the current state of technological advancement. However,

1.2 Sex Robots and Important Cultural Shifts

The Western world is currently witnessing a continuing and signiﬁcant shift in

enterprise. It is a normative category of social life. It instills moral discipline and

To speak of the family in such traditional terms, however, as a foundational social

1.3 Signiﬁcant Cultural Changes and Cross-Cultural

The dominant Western liberal worldview is characterized by an assumption against

1.4 Chinese Commitments and Realities

Despite Western inﬂuence on China, Confucianism and its understanding of the

1.5 Moral Pluralism and Proper Forms of Sexual

Evans suggests looking to content-full moral communities, such as traditional

As a result, such activity is likely representative of vicious activity, while also

Extramarital sex is by no means a recent discovery or cultural development. What is

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 25

2.2 The Argument for Carebots

Table 2.1 Central human capabilities and their deﬁnition

Table 2.2 Capabilities carebots could support

2.3 The Argument for Friendbots

Some older people, such as Li Wei, might be accustomed to having a human

Table 2.3 Capabilities friendbots could support

stroke (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2020). The

Table 2.4 A continuum of reciprocity

2.4 The Argument for Sexbots

Table 2.5 Capabilities sexbots could support

2.5 The General Argument and Conclusion

This argument is dignity-based in the sense that it interprets respecting human

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